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dc.contributor.authorDaniels, Joseph P.
dc.contributor.authorNourzad, Farrokh
dc.contributor.authorVanHoose, David D.
dc.date.accessioned2005-08-13T17:49:37Z
dc.date.available2005-08-13T17:49:37Z
dc.date.copyrightOctober 21, 2004
dc.date.issued2005-08-13T17:49:37Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/324
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a model of an open economy containing both sectors in which wages are market-determined and sectors with wage-setting arrangements. A portion of the latter group of sectors coordinate their wages, taking into account that their collective actions influence the equilibrium inflation outcome in an environment in which the central bank engages in discretionary monetary policymaking. Key predictions forthcoming from this model are (1) increased centralization of wage setting initially causes inflation to increase but then results in an inflation dropoff, (2) a greater degree of centralized wage setting reduces the inflation-restraining effect of greater central bank independence, and (3) increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation in nations with less centralized wage bargaining. Analysis of data for seventeen nations for the period 1970-1999 provides generally strong and robust empirical support for all three of these predictions.en
dc.format.extent223331 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBaylorBusiness Economics: Working Papers Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2005-059-ECOen
dc.subjectOpen Economyen
dc.subjectWage Settingen
dc.subjectInflationen
dc.titleOpenness, Central Wage Bargaining, and Inflationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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