Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorBuras, Todd
dc.contributor.authorByrd, Cameron
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-03T19:59:10Z
dc.date.available2012-05-03T19:59:10Z
dc.date.copyright2012-05-03
dc.date.issued2012-05-03
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/8365
dc.description.abstractThis thesis demonstrates that any interpretation of the status of ‘mind-independent reality’ or ‘the external world’ in Kant’s transcendental idealism is incomplete if it fails to account for the metaphysical implications of the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, I argue that Kant’s description of ‘experience,’ when taken in conjunction with the metaphysical implications of the second Critique, probably (if not necessarily) excludes the existence of the traditional conception of physical matter.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsBaylor University projects are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectKant's Transcendental Idealismen_US
dc.subjectCritique of Pure Reasonen_US
dc.subjectCritique of Practical Reasonen_US
dc.subjectMetaphysicsen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.subjectEthicsen_US
dc.titleA Priori Laws and the External Worlden_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide accessen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dc.contributor.schoolshonors collegeen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record