

## ABSTRACT

Rhetoric and Philosophy: Cicero's Model for Moral Education

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Cicero recognized that rhetoric was a powerful art and that it was necessary to develop virtue and integrity in those trained as orators. In *De Oratore*, he seeks to reunify the subjects of philosophy and rhetoric for the purpose of preparing orators to use the faculty of rhetoric for the proper ends. In the first *Tusculan Disputation* Cicero identifies four immortal qualities of the soul that unite the practices of philosophy and rhetoric, while modeling the way in which philosophy and rhetoric may be used together. For Cicero, philosophy and rhetoric ought to be united because they are both methods by which truth is sought and approximated. By examining Cicero's educational philosophy and the history and status of moral education in America, I argue that Cicero's approach is an effective model and that aspects of his approach could be applicable in America today.

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RHETORIC AND PHILOSOPHY:  
CICERO'S MODEL FOR MORAL EDUCATION

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## INTRODUCTION

This work is as much a consolation to myself, that the philosophical can and should inform the practical, as it is a scholarly argument about how we should morally form our children. This project grew out of my initial observation that moral education in America today seems to be hodgepodge at best. I see moral education as a necessity in a society like ours with pressing moral concerns and varying arts and technologies that could be used to serve either good or evil. I, like Cicero, cannot escape from a love of philosophy nor a need to engage in the practical, so it was only natural to look backwards to the recommendations of a man who sat between the theoretical and the practical to find a model for moral education in the modern age. I do not intend with this thesis to offer a practical guide for instituting Cicero's program for moral education; instead, I mean to explore Cicero's approach on its own terms and then gesture at ways in which it could be applicable today.

In modern America, as in many societies throughout history, moral education has been tied to religious formation. With the removal of religion, specifically Christian moral teaching and the Bible, from public schools in the twentieth century, a void opened up in which moral education has since been approached in numerous of ways, all of which, in my view, lack comprehensiveness and effectiveness. Marcus Tullius Cicero, one of Rome's greatest orators and statesmen, saw the need for moral education in his own time. After witnessing abuses of the faculty of rhetoric, Cicero wrote *De Oratore* with the aim of morally educating young orators to use rhetoric for the proper ends. In

order to accomplish this task, Cicero argues for the incorporation of the study of philosophy into Roman rhetorical education.

I have organized this work into four sections. Chapter 1 will focus on the way in which moral education was accomplished through the Roman system of education. We will walk through the stages of education that boys on track to become orators would have passed through. Through this progression, we will see that the fathers played an integral role in morally forming sons, that the schools of the *grammaticus* and the *rhetor* incorporated moral formation into daily practices, and that the apprenticeship system in Rome supported moral education.

In Chapter 2, we will turn to Cicero and his proposal for moral education in *De Oratore*. We will see why Cicero thought that moral education needed to be improved in Rome, and that he argues for the reunification of rhetoric and philosophy in education. He believes that by incorporating the study of philosophy into the education of the orator, he will be able to furnish orators with the morality that is appropriate for the use of such a potentially dangerous skill.

In Chapter 3, I will seek to explain why the combination of philosophy and rhetoric in education constitutes moral education through *Tusculan Disputation 1*. By examining Cicero's four immortal qualities of the soul and their correspondences to rhetorical and philosophical practices, we will see that in Cicero's view both philosophy and rhetoric are oriented toward truth and have the capacity to help furnish morality. We will also see through the dialogue in the first *Tusculan* that Cicero models the proper use of rhetoric and philosophy together.

Finally, in Chapter 4 we will turn to the United States. I will first briefly delineate the history of moral education in America in order to argue that because religion and moral formation have been tied in America since the Founding, the void that followed the removal of religion from public schools has not been sufficiently filled. I will then identify five aspects of Cicero's approach to moral education, which I have termed "The Tullian Approach," that could be applied in modern America.

## CHAPTER ONE

### Education in Ancient Rome

*As a field, though fertile, cannot yield a harvest without cultivation, no more can the mind without learning; thus each is feeble without the other.*

-Cicero, *Tusculan Disputation* II.5

In order to understand Cicero's proposal for moral education in Rome, we must first understand how education was conducted in ancient Rome. In the Roman Republic education was structured, but not nearly as systematized as it is today in modern America. The structure varied across classes, amongst families, and in different geographic areas. In this chapter I will examine the Roman education system, paying particular attention to the way in which moral formation was accomplished. In Rome, both under the Republic and the Empire, all children were educated to some extent, but males, primarily from elite families, were the only ones who were trained in rhetoric. Because of this, I will primarily be discussing the education of elite males in Rome, which was aimed at preparing boys for careers in service of the state. I will begin my analysis of the education system with a brief word about Roman values. I will then examine the role of the family, and the schools of the *ludi magister*, the *grammaticus*, and the *rhetor*. Finally, I will discuss the apprenticeship system in which older men mentored younger men. We will see that moral formation was highly valued and employed through a variety of means in Roman education.

## *Roman Virtues*

Rome began as an agrarian society. Because “all people make virtues out of necessities,” glorifying the behaviors that are necessary for survival, the ancient Romans understood “the qualities necessary [for] a successful farmer” to be virtues.<sup>1</sup> “Diligence, determination, austerity, gravity, discipline, and self-sufficiency” were considered to be virtues throughout the history of Rome.<sup>2</sup> The Roman people shared the notion that a Roman citizen ought to act in accordance with these virtues. Despite the fact that many Romans were not stern, diligent, or self-sufficient, the virtues remained an ideal in Roman life. The Romans also held a high view of duty, which they called *pietas*. A Roman was “expected to be devoted and dutiful to his family, friends, fellow citizens, country, and gods.”<sup>3</sup> The virtues that the Romans esteemed and the sense of duty that was expected pervaded every sphere of Roman life. These are unique characteristics of Roman civilization that affected the way in which the Romans approached moral education.

## *The Roman Family and Education*

Because the family is the fundamental social unit of society, family norms and behaviors are foundational in the education and the moral development of children. Roman families were actively engaged in the education of children. Due in part to the fact that Roman culture developed out of an agricultural society that conducted education in the home, Romans generally “prized those skills which were transmitted in traditional

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<sup>1</sup> Jo-Ann Shelton, *As the Romans Did: A Source Book In Roman Social History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

fashion on the model of home-based practical learning.”<sup>4</sup> Children in Rome were not required to attend a formal school outside of the home. For all children, basic education typically occurred in the home. Children learned from “their fathers, just enough ‘reading, writing, and ‘rithmetic’” to enable them to effectively navigate business transactions.<sup>5</sup> As children got older, some were educated in formal schools, while others were educated by tutors. Within the family, the father held a position of authority and responsibility. At the birth of a child, once a midwife had pronounced the child fit to live, the child “would then be placed on the ground for the *paterfamilias* to raise up;” picking up the child would ritually serve as the father’s “indication that he accepted his paternity of the child and wished to rear it.”<sup>6</sup>

In practice the women of the household, often the midwives, tended to care for babies and young children, but, as the children matured, fathers would often take a more active role, paying the most attention to the boys. The authority of a father was extensive; a father “could not only expose a child at birth; he could repudiate an erring son and dismiss him to servile labor, or order him to be flogged, or imprisoned, or even put to death.”<sup>7</sup> This right, summarized in the term *patria potestas*, was accorded to fathers even before the Twelve Tables recognized it as law. Only the censors “could interfere in any way with the freedom of Roman parents to treat their children as they

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<sup>4</sup> Suzanne Dixon, “Children in the Roman Family” in *The Roman Family*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 117.

<sup>5</sup> Shelton, *As the Romans Did*, 104.

<sup>6</sup> Dixon, “Children in the Roman Family”, 101.

<sup>7</sup> Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the elder Cato to the younger Pliny*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 5.

please.”<sup>8</sup> In fact, “one of the powers which the censors possessed was to stigmatize those who were either excessively severe, or excessively indulgent in the upbringing of their sons.”<sup>9</sup> Barring extreme circumstances, fathers tended not to exercise their full authority by utilizing all of the alternatives they had at their disposal in punishing their children. In daily life the authority of the father typically helped children develop respect for their parents and the habit of following parental instructions.<sup>10</sup> Fathers also sought to instill in their children “respect of tradition and a solid comprehension of *pietas*.”<sup>11</sup> An understanding of *pietas* helped to develop the Roman sense of duty to the family and the virtues that were valued by society as a whole.

Roman society expected parents “to teach their children moral values, and severity in this process was generally regarded with some favor by the ancient sources.”<sup>12</sup> The Romans taught morality, in part, by encouraging young men and women to imitate and listen to their elders. The respect that children developed for their parents seems to have been crucial to the effectiveness of moral education in Rome. It helped to develop the Roman sense of duty that encouraged moral action. The authority of parents and the respect children were taught to give them supported the moral formation that began with parents and was continued by teachers, tutors, and mentors.

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<sup>8</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 19.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Shelton, *As the Romans Did*, 104.

<sup>12</sup> Dixon, “Children in the Roman Family,” 117.

Roman children were expected to “provide their parents with support in old age and proper commemoration at death.”<sup>13</sup> Regardless of class, parents valued the help (often in the form of economic support) of their children in old age. Funeral rites were important to the Romans, and children held the responsibility of organizing an appropriate funeral for deceased parents.

Children were also expected to maintain or improve the social class of the family. This expectation resulted partially from the fact that the “Roman senatorial class was one to which membership had to be re-earned in each successive generation. The young man of a senatorial family had to see to it that he was elected to senatorial office and that he maintained the family’s fortune at the requisite level to avoid exclusion from the specific census category.”<sup>14</sup> To do so, young men would work to gain the skills (typically rhetorical or military) that would enable them to maintain and affirm membership of the elite class.

In Rome a man did not “‘run’ for the position of senator, but once elected quaestor, for example, for a one-year office, he was admitted to the Senate life.”<sup>15</sup> It was common to seek more magistracies for oneself and for one’s family members. When a son was elected as a magistrate, he was able to honor his family. Throughout Roman society, “Roman sons and daughters literally bore the family name and could bring glory or discredit on it by their behavior.”<sup>16</sup> In Plato’s *Symposium*, Diotima describes having

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>14</sup> Dixon, “Children in the Roman Family,” 109.

<sup>15</sup> Shelton, *As the Romans Did*, 225.

<sup>16</sup> Dixon, “Children in the Roman Family,” 110.

children as a way in which parents can grasp at immortality.<sup>17</sup> This can be a helpful way to frame parent-child relations in Rome. If children are the vehicles by which parents can live on, it follows that parents would seek to ensure that their children could maintain or improve the family's social status. If this is a natural or common desire, it may have been compounded in Rome by the necessity of reestablishing a place in the senatorial class each generation.

The "Roman ideal [for parenting] entailed intense parental involvement in children's upbringing."<sup>18</sup> This may have resulted in part from the dependence among family members to maintain honor and respect for the family. The education that the elder Cato provided for his son illustrates what would have been considered ideal parental involvement. Even though Cato's approach was not necessarily the norm, he was respected by his peers and was looked upon as a model by successive generations. In Plutarch's biography of Cato "After the birth of his son, no business could be so urgent, unless it had a public character, as to prevent him from being present when his wife bathed and swaddled the babe... As soon as the boy showed signs of understanding, his father took him under his own charge and taught him to read," despite having an accomplished slave that could have completed this task.<sup>19</sup>

Cato chose to play an active role in his son's education. This enabled him to have more control over who influenced his son as he matured. Plutarch tells us, "Cato thought

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<sup>17</sup> Plato, *The Symposium*, trans. Christopher Gill, (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 207a-208b. Although this is a Greek source, it is helpful in framing the way in which the Roman family operated. I am not arguing that this idea influenced Roman life, only that it can help us understand it.

<sup>18</sup> Dixon, "Children in the Roman Family," 116.

<sup>19</sup> Plutarch, *Lives*, vol. VIII, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919), 361.

it not right, as he tells us himself, that his son should be scolded by a slave, or have his ears tweaked when he was slow to learn, still less that he should be indebted to his slave for such a priceless thing as education.”<sup>20</sup> Cato’s reluctance to entrust his son’s education to his slaves reflects a high value of education and an acknowledgment that parents have the greatest interest in the education of their children. After all, the father has authority over the child, and the father that will benefit or suffer based on the level of his son’s success. While Cato’s attitude and actions reflected the ideal in Rome for parental involvement, on the whole, slaves played a significant role in the education of children in Rome.

In families with fathers who were able to play an active role in the rearing of children, the fathers would give what were called ‘paternal precepts’ (advice) to their sons. The advice could be “on a wide range of subjects, practical, political, social and moral.”<sup>21</sup> For example, Cicero offered advice to his son concerning public affairs; “whilst urging his son Marcus to aim high, forewarned him of the pitfalls which might lie in his path.”<sup>22</sup> Father’s would offer their experience to their sons, hoping they would benefit from their wisdom. Cato even composed an encyclopedia for his son “in adult life precepts on subjects as diverse as agriculture, warfare, medicine and oratory.”<sup>23</sup> These precepts were not only intended to assist sons in refraining from making their father’s mistakes, but they were also intended to teach the young men to live like their fathers. Fathers were able to pass on their wisdom through the paternal precepts. This was one

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<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, *Lives*, 361-363.

<sup>21</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 17.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

avenue through which fathers could instruct their sons about morality. The practice seems to have played a role in preserving Roman morals and ideals in each successive generation. On the whole, the family, but especially the father, played a significant role in the education of children and provided the framework in which boys could develop in alignment with Roman virtues and *pietas*.

### *The Progression of Roman Education*

Formal schooling in Rome was by no means uniform across families and social classes. Children could be educated by a slave (*pedagogus*), a freeborn tutor, a teacher, a family member, or a family friend. Parts of education could be accomplished at home or at a school. Elite children were taught rhetoric, while the children from lower social classes often learned trades. Despite the many differences in how children were educated, it has often been thought that there were three stages of education in Ancient Rome that students would progress through sequentially. In the first, the boy would attend the school of the *ludi magister*, in the second that of the *grammaticus*, and in the third that of the *rhetor*.

In this picture, the divisions between each level of education are clear and the progression is natural. However, the Roman education system was more complex. Some scholars argue that the “extant evidence commonly points towards a recognition of two stages of education, that of the *grammaticus* and that of the *rhetor*,” instead of three stages.<sup>24</sup> This opinion results from the fact that the *ludi magister* is often absent from descriptions of Roman education; for example, Quintilian says that the boy begins his

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<sup>24</sup> Lisa Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome: The Magister and His World*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 2.

learning outside the home under the *grammaticus*, and Ausonius and Prudentius list grammar as the first phase of their education.<sup>25</sup> Not only is the *ludi magister* often absent from discussions on education, but the *grammaticus* is at times depicted as the one teaching the elementary level. As a result of these inconsistencies, confusion over the recognized stages of education has developed. It is likely that the *grammaticus* often taught elementary studies in addition to the more advanced studies. The reason for this is that there were actually different tracks for the upper and lower classes. Elite children would study with a *grammaticus* and *rhetor*, but children from the lower classes would study under a *ludi magister*. Instead of offering a liberal education, the *ludi magister* offered “a kind of ‘trade school’ . . . teaching a level of ‘craft literacy.’”<sup>26</sup>

Students of the lower classes would not advance to learn rhetoric, but their education would be limited to what they learned at the elementary level. Thus, they would be taught “the basic literacy necessary for trade and day-to-day” life, which included “recognition of letters, reading, writing and some arithmetic.”<sup>27</sup> These children would then be trained in some sort of trade; “a child might take up the same job as his father or might be sent to be an apprentice to a craftsman.”<sup>28</sup> It seems that this two-track system of education existed mostly in cities large enough to support both systems, such as Rome, Antioch, or Alexandria.<sup>29</sup> This understanding also accounts for the discrepancies in descriptions of education. Even though Roman education was varied across regions,

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<sup>25</sup> Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome*, 4-5.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>28</sup> Shelton, *As the Romans Did*, 116.

<sup>29</sup> Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome*, 9.

classes, and families, a few regularities emerge; the Romans recognized multiple phases of education and that most children received some sort of general elementary level of education.

### *The School of the Grammaticus*

Roman education came to be highly influenced by the systematic Greek system as more Greeks began to migrate to Rome.<sup>30</sup> *Grammatici* and their subject matter (grammar and literature) originated in Greece. The *grammaticus* would start “with the letters of the alphabet (*grammata*)” and then would make “it an important part of his work to familiarize his pupils with the writings of the poets, especially Homer, and not only [would make] them learn much poetry by heart but [would stress] the moral lessons which it conveyed.”<sup>31</sup> *Grammatici* were more learned than other primary schoolmasters because they had the domain of literature. At first they only taught reading, writing, and literature because in classical Greece, grammar was not a subject recognized by curriculum at first. The knowledge of literature distinguished them and differentiated the education that they offered to students, and “thus instituted a higher, or, as we should say, secondary level of education” in Greece.<sup>32</sup>

Some of the scholars of the Stoic school, the first of which we know of being Digenes of Babylon, began to develop the subject of grammar by classifying the alphabet and distinguishing parts of speech. Following this development we see the

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<sup>30</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 48.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* 49.

earliest manual of Greek grammar appear around 100 B.C.<sup>33</sup> Following the publishing of manuals and debates over correctness, “the situation arose which the *grammatikos* found himself obliged to give his pupils a preliminary course in grammar, in the fullest sense, as well as to lecture on the poets.”<sup>34</sup> In regards to the Latin language, “we see from the mid-second century B.C. onwards, events had begun to move in the same direction as in Greece,” with grammar taking on a similar importance to literature in the instruction of the *grammaticus*, “and by the first century A.D. remarkably parallel developments had taken place.”<sup>35</sup> Thus, the *grammaticus* ended up with two domains, grammar and literature. Even though the *grammaticus* “required his students also to learn music, astronomy, philosophy, natural science, and other disciplines,” these subjects were “justified only in their application to the study of literature.”<sup>36</sup>

The curriculum of the *grammaticus* in Rome was similar to what we would term a “liberal education.” It prepared students for the study of rhetoric. Because the study of rhetoric was limited to those from the upper classes, I will confine my discussion of curriculum to that which applied to boys who were expected to learn rhetoric for a public career. Students typically studied both Latin and Greek under the *grammatici*; “the aim was certainly to produce an equal level of erudition in both languages.”<sup>37</sup> For students from elite families, Greek was necessary because they were expected to be able to interpret and understand the Greek poets. In order to learn two languages, a boy would

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid. 49-50.

<sup>34</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 51.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>36</sup> Shelton, *As the Romans Did*, 116.

<sup>37</sup> Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome*, 10.

have a Greek *grammaticus* and a Latin *grammaticus*.<sup>38</sup> In studying each of these languages, students participated in six daily activities: “reading aloud, including understanding meters used in verse; identification of tropes in the text; explanation of the meaning of rare words and historical references; construction of etymologies; practice in declining nouns and verbs, and what is called ‘judgment of the poets.’”<sup>39</sup> These activities taught students how to read texts, interpret them, and judge their value. In judgment of the poets “literary, or perhaps we should say rhetorical, evaluation” was included, but it “seems to have been less aesthetic or critical in our sense, than moral, the search for *arête*, virtue, and not just for *aretai*, stylistic excellences. The educator sought moral lessons in literature.”<sup>40</sup>

The study of literature taught students how to use speech correctly, as the poets were the prototypes for excellent speech, but it also “meant the discernment of moral good as much as aesthetic good.”<sup>41</sup> The heroes in the stories of the poets could serve as exemplars for virtue and could be used as models for moral or immoral action. The *grammaticus* would read the literature with his students, explaining “literary, geographical, astronomical, mythological and other references in the text. These explanations, which were called *historae*, often involved extended narrations of mythological stories.”<sup>42</sup> This practice helped students learn the context that they needed to properly understand the

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<sup>38</sup> Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome*, 10-11.

<sup>39</sup> George Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 83.

<sup>40</sup> Frances Young, “The Rhetorical Schools” in *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick*, ed. Rowan Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 187.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>42</sup> Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome*, 11.

poets and see how references could be used in language to convey meaning. Present in the school of the *grammaticus* were “two distinct attitudes to a text’s fundamental meaning and reference to how these were to be discerned.”<sup>43</sup> The first was philosophy, which “found abstract doctrines or virtues through verbal allegory,” while the second, which was rhetoric, “looked for concrete ethical examples in a narrative, and for models of excellence both stylistic and moral in the construction of the presentation of the whole.”<sup>44</sup> The first prepared students for the study of moral philosophy, while the second played a role in moral education. Through the study of both grammar and the poets, students learned how language ought to be used and what kind of behavior should be emulated. The poets served as exemplars for the use of language and some of their characters served as exemplars for living well.

### *The School of the Rhetor*

Rhetoric was primary in ancient Rome. Its status derived from the structure of political life and the legal system. “Trials were held in the open, with judges sitting on platforms in the midst of a noisy crowd.”<sup>45</sup> Because of this, the lawyers’ speeches were public and could win lawyers attention and lead to a political career. Magistrates and senators were also continually in the public eye because “they published decrees, had citizens arrested and convicted, levied fines and convened assemblies” in the open.<sup>46</sup> With the public nature of political and legal action in ancient Rome, persuasion through

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<sup>43</sup> Young, “The Rhetorical Schools,” 188.

<sup>44</sup> Young, “The Rhetorical Schools,” *ibid.* 188.

<sup>45</sup> Florence Dupont, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome*, trans. Christopher Woodall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 161.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

rhetoric was utilized extensively. Because of the primacy of rhetoric in Rome, the study of rhetoric was indispensable for a young man's career. Boys began studying under a *rhetor* around the age of twelve to fourteen.<sup>47</sup> The chief purpose of education under the *rhetor* was "to develop the powers of oratory and rhetoric, which would lead to a public career."<sup>48</sup> Rhetoric would be vital to a young man's success if he became a general and spoke in the people's assembly or if he became a senator and spoke in the forum.

The Romans owed much to the Greek systematization of rhetoric. Although Rome did not adopt Greek rhetoric immediately, it was eventually utilized extensively. As Greek influence spread, Romans quickly became wary of Greek rhetoric. The first Greek rhetorical schools in Rome can be found as early as 169 B.C., but by 161 B.C.

"rhetoricians must have seemed more influential, since concern about these teachers led to an official expulsion of both the *rhetores* and philosophers from Rome, by senatorial decree."<sup>49</sup>

The fears of the Romans were a part of a long debate over rhetoric. In Greece writers such as Aristophanes in the *Clouds* or Plato in the *Phaedrus* and the *Gorgias* had expressed criticism of those who used rhetoric to "make the weaker argument the stronger." Socrates claims that he was accused of doing the same in the *Apology*, and Aristotle cites this same claim as the accusation levied against the sophist Protagoras.<sup>50</sup> Those who were unskilled in the technical aspects of rhetoric often became frustrated "when traditional ideas of morality and truth were undermined by verbal argument and

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<sup>47</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 83.

<sup>48</sup> Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome*, 13.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* 14.

<sup>50</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 7.

paradoxical views that seemed wrong to common sense” by rhetoricians.<sup>51</sup> The concern was that rhetoric could allow for falsehood to be made persuasive in the courts as well as the forum.

Greece had also faced the challenge of a division between rhetoric and morality. The Sophists in Greece focused primarily on the technical skills of oratory, but little on the morality and ethics within speeches. Isocrates, a Greek teacher of rhetoric in Athens, recognized that rhetoric ignorant of morality could be problematic.<sup>52</sup> He criticized the methods of the (historical) Sophists and sought to educate an orator “in the arts and sciences,” so that he would be “morally and ethically sensitive, and would be an excellent and effective public speaker.”<sup>53</sup>

At least in Plato’s dialogues, there were actually two problematic groups, the rhetoricians and the sophists. The “rhetoricians promised to turn students into expert speakers, the sophists promised something categorically different. They promised to effect a moral transformation in the pupil himself, to make him ‘better,’ to render him *kalos kai agathos*, noble and good.”<sup>54</sup> In the *Gorgias*, Gorgias separates himself from the sophists and claims to just teach rhetoric. The sophists claimed to teach *areté* (succeeding and failing to varying degrees), but the rhetoricians did not. By “teaching rhetoric alone, divorcing this from the more challenging business of imparting *areté*, Gorgias seems to have hoped to avoid the problem of being blamed for his students

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<sup>51</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 7.

<sup>52</sup> Gerald Lee Gutek, *Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Education: A Biographical Introduction*, (Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2001), 46.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> David D. Corey, *The Sophists in Plato’s Dialogues*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), 33.

misdeeds.”<sup>55</sup> Despite understanding the danger of rhetoric, then, Gorgias chose not to attempt to impart morality.

Even though there was uneasiness about the power of rhetoric, eventually, schools of rhetoric were allowed to reopen and rhetoric ended up becoming essential to political life in Rome.<sup>56</sup> Cicero was one of the first prominent Romans to accept Greek philosophy and rhetorical theory. When the first Latin schools of rhetoric were opened, they were looked upon with suspicion, and some of them were even closed by the censors in 92 B.C.<sup>57</sup> The study of rhetoric finally took hold in Rome after ambitious young men began to seek out rhetorical training: Cicero thinks that the enthusiasm of the young men “had been kindled by listening to the Greeks, and they became more keen to bring in professional rhetoricians to teach them the art.”<sup>58</sup> The art was useful both in the law courts and in the forum. For young men, rhetorical skill was especially advantageous, as they could begin and advance a career through oratory.

Republican Rome operated under a long held “model of social protectionism under which humble citizens looked to more wealthy or established ones as *patroni* for informal arbitration or actual representation in court.”<sup>59</sup> Patrons, who were often senators, were duty bound “to devote their time, energy, and money to the welfare of those inferior to them—the lower-class masses—and to provide public services without pay, but they

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<sup>55</sup> Corey, *The Sophists in Plato's Dialogues*, 31.

<sup>56</sup> Maurice, *The Teacher in Ancient Rome*, 14.

<sup>57</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 65-66.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>59</sup> Elaine Fantham, “The Orator and the Law,” in *The Roman World of Cicero's De Oratore*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3.

demanded in return, gratitude, submission, and veneration.”<sup>60</sup> A similar relationship evolved when an individual asked a “better educated and more powerful than himself for advice and protection. In return, he became a retainer and provided various services for his protector.”<sup>61</sup> These relationships bound the upper and lower classes together. The *patroni* often expected their clients to support them politically and having many clients was a sign of power and success.<sup>62</sup>

For young men this system of representation was important because they could “make their names by a successful prosecution,” or if they were pursuing political office they could “act as a defending counsel, not as an accuser, so as to make, rather than lose, influential friends.”<sup>63</sup> The judicial branch of oratory was often utilized to establish or further a man’s career. Because the system operated hierarchically, young men whose father’s had held high political offices could use their names to help them win a case.<sup>64</sup> Within this system, skill in judicial oratory could lead to attractive rewards. If they were successful advocates, young men could make their names known, acquire the goodwill of clients, win public recognition, and begin a political career.<sup>65</sup> There was also a place for the deliberative branch of oratory, as men would eventually need the ability to urge “in

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<sup>60</sup> Shelton, *As the Romans Did*, 13.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>63</sup> Fantham, “The Orator and the Law,” 3.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 66.

the Senate or before an assembly of the people, the advisability or inadvisability of measures affecting the State.”<sup>66</sup>

Roman education incorporated rhetoric, in part, because of the role it played in society. Politics in Rome centered around the use of rhetoric. As such, “all senators were orators capable of addressing the courts, the Senate, and popular meetings; through their speeches, they set policy, advocated justice, shaped public opinion, and won popular acclaim.”<sup>67</sup> It was “[d]uring the lifetimes of two of the greatest Republican orators, L. Licinius Crassus (140-91 B.C.), and M. Antonius (143-87 B.C.), grandfather of the triumvir, that there became available in Rome not only an ample supply of teachers of rhetoric, but also a number of established schools.”<sup>68</sup> These schools were distinct because they were not run by the Greeks, who had been overseeing the rhetorical schools up until that time. Thus, Roman education not only incorporated rhetoric, but also adopted it as a part of Roman culture.

The Roman rhetorical schools “concentrated on study of prose writers and techniques of argument, amplification, and ornamentation, including figures of speech, but in practice advanced stages of grammar often overlapped with introductory stages of rhetoric.”<sup>69</sup> It was the *rhetor* who introduced students to the five parts of the theory of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery). Invention consisted in identifying the stasis (the question), and the means of persuasion, both direct evidence

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<sup>66</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 66.

<sup>67</sup> Joseph A. DiLuzio, “Cicero and the Education of the Republic’s Last Generation: His Program for Civic Renewal,” (Conference Paper, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1, 2013), 1.

<sup>68</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 68.

<sup>69</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 83.

and artistic means of persuasion. Arrangement involved organizing the speech into parts and determining the order in which the arguments will be presented. Style was the “deliberate process of casting a subject into language” that contained two parts: diction and composition. Memory simply referred to memorizing a speech and how to deliver it. Delivery concentrated on control of the voice and gesture (control of the eyes and limbs).<sup>70</sup> The five parts of rhetoric were the basic building blocks that were necessary for writing speeches.

Although the rhetorical schools taught the theory of rhetoric, primarily “the student was expected to apply his growing understanding of rhetoric in practice speaking in the classroom.”<sup>71</sup> The theory of rhetoric was helpful, but the practice of it was perhaps more important; commonly “the more eminent a Roman orator became, by virtue of wider personal study, practice and experience in various kinds of public speaking, the more likely he was to stress the inadequacy of the textbooks, as compared with the kinds of skill which he found to be necessary in the arena of real-life debate.”<sup>72</sup> Much of this skill was acquired as men established their careers through judicial rhetoric. However, the rhetorical schools certainly stressed the need for practice and ensured that the boys would be prepared to declaim outside of school. It was a common practice for the teacher to choose a subject, discuss how it could be treated, and declaim a speech as a model treatment. Students then would be assigned topics, on which they would write speeches.

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<sup>70</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 4-6.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. 83.

<sup>72</sup> Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome*, 69.

Teachers would then correct the speeches, and the boys would subsequently memorize and deliver the speeches.<sup>73</sup>

This process was used to teach two types of speeches, the *suasoria* and the *controversia* speeches. The *suasoria* speeches were intended to give young men practice in deliberative oratory. Students were “asked to advise some mythological or historical figure what to do in a given situation: for example, ‘Advise Agamemnon whether or not to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia.’”<sup>74</sup> This helped students practice the kind of moral deliberation they might need to do in the Senate. The *controversia* speeches were intended to give students practice in judicial oratory. They would declaim “in imitation of a speech in a court of law,” having been “supplied with applicable laws, real or imaginary, and given a specific case to defend.”<sup>75</sup> This helped students practice the skills they would need in the law courts. These exercises were an integral part of the training offered by the *rhetor*. Rhetorical training was practical in nature because was aimed at preparing young men for high profile careers. It also continued to develop the moral sensibilities of young men as they deliberated on moral quandaries and proceeded to defend a particular course of action.

### *The Roman Apprenticeship System*

When a boy reached puberty and transitioned from boyhood to manhood, he would participate in a puberty ceremony. The ceremony occurred approximately at age sixteen; “a boy would undergo a ceremony at which he set aside the *bullā* and the tunic (*toga*

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<sup>73</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 84.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

*praetexta*) of his childhood and took on a man's dress (*toga virilis*).<sup>76</sup> The *toga virilis* was all white, while the *toga praetexta* had a purple border. The change in dress clearly marked the transition.<sup>77</sup> Often this ceremony occurred on the Liberalia. Some sources support that "a physical inspection of the boy's genitalia was required," and "St. Augustine claims that phallic worship was associated with Liberalia; the day, then, is one for the celebration of physical manhood."<sup>78</sup> Following the transition from boyhood to manhood, boys would serve their *tirocinium*, a period in which they would either apprentice a leader in the military or the forum.<sup>79</sup> This process readied boys for careers in public service and trained them in the customs of the military or the forum.

The apprenticeship functioned as "a special kind of teaching in which elite men train[ed] their replacements."<sup>80</sup> After receiving the all white *toga virilis*, the boy was passed "from father to role model."<sup>81</sup> This was a significant step because it ceremonially involved the father giving another man the ability to guide his son's education. The father had agreed to raise the boy up under the power of the *pater familias*, a place where he has primary authority, but after the boy takes on the *toga virilis*, his own manhood is recognized and his father hands him to the role model that will prepare him for his career as a military officer or a senator. Once the boy has been handed over, "orator and father

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<sup>76</sup> Dixon, "Children in the Roman Family," 101.

<sup>77</sup> Amy Richlin, "Old Boys: Teacher-Student Bonding in Roman Oratory," *Classical World* 105, no. 1 (2011): 93.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> Dixon, "Children in the Roman Family," 102.

<sup>80</sup> Richlin, "Old Boys: Teacher-Student Bonding in Roman Oratory," 91.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

[become] co-parents of the budding talent,” sharing responsibility of his education.<sup>82</sup> In this new phase of education, a large portion of the boy’s training is still devoted to rhetoric, as it will be integral in the establishment and maintenance of his career.

Cicero, Quintilian, and others often speak of rhetorical training in *tirocinium* through military metaphors. For example, Quintilian compares it to gladiatorial training and seamanship.<sup>83</sup> Because rhetoric was the vehicle by which conflict was aired, the military connotation is fitting. After all, “the forum in the late Republic was filled with those who preferred the metaphor to the reality, verbal to mortal combat, though they were certainly combative.”<sup>84</sup> Cicero, in his famous speech, *Pro Caelio*, engages in this kind of combat by defending his friend Caelius. It was common for men to sue each other because of personal vendettas and arguments.

As apprentices, boys were adopted into the cultures of the forum and the military and were prepared to take part in them. Tacitus in his *Dialogues* (34) provides a thorough description of the apprentice system:

It was accordingly usual with our ancestors, when a lad was being prepared for public speaking, as soon as he was fully trained by home discipline, and his mind was stored with culture, to have him taken by his father, or his relatives to the orator who held the highest rank in the state. The boy used to accompany and attend him, and be present at all his speeches, alike in the law-court and the assembly, and thus he picked up the art of repartee, and became habituated to the strife of words, and indeed, I may almost say, learnt how to fight in battle. Thereby young men acquired from the first great experience and confidence, and a very large stock of discrimination, for they were studying in broad daylight, in the very thick of the conflict, where no one can say anything foolish or self-contradictory without its being refuted by the judge, or ridiculed by the opponent, or, last of all, repudiated by the very counsel with him. Thus from the beginning they were imbued with true and genuine eloquence, and,

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<sup>82</sup> Richlin, “Old Boys: Teacher-Student Bonding in Roman Oratory,” 98.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.* 95.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

although they attached themselves to one pleader, still they became acquainted with all advocates of their own standing in a multitude of cases before the courts.<sup>85</sup>

The boys were to learn by observation and were to imitate what they observed in their own careers. This exposed boys to different styles of oratory, showed them what was effective, and introduced them to the cultures they would be a part of.

The older man they were apprenticing was one model that they were supposed to learn imitate after attending speeches and observing behavior. However, boys could also observe other senators and lawyers and learn from them. Once Cicero entered the forum “he attended hearings during the [Social] war, where he heard minor orators, and went daily to hear politicians speaking on Rostra. He studied law and philosophy, and practiced declaiming; for all these pursuits he lists the names of the men who were his models.”<sup>86</sup> Cicero listened and learned from the models he chose. This system ensured that boys were not just taught about rhetoric through written speeches or theoretical models, but were able to see what was possible, what was effective, and what they were expected to do. This made the apprenticeship system beneficial to the boys, but also to Roman society because they were able to ensure that the new statesmen would be similar to the last. Tradition and custom could be passed on by impressing it upon young men at the beginning of their careers.

### *Conclusion*

Each of the aspects of Roman daily life discussed in this chapter contributed to Roman moral education. The family was foundational for this process. The father,

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<sup>85</sup> Tacitus, *Complete Works of Tacitus*, Trans. Sara Bryant, (New York: Random House, 1942).

<sup>86</sup> Richlin, “Old Boys: Teacher-Student Bonding in Roman Oratory,” 96.

holding responsibility and authority over his children, sought to develop in them the virtues valued by Roman society and a strong understanding of *pietas*. Moral education was built upon this foundation in ancient Rome. Teachers, tutors, mentors, and parents could better educate children because they were afforded respect. Children were shown models of virtue by studying the poets under the *grammaticus* and the study of literature guided by the *grammaticus* began process of learning how to discern moral action.

Under the *rhetor* boys were asked to apply their knowledge by recommending a course of action to a literary character. This exercise allowed students to practice making moral decisions and giving advice in complex situations. During the apprenticeship phase of a boy's education, he was taught how he should behave. He was shown models and he was given a mentor that was tasked with guiding and correcting him. In Roman education, moral formation took place through a variety of methods. Moral education did not remain in the theoretical realm for the Romans and did not rely on moral precepts. Instead, it focused on developing the ability in students to recognize what was good and right and for making choices in variable situations. Even though the Romans sought to morally form their children, Cicero still thought that something was missing in this process. He found moral education in Rome to be insufficient in this form.

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Tullian Approach

*“For it is from knowledge that oratory must derive its beauty and fullness, and unless there is such knowledge, well-grasped and comprehended by the speaker, there must be something empty and almost childish in the utterance.”*

-Cicero, *De Oratore*: Book I.20

After witnessing rhetoric being used for erroneous ends in Rome, Marcus Tullius Cicero, the great orator and Roman statesman, advocated for a new form of moral education in Rome that would train future orators to use rhetoric for the proper ends. He recognized that rhetoric, used wrongly, posed a threat to Roman society. To prevent this, he sought to use the study of philosophy to equip young men with the ability to use the faculty of rhetoric well. To accomplish this, Cicero argues in *De Oratore* for the study of philosophy to be incorporated into rhetorical education. Philosophy was understood by the ancients to be a way of life and its study was aimed at finding “the best condition of life.”<sup>1</sup> To Cicero the study of philosophy and the practices of rhetoric are complimentary, flowing from a common source. Cicero hopes that the reunification of philosophy and rhetoric and Roman education will produce moral orators that will discern how they should employ the faculty of rhetoric.

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<sup>1</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Cicero's Tusculan Disputations*, trans. Andrew P. Peabody, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1886), 251-252.

## *Cicero's Relationship to Philosophy*

Cicero was first and foremost a statesman. Known as one of Rome's greatest orators, Cicero used his rhetorical skill to participate in the politics of Republican Rome. However, he was also committed to philosophy. Cicero became a great lover of philosophy at a time when many Romans were still suspicious of Greek philosophy. He turned to it throughout his life, and "seems to have been the first educated Roman who developed a real flair for philosophy and a serious attachment to it."<sup>1</sup>

He first studied philosophy in 88 B.C. "when Philo of Larissa, the last scholarch of the Academy took refuge in Rome."<sup>2</sup> Cicero took up the study of philosophy with vigor, partially because the law courts were shut down as a result of turmoil in Rome. He recalls this time in *Brutus* saying, "Filled with enthusiasm for the study of philosophy, I gave myself to this instruction."<sup>3</sup> Philosophy had a profound effect upon Cicero; it helped to form his sense of morality that he lived by throughout his career as a statesman. He "affirms that his own moral qualities were formed thanks to the precepts and the examples he found in books."<sup>4</sup> Loving the study of philosophy, but also committed to public life, Cicero attempted to incorporate philosophy into his own public life. He could never fully pledge himself to philosophy, but he never entirely left it behind.

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<sup>1</sup> Gisela Striker, "Cicero and Greek Philosophy," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 97, (1995): 54.

<sup>2</sup> Carlos Levy, "Philosophical Life versus Political Life: An Impossible Choice for Cicero" in *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, ed. Walter Nicgorski (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 60.

<sup>3</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero, *Brutus*, trans. G. L. Hendrickson, H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 267.

<sup>4</sup> Levy, "Philosophical Life versus Political Life: An Impossible Choice for Cicero," 66.

His role models, “Anthony and Crassus, had shown, at least if we go by the *De Oratore*, that the interest in Greek culture could be secured within the respect for tradition” in Rome.<sup>5</sup> Yet, as Nicgorski argues, Cicero sought to accomplish this because he respected the Republic and the traditions of Rome. His affection was strong, but he placed his duty to the state over his love for philosophy.<sup>6</sup> As a result, he wrote and studied philosophy when his career allowed it. For instance, he wrote *De Oratore* while he was out of power and in exile, and most of his philosophical works were written at the end of his life once he had left public office. Given the status of philosophy in Rome while Cicero was being educated, his study of philosophy was unique. Most young men did not receive as thorough of an education in philosophy, nor did they seek out continued study as Cicero did.

One of Cicero’s goals was to make Greek philosophy more accessible to Romans. As a part of this project, he translated Greek works and incorporated Greek thought into his own works. He translated the *Protagoras*, and his “philosophical works include translations from other dialogues of Plato, especially *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. The only major dialogues he may not have known appear to be *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*. His favorites, one may guess, were *Apology*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Gorgias*.”<sup>7</sup> He would have likely first studied Plato under Philo of Larissa, and his works bear the marks of influence from the Platonic dialogues over the course of his life.

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<sup>5</sup> Levy, “Philosophical Life versus Political Life: An Impossible Choice for Cicero,” 62.

<sup>6</sup> Walter Nicgorski, “Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy,” *The Political Science Reviewer* 8, (1978): 67.

<sup>7</sup> A.A. Long, “Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle” in *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 291.

His knowledge of Aristotle's corpus was probably much less extensive, since "our Aristotle—the Aristotle of the treatises we possess—was just coming back into circulation at the end of Cicero's life."<sup>8</sup> However, Cicero references Aristotle's work directly, but likely had access to different Aristotelian works than we do today. A.A. Long argues that the Aristotle Cicero "knew at first hand was probably confined in the main to doxographical notices, the dialogues lost to us, and the incorporation of Aristotelian rhetoric in Hellenistic handbooks."<sup>9</sup> Even so, Cicero's philosophy is at times consistent with Aristotelian thought. Both of these authors influenced Cicero's method, his style, and the content of his philosophical work.<sup>10</sup>

His experience with philosophy led him to determine that philosophy had great power to positively influence human life. He attached himself to the method(s) of philosophy in seeking truth. His high view of philosophy contributed to his recommendation that young men study it as a part of their oratorical training as a means of informing their speeches and preventing the use of rhetoric toward evil ends. Because philosophy helped to develop his own moral sensibilities, he thought that it could do the same for others. Although he "does not deny that certain individuals could have by nature superior moral qualities" and not need philosophy in order to become moral, "he claims that even in such cases, *doctrina* enables one to surpass oneself."<sup>11</sup> The study of philosophy is, therefore in Cicero's view, useful for all students, especially those who will wield power and whose moral decisions will be of consequence for others.

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<sup>8</sup> A.A. Long, "Cicero's Plato and Aristotle," 290.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Cicero was also influenced the Stoics, the Academics, and the Epicureans. I focus on the works of Plato and Aristotle because their work on happiness and the soul is relevant in the third chapter.

<sup>11</sup> Levy, "Philosophical Life versus Political Life: An Impossible Choice for Cicero," 66.

What Cicero means by “philosophy” differs from the modern conception. His understanding of philosophy was certainly informed by the works of Plato and Aristotle and his experiences with Philo of Larissa, the Academics, Antiochus the founder of the “Old Academy,” and the Stoics.<sup>12</sup> Ancient philosophy was not confined to the schoolhouse, but reached into every area of life. In the fifth *Tusculan Disputation* Cicero states,

[T]he efficient motive of those who first devoted themselves to the study of philosophy was the desire to occupy themselves—all things else being held as inferior account—in quest of the best condition of life, they certainly disposed so large an amount of time and labor on that inquiry with the hope of living happily.<sup>13</sup>

Philosophy in this sense is practical for human life. Its role is to help humans pursue the best kind of life and fulfill their purpose.

Philosophy was later reinterpreted “in western Europe [to be] primarily located in the meaning of certain texts, and secondarily the activity of studying those texts. This is to be contrasted with the conception of philosophy, ubiquitous in antiquity, as essentially a way of life, to which Cicero himself subscribed.”<sup>14</sup> Thus, when Cicero advocates the study of philosophy, he does not mean that students should study the meaning of texts and simply learn to understand the arguments. On the contrary, philosophy “was fundamentally an approach to the whole of life, both public and private, cultivated within a school by means of intellectual activity pursued in oral discourse.”<sup>15</sup> Those who study philosophy seek to live happy human lives, and by incorporating philosophy into

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<sup>12</sup> Nicgorski, “Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy,” 68.

<sup>13</sup> Cicero, *Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations*, 251-252.

<sup>14</sup> Dougal Blyth, “Cicero and Philosophy as Text,” *The Classical Journal* 106, no. 1 (2010): 71.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

education, Cicero hopes to train men to orient their lives and their daily decisions around the end of happiness. By training young men in philosophy, Cicero is really training them in living happily. They are learning how to seek the truth, think rightly, and act rightly.

He identifies Socrates as being the one who “first called philosophy down from heaven, and gave it a place in cities, and introduced it even into men's homes, and forced it to make inquiry into life and morals, and things good and evil.”<sup>16</sup> The end of these inquiries is to discern the truth or what is apparently the truth. Cicero bases his own method on Socrates’ method that he observes in Plato, which consists of “concealing [his] own opinion, relieving others of their errors, and on every question seeking to ascertain what is most probable.”<sup>17</sup> This is accomplished primarily through conversations with others (dialectic). Many of Cicero’s philosophical works are dialogues that are based on conversations he had with his friends.

### *Cicero’s Experience with the Misuse of Rhetoric in Rome*

Cicero lays out his educational philosophy in *De Oratore*, which he wrote as response to problematic uses of rhetoric he had observed and been victim to in Rome. While Cicero was serving as consul, the highest political office, in Rome (63 B.C.E.) he “exposed and denounced what he regarded as the Catilinarian conspiracy against the state,” which was led by L. Sergius Catilina (Catiline).<sup>18</sup> Catiline sought to cause a violent revolution in order to absolve the debts of the Roman people, and Cicero believed

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<sup>16</sup> Cicero, *Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations*, 257.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Nicgorski, “Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy,” 68.

that by exposing him, he was saving the Republic. In response to the conspiracy, the Senate voted to execute some of the conspirators without holding a trial. Cicero carried out the Senate's decision quickly, even though the men were Roman citizens and it was illegal to execute a Roman citizen without a trial.<sup>19</sup> At the time, Cicero received broad political support for his actions. A few years later, a man named P. Clodius Pulcher began to attack Cicero and the Senate<sup>20</sup> for what he saw excessive uses of authority.<sup>21</sup> Clodius seems to have been an "effective orator, capable of spurring an audience to action."<sup>22</sup> He had sparred with Cicero previously in the events surrounding the Bona Dea trial. Clodius and his supporters, "when they did not prevail in the Senate, [had] resorted to inflammatory rhetoric at public meetings to whip up popular resentment. At the same time, they sought to use violence and intimidation to disrupt the proper functioning of the Republic's institutions."<sup>23</sup> Cicero did not approve of the way Clodius and his supporters used rhetoric.

When Clodius was named tribune, he "promulgated a law banishing anyone who had put to death a citizen without trial."<sup>24</sup> This law was targeted at Cicero for his response to the Catiline conspiracy, and after the law was enacted, Cicero was forced into exile. He was not permitted to return until a year and a half later when the political

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<sup>19</sup> DiLuzio, "Cicero and the Education of the Republic's Last Generation," 14.

<sup>20</sup> Edward Clayton, "Cicero (106-43 B.C.E)," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed October 23, 2017, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/cicero/>.

<sup>21</sup> DiLuzio, "Cicero and the Education of the Republic's Last Generation: His Program for Civic Renewal," 16.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 15.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 14, 17.

climate had changed and his friends had worked to remedy the situation.<sup>25</sup> It was during this time period (55-51 B.C.) that Cicero wrote *De Oratore* and much of his philosophical corpus.<sup>26</sup> Clodius had been a poignant example of the way in which rhetoric could be used toward erroneous ends and the way it could negatively influence the Roman people. In response, Cicero sought to prevent similar abuses of rhetoric “by redefining what it means to be a good orator and by re-conceptualizing (rhetorical) education.”<sup>27</sup>

### *Cicero’s Reunification of Rhetoric and Philosophy*

*De Oratore* is written as a dialogue, primarily between Crassus and Antonius, in which the interlocutors examine the ideal orator. Throughout the dialogue, Cicero (predominantly through Crassus) develops an idea of what a person would need to learn in order to become the ideal orator. Crassus does not simply serve as a mouthpiece for Cicero, other characters likely represent aspects of Cicero’s view as well in the dialogue. Having engaged with Cataline and Clodius, and being a superb orator himself, Cicero was acutely aware of the power of rhetoric and the effects it could have on an audience. Cicero saw that rhetorical appeals to emotion are by far the most effective of the three rhetorical appeals the orator has at his disposal (reason, emotion, and the character of the orator). This meant that “for good or ill, the crowd would be swayed by their emotions, and it falls to the orator to manipulate them responsibly.”<sup>28</sup> *De Oratore* deals primarily with political rhetoric, oratory that would be done in the forum.

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<sup>25</sup> Clayton, “Cicero (106-43 B.C.E).”

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> DiLuzio, “Cicero and the Education of the Republic’s Last Generation: His Program for Civic Renewal,” 18.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 26.

Cicero uses a metaphor that likens technical skill in rhetoric to weaponry. He says, “The stronger this faculty is, the more necessary it is for it to be combined with integrity and supreme wisdom, and if we bestow fluency of speech on persons devoid of those virtues, we shall not have made orators of them but shall have put weapons into the hands of madmen.” This metaphor indicates that there is a right way to wield the weapons of rhetoric, that rhetoric’s role is to be employed in the service of some end, and that rhetoric has the power to be dangerous. In practice, rhetoric can spur a violent revolution, acquit a criminal, rally the troops, or win over a crowd. Because of rhetoric’s power, it is important that those who are strong orators can also discern what ends rhetoric should serve.

Cicero attributes the misuse of rhetoric in Rome to a divide that opened up between word and deed. Crassus recalls that in the “old days at all events the same system of instruction seems to have imparted education both in right conduct and in good speech.”<sup>29</sup> Morality was taught alongside rhetoric, as well as the other subjects. In this system of education the old masters “used to combine with their theory of rhetoric the whole of the study and the science of everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics,” subjects that would be relevant to the practice of rhetoric.<sup>30</sup> After all, the statesman must be able to make ethical decisions and argue for particular courses of action. However, in the divide that had opened up, the art of speaking well had become

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<sup>29</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Oratore: Book III*, trans. H. Rackham, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 47.

<sup>30</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 59.

separated from the art of living well. Rhetoric became disconnected not just from the other subjects, but also from morality.

To illustrate what has occurred, Crassus tells a story of two rivers, “the streams of learning flowing from the common watershed of wisdom.”<sup>31</sup> These two streams, “as rivers do from the Apennines, divided in two, the philosophers flowing down into the entirely Greek waters of the Eastern Mediterranean with its plentiful supply of harbours, while the orators glided into the rocky and inhospitable Western seas of our outlandish Tuscany.”<sup>32</sup> With this image, Crassus establishes that rhetoric and philosophy flow from the same source. They both flow out of wisdom. The streams carry the same water down to their respective destinations. However, they should be studied together because they flow from the same source

After providing this image, Crassus argues that rhetorical theory alone is insufficient and that further study is necessary for eloquence. He says, “Consequently, if we are contented with this degree of eloquence, with the orator” who only knows rhetorical theory;

[A]nd if you people think it sufficient to learn the instructions drawn up by your writers on the science of rhetoric...if you are content with these rules and also the ones you have desired me to state, you are making an orator abandon a vast, immeasurable plain and confine himself to a quite narrow circle. If on the other hand you chose to follow the famous Pericles of old, or even our friend Demosthenes... and if you have grown to love that glorious and supreme ideal, that thing of beauty, the perfect orator, you are bound to accept either the modern dialectic of Carneades or the earlier method of Aristotle.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 57.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

Crassus argues that the technical aspects of oratory are not enough. The ideal orator must also have further knowledge. The older masters combined the study of rhetoric with all the other sciences and with morality. Cicero, through Crassus, does not argue for a brand new educational philosophy, but a return to that of the old masters, who combined eloquence with philosophical learning.

Crassus faults the philosophers, but especially Socrates, for causing the separation of philosophy and rhetoric because, despite possessing both knowledge and eloquence, Socrates shrank from participation in political life.<sup>34</sup> His preference of leisure to politics drew him away from public affairs.<sup>35</sup> Formerly, the disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy were both called philosophy, but “Socrates robbed them of this general designation, and in his discussions separated the science of wise thinking from that of elegant speaking, though in reality they are closely linked together.”<sup>36</sup> The orators were not innocent in this process. In response to Socrates and the other philosophers, they “scorned wisdom, [which was] a dangerous development considering that political leaders must be capable of speaking *well* on a broad range of topics,” including virtue.<sup>37</sup> To leave wisdom behind is hazardous because without wisdom rhetoric can be reduced to a technical science and that is not guided by morality.

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<sup>34</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 49. Although Socrates uses rhetoric, it seems that Cicero faults him for not using rhetoric, informed by wisdom, in the public square.

<sup>35</sup> DiLuzio, “Cicero and the Education of the Republic’s Last Generation: His Program for Civic Renewal,” 22.

<sup>36</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 49.

<sup>37</sup> DiLuzio, “Cicero and the Education of the Republic’s Last Generation: His Program for Civic Renewal,” 22.

Cicero was not the only Roman to observe that the separation of rhetoric and philosophy was detrimental. Quintilian, a Roman educator who lived during the empire and was troubled with similar issues as Cicero, artfully describes the separation.

Some, disdainful of the effort of speaking well, returned to the business of forming character and establishing rules of life, and kept for themselves what would be, if the division were possible, the more important part; they laid claim, however, to a very presumptuous name, wishing to be regarded as only 'students of wisdom'—a distinction which neither the greatest generals nor the most famous statesmen and administrators have ever dared claim for themselves, because they have always preferred to do right rather than to profess it.<sup>38</sup>

Quintilian, like Cicero, was concerned with action. The choice of the philosophers, to remove themselves from political action and not use their wisdom for the good of the state, created the space in which men could be trained in the science of rhetoric without wisdom. The philosophers kept the more important part, wisdom. Taking Clodius as a powerful example, the misuse of rhetoric posed a substantial threat to Roman society. Because Cicero saw that rhetoric has the “power of driving the hearers forward in any direction in which it has applied its weight,”<sup>39</sup> he recognized that an educational philosophy that treats the two subjects independently could also lead to a separation between philosophy and rhetoric in practice.

The separation of wisdom from political action removed the practical aim of philosophy and affected education. According to Cicero, the dialogues of Socrates are also “the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set

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<sup>38</sup> Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans. Donald A. Russell, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 59.

<sup>39</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 45.

of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak.”<sup>40</sup> Rhetoric and philosophy became separate disciplines, taught by distinct teachers. Practically this meant that students were no longer taught to speak informed by philosophy and morality, nor were they taught that the study of philosophy ought to guide their whole lives. This development was problematic because the orator, unchecked by morality, has the ability to incite a crowd to action towards wicked ends.

Because Cicero understands philosophy to have the power to develop morality and direct the choices of men according to wisdom, it is natural for him to try to incorporate the study of philosophy in the orator’s education. He hopes to reconcile the disciplines and produce the kind of man that Phoenix was ordered to make the young Achilles, “both a speaker of words and a performer of deeds.”<sup>41</sup> For Cicero, a performer of deeds is a man who partakes in political life. The wisdom found in philosophy ought to inform both the words and deeds of the man in public life.

### *Philosophy and Rhetoric in Education*

Cicero’s proposal in *De Oratore* does not entirely restructure education in Rome. He still wants students to be trained in oratory, but alongside philosophical training. The students that Cicero is interested in are those who advance to study under the *rhetor*. These students are those who will be handed the weapons of rhetoric and must also be guided by wisdom. Because Cicero does not rework the elementary levels of study, he assumes that any student he is training to be an orator will have learned the rules of correct Latin grammar by undergoing a “systematic study of literature, or else by the

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<sup>40</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 49.

<sup>41</sup> Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Caroline Alexander, (Broadway: HarperCollins Publishers, 2015), 187.

habit of daily conversation in the family circle, and confirmed by books and by reading the old orators and poets.”<sup>42</sup> Here, he refers to what a child would often have learned in the school of the *grammaticus*. This is valuable education that not only prepares a student to learn oratory, but also participates in moral formation. Knowledge of grammar and literature is foundational for an orator. Grammar is essential because an orator must know how to speak correctly, and literature is necessary because it furnishes the orator with the context he will need, provides examples of good speech, and illustrates moral and immoral action.

To learn oratory, students must listen and read speeches, but also develop a unique style of speaking through practice. Practice occurs in the school of the *rhetor* (and in the law courts early on in a boy’s career), as described in the previous chapter. Because the purpose of oratory is “to throw light on the facts,”<sup>43</sup> each style must allow for effective and clear communication. Those whose speeches are “clear explicit and full, perspicuous in matter and in language,” “who in the actual delivery achieve a sort of rhythm and cadence,” and “who manage this same artistry as the relative importance of the facts and persons concerned directs,” are the kind of orators who may be called eloquent.<sup>44</sup> The fundamental goal of the orator is to communicate the content of the speech clearly, but style can add to the persuasiveness and beauty of a speech. As they are being trained, students of rhetoric must learn both about content and style.

Crassus reveals that the true orator’s aim is to shed light on the facts. This means that the content of the orator’s speeches must have truth-value. The ideal orator must be

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<sup>42</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 39.

<sup>43</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 41.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

able to balance using style to engage the listener and providing truthful content. Cicero seems to be in conversation with Plato on this point regarding the nature of rhetoric. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates argues that “an orator must know the subjects of which he is speaking and that “true” rhetoric must be tailored to the soul(s) of his audience.”<sup>45</sup> Only after mastering the truth can an orator convince others of it. Lysias’ speech in the *Phaedrus* is an example of the technical aspects of rhetoric being used without the truth. This speech could not be classified as “true” rhetoric. Through *De Oratore*, Cicero argues along very similar lines, and “the form and content of *de Oratore* nonetheless implies that Cicero agrees, at least in principle, with the use of such “true” rhetoric in the formation of the orator.”<sup>46</sup> Making the truth clear is a part of the definition of oratory for Cicero.

Because the purpose of oratory is to throw light on the facts, the orator must be able to discern what the facts are. Philosophy can play a role in this process. Dialectic, in particular, enables “the pursuit of philosophy through which one gains knowledge and learns to think properly.”<sup>47</sup> To make the truth clear through oratory, the first step for the orator is understanding what truth needs to be made clear through speech. Philosophy is essential for this reason. Its study prepares a person to be able to throw light on the facts by developing the capacity to think and reason well.

Cicero’s educational philosophy substitutes the practical process of rhetoric for “the more theoretical goal of philosophy, but with a deeper basis of knowledge than

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<sup>45</sup> DiLuzio, “Cicero and the Education of the Republic’s Last Generation: His Program for Civic Renewal,” 19.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 21.

could be derived solely from the study of rhetorical rules.”<sup>48</sup> In the education of the ideal orator, the theory of rhetoric is insufficient. Using Crassus as an example of a good orator, Cicero shows that a student must study philosophy in order to become the ideal orator. Crassus himself has not had the opportunity for time singularly dedicated to the study of philosophy because of the demands of public life, but he recognizes its importance and has devoted as much time as possible. Crassus argues that “the genuine orator must have investigated and heard and read and discussed and handled and debated the whole of the contents of the life of mankind inasmuch as that is the field of the orator’s activity, the subject matter of his study.”<sup>49</sup> Antonius declares that philosophy has been the source from which Crassus’s oratorical fluency has derived.<sup>50</sup> Philosophy has informed Crassus’ rhetoric because it has allowed him to make inquiry into the truth that he is charged with making clear as an orator. This is the way philosophy and rhetoric ought to be used together.

Because the orator is devoted to public life, he applies philosophy in practice and handles the material differently from “those who take their pleasure in the pursuit of the sciences themselves.”<sup>51</sup> The study of philosophy for the orator is practical. He utilizes it when he faces decisions and moral dilemmas. The orator uses philosophy in order to “speak both *pro* and *contra* on the topics of virtue, duty, equity and good, moral worth and utility, honour and disgrace, reward and punishment, and like matters.”<sup>52</sup> To this end,

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<sup>48</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 9.

<sup>49</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 43.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 69.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 84-85.

the orator must understand these topics, and then apply the science of rhetoric to that knowledge. Philosophy is the vehicle by which the orator understands the topics relevant to human life and determines how to treat them in speech. Without a rich understanding of these topics, there is the risk that the orator will lead others astray by not speaking the truth. Philosophy seeks to discern the truth and allows the orator to grasp at the right and the true. Only then can the orator speak with his speech informed by the truth that is revealed in philosophical study.

Cicero's proposal for education does not fully depart from the common practices in Roman education. In fact, Cicero's proposal could have easily been supported by the structures already in place, as well as affirmed by the virtues of the ideal Roman that educators already sought to develop. Overall, it was understood that "the good Roman was self-controlled and self-disciplined, respected family ancestors and traditions, maintained property in good order, was thrifty and temperate, and patriotically and courageously performed the military and civil duties needed by the state."<sup>53</sup> The educational practices in Rome helped the Romans to pass on tradition, decorum, and the proper Roman values. Cicero incorporates some of the old Roman values into his educational philosophy, encouraging students to learn from their elders and from traditional books, texts, and speeches. He recognizes these practices as good pedagogy that works alongside philosophy to inculcate virtue in children. Additionally, Cicero's conception of oratory aligns with Roman *pietas*. The orator educated by philosophy can better serve the state because he is equipped to act rightly.

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<sup>53</sup> Gutek, *Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 44.

## *Conclusion*

Cicero was unique in that he was a statesman and a philosopher. As one of Rome's greatest orators, he was deeply committed to public life, but he always retained a love for philosophy. He saw that rhetoric had the potential to be dangerous in Rome if it was used by those who lacked morality. Cicero sought through *De Oratore* to incorporate philosophy into rhetorical education in Rome to morally educate future orators. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Romans already had in place many structures that promoted moral education. Even though Cicero's proposal for education does not entirely restructure education in Rome, Cicero thought that Roman education needed philosophy if it was to produce moral orators. He observed that philosophy had been separated from the study of rhetoric in Rome, which had allowed for the weapons of oratory to be placed in the hands of men who were ill equipped to determine how they ought to be used. By bringing together the study of rhetoric and the study of philosophy, Cicero hopes to form moral orators that will use the faculty of rhetoric well. Cicero believes in the capacity of philosophy to make men moral. The wisdom furnished by philosophy is the foundation from which the orator may use the faculty of rhetoric in service of the proper ends. Although Cicero shows the danger that results from the separation of philosophy and rhetoric and how philosophy could help the orator to better accomplish the goal of shedding light on the facts, Cicero does not fully explain in *De Oratore* why the study of these two disciplines together should produce moral orators.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Rhetoric and Philosophy as Moral Education

*Philosophy “educated us first to worship [the gods], secondly to justice among men, which is based on the community of the human race, then to self-control and valour of the soul. It too drove the darkness from our minds as from our eyes, so that we could see everything above and below, the first and the last things between.*

*-Cicero, Tusculan Disputation 1*

In the philosophical traditions of both Plato and Aristotle—of which Cicero is an inheritor—the practice of philosophy is a constituent of the virtuous life. It is by the philosophical pursuit of truth, so the thinking goes, that man can become virtuous. Cicero augments this tradition by arguing in the first *Tusculan Disputation* that rhetorical practices, in addition to philosophical practices, play a necessary role in the pursuit of truth, and therefore, moral education.

Cicero divides the practice of rhetoric into five parts. Three of the practices of the orator—delivery, memory, and invention—play a role in the pursuit of truth. In order to see how, we will look at the way that delivery, memory, and invention correspond to three of the four immortal qualities of the soul identified by Cicero, while philosophy corresponds to the fourth. Finally, we will see how Cicero models the proper use of moral rhetoric alongside philosophy in the dialogue itself.

*Philosophy, Happiness, Virtue and the Soul in Plato and Aristotle*

As noted in the previous chapter, Cicero was greatly influenced by the works of Plato and Aristotle. He builds upon Plato and Aristotle's views of the soul and its highest activity in *Tusculan 1*. To better contextualize Cicero's stance, we will briefly review how philosophy, happiness, virtue, and the soul are related in the works of Plato and Aristotle because in Cicero's program for moral education philosophy is central. The arguments of Plato and Aristotle that identify the practices of philosophy as key to the development of virtue support Cicero's claim that philosophy should be included in the moral education of the orator. Through *Tusculan 1* we will see that Cicero sees the practices of rhetoric also having the capacity to develop morality in a similar way.

Plato and Aristotle both make inquiries into what constitutes human flourishing—the best human life—in the *Republic* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, respectively. For Plato the proper ordering of the soul places the rational part at the helm, and by exercising reason through the practices of philosophy, he believes man is able to perceive the good and become virtuous. This constitutes the happiest life for man. For Aristotle, happiness is found by fulfilling one's characteristic function, which for man is the exercise of reason (it is the rational nature of man's soul that distinguishes man). The highest form of this is, of course, the practice of philosophy. Like Plato, Aristotle understood the practice of virtue to be part of the happiest life. Aristotle also believed that the practice of virtue requires more than knowledge of the good: one must will to do the good once he has discovered it. Virtue must be developed through education and habit.

Socrates argues that men can encounter the good through rational activity. For instance, in mathematics learning about the number one can “lead and turn around toward

the contemplation of what *is*,”<sup>1</sup> and geometry “tends to make it easier to make out the *idea* of the good” and “it can draw the soul toward truth.”<sup>2</sup> But, Socrates identifies dialectic as the process that releases a prisoner from bondage (as in the Allegory of the Cave) and turns him toward the light. Socrates tells Glaucon that just as sight looks at the animals and the stars before looking at the sun itself,

So also, when a man tries by discussion—by means of argument without the use of any of the senses—to attain to each thing itself that *is* and doesn’t give up before he grasps by intellection itself that which is good itself, he comes to the very end of the intelligible realm just as that other man was then at the end of the visible.<sup>3</sup>

Dialectic is one of the chief methods by which Socrates reasons in his dialogues. It is a way of conducting philosophical inquiry and attempting to glimpse Truth. The soul that has sought to reason toward the truth is the soul that is most capable displaying virtue. Having glimpsed Justice, it can behave in a just manner. The soul that engages in philosophical inquiry is best equipped to determine what he ought to do in particular situations. Because becoming moral or virtuous derives from seeing the good to living in accordance with virtue, a life spent engaging in philosophy can lead to living the best human life.

Aristotle defines *eudaimonia* as activity performing one’s characteristic function well.<sup>4</sup> Aristotle observes that man is unique in that he is rational; neither the plants nor the animals have a rational part in their souls. Because reason is unique to humans, “the

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<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republic*, trans. Allan Bloom, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 525a.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 526e, 527b.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 532b.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Martin Ostwald, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999), 1177a10-15.

proper function of man, then, consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle or, at least, not without it.”<sup>5</sup> Because happiness is “activity in conformity with virtue” and man’s highest virtue is his reason, happiness for man is rational activity.<sup>6</sup> A life guided by rational activity “is the best and most pleasant for man, inasmuch as intelligence, above all else, is man.”<sup>7</sup> The kinds of activities that man must do to participate in the happy life are those that are desirable in themselves. Aristotle says that “actions in conformity with virtue evidently constitute such activities; for to perform noble and good deeds is something desirable for its own sake.”<sup>8</sup> The virtues for Aristotle are both intellectual, which can be furnished by teaching, and the moral, which must be developed by habit.<sup>9</sup> The happiest life for man, in his view, is guided by reason and must consist of the exercise of virtue.

Cicero includes philosophy in the orator’s moral education. Although Plato and Aristotle understand the relationship between the practices of philosophy and the development of virtue differently, they both recognize it to play a key role. Cicero agrees that the practices of philosophy aid moral formation. However, the education he recommends includes philosophy and rhetoric. We will see that the relationship between rhetorical and philosophical practices and the four immortal qualities of the soul that Cicero identifies in the first *Tusculan* explains why an education consisting of rhetoric and philosophy comprises moral education.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 1098a5-10.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 1177a15.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 1178a5.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 1176b5.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 1103a15.

### *Cicero's Four Immortal Qualities of the Soul*

In the first *Tusculan Disputation*, Cicero identifies four immortal qualities of the soul, all of which, we will see, correspond to rhetorical and philosophical practices. Before examining the correspondences, we will first survey each quality that Cicero distinguishes. Cicero wrote the *Tusculan Disputations* while Julius Caesar held an almost sovereign reign in Rome. Cicero often turned to philosophy when he faced political disappointments, “but nowhere else does he make it so clear that he sees no hope of relief from the oppressiveness of Caesar’s rule.”<sup>10</sup> The five dialogues differ from many of Cicero’s other philosophical dialogues. They are not written *in utramque partem*, with alternating speeches presenting the different views nor do they present the viewpoint of one speaker. Instead, they take the form “of the refutation of a thesis propounded by some other person,” that occasionally intervenes or interrupts.<sup>11</sup>

In the dialogues, the speaker titled M is thought to speak for Cicero, and A is the speaker that raises the thesis that M attempts to refute.<sup>12</sup> Cicero describes the *Tusculans* “as his *senilis declamatio*, the (philosophical) declamation of his old age as opposed to the (oratorical) declamation of earlier years.”<sup>13</sup> The thesis that M attempts to disprove is the opinion that death is an evil.<sup>14</sup> Through the disputations, Cicero strives to convince others, and himself, that the life of virtue really is the best life, even when suffering and

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<sup>10</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero, Introduction in *Tusculan Disputations I*, trans. A.E. Douglas, (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd, 1985), 17.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>12</sup> The form of the dialogue as a refutation makes it more likely that M speaks for Cicero.

<sup>13</sup> Introduction in *Tusculan Disputations I*, 16.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

tragedy strike. He is concerned with the value of a life of virtue apart from external factors. The disappointment he has experienced in the deterioration of Rome inspires Cicero to argue that despite all that has befallen him, the life of virtue is still the most worthy and can still be called the best life.

In the first *Tusculan* Cicero describes “the immortal quality of the soul in terminology made familiar in rhetorical theory.”<sup>15</sup> Given the significance of the soul in relation to the study of philosophy and virtue in Plato and Aristotle, it is striking that Cicero discusses the immortality of the soul by using rhetorical language. However, as discussed previously, for Cicero one of the definitional aspects of rhetoric is that it ought to be based on truth, as opposed to opinion or falsehood. In this way rhetoric and philosophy are similar in Cicero’s view. In his inquiry into the soul in *Tusculan Disputation 1*, Cicero begins by identifying the divine qualities that contribute to the immortality of the soul. We will come to see that three of the four immortal qualities of the soul correspond to three of the five traditional practices of the orator (delivery, memory, invention, arrangement, and style). The final is philosophy. Thus, we will see that rhetoric and philosophy both imitate and participate in the immortal qualities of the soul.

The first divine quality of the soul that Cicero identifies is motion. He quotes the *Phaedrus* at length to support his argument and appeals to Socrates’ claim that “what always moves is eternal.”<sup>16</sup> Something that always moves was never moved by anything outside itself. Instead, it set itself in motion, is in motion, and never desists from motion.

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<sup>15</sup> Daniel P. Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul in *Tusculan Disputation 1*,” *Syllecta Classica* 24, (2013): 79.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 49.

Cicero, like Socrates before him, claims that the soul has this quality of motion. He argues that “the soul perceives that it moves, and when it perceives that, it perceives as well that it moves through its own and not an external power. Nor can it come about that it is ever abandoned by itself.”<sup>17</sup> Because its motion is unceasing, it is eternal. This is the argument of “automatic movement: that that which sets itself in motion, and the motion of which is not imparted by an external source, is eternal.”<sup>18</sup> The immortality of the soul contributes to Cicero’s overall argument in the first *Tusculan* by explaining why death is not evil—because an immortal soul is not destroyed by bodily death. This means that the good of the soul is relevant beyond death.

The second divine quality of the soul that Cicero identifies is memory. He appeals to Plato’s claim that memory is “a recollection of an earlier life” and the example in the *Meno* of Socrates leading a boy through questions in geometry that results in the boy being able to answer as if he had learned geometry.<sup>19</sup> From this experience, “Socrates claims it follows that learning is nothing other than remembering.”<sup>20</sup> He does not think that this outcome would be possible if the boy did not have some prior knowledge. By leading the boy with questions, he reminds the boy of the truth he already knows.

Souls have different capacities to remember, but the right questions can help a person recollect what they know.<sup>21</sup> The philosopher is best equipped to remember the

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 84.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 57.

<sup>21</sup> They charioteer myth in the *Phaedrus* makes this idea clear.

truth because he was able to glimpse Reality prior to his life by looking at the Plain of Truth. Memory speaks to the fact that the soul existed prior to animating a human body. Cicero marvels at the memory of mankind, especially for those “who are engaged in some major study and art” because of how much they remember.<sup>22</sup> He thinks that memory is so remarkable that it is obvious what its power and source are. He says, “whether it is of breath or fire I do not know, nor am I ashamed, as they are, to admit that I do not know what I do not know. If I could assert anything else on this obscure topic, I should swear that whether the soul is breath or fire, it is divine.”<sup>23</sup> The ability of humans to recall truth through memory points to immortality.

The third immortal quality of the soul that Cicero identifies is discovery/invention, “the power which explores what is hidden.”<sup>24</sup> To illustrate this quality of the soul, Cicero points to the example of “the man who first gave names to things,” the man who “first gathered together mankind,” the man “who brought within the limits of only a few written signs the sounds of speech which seemed countless,” and the man “who marked the courses, advances and pauses of the wandering stars.”<sup>25</sup> Like with memory, Cicero marvels at this unique quality of the soul. He does not see how it could have possibly come from our “earthy, mortal and transitory nature,” but that it must be divine.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 51.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. 53.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 53.

By discovering the world and making sense of it, man participates in a divine activity. Cicero likens this activity to the creation of the world by the god in the *Timaeus*.<sup>27</sup> Discovery imitates the divine, but Cicero also sees discovery as being inspired by the divine. He does not suppose “that a poet pours forth his impressive and resounding verses without some heavenly prompting of the mind, or that eloquence flows with a flood of resolute words and copious thoughts without some strong power.”<sup>28</sup> Invention, as described in the first *Tusculan*, is “the process by which humans have conceived of and investigated fields of intellectual activity (*artes*).”<sup>29</sup> It is a creative process, by which man participates in and imitates the activity of the gods.

The final immortal quality of the soul that Cicero identifies is philosophy. He identifies it as a divine quality of the soul because of what it has allowed humans to accomplish. Philosophy

Educated us first to worship [the gods], secondly to justice among men, which is based on the community of the human race, then to self-control and valour of the soul. It too drove the darkness from our minds as from our eyes, so that we could see everything above and below, the first and the last things between.<sup>30</sup>

Like discovery, philosophy allows man to accomplish remarkable tasks. It permits for discovery of the gods and for discovery about what it means to be a human being. It also is the means by which man has been able to see the truth, to the extent that he is able, and order his life after it. Philosophy has been the vehicle by which man has sought the best life for man. It is what helps man to become virtuous because it is “the cultivation of the

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 94.

<sup>30</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 53.

soul. It draws out vices by the root, prepares the mind to receive seed, and commits to it, and, so to speak, sows in it what, when grown, may bear the most abundant fruit.”<sup>31</sup>

Cicero ends his discussion of the soul by asking, “*Quae autem divina? Vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse.*”<sup>32</sup> *Vigere* (to be active) corresponds to the motion of the soul, *sapere* (to understand, or to be wise) refers to philosophy, *invenire* (to discover) corresponds to discovery or invention, and *meminisse* (to recall or remember) refers to memory. Daniel Hanchey observes that “these infinitives have nominal correspondences with the terms *motus, philosophia, inventio, and memoria*, respectively a list that should attract the attention of both the rhetorician and the dialectician” because three of the terms, *motus, memoria, and inventio* evoke three of the five traditional practices of the orator: “delivery (varyingly called *motus, pronuntiatio, or actio*), memory (*memoria*), and invention (*inventio*, and closely associated with *topica*).”<sup>33</sup> For Cicero, this association is unsurprising, given his commitment to oratory. The four immortal qualities of the soul do not perfectly map onto the practices of the orator, but the correspondences are noteworthy and meaningful for the education of the orator.

#### *Rhetorical Practices and the Immortal Qualities of the Soul*

Delivery (*motus, pronuntiatio, or actio*) in rhetoric traditionally involved control of the voice and of the gestures for the orator. The connection between motion and delivery is not immediately obvious. Hanchey argues that Cicero’s view of *actio/motus* goes beyond the typical definition found in rhetorical textbooks like *Rhetorica ad*

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<sup>31</sup> Cicero, *Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations*, 96.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>33</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 85.

*Herennium*. By relating *actio* to the motion of the soul, “Cicero seeks to render delivery more genuine by connecting it not only to the speaker’s words, but also to his true thoughts and emotions.”<sup>34</sup> In *De Oratore*, Crassus differentiates between the orator and the actor. He stresses the importance of delivery in oratory and calls it the “dominant factor in oratory.”<sup>35</sup> He quips that delivery would not be such a large factor if “reality unaided were sufficiently effective in presentation.”<sup>36</sup> Delivery is necessary because it has the power to incite the proper emotions make reality clear to listeners.

Crassus accuses the orators of abandoning true oratory for acting. He says delivery “has been abandoned by the orators, who are the players that act real life, and has been taken over by the actors who only mimic reality.”<sup>37</sup> Even though both oratory and acting involve a speaking and performing in front of people, Crassus pinpoints an important difference between the two. One represents truth and reality, while the other is an imitation, and “there can be no doubt that reality beats imitation in everything.”<sup>38</sup> Therefore, delivery is integrally connected to the truth, the reality the orator seeks to illuminate.

Crassus also links delivery to the movement of the soul in this section of *De Oratore*. He utilizes the metaphor of a lyre. “The orator’s actions on the rostra are the corresponding external demonstrations of the soul’s movement (*motus animi*), like strings on a lyre strummed by the motion of the soul; bodily action is a sort of reverberation of

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<sup>34</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 86.

<sup>35</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 45.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

the soul's action."<sup>39</sup> In this sense, every look, tone of voice, and gesture corresponds to a movement of the soul. Expression, for Crassus, ought to be authentic to the state of the soul. Because delivery must represent reality or truth and delivery comes from true movements of the soul, delivery (*actio/motus*) is oriented around truth and requires authenticity from the orator.

Memory (*memoria*), the second immortal quality of the soul, is defined by Cicero in a rhetorical context as “the firm mental grasp of matter and words” in *De Inventione*.<sup>40</sup> For Cicero, like Plato, learning is the process of remembering Truth or Reality. Because of this, even rhetorical memory participates in the divine activity of memory. Cicero indicates this with his definition of memory, that it involves grasping both matter and words. It is not enough to simply memorize the words of a speech (*verborum*). The orator must also have a firm grasp of the content of the speech, the matter (*rerum*). Memory for Cicero is much more involved than memorizing the order of words and sentences in order to perform them. It involves understanding and grasping the truth that is contained in the meaning of the words. This means that before an orator can speak, he must understand the truth that he is to proclaim, a high bar for the orator. This standard for rhetoric would not allow for sophistry or the erroneous uses of rhetoric that Cicero aims to eliminate.

Despite the fact that “the rhetorical tradition at times reduced memory to an artificial mnemonic process, never pursuing the implications of the wax tablet metaphor” that was prevalent at the time, Cicero “maintains that the orator’s memory is

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<sup>39</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 86.

<sup>40</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Inventione*, trans. H. M. Hubbell, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949), 21.

fundamentally associated with a natural, psychic faculty or process of remembering... unlike a simple art of mnemonics, such memory reflects the immortal quality of the soul.”<sup>41</sup> Because rhetoric is truth oriented for Cicero, and memory involves recalling Truth, it is fitting that in order for the orator to deliver a speech, he must acquire a firm grasp of both the matter and the words he will be performing. Memory in this sense is similar to understanding. Memory understood in this light establishes a high standard for the orator.

Regarding invention or discovery (*inventio*), rhetorical invention is concerned with the content of a speech. It involves “identifying the question at issue, which is called the *stasis* of the speech, and the available means of persuading the audience to accept the speaker’s position.”<sup>42</sup> Traditionally, the orator has both direct evidence and “artistic” means of persuasion at his disposal. “Artistic” means include “presentation of the speaker’s character (*ethos*) as trustworthy, logical argument (*logos*) that may convince the audience, and the *pathos* or emotion that the speaker can awaken in the audience.”<sup>43</sup>

Cicero defines invention in *De Inventione* as “the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one’s cause plausible.”<sup>44</sup> This is a pretty standard definition of invention. Because *De Inventione* was written about thirty years before *De Oratore*, it predates most of Cicero’s philosophical writing. By defining invention this way, Cicero

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<sup>41</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 94.

<sup>42</sup> Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, 4.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Cicero, *De Inventione*, 19.

is probably “not making a statement on philosophical practice.”<sup>45</sup> Yet, “the presence of a pair of hallmarks of Academic philosophy in this definition (the references to the *very simile* and the *probabile*) highlights the possible relevance of *inventio* to a philosophical method in search of knowledge.”<sup>46</sup>

These terms tie invention to the search for truth. In *Tusculan* 1 it is defined as “the power which explores what is hidden.”<sup>47</sup> Because Cicero thinks that rhetoric should be based in the truth, rhetorical invention is a process that seeks and discovers truth. Rhetorical invention and invention more broadly are connected both in process and in aim. Invention for the soul is “the ability to discover *artes* with a view to the development of specific abilities aimed at achieving knowledge of the truth,” while invention for the orator is the ability to discover what is true or seemingly true for his argument.<sup>48</sup> Both types of invention involve the same kind of activity. The difference lies in that the orator’s occurs within the frame of the topic or argument he is currently engaged in.

The final immortal quality of the soul that Cicero identifies, philosophy (*philosophia*), does not map onto any of the five traditional practices of the orator (delivery, memory, invention, arrangement, and style). However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Cicero argues for the inclusion of philosophy in the education of the orator. As Plato and Aristotle argued, philosophy plays a key role in the development of virtue. Through the practice of philosophy, the orator can try to discover the truth of the

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<sup>45</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 94.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>47</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 53.

<sup>48</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 95.

subjects he is to speak on and attempt to align his life to philosophy's moral precepts. Cicero even calls philosophy the "mistress of morals and discipline."<sup>49</sup> Philosophy pursues the virtuous life, and because the orator is responsible to use the faculty of rhetoric well, the virtue that philosophy furnishes is essential for him.

Philosophy, as the fourth immortal quality of the soul, is distinct from the other three. It is a "traditionally dialectical activity (*sapere*)," while the others are rhetorical activities (*vigere, meminisse, invenire*).<sup>50</sup> The study of philosophy is argued to be indispensable for the orator in *De Oratore*, and in the *Tusculan Disputations*, philosophy is included as one of the activities that imitates the divine and proves the immortality of the soul.

Philosophy alone is not the highest achievement or virtue of the soul, as Plato argued in the *Republic* or as Aristotle argued in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for Cicero.<sup>51</sup> Instead, it is classed with three rhetorical practices. Not only should the orator study philosophy, but the "philosopher, in addition to pursuing knowledge through dialectic in the tradition of all Socratic philosophy, also should and must practice rhetoric."<sup>52</sup> For Cicero, then, philosophy is one of the fundamental practices of the orator.

When Cicero asks, "*Quae autem divina?*" He uses verbs (*vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse*) to describe what characteristics make the soul divine.<sup>53</sup> These verbs are translated into English as nouns (energy/motion, wisdom, invention, and memory), but the Latin conveys that they are actions and that the soul is active when participating in

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<sup>49</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 253.

<sup>50</sup> Hanchey, "Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul," 99.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 100.

<sup>53</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 55.

any of these practices. Whether a man engages in the practice of philosophy or the practices of rhetoric, he “echoes and performs the behaviors that render his soul divine.”<sup>54</sup> The union between rhetoric and philosophy that Cicero creates in his description of the immortal qualities of the soul brings together his argument that philosophy in rhetorical education constitutes moral education.

It does this in three ways. First, Cicero establishes that the practices of rhetoric are worthy in themselves because they reflect and imitate three of the divine qualities of the soul.<sup>55</sup> Because the qualities of the soul that are immortal can be imitated by and participated in through rhetoric, rhetoric becomes one of the highest human activities. This places philosophy and rhetoric in the same class, both practices that imitate the immortal qualities of the soul and are valuable activities in themselves. Second, Cicero establishes rhetoric as a process aimed at truth. Delivery requires authenticity of the orator, memory involves recalling Truth, and invention involves discovery of the truth. In Cicero’s formulation of rhetoric, philosophy and rhetoric are two methods aimed at the same end, truth. The practices of both philosophy and rhetoric aim at truth and offer avenues by which it can be sought. Because for Cicero philosophy alone is not the soul’s highest activity, the orator who studies and practices both philosophy and rhetoric engages in the highest activities of the soul, imitating and participating in the divine. He drinks from the common source (wisdom) from which the streams of philosophy and rhetoric flow. Third, by including philosophy in moral education Cicero stands in agreement with those in the Greek philosophical tradition who saw philosophy as that which furnishes morality. Philosophy, in Cicero’s proposal, retains its position as a key

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<sup>54</sup> Hanchey, “Rhetoric and the Immortal Soul,” 100.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

player in the moral formation of men. Philosophy cultivates the soul of the orator in order to make him virtuous.

The orator educated in rhetoric and philosophy will be able to illuminate the truth, or what seems to be true, through rhetoric and will be better equipped to discern what ends the faculty of rhetoric should serve. With the understanding of the immortal soul provided in the first *Tusculan*, Cicero shows that a curriculum that unites the study of philosophy and the study of rhetoric trains students in the practices that aim at the happy life and develop morality. He also reorients rhetorical practices to aim at truth and establishes a high standard for the art of oratory.

#### *M as a Model for the use of Rhetoric and Philosophy in Tusculan 1*

In *Tusculan 1*, Cicero also models the way in which philosophy and rhetoric are complementary through the dialogue itself. Before M gives his view on the immortality of the soul In *Tusculan Disputation 1*, he and A have a conversation about Plato's *Phaedo*. The *Phaedo* is notable because, after all the arguments have been completed, Crito remains unconvinced. Cicero retells a conversation that occurs between Socrates and Crito at the end of the *Phaedo*:

After discussing the immortality of souls and the time to die was already pressing, he was asked by Crito how he wanted to be buried. 'I have wasted a lot of effort, my friends' he said, 'I have failed to persuade my friend Crito that I shall fly away from here and leave nothing of myself behind. But Crito, if you can catch me or come upon my anywhere, bury me any way you like. But believe me, none of you *will* catch me, when I leave here.' A fine utterance that: he gave his friend leave and showed that he was quite unconcerned about this whole business."<sup>56</sup>

In Cicero's retelling of the scene, Socrates admits his failure to convince Crito and shows that he is committed to the truth of his argument that death is not an evil. The admission

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<sup>56</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 77.

of wasted effort “attributed to Socrates finds no parallel in the Platonic text.”<sup>57</sup> Cicero’s Socrates takes the failure much more seriously than Plato’s Socrates; there is “no suggestion that the failure to convince Crito undoes what has been achieved in the conversation with Cebes and Simmias” in the Platonic text.<sup>58</sup> The Platonic Socrates simply admits a failure to convince Crito, but “Cicero’s Socrates admits the failure of the entire dialogue, and thus Cicero’s Socrates confesses the ultimate defeat of his method.”<sup>59</sup>

Dialectic was insufficient to convince Crito that death is not an evil. When M brings up the *Phaedo* to A early on in their discussion, they discuss the *Phaedo*’s inability to convince A as well:

M: Why do you need my help then? Surely I can’t outdo Plato in eloquence. Read carefully that book of his on the soul: you will want nothing more.

A: I have done that, many times too. But somehow while I am reading, I am convinced, but when I put the book down and begin to think for myself about the immortality of souls, I lose all that conviction.<sup>60</sup>

The *Phaedo* is somehow insufficient to convince both Crito and A about the immortality of the soul. In the conversation, there is no indication that the *Phaedo* “has been found logically defective, badly written, or difficult to comprehend... The problem is that the *Phaedo* has produced only a temporary enchantment.”<sup>61</sup> *Tusculan 1*, taking up the same subject matter, seems to be “implicitly offered as a ‘Roman’ alternative, that claims to be

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<sup>57</sup> Lawrence P. Schrenk, “Cicero on Rhetoric and Philosophy: Tusculan Disputations I,” *Ancient Philosophy* 14, no. 2 (1994): 356.

<sup>58</sup> William Stull, “Reading the *Phaedo* in *Tusculan Disputations 1*,” *Classical Philology* 107 (2012): 50.

<sup>59</sup> Schenk, “Cicero on Rhetoric and Philosophy: Tusculan Disputations I,” 356.

<sup>60</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 34.

<sup>61</sup> Stull, “Reading the *Phaedo* in *Tusculan Disputations 1*,” 39.

successful because it makes not only a rational appeal, but also a rhetorical one.”<sup>62</sup>

Cicero’s method is similar to Socrates’ in this dialogue, but he adds to Socrates’ approach by incorporating Roman rhetoric into the philosophical argument.

For *Tusculan 1* to go beyond the *Phaedo*, it must convince A in such a way that he will not lose his conviction. At the end of M’s philosophical argument, A admits that he has been convinced by M’s argument, saying, “by your whole discourse it was certainly brought about that I did not reckon death among evils.”<sup>63</sup> Because A has read the *Phaedo* and was convinced by it at first, but later lost his conviction, it seems that M’s argument has not improved upon Socrates’. Based on his previous response, A is still at risk of losing his conviction upon further reflection.

M responds to A by asking a question that is on its face, unrelated. He asks, “Well then, do we need a peroration on rhetorical lines? Or are we now abandoning this art completely?”<sup>64</sup> A peroration is the concluding part of a speech, an epilogue, that is a common rhetorical device. A encourages M to proceed with his peroration. In the peroration, M goes beyond his earlier arguments where “philosophers, poets, and nations had testified to the immortality of the soul and the positive benefits of death;” here he appeals to the gods and their own approval of M’s argument that death should not be ranked among evils.<sup>65</sup> The “affirmation of the gods and the rousing rhetorical finish” are effective and seem to solidify A’s conviction of the truth of M’s argument.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Schenk, “Cicero on Rhetoric and Philosophy: Tusculan Disputations I,” 355.

<sup>63</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 83.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>65</sup> Schenk, “Cicero on Rhetoric and Philosophy: Tusculan Disputations I,” 360.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

When M finishes the peroration, A tells him, “the peroration of yours has made me even more resolved.”<sup>67</sup> The peroration belongs to the art of rhetoric alone, and not the art of philosophy. Even though M seeks to convince A with a philosophical argument for most of the dialogue, he uses the rhetorical peroration to affirm the conviction he has produced through dialectic. The use of the peroration “does prove efficacious in affirming A’s belief; rhetoric has made a contribution to belief beyond that which philosophy offered.”<sup>68</sup> Cicero’s dialogue on the soul differs from Plato’s in that it does not end with the completion of the philosophical argument, it goes on to utilize rhetorical flourish to affirm the truth that has been revealed in discussion, and it demonstrates the effectiveness of rhetoric.

Cicero’s use of rhetoric within *Tusculan 1* illustrates the value of rhetoric in persuading individuals of the truth that can be found through philosophical processes. The practices of rhetoric and the practices of philosophy are complementary in the pursuit of truth. M shows that together philosophy and rhetoric can go beyond the capabilities of either by itself. Rhetoric can affirm and strengthen conviction of truth sought by philosophy.

### *Conclusion*

The Greek tradition had understood philosophy to be a key component of developing morality. Cicero himself loved philosophy, was formed by it, and turned to it throughout his life. He lived a life informed by philosophy and sought to incorporate it further into Roman life and the education of those who would become orators.

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<sup>67</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations I*, 87.

<sup>68</sup> Schenk, “Cicero on Rhetoric and Philosophy: *Tusculan Disputations I*,” 360.

In *Tusculan Disputation 1* Cicero makes the case for rhetorical practices to be classed with philosophy as the highest activities of the soul. The four immortal qualities of the soul that Cicero identifies bring together philosophy and rhetoric. Three of the qualities (motion, memory, and discovery) correspond with rhetorical practices (delivery, memory, and invention), and the fourth is philosophy. Because the rhetorical practices and philosophy imitate and participate in the four immortal qualities of the soul, rhetoric is elevated to be worthy in itself, like philosophy had long been thought to be. Additionally, Cicero redefines the rhetorical practices by orienting them around truth. This view of rhetoric requires it to be based on truth and establishes a high standard for the orator.

Cicero also illustrates the complementary natures of rhetoric and philosophy through the dialogue itself. *Tusculan 1* takes on the same subject matter as the *Phaedo*, a dialogue in which Socrates' interlocutor, Crito, remains unconvinced at the end. Cicero seeks to improve upon the *Phaedo* by having M convince A in a more lasting way. A is persuaded at the end of the philosophical argument, but he was also persuaded by the *Phaedo* until, upon further reflection, he lost his conviction. After hearing A's assent to the philosophical argument, M goes on with rhetorical flourish by giving a peroration. At the end of this peroration, A's conviction has been strengthened. Through this episode, Cicero shows that philosophy and rhetoric are complementary and can be used together to shed light on the truth. Together, philosophy and rhetoric can go beyond what either could do on its own.

In light of the first *Tusculan*, Cicero's recommendation that the orator be trained in philosophy in addition to rhetoric is fitting. The education that Cicero seeks to provide

habituates an individual in practicing the highest activities of the soul. This curriculum constitutes moral education because the practice of philosophy engages the soul in pursuit of the best life, the life of virtue. It also supplies the soul with a method by which it can seek after truth. The rhetorical practices, as Cicero relates them to the immortal qualities of the soul, provide another method for discovering truth and establish standard that determines to what ends rhetoric may apply its weight. The soul that studies and practices philosophy and rhetoric will be oriented toward truth and will use rhetorical practices to shed light on the truth, much like M does at the end of *Tusculan Disputation* 1. M is able to show the truth to A through dialectic, but also uses rhetoric to affirm and strengthen the conviction that has been created within A. As a man trained in both philosophy and rhetoric, M is able to go beyond the capabilities of the philosopher and use the tools of rhetoric for the proper purpose: to illuminate the truth. M's use of rhetoric models the way in which Cicero Roman orators will use the power of oratory.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### The Tullian Approach Applied to America

*“The stronger this faculty is, the more necessary it is for it to be combined with integrity and supreme wisdom, and if we bestow fluency of speech on persons devoid of those virtues, we shall not have made orators of them but shall have put weapons into the hands of madmen.”*

*-Cicero, De Oratore: Book III*

Cicero’s approach to moral education is vastly different from the methods that are currently being used in America today. Cicero does not carry the baggage that exists in American educational thought. In this chapter, we will briefly walk through the history of moral education in America and then I will suggest five aspects of Cicero’s educational philosophy that could be applicable in America. In our cursory look at the history of moral education in America, we will see that moral education has been tied to religion since America’s inception. Christianity played a significant role in education for over a century. However, since the doctrine of the high “wall of separation” between church and state was applied to public education and the Bible was removed from public schooling, a variety of approaches to moral education have developed. These attempts speak to the fact that moral education remains a priority in America. However, America seems to remain in need of a systematic and comprehensive approach to moral education. Because Cicero’s proposal, which I am calling “The Tullian Approach” is not composed of religious moral precepts, it could be well suited for America.

### *Moral Education and Christianity in the U.S.*

The New World was first colonized by many individuals and groups that sought to escape religious oppression or licentiousness in their home countries. For some, settlement in the New World held the promise of freedom to educate children in morality and religion. The Puritans were one of these groups. They held knowledge in high regard for religious reasons. In 1647, they passed what has been called the “Old Deluder Satan” law, which “held that it was ‘one chief project’ of the ‘Old Deluder Satan’ to ‘keep men from knowledge of the Scriptures.’”<sup>1</sup> In order to prevent children from being deluded “towns with fifty householders were required to establish a school which would teach reading and writing... [and] towns with one hundred householders were ordered to set up a grammar school.”<sup>2</sup> For the Puritans, education was expressly tied with religion. Knowledge was believed to guard against the delusions of Satan and lead to moral behavior. Thus, for some of the first settlers of America, education, morality, and religion were closely related.

The Puritans thought that moral education could benefit their children, but they also saw moral education as a way to “promote social harmony, encourage hard work, and spread the Christian faith to the heathen”—in short, a method to widen the sway of religious orthodoxy.<sup>3</sup> Although the Puritans believed in predestination and did not see moral education as a means of assuring the salvation of those who were not elect, they thought it could expose the elect to the message of salvation and promote moral behavior

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Hunt and Monalisa McCurry Mullins, *Moral Education in America's Schools: The Continuing Challenge*, (Greenwich: Information Age Publishing, 2005), 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>3</sup> B. Edward McClellan, *Moral Education in America: schools and the Shaping of Character from Colonial Times to the Present*, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999), 2.

that would glorify God.<sup>4</sup> Because teaching children to read provides children the capacity to encounter the scriptures for themselves, some Christian sects that did believe in predestination saw education as a means for spreading the gospel. For Christians in both camps, education was of utmost importance because it helped accomplish the goals of the Christian faith.

The Christian religion permeated curriculum in the New World. The *New England Primer*, which was the “most popular text for primary instruction” for over a hundred years taught the foundations of the Christian faith through the alphabet: “‘A’ In Adams Fall, We sinned all. ‘B’ Heaven to find, The Bible mind. ‘C’ Christ crucify’d, for Sinners died, and so forth. Versions included the Lord’s Prayer, the Creed, the Ten Commandments” and other religious content.”<sup>5</sup> The *New England Primer* simultaneously taught religious precepts and basic skills, such as reading and writing.

Although moral education looked somewhat different in each colony, there were a few consistencies. First, the family was the primary societal institution responsible for moral formation. Second, other institutions such as schools and churches supported the efforts of the family. Third, “everywhere, [the colonists] believed that religion and morality were linked,” and fourth, “almost always they used the catechism as the primary pedagogical tool for teaching the essential truths of the society.”<sup>6</sup> For example, in the New England Primer John Cotton’s Catechism for children, *Spiritual Milk for America*

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<sup>4</sup> McClellan, *Moral Education in America*, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Hunt and Mullins, *Moral Education in America’s Schools*, 5.

<sup>6</sup> McClellan, *Moral Education in America*, 9.

*Babes*, was included.<sup>7</sup> The common features of moral education across the colonies illustrate the relationship between moral education and religion, specifically the Christian religion, in Colonial America.

The first settlers of America were committed to moral education, and as the colonies became more stable, the colonists did not waver on their stance, but as “life had acquired a comfortable, almost casual quality about it, moral education began to lose some of the rigidity that early settlers had given it.”<sup>8</sup> Families and societies continued to teach the tenants of the Christian faith in order to form children morally, but with less intensity. Moral formation could be accomplished with less anxiety as settlers became more comfortable in their new homes and communities were built. In more established communities, education became more formalized. During the Revolution, schools opened at an increasing rate across the colonies; for example, “as early as 1777 the State of Vermont enacted provisions for schools,” which identified the aim of education as promoting virtue and preventing vice.<sup>9</sup> These schools were run by their communities, but were not what we would term “public schools.”

As the new nation established itself, moral education became part of national interest. Congress stated in the Northwest Ordinance in 1787: “religion, morality and knowledge being necessary for good government and the happiness of mankind, schools

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<sup>7</sup> “Spiritual Milk for American Babes, Drawn out of the Breasts of Both Testaments for their Soul’s Nourishment,” in *American Educational Thought: Essays from 1640-1940*, ed. Andrew J. Milson, Chara Haeussler Bohan, Perry L. Glanzer, and J. Wesley Null (Charlotte: Information Age Publishing, 2010), 1.

<sup>8</sup> McClellan, *Moral Education in America*, 10.

<sup>9</sup> Hunt and Mullins, *Moral Education in America’s Schools*, 15.

and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”<sup>10</sup> Moral education was valued in part because of the potential it had to be a stabilizing force in the fragile new nation. The idea was that moral citizens would better participate in the new system of government and would preserve the character of the new nation. Even though the cultivation of morality became a democratic concern, many citizens remained concerned with moral education for religious reasons.

Christian precepts and the Bible itself continued to play a significant role in moral education after the Revolution, but some of the founders considered the role of religion to be problematic. This can be seen in a letter of Thomas Jefferson’s to the Danbury Baptists dated to 1802:

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.<sup>11</sup>

Although Jefferson’s idea of a “wall of separation between Church and State” would not be embraced in practice in education for another century, the metaphor would come to define the relationship between religion and education in the United States.

The reading of the Bible was prolific in American schools through most of the 1800s. One example that illustrates the role of the Bible comes from the Baltimore City Council in 1839. The council lays out its view on the “moral educative role of the Bible in its public schools: ‘The chief object in adopting the use of the sacred volume was, to

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<sup>10</sup> “Transcript of the Northwest Ordinance (1787),” Our Documents, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=8&page=transcript>.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists, 1 January 1802, *Library of Congress Information Bulletin* 57, no. 6 (1998).

endeavor, by every available means, to imbue the minds of the scholars with that moral influence which its inspired pages are so well calculated to impart.”<sup>12</sup> The Bible was understood to be well suited for the task of moral formation because of the comprehensive view of morality it offered and the fact that it taught morality through precepts, stories that demonstrate immoral and moral behavior, and parables.

Although the use of the Bible in schools as a part of moral formation was wide spread, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the practice began to be challenged in court. In response to one of these early lawsuits, a state court decision in the mid-1800s in Massachusetts affirmed the practice of Bible reading in public schools saying that “no more appropriate method could be adopted of keeping the minds of both teachers and scholars that the one of the chief object of education, as declared by the statutes of this commonwealth... is to impress upon the minds of children... the principles of piety and justice, and a sacred regard for truth.”<sup>13</sup> Despite the challenge in court, the practice was affirmed and continued.

Prior to the 1830s “parents sent their children to an assortment of denominational, charity, and private schools,” but, between 1830 and 1860, a system of public education began to be constructed in America.<sup>14</sup> Horace Mann, the leader of the common school movement, championed public education in the mid-late nineteenth century. He argued that “education must be universal” and that the common schools

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<sup>12</sup> Hunt and Mullins, *Moral Education in America's Schools*, 90.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* 96.

<sup>14</sup> McClellan, *Moral Education in America*, 22.

should welcome all children, be non-sectarian, and be publically funded.<sup>15</sup> He also saw a place for moral education in the common schools, as a “primal necessity of social existence,” because children needed to be taught to restrain their passions.<sup>16</sup> Horace Mann stood against sectarian education, but thought that the Bible could play a role in non-sectarian schools. A debate was developing in this period over whether Bible reading in schools constituted sectarian education.

In the 1880s, Bible reading in public schools was for the first time successfully challenged in court on the basis that “devotional reading of the Bible constituted sectarian instruction, violated the rights of conscience of the Catholic students in the school, and hence was in violation of the law.”<sup>17</sup> The case was brought by some Catholics in Egerton, Wisconsin and was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined in 1890 that “devotional Bible-reading in public schools constituted sectarian instruction and made the school a place of worship; hence, it was in violation of the Wisconsin Constitution.”<sup>18</sup> This decision was followed by numerous Supreme Court opinions in the twentieth century that sought to define the relationship between religion and public education in the United States.

In *Everson v. Board of Education* (1947) Justice Black declared, “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high

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<sup>15</sup> “Selected Writings of Horace Mann,” in *American Educational Thought: Essays from 1640-1940*, 161, 172.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* 170.

<sup>17</sup> Hunt and Mullins, *Moral Education in America's Schools*, 98.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 99.

and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.”<sup>19</sup> This language refers back to Jefferson’s “wall of separation” and turned it into a legal concept, as opposed to commentary on the interpretation of the First Amendment. In 1963, the Wisconsin case was affirmed by the Supreme Court decision *Abington v. Schempp*. In this case Justice Clark, referencing a prior opinion of Justice Black, stated that neither a state nor the Federal Government “can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”<sup>20</sup> Bible reading was determined to aid one religion and, therefore, could not continue to be practiced in public schools.

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the role of moral education in America eroded. Part of this was due to the fact that “postwar Americans began to demand that schools emphasize high-level academic and cognitive skills, often at the expense of the various forms of moral, civic, and social education that had been emphasized” previously.<sup>21</sup> In this period, formal moral education eroded more from a shift in priorities than a focused move away from it. However, in the 1960s and 1970s the retreat from moral education became purposeful. The social upheaval and pluralism present in these decades made moral education challenging for public schools and schools gradually “sought to preserve a fragile peace by accepting differences and encouraging tolerance. In the process they elevated cultural relativism to a primary social value.”<sup>22</sup> The general cultural support of moral education decreased in this period. Moral

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<sup>19</sup> *Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing* 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

<sup>20</sup> *School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp* 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

<sup>21</sup> McClellan, *Moral Education in America*, 73.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 75.

education had been “a central responsibility of the school” for over three centuries,” but now had “become both peripheral and problematic.”<sup>23</sup>

However, even during this period, “a handful of prominent intellectuals together with a large number of ordinary Americans sought to spark a revival” of moral education.<sup>24</sup> The landscape was different though. With the Bible having been removed from public schools, America was left to come up with other methods through which it could conduct moral education. Since the American founding, the Bible had played an integral role in moral education. It provided a framework, moral precepts, and stories that illustrated the moral life. After Bible reading was removed from public schools, many approaches were attempted, but none of them were able to provide a comprehensive program of moral education. In general, going forward, moral education was often oriented around democracy and the need for citizens to have a kind of morality that would allow for the flourishing of American democracy.

One approach to moral education was the values clarification movement in the 1970s. Values clarification programs of moral education “can be viewed as any process an individual chooses that will help him or her better articulate and clarify the values that he or she believes are important.”<sup>25</sup> The method has been sharply criticized for its relativistic approach to morality. Another method that was attempted was cognitive developmentalism, which was developed by “a number of philosophers, psychologists, and educators,” who “sought to find a way to refine moral judgment without teaching a

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<sup>23</sup> McClellan, *Moral Education in America*, 78.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* 79.

<sup>25</sup> Hunt and Mullins, *Moral Education in America's Schools*, 181.

specific set of values.”<sup>26</sup> Lawrence A. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development was the most prominent and focused primarily on the process of moral decision-making than inculcating specific values.<sup>27</sup>

A more recent approach has been called the character education movement. This approach came out of a frustration with “the lack of success” of Kohlberg’s cognitive development approach and the values clarification approach.<sup>28</sup> The character education movement sought to defend and reestablish the more traditional virtues in education. One way this was done was by defining core values that promote human rights and human dignity.<sup>29</sup> The core values were then taught directly through different parts of the curriculum. Some families have chosen to remove their children from public schools and provide moral education by sending them to private sectarian schools or by homeschooling them.

The removal of the Bible from public schools created a space in which a myriad of approaches to moral education appeared. Moral education has continued to be a priority for Americans. The various approaches to moral education that have been attempted since the Bible was removed from public schools speak to this fact. However, none of the approaches seems adequate. They lack a comprehensive nature. Despite the fact that the practice of teaching morality through the Christian faith has ceased, morality shares a long history with Christian teachings in America. Morality should continue to be of utmost importance in curriculum. Because Cicero’s model for moral education sits

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<sup>26</sup> McClellan, *Moral Education in America*, 82.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 83.

<sup>28</sup> Hunt and Mullins, *Moral Education in America’s Schools*, 189.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 191.

outside the Christian tradition and does not utilize religious material, it is a model that may be useful in the United States. Even though Cicero's model cannot be wholly applied in America because it was created for a very different kind of society, parts of the model could be employed in order to take a more systematic approach to moral education.

### *The Tullian Approach*

Cicero, known to his friends as Tullius (and often dubbed Tully in British poetry), recognized that technical skill in oratory was dangerous to supply a person without also developing strong moral sensibilities. He said in *De Oratore*, the stronger the faculty of rhetoric, "the more necessary it is for it to be combined with integrity and supreme wisdom, and if we bestow fluency of speech on persons devoid of those virtues, we shall not have made orators of them but shall have put weapons into the hands of madmen."<sup>30</sup> In Republican Rome, rhetoric was a technical skill by which men could accomplish good or evil. In America today, the means differ. Science, technology, and media have opened up new avenues in which the ability to judge what is moral is needed. The specific moral quandaries we face today vary from those in Ancient Rome, but it is as imperative as ever to equip children to be able to evaluate what should be done in particular circumstances. Otherwise, we too will have put weapons into the hands of madmen. Because moral education based on religious grounds is prohibited in public schools, Cicero's method of moral education is a viable alternative.

Cicero marries philosophy and rhetoric in Roman education to furnish morality in young men. As we saw in the last two chapters, he takes this approach because in his

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<sup>30</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, 45.

view the practices of philosophy and rhetoric both aim at truth and can help to develop virtue. By engaging students in the practices of each, Cicero habituates students in processes of seeking after truth—processes that are traditionally thought to make men moral. By defining rhetoric as a process aimed at the truth and connecting the practices of the orator—delivery, memory, and invention—to immortal qualities of the soul, Cicero also creates a new standard for rhetoric as an art that illuminates the truth and must be authentically engaged in. Even though Cicero’s reunification of philosophy and rhetoric would alter Roman moral education, Cicero does not entirely remake education. He retains the general structure of the Roman system of education, infusing philosophy and redefining the practice of oratory. Within the Tullian approach, many aspects could be applied in America today. The following are five aspects of the Tullian approach that I argue could be applicable: education in modes of inquiry as opposed to moral precepts, training in the art of rhetoric, a curriculum similar to a traditional liberal arts education, the use of literary and living models, and an orientation towards providing for the good of the human soul.

Cicero seeks to train students both in philosophy and rhetoric. Since these are both methods by which truth can be found or approximated, students trained in these processes are able to actively engage in the process of discovery of truth.<sup>31</sup> The philosophical method of dialectic involves seeking knowledge through conversation, as Socrates did in the dialogues of Plato. The rhetorical process involves invention, memory, and delivery. It includes intellectual investigation, but also involves

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<sup>31</sup> I recognize that many academics today do not believe that there is such a thing as “truth” that can be found or even approximated. However, this may be a part of the problem with education in America today. The inability to determine truth can limit inquiry and leave important questions untreated and unanswered. Cicero recognizes that truth can often not be fully determined, and that is why he also thinks it is important to seek after “what seems to be true.”

illuminating the truth to others through speech. The combination of philosophy and rhetoric equips students to discover the truth or what seems to be true, but also to communicate it to others. This is a grave matter for Cicero; he faulted the philosophers for having wisdom and shrinking from political life. Truth for Cicero ought to be communicated and utilized in public life. Even though rhetoric is more public than philosophy, philosophy requires interlocutors. Neither method can be successful in solitude.

The practice of training students in methods of inquiry could be useful in the United States for a number of reasons. First, methods of seeking and discovering truth are pertinent in a wide variety of situations and fields. The capacity to reason through the methods of philosophy or rhetoric would allow people in different fields to approximate truth in the midst of particulars. Second, students would be trained in seeking truth with one another. Both rhetoric and philosophy are active practices that allow students to teach and correct each other. In the working world, the skills that would be developed by engaging in these methods would equip co-workers with the ability to actively seek truth and determine the right action together. Third, both rhetoric and philosophy develop communication skills. Each of these methods requires the translation of truth into human language. Because when practicing either method, the speaker seeks the hearer's understanding, the speaker must make the truth clear. Fourth, if one important aim of philosophy—one might say its ultimate aim—is to find the happiest life, and if the happiest life is the moral life, then citizens would be taught how to seek the best life through these methods of inquiry.

The second aspect of Cicero's educational philosophy that could be used in modern America is rhetorical training. Roman rhetorical training develops the ability to speak, but also the ability to choose well and to evaluate the strength of arguments. As discussed in Chapter 1, the *rhetor* would have students practice both *suasoria* and *controversia* speeches. Students would write speeches advising what a character/person should do in a particular situation to practice *suasoria* speeches, and they would defend imaginary or real legal cases to practice *controversia* speeches. In both cases, the teacher would correct and guide the students. This practice allowed students to apply their reason to particular situations.

The *suasoria* speeches were a part of deliberative oratory, which often involved moral quandaries. By advising characters, boys would practice making moral decisions in difficult situations, and then defending their decisions. Making a defensible choice to oneself is a good first step, but to defend that choice to others is more challenging. Because the boys would speak in front of each other, ideas could be challenged in addition to being defended.

By learning the science of rhetoric, students also learned how to select evidence in order to support their position. To whatever evidence they could supply, they could add artistic means of persuasion, but they still had supply evidence. Rhetorical training causes students to engage in the process of taking a position and defending that position. Rhetorical education, as approached by the Romans, would be a worthy practice to incorporate into American education because it would help students develop the capacity to choose well, to supply reasoning in support of their choices, learn to evaluate the arguments of others, and practice making moral decisions in difficult situations.

Supplying a wide basis of knowledge, like that traditionally imparted in a liberal arts education, is a third aspect of the Tullian approach that America could learn from. Because the orator must be able to speak on any topic, he must be familiar with a wide range of subjects. Cicero argues for an education “in the liberal arts which would include reading the poets, masters, and authors in all the *bonae artes* (1.158); an informed grasp of history, law, political philosophy, the procedures of the senate, and government policy; and the rights of allies, treaties, and conventions.”<sup>32</sup> Only a broad education could prepare the orator to be able to speak *pro* and *contra* on any subject. This program of study highlights the acquisition of knowledge, and recognizes that knowledge is essential for critical thinking and reasoning.

While the liberal arts have been formally present in education since Medieval times, the liberal arts face a much more uncertain future today. Cicero’s proposal is unique in that he emphasizes the liberal arts for students on the professional tract to become orators. These students will live in the practical and have careers built upon technical skill, but will be informed by their study of the liberal arts. In America today, with the wide range of professional tracts available, a liberal arts education can still be valuable. The knowledge gained through the study of the liberal arts can be brought to bear in decision-making, problem solving, and moral reasoning, even in technical fields.

The use of models is the fourth part of the Tullian approach that could have practical application in America. In Roman education, models were provided within the literature that was studied and through the apprenticeship system. Poetry provided models both of immoral and moral action. Teachers could discuss the actions of the

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<sup>32</sup> Ethyle R. Wolfe, “Cicero’s ‘De Oratore’ and the Liberal Arts Tradition,” *The Classical World* 88, no. 6 (1995): 462.

heroes with students, and the students could see the consequences of their actions.

Roman boys were also provided with living models. The father served as the first model for young boys, but after receiving the *toga virilis* the boys were passed on to an older man who was to act as a role model. These men were charged with inculcating the boys into the practices and traditions of Rome. As apprentices, boys would learn to imitate the older men they were apprenticing, but also the other senators and lawyers they observed. Models are useful because they illustrate how an idea or philosophy functions in reality. The models found in literature play a role in moral formation and because they demonstrate moral action, and the events of stories display the consequences of moral and immoral action. The apprenticeship system allowed older Romans to shape and mold young men in the ways of Rome through example, and provided an avenue for correction of adverse impulses.

In America, a return to a moral reading of literature could be beneficial. It would introduce students to embodied moral and immoral action, and what the consequences of each are. Especially for younger children, this could be an effective method of inculcating virtue. Establishing something like the Roman apprenticeship system could also be advantageous. In America, this would take a great deal of creative energy and would be challenging to institute because America is geographically spread out and students seek a wide variety of careers. Even so, if it were to be established, within a few generations it could become an integral part of guiding young professionals in standards of morality as they mature.

Fifth and finally, America could learn from the way the Tullian approach takes into account the nature of the human person and what is best for human flourishing.

American education is oriented toward the productive and does not always take into consideration the good of those being educated. While many educators in America are concerned for the good of their students, the system as a whole does not account for the good of the human soul. Because Cicero sees the practices of rhetoric and philosophy as the highest activities of the soul, he ensures that students are trained in those practices. Even though it is challenging to come to an agreement about the nature of the soul—and one should keep in mind that was true in Cicero’s day too—much less orient education around that view, we can still learn from the Cicero’s approach. Because education affects the soul, the nature of the soul ought to be considered in determining curriculum.

By providing public education, America presumes that humans can be taught to reason well. In a system of government like ours, this is an important premise. If we are to trust ourselves (the people) to choose elected officials well, we have to believe that people can reason, and that they can be taught to reason well. Perhaps, in determining how we will better approach moral education, we can start with an agreement that it is good for the human person to develop the ability to reason well and choose well. This premise, it seems, is not so far from the premises of Cicero, Aristotle, or Plato. If our goal is to develop citizens who can reason well and choose well in all areas of their lives, we should orient education around that goal.

### *Conclusion*

Cicero’s proposal for moral education in Republican Rome recognizes the value of developing morality in those who will be given powerful weapons to wield. Cicero understood that rhetoric could be used for varying ends and he sought to equip young men to use rhetoric well. By reuniting rhetoric and philosophy, Cicero brought together

two methods oriented towards seeking and approximating the truth. A vital aim of philosophy is to find the happiest life, and Cicero believes that the happiest life is the moral one. By training the orator in philosophy, he hopes that the orator will live the moral life and use rhetoric to shed light on the truth. He also redefines oratory in such a way that he establishes a high standard for the orator—he must shed light on the truth.

Because Cicero was never able to give himself fully to philosophy because of his commitment to the state, Cicero is always part philosopher, part politician. He lives in between the theoretical and the practical, always trying to allow the theoretical to inform his practice. His educational philosophy mirrors his disposition. It seeks to allow practice to be informed and influenced by the truth found through philosophy.

The Tullian Approach to moral education does not rely on religious precepts or stories; instead, it trains students in seeking and approximating the truth. For this reason, it is an approach that could be utilized in America. Moral education has been tied to religion, specifically Christianity, since the first colonists settled here. Religious precepts and Bible reading played a large role in American education for almost two centuries. However, as Jefferson's "wall of separation" was applied to education, moral formation aided by the Christian tradition was removed from public schools. The methods of moral education that have been attempted since that wall was erected seem to be inadequate. By adopting parts of the Tullian approach—training students in methods of inquiry, teaching students rhetoric using the pedagogy of the Romans, providing a liberal arts foundation, utilizing literary and human models to illustrate moral action, and accounting for the good of the human soul in education—American schools could take a more systematic and comprehensive approach to moral education. Even though Cicero's

approach is not wholly applicable in America, its emphasis on process as opposed to precepts is uniquely suited to our system of government and could develop children prepared to face the difficult moral decisions present in the modern world.

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