

ABSTRACT

Animals Now and Then

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One aim of this dissertation is to remove ambiguities that have impeded a clear discussion and adequate evaluation of animalism. To that end I develop a taxonomy of different varieties of animalism and argue that there are substantive differences between them. In earlier debates about animalism, the previously elided distinctions that my taxonomy makes clear create unnecessary confusion and disagreement. My taxonomy resolves some of that confusion and provides the parties to the debate with a conceptual framework for importantly distinct accounts of personal identity. I also evaluate animalist arguments in light of the distinctions my taxonomy tracks. Specifically I identify which arguments support which varieties of animalism. The most popular varieties, I argue, are critically under-supported. All rely on a tacit presupposition that ‘animal’ is a natural kind term or a substance sortal, a supposition that animalists are under some pressure to reject. Thus, my evaluation prompts a refocusing of the standard defenses of animalism to prioritize defending the tacit presupposition. Finally, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from two objections: first, from the objection that if animalism is true, then human persons cannot survive death, or at least they cannot exist in an intermediate,

disembodied state between their deaths and resurrections (if indeed they are to be resurrected). I do this by arguing that given hylomorphism, animals can become immaterial, and that this is less an affront to intuition and mereology than it might seem. Second, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from the objection that if it is true, we are not the primary thinkers of our thoughts. The criticism is that if hylomorphism can solve certain puzzles (for example, the problem of temporary intrinsics), the resolving of which is one of the main points in hylomorphism's favor, the view implies that our contingent mental properties primarily characterize something other than us. I argue that this criticism turns on a misunderstanding of how the hylomorphism at stake solves the relevant puzzles and that it can do so without major modification.

Animals Now and Then

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DEDICATION

To my grandparents, Paul and Shirley Krile, Jerry and Anne Thornton, Gene and Susan McGowan, and Jerry Hardcastle, whose generosity has given me the opportunity to study philosophy.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1. Introduction

1.1 On Two Core Questions of Personal Identity, Answering One of Them, and How the Resulting Views Relate to One Another

After years of careful saving, tireless entrepreneurship, and mild money laundering, Maggie purchases the sailboat of her dreams: the Morris Yachts M36, a 45-foot sailboat she intends to sail around the world. After carefully painting “Nauti Life” on the stern, she sets out and circumnavigates the globe twice before admitting that the boat is in need of repairs she is unable to make. Always on the look-out to save a few dollars, Maggie takes *Nauti Life* to a sketchy shop whose owners agree to repair all of its broken parts for a surprisingly low price. The mechanics move the boat into the third slip and get to work. In the course of making the repairs, it becomes clear that every part of the boat is broken and ought to be replaced. “Out with the old, and in with the new!” the mechanics say, resourcefully reserving the old for a project out back. One night, just hours before Maggie is to collect *Nauti Life*, a fire begins to spread through the docks. The mechanics on call are oblivious, absorbed in the final stages of their special project: building a boat made out of the discarded parts of *Nauti Life* in precisely the arrangement in which they came to the shop. The fire sweeps through the docks, utterly destroying the ship in Slip 3. Heartbroken—but relieved to have taken out such a hefty insurance policy—Maggie files a claim with her insurance provider, stating that her boat burnt down. Meanwhile, the negligent mechanics escape on a sailboat, a flaking “Nauti Life” on its stern glistening in

the sun. “Thank you for holding, Maggie” her insurance company says. “Unfortunately, we are unable to process your request. Your ship has been stolen, and we don’t cover theft.” Should Maggie receive payment from her insurance company in this situation? Has Maggie’s boat been burnt, or has it been stolen?

Congratulations! You’ve just signed a three-year contract to play quarterback for the Dallas Cowboys. A year into your tenure, after a wildly successful season, the executive committee and coaching staff, having received irresistible offers elsewhere in light of the team’s performance, leave for better jobs. Immediately upon their inauguration, the new management announces that the team will be relocating to Dallas, Iowa (better summers; nicer people). In response, many of your teammates quit. The new management hires other players, eager to play for the Dallas Cowboys, but you remain the only player who was on the team when you signed. Is your contract still binding? Is there still a team, the Dallas Cowboys, to whom you are bound by contract?

A retired medical doctor and CEO of a biotech startup has friends in high places. He feels held back by his aging body and convinces his friends to replace the whole thing with the artificial limbs, organs, and cells they have in R&D. (Which thing they use depends on the fragility of the system they replace. Legs, they’ve found, are rather easy to replace all at once, but brains they’ve got to do neuron by neuron.) After months of gradual replacement, the result is a fully bionic doctor, able to live his life—or something—without the nuisance of a body in decline. Years later, to his chagrin, a critical piece of his body breaks. He can no longer operate unless plugged into a MacBook Pro plugged into a wall. Frustrated, he calls his friends, but they’ve all moved on to other startups, their old biotech company having flopped. Nobody can fix him. To

this day, he wanders around Silicon Valley, lugging his MacBook and a very long extension cord. Is the MacBook a part of the doctor? Is the extension cord? If not, does he have *any* parts? Does he, post replacement, have a *life*?

Each of the above stories raises interesting questions about identity. One type of question they raise is this: what does it take for something to persist through time? More precisely: for a kind K—like *ship*, *team*, or *person*—what relation obtains between K-stages that are stages of the same member of K (where a K-stage is a member of K at a time, or a set containing all and only the parts of a given member of K at a time).¹

Another type of question they raise is: what does it take to be a K-stage? Answering that question might involve asking: what sorts of things make up a K-stage? How are those things unified in order to make up the K-stage?² There are trivial answers to these

¹ Though stage terminology is frequently associated with four-dimensionalism, I do not mean to commit myself to a four-dimensionalist framework by my use of “person-stage”. In fact, for simplicity’s sake, I tend towards introducing these questions a three-dimensionalist framework (so, a person-stage can be a person at a time, and not just a time-slice of a person). That is why I do not discuss David Lewis’s notion of the I-relation, which was contrived for a four-dimensionalist framework (Lewis 1976). What Lewis means by it is the relation that holds between person-stages of the same person, where person-stages are not persons but are time-slices of persons. (This is why he distinguishes the I-relation from identity—see his “Survival and Identity”.) Since person-stages, on my view, may not be merely time-slices of persons, the relation between person-stages may not be the I-relation. However, it’s similar, and it might be helpful to associate this first question—what relation obtains between K-stages that are stages of the same member of K—with the question of “what is the nature of the I-relation?” (Lewis’ answer is that it’s the R-relation, the relation that holds between mentally (etc.) continuous things.) It might be helpful to think of a more neutral understanding of I-relation (i.e. it’s either Lewis’ I-relation or the relation that a three-dimensionalist would say holds between person-stages of the same person). Then we can frame the discussion of personal identity like this: everybody ultimately wants to elucidate the nature of the I-relation. That’s what the project of answering the diachronic question is about. Some just straightaway give the answer (like Locke), and others give it by first connecting human persons to another kind of thing. For example, they might say that persons are animals. And so the I-relation they are more interested in is the relation that holds between animal-stages. It is, for example, the B-relation, where B means biologically continuous.

² My formulation of these questions is inspired by but differs from John Perry’s (1975) introduction to the collection of essays on personal identity that he edited. I diverge most significantly from his formulation of the synchronic question. Here’s it is as Perry puts it: What relation obtains between simultaneous K-events that are events belonging to the same K? (Perry (1975, 9)). I made the alterations I did for two reasons. First, I don’t think the synchronic question should be framed in terms of events. I think doing so makes the question a leading question in favor of broadly Lockean (psychology-forward) accounts

questions, of course. For example, a relation that obtains between team-stages that are stages of the same team is *is the same team as*. But there may be more informative answers as well, and whether there are—and if so *what* they are—are fundamental concerns of any theory of identity.

In particular, the questions that result from substituting “person” for “K” are at the heart of developing a theory of personal identity.³ The first (diachronic) question has received the bulk of the attention at least since Locke, whose puzzle cases inspire the contemporary literature’s infamous thought experiments on split brains, brain transplants, transporters, and so on. The second (synchronic) question, though arguably prior to the diachronic question in important ways, has received relatively little attention. The synchronic and diachronic questions are not the *only* questions relevant to developing a theory of personal identity. There are many more besides them. For example: how can we know that the specified relation obtains between person-stages? Nevertheless, the above two questions are at the center of the conversation. Many intuitive answer-pairs to these two questions clash loudly. To the diachronic question, we tend to gesture at relations that hold between mental states. To the synchronic question, we lean towards relations that hold between living bodies and their parts. Answers along these lines are not strictly incompatible,⁴ but it is striking that we take person-stages to be quite different kinds of things depending on the question we ask. We at once take ourselves to be living human

of personal identity. Second, I don’t think the question should be a composition question. The criteria for being a K-stage might involve more than composition or something else entirely.

³ Unless otherwise noted, I will use the term “person” to refer to human persons (as opposed to, for example, divine or angelic persons.)

⁴ Or even indefensible. See Sharpe (2015).

animals and yet unrestrained by the criteria of bodily identity. That's at least a surprise and perhaps a problem. Accordingly, these core questions deserve careful treatment.

In this dissertation, I attempt to shed light on and defend answers to the above core questions of personal identity. In the present chapter, I provide a framework for situating a variety of prominent answers to the diachronic question, including one I focus on in the remaining chapters: animalism, the main variety of which is the view that we are animals and persist accordingly. Exactly what it means to “persist accordingly” varies between varieties of animalism. I discuss some of the alternatives in Chapter Two. In that chapter, I also point out that not every variety of animalism implies an answer to the diachronic question. Some only imply an answer to the synchronic question. They imply that we are (at least usually) animals, that all of our parts are parts of an animal and that all of that animal's parts are our parts, but not necessarily that we persist if and only if our animal does. Though such varieties receive much less philosophical attention than the varieties of animalism that include answers to the diachronic question, both sorts qualify as animalist views according to how we will understand animalism here. Here, a view will be a variety of animalism if it identifies human persons (at least normally) with animals.⁵

⁵ Some views that meet this condition are obviously false—for example, views that include obviously false accounts of the nature of animals. Others are equivalent to views that are standardly taken to be opponents of animalism—for example, views according to which animals are what Cartesian dualists think souls are. I don't think it's important to characterize animalism in a way that precludes counting such views as varieties of animalism. One reason I don't think it's important is that apparently neither does Eric Olson. One of the three varieties of animalism that Olson (2015b) considers (one he calls simply ‘animalism’ throughout the majority of the paper) is “the bare claim that we are animals (in the ordinary sense of ‘are’)” (Olson 2015b, 98). Weak animalism is contrasted with strong animalism (weak animalism conjoined with a bunch of further claims), new animalism (weak animalism conjoined with the negation of those same claims), and intermediate versions of animalism (weak animalism conjoined with some but not all of the further claims). If Olson's weak, strong, new, and intermediate animalisms are all versions of animalism, then so is an account that implies *we are animals* and includes or is compatible with an obviously false account of the nature of animals or an account of animals according to which they are what Cartesian dualists think souls are. Many views like those will fall in at least one of the categories Olson

The framework I propose in this chapter concentrates on the diachronic question for a couple of reasons. First, doing so tracks the literature's long-standing emphasis on our persistence over time. A great deal of the work on personal identity is footnotes on Locke, and to the extent that a view engages Lockean-style thought experiments, it is a part of the conversation about how we persist. Second, sorting answers to the synchronic question (not to be confused with *giving* answers to the synchronic question) is already straightforward enough: for example, one can maintain that person-stages are soul-stages or animal stages or brain-stages, etc. (What's really tricky is specifying how answers to that question restrict available answers to the diachronic question. If, in answering the synchronic question, we say that we are immaterial, can we plausibly maintain that there are material or bodily criteria for our persistence over time? If we say that we are bodies, can we plausibly maintain that our persistence conditions are psychological? These are good questions, and I suspect that careful answers to them would go a long way in fostering ecumenism between opposing parties in the personal identity debate. But such questions are not within the scope of this dissertation, and that's another reason I omit setting up a framework for thinking about them here.)

The principal dividing line in my framework is between accounts of personal identity that do not equate personal identity with another kind of identity and those that do. Views of the second type either identify persons with things of different kinds—immaterial substances, animals, thinking parts of animals, etc.—or state a necessary connection between persons and those kinds of things and then provide the persistence

identified. To be sure, such views would be no more probable than the improbable claims they entail or original than the views they coincide with, but for that reason they should be easy to dismiss on their own, without reference to their connection to 'animalism'.

conditions (partial or otherwise) for those kinds of things. Views of the first type straightforwardly provide the persistence conditions of persons.

To illustrate the distinction, consider its analog between differing accounts of the identity of teams (which I'll call "team identity"). Some accounts do not equate team identity with another kind of identity. Instead they just pick out the kinds of continuity that must obtain between team-stages of the same team. For example, they might pick out continuity of team rules or team objectives. According to these types of accounts, two team-stages can be the same teams without being the same anything else. Some accounts of team identity, on the other hand, state that the persistence of something else—like a manager, for example—is required for the persistence of the team, or identify a team with a different kind of thing, aligning the persistence conditions of the team with the persistence conditions of the other kind of thing. For example, some accounts of team identity identify teams with the collections of their members. According to these types of accounts, two team-stages can be the same team *only if* they are the same something else. They need to be same collection (to follow the above example), and whatever it takes to be the same collection is what it takes to be the same team.

A similar distinction divides accounts of personal identity. On one side of the divide, there are views that directly pick out the kinds of continuity that must obtain between person-stages of the same person. For example, such views might pick out memorial continuity or causal continuity. Defenders of these views do not bother to say what other types of things person-stages are stages of. More specifically, the views they defend do not state that a necessary condition of being person-stages of the same person is having the same special component (like brain, cerebrum, soul, etc.) or being F-stages

of the same F, where Fs and persons have matching persistence conditions (and F is not Person). On these views, person-stages—consider two of them named A and B—may be person-stages of the same person but not stages of the same anything else—at least not anything else interesting. A might be an animal, while B is not an animal but a brain in a vat. What person-stages are is not central on these views. The focus is on the relations that hold between person-stages because what person-stages are does not determine whether those relations hold. Such views contrast with views that tie personal identity to the identity of different kinds of things. On these views, if a given pair of person-stages are stages of the same person, they are also, for example, soul-stages of the same soul, brain-stages of the same brain, or animal-stages of the same animal, or they have the same soul, brain, or body.⁶

Here is a figure that represents how the views I've discussed above relate to one another:⁷

First, on Row 3, the left branch is empty. That's because, of course, on views of this type, persons do not consistently fall under other sortals relevant to personal identity. Nevertheless, many views of this type still state criteria of personal identity over time. They just do so immediately. Defenders of such views might understandably wonder

⁶ I am following Olson (2012) here in rejecting a traditional way of classifying accounts of personal identity into “complex” and “simple” views, the former being further split into psychological continuity views and physical continuity views, the latter being filled by views according to which whether A and B are the same person is grounded in nothing other than that A and B are the same person. Olson argues that it's very difficult to articulate the difference between complex and simple views in a way that classifies proposed accounts of personal identity in the standard way. I agree. Even if all views on offer are either psychological continuity views, physical continuity views, or views that imply that personal identity is fundamental, I don't think that a chart that related views with respect to those categories is as helpful as the one I propose.

⁷ On this chart, F is not Person.




Figure 1.1. Theories about Personal Identity

whether right branch views add anything by connecting personhood to other sortals or whether they simply push the tough question back. After all, for any candidate sortal F, we can ask (as Row 4 indicates) what it is to be the same F. There's a sense in which without an answer to the relevant instance of *What is it to be the same F?*, a right branch view is less complete than a left branch view. In response to this concern, I imagine that defenders of right branch views would maintain that equating personal identity with identity of another kind is informative. For instance, consider the animalist answer to the diachronic question of personal identity: person-stages A and B are the same person if and only if they are the same animal. The animalist could say that because what it is for animal-stages to be the same animal is straightforward (or at least somebody else's business, which is in fact what many animalists say) the animalist answer is adequately

informative. (Perhaps she would maintain that the animalist answer is *more* informative than alternatives because what it takes for animal-stages to be the same animal is better known than what it takes for other F-stages to be the same Fs or better known than what it takes for psychological states to be adequately continuous.) Even if the domain to which a right branch view reduces personal identity clearly permits no further reduction, defenders of it might still reasonably argue that the view is informative, better than nothing, or the best we can do. This is what I take defenders of the so-called Simple View of personal identity to argue.⁸ On the Simple View, personal identity depends on soul identity, but there are no informative and non-trivial analyses of soul identity. Though this is a cost of the view, it is not definitive.

Second, and relatedly, anyone can have a fundamentally anticriterialist theory. (In fact, at some level or other, every theory will make anticriterialist appeals.) As I mentioned above, one could maintain that A and B are the same person if and only if they are the same soul but that there are no non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for soul-stages to be the same soul. One could maintain that A and B are the same person if and only if they are the same animal but that there are no non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for animal-stages to be the same animal. One could also maintain anticriterialism about persons directly: there are no criteria at all about what it takes for person-stages to be the same person.⁹ I do not here dwell on anticriterialism of any kind, though because many dualist views on offer are strikingly anticriterialist, it will show up in Section 4.2 below.

⁸ Swinburne (Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984) defends a Simple View. I discuss it below in section 4.2.

⁹ For the leading case for anticriterialism about persons, see Merricks (1998).

Third, the chart suggests that at a certain level, superficially distinct views can have importantly equivalent consequences. For example, a left branch view according to which what it takes to be the same person is to have continuity of consciousness, and a right branch view according to which persons are souls and what it takes to be the same soul is to have continuity of consciousness will be in many ways functionally equivalent views. I point this out because I think a fruitful avenue for further research is in considering the extent of the overlap. Rival views may have more in common than meets the eye.

1.2 About This Dissertation

My project in this dissertation can be described in reference to the above chart. In this dissertation, I offer four thematically connected papers. My focus in each of them is almost entirely on the right branch category of views according to which “F is Animal” (these are animalist views). In Chapter Two, I describe the multiplicity of views that fall into that category plus a few more that are related to and have been confused with those views. In Chapter Three, I identify a way in which arguments for animalist views are generally underdeveloped, and I supplement those arguments. In Chapters Four and Five, I defend a particular view that falls into the animalist category. The animalist view I defend is that A and B are the same person iff they are the same animal, where animals are typically hylomorphic compounds (though, as I argue in Chapter Four, they need not *always* be hylomorphic compounds).

A disclaimer: in Chapters Four and Five, I do not attempt a complete defense of the view in question. Rather, I address two specific objections to it: first (in Chapter Four) the objection that if the view is true, we cannot survive our deaths; second (in

Chapter Five) the objection that if the view is true, we are not the primary thinkers of our thoughts. There is, of course, very much more than what I say that can be said for and against the view I propose. Hylomorphic animalism is (or better: some species of hylomorphic animalism are) arguably the view maintained by Aristotle and Aquinas, and it has enjoyed a resurgence of attention by Brower, Brown, Eberl, Hershenov, Jaworski, Oderberg, Toner, and many others. I have not covered those arguments in the present project in part because they have already been addressed at length both historically and in contemporary literature; there is no need to rehearse in my dissertation a huge debate in the history of philosophy only to state opinions about arguments readers can easily find elsewhere. The objections of Chapters Four and Five, though very specific, are in the literature only unsatisfactorily answered (if answered at all), and I think that is reason enough to include them here. The cost of my narrow treatment is that I risk utter irrelevance in the event that hylomorphism turns out to be untenable for reasons other than the ones I consider. But the benefits are efficiency, a greater degree of precision than I could otherwise provide, and room to examine animalism more generally as it has been cultivated in contemporary discourse. So in short: I acknowledge the risk of omitting a more thorough defense of hylomorphic animalism, but I judge it to be a risk worth taking.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will do two things to prepare for Chapters Two-Five. First, in sections 2, 3, and 4 below, I will discuss views that fall into non-animalist categories. The categories I will discuss do not exhaust the available logical space, and the particular theories I've selected as representatives of those categories are not always the most popular representatives on offer. But all the views I discuss are significant, with precedent, and beneficial to examine. Thinking about what those views say about us will

help highlight what is special about the accounts of personal identity that tie our persistence to animal persistence. Moreover, these alternative views represent important parts of animalism's dialectical context, and understanding that context will shed light on the dialectical role animalism is supposed to fill.

Second, in Section 5 below I will consider some preliminary objections to animalism. Addressing these objections will help clarify both the view and some of the assumptions I take on in the present defense of animalism. They will also pinpoint some of the questions animalists should consider more closely and articulate their answers to.

2. A Left-branch View: Locke's Account

Two features of Locke's account of personal identity directly oppose animalist accounts of the persistence of human persons. First, Locke's view of the persistence conditions of human persons do not require the persistence of another type of substance, e.g. Animal. Second, Locke argues that continuity of consciousness, not continuity of an animal, is required for human persons' persistence. With respect to both features, Locke's position laid the groundwork for contemporary opposition to animalism; for that reason I will focus on Locke's arguments for each feature.¹⁰

¹⁰ A note about my presentation of Locke's project: In order to emphasize what I think are the most relevant claims of Locke's account and consolidate many of his points, I present his project in a different order than he does. In case the reader wants to fit the claims I highlight into the arch of Locke's project as he published it, here's what I take the outline of Locke's account of personal identity to be. First, he argues that consciousness (and consciousness alone) is essential to a person (*Essay* II.xxvii.9-10). His argument boils down to his analysis of 'person' (which he introduces at II.xxvii.9 and adds to at II.xxvii.26, in which he argues that 'person' is a forensic term), his account of memory introduced earlier in the *Essay* (II.x), and his account of consciousness (which he introduces in II.i.19 and discusses in more detail throughout II.xxvii). He then argues that sameness of immaterial substance is not necessary to sameness of person (II.xxvii.13), that sameness of immaterial substance is not sufficient for sameness of person (II.xxvii.14), and that sameness of material substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for sameness of person (II.xxvii.15). In most of the remaining sections, he argues (i.e. gives thought experiments) that sameness of consciousness is necessary for sameness of person (II.xxvii.17, 19, 23-24) and that sameness of consciousness is sufficient for sameness of person (II.xxvii.16-19, 23). Other sections after II.xxvii.15

With respect to the first feature, that the persistence conditions of human persons do not require the persistence of another type of substance, Locke argues that neither sameness of material substance nor sameness of immaterial substance is necessary (or sufficient) for personal identity. Locke thinks that it is irrelevant whether two person-stages are the same substance over time. Here's Locke:

[The question of whether two person-stages are the same substance] concerns not personal identity at all: the [relevant] question being, what makes the same *person*, and *not whether it be the same identical substance*, which always thinks in the same person; which, in this case, matters not at all: different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united to one person, as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life. (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.10, emphasis added)

Locke offers a variety of thought experiments to make the point (*Essay* II.xxvii.13-15). The idea behind each of them is that personal identity is preserved regardless of whether there is sameness of material or immaterial substance. In fact, person-stages can be identical even if we know them not to be the same substance, and person-stages can fail to be identical even if we know them to be the same substance. Here's his case. To argue against the view personal identity requires (and is required by) sameness of material substance—or body, according to Locke—Locke presents the following thought experiment:

[Should] the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same *person* with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would say it was the same *man*? The body too goes to the making the man and would, I guess, to everybody determine the man in this case; wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to everyone besides himself. (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.15, emphasis added)

cover objections to and replies on behalf of his view (II.xxvii.20, 22) and a theory about why we interpret the thought experiments in the way that we do, viz. because 'person' is a forensic term (II.xxvii.18, 26).

Here, Locke argues that the cobbler's body occupied by the prince's soul is the same "man" (i.e. human animal) as the cobbler's body occupied by the cobbler's soul but is not the same *person* as the cobbler's body occupied by the cobbler's soul. When the cobbler's body is occupied by the prince's soul, he is the same person as the prince (i.e. the person who originally had the prince's body). That person has, in Locke's experiment, switched which man he is. Being the same man, then, is insufficient for personal identity, since the same man can be different persons. Further, being the same man is unnecessary for personal identity, since the same person—for example, the prince—can switch which man his is.

But neither is it the case that person-stages are the same person only if they are the same *immaterial* substance or soul. Locke states this point explicitly (*Essay* II.xxvii.13) but doesn't design a thought experiment directly for this point. Nevertheless, based on what he says elsewhere in the chapter, we can build a case for it. The first part of the case is based on an analogy between persons and animals, which he is keen to draw upon throughout the chapter (see, for example, the passage from *Essay* II.xxvii.10 above). Locke argues that just as animal identity can be preserved despite the change in material substances, personal identity can be preserved despite the change in immaterial substances:

[Those] who place thinking in an immaterial substance only [...] must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances or variety of particular bodies. (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.12)

And later, having established that the changing of material substance does not matter for either animal or personal identity (*Essay* II.xxvii.5-6 and 15 respectively), he

argues that, “the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity, any more than that any particle of matter does” (*Essay* II.xxvii.25).

A second part of Locke’s case involves thought experiments he designs throughout the remaining sections of the chapter to show that sameness of consciousness is sufficient for personal identity regardless of, Locke repeatedly emphasizes, sameness of substance. I will introduce the bulk of these thought experiments later in this section since they are more pertinent to Locke’s account of the persistence of persons than to his denial that sameness of immaterial substance is necessary for sameness of personal identity, but the following excerpt is a good example:

Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah’s flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self, *place that self in what substance you please*, than that I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial or no) that I was yesterday. (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.16)

Moreover, Locke argues that sameness of immaterial substance is not *sufficient* for personal identity. He appeals to a hypothetical case of reincarnation:

Suppose a Christian Platonist or a Pythagorean should, upon God’s having ended all his works of creation on the seventh day, think his soul hath existed ever since; and would imagine it has revolved in several human bodies, as I once met with one, who was persuaded his had been the soul of Socrates; [...] would any one say, that he, being not conscious of any of Socrates’ actions or thoughts, could be the same person with Socrates? (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.14).¹¹

¹¹ In II.xxvii.23, he gives another example that illustrates his point. He imagines the same immaterial spirit in cycles of memory and forgetfulness, maintaining that such a thing would be two persons with only one spirit.

Thus, by the end of II.xxvii.15,¹² Locke takes himself to have established that the question of whether two person-stages are the same substance “concerns not personal identity at all.” This frees him up to defend his theory about what does concern personal identity, namely consciousness.

Concerning, then, the second feature of Locke’s account of personal identity that directly opposes typical animalist accounts, Locke argues that continuity of consciousness is necessary and sufficient for the persistence of persons. Roughly speaking, this is because according to Locke, consciousness powers the thought-process that distinguishes individual persons (which are, on Locke’s account, essentially intelligent beings that have reason and reflection) from other individuals. This thought-process is the consideration of self as self in different times and places (*Essay* II.xxvii.9). Consciousness allows someone to perceive that she perceives, or to perceive that her perceptions are specifically hers. What it takes for two person-stages to have the same consciousness is for the later person-stage to remember a perception as a perception earlier had by herself, as a perception she was once conscious of. If (and only if) she does this is she identical to the relevant earlier person-stage.

Locke spends the second half of Chapter xxvii providing thought experiments and analogies to substantiate this thesis. Below I present several of these experiments and analogies, organized by whether they support the claim that sameness of consciousness is sufficient for personal identity or whether they support the claim that consciousness is necessary:

¹² Or by the end of II.xxvii.16 if you include the Noah’s flood example.

Sameness of consciousness is sufficient for sameness of personhood:

[Everyone] finds, that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person, and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.17)

Could we suppose [...] the same consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies [...] I ask whether [...] there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.23)¹³

Sameness of consciousness is necessary for sameness of personhood:

[If] the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because there outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.19).

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day the other by night [...]; I ask [...] whether the day and the night man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.23)?¹⁴

[Just as a limb cut off is no more a part of a man's self than any other matter in the universe, so] it will be in reference to any immaterial substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am myself to myself: if there be any part of its existence which I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby I am now myself, it is in that part of its existence no more myself, than any other immaterial being (Locke, *Essay* II.xxvii.24).

Similar puzzle cases continue to drive the debate about personal identity. The idea behind them—that our mental lives are essential to who we are—is highly intuitive, and consistency with that idea is regularly taken as a desideratum for an account of personal

¹³ In context, this is clearly a rhetorical question.

¹⁴ This is another rhetorical question.

identity (for example, see the discussion of the embodied parts views below). That's why these kinds of thought experiments create problems for animalism. On animalism (or rather: on the leading varieties of it), the person always goes with the animal, regardless of the mental facts. As a result animalism often delivers counterintuitive results. In the story about the cobbler and the prince, for example, animalism tells us that the cobbler with the prince's soul is the same person as the cobbler with the cobbler's soul. So with respect to interpreting certain compelling puzzle cases, Lockeanism bests animalism.

Locke's view, however, is not without shortcomings. For example, as Locke admits, if you forget having done something, you are not the person who did it. Locke himself finds that consequence unproblematic (*Essay* II.xxvii.20). A more concerning objection is that the second feature of Locke's account that opposes animalism—that the persistence conditions of persons can be analyzed in terms of sameness of consciousness—violates the transitivity of identity. Thomas Reid offers the following to illustrate that point:

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard for the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life; suppose, also [...] that, when he took the standard, he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.

These things supposed, it follows, from Mr. Locke's doctrine, that he who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and that he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. Whence it follows [...] that the general is the same person with whom who was flogged at school. But the general's consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke's doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person with him who was flogged at school. (Reid, 1975, 114-115)

Another objection targets the first feature of Locke's account that opposes animalism—that sameness of substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal

identity. Joseph Butler presses this objection, maintaining that Locke's view violates the "self-evident" principle that nothing can be the same with that with which it has nothing the same:

In a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, nor any thing, can be the same with that, with which it hath indeed nothing the same. Now, sameness is used in this [strict and philosophical] sense when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance. (Butler, 1975, 101)

Butler's argument here and his appeal to self-evidence is not especially compelling, but if he's right, Locke's view cannot account for our concern about our future well-being. He argues, "[If] the self or person of today, and that of tomorrow, are not the same, but only like persons, the person of today is really no more interested in what will befall the person of tomorrow, than in what will befall any other person" (Butler 1975, 102).

Animalism is not susceptible to Reid's and Butler's objections. Granted: there have been refinements and substantive philosophical work done since Locke's original publication, and of course there are replies to the above objections.¹⁵ But rehearsing Reid's and Butler's objections highlights some of the putative benefits of animalism (or varieties of it): first, it is because animalism connects sameness of personhood to sameness of something else (namely, Animal) that it avoids Butler's objection. Second, it is because animalism grounds personal continuity in bodily continuity that it is not susceptible to Reid's objection.¹⁶

¹⁵ See, e.g., Grice (1941), Quinton (1962), Shoemaker (1970), Garrett (2003), Kind (2004).

¹⁶ I omit a discussion of alternative left branch views for consideration of space and because Locke is the trailblazer for left branch views, but see John Perry's (1975) edited collection of texts on personal identity that frames some of the work that comes after Locke as refinements of Locke's account (for example, Grice (1941), Quinton (1962)).

3. *Special Components Views*

An alternative to Locke's type of approach to answering the diachronic question about personal identity is to identify a special (proper) part of the human person, special in the sense that it is both necessary and sufficient for a human person's existence. Some of the views according to which human persons have souls are views of this type. Others of them, ones that imply that we *are* the souls we have, are right branch views. Both types of soul views have gone by the name 'dualism' (or variants thereof). I'll follow suit but distinguish between special-component dualism, according to which souls are peoples' special components, and self dualism, according to which people *are* souls. I'll consider special-component dualism in this section, and self dualism I'll consider in the right branch section below.

Swinburne (1984) defends what he calls "classical dualism." The central claims of that view are that we are composed at least partly of immaterial stuff (soul) and that personal identity depends on soul identity (see (Swinburne 1984, 27-28)). Putting the latter claim in the terms I've been using yields: person-stages are stages of the same person if and only if they are, or have, the same soul. As stated, classical dualism is ambiguous between a view that belongs in this section of this chapter—i.e. one that implies that person-stages are stages of the same person if and only if they have the same soul—and one that belongs elsewhere—i.e. one that implies, like self dualism, that persons are immaterial things.¹⁷ Swinburne (1984) (1997) advocates the former:

¹⁷ Classical dualism as stated is further ambiguous between (a) an animalist view according to which person-stages are stages of the same person if and only if they are animal stages of the same animal, animals are normatively (but not necessarily) soul-body compounds, and what it takes for two animal-stages to be the same animal is to have the same soul; (b) an animalist view according to which persons are animals accidentally (or "not firmly", as I prefer to put it in Chapter Three), animals are necessarily soul-

It does not follow from all this that a person's body is no part of him. Given that what we are trying to do is to elucidate the nature of those entities which we normally call 'persons', we must say that arms and legs and all other parts of the living body are parts of the person. (Shoemaker and Swinburne, 1984: 31)

Those persons which are human beings (or men) living on Earth, have two parts linked together, body and soul. A man's body is that to which his physical properties belong. If a man weighs ten stone then his body weighs ten stone. A man's soul is that to which the (pure) mental properties of a man belong. If a man imagines a cat, then [...] his soul imagines a cat. [...] On the dualist account the whole man has the properties he does because his constituent parts have the properties they do. I weigh ten stone because my body does; I imagine a cat because my soul does. (Swinburne, 1997, 145)

On the view Swinburne prefers, we literally have arms, legs, etc.—all of our animal's parts—as *parts* whereas on the alternative, we do not. (On the alternative, we may still have those things but in the sense of 'have' in which we have books.) The bodily parts we have, however, are parts we can survive losing. We can become things that don't have those parts, either by acquiring totally different bodies (including brains) from the ones we have now or by coming to have no bodily parts at all. As long as we have our souls, we survive.

There are materialist special components views as well. Olson (2015a) briefly considers one in response to the remnant-person and transplant objections to animalism, objections that turn on the possibility that our brains could be removed from our bodies and yet continue to support thought and consciousness. The problem is that animalism implies that we cannot become such brains, even if the mental lives produced by those brains are continuous with our mental lives. More carefully: given that pared-down brains

body compounds, and a human person persists if and only if she has the same soul; and (c) a view according to which persons are some kind of super-animal, something that has both an animal and a soul as proper parts, and persist if and only if they have the same soul. (In contrast to (c), (a) and (b) imply that we have animals as *improper* parts.) On any of these views, the person can persist as long as the soul does, whatever happens to her body. On (a), a person who lost her body could continue to be an animal. I defend that view in Chapter Four. On (b), a person who lost her body could continue to exist but not as an animal.

are not organisms, some varieties of animalism—ones that answer the diachronic question—imply that we cannot become such brains.

In response to these objections, Olson considers a view according to which we are *now* animals but could become our brains kept alive in vats or transplanted into other bodies:

One suggestion is that despite appearances, the remnant person [the person whose mental life a brain-in-a-vat or mid-transplant brain is producing] is you, the donor organism. Removing your brain or cerebrum from your head would not remove an organ from a human animal, leaving that animal with an empty head. And putting your brain or cerebrum into my head would not supply this animal—my body—with a new organ. Rather, the operation would pare an organism down to a naked brain, and later supply it with peripheral parts to replace the ones cut away. Of course, the brain or cerebrum in mid-transplant is not an organism, at least not then. But perhaps an organism is not an organism essentially, and can exist for a while as a non-organism, just as a student can take a leave of absence and exist for a while as a nonstudent. (Olson, 2015a, 29)

Olson doesn't think this suggestion is tenable. It seems that a donor organism could survive the kind of operation described, especially if the cerebrum is all that is removed. (As Olson argues, if an organism can't survive that kind of operation, if it can't exist even for a moment without its cerebrum—a mass of tissue not essential to the organism's life sustaining functions—we ought to wonder whether an organism can exist without any of its organs, including kidneys and appendices.) And if the donor survives, it would be the same organism that existed before the operation. But the suggestion above implies that the donor would not be the same organism; *that* organism has become a non-organism, like a student taking a leave. Even if the donor doesn't survive—that is, even if whatever empty-headed creature remaining on the operating table isn't the donor—the brainless remainder still seems to be *an* organism. And if he's not the donor organism, he's a new organism, one surgeons have brought into existence just by removing

something else's brain. As Olson puts it, that's a baffling result. The brain-centered special-component view is hard to defend.

It's worth pointing out that soul-centered special-component views have a way of avoiding Olson's critique. On many accounts, the soul (unlike the cerebrum) is required for animal persistence: if an animal's soul is removed, the remnant mass of tissue cannot be alive. So there is no pressure to admit that we can bring new organisms into existence merely by removing souls.

There is another way of responding to the remnant-person and transplant problems that avoids Olson's critique. It's to say that we are brains (or cerebra), even when the brains (or cerebra) are in their normal place. If someone were to remove my brain, they would thereby remove *me*. And if I'm just a brain, it's no problem to say that the donor organism is the same organism it was prior to the operation. This kind of view is a right branch, non-animalist view. In spite of its oddness, the view has several defenders, in part because unlike animalism and materialist special-components views, it very simply avoids conflict with our intuitions about what happens in transplant scenarios. In the next section (4.1), I'll consider the view in more detail.

4. Right-branch, Non-animalist Views

Like special components views, right branch views answer the diachronic question of personal identity by appealing to what we know about how other kinds of things persist. They differ from special components views in identifying persons with those kinds of things. Views according to which persons are animals, parts of animals, or

immaterial things are views of this type. In this section, I will discuss the latter two views.

4.1 Persons are Embodied Material Parts

On any view according to which human persons are (non-simple) material things, human persons either have a proper part that thinks (a cerebrum, for example) or they do not. If they do, the view faces a problem of too many thinkers: wherever a given person is, not only she but also her thinking proper part thinks. This is a problematic consequence because it implies that there are at least twice as many thinkers as common sense suggests. But if human persons are non-simple material things and do *not* have a proper part that thinks, there is another problem. At least, there's a problem as long as human persons have a proper part that could *come* to think if detached (a cerebrum, for example), which seems to be the case.¹⁸ The problem is that whenever that part is removed from the whole, a new thinker comes into existence, and whenever it is returned, a thinker goes out of existence.

The following example illustrates the above point: let's say that human persons are animals that do not have thinking proper parts but have cerebra which enable animals to think. And let us suppose that we surgically remove the cerebrum of one of these animals, keeping the cerebrum alive by an artificial support system. We subject the cerebrum to tests and scans, and connect it to a device that enables it to communicate with us. All the data we collect, suppose, suggests that the cerebrum is conscious. Specifically, the data suggests that it's as conscious as something is when it's a person. But per our initial assumption—that prior to the operation, the cerebrum, being a proper

¹⁸ Granted: in a generous sense of “could”.

part of an animal, is not itself a thinker—it follows that a new thinker, a new person, comes into existence as a result of the operation. Likewise, it follows that this new person goes out of existence if we reverse the operation, that we can eliminate a person just by sewing him into something. That is a bizarre and unhappy result.¹⁹ We can, following Olson who recognizes the difficulty these considerations make for the animalist view he defends, call these problems the Creation and Destruction problems.²⁰

Thus, if human persons are composite, material things, either there are far too many thinkers or—given that persons have proper parts that can come to think if detached—we can pop people in and out of existence just by detaching and reattaching parts. The consequent seems false. If it is false, then human persons are not composite material things. But if not composite, material things, what are they? Here are a few options: 1. They're simple material things. 2. They're immaterial things. 3. They do not have a proper part that can come to think if detached.

Parfit (2012), Campbell and McMahan (2010), and Hudson (2007) defend the third option. (I'll consider a defense of the second option in the next subsection.) On their views, a human person is just that proper part of an animal responsible for its mental life (whatever part that turns out to be, though it's generally assumed to be some chunk of the upper brain). In Parfit's words, "we are what McMahan calls the conscious, thinking, and controlling *parts* of human beings" (Parfit 2012, 14). And in Campbell and McMahan's words, "we are parts of organisms—specifically, the areas of the brain that are necessary and jointly sufficient for the capacity for consciousness (Campbell and McMahan 2010,

¹⁹ And even on a weaker reading of the experiment—that the detached cerebrum is not a person, though it has various mental properties—the result is strange. It implies that things can gain or lose mental capacities in, as Olson put it, "an utterly baffling way."

²⁰ Olson (2015a).

289).²¹ And in Hudson's words, "the only non-arbitrary choice [among the candidate things that we are] would be an object each of whose parts plays a contributory role in supporting a psychological profile constitutive of personhood" (Hudson 2007, 224); we are located "under the skin" (Hudson 2001, 143). Parfit calls this family of views embodied parts views.²²

Notice how these views avoid the Creation and Destruction problems. If we are just cerebra (or whatever), then if our animals' cerebra were detached from the rest of their bodies and artificially supported, no *new* conscious beings would come into existence. Nor would conscious beings go out of existence just by reattaching the cerebra or attaching them to another animal. As Parfit puts it, "The same conscious being would

²¹ In an earlier work, McMahan (2002) defends a similar view, the Embodied Mind Account, according to which human persons are essentially embodied minds. The Embodied Mind Account differs from the view cited above insofar as the Embodied Mind Account "can remain agnostic about [what the relation between the mind and brain is]," (McMahan 2002, 88) and so it does not imply that we are parts of organisms. (Note: in Campbell and McMahan (2010), they openly assume "for simplicity of exposition" that the relation is identity.) McMahan (2002), however, does consider the version of the Embodied Mind Account according to which we are parts of organisms. He writes, "[the suggestion that we are parts of organisms] will seem most cogent if we assume that the mind is entirely reducible to certain regions of the brain. If, for example, the mind just *is* those regions of the brain in certain functional states, and if I am this mind, then I am, in effect, this functional brain, which is itself a part of this organism; therefore I am a part of my organism. But even if the mind is not entirely reducible to the brain, it is still something that is generated by the operations of the brain and is a critical component of the systems controlling the functions of the organism. Hence it may be regarded as a part of the organism even if it is not so obviously a part as is an organ such as the brain" (McMahan 2002, 92). Interestingly, McMahan touches on the question of how we (embodied minds) relate to human organisms only in the final subsection (5.5) of the section on the Embodied Mind Account. He spends the vast majority of his attention in that section on how such minds persist. Because of this, and because the Embodied Mind Account is so neutral with respect to how minds relate to organisms, I think a strong case could be made for placing the theses at the heart of McMahan's defense on the left branch of the above chart. (To the extent that McMahan's work could fall into the left branch, his project differs significantly from Hudson's, in spite of their obvious overlap. Hudson explicitly remains neutral on and disregards the criteria for our identity over time (Hudson 2007, 2017).) Nevertheless, I place his view where I do because the central view in McMahan (2010) is a clear expression of views in the logical space of the right branch, and because the method in McMahan (2002) *did* proceed by first identifying us with embodied minds and then giving an account of how embodied minds persist. Even if the identification was unnecessary and not really a core part of McMahan's discussion, he still made the claim.

²² Parfit defends a specification of the embodied parts view, viz. the embodied persons view: we are Lockean persons that are parts of animals, specifically the parts by which human animals think. (Parfit 2012, 17).

exist throughout, first as the thinking, controlling part of one human animal, then existing for a while on its own, then becoming the thinking, controlling part of a different human animal” (Parfit 2012, 14).

There’s further motivation for the embodied parts view. Hudson, for example, takes a different tack in defending his version of the view. He points out that on a materialist metaphysics, there are very many person candidates. For example (and depending on background assumptions about composition, vagueness, etc.), the multitude might include a whole living human organism, various proper parts of a living human organism (for instance: just the bones, just the skin, just the brain, etc.), and fusions of parts of an organism with anything else (like the sum that is the whole organism and the Eiffel Tower). Given so many nominees, Hudson argues, we need a principle that eliminates ineligible candidates. The principle Hudson proposes eliminates those candidates that have parts superfluous to supporting a psychological profile constitutive of personhood. The basic insight driving that principle is that if you must recognize a single person from two candidates and you are allowed to assume that they are not both human persons, you should “put your money on the one just big enough to do the job. If a less inclusive thing will do, any larger choice (i.e. anything with parts that are wholly irrelevant to securing a psychological profile constitutive of personhood) is arbitrary and unmotivated” (Hudson 2007, 219).

According to Hudson, what it means for a part to play a contributory role in securing a psychological profile is for the part in question to “[manifest] certain properties and [stand] in certain relations upon which a particular collection of psychological properties supervene” (Hudson 2007, 219). For humans, the only parts that

manifest the relevant properties and stand in the relevant relations are neurological. Remaining body-parts are superfluous. And so given Hudson's elimination principle, the brain (or a part of the brain) is the leading human person candidate.²³

Embodied parts accounts of personal identity lack some of the intuitive appeal alternatives enjoy. It is at least sort of creepy to consider that we are actually located somewhere "under the skin", faceless and awash in cerebrospinal fluid, to think that the only literal portraits of us are scans of our brains.²⁴ But the view is not wholly counterintuitive. In fact, in some cases, it may be more intuitive than its alternatives. As Parfit points out, if you identify persons with whole bodies, then by "Einstein discovered the theory of relativity" you imply that Einstein's body discovered the theory of general relativity. But if you identify persons with brains, you imply (by that statement) that Einstein's brain discovered the theory of general relativity. The latter implication seems more intuitive. At any rate, it's not clearly less intuitive.

With respect to animalism in particular, embodied parts views have some advantages and some disadvantages. A key advantage is that they avoid the Creation and Destruction problems, whereas as long as animalists deny that the (attached) cerebra think, they seem stuck with them. A disadvantage is that according to the embodied parts views, we do not literally have arms, legs, stomachs, etc. as parts. According to

²³ Hudson is fairly neutral on exactly what parts play a contributory role in supporting personhood: "I happily grant that I have nothing like a comprehensive account of just what parts of a living organism play such a role and which do not. Presumably some parts of the brain are relevant, some parts of the hand are not, and some parts of the nervous system are borderline cases" (Hudson 2007, 224-225). It's also worth noting that here Hudson is making a point about a three-dimensional metaphysics, though his own view, one he defends at length in Hudson (2001), is four-dimensionalist.

²⁴ It is odd, but not so odd that the point hasn't been proffered among folk accounts (so to speak) of personal identity. I recently saw a meme in which a picture of a human brain and spinal cord spread out on a table was captioned "This is you! This is where all your thoughts are kept. Every other part of your body is used to protect and sustain this."

animalism, of course, we do.²⁵ In some respects, embodied parts views and animalism are comparable. Both identify persons with things of another kind, specifically with material things or things that are at least *partly* material (in the event that animals and/or cerebra are hylomorphic compounds). It is not clear to me whether doing so is an advantage or disadvantage; either way, with respect to that feature, embodied parts views and animalism are on a par.

4.2 Persons are Immaterial Things

Earlier in this chapter, I distinguished between special-component dualism, according to which souls are peoples' special components, and self dualism, according to which people *are* souls. In this section, I will discuss self dualism.

The first advocate of self dualism I will consider, Plato, is commonly characterized as defending the view that we are immaterial things. More specifically, he is taken to argue that we are immaterial things trapped in and weighed down by our bodies. The view in question arises out of Plato's treatment of our post-mortem existence. On his deathbed, as recorded in *Phaedo*, Socrates argues that we—philosophers especially, given how preoccupied we are with minimizing the distractions and distortions of reality produced by our bodies—should not fear death because death separates souls from bodies [64c], thereby freeing us from the very things that have kept us from satisfying our desires to have pure knowledge and wisdom [66e]. Before death “we men are in a kind of prison” [62b]. After death, we are unyoked from the body and its concomitant evils [66b]. The suggestion seems to be that we identify with simple,

²⁵ But see Parfit's reply (2012, 15). In Section 4, Parfit considers and replies to further objections to the embodied parts view.

immaterial (though before death, embodied), intellectual substances, and that in this life we are joined to and burdened by a foreign, material substance, our body.

A clearer argument for the view that we are immaterial things is offered by Descartes, though he is careful to distance the view he defends from one according to which we are to our bodies what a sailor is to his ship. He argues that we are much more closely united to our bodies (so “intermingled with [them] that [we] seem to compose with [them] one whole”) than sailors are to their ships. When someone notices damage on their ship, they do so by sight; but when someone notices harm to her body, she does so by experiencing pain. Nevertheless, he admits that it is not wrong to say that “I am lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel”, and the following argument seems to commit him to it:

Just because I know certainly that I exist, and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing necessarily pertains to my nature or essence, excepting that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. And although possibly... I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that this I [that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body and can exist without it. (Descartes, *Meditations* 6)²⁶

Rather than fully evaluating Plato’s and Descartes’ main arguments or considering arguments about the extent to which they held the above views, I will focus

²⁶ As Alex Pruss has pointed out to me, whether Descartes in this passage expresses the view that we are immaterial things depends on what he means by “entirely and absolutely distinct.” In saying that this I (that is, my soul) is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, he may mean that I have no parts that my body has, from which it follows that my body is not a part of me. But he may just mean that my body and I are non-identical, which leaves open the possibility I have my body as a proper part. Furthermore, as Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984, 31) and others point out, even if Descartes here seems to claim that our bodies are not now parts of us at all, he elsewhere seems only to be making the weaker point that our bodies are not *essential* parts of us.

in this subsection on a few ways in which self dualism contributes to the debate between animalism and other accounts of personal identity.

First, it is often argued as a point in dualism's favor that the naïve and intuitive conception of ourselves is (self) dualist. But as Snowdon (2014) argues, this seems not to be the case (and not even what Descartes thought—see (Snowdon 2014, 87)). Our pre-theoretical thoughts about ourselves include that we occupy the space our bodies occupy. We do not think that when we meet someone face-to-face, we are not really seeing him, or that when we shake someone's hand we are not really coming into contact with him. And we classify ourselves along some physical dimensions: we sometimes take ourselves to be biologically males or females, for example. Animalism makes sense of that way of thinking about ourselves better than dualism does. (Though of course dualist views can accommodate the fact that we classify ourselves along physical dimensions, too. For example, a self dualist could maintain that being male is extrinsic: we are males if and only if we are united to male-type bodies. And special-component dualism seems to avoid the objection altogether.)

Second, as Bailey (2015) argues, self dualism (which he calls “Cartesian dualism”) is, along with animalism, one of the only accounts of personal identity that respects the principle that we (rather than something of which we are a part, or something that is a part of us) are the primary thinkers of our thoughts. According to self dualism, we are souls and souls are thinkers. Self dualism thus contrasts, for example, with views according to which souls are the thinkers by which we, fusions of body and soul, think derivatively.²⁷

²⁷ Swinburne's special-component dualism seems to be such a view, but I do not think that special-component dualism entails that we think our thoughts derivatively. So there is space for a special-

Third, self dualism, like animalism, gives us a non-trivial and informative account of personal identity. Nevertheless, this account (along with special-component dualism) is sometimes criticized for not giving an informative and non-trivial account of what it takes to be the same *soul*, and so is often associated with anticriterialism. Swinburne (1984), for example, in spite of defending his “classically dualist” account of personal identity, nevertheless maintains that personal identity is analyzable neither in terms of physical continuity nor memorial continuity. This is taken by some to be a negative result because deeply anticriterialist accounts don’t seem to get us very far in understanding how we persist over time. Although dualist accounts are sometimes impugned, we should follow Olson (2012) in thinking that a view according to which x and y are the same person if and only if they are, or have, the same soul is non-trivial and informative, even if it doesn’t permit an interesting account of the persistence conditions of souls:

Cartesianism is far from trivial: it tells us something about human people in particular, and is not true of concrete objects in general. It is also informative, in that one needn’t know whether x is y before knowing whether x has y’s soul. There may of course be practical obstacles to finding out whether we have the same soul before finding out whether we have the same person, owing to the fact that we cannot observe souls. But these obstacles appear to be only contingent. So Cartesianism is a proper criterion of personal identity. (Olson, 2012)

By “Cartesianism”, Olson refers to a special-components dualism, but the same line of thought can be applied to self dualism as well.

component variety of dualism that respects the principle Bailey has in mind. In fact, I defend it in the final chapter of this dissertation, but following the authors I engage in those chapters, I call the view hylomorphic.

5. *Animalism: Two Initial Objections and Two Replies*

In this section, I will consider a couple of preliminary objections to animalism that will help clarify the view and highlight some of the questions that I think animalists should consider more closely.

The first objection is that if animalism is true, we are mere animals, not any more significant than dogs and chickens, and not special among the living things. A religious variant of this objection runs as follows: if we're animals, then we needn't be essentially persons (we were all once fetuses); so either (a) the *Imago Dei* isn't among our essential properties, or (b) personhood isn't, after all, a key element of the *Imago Dei*. And neither of those options is good, so animalism is false.²⁸

In reply, I argue that although animalism does imply that we, like dogs and chickens, are animals, it does not imply anything interesting about our relative significance or uniqueness. If we are unique among animals, our uniqueness may not be due to not being animals, but rather to our unique capacities, like our capacity for language, or because of the care we ought to show for every other living thing.

Or perhaps if we are unique, it is because we are made in the image of God. The correct answer to the religious variant of this objection is (b) personhood isn't a key element of the *Imago Dei*. At least, Lockean personhood (being a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself in different times and places (*Essay* II.xxvii.9)) isn't a key element of the *Imago Dei*. But perhaps a different sense of personhood is. Here's one suggestion: persons are essentially relational beings, existing in relation with other persons, God, the world, and herself, and this relational

²⁸ I got this version of the objection from Andrew Bailey in correspondence.

aspect of human beings (or: personhood in this different sense) is a part of the *Imago Dei* in us.²⁹

Here is an error theory about the objection: it's due to the 'barn-yard animal' connotation of 'animal' (or at least: to the 'non-human animal' sense of 'animal'). I think this connotation is behind much initial aversion to animalism, aversion which in my experience (oddly, if 'animal' weren't doing some shady work) is often mitigated by presenting the view in one of these ways instead: "We are mammals", "We are critters", "We are living things that aren't plants or bacteria or fungi", and even "We are organisms". I think it's primarily the barn-yard-animal reading of animalism that seems to clash with the *Imago Dei* doctrine. And to the extent that I think that reading is simply misguided, I think the *Imago Dei* objection is simply misguided.

Alasdair MacIntyre's version of this error theory is that the non-human animal use of 'animal' became dominant "and with it a habit of mind that, by distracting our attention from how much we share with certain other animal species, puts itself at odds both with older Aristotelian modes of thought and with modern postDarwinian evolutionary naturalism." He argues

Aristotelians had focused attention on the distinction between the living and the inanimate, including human beings under the genus 'animal' so that even the specific rationality of human beings is to be understood as animal rationality. And from Darwin we should by now have learned that human history, whatever else it is, is the natural history of one more animal species and that to understand such a history comparison with the history of certain other animal species may always be and often is necessary. [...] We all of us, or almost all of us, know this. But there are too many contexts in which we allow ourselves to forget it, a cultural tendency that is reinforced by too exclusive an attention to and exaggeration of what does indeed distinguish human beings from members of all other species. (MacIntyre, 1999, 11-12).

²⁹ And a view like that has not gone undefended from an authority on the subject: <http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040723_communion-stewardship_en.html>

Another objection is that animalism doesn't seem particularly informative as an answer to the core, diachronic question mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, namely what relation obtains between persons-stages that are stages of the same person? It tells us that the person-stages have to be animal-stages of the same animal, but it doesn't tell us what it takes for an animal to persist. For all that animalism tells us, what it takes for an animal to persist is sameness of consciousness, and then we've got a view that boils down to Locke's.

This main claim of this objection is correct. Animalism is officially neutral about the details of animal persistence, and there is nothing logically in the way of combining a consciousness-based account of animal persistence with animalism itself. But animalism is not the only view that can adopt an account of persistence that is not standard issue. Embodied parts views and both dualisms (as I've discussed them here), for example, could appeal to a variety of accounts of soul-persistence and cerebrum-persistence. I think we would do well to recognize this kind of modularity among typically competing accounts of personal identity. Doing so will at least help us pinpoint where disagreement lies, and perhaps it will help us design better theories.

That being said, animalists typically maintain that animal persistence is something that biologists either understand or are going to figure out. On the whole, they offer shockingly little in the way of their own accounts (ironically, less than Locke does), happily leaving blanks for biology to fill as if what biology has to say were irrelevant to animalism's appraisal. I think this is a serious problem. What biology says is *not* irrelevant. If biology says that an animal life is preserved in a brain in the vat, for

example, that makes a difference for how we read brain transplant cases and therefore how we evaluate animalism. Moreover—and perhaps worse—the relevant biological questions themselves are not even remotely settled. All of the following questions are both relevant and unsettled: What (if any) non-trivial properties are shared by all and only organisms (or animals or *Homo sapiens*)? Are there spatially divided animals or other organisms? Can the same organism have distinct genomes? What individuates one animal from another? When does an animal life begin and end? What distinguishes one life or set of life processes from another? To what extent can one organism depend for its continued existence on another and remain distinct? It's not even settled that *animal* is a consistent concept in biology.

In conclusion, I think the second objection is a good objection to animalism. I think animalists need to take a break from the identity claim and do at least a little more philosophy of biology. But I myself do not do that in this dissertation. Instead, I will commit the same crime as the animalists, gesturing at a blank for someone else to fill.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have introduced four alternatives to animalism: Lockeanism, special-components dualism, the embodied parts view, and self dualism. Lockeanism differs from animalism both insofar as it, unlike animalism, does not require for the persistence of a person the persistence of another kind of thing, and insofar as it grounds personal identity in psychological continuity, which animalism does not standardly do. However, as I have pointed out, there is logical space for a view that identifies persons with animals (and for that reason, reasonably qualifies as a variety of animalism) but which analyzes animal identity in terms of psychological continuity. The main difference

between Lockeanism and that variety of animalism is that the latter requires that person-stages of the same person are stages of the same animal.

The embodied parts view and self dualism differ from animalism insofar as they identify persons with non-animals. The former identifies us with parts of animals (e.g. cerebra), and the latter with immaterial things (e.g. souls). These views may further differ from animalism according to their analyses of cerebrum identity or soul identity; those analyses are liable to differ from the plausible analyses of animal identity. But they need not. Perhaps what it takes to be or have the same soul is exactly what it takes to be the same animal. In that case, self dualism and animalism will have many of the same results.

When discussing alternative answers to the diachronic question of personal identity, I think it's important to be clear about whether you think that persons need to be the same something else in order to persist. If so, it's important to be clear not only about what you take persons to be (e.g. brains, souls, animals, etc.), but also what you take the persistence conditions of those things to be. Without being clear about those issues, it is difficult to determine whether alternative views are exclusive and if there is disagreement, where the conflict lies. Paying attention to these distinctions can also help us pinpoint exactly what it is that an argument, thought-experiment, or analogy about personal identity supports. Arguments support that persons are animals, for example, do not generally tell us what the persistence conditions of animals are (or even whether they are broadly psychological or physiological). As I mentioned in Section 5 of this chapter, one open question for animalists is how animals persist. Even more significantly, as I argue in Chapter Three, though many arguments support the view that persons are animals, they do not thereby determine whether x and y must be the same animal to be

the same person. In other words, they do not determine whether our being animals actually gives us any insight into answering the diachronic question of personal identity.

In the remainder of this dissertation, I discuss a family of views that are broadly-speaking animalist. They all imply that we are animals. As I argue in Chapter Two, there are many varieties of animalism, some of which are not answers to the diachronic question of personal identity. Of the ones that are, some will fit better with psychological accounts of our persistence over time, and some will fit better with physiological accounts of our persistence over time; I will discuss some of that variability in Chapter Two. In that chapter, I also introduce a distinction between varieties of animalism according to which animals are totally material (i.e. they have no immaterial part) and varieties according to which they have an immaterial part. That the latter variety, though it is by no means novel, is relatively overlooked as a live option in the contemporary debate about personal identity. In Chapters Four and Five, I consider a hylomorphic variety of animalism in more detail.³⁰

³⁰ Thanks to Alex Pruss, Brandon Rickbaugh, and Chris Tweedt for their helpful comments on this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

Varieties of Animalism

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1. Introduction

Animalism in its basic form is the view that we are animals. It’s a thesis about the kind of thing that we, human persons, are.¹ Whether it is or entails a thesis about anything else—like what the conditions of our persistence through time are, or whether we are wholly material things—depends on facts about the persistence conditions of animals and whether they are wholly material. Animalism in its basic form, then, does not commit its proponents to a definite stance on issues like how we persist through time or whether we are wholly material, but animalism in its basic form plus other views about the persistence and composition of animals or the nature of our relationship to animals can have corollaries relating to how we persist through time or whether we are wholly material things.

There are many possible pairings of animalism in its basic form and related, other views. I’ll call such pairings ‘varieties of animalism’. In this paper, I’ll present a taxonomy of those varieties. In most contemporary conversations about animalism, the distinctions between varieties have not been very explicitly identified.² Thus, neither

¹ Recent defenses of animalism include Bailey (2014), Belshaw (2011), Blatti (2012), (2007), Hershenov (2009), Licon (2012), (2013), Merricks (2001), Olson (1997), (2003), (2007), (2015a), (2015b), Sharpe (2015), Snowdon (1991), (2014a), (2014b) Toner (2011), (2014), van Inwagen (1990), Yang (2015).

² However, explicit identification of some varieties happens in Olson (2015b). Olson identifies three varieties: weak animalism, which is equivalent to what I have called ‘animalism in its basic form’ (Olson 2015b, 98); strong animalism, which is the conjunction of weak animalism and five further claims

have the downstream disparities that those distinctions lead to. This has left it unclear what precisely a given variety of animalism is about, what other theses about human persons it is compatible with, and what debates about it turn on.³ Moreover, the different varieties vary in credibility: some varieties will be supported by arguments that are irrelevant to others, and some varieties will be susceptible to objections that other varieties can resist. Adequately distinguishing between varieties of animalism is thus an important preliminary to evaluating them.

Why not focus our evaluation of animalism on animalism in its basic form instead of first developing a taxonomy of its varieties? The reason is that animalism in its basic form says too little to warrant an extended assessment. It says only that we are animals, but it doesn't say what animals are or whether you or I could exist without being one. What sort of evidence would confirm or disconfirm animalism in its basic form if it doesn't tell us what is meant by 'animals' or whether something that is now an animal could ever exist without being an animal?⁴ The indeterminacy of animalism in its basic

about the metaphysical nature of animals (Olson 2015b, 98); and new animalism, which is the conjunction of weak animalism and the denial of those five claims (Olson 2015b, 101). Similarly, Bailey (2015) argues that animalism in its basic form is compatible with a variety of views about how animals persist. Snowdon (2014a, 172) also acknowledges Bailey's (2015) point.

³ For example, animalism is often taken to require that 'psychology is irrelevant to our persistence' (Hershenov 2008, 481), to require restricted composition (Olson 2007, 223–232), to be in tension with the thesis that we are identical to brains, and to deliver counterintuitive verdict in brain transplant cases (Olson (2007, 41–42)). But some varieties of animalism are innocent of such charges. For example, Sharpe's (2015) version is innocent of the first, Yang's (2015) is innocent of the second, Licon's (2013) is innocent of the third (and fourth), and Olson's (2015b) is innocent of the fourth.

⁴ Here's an important set of data that's irrelevant if animalism doesn't specify whether something that is an animal can continue to exist without continuing to exist as an animal: the intuitions about brain transplant cases, which are thought experiments about moving one human's brain the empty skull of another human body. These intuitions are oft-cited anti-animalism data, but unless animalism specifies whether a human person who is an animal can go on existing not an animal, animalism doesn't make any predictions about brain transplant cases. Because brain transplant cases are supposed to be key witnesses in understanding personal identity, I discuss them in further detail below. A spoiler: they turn out not to bear on some varieties of animalism.

form may be why philosophers sometimes resort to describing it by contrast with opposing views: animalism is not the view that we are souls, and not the view that we are parts of brains, and not the view that we are material simples, etc.⁵ But whether animalism rules out these putative opponents seems to be underdetermined. That we are animals rules out that we are souls, for example, only if animals aren't or can't be souls, but maybe they are or can be.⁶ That they are not should not be assumed at the outset. Without fleshing out basic animalism—that is, without pairing it with some other theses and getting a variety of it on the table—there isn't much to say about what it is, what it is not, or whether it's true.

It might also be argued that while basic animalism is too nebulous for further study, the popular One True Animalism isn't, where The One True Animalism is basic animalism plus the theses that animals are wholly material, that whatever is an animal is essentially an animal, and that animals have biological persistence conditions (i.e. that they persist as long as certain biological functions continue).⁷ After all, one or more of those theses do seem to be among the assumptions of many animalists and many critics of animalism.⁸ They may even be standard assumptions. But they are far from universal. Leading animalist Eric Olson, for example, insists that an animalist can coherently maintain that human persons are *not* essentially animals but rather are animals 'in exactly

⁵ See, for example, Blatti (2014), Johansson (2007), Olson (2003), Olson (2007), Noonan (1998).

⁶ See Chapter Four for a defense of this possibility.

⁷ This is the view defended by Olson (1997), (2003), (2007), van Inwagen (1990), Bailey (2014), and many others.

⁸ See Hudson (2007) and anyone who thinks that brain transplant types of cases tell against animalism, like Locke (1998) ('Of Identity and Diversity', Book II, Chapter XXVII) and Parfit (2012). See also Olson's (2015b, 97–102) account of 'strong animalism', of which The One True Animalism is a version, and which Olson identifies as the main target of objections to animalism.

the same sense that I am a philosopher and a parent'.⁹ And there are animalists who argue that animals are not wholly material things: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Toner (2011), (2014), for example.¹⁰ These authors and the fact that they claim that we are animals threaten the idea that One True Animalism is the only genuine variety.

Furthermore, we would do well to avoid a debate over what collection of theses warrants a title. Thus the taxonomy. From now on, let's recognize variety among the views that have shared the title 'animalism'. Let us consider which of those varieties comes out on top evidentially. The taxonomy that I'll propose will help identify which questions which varieties of animalism are suited to answer, what the disputes between animalists and their opponents actually hinge on, and which varieties of animalism are the most plausible.

2. *The Taxonomy*

Alternative answers to the following questions generate the taxonomy.

Essentiality Question: Are human persons essentially animals?

Persistence Question: What are the persistence conditions of animals?

Matter Question: What are animals made of?

If the questions were independent, there would be as many items in the taxonomy as there are combinations of answers to the questions, but the questions are not entirely independent. Though the Essentiality Question is independent of the Persistence and Matter Questions, the Persistence and Matter Questions are arguably not independent of

⁹ Olson (2015b, 92, 96–97). See also Olson (2003). Though Olson makes this point, he himself argues that something that is an animal is an animal throughout its existence and sometimes describes animalism as including that claim (for example, he says that animalism is “the claim that we are human animals and not psychological continuers” (Olson 2002, 202).)

¹⁰ See also Hershenov (2008), (2011b), and Oderberg (2005).

each other. For example, if the answer to the Matter Question is *matter and form*, animals could have purely spiritual persistence conditions: perhaps they last across an interval just in case certain activities of their forms continue.¹¹ But if the answer to the Matter Question is *only matter*, animals' persistence cannot depend on the activity of such forms. Similarly, if animals cannot have prostheses as parts, their persistence conditions cannot allow for surviving the replacement of all their organic parts with artificial ones.¹² Thus, some answers to the Matter Question restrict available answers to the Persistence Question.

Nevertheless, not all answers to the Matter Question make very specific restrictions. For example, although materialism about animals is not compatible with every answer to the Persistence Question, it is compatible with a range of answers.¹³ Materialists about animals could maintain—as they often do—that animals have wholly biological persistence conditions, that they last over time just in case their 'purely animal functions—metabolism, the capacity to breathe and circulate one's blood, and the like—continue'.¹⁴ But materialists about animals could alternatively maintain that an animal's criteria for identity over time are psychological.¹⁵ So while answers to the Matter and

¹¹ This seems to be the suggestion in Hershenov (2008), for example.

¹² See Pruss (MS) for a defense of the view that no prosthesis (i.e. 'mechanical device that [...] is neither maintained nor nourished by the body in the way that paradigmatically bodily parts are') is a part of an animal.

¹³ See Bailey (2015) for a careful treatment of this point and a discussion of the criteria for identity over time that are available to the materialist about animals.

¹⁴ Olson (1997, 16)

¹⁵ See Sharpe (2015) for a defense of this view, and see Olson (2015b, 102–106) for a critique of it.

Persistence questions are not entirely independent, some answers to one are compatible with diverse answers to the other.

Thus, exactly how many varieties of animalism are in the taxonomy will depend not only on how many answers the above questions have but also on how restrictive the answers are. Moreover, since the answers can be more or less general, some varieties of animalism will be subvarieties of others. For example, a variety of animalism according to which animals are made of organic matter is a subversion of materialism about animals. One might wonder whether we should count subvarieties as distinct from the varieties that subsume them. If our purpose is to evaluate varieties of animalism better, it seems that we should. Many of the differences between varieties and subvarieties of animalism make for differences in their predictive power and in what arguments can be made for and against them.

Nevertheless, we will not here consider in detail—or even list—every distinct variety or subvariety of animalism that substantive and interesting differences yield. Here, I will focus on the distinctions that make for the most radical theoretical differences. These are the distinctions from which we'll get the most mileage clarifying what the debates about animalism can and have turned on.

3. The Essentiality Question

3.1 Introduction

Discussion about personal identity centrally tracks at least these two questions: *How do we persist?* and *What kind of thing are we?* The answer to *How do we persist?* is our persistence conditions, the criteria we must satisfy in order to persist through an

interval of time. Example criteria are having biological continuity or having psychological continuity. The answer to *What kind of thing are we?* is something describing a kind, substantial or accidental, and more or less general. Example answers include *substance, material thing, mammal, and grad student*. Whether a variety of animalism is a thesis about our persistence conditions or is instead a thesis about what kind of thing we are depends on whether, according to the variety in question, human persons are essentially animals.¹⁶

Let's consider the two kinds of varieties of animalism that this discussion has introduced. First, let's consider those that make claims about some of our essential features. These varieties entail something about how we persist.¹⁷ Second, let's consider those varieties of animalism that do not entail something about how we persist, but rather merely answer *What kind of thing are we?*

¹⁶ And there are two ways for a variety to express an essential relation. One is direct and the other is indirect, by stating our membership to a kind that determines our persistence conditions. If kinds are defined in terms of persistence conditions (as Johansson (2007) seems to assume about substantial kinds), then whether we belong to a given kind will depend on what our persistence conditions are, or what our persistence conditions are will depend on whether we belong to a certain kind (provided an individual can't change kinds of this sort). Thus, we can see that the answers to these two central questions about personal identity—*How do we persist?* and *What are we?*—possibly go hand-in-hand. Whether they actually go hand in hand depends on what else is true, namely whether one of the kinds that we are in determines our persistence conditions. Nevertheless what we are need not be related to how we persist in this way. At least: a theory about what we are can remain neutral about our persistence conditions and vice versa as long as it doesn't make or depend on assumptions that connect the two. For simplicity's sake, in this paper I will make no assumptions that connect the two.

¹⁷ As I will argue in Chapter Three, varieties of animalism that make claims about some of our essential features are not the only varieties of animalism that imply our persistence conditions. For example, on some understandings of fundamentality (e.g. the understanding that seems to be operative in Olson (1997) (who draws on Wiggins (1980)), Nichols (2010), and Olson (2015b)), varieties of animalism according to which we are fundamentally animals also imply our persistence conditions. For expository purposes, I focus here on essentialist varieties.

3.2 Essentialist Varieties

The claim that human persons are animals could amount to the claim that we are essentially animals. It could entail that wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal. I can't exist without being an animal.

There is an ambiguity in the expression 'Wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal' that points to a distinction between essentialist varieties of animalism. 'Wherever and whenever I exist, I am an animal' is ambiguous between a view according to which wherever and whenever I exist, I'm some animal or other and a view according to which wherever and whenever I exist, I'm this one particular animal. Both views are views about our persistence conditions, and both take being an animal to be a necessary condition of our existence. But the second view is narrower than the first, specifying *which* animals it is necessary that each of us be (namely, the ones that each of us now is). This difference is not trivial; the views can make different predictions about whether a human person will (or can) continue to exist if you kill the animal that he is or if you put his animal's brain in another animal's body.

However, these views are distinct only if there is such a thing as relative identity. Without relative identity, the first, broader view (let's call it Broad Essentialist Animalism) collapses into the narrower view (let's call it Narrow Essentialist Animalism). What is special about Broad Essentialist Animalism is that it leaves open the possibility that the same person is identical to different animals. For example, it leaves open the possibility that the animal that I am at t1 is not identical to the animal that I am at t2. But if identity isn't relative, that is not a possibility that can be left open. Here's why. If A=the animal that is A at t1, and A=the animal that is A at t2, then by the

transitivity of identity, the animal that is A at t1 = the animal that is A at t2. Generally, if identity isn't relative, I can't be different animals at different times; all the animals that I am (so to speak) are in fact the same animal. If identity is relative, however, then it is possible for there to be an x, y, F and G such that x is the same F as y but not the same G as y. For example, substitute 'the animal that is A at t1' for x, 'the animal that is A at t2' for y, 'person' for F, and 'animal' for G. If identity is relative, it is possible that the animal that is A at t1 is the same person as the animal that is A at t2 but not the same animal as the animal that is A at t2. But if every x that is the same F as y is the same G as y (as is the case if there is no relative identity), then the animal that is A at t1 is the same animal as the animal that is A at t2 as long as they are the same person. Thus, the viability of Broad Essentialist Animalism depends on the viability of relative identity. Whether there is a relative identity relation is controversial, and defenders of the view that there is are in the minority.¹⁸ Broad Essentialist Animalism, therefore, is not often defended.

Narrow Essentialist Animalism, on the other hand, is the most common animalist representative in the debate about how we persist.¹⁹ The prominence of Narrow Essentialist Animalism is clear in light of standard evaluations of brain transplant cases, in which it seems to be presumed.

Brain transplant cases are thought experiments in which the brain of a human animal (let's name the person whose brain that is Donor) is transferred, fully functioning and with all of Donor's memories intact, into the empty cranium of another human

¹⁸ See Deutsch (2008) for a detailed summary of the debate about relative identity and Geach (1967) for the earliest defense of relative identity.

¹⁹ A narrow essentialist animalism is the animalist representative in Bailey (2014), Mackie (1999), Merricks (2001), Olson (1997), Olson (2007), van Inwagen (1990), Noonan (1998) and many others.

animal.²⁰ What's left at the end of the transfer are two living bodies, one which has a brain but which didn't at the beginning of the transplant and one which no longer has a brain but did at the beginning of the transplant. Some people have intuitions about where Donor is after all that. One way to find out what your intuitions are is to ask yourself some questions. For example, suppose that you were married to Donor and you'd like to take your spouse home. Which creature are you going to put in your car? Whichever one you pick is probably the one you intuit to be (or include) the human person.²¹ More broadly, you might try to identify which thing you are more interested in taking care of.²² Once you have a grip on your intuitions about where Donor is, compare those intuitions to the various predictions of different accounts of personal identity. A view according to which human persons are brains will have Donor follow her brain. Does that fit with what you wanted to take home from the hospital? A view according to which whether a person persists depends on the content of her memories will also have Donor follow her brain. A view according to which human persons are essentially the animals that they are, like Narrow Essentialist Animalism, will have Donor follow her animal. This is because according to Narrow Essentialist Animalism, wherever and whenever Donor exists, she is *that* particular animal—in this case, the animal who had a brain this morning and doesn't

²⁰ For now, bracket the concerns in Olson (2007) that have him cast brain transplant cases as cerebrum transplant cases.

²¹ Of course, you might not in fact think that the one you pick is the human person. You might, for example, think that marriage occurs between animals, not persons, and so it does not matter which of those bodies is the human person you're so familiar with. You're concerned with taking home the right animal (and not so much the right person).

²² See Hershenov (2011b).

any more. Plausibly, that animal didn't go anywhere.²³ So it's the brainless but living body on the operating table that is Donor. How does *that* fit with your intuitions?

Animalist interpretations of brain transplant cases (and variants thereof) are generally taken not to fit well with intuitions about brain transplant cases. Thus, brain-transplant sorts of cases are widely recognized as a stumbling block, if not a *coup de grace*, for animalism.²⁴

But note well: brain transplant cases like the one involving Donor don't create the same kind of trouble for Broad Essentialist Animalism. According to Broad Essentialist Animalism, in order to continue to exist, a human person just has to be some animal or other, not necessarily the same animal she has been. And so if Broad Essentialist Animalism (but not Narrow Essentialist Animalism) is true, there's no special barrier to identifying Donor, for example, with the body that has a brain at the end of the operation.²⁵ What this shows is that Broad Essentialist Animalism is not what people assume when they say that our intuitions about brain transplant cases are evidence against

²³ Of course, this is the upshot of Narrow Essentialist Animalism only if that brainless animal really is the same animal. It's plausible and commonly assumed that it is, but it wouldn't be incoherent to deny that it is the same animal. You would just have to identify the persistence conditions of animals such that the brainless body (or heap) on the operating table does not meet them. Moreover, if you think that Donor is the animal with a brain at the end of the operation, you'll have to have the conditions be such that that animal does meet the persistence conditions you identified. This is why the Persistence Question is extremely important. See Section 4 for more details.

²⁴ See Locke (1998, 296–314), i.e. 'Of Identity and Diversity', Book II, Chapter XXVII; Olson (2007, 42).

²⁵ There may be concerns about how exactly Donor comes to be the body with a brain at the end of the operation when her old, otherwise-perfectly-good body is still around. But these are something that Broad Essentialist Animalism at least is compatible with getting around. Narrow Essentialist Animalism is not.

animalism. Rather, they seem to be assuming something like Narrow Essentialist Animalism.²⁶

Let's take a closer look at Broad Essentialist Animalism, which requires of a person only that she be some animal or other (not necessarily the same animal she is now) in order to continue to exist. Broad Essentialist Animalism is not popularly defended or even explicitly taken seriously in the debate about how we persist. This is due not only to its dependence on an unpopular view of identity, as discussed above, but also to the fact that it doesn't specify what kind of continuity our identity over time consists in. In contrast, Narrow Essentialist Animalism gives you that kind of account. According to Narrow Essentialist Animalism, the kind of continuity that has to hold between a present person and a future person in order for them both to be you is animalian continuity (whatever that amounts to). According to Narrow Essentialist Animalism, the past or future things that are you are the things that are the same animal that you are. Broad Essentialist Animalism doesn't give you that kind of answer to *How do we persist?*. Even so, we have good reason to countenance it as a variety of animalism and classify it as a variety that helps answer how we persist. First, it is a view about human persons according to which there are no non-animal human persons. That there are no non-animal human persons is logically equivalent to that all human persons are animals. That equivalence is enough to warrant categorizing this view as an animalist view. Moreover, Broad Essentialist Animalism, because it entails an essential connection between human persons and animals, entails an animal-based restriction on the

²⁶ Olson (2007, 42) says that cerebrum transplant cases are supposed to show that 'you are not essentially an animal', which he wouldn't think if he had Broad Essentialist Animalism in mind.

persistence of human persons (even if it doesn't make explicit a complete criterion of a person's identity over time).

For this reason, a variation of the above brain transplant case can be run against Broad Essentialist Animalism (even if the exact brain transplant case given above has no bearing on the view). Suppose Donor walks in for the surgery, and a doctor transfers her brain from her cranium to the cranium-like cavity of a humanoid robot. The robot lights up, having all of Donor's memories, eager to continue saving for that vacation, remembering her wedding day, wanting to go home and see the children, etc. Isn't that Donor? Not according to Broad Essentialist Animalism. At least, not according to Broad Essentialist Animalism if robots aren't animals (not even animaloid ones with animal brains). This is because if Broad Essentialist Animalism is true, nothing that's a non-animal is a human person. Since Donor is a human person, the non-animal robot is not even a Donor-candidate.²⁷

We have thus far considered two varieties of animalism that entail something about how we persist. These varieties make essentiality claims. One claims that essentially we are some particular animal (that's Narrow Essentialist Animalism), and the other claims that essentially we are some animal or other (that's Broad Essentialist Animalism). These theories are different enough that they make opposing predictions in certain brain transplant cases. But they have much in common: both entail that there are no non-animal human persons and both make predictions (even if not the same ones)

²⁷ The Broad Essentialist Animalist could hold that the animal has shrunk to the size of the brain. In that case, she couldn't say that the *robot* is the animal, but she could say that the robot has a brain-sized animal inside of it. But if no brain is an animal then this route is not available to the Broad Essentialist Animalist either.

about brain transplant types of cases. The reason both make predictions about brain transplant cases is that both entail something or other about how we persist.

However, brain transplant cases do not pertain to the varieties of animalism that answer only the question, ‘What are we?’ (where our persistence conditions are not determined by being whatever is referred to in the answer to that question). In the next section, we will consider varieties of that sort.

3.3 Non-essentialist Varieties

It is sometimes taken for granted that animalism is (or all animalisms are) one of the above varieties. Indeed, essentialist animalisms are popular varieties of animalism. More generally, that animalism is an essentiality claim is implicitly the view of any defender of animalism who takes animalism to be a reply to Locke. This is because Locke’s view about personal identity answers the ‘how do we persist’ question.

But essentialist animalisms are not the only varieties of animalism. Some defend a variety of animalism that is about what kind of thing we are, while denying that (or being neutral about whether) claims about what kind of thing we are entail non-trivial claims about our persistence conditions. This is what Eric Olson is doing when he argues that animalism says that we are animals in the same ordinary sense in which we are parents and music-lovers, and that you could be an animalist in ‘his sense’ without accepting that we are essentially animals.²⁸

Some take this to be the view of Thomas Aquinas because they interpret Aquinas to maintain that we are animals who exist between death and the resurrection as non-

²⁸ See Olson (2015b, 92) and Olson (2003). Olson’s (2015b) ‘weak animalism’ is a non-essentialist animalism.

animals.²⁹ Let's skip over details about whether this is his view. But if it is, it's one according to which human persons are animals but can outlast those animals, and that's exactly the sort of animalism we are discussing. It's one that answers 'What are we?' without answering 'How do we persist?'

Though some would not classify non-essentialist views as animalist views, we will count them as varieties of animalism for a couple of reasons: they fit with a straightforward interpretation of the phrase 'Human persons are animals', which is characteristic of all varieties of animalism, and other people (for example, Suachelli (2016) and Olson (2015b) seem to take this view to be at least a variety of animalism if not animalism itself.

4. The Persistence Question

Recall the brain transplant cases discussed above, the interpretations of which are widely taken to tell against essentialist varieties of animalism. In these cases, Donor's brain is moved from his head into something else, and we wonder where Donor went. It seems like he went with his brain, but it also seems that essentialist animalism rules that he stayed with his brainless but living body.

But there is a complication: no essentialist variety of animalism, at the level of specificity we have considered so far, *entails* certain interpretations of brain transplant cases. And so brain transplant cases are not in fact definitely evidentially relevant to essentialist varieties of animalism. Whether a given variety of animalism entails that

²⁹ For example, Brower (2014) maintains that Aquinas thinks we exist between our deaths and resurrections, but not as animals (even though before death we are animals). In contrast, Stump (2006), Oderberg (2008), and Brown (2007) maintain that Aquinas thinks that we exist between our deaths and resurrections, but also that we are animals (even then); and others (e.g. Toner (2007), Toner (2009), Toner (2010)) take Aquinas to think that we don't exist between our deaths and resurrections at all.)

Donor is here or there (or in neither location!) depends not just on whether that variety of animalism is an essentialist variety, but also on what the facts about animal persistence are. Even if there are *plausible* essentialist-animalist deliverances about brain transplant cases, there are no deliverances strictly speaking and independent of negotiable assumptions. And so in order to identify an animalist prediction more precise than ‘The human person will be the human animal, whatever *that* is’, you must answer the Persistence Question.

This indeterminacy is not unique to essentialist *animalisms*. Rather, it is a feature of any essentialist view that is not maximally precise. Consider, for example, the proposition that a human person is essentially a thing that persists through a given length of time if and only if it has the same brain throughout that time. That proposition does not entail anything very particular about which sorts of medical operations, for example, a human person can survive. The reason is that that proposition is indeterminate with respect to which operations a brain can survive as the same brain. More generally, that proposition does not entail what the persistence conditions of brains are. For example, consider Brainy, a human person who persists if and only if she has the same brain. Can she survive a brain transplant? It’s not clear because it’s not clear whether her brain would survive the transplant. Can a given brain relocate to and govern a new body and yet remain the same brain? Can a brain cease being a proper part of a larger body (as it might have to during a brain transplant) and continue to exist as the same brain? Aristotle did not think that fingers could do that. Cut them off and they aren’t really fingers any more. By analogy, the removed brain would not be the same item as the attached brain. And who knows what to say if you reattach the ‘fingers’ or ‘brains’ to other bodies?

Would they be fingers and brains again? Would they be the same fingers and brains? Is gappy existence possible for brains? That is, could the very same brain go out of existence and then back into it? Even assuming that human persons persist if and only if they have the same brain, we would need to have answers to these questions in order to keep track of the human person in a brain transplant or similar adventure. Similarly, we need to have answers about animal persistence in order to understand whether and how animals would survive brain transplants.

So while it's tempting to say that our intuitions about brain transplant cases are evidence against some varieties of animalism, basic animalism is not determinate with respect to what happens in those cases. It takes two things for a variety of animalism to specify human persons' persistence conditions: the first thing is that the variety has to be an essentialist one, and the second thing is that the variety has to say something about what the persistence conditions of animals are.

One popular account of what the persistence conditions of animals are is what Olson calls the 'Biological Approach'. On this approach, a human animal's persistence through time depends on the continuation of its purely biological processes. Notably, it is the conjunction of the Biological Approach and Narrow Essentialist Animalism that is the usual target of objections from brain transplant cases.³⁰ This is because in a brain transplant, the donor's biological processes continue in the brainless donor body (provided it survives), and according to the Biological Approach, that means that that

³⁰ More precisely, it is usually the conjunction of Narrow Essentialist Animalism, the Biological Approach, *and* materialism about animals that is the target of objections to animalism from brain transplant cases. But the materialism conjunct is not necessary for the objection to be relevant. For example, a standard brain transplant case can be run as-is against a narrow essentialist animalism where animals are hylomorphic compounds.

animal persists.³¹ From Narrow Essentialist Animalism follows the counterintuitive conclusion that the persisting, brainless animal is the person and that the recipient of the brain is not the person.

But an animalist need not adopt the Biological Approach. Andrew Bailey has recently sketched three available alternatives.³² On one, animal persistence—at least, the persistence of *human* animals—consists in psychological continuity, not biological continuity.³³ On another, hybrid account, an animal persists if either sufficient biological continuity or sufficient psychological continuity is maintained.³⁴ On a third account, animal persistence depends on what future things we tend to identify ourselves with.³⁵ There are even more accounts of persistence conditions available, particularly for proponents of non-materialist animal ontologies. For example, those who think that animals have souls as parts can base animals' criteria for identity over time on the continued existence or activity of the soul.³⁶ An animalist of this variety has the potential to respond well to brain transplant cases in case the soul performing its activities follows the transplanted brain. If she did, she would be able to say that the animal follows its brain and thus that the person does as well.

³¹ This point is actually fairly contentious for *brain* transplant cases since some argue that the life processes plausibly follow the brain and/or brainstem. This is one of the reasons brain transplant cases are often cast as cerebrum transplant cases. Here we will sidestep this particular debate, but it is interesting to note the bearing that a view that is independent of animalism (i.e. the view that biological processes 'follow' the brainstem) has on what an animalist can say about transfer scenarios.

³² Bailey (2015).

³³ A psychologically serious account like this one is defended by Sharpe (2015).

³⁴ A disjunctive account like this one is defended by Langford (2014) (who does not take this approach to be compatible with animalism, but it seems that he means by 'animalism' basic animalism plus the Biological Approach.)

³⁵ This account is inspired by Johnston (2010).

³⁶ See, for example, Toner (2014).

5. The Matter Question

What are animals made of? Are they wholly material things, compounds of matter and some- thing immaterial, or wholly immaterial things? What animals are made of is important because their persistence conditions can depend on what they're made of.³⁷ For example, if animals are compounds of matter and something immaterial, there will be a variety of animalism according to which the something immaterial can exist without the matter and a one according to which the something immaterial cannot exist without the matter. There will be varieties according to which animals are three-dimensional objects and alternatives according to which they are four-dimensional objects.³⁸ There will be varieties according to which animals can have inorganic or artificial parts and varieties according to which they can't. There will be subvarieties specifying just how many artificial parts they can survive having.³⁹ There will be varieties according to which material things can continue to exist without being material and varieties according to which they cannot.⁴⁰

³⁷ The importance of outlining the metaphysical nature of animals has not been entirely overlooked. Olson (2007, 27–29) gives a sketch of what he takes the relevant characteristics to be, and Toner (2011) indicates that he takes animals to be hylomorphic compounds, etc.

³⁸ Olson (2007, 162–168), however, argues that an ontology of temporal parts reduces the problem of personal identity to a linguistic debate. Others, for example Hudson (2007) and Hershenov (2011a), don't seem to think so. (Hudson (2007) argues that in some cases, the differences between four-dimensionalist and three-dimensionalist ontologies don't matter to the strength of the animalism.) And Olson (2007, 99–129) seems to think that it might not be a *wholly* linguistic debate after all, suggesting that an ontology of temporal parts can solve an otherwise insoluble problem (Olson 2007, 20).

³⁹ See Pruss (MS) for an example of how the thesis that animals cannot have prosthetics as parts affects the credibility of animalism.

⁴⁰ The variety according to which they can continue to exist is not so unbelievable: suppose that thoughts are immaterial. You play chess. You move the king. Arf! Suddenly, the king is eaten by the dog! You keep playing with a mental king that you and the other player have in your minds. It's the same king as the one at the beginning of the game: there is only one king in a chess game, though he might be represented by many lumps or thoughts. Or the king could turn into the shadow of your finger, and shadows aren't material. Either way, the king turned immaterial from being material. (Thanks to Alex Pruss for this example.)

The differences between these views matter. For example, if souls are parts of animals, whether it's possible that an animal soul exist without its body (as at least Aristotle seems to deny) will make a difference to some theories about animal life and persistence. For example, that animal souls can exist without animal bodies seems to increase the plausibility of the theory that gappy existence is possible for animals because there is some likelihood that animal souls contain all of the information needed to turn chunks of matter into the animals whose souls they are. Thus, in case an animal goes out of existence, there might be *some* way of getting that animal back: just give that animal's soul some matter to work on. The separability of the animal soul from the animal body is not decisive evidence in favor of the possibility of gappy existence, but it's not wholly irrelevant either.

No matter the ontology of animals in general, questions will remain about the nature of human person candidates in particular. What do we mean by 'animals' when we say that human persons are animals?⁴¹ Will any carbon-based, sentient life form do?⁴² If so, there could be a human person who is a dog (provided it's intelligent enough) or one who is a Martian (as long as Martians are sentient and carbon-based). Do we mean something more specific by 'animals'? For example, do we mean anything from the genus *homo sapiens*? A human person who is a Martian would be a counterexample to a variety of animalism where the animals in question are *homo sapiens*. Maybe we mean something less restrictive than *homo sapiens* but more restrictive than 'any carbon-based sentient life form', like we mean anything from the genus *homo*. But we might want to

⁴¹ See Olson (2007, Chapter Two) for Olson's answer.

⁴² Toner (2011) argues that it will do quite well.

avoid the not-particularly-philosophical categories of biology altogether. Figuring out what we want to say is difficult: it's hard to identify which animals human persons can be in a way that does not define that class of animals by the relationship that the members of that class usually have to human persons.⁴³

There are even more questions whose answers partly map out the metaphysical nature of animals. Assuming the animalist proposal is that human persons are *living* animals, we might wonder: What is a life? What is death? Are there dead animals?⁴⁴ How do you account for the unity of the disparate parts of a living body?⁴⁵ How do you account for the unity of a life? You can probably think of additional ones. What's more: there are multiple coherent ways of answering all of them. For every way, there is another variety of animalism. There will be materialist varieties of animalism: varieties according to which animals are wholly material things. There will be hylomorphic varieties of animalism: varieties according to which animals are body-soul compounds. There will be dualist varieties of animalism: varieties according to which animals are material things animated by some separate, immaterial, non-animal thing. And so on.

6. Conclusion

What the above sections show is that there are many ways of being an animalist. One can take animalism to answer 'What kind of thing are we?' and 'How do we persist?' or just one. One can assume a biological approach to persistence conditions, a

⁴³ The difficulty in avoiding circularity in specifying which animals human persons are supposed to be given animalism is a problem that has preoccupied both critics and defenders of animalism. See Blatti (2014), Johansson (2007), Olson (2007), Noonan (1998) for a sample.

⁴⁴ See Hershenov (2005) and Belshaw (2011) for discussions of this question.

⁴⁵ See Olson (2007, Chapter Nine) for a discussion of this question and what it means for animalism.

psychological approach, or another approach. And one can adopt a variety of accounts of the metaphysical nature of human animals.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Thanks to Charity Anderson, Andrew Bailey, Meghan Page, Alex Pruss, Mike Rea, Brad Rettler, Lindsay Rettler, Jeff Russell, Chris Tweedt, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments or conversations on earlier drafts of this chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

How to Argue for Animalism

1. Introduction

Generally speaking, animalism is the view that you and I are animals. Precisely speaking, what animalism entails about us varies according to assumptions made about animals, such as what their persistence conditions are, whether we also have those persistence conditions, and whether they are wholly material things. As I argued in the previous chapter, different varieties of animalism vary with respect to their commitments regarding those assumptions. The varieties of animalism most commonly assessed are ones that tell us something about our persistence conditions. Specifically, they entail that we share our persistence conditions with animals. Though varieties of this type differ with respect to precise accounts of animals' persistence conditions, they have in common a commitment to a close connection between human persons and animals: they entail that we are *firmly* animals, by which I mean that we are now animals and once we are animals, we cannot exist without being animals. We will call such views firm varieties of animalism.¹

¹ Firm varieties should be distinguished from essentialist varieties. The latter is a species of the former; essentialist animalism is firm animalism plus the modal claim that we could not have existed as non-animals. Firm animalism is not meant to imply more than that I have my identity conditions by virtue of being an animal, that *animal* is my substantial kind, that *animal* is the substance sortal I fall under, etc. It is not meant to imply that I am fundamentally an animal or essentially an animal (though I think that in some of the literature, all that is meant by the fundamentality and essentiality nomenclature is what I mean by firmness). Thus understood, essentialist animalism does entail firm animalism—if we are animals and there is no world in which we are non-animals, then we cannot become non-animals—but firm animalism does not entail essentialist animalism—perhaps we have the persistence conditions of animals, but we might not have been animals at all.

Because of the relative popularity of firm varieties of animalism, we might expect that the most popular animalist defenses would entail or at least probabilify that we are firmly animals. But as I will argue below, absent a principle that virtually no one defends, this is not the case. The most championed and scrutinized defenses of animalism have non-modal, non-persistence-prescribing conclusions. They entail only that we are animals, maybe firmly, but maybe not.

This is problematic for two reasons. First, insofar as animalism is a contender in the debate about personal identity, it is critically under-supported. The views that standard defenses of animalism deliver tell us very little about how we persist over time. They tell us only that we are animals “for now”, so to speak.² But we need more than that from a variety of animalism that is an alternative to, for example, neo-Lockeanism about personal identity. Such a view needs to specify whether we can survive becoming non-animals. But whether our being animals “for now” implies that we must continue to be depends on whether things that are animals can become non-animals and remain numerically the same. It depends, in other words, on whether all animals are animals firmly, or on whether ‘animal’ is a substance sortal as opposed to a phase sortal, or on

² They do give us sufficient conditions. If I am an animal, then if the same animal persists, then I persist. This is informative in cases like amnesia (provided that the pre-amnesiac and amnesiac animals are the same animal, which, implausibly, they might not be): if I’m an animal and after amnesia there is still an animal, then I persist. But sufficient conditions fall short of what we want from a statement of our persistence conditions for two reasons. First, they do not (of course) tell us the necessary conditions for our persistence, and so they don’t tell us what happens when, after some adventure, there remains no animal or there are multiple candidates for being me (e.g. it doesn’t tell us whether brain-transplant cases are cases of fission). Second, they are not a very deep or insightful part of an account about how we persist. The claim that we are animals articulates one of our sufficient conditions for persisting in the same way that “I am bipedal”, “I am a resident of Texas”, “I am a philosopher” does. If I’m bipedal (Texan, a philosopher) and after some adventure, the same biped (Texan, philosopher) exists, then after that adventure I exist. I exist then even if I’m no longer bipedal, Texan, or a philosopher since bipeds, Texans, and philosophers can lose legs, move, and quit. “We are animals” tells us something about how we persist just because it allows us to substitute animal for F in the following principle: if a and b are the same F, then a is b. But that instantiation doesn’t give us much more metaphysical insight than do other instantiations: biped, Texan, or philosopher. Those instantiations don’t give us substantive philosophical insight because they are merely instantiations of a logical principle.

whether animals are essentially animals. I'll call the thesis that at least one of those disjuncts is true AHA—the Animals Have to be Animals thesis. But *whether* AHA is true, though its relevance has not gone unrecognized,³ is a question often set aside,⁴ overlooked⁵, or dwarfed by the attention given to the synchronic claim of animalism and the arguments that back it up. This leaves vulnerable even animalism's candidacy as a theory about personal identity.

Second, it's bad news for a view if the most popular defenses of it do not fully support its most popular varieties. It is particularly bad news if a view's standard defenses support rival views as well as they support the view in question. But without a defense of AHA, that's the status of firm animalism. There is an alternative variety of animalism on offer (let's call it phase animalism, following a recent defender of the

³ See especially Sauchelli (2016) and much of Olson's work, including Olson (1997, 2003, 2015b). Olson (1997, 120-123) explicitly considers the objection to his view that *animal* might not be a substance concept, noting that it "represents perhaps the most promising strategy" for defending a broadly Lockean, psychology-based account of our persistence conditions. (Nevertheless, he spends barely more than a page replying to it.)

⁴ See, e.g., Olson (2003), Olson (2007, 27), Johansson (2007, 196). Olson (2015b, 95, 97) maintains that both animalists and non-animalists "agree that animals are animals fundamentally", that animals are animals essentially, etc. Very recently, in their introduction to a new anthology of articles on animalism, Blatti and Snowdon (2016) acknowledge that one of the main arguments for animalism, the too-many-thinkers argument, does not show that animalism is a substance type and therefore does not "take us all the way to animalism", but they set the point aside because it "was more or less taken for granted."

⁵ For example: Nichols (2010): "According to Animalism, we are not essentially persons. Instead, we are essentially biological entities [...]. Accordingly, say the animalists, our persistence conditions are provided by the substance concept animal [...]." Licon (2014, 62): "the animalist view of personal identity holds that someone is the same person over time if they are the same organism over time." Snowdon (2014b, 9-10) states that animalism implies necessary conditions on our existence (in particular, that a person could be preserved with his or her brain if it became separated from the rest of the body). Johnston (2016, 89): animalism is committed to the thesis that "*animal* is one of our substance kinds, i.e. every human person is always in fact an animal, and there is no possible future deviating from any point in his or her existence in which they are not animals." Sauchelli (2016), though arguing for a variety of animalism according to which persons can survive destruction of their animal, admits in his project to going against "the spirit of animalism". Even Olson often makes quick claims like these: "If we are animals, no sort of mental continuity is either necessary or sufficient for us to persist" (Olson (2002, 194) and "If we are animals, [...] we cease to exist when we die" (Olson (2004, 267). I hesitate to say that when philosophers say things like this they *overlook* the fact that *we are animals* entails that mental continuity is necessary and sufficient for us to persist only if AHA is true. But the general effect is that animalism and AHA get presented as a package, no questions asked.

view⁶), which AHA-free animalist arguments support no less than they support firm animalism. According to phase animalism, we are animals but not firmly so. And since it is our *firm* animality that binds firm animalists to many of their view's unfavorable consequences, phase animalism offers a tempting alternative to the norm: it offers as much credibility as firm animalism but less of its baggage. At least, it does as long as AHA is undefended. Thus, if firm animalists want to defend their view *over* the phase animalist's alternative, they need to do more than what they've done so far. They need to defend AHA.

In this paper, I will evaluate three of the most popularly cited defenses of animalism—The Thinking Animal Argument, The Animal Ancestors Argument, and The Association Argument—and show that none of the strongest versions of them support firm animalism on their own. For any of those arguments to yield that variety of animalism requires a principle connecting their conclusions to modal ones: for example, AHA. Along the way, I will specify other weaknesses in the animalist defenses. The result is an inventory of what objections need to be replied to, what bullets bitten, and what auxiliary premises defended to shore up the animalist project. In this chapter, I will

⁶ Saucelli (2015, 9), who actually further specifies the view as “non-modal phase animalism” or NMPA. Specifically, NMPA is the view that we are human animals and *human animal* is a phase sortal, a concept that something can fall under temporarily, like *child* or *athlete*. Phase sortals are contrasted with substance sortals (also known as “substance concepts”), under which things fall for their whole existence. According to NMPA, it's possible that we continue to exist as non-human-animals. Earlier than Saucelli, Pruss (in 2014) suggested the possibility that “animal” is a stage term: <<http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2014/02/might-be-stage-term.html>>. Even earlier, Olson (1997, 120-123) considered the possibility and its relevance to animalism. There, in the voice of an objector, Olson suggested that “The real question [the answer to which will determine whether a psychological or a biological account of our persistence conditions is correct] is whether *person* or *animal* is a substance concept: whether we are essentially people or essentially animals, and whether we have our persistence conditions by virtue of being people or whether we have them by virtue of being animals.” Of course, Olson thinks that the answer is that *animal* is the substance concept. But his direct defense of that claim is minimal (see footnote 4 above). He gives an indirect defense in Chapter Two of the same book by arguing that that *person* is not well suited for being a substance sortal. (For an interesting reply to that claim, see Nichols (2010).) The distinction between phase and substance sortals comes from Wiggins (1967, 1980, 2001).

not reply to the objections to the premises of animalist arguments or to softening the blows of accepting those objections. That is an enterprise the value of which animalists already recognize and have embarked on. Instead, I will focus on AHA: first, on showing that the standard arguments for animalism don't return firm animalism without it, and second (in the final section of this chapter) on offering arguments for it.

2. The Thinking Animal Argument

Wherever you are right now, there is also an animal, one that is invariably affiliated with you. As you read this paper and consider its contents, so does that animal. Every thought you have about the paper, the animal has, and every thought the animal has, you have. But if you have the animal's thoughts and the animal has your thoughts, then you and the animal must be the same thing. To avoid this conclusion, one would have to accept that for every thought, there would be two creatures thinking it: the animal and you. Something that isn't you would be thinking your thoughts, and you'd be thinking the thoughts of something that isn't you.

This is problematic. If you and the animal both think (and most people's animals, like yours, think) then there are far more thinkers than we typically suppose. Call this (following Olson (2002)) the overcrowding problem.

Another problem: if you've ever believed that you are a person, your animal has believed that it is a person, too. You've both believed 'I am a person.'⁷ One of you has

⁷ Proposed solution: When your animal thinks 'I am a person', 'I' refers not to the animal, but to the relevant person. So when your animal thinks 'I am a person', what she means is 'my person is a person', and so she isn't wrong. Noonan (1998, 2001) pursues this kind of strategy, but Olson (2002) points out that Noonan's case implies that the view that we have non-psychological persistence conditions self-contradictory. Noonan's view has the result that rational human animals are not people *merely* because they have the wrong identity conditions. Olson thinks that a linguistic solution to the epistemic problem just won't work; to avoid it, one has to deny that human animals can think at all.

been wrong, however, even though the two of you have always been equally justified in believing that you are a person, or at least base your beliefs about being a person on the same evidence in the same way. If you were the animal, as opposed to the person, you wouldn't be able to tell. In fact, for all you know, you *are* the animal. Call this (again, following Olson (2002)) the epistemic problem.

A third problem: the animal, psychologically exactly like you as she is, is psychologically exactly like a person. By almost all accounts of personhood, there's thus no reason not to count her as a person. But if she's a person, then there is an animal that is a person. And if there are animals that are people, then it's hard to see what reasons any of us could have to believe that we are not the animal people, i.e. to see that that animalism is false. Call this (following (Olson (2002))), the personhood problem.⁸

A fourth problem: If there are two thinkers where you are, then there is nothing you do that your animal doesn't do. Not only does it do all of the physical activities you do but it also does all of the *mental* activities you do. It does *everything* you do, which means everything you do is causally determined both by you and by the animal. So if you and the animal are different thinkers, everything you do is *overdetermined*. But things are very probably not massively overdetermined. And the theory that something distinct from me is thinking my thoughts entails that things are massively overdetermined. Call this (following Licon (2012)) the overdetermination problem.

The above considerations have much in common with what is perhaps the most well-known family of pro-animalist arguments, such as “The Thinking Animal Argument,” “The Too Many Thinkers Argument,” “The Too Many Minds Objection,”

⁸ For additional discussion of the overcrowding, epistemic, and personhood problems, see Olson (2007, 35-37).

and the “Two Lives Objection.” Here, I articulate those considerations in what I will call the Thinking Animal Argument, setting it up in a way that makes clear the connection between thinking animals and the overcrowding, epistemic, personhood, and overdetermination problems that have also been pressed in the literature. Here’s the argument more precisely:

1. Assume (for *reductio*) that you are not your animal.
2. Assume that you think.
3. Assume that your animal thinks what you think.
4. Assume that you and your animal are both where you are.
5. So, there are two subjects where you are—you and your animal—both of whom think what you think. (From 1-3.)
6. There are not two subjects where you are—you and your animal—both of whom think what you think.
7. So, you are your animal.

The overcrowding, epistemic, personhood, and overdetermination problems relate to premise (6). They are problems that arise if (6) is false.

The argument is open to numerous objections, which I will consider below. But first I will focus on the force of the Thinking Animal Argument on the assumption that it is sound. It does not entail firm animalism. The conclusion—that you are your animal—is compatible with the possibility that you will cease to be an animal or that you once were

not an animal.⁹ That this is so is made clear by the following parody of the Thinking Animal Argument:

- 1.' Assume (for *reductio*) that you are not your firefighter.
- 2.' Assume that you think.
- 3.' Assume that your firefighter thinks what you think.
- 4.' Assume that you and your firefighter are both where you are.
- 5.' So, there are two subjects where you are—you and your firefighter—both of whom think what you think. (From 1-3.)
- 6.' There are not two subjects where you are—you and your firefighter—both of whom think what you think.
- 7.' So, you are your firefighter.

The conclusion of the parody is obviously compatible with your not being a firefighter for part of your existence. No premise of the argument is made false by possibility of a career change. The reason this argument fails to support a firmness claim is that its premises are modally too weak: none of them are themselves firmness claims. You can't derive a firmly-is from an is.

For the same reasons, the conclusion of the Thinking Animal Argument is compatible with you not being an animal for part of your existence. Thus, the Thinking Animal Argument doesn't itself support firm varieties of animalism. It can, however, support a firm animalism if a connecting principle like "If you are your animal you are

⁹ This point has been made explicitly in Olson (2015b), in which Olson argues that the Thinking Animal Argument supports only "weak animalism", which is equivalent to what I am calling non-firm animalism in this paper. Johnston (2016) has also made this point.

firmly your animal” is true. So defending firm animalism on the basis of the Thinking Animal Argument requires defending the relevant connecting principle.

In addition, the Thinking Animal Argument faces myriad objections to its premises. Its success as a defense of animalism hinges on numerous issues that are not definitely settled in ways that favor the argument. More specifically, some of what the premises of the Thinking Animal Argument depend on is less plausible than the conclusion of the Thinking Animal Argument. Below, I will consider some of the most significant.

Objection to (3): Animals, human or otherwise, do not think. We might sometimes speak as though animals think, and biologists might sometimes attribute thought to animals, but it is always *people* who think. Animals might inherit thoughtful qualities from persons that stand in certain close relationships to them—and so we might sometimes *say* that animals think—but that does not mean that the animals themselves really are the thinkers. Consider that when a CEO is profligate, her corporation might be affected in such a way that we describe it as a profligate corporation. But by doing so, we do not thereby mean that the corporation itself is literally profligate. Corporations are not the sorts of thing that can be profligate; people are. Likewise, animals are not the sorts of thing that really think.¹⁰

Objection to (4): We and our animals are not in the same place because we do not have locations. Whatever we are, we are immaterial things, and immaterial things do not exist in places. At any rate, they do not exist in the same space as animals. Alternatively: we and our animals are not in the same place because we are brains and our animals are

¹⁰ What about lions? Don't they think? The objector who backs Objection to (3) will have to say either (a) that lions don't think or (b) that lions have persons associated with them. Some traditions (perhaps Cartesian ones) will be more comfortable with option (a). An argument for it might go like this: if something thinks, it is immaterial. Lions are not immaterial, so lions do not think. Option (b) doesn't seem too bad, especially for those who think that lions think.

more than brains. Our animals take up more space than a brain, and so we and our animals are not in the same space.

The aforementioned overcrowding, epistemic, personhood, and overdetermination problems enter in defense of (6), and other objections to the Thinking Animal Argument are directed at parts of those defenses.

The epistemic problem amounts to

The Epistemic Argument for (6):

8. Assume there are two subjects where you are, both of whom think what you think.

[Assume for *reductio*.]

9. If there are two subjects where you are, both of whom think what you think, then there are two subjects where you are who believe the same things (or at least: have the same *de se* beliefs) based on the same evidence and reasons.

[Assumption]

10. So there are two subjects where you are who believe the same things (at least: have the same *de se* beliefs) based on the same evidence and reasons. [from 8, 9]

11. You know (and so believe) of yourself that you are a person. [Assumption]

12. The animal believes of itself that it is a person. [from 8, 11]

13. The animal is wrong that it is a person. [Assumption]

14. If two subjects have the same *de se* beliefs based on the same evidence and reasons and one subject is right but the other is wrong, the evidence and reasons on which they believe are not good enough support for their belief to be knowledge. [Assumption]

15. The evidence and reasons on which you believe you are a person are not good enough support for your belief to be knowledge. [from 10, 11, 13, 14.]
16. So, you don't know you're a person. [from 15]
17. Contradiction [from 11 and 16].
18. So, there are not two subjects where you are, both of whom think what you think.¹¹

The premises, of course, are open to a variety of objections. Two considerable ones are:

Objection to (9): Externalism about evidence and reasons is true. Someone who hallucinates does not have the same evidence as someone who isn't hallucinating, even if they are thinking the same thing. Similarly, a subject who is wrong has different evidence from a subject who is right, even if the evidence seems to be the same to the subjects. Animals, then, have different evidence than do persons, so (9) is false.¹²

¹¹ Here's the argument as it appears in Olson (2007, 36):

If there really are two beings, a person and an animal, thinking your thoughts, you ought to wonder which one you are. You may think that you're the person—the one that isn't an animal. But since the animal thinks exactly as you do, it ought to think that *it* is a person. It will have the same grounds for thinking that it is a person and not an animal as you have for believing that you are. Yet it is mistaken. If you *were* the animal and not the person, you would still think you were the person. So for all you know, you are the one making the mistake. Even if you are a person and not an animal, it is hard to see how you could ever have any reason to believe that you are.

¹² Sutton (2014) criticizes something like (13) similarly. She draws an analogy to driving on overlapping highways A and B. On the stretch you're on, A and B are indiscernible, but you can still know you're driving on A. You can know this because you know that you're driving on A and you know you're driving on B. Analogously, even if the person and the animal are psychologically indiscernible, you can know that you are a person because you know that your thoughts are had by both a person and an animal. (As Leo Iacono pointed out in "The Epistemic Problem of Too Many Thinkers" delivered at the 2016 Central States Philosophical Association meeting, there's an implicit and unjustified premise that connects "you know your thoughts are had by a person" to "you know you are a person".)

Objection to (14): Knowledge is fallible. Just as someone in a solipsistic demon world might have evidence enough to know that there are other people (even though the belief would be wrong), so an animal has evidence enough to know it is a person (even though its belief is wrong). Evidence enough to know is often not decisive or certain because the subject could be in a bad case. Our animals are just in a bad case, like someone in a demon world. Thus, (14) is false.

The personhood problem yields:

The Personhood Argument for (6):

19. There are two subjects where you are—you and your animal—who think what you think. [Assume for *reductio*]
20. You are a person. [Assumption]
21. If there are two subjects where you are—you and your animal—who think what you think, then there are two subjects where you are—you and your animal—who think what a person thinks. [from 20]
22. Your animal thinks what a person thinks. [from 20, 21]
23. If something thinks what a person thinks, then it is a person. [Assumption]
24. Your animal is a person. [from 22, 23]
25. Your animal is not a person. [Assumption]
26. So there are not two subjects where you are—you and your animal—who think what you think.

Premise (25) is an assumption of anti-animalists. They need not hold it, but if they do not, they lose a lot of the motivation for opposing animalism. If animals are persons, why not say that we are one of the animal people? (25) is not an animalist assumption. In

fact, it is incompatible with both firm animalisms and animalisms on which we are not firmly animals. So the Personhood Argument is not one that animalists themselves would do well to make, but is rather one that anti-animalists should accept by their own lights.

Premise (6) is also supported by an overdetermination worry.

The Overdetermination Argument for (6):

27. Your animal has exactly the same causal powers you do (i.e. her causal powers are redundant).
28. We should avoid positing two separate subjects with redundant causal powers without good reason, so as to avoid causal overdetermination.
29. So, we should avoid positing that you and your animal are distinct subjects. (i.e., we should avoid $\sim(6)$)¹³

Objection to (27): There is a causal ordering between my animal and me, so my animal's causal powers are not redundant. Perhaps my animal thinks all the same thoughts I do *because* I think them, for example. In this case, there aren't redundant causal powers any more than there are when I act on behalf of a group. When I act on behalf of a group, I act and the group performs the same action, but there are no redundant causal powers.

Objection to (28): There are redundant causal powers. And not just in this case, and it isn't bad. When a baseball shatters a window, the parts of the baseball also shatter

¹³ In his formulation of the argument, Licon (2012) adds another step: that in light of the prohibition on positing overdetermination, the best explanation for the fact that you and your animal have exactly overlapping causal powers is that you are your animal. Thus he argues directly for animalism while bypassing the Thinking Animal Argument. Here, I have cast the Overdetermination Argument as a defense of (6) to show how the considerations driving the Overdetermination Argument are connected to the Thinking Animal Argument.

the window. When a mental event causes the lifting of a mug, so also does a physical event. It's not bad for a view if it entails that there are redundant causal powers.¹⁴

3. *Animal Ancestors Argument*

If you aren't an animal, then neither are your parents animals. And if your parents aren't animals, then neither are *their* parents, and so on, for as far back as your ancestry goes. But if none of your ancestors were animals, then the standard evolutionary theory about your origins is false since that theory implies that your ancestry includes animals. But the standard evolutionary theory about your origins is true. So the assumption that we are not animals is false. Thus, the credibility of evolutionary theory supports animalism.¹⁵

Here's the argument reconstructed:

30. The evolutionary theory of your origins is true.
31. If the evolutionary theory of your origins is true, your ancestors are animals.
32. If your ancestors are animals, you are an animal.
33. You are an animal.¹⁶

Premises (31) and (32) are open to serious challenges. But before taking note of them, notice that the Animal Ancestors Argument, like the Thinking Animal Argument,

¹⁴ See Sider (2003).

¹⁵ From Blatti (2012, 686). In my reconstruction, for the sake of clarity, I've used the contrapositives of Blatti's first two premises and reordered the premises.

¹⁶ The primary critic of Blatti's argument, Gillett (2013), address a reconstruction of the argument different from what I have produced here. In Gillett's reconstruction, the most controversial premise is "if you are not identical to an organism, then you are not evolved or a product of evolution." That is the premise on which Gillett focuses his critique. I have chosen to reconstruct the argument as I did because I don't think Gillett's version is true to the spirit of Blatti's proposal. Blatti did not make or imply the claim Gillett's criticism targets, and there is a natural reading of Blatti's argument—namely mine—which avoids making the claim anyway. In addition, my reconstruction includes Blatti's claims about animal ancestry, which Gillett's reconstruction overlooks. I do think, however, that we can fruitfully apply many of Gillett's insights to the argument as I see it. In particular, much of his criticism applies to (31) and (32).

fails to imply firm animalism, even if sound. The premises do not themselves rule out a Lockean interpretation of brain transplant cases or the thesis that you go wherever your mental states are realized. That your origins are correctly explained by a standard evolutionary theory is compatible with your having psychological persistence conditions (and this is so even if we assume that animals have purely biological persistence conditions). Moreover, “you are an animal” in (32) is ambiguous between “you are firmly an animal” and “you are firmly or not firmly an animal”. The latter is the weaker reading and so seems preferable, but then the conclusion is for non-firm animalism, too. In fact, in order to get firm animalism out of the assumptions, you need to adjust some of the premises, either like this:

Animal Ancestors Argument - Revision 1 (AAA-R1):

- 30*. You are firmly such that the evolutionary theory of your origins is true.
- 31*. If you are firmly such that the evolutionary theory of your origins is true, you are firmly such that your ancestors are animals.
- 32*. If you are firmly such that your ancestors are animals, you are firmly an animal.
- 33*. You are firmly an animal.

Or like this:

Animal Ancestors Argument - Revision 2 (AAA-R2):

- 30. The evolutionary theory of your origins is true.
- 31. If the evolutionary theory of your origins is true, your ancestors are animals.
- 32**. If your ancestors are animals, you are firmly an animal.
- 33*. You are firmly an animal.

AAA-R1 is a valid argument for firm animalism. Though (30*) is stronger than (30), it is just as plausible. Our origin (evolutionary or otherwise) is the sort of thing we can't now change about ourselves. Premise (31*) also seems true. That our ancestors are animals is just a part of the evolutionary theory of our origins.

AAA-R2 avoids modality until premise (32**). The argument isn't notably better for that; (30) and (31) are no more plausible than (30*) and (31*). And the conclusion of AAA-R2 is also firm animalism.

So there are iterations of the Animal Ancestors Argument that imply firm animalism. The problem is that those versions have premises that will cut no ice with those who oppose firm animalism.

Consider (32*). Anti-firm animalists reject this claim. A brain in a vat that used to be an animal is a counterexample to it (assuming BIVs are not animals).

Consider (32**). The only reason we have for affirming (32**) is (32)—if your ancestors are animals, you are an animal—plus a connecting principle like “animals are firmly animals.” But that connecting principle is exactly the sort of thing the anti-firm animalist denies. So the Animal Ancestors Argument, like the Thinking Animals Argument, makes little progress against the anti-firm animalist.

Even as a defense of phase animalism, however, the argument is weak. (30), (31), and (32) face considerable objections. (Similar objections apply to (31*) and (32*), so in addition to the considerations mentioned above, there are more marks against the revisions of the Animal Ancestors Argument).

Objection to (30): Evolutionary theory is about animal origins, not about *our* origins, persons' origins. Nothing biologists can put into the evolutionary theory implies something about persons. At least, not unless there is the relevant type of relationship between persons and animals. But that there is such a relationship is neither fair to assume—it is exactly what's disputed in the debate about animalism—nor in the purview of biologists qua biologists. Evolutionary theory thus has nothing to say about *us*. As Blatti points out, there's got to be some explanation of our appearance on the scene.¹⁷ But an explanation isn't too hard to come by. For example, perhaps it is a necessary truth that whenever a human animal (or at least a human animal of sufficient maturity and mental health) shows up, it constitutes a human person.¹⁸ And so then we can explain why human persons showed up: human animals showed up, for evolutionary reasons, and they necessarily constituted human persons.

Objection to (31): I'll grant that evolutionary theory is about *our* origins, but I deny that it follows from that that our ancestors are animals—or even that it follows that they are organisms. The only principled reason for thinking so is that generally speaking, organisms are the only things subject to evolutionary pressure. But that principle is false. Organisms are no more the product of evolution than are parts of organisms (like organs and cells), superorganisms (like the Portuguese Man-of-War), colonies of organisms, or maybe even souls (if there are souls and they are souls of a certain type; I'll discuss an example below). If we were brains, or things composed of organisms, or souls of a

¹⁷ Blatti (2012: 688).

¹⁸ Thanks to Alex Pruss for this suggestion.

certain sort, we could still be products of evolution, and yet the evolutionary theory would clearly not imply that our ancestors were organisms.¹⁹

Biologists take organs and superorganisms to be products of evolution because they satisfy these conditions: they arose from situations that involved inheritance of traits in the next generation with some variation in those traits, and the inherited variants differed in their fitness for the respective environments.²⁰ On some theories according to which we are souls, souls satisfy these conditions, too. For example, Hasker's (1999) soul theory is charitably interpreted as positing fundamental laws of nature like that the creation of a brain leads to the creation of a soul co-located with that brain, that the psychological properties of the soul depend on the properties of the brain, and that the soul and the brain interact. Souls that satisfy such laws satisfy the conditions on being a product of evolution (at least the ones Gillett cites): they arose from a situation that involved inheritance of traits in the next generation with some variation, and the inherited variants differ in their fitness for the environment.²¹ Thus, if we were these sorts of souls, it would be possible for us to be products of evolution with parents who were not animals but rather souls.

Arguably, by the same token, things constituted by organisms are products of evolution. And if things constituted by organisms are the products of evolution, then evolutionary theory does not even rule out what one of animalism's leading competitors proposes: that we are not animals, but persons constituted by animals. The reason for

¹⁹ This objection is inspired by Gillett (2013). Gillett is replying to the claim that we are the products of evolution only if we are animals. Obviously, that is not equivalent to (31). But I think it is the main reason for maintaining (31), and so Gillett's points apply.

²⁰ Gillett (2013: 273).

²¹ Gillett (2013: 274-275).

thinking that things constituted by organisms are the products of evolution is that things composed by organisms—like superorganisms—are products of evolution. And for the same reasons that things composed by organisms are products of evolution, things constituted by organisms can be products of evolution.²² Thus, if we were things constituted by organisms, we could be products of evolution and have non-animal parents. In short, a general takeaway is this: evolutionary theory fails to support animalism over its rivals.

Another objection to (31): I (a typical anti-animalist, suppose) am already willing to say things like: “Your animal thinks derivatively while you think non-derivatively.” There is little further cost in saying: “Your animal non-derivatively has animal ancestors; you derivatively have animal ancestors. You non-derivatively have person ancestors; your animal only derivatively so.” If I’m right, we could be products of evolution without (non-derivatively) having animal ancestors.²³

Objection to (32): Natural generalizations of (32) are false by evolutionary theory’s own lights. For example, it’s false that if your ancestors are invertebrates, then so are you. (And natural generalizations of (32*) are false too: it’s false that if you are firmly such that your ancestors are invertebrates, then you are an invertebrate.) It is possible for an animal’s descendants to be non-animals (even if this hasn’t happened) and for an organism’s ancestors to be non-organisms. In fact, one of the most attractive features of evolutionary accounts of biodiversity is that they explain how one kind of thing can evolve from another kind of thing. Evolutionary theories account for how

²² Gillett (2013: 276).

²³ Thanks to Alex Pruss for this point.

complex molecules came from simple molecules, cells came from non-cells, and organisms from non-organisms.²⁴

4. *The Association Argument*

Consider the close association between Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens. For example, consider that whenever Mark Twain goes to a book signing, so does Samuel Clemens, and that whenever you talk to Mark Twain, you talk to Samuel Clemens. The simplest explanation of these sorts of correlations is that Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens are identical.

Consider also the close association between you and your animal, the one you see in the mirror whenever you look. Between you and that animal, there is a striking number of correlations. For example, wherever it goes, you go. When its stomach is empty, you are hungry. When you are sad, it cries. The simplest explanation of these correlations is animalism: you and your animal are identical.

There are adequate explanations for the association between you and your animal besides animalism, just as there are adequate explanations for the association between Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens besides the hypothesis that they are identical. For example, that Mark Twain inherits his properties from Samuel Clemens (or vice versa) explains the strong correlation between them, and it does so without presuming that they are identical. Similarly, that you inherit your properties from your animal (or vice versa)—like *being hungry* or *being sad*—explains the strong correlation between the two of you, and it does so without presuming that you are identical. There are other options, too: you are a spatial or temporal proper part of your animal; you are constituted by your

²⁴ See Gillett (2013, 277).

animal; you are an immaterial thing inhabiting or embodied in your animal. Each of those options has as much explanatory power for the striking correlation between your animal and you as animalism does. What animalism has over its rivals is simplicity. It is thus the preferred explanation for the association between you and your animal.

This argument does not entail animalism (as its author, Bailey (2014: 870-872), admits). Its conclusion is just that the association between human persons and human animals is strong evidence in animalism's favor.²⁵

Here is the argument reconstructed:

34. There are close associations between you and your animal (You are co-located. You see it when seeing yourself in mirrors. To harm your animal is to harm you. You become conscious when your animal wakes up.
35. With respect to the associations like those listed in (34), the hypothesis that you are your animal is at least as explanatorily powerful as the most explanatorily powerful of its rivals, and it is the simplest explanation among them.
36. The simplest explanation (among equally explanatorily powerful options) is probably the right one.
37. So, it is probably true that you are your animal.

The two most promising lines of response to this argument target (35) and (36). First, it is not in fact clear that animalism is simpler than its rivals. And second, even if it is simpler, the evidential import of the simplicity of animalism in particular or metaphysical theories in general is debatable.

²⁵ For a similar argument, see Licon (2014).

But before pursuing those objections, notice what varieties of animalism this argument supports. Like the Thinking Animal Argument and the Animal Ancestors Argument, the Association Argument supports a view no stronger than non-firm animalism. *You are your animal* in (37) (and the same proposition as it appears in (35)) is open to various interpretations. It might mean that you are firmly your animal, but it might mean that you are your animal but not firmly. Only the former disambiguation makes the Association Argument favor firm animalism in particular. The problem with employing that disambiguation is that it makes (35) false. That you are firmly an animal is not the simplest explanation among its equally explanatorily powerful rivals. That you are an animal but not firmly an animal is just as explanatorily powerful and is no less simple.

Suppose that there is a professor very closely associated with you. She teaches every class you've ever taught, and so on. A good explanation for the correlations is that you are identical. But of course, you could survive quitting the profession. You are not firmly a professor. Likewise, without further argument, being an animal does not entail being firmly an animal. So the Association Argument, too, requires a connecting principle to get from its conclusion to firm animalism.

Objection to (35): Many of animalism's rivals do not actually posit more entities than animalism does. For example, the view according to which a person is constituted by (as opposed to identical to) an animal does not entail that there are two real entities with distinct causal roles subject to distinct causal laws any more than animalism does. For the constitution theorist, the constitutor (e.g. the lump, or the animal) and the constituted (e.g.

the clay, or the person) are not distinct entities with distinct causal roles. They don't crowd the explanatory structure in the way that violates simplicity.²⁶

Objection to (36): The simplest explanation may not be the right one. Moreover, even granting the theoretical virtue of simplicity for physical theories, it is not clear that simplicity is a theoretical virtue for metaphysical theories.

5. A Thomistic Argument from Sensation

Let's say that animals are made out of matter and a certain kind of soul and that animals are the only sort of thing made out of matter and that kind of soul. If that's true, and if it's true that *we* are made out of matter and that kind of soul, then animalism is true. And we do seem to be made out of matter and the relevant kind of soul. At least, we are made out of matter and that kind of soul if matter is necessary for sorts of acts of sensing we perform and the soul is necessary for sorts of intellectual activities we perform. And they are. Thus Aquinas:

To be sure, [the claim that the man is just the *soul*] could be sustained if one asserted that the sentient soul's operations are its own without the body, since in that case all the operations attributed to the man [i.e. both intellectual and sensitive] would belong to the soul alone. But it is the entity that performs the entity's operations. Hence, it is the man that performs the man's operations. But it has been shown that an act of sensing is not an operation belonging only to the soul [but rather belonging to the conjoined entity]. Therefore, since sensing is one of the man's operations, even if not his proper operation, it is clear that a man is something composed of a soul and a body and is not the soul alone.²⁷ (Aquinas *Summa Theologica* 1 Q.75 a.4)

²⁶ See Snowdon (2014b, 81).

²⁷ Translation from Freddoso (2010). *Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est operatio animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.*

Here's that core Argument from Sensation reconstructed:

38. Sensing is one of your operations.

39. If sensing is one of your operations, you are [not just a soul but rather] a soul/body compound.

40. So, you are [not just a soul but rather] a soul/body compound.²⁸

Given that all soul/body compounds that sense are animals, animalism follows.

Premise (38) is obviously true. In fact, you're proving it right now.

The defense of premise (39) has two parts. First, you are whatever performs your operations. So if sensing is one of your operations, you are whatever senses. Second, it is compounds of matter and form that sense. It's not just souls that sense because sensing is an activity that involves bodily change, and so it involves a body. So: if sensing is one of your operations, you are a soul/body compound.

We might wonder whether restating this argument in the second person is true to Aquinas' thought. The word Aquinas uses for man is "homo", and that translates as "man" in the gender-neutral sense. I have suggested reading this such that it refers to you and me and the others relevantly like us—the (human) persons. On this reading, the first of two I will consider, the argument supports animalism. *We* are compounds, it concludes, and on a hylomorphic picture of the world, these compounds are animals. But there is a second reading available, according to which "homo" refers directly to human

²⁸ Here's another way of analyzing the argument:

1. If a thing performs your operations, you are that thing.
2. Sensing is one of your operations.
3. A compound senses.
4. So, you are a compound.

I went with the above because I think it's cleaner, and I combined (1) and (3) in my defense of premise (38).

animals. The conclusion of the argument on that reading is this: human animals are compounds of body and soul. The argument read that way supports the hylomorphic view that human animals are compounds of body and soul, but it does not support animalism. Animalism is a thesis that connects human persons to human animals, but on this latter reading, the conclusion is just about the metaphysical structure of human animals.

We might also wonder whether Aquinas intended his argument in this passage to support a view about firmness. We can distinguish between four theses he may have taken himself to have supported. Assuming the first reading, we might ask whether he took himself to have shown

Firmly Animals: We are firmly compounds (i.e. animals)

or rather just

Weakly Animals: As a matter of fact, and right now, we are compounds (i.e. animals).

Assuming the second reading, we might ask whether he took himself to have shown

Firmly Compounds: Animals are firmly compounds

or just

Weakly Compounds: some currently sensing animal currently is a compound.

Many scholars of Aquinas have interpreted Aquinas such that he thought *Firmly Animals* anyway. These scholars include corruptionists, those who maintain that Aquinas believed that human beings cease to exist at their deaths and with them their corresponding people. The corruptionists make a strong textual case. Consider Aquinas on his early commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*:

The soul of Abraham is not, strictly speaking, Abraham himself, but is part of him—and the same for others. So the life of Abraham's soul would not suffice for

Abraham being alive...but the life of the whole compound is required—namely, soul and body. (Aquinas, *Commentary on Lombard's Sentences*, Book IV, d. 43, q.1, a.1, qc.1 *ad* 2.)

And the corruptionists have arguments, too: Aquinas clearly thinks that the death of a compound is the separation of its matter and soul. He clearly thinks that separation of matter and soul effects a substantial change for the compound and therefore ends the existence of compound. And he clearly thinks that *we* are compounds. Therefore, he must think that we do not exist past our deaths. We do not exist as souls in the afterlife or the interim state. We simply don't exist at all until the resurrection of our bodies, until the resurrection of the animals that we are. That's why the resurrection is so important.²⁹

But of course, there are dissenters among interpreters of Aquinas. Some scholars are survivalists, arguing that Aquinas believed that we could survive our deaths, even though death separates our matter from our souls. The survivalists' case includes texts in which Aquinas refers to someone's (post-death) soul by the person's name (he says, for example, that *the martyr Felix*—not Felix's soul—appeared to the people of Nola), suggesting that the person survives death. The case also includes considerations about whether it is just to punish merely the *souls* of the guilty as opposed to the guilty parties themselves. Both corruptionists and survivalists agree that Aquinas is committed to some things experiencing punishment in the afterlife, but because only corruptionists maintain that Aquinas thinks that what exists in the afterlife is not a person, only the corruptionists must maintain that Aquinas is committed to things (viz. souls) receiving the punishment

²⁹ See especially Toner (2009) and Toner (2010) for the arguments that favor the corruptionist interpretation of Aquinas.

belonging more properly to other things (viz. people). And that might be a point in survivalism's favor.³⁰

Interestingly, both corruptionists and survivalists generally behave as if Aquinas is committed to *Firmly Animals*. On some reconstructions of the corruptionist case, a premise like this is needed to make the extinction of the person follow from the dissolution of the compound: the *way* in which the human person is a compound is firmly. Consider this corruptionist argument to see why: Alli is a compound of a right arm and a human-body-minus-a-right-arm. If you separate the right arm from the human-body-minus-a-right-arm, there no longer *is* a compound of right arm and human-body-minus-a-right-arm. (Feel free to destroy the right arm if it makes the point clearer.) Therefore, if you separate the right arm from the human-body-minus-a-right-arm, there no longer is Alli.

As stated, the argument is invalid. It's its own counterexample. Of course I can survive going from having a right arm to not having one.³¹ But adding this premise would make it valid: Alli is *firmly* a compound of a right arm and a human-body-minus-a-right-arm.³²

³⁰ Hershenov and Koch-Hershenov (2006) argue that it is a point in survivalism's favor, but Toner (2012) has a rejoinder.

³¹ There's a puzzle (Body-minus, Tibbles/Tib, Dion/Theon) in this neighborhood, but there are multiple ways to resolve it. I discuss some of them in the next chapter.

³² Other reconstructions of the corruptionist argument avoid dependence on the firmness claim. Here's an example (let p stand for a particular person and c stand for a particular compound):

1. $p = c$
2. c goes out of existence at death.
3. So, p goes out of existence at death.

I don't think that this is a good reconstruction. The problem, I think, is that this reconstruction overlooks the distinction between identity and predication, and so the argument too straightforwardly begs the question against the survivalist. The survivalist simply denies (2), and yet given the distinction between identity and predication, she can still appreciate the point that on hylomorphism, death is the dissolution of a compound: instead of (2), the survivalist will maintain that *is a compound* is no longer predicated of c at death. And all that follows from that is that *is a compound* is not predicated of p at death.

Survivalists, too, maintain that their view is consistent with *Firmly Animals*. The standard survivalist account is that even after death, the deceased is still an animal. Here are two survivalists making the point:

Aquinas should be interpreted as holding that, in Socrates's disembodied condition, when he is not composed of the normal constituents for human beings, Socrates is nonetheless identical to the same thing he was identical to in his embodied condition: an individual substance in the category rational animal (Stump 2006, 166).

Socrates is (always) identical to a particular substance belonging to the species, *rational animal*. That is to say, whenever or wherever Socrates exists, he is a human person, and human persons are, to use Aquinas's favorite definition, *rational animals* (Brown 2007, 656-657).

Corruptionists point out that this view implies that there are immaterial animals.³³ Some survivalists agree, but argue that that's okay,³⁴ thereby seeming to concede the point that Aquinas is committed to *Firmly Animals* (more specifically, to the part of *Firmly Animals* that says that we are firmly animals, which is the relevant part of it). One survivalist exception to the norm is Brower (2014), who argues that consistent with Aquinas's metaphysics is this: we survive death, but we do not survive *as animals*.³⁵ The view he defends implies that Aquinas denies *Firmly Animals*.

My own impression is that the *Firmly Animals* or *Weakly Animals* readings of the Thomistic Argument from Sensation—the ones that imply either firm or phase animalism—are the better readings. Earlier in the article quoted above, Aquinas considers the view that man (the species) is a soul and yet *this particular man (hic homo)* is body

At any rate, even if the argument in this footnote is truest to the corruptionist case, corruptionists vehemently oppose the idea that for Aquinas human persons can exist without their animal souls attached to matter, and so they seem to think Aquinas was committed to *Firmly Animals*.

³³ E.g. Toner (2010).

³⁴ See especially Stump (2006), Brown (2007), and Eberl (2009).

³⁵ Brower (2014, Chapter Thirteen)

and soul, and he suggests Socrates as an example of a particular man.³⁶ And Socrates is one of us; he's one of the things we are considering accounts of. But as for choosing between the *Firmly Animals* or *Weakly Animals* readings of the argument, I can't decide. One reason not to take the *Firmly Animals* reading is that if *Firmly Animals* is supposed to be the conclusion, the argument is invalid.

Firmly Animals is firm animalism, but—like the other animalist arguments we have considered—the premises of the Argument from Sensation do not involve firmness, and so, unsurprisingly, we can run a parody:

38*. Being a quarterback for the Patriots is one of Tom Brady's operations.

39*. Being a quarterback for the Patriots is one of Tom Brady's operations, then Tom Brady is employed by the NFL.

40*. Tom Brady is employed by the NFL.

(40*) is true (today) but it does not imply that Brady is firmly employed by the NFL. Of course he could survive quitting. Likewise, the Argument from Sensation implies only that you are a soul/body compound (henceforth: an animal³⁷) but not that you couldn't survive becoming something else. And so like the other pro-animalist arguments we have considered, the Argument from Sensation requires some modification in order to demonstrate firm animalism.

³⁶ *Respondeo dicendum quod animam esse hominem dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod homo sit anima, sed hic homo non sit anima, sed compositum ex anima et corpore, puta Socrates.*

³⁷ Of course Aquinas thinks that not all soul/body compounds are animals, but in the context, it's clear that the type of compound he's arguing man is is the animal type.

Adding a principle like AHA would work.³⁸ So would either of the following modifications to (39):

39**. If sensing is one of your operations, you are *firmly* an animal.

39***. If sensing is firmly one of your operations, you are *firmly* an animal.

(39**) seems susceptible to the same criticism faced by the argument as a whole. Just as it is possible that Brady is both a quarterback for the Patriots and not firmly employed by the NFL, it seems possible that you both sense and fail to *firmly* satisfy one of the necessary conditions of sensing.

Premise (39***) seems plausible, though. The reasons stated in support of (39) support it just as well as they support (39).³⁹ If we modify (39) in this way, however, we will have to modify (38) accordingly to preserve validity:

38**. Sensing is firmly one of your operations.

The problem is that if (38**) is a part of the argument, it will make no headway against the anti-firm animalist. Anti-firm animalists simply reject (38**). They think that we go wherever our mental states are realized and that there is no metaphysical barrier to our mental states being realized in something that does not—or even cannot—sense. That's why they think that we can become brains in vats or disembodied souls. (Moreover, it seems that even firm animalists would want to reject (38**). It seems that you could survive—even if animalism is true—the destruction of all of your senses. It would feel like sensory deprivation.⁴⁰)

³⁸ It is worth noting, however, that Aquinas himself could not maintain AHA given that he thought both that Christ was at one point a human animal and at another point (during the three days of his death, for instance) not. See, for example, Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* 3.50.4 *sed contra*.

³⁹ Mutatis mutandis, anyway.

⁴⁰ Thanks to Alex Pruss for pointing this out.

Thus, without AHA, the Argument from Sensation also falls short of supporting firm animalism.

One final note about the Thomistic view: what I have said here is not remotely enough to decide one way or another whether Aquinas' preferred firm animalism to phase animalism. For one thing, the Argument from Sensation is one of many of Aquinas's anthropological arguments. Consider this one, in which the notion of essentiality makes an important appearance:

Plato claimed that a human being is not a composite of soul and body but that a human being is the soul itself using a body [...]. But this position is shown to be impossible. For an animal and a human being are natural, sense-perceptible things. *This would not be the case, however, if the body and its parts did not belong to the essence of a human being and an animal.* Instead, on Plato's view, the whole essence of both a human being and an animal would be the soul, although the soul isn't anything sense-perceptible or material. And for this reason it is impossible that a human being and an animal be a soul using a body. (Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* II.57, emphasis added.)

The emphasized sentence identifies a necessary condition for an apparent truth (that an animal and a human being are sense-perceptible things): a body and its parts belong to the essence of a human being and of an animal. Does *that* imply firm animalism? It depends on whether his understanding of essentiality implies that something that is essentially *F* is *F*. I can't pursue that debate here.⁴¹ Suppose it does imply firm animalism. Is the argument *sound*? That depends on whether it's true that a necessary condition for animals and humans being sense-perceptible things is that a body belongs to the essence of humans and animals (in a way that makes humans firmly animals). I flag these debates because they are among the ones that would help decide whether Aquinas' views commit him to firm animalism.

⁴¹ But note: Brower (2014, Chapter Thirteen) thinks it does not. In fact, he thinks that Aquinas would be inconsistent to say so.

6. Arguments for AHA

The Thinking Animals Argument, the Animal Ancestors Argument, the Association Argument, and the Thinking Animals Argument fail to demonstrate firm animalism. But they come close: if AHA is true, and the premises of the above arguments are true, then we can easily construct good arguments for firm animalism out of those premises and AHA. In this section, I introduce and develop a few arguments for AHA, specifically for the view that animals are firmly animals.

6.1 The Argument from the Absence of Evidence

Here's the argument: If AHA were false, we would expect to see more animals becoming non-animals than we do. At the very least, we would expect to see *some*. But we don't. In fact, we don't even have much evidence that there are any. So AHA is probably not false (so probably AHA is true).

One reason to doubt this line of reasoning is that if AHA were false, it seems we should *not* expect to see more animals becoming non-animals. After all, if AHA were false, the most plausible places to look for animals becoming non-animals are postmortem states and in high-tech procedures like brain transplant cases. Consider first postmortem states: a lot of human animals have died. When human animals die, we either (a) lose access to them or (b) we don't. If (a) we lose access to them, then we wouldn't expect to see them or have much evidence that they have become non-animals. And in that case, the absence of evidence that they've become non-animals would *not* amount to evidence that have not become non-animals, as the above argument implies that it does. That's because the absence of evidence that something is the case is evidence that that something is not the case only if if it were to be the case, we would have evidence that it

is. If (b) we do not lose access to those dead humans, then we have access to very many cases of animals becoming non-animals. In fact, for human animals, there are far more cases of animals becoming non-animals than there are cases of animals staying animals. And so the empirical claim of the argument is false. Consider next high-tech activities: because we lack the requisite technology, we should not expect to see animals becoming non-animals. Thus, the lack of animals becoming non-animals is not evidence for AHA.

In defense of the Argument from the Absence of Evidence, it seems we don't lose access to the dead—we can collect data about them at least through philosophy and perhaps also through revelation—but it is not clear that they count as evidence against AHA. Perhaps what exists in the afterlife never were animals—which is the case if the corruptionist-Aquinas is right—and so can't count against AHA. Or perhaps what exists in the afterlife *are* animals—which is the case if survivalist-Aquinas⁴² is right, or if what I say in the next chapter (basically: that after death, we might be immaterial animals) is correct. In that case, too, what exists in the afterlife does not tell against AHA.

6.2 *Argument from Standard Animals*

41. If some standard animals are firmly animals, then all animals are firmly animals.

42. Some standard animals (e.g. crickets) are firmly animals.

43. So all animals are firmly animals.⁴³

The first premise is true because whether a sortal is a substance sortal or a phase sortal is not relative to an individual classified by it. 'Quarterback', for example, is not a phase

⁴² Of the standard Brown/Stump sort, I mean.

⁴³ Based on an argument from Alex Pruss, though Olson (1997, 123) briefly considers a similar strategy.

sortal for Tom Brady and a substance sortal for something else. So if ‘animal’ is a substance sortal for some animals, it’s a substance sortal for all of them.

In defense of (42), consider performing a brain transplant on a cricket named Jiminy. There’s no temptation to say that mid-transplant, Jiminy has become his brain, and there’s no temptation to say that post-transplant, Jiminy has become the recipient cricket. Jiminy either dies or remains the donor body (in the event that the donor stays alive), but he doesn’t become a non-animal.

It might be argued that we should not look to cricket-brain transplant cases to tell us about how crickets persist and what substance sortal they fall under. After all, Jiminy’s brain plays a relatively unimportant role in his life. The fact that we are not tempted to say he becomes his brain does not suggest that he is firmly an animal; maybe there is another non-animal part of himself that he can become. Perhaps, for example, crickets persists as long as their abdomens do (and those aren’t animals because they can’t keep themselves alive under normal conditions). Or perhaps he’ll survive his death, and animals that survive death must survive as non-animals.

But Jiminy has to belong to *some* substance sortal, and ‘animal’ seems to be the best one. It’s better than whatever both cricket and cricket-abdomen fall under. Plus, as I’ll argue in the next chapter, maybe animals need not cease being animals upon death.

6.3 Argument from Teleology

44. Something is an animal only if it has certain (animalian) teleological features.

(We have to have some principled way to distinguish between kinds, and by teleology is the best way to do it.)

45. If something has animalian teleological features, it is firmly an animal.

46. So if something is an animal, it is firmly an animal.⁴⁴

The second premise seems true because teleological features are fundamental to a thing. If your *telos* could change, it would not be your *telos*. (That is, if your *telos* could change, it would not distinguish the kind to which you belong.)

However, it might be argued that if teleological features are fundamental to a thing then an animal that becomes a brain in a vat (perhaps after a terrible accident and through heroic medicine) thereby loses its *telos*—supposing, as many do, that brains in vats are not animals. And it seems false that such a creature would lose its *telos* in those conditions; it would not lose its *telos*, but rather just get farther from achieving it.

Someone who objects along those lines is right to point out the inconsistency of (a) the claim that *teloi* are fundamental, (b) the supposition that brains in vats are not animals, and (c) the hypothesis that a brain in a vat that would retain its *telos* and just get farther from achieving it. But the defender of (45) need not therefore concede that *teloi* are not fundamental. She could reject (b) instead. If a brain in a vat has the animal *telos*, then the brain in a vat is in fact an animal. Given an understanding of ‘animal’ on which typical animal appearances and behaviors are only normative parts of the concept—an understanding that I argue for in the next chapter—such a resolution to the tension is plausible. Alternatively, if (b) is certain (i.e. if it is certain that brains in vats are not animals), then if a given brain in a vat does retain the proposed animalian *telos*, she can argue that the proposed *telos* is not particular to the animal kind, but is rather a more general end.

⁴⁴ Based on an argument from Alex Pruss.

7. Conclusion

All of the most popular defenses of firm animalism require the connecting principle that animals are firmly animals (or that *animal* is a natural kind or that ‘animal’ is a substance sortal, or that animals are essentially animals—a principle I’ve called AHA), and extant treatments of those defenses leave underdeveloped justification for that connecting principle. This is significant because without AHA, animalism does not propose a full account of our persistence conditions that is an alternative to a Lockean account. Unless the principle is true, the animalist arguments on offer, even if sound, support phase animalism no less than they support firm animalism. The best prospect for defenders of firm animalism is to work out a defense of the principle. They should say why we ought to think that ‘animal’ is a substance sortal instead of a phase sortal in spite of thought experiments that suggest that we are sometimes animals and sometimes not. They should say why we should we think that ‘animal’ is not like ‘quarterback’ in the relevant ways or why *animal* is one of those kinds that we can’t survive leaving. In this chapter, I have argued for the failure of standard animalist arguments and variations thereof to adequately support firm animalism. I’ve also introduced a few lines firm animalists can take in defending AHA.

In the next chapter, one of the claims I will defend is that animals can be immaterial. Though I defend this claim in response to an objection to firm animalism more generally, my defense is relevant to whether AHA is true. If animals can become

immaterial things without becoming non-animals, afterlife-based objections to AHA lose some of their force.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Thanks to Anne Jeffrey, Alex Pruss, Mike Rea, Jesse Schupack, Chris Tweedt, and participants of the 2017 Alabama Philosophical Society Meeting for constructive comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Disembodied Animals

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I defend a hylomorphic version of animalism according to which we survive as immaterial, bodiless animals after death. According to the hylomorphism I am assuming, a soul survives death, and according to the animalism I'm assuming, I am necessarily an animal.¹ One might think this entails that I don't survive death since if I were to survive my death, I would be both an immaterial thing and an animal after death, but necessarily animals are material. I show that the hylomorphic animalist can overcome this problem in a way that respects our intuitions about animals being material. In addition, I defend the hylomorphic animalist who thinks we can survive death from the objection that her view introduces an insoluble mereological puzzle.

2. Hylomorphic Animalism

In this chapter, I defend a thesis about the persistence of human persons that is conditional on certain metaphysical assumptions. Those assumptions belong to a view called hylomorphic animalism. According to that view, we are animals and animals are living organisms that result from a form configuring matter. In this section, I'll discuss

¹ This variety of is a species of firm animalism, which I introduced in the last chapter, and is equivalent to essentialist animalism, which I discussed in Chapter Two. I have avoided that terminology here because it is unfamiliar to the corruptionist/survivalist debate that I engage in this chapter. That we are necessarily animals will be a more familiar thesis to the parties to that debate.

the details of hylomorphic animalism that are relevant to the debate about whether we survive death.

Animalism is the view that we, human persons, are animals. As I argued in Chapter Two, it is a view that admits of many varieties. Some varieties entail that we are wholly material things; some do not. Some delineate the conditions of our persistence through time; some do not. In this chapter, the variety of animalism I will assume implies not only that we are animals, but also that we are necessarily animals. So the variety in question does have implications about the criteria for our identity over time: we last across an interval just in case a particular animal does.² In addition, the variety of animalism I will assume is a hylomorphic one. That is, it implies that animals are body-form compounds—more details to follow. Thus, on the variety of animalism in question, the conditions of our persistence (especially as they relate to our deaths) depend on what a hylomorphist can say about whether (and if so, how) animals persist after death.

And what can she say? According to the hylomorphist, the material part of the animal is its body, but “body” can be said in two ways. In one sense, the animal *is* a body. In another sense, the animal *has* a body. The body that the animal *is* is a complex, organized, metabolizing object. It is, for example, the living, breathing thing that is Shamu. It is not in this sense of “body” that an animal has a body; Shamu is not partially a living animal. By the sense of “body” in which Shamu *has* a body, we mean the purely material aspects of Shamu. We mean the stuff that in itself is not living, but which happens to be caught up in the life of the animal. It’s this second sense of “body” according to which an animal has a body. For the hylomorphist, body in the second sense

² See, for example, Bailey (2015), Blatti (2014), Olson (1997), Toner (2011), and van Inwagen (1990) for discussions of this variety of animalism.

is a component of an animal. Body in the first sense is the compound of body in the second sense and something else.³

The form is the other part of an animal, and it is immaterial. ‘Form’ is defined functionally. It is whatever immaterial thing it is that configures body-in-the-second-sense to be an individual of a certain kind. In the case of an animal, it takes that body in the second sense and makes it a particular living and sentient body-in-the-first-sense, an individual. In the case of a human animal in particular, the form is what makes a body not only a living and sentient individual, but also a rational one. We’ll follow a tradition of usually calling the forms of living things ‘souls’. On the hylomorphism we are considering, it is possible that human souls exist without their wholes for at least some of the time that they exist. (Note that this assumption is compatible with souls needing to be a part of a material whole for some—perhaps the initial—phase of their existence.) In fact, on the hylomorphism we are considering, human souls survive the deaths of the compounds of which they are parts. I will not give an argument in support of the claim that human souls can exist without being a part of a compound.⁴ I will not even argue that the claim makes any more sense than the claim that a knot could continue to exist after

³ Here, I follow Toner (2010, 589-591) in distinguishing sense of the term “body”. See also Kenny (1993, 28).

⁴ But some people have given arguments. Aquinas says that it’s because the human soul is the source of a power that can be exercised without the body (*Summa Theologica* I.75.2). In fact, he argues that souls can’t be destroyed (unless they are destroyed by God) because they are metaphysically indivisible (*ST* I.75.6). So insofar as death is the separation of soul from body and death occurs, the persistence of the soul without the compound of which it once was a part is not only possible, but required.

the rope it was in is burned to ashes.⁵ Rather, I will assume that it does make sense, following many others who have found it sensible enough to evaluate.⁶

A hylomorphic account of death is that death is the separation of the soul from the body. It's a cessation of the form performing its typical function (though perhaps the form continues to strive to perform that function). Thus, after death there isn't a living, sentient body (that is, a body in the first sense) any more, because that was something that depended for its existence on the soul doing its work.⁷ This is why some take the word "dead" to be an alienans, an adjective that negates the applicability of what it modifies, like "decoy" and "pseudo". Some believe "dead" to be like "decoy" and "pseudo" when modifying "animal" because they think that a dead animal is not really an animal. Animals are things that are alive, and if a soul is what makes non-living body alive, wherever there is not a soul there is not an animal. Thus, on a standard hylomorphic account of death, although the human soul is understood to survive death, the human animal is not. Whether that entails or is compatible with *us*, the persons, surviving death is debatable. It's a debate we are now in a position to survey and contribute to.

⁵ This is the claim to which Olson (2007, 174-175) compares the claim that a human being's form could continue to exist after the human being is burned to ashes.

⁶ Like Brown (2005, 2007), Hershenov and Koch-Hershenov (2006), Hershenov (2008), Toner (2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011), Stump (2009), Van Dyke (2014), and many others working within the Thomistic tradition. Brower (2014) does an especially good job of both articulating the difficulty of making sense of the possibility and arguing for its coherence (see especially sections 11.4, 11.5, and 12.5.)

⁷ I will remain neutral for now on what death means for body in the second sense. A compound's body in the second sense may depend for its existence on being a part of the compound, in which case *both* body in the first sense and body in the second sense go out of existence at death.

3. *On Whether We Survive Death and an Argument against the Claim That We Do*

The opposing parties in the debate on whether we survive death are corruptionists and survivalists. Corruptionists contend that we don't survive our deaths, and survivalists contend that we do. Before getting in to the defenses of these positions, I want to acknowledge that much of the reasoning for and against them comes out in the context of discussing what other hylomorphists have thought about the matter. The hylomorphic view I sketched above roughly belongs, of course, to the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions, and much of the contemporary conversation about corruptionism and survivalism (from a hylomorphic perspective) has centered on figuring out to which of those camps Aquinas belonged.⁸ It is not one of my present goals to stay true to what Aristotle or Aquinas actually held. Nevertheless, the work on figuring out what they believed about death has suggested good reasons for and against the view that we can survive it. It's those reasons that will come into play in this chapter, and I won't bother very much here about whether Aquinas or Aristotle actually had those reasons.

The central question in the corruptionism/survivalism debate is whether we, human persons, survive death. The central question is not whether souls survive death. As I mentioned above, there is significant agreement about the compatibility of hylomorphism and the soul's survival. But since, on a hylomorphic view of human persons, we are not souls but instead are animals that are soul-body compounds, the view that souls survive death doesn't entail that *we* do. Nor is the central question in the corruptionism/survivalism debate whether animals survive death. Rather, the central question is whether *we* survive death. But since, given the variety of animalism in

⁸ See, for example, Brower (2014), Brown (2005, 2007), Oderberg (2005, 2007, 2012), Stump (2003, 2006), Toner (2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), and Van Dyke (2014).

question, we are necessarily animals, one of the arguments for the view that we cannot survive our deaths involves a claim about whether animals can survive death. Here is that argument for corruptionism.

The Argument for Corruptionism:

1. If I can survive death, then possibly, I am immaterial.
2. If possibly, I am immaterial, then possibly an animal is immaterial.
3. Necessarily, all animals are material.
4. So, it's not possible that I am immaterial.
5. So I cannot survive death.

The argument is valid, so let's look at the defenses of the premises. (1) follows from the fact that after my death, there seems to be nothing material for me to be.⁹ After my death, there will be a corpse; but on many accounts, a corpse is not a single thing, but rather just a lot of tiny simples arranged in a certain way. Even if my corpse were a single substance, it wouldn't be alive since it would have no soul configuring it into a living thing. And on many accounts, if you can *survive* death, it won't be as a non-living thing, so it won't be as a corpse.¹⁰ It seems, then, that were you to draw up a list of all my parts after death, there would be no material item on the list, and so I would be wholly immaterial. So, if I can survive my death, then possibly I am immaterial.

⁹ Assuming also that if there is a resurrection of the body, it's not immediate and that if there's a resurrection of the body, anyone who is resurrected exists between death and the resurrection.

¹⁰ There are dissenters to such accounts, e.g. Feldman (1992, 89-124), whose view is characterized by its rejection of the corruptionist claim. Defenders of such views are obviously a tough crowd for the corruptionist, but she has at least two options: (1) she can concede that the above Argument for Corruptionism might hold sway only for that (sizeable!) portion of her audience that rejects the claim that a corpse can in any meaningful way be said to have "survived" death, (2) she can address the arguments for the view that you can become a corpse. Here is not the place to pursue Option 2, but I will note that Feldman's argument in particular depends on both a materialist view of human persons and a denial of the claim that psychological abilities, activity, or continuity is necessary for our persistence, and that many hylomorphists differ from Feldman on those points.

Premise (2) follows from animalism (at least, it follows from the variety we are assuming). If it's necessary that if I exist I'm an animal (so if wherever and whenever I exist, I'm an animal) and it's possible that I'm immaterial, then it's possible that I am both an animal (I have to be) and that I'm immaterial. So, if it's possible that I'm immaterial, it's possible that an animal is immaterial.

Premise (3) seems obvious. Animals eat and breathe and reproduce and sense, and all of those activities require having a body. If something doesn't have a body, it isn't capable of doing those characteristically animalian activities. And such a thing, it seems, can't be an animal when it can't do those things. So, necessarily animals are material.

I think there is something wrong with this defense of (3), and so I think the above argument against survivalism has a weakness. In the next section, I'll call (3) into question.

4. A Reply to the Argument for Corruptionism

Here, I'll deny that necessarily, animals are material by distinguishing between necessarily being material and being normatively material, arguing that something can be normatively material without necessarily being material, and that we only have reason to believe that animals are normatively material.¹¹ If animals aren't material necessarily, then possibly, an animal is immaterial.

¹¹ Using normative concepts in debates about personal identity is not without precedent. For example, Gorman (2011) develops and defends a normative notion of personhood. He also briefly suggests that having a body is a normative, but not necessary, condition on being human. Somewhat similarly, Brower (2014) defends what he calls "The Thomistic Conception of Natures" according to which if something is essentially *F*, and *F-ness* is its primary nature, then that thing is *disposed* to be *F*, and can cease to be *F* without ceasing to exist. He uses this conception of natures to argue that human persons can survive their deaths without surviving as human beings (i.e. animals) (see Brower (2014, 297-301)), so Brower, too, considers something like a normative account of personhood. One way in which what I am doing here differs from what Gorman and Brower did is that I am defending a normative account of *animal*, whereas they developed and applied normative accounts of *person*.

Normativity and necessity come apart, in part because they are about different things.¹² If something is normatively a certain way, it is that way when it is working properly. If something is necessarily a certain way, it is that way whenever it exists. Being some way normatively, then, is contrasted with necessarily being some way because while something cannot exist without exemplifying all the ways it is necessarily, something can exist without working properly, and so it can exist without exemplifying all the ways it normatively is. If something is normatively a certain way but not *in fact* that way, it is defective. For example, if an individual (we'll call him Tony; he's a tiger) is normatively four-legged but not in fact four-legged, he is defective. But notice that being a defective tiger does not entail not being a tiger. "Defective", in other words, isn't an alienans. If necessarily tigers are four-legged, on the other hand, then three-legged Tony wouldn't be a tiger, even if he had all the stripes and whiskers and DNA of a tiger.

Here's another illustration. Basketball is normatively a game in which players on teams score points by throwing a ball into a hoop without traveling, fouling, double dribbling, etc. In other words, it is normatively a game in which ten people try to score points while following the rules of basketball.¹³ Sometimes, however, players break the rules. Sometimes they travel, for instance. But when they travel, they are still playing basketball. Even when they break the rules that specify what's normative for the game, they are still playing basketball, but when they do break such rules, they are playing the game defectively. That is why they get a penalty, which signals defective play. However,

¹² The normativity I'm talking about is not a moral sort of normativity, of course. If something fails to be the way it ought to be relative to the sort of norms I'm talking about, it isn't therefore evil. It is therefore imperfect, but amorally so.

¹³ Moreover basketball games are necessarily normatively that way. It's not the case that some basketball games are normatively defined while others are not.

when players get a penalty, they are still playing. After all, players don't get penalized if they're not playing. If, necessarily, basketball is a game in which players score points by throwing a ball into a hoop without traveling, then no one could travel while playing basketball. But people do travel while playing basketball.

There are, of course, important differences between basketball games and animals—one of which is that the relevant norms for basketball games are socially constructed (and so possibly changeable), whereas the relevant norms for animals are probably not—and so there are significant limits on the conclusions we can draw about one based on the other. The main work for the basketball example is to illustrate how something can fail to meet the normative requirements on being a certain kind of thing and yet be that kind of thing. *That* is what I think basketball games and animals have in common. I will argue that animals are not material necessarily, but rather are normatively material, in much the way that it is normative but not necessary that basketball players not travel. I will argue, in other words, that animals *can* be immaterial. It's just that when they are, they're defective.

It's difficult to find a principled reason to deny this possibility. After all, animals can survive the loss of many of their body parts. What reason does a hylomorphist have for saying that they can't lose all of them? A materialist (of the variety that excludes the possibility of a disembodied soul) has a principled reason for maintaining that an animal has to be composed of *some* matter in order to exist, but the reason is just that *nothing* exists unless it's made of matter. A hylomorphist, on the other hand, who (on the variety of hylomorphism we are assuming) already grants the possibility of a disembodied soul, does not have that reason.

To be clear, my point is that it is difficult to find principled reasons to deny that animals *the souls of which can survive disembodiment* can become immaterial.¹⁴ If some kinds of animals have souls that cannot survive disembodiment, then my point does not apply to them. For animals of such kinds, there is a principled reason to deny that they can become immaterial: they cannot become immaterial because none of their parts are such that they can be both the only remaining parts of an animal and immaterial. A traditional argument (one found, for example, in Aquinas) is that because only humans have essential functions that can be sustained without the body, only humans have the kinds of souls that can survive disembodiment. If Aquinas is right, then my point only applies to human animals. But if he is wrong (if, that is, other animals have souls that can survive separation from the body), then my point applies to them, too.

Here's a principle reason a hylomorphist might deny the possibility: it seems incomprehensible that something could lose all of its material parts without ceasing to exist. It is hard to imagine, for example, how one could maintain that a house could survive as an immaterial thing after it had been burned to the ground and its ashes scattered.¹⁵ But this objection seems tacitly to presuppose either materialism or a variety of hylomorphism that is at odds with the view I am arguing for. In either case, it is assumed that the annihilation of the matter of a thing is tantamount to the annihilation of that thing. But that is a principle in need of defense. My argument is that it is, though perhaps surprising, not at all paradoxical for the variety of hylomorphism in question to have the consequence that a thing could survive the loss of all its material parts. After all,

¹⁴ And this may be a small class of souls, perhaps including only human souls. Historically, many have thought that souls all of whose functions depend on a body cannot survive without the body and that the souls of all kinds of things but humans depend for all their operations on bodies.

¹⁵ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing this objection.

on the variety of hylomorphism in question, not all of the thing's parts are material parts—there is still a soul besides. And so the destruction of all of an animal's material parts might be like the destruction of the shutters and doors of a house, an event that, on many ordinary views, a house can survive. That the disembodied soul is relevantly like a house without its shutters is a substantive and surprising claim. (That's why I attempt a defense of it below.) But the claim is not incomprehensible.

Perhaps it will be insisted that animals necessarily have at least some material part, normatively defined though the concept may be. After all, the variation that normative concepts allow is generally limited by a core of necessity. Even if basketball, for example, is normatively defined, there is a limit on how many (or which) rules can be broken, and if athletes on a court break those rules, whatever they're doing out there is not playing basketball. Likewise, it might be argued, the fact that an animal can lose some of its body does not show that it can lose all of it. There is a limit on the number (and maybe type) of material parts that an animal can lose without ceasing to be an animal.¹⁶

But why should we think *that*? Why should we think that an animal without its body is like a basketball game in which almost everyone violates almost all of the rules? Why should we think that these things that are usually composed of matter and form *must* be so composed? It might be argued that being material or having a body is part of the “core of necessity” of the concept *animal* because animals need bodies to perform their characteristic functions, like sensing and metabolizing, and things need to be performing characteristically animal functions in order to be animals. But the second conjunct isn't

¹⁶ Thanks to a number of people for raising this objection, but especially to Turner Nevitt, who clearly voiced it in personal correspondence.

right: something can cease having its characteristic features or stop doing its characteristic activities and remain the kind of thing that those features and activities are characteristic of. The fact that animals need bodies to perform their characteristic functions suggests no more than that being material is a normative part of the concept animal, a feature that animals have when they are working well. So even if animals need bodies to perform their characteristic functions, they may not need bodies in order to exist.

So it seems to me that convincingly denying the possibility that an animal becomes immaterial is difficult—especially while granting the hylomorphic picture according to which animals have a purely immaterial component that can exist disembodied. I don't know whether the difficulty is due to an absence of good arguments against the possibility, or because arguments for claims about what's necessary require premises about what is necessary and it's difficult to find relevant ones that the opposing parties in this debate agree on, or just because I have a deficient imagination when it comes to arguing for claims about what's necessary that I think are false. I nevertheless think that the burden of proof is on the defender of the less intuitive claim, and so I will offer a short, but positive, defense of it.

Some have argued that an animal can be pared down to its brain.¹⁷ Their contention is that just as you can cut off an animal's finger or arm without destroying the animal, you can cut off an animal's entire brain-complement—the part of an animal that is the rest of it besides its brain—without destroying the animal. The case of an animal who has lost his brain-complement is, as van Inwagen argues, “logically not much

¹⁷ In particular, I have in mind van Inwagen (1990) and Pruss (MS), as I will discuss.

different from the case of the man who has lost an arm: the latter was recently a 150-pound man and has lost about six pounds of bone and blood and tissue; the former was recently a 150-pound man and has lost about 147 pounds of bone and blood and tissue.”¹⁸ On the minimal hylomorphic assumptions that we are granting here—namely, that an animal has a soul, that the soul is what makes the animal alive, and that the soul can exist disembodied—something similar can be said about the case of an animal who lost all but its soul: it is logically not much different from the case of the man who has lost all but his brain.¹⁹

Arguments that confirm that animals can be reduced to their brains (or arguments that are parallel to those arguments) equally well support the claim that animals can be reduced to their souls. For example, Pruss (MS) argues that the most plausible way of rendering how much an animal can survive the loss of is in terms of functional complexity, and that in humans, since the brain controls and coordinates the functioning of many other parts, this measure classifies the brain as the minimal part an organism needs to survive.²⁰ No measures that classify any other part of the animal as necessary are plausible. For example, a measure that limited the size, weight, or number of organs removable would rule as necessary parts of the body besides the brain, but that measure is

¹⁸ Van Inwagen (1990, 172-173).

¹⁹ Oderberg (2005, 96-97) and Oderberg (2007) argues for the person’s existence after death by a similar analogy, maintaining that after death, we persist as persons in a radically mutilated state. He denies, however, that persons are identical with their souls after death, opting instead for the view that we are constituted by our souls. (As I argue below, I think that’s an unnecessary concession.) Though it is clear in the cited passages that Oderberg thinks human persons survive death, he is not explicit about whether animals do or whether, instead, animals are just what persons are constituted by before persons die. In this chapter, I appeal to Pruss and van Inwagen to support the claims that it is *animals* that survive death disembodied and that we can be *identical* to them (for the latter claim, see Section 5).

²⁰ In personal correspondence, Pruss has clarified that what he means is that the brain only does its work *qua* something with form. And the form it has is the human form that informs all of the body. So the brain in Pruss’ paper is a formed brain.

not plausible. We can imagine someone suffering from something like elephantiasis such that her affected limbs are a significant percentage of her weight, size, and number of organs (if each cell counts as a kind of functional organ), but even so, it seems that she could survive the loss of those limbs. It is not the *size* of an animal's limbs that are relevant to whether she can survive without them. Another measure, which tracks the importance of organs, also fares poorly. Many organs are equally important, and so it seems unlikely that comparisons between them make sense. For Pruss, the upshot of these considerations is that some animals, like human beings, can survive the loss of all of their body parts except for their brains.

It seems that for the hylomorphist of the sort we are discussing, the soul has the functional role that the brain does on the materialist picture: the soul controls and coordinates the functioning of many other parts.²¹ In fact, we have defined the soul as something that coordinates non-living material and turns it into something living. And if performing that functional role is the criterion by which we judge whether something is the minimal piece an animal needs for survival, it seems that on the hylomorphic picture,

²¹ Objection: if the soul on the hylomorphic view does the job of the brain on the not-hylomorphic view, we might wonder what work, on the hylomorphic view, there is for the brain to do. If it does what the soul does, then one of the two is redundant, and that seems unlikely. If it doesn't do what the soul does, then it doesn't actually play the role that Pruss and van Inwagen (in the next section) say that it does, and that seems problematic since what Pruss and van Inwagen presume about the brain's behaviors—like that it coordinates certain behaviors in response to certain stimuli—are fairly commonsense. Reply: It's compatible with hylomorphism that the brain's activities are (mechanically-speaking) the same as they are on the not-hylomorphic view (this allows her to preserve the commonsense picture of the brain's behavior), but what those activities accomplish is different (this allows her to leave work for the soul to do). On this sort of view, information processing and response coordinating are insufficient to unify an organism. There must also be a soul. But what does the soul *do* on her view? And why isn't what the brain does sufficient for organic unification? To the first question: I'm hesitant to commit the hylomorphist to anything beyond what our merely functional definition of the soul permits, but perhaps she can say something like: the soul unifies through the activity of the brain, activity which is related closely enough to actually unifying that we can sometimes felicitously describe it as unifying activity. Just as we see with our eyes but can sometimes say that eyes see, the soul does the unifying with the brain, though we can sometimes say that the brain unifies. To the second question: this question is a specification of a more general question for hylomorphists, namely why do we need forms in our theory at all? The answer to that question, of course, is far outside the scope of this chapter.

the soul is all an animal needs to survive. In defense of the idea that a functioning but detached brain is a living animal, Pruss notes that, “At least a part of what defines an organism as a living organism of its natural kind is not the actual performance of life functions but something more like a striving for such performance. Think of the fish out of water, which struggles to extract oxygen from its unnatural environment. As long as it is striving, it is alive.” Perhaps the separated soul continues to strive for the performance of life functions and so is like a fish out of water, alive as long as it is striving.²²

Similarly to Pruss, van Inwagen (1990) argues that an animal can be “radically maimed” to the extent that all that remains of it is brain-shaped (or made up entirely of the simples that had virtually composed the virtual object that was the animal’s brain). Van Inwagen employs a political analogy to illustrate his claim: we are to imagine an empire governed almost entirely from its Imperial Palace. The palace delivers instructions to empire, thereby directing all of the empire’s business, the flow of commodities within its borders, the local administration of the courts and police, etc. We are then to imagine a catastrophe isolating the palace so that no information about the empire can get in, and no information or instructions for the empire to follow can get out. The empire, consequently, falls apart. As soon as the flow of coordinating information from the palace stops, the empire shrinks to comprise the isolated palace staff, “not quite” ceasing to exist (see pages 174-175). Van Inwagen argues that a severed brain—kept alive by some elaborate machine, perhaps—is like the isolated palace. Just as the catastrophe that struck the empire reduced the empire to the size of its palace, so too

²² This is an application that Pruss saw but did not develop: “It is worth noting that the control-based and Aristotelian arguments might allow an animal that has a soul as a part of it to survive as just the soul.”

would separating the brain from the rest of the body reduce the organism to the size of its brain.

On the hylomorphic view we are considering, it seems that the soul has a role very much like the role of the Imperial Palace or the brain on van Inwagen's picture. The soul is, by its functional definition, the thing responsible for making some matter the matter of a particular living organism, and it coordinates and unifies all of what would otherwise not be a part of an organism or caught up in the life of that organism. Provided, then, that the soul can exist in the absence of the soul-complement (which is what we'll call the virtual part of a human being that is the rest of him besides his soul), it seems that the animal can be reduced to its soul no less than an empire of the centralized sort described above can be reduced to its imperial palace or an animal to its brain.

5. The Afterlife Puzzle

Nevertheless, this picture of the afterlife presents a puzzle. Prior to the soul's separation from the body, both the soul and the animal exist, but because the animal has parts the soul doesn't have, the soul and the animal are distinct from one another. After the soul's separation, however, if the animal continues to exist—which is what I'm suggesting—the soul and the animal seem not to be distinct. In fact, if the animal survives death, it seems that the animal becomes the soul. But if the animal were to become the soul, then two distinct objects would become the same object, and that is impossible. Something has to give. Is it that the animal can survive death?

Not necessarily. The general concern about distinct things, one of which is a part of the other, becoming the same thing is not without precedent, and there are a variety of ways to mitigate the concern. The above puzzle about the afterlife is a version of the

familiar body-minus puzzle of material constitution. To illustrate the problem, consider a well-formed and properly functioning cat named Tibbles, and consider the large part of Tibbles that includes all of her except her tail. We will call that large part of Tibbles that excludes her tail ‘Tib’. Tibbles and Tib are not identical; Tibbles has a tail but Tib does not. But suppose that at some point, an accident occurs and Tibbles’ tail is annihilated. After the accident, it seems that Tibbles and Tib are identical. But if Tibbles and Tib are identical, then two distinct objects become the same object, and that is impossible. We have a problem.²³

This problem generalizes to create a puzzle about anything that can lose a part. For anything that can lose a part, that thing, ‘Body’, has a large proper part, ‘Body-minus’. Body and Body-minus are not identical; Body has a part that Body-minus does not. However, when Body loses a part, Body—distinct from Body-minus—seems to become identical to Body-minus. Thus the puzzle.

There are a variety of resolutions to this puzzle, and because the puzzle about the afterlife is a version of the body-minus puzzle, its resolutions model answers to the afterlife puzzle. Looking more closely at the body-minus puzzle and how one can reply to it, then, is helpful in identifying available replies to the afterlife puzzle.²⁴

As Rea (1997) formulates the body-minus puzzle, the puzzle arises from the following five, mutually inconsistent claims:

The Identity Assumption: If Body and Body-minus share all of the same parts at the same time, then Body is identical with Body-minus.

²³ This puzzle, based on a similar Stoic puzzle, was introduced into contemporary discussion by Geach (1962) and Wiggins (1967) and discussed in detail by Rea (1995, 1997).

²⁴ Thanks to Mike Rea for pointing this out to me.

The Necessity Assumption: If Body is identical with Body-minus, it is necessary that Body is identical with Body-minus.

The Existence Assumption: Body and Body-minus exist.

The Essentialist Assumption: The parts of Body compose something such that, necessarily, its parts are arranged Body-wise.

The Principle of Alternative Compositional Possibilities: The parts of Body compose something such that, possibly, its parts are not arranged Body-wise.

Denials of different claims amount to different solutions to the puzzle. For example, denying the Identity Assumption, as Wiggins (1968) does, relieves the pressure to say that Body and Body-minus are ever identical. As long as the Identity Assumption is false, when Body and Body-minus share all of their parts, one of them can constitute the other without being identical with it.²⁵ Denying the Necessity Assumption, as Myro (1985) does, makes room for the possibility that two things are identical only temporarily. Denying the existence assumption, as van Inwagen (1980, 1981, 1990) and Unger (1980) do, takes either Body or Body-minus out of the picture, so that there aren't two things for there to be a problematic relation between. Denying a three-dimensionalist metaphysic is another option. Given the doctrine of temporal parts (and modifying the above assumptions accordingly), the body-minus puzzle does not get off the ground, even if all five modified assumptions are true. This is because if things have temporal parts, then Body has temporal parts that Body-minus doesn't have. It has, for example, the temporal part that fills up the region of space-time that it occupies up to the annihilation of its tail. If Body has parts that Body-minus doesn't have, then the Identity

²⁵ This view has many defenders. Among them are Doepke (1982), Baker (1997, 1998), Koslicki (2004), and Rea (1998).

Assumption—even when modified to suit a four-dimensionalist metaphysic—doesn't tell us that Body and Body-minus are identical. Besides these, there are many other possible ways to resolve the above puzzle, but I will not continue the survey here.²⁶

To turn the body-minus puzzle into the afterlife puzzle, substitute 'Soul' for 'Body-minus' and 'Animal' for 'Body' in each of the above assumptions. Denials of the different adjusted claims (or the adoption of the doctrine of temporal parts) amount to different solutions to the afterlife puzzle. The question at hand is this: which (if any) of these solutions are available to the defender of disembodied animals as described in this chapter? Available solutions are those consistent with the following: (1) basic hylomorphism (as described in Section 2); (2) animalism (as described in Section 2); and (3) the thesis that an animal can exist without its body.²⁷ If there are no available solutions, hylomorphic animalist survivalism succumbs to afterlife problems; disembodied animals are things we can never become. If, however, there is an available solution, there is nothing mereological in our way.

It's clear that some solutions are unavailable. The hylomorphist could not adopt physicalist solutions, for example. She could not adopt Unger's (1980) eliminativist solution, according to which there are no compounds. On the additional assumption that compounds can survive the loss of some of their parts, she could not adopt Chisholm's (1973, 1979) mereological essentialist solution, either.

Nevertheless, several replies are promising. For example, the defender of disembodied animals could reject the identity assumption. This is the solution that Stump

²⁶ See Rea (1997) and Wasserman (2015) for analyses of other solutions.

²⁷ In addition, in order to effectively model her solutions to the afterlife puzzle after solutions to the body-minus puzzle, the hylomorphist has to understand the soul as a part alongside the more familiar material parts. Fine (1999) and Koslicki (2008) defend such accounts. Johnston (1992, 2006) does not.

(2006) proposes.²⁸ According to Stump, we are animals—and necessarily so—but we survive death without matter. Although Stump thinks that at death Socrates has no matter but is yet an animal, she denies that that animal is identical to the immaterial soul. Rather, Stump argues that after death, the animal is wholly *constituted* by its immaterial soul. Stump characterizes the constitution relation as the relation that holds between a whole and its parts when the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.²⁹ According to Stump’s constitution view, throughout the existence of an animal, the animal is at least partly constituted by her soul, but at some times when it exists, the animal is also constituted by matter. At death, the matter ceases to constitute the animal, and the soul becomes the only constitutor. When that happens, the animal continues to exist since, according to Stump, the soul is sufficient for the continued existence of the animal. Nevertheless, the two are not identical; rather, the soul constitutes the animal.

That is one promising way to resolve the afterlife puzzle, but it is not the only one, and there may be better ones on offer. Besides inheriting the general worries about constitution as distinct from identity, the view arguably introduces new worries special to the afterlife case.³⁰ In addition, it falls short of making the bold claim I think the defender of disembodied animals is justified in maintaining: i.e. that an animal can be identical to an immaterial thing. To support the claim that an animal can become identical to a soul, one could deny the Existence Assumption (for the soul prior to death) rather than the Identity Assumption. In what follows, I’ll show how the hylomorphist can do that,

²⁸ She proposes this solution in the context of interpreting Aquinas, and she is not alone in reading Aquinas as denying the identity assumption (see, for example, Brown (2005), Brower (2014)).

²⁹ For further discussion of this relation, see Baker (1999).

³⁰ See Toner (2009a) and Williams (2005).

modeling her denial after van Inwagen's denial of the same assumption, and I will leave it up to the reader to develop and defend other ways of solving the puzzle, whether via different ways of denying the Existence Assumption or via denying different assumptions altogether.

When van Inwagen denies the Existence Assumption, he denies that Body-minus exists. Roughly, here's his case for doing so: consider again both Tibbles and the proper part of Tibbles that is all of him besides his tail, Tib. If both Tibbles and Tib exist, they are not identical (since one has a tail and one doesn't) but can *become* identical (since Tibbles can survive the loss of his tail). Since it's impossible for different things to become the same thing, given that Tibbles exists, either Tibbles can't lose his tail or Tib doesn't exist before the amputation. The latter disjunct is preferable.³¹

Similarly, the hylomorphist could deny that the soul—the afterlife puzzle's counterpart to Tib and Body-minus—exists. Just as after the accident Tibbles is the creature without a tail (which technically did not exist prior to the accident), after death, the animal is the creature without a body (i.e. she is the soul, which technically did not exist prior to death). On this solution to the afterlife puzzle, it's possible for an animal to be identical to a material thing now but identical to an immaterial thing after her death.³²

³¹ Jaworski (2016), a hylomorphist, also endorses this kind of solution to the Body-minus puzzle, but doesn't apply it to the afterlife case.

³² In light of other commitments van Inwagen has, he must make the following concessions: that Tibbles' tail is not an organism and that Tib in the proper environment will maintain itself but the tail will not. He makes similar concessions explicit in discussing the possibility of an animal shrinking to its brain. He argues that the severed brain-complement is not an organism (1990, 177) and that while a severed head will maintain itself in the proper environment, a headless body will not be able to do so without a life-support system that involves the functional equivalent of a computer (1990, 178). This difference is what makes it so that the simples composing a separated brain constitute a life while the simples (virtually) composing a separated brain-complement do not. If the hylomorphist has to make parallel concessions (viz. that the soul is a virtual object; that the severed soul-complement is not an organism; that a severed soul in the proper environment will maintain itself, but a soulless body will not be able to do so without a life-support system that involves the functional equivalent of a computer; that this difference is what makes it

Denying the Existence Assumption might seem to be a problematic solution to the afterlife puzzle. That solution implies that the soul didn't exist before death, and hylomorphism implies that animals have both bodies and souls before death. Whether the solution is properly hylomorphic is thus questionable. If there's anything the hylomorphist can't eliminate in her theory, it's one of the two elements of her fundamental metaphysics.

But perhaps that objection is misguided. Consider a view according to which there are forms, bodies capable of taking on the forms, and substances, things produced by a certain arrangement of matter and a special kind of form. On this view, the existence of a substance trumps the existence of its parts: if a body and form come together to make a substance, in so doing, they go out of existence and the substance comes into it. So if you put a substance in a crate—let's call up poor Tibbles—and wondered how many things were existing in the crate, the correct answer would be “one”, just Tibbles. On this view, “two—a body and a soul” would be a wrong answer, as would “three—a body, a soul, and a cat.” Nevertheless, should the substance break, the substance would go out of existence and body and form would come into it. On this view, body and form on their own exist, but as parts, they do not. (The same can be said of the brain on van Inwagen's view: on its own, it exists, but as a part of a living thing it does not).

Though eliminativist, the above view strikes me as involving enough soul to qualify as hylomorphic. If it fails, it fails on other accounts. It also strikes me as roughly squaring with a central commitment of Aristotelian metaphysics: that wholes are ontologically prior to their parts. For Aristotle, the primary sense of ‘existence’ applies

so that the separated soul constitutes a life while the soul-complement does not), I do not think she should see them as particularly costly.

only to substances. It does not apply to their parts. Demoting parts of organisms on the existential front should be a familiar move.

It is important to point out that eliminating souls within hylomorphism does not disqualify it from being a view that can make sense of claims like “this animal is composed of matter and soul” any more than eliminating brains within van Inwagen’s account disqualifies it from being a view that can make sense of the claim that unlike most animals, jellyfish lack brains. On van Inwagen’s view, of course, *all* animals lack brains, jellyfish or not. But that does not preclude the defender of his view from distinguishing between jellyfish and other animals according to standard phylogenetic rules, which classify jellyfish as uniquely in the “animal-that-lacks-a-brain” family. This is because van Inwagen’s eliminativism is not a revelation about biology; it doesn’t suggest anything like that mammals are neurologically more similar to jellyfish than previously thought. If van Inwagen is right, mammals and jellyfish are no less distinguishable than they are if he’s wrong. Similarly, if the hylomorphist who denies the existence assumption is right, it is not thereby especially difficult to distinguish between the hylomorphic animal and something without a form. If there can be something neurologically distinctive about non-jellyfish on van Inwagen’s view, there can be something formally distinctive about hylomorphic animals on the view in question. The point is this: suppose we grant (as we would if van Inwagen is right about brains) that it is not in principle incoherent to deny the existence of brains and yet meaningfully maintain that unlike jellyfish, most animals have brains. On that supposition, it seems likewise not in principle incoherent to deny that the soul exists prior to death and yet meaningfully maintain that unlike animals on a physicalist picture (or rocks given a species of

hylomorphism on which only organisms have forms), hylomorphic animals are made up of bodies and souls.

Some may find the above responses less than ideal. Good news: you may not need them. Perhaps you could deny an assumption other than the Identity or Existence Assumptions, or deny them in ways that differ from van Inwagen's and Stump's. I leave it to the reader to explore these solutions further and select the one that fits best with her more central metaphysical assumptions. In order to avoid burying my main thesis in the details of a tangential debate, I will not pursue the other possibilities here.³³ I will, however, flag the project of exploring alternatives as a worthwhile pursuit. The exploration stands to focus widespread disagreement about death in the hylomorphic literature. My sense is that the parties to the disagreement have a sense for what some of the principles at stake are— for example, there's significant back-and-forth about survivalism's violation of the necessity of identity or the weak supplementation principle—but haven't systematically considered all of the alternatives to violating them. My point for now is that there is at least one pretty good solution to the afterlife puzzle that allows there to be disembodied animals in a really robust way: animals which are not only closely associated with disembodied things, but identical with them.

³³ I will highlight, however, the independence of solution selection from views about whether humans are special among the animals with respect to post-mortem survival. Nothing in my approach to solving the afterlife puzzle has ruled out its application to animals in general rather than to human animals exclusively. But that is because the scope of things to which afterlife-puzzle solutions can be applied (i.e. things the souls of which can survive disembodiment) will vary according to the species of hylomorphism presumed, and the current discussion is neutral between species of hylomorphism that vary along that dimension. For an argument that non-human animals also survive death, see Dougherty (2014).

6. Conclusion

Neither animalism nor hylomorphism entail that necessarily animals are material or that animals are necessarily material. If anything, it seems that animals are normatively material, but something can be both normatively material and actually immaterial. It's just that when it is immaterial, it is a defective instance of whatever kind it belongs to. There should be nothing terribly alarming here. Souls, we granted, play a certain functional role and can exist independently of matter. On those assumptions, it is no weirder to say than animals can be severed souls that that they can be severed brain.³⁴

It thus seems that the hylomorphist has available a line of reply to objections to the effect that we cannot survive our deaths because we are animals. She only has to admit that there can be immaterial animals and that we can be them, and as I hope to have shown in this chapter, those are not unreasonable admissions.³⁵

³⁴ I have focused the preceding discussion on defending hylomorphic animalism, but a similar defense could be made for alternative accounts of personal identity. For example, a defender of the view that human persons are brains could reply to the survivalist's objection by arguing that brains are not necessarily material. She could tell, *mutatis mutandis*, the story I tell about how hylomorphic compounds become immaterial. Additionally, perhaps a defense of the possibility of disembodied animals is available even to the proponents of *non*-hylomorphic accounts of personal identity. For example, if there are immaterial things that are not souls in the hylomorphic sense, perhaps the possibility of animals becoming those things is also defensible. Exactly how alternative accounts of personal identity fare in reply to the survivalist objection is outside of my present jurisdiction; nothing I have argued here implies that hylomorphic animalism has an edge relative to alternative accounts (hylomorphic or otherwise). Rather, what I have argued is that if, more things considered, hylomorphic animalism fails to have an edge, it is not because it entails corruptionism.

³⁵ I am grateful to Andrew Bailey, David Hershenov, Turner Nevitt, Alex Pruss, Mike Rea, Jesse Schupack, Chris Tweedt, participants in colloquia at Baylor University and the University of Notre Dame's Center for Philosophy of Religion, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

CHAPTER FIVE

If I'm a Hylomorphic Compound, Who Thinks My Thoughts?

1. Introduction

Here is a plausible principle about our mental lives:

The Priority Principle: We have our mental properties (like *hoping for rain* and *thinking about metaphysics*) in the primary or non-derivative sense; we do not have our mental properties in virtue of something else—like one of our parts, or something of which we are a part—having them for us.¹

Here is another:

The Single Thinker Principle: There aren't two thinkers where I am. Nothing else here thinks my thoughts at all, derivatively or otherwise.

In light of the intuitive plausibility of the Priority Principle and the Single Thinker Principle and compelling arguments offered in their favor,² a view's failure to comply with them indicates significant theoretical cost. Some have argued that a hylomorphic account of human persons—an account according to which a human person is a compound of matter and form—violates both theses and is thus a dead end in the metaphysics of the human person. In this chapter, I argue to the contrary. Hylomorphism need not—and the particular varieties accused *do* not—imply that we have our mental properties derivatively or that there are multiple thinkers of our thoughts.

¹ See Bailey (2015).

² For the first, most prominently Bailey (2015), and for the second, see Olson (2003, 2007).

First, I will present the case against hylomorphism. In particular, I will examine Andrew Bailey's (2015) argument that hylomorphism (as defended by Jeff Brower) violates the Priority Principle. Brower's hylomorphism seems suspect partly because it seems to imply that our mental properties inhere in multiple subjects—in other words, because it seems to imply that the Single Thinker Principle is false. I will defend hylomorphism from both claims. Along the way, I will consider an attempt to exculpate hylomorphism much different from mine, an attempt that requires significant revisions to the theory. Jeremy Skrzypek (Forthcoming) has recently pursued such a strategy, and as I will argue below, his approach is ultimately untenable. I conclude that it is a mistake to construe hylomorphism, even without major revision, as running afoul of the Priority or Single Thinker Principles.³

2. *The Accusations*

I present a pair of passages incriminating hylomorphism. First, here's Brower on a hylomorphic solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics:

Ordinary objects persist through intrinsic change by successively entering into larger wholes of which they and their temporary intrinsics are proper parts or constituents. Moreover, it is only these larger wholes which have the relevant properties simpliciter, whereas ordinary objects come to have these same properties only by entering into such wholes as parts. Thus, in the particular case of Socrates, an enduring object (namely, Socrates himself) derivatively possesses the properties of bentness and straightness at different times solely by successively being part of two distinct objects (namely, Socrates at t_1 and

³ A note about the subject of this chapter: because the target of Bailey's critique and Skrzypek's defense is Brower's hylomorphism in particular, my focus, too, will be on Brower's hylomorphism. I believe that other varieties of hylomorphism may seem just as susceptible to Bailey's criticism, however, and that the solution I propose can be extended *mutatis mutandis* to those varieties as well. (I suspect that varieties of hylomorphism that permit multiple modes of property possession—like possessing properties essentially or accidentally—and varieties that countenance property possession by things non-identical to material substances will be as prone to violating the two principles as Brower's view is.) In the interest of brevity, I will not extend the defense to other varieties of hylomorphism in this chapter but will continue to let Brower's very carefully defended view represent the others in its family.

Socrates at t_2 , respectively), which possess these properties in the primary or proper sense (Brower 2010, 889)⁴

Roughly, the idea is that Socrates gets his temporary intrinsic properties by becoming a part of a larger whole that has those properties as parts, and the larger whole is what has the property in the primary sense. Given that *thinking* is a temporary intrinsic property, this passage implies that it is not Socrates that thinks in the primary sense, but instead what thinks in the primary sense is something that Socrates and the property *thinking* are parts of—let's call it 'thinking-Socrates'. Socrates himself possesses the property *thinking* in a derivative sense in virtue of being a part of thinking-Socrates. And so the hylomorphic solution articulated in this passage seems to violate the Priority Principle.

Second (and relatedly) here is Brower on a distinction afforded by the hylomorphism he defends between different modes of property-possession:

Subjects are characterized primarily [...] by the forms (or properties) that they possess as proper parts or constituents [...] Subjects are also characterized in a secondary or derivative sense by the constituent properties of things with which they are [numerically] the same but not identical. (Brower 2014, 94)

This distinction is critical for Brower's project. By it, he reconciles the Aristotelian conception of forms—according to which things cannot be successively characterized by the properties they possess—with the apparent fact that things *are* successively characterized by at least some of the properties that they possess.⁵ The distinction allows him to say that things are non-successively characterized by the properties that

⁴ Brower (2010): 'Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsic', as quoted by Bailey (2015, 170), who describes the problem of temporary intrinsics as Brower understands it thus: "roughly the problem of saying what is wrong with arguments like the following (suppose Socrates is sitting at t_1 and standing straight up at t_2):

P1. Socrates at t_1 is bent, though Socrates at t_2 is straight.
P2. Socrates at t_1 = Socrates at t_2 = Socrates.
C. Therefore, Socrates is both bent and straight."

⁵ See Brower (2014, 92).

characterize them “in the primary sense”, and they are successively characterized by the properties that characterize them “in the secondary or derivative sense”.

Below, I’ll discuss the details of Brower’s view that allow him to apply the distinction in that way. But first, notice that on this front, too, Brower seems at odds with the Single Thinker and Priority Principles. After all, Socrates’ contingent mental properties like *thinking* are ones that he is successively characterized by. Given Brower’s application of the above distinction, they thus are properties he is characterized by in the secondary or derivative sense. What’s worse, in light of Brower’s analysis of secondary property characterization—according to which things are characterized in a secondary sense by properties that primarily characterize other things (things with which they are the same but not identical)—Socrates is not the only thing characterized by *thinking*. A subject with which Socrates is the same but not identical is also characterized by *thinking*. And that one in the primary sense! And so here, too, hylomorphism seems to violate both the Single Thinker Principle and the Priority Principle.

Some additional background will be helpful for understanding why Brower makes these remarks and what the constraints are on defending his view. By ‘subjects’, Brower refers to two kinds of hylomorphic compounds: material substances and accidental unities. What makes material substances and accidental unities both hylomorphic compounds is their constituent make-up. Both have matter and form (or properties) as constituents (or parts).⁶ What makes material substances and accidental unities different types of hylomorphic compounds is the nature of their constituents. In general, the matter

⁶ ‘Constituent’ is one of Brower’s terms of arts, and by describing something as a constituent of a compound, he means roughly that it partly composes the compound. But composition “need not be conceived of in terms of literal parthood or constituency, but only as a relation (whatever it is in itself) that plays what we might call the ‘composition role’—that is, the role of appropriately uniting the termini of a given change with some corresponding matter and form” (Brower 2014, 73).

of a material substance is prime matter (whatever that is; we'll skip that entire conversation), and its constituent properties are essential properties. The matter of an accidental unity, on the other hand, is a material substance, and its constituent properties are accidental properties. An example of a material substance is Socrates. An example of an accidental unity is something of which Socrates and an accidental property like *thinking* are jointly constituents—what we've been calling thinking-Socrates.

Here's an illustration.




Figure 5.1 Brower's Model. Source: Jeremy Skrzypek, "Hylomorphism and the Priority Principle", *Metaphysica*. Forthcoming.

On Brower's view, the relation material substances bear to the accidental unities of which they are constituents is *being the same as without being identical to*. So Socrates is the same as but not identical to thinking-Socrates. And the relation accidental unities' constituent properties bear to the material substances with which their accidental unities are the same but not identical is called "inherence". So *thinking* inheres in Socrates and constitutes thinking-Socrates. Thus, Brower's remark that subjects are characterized in a secondary sense by the constituent properties of things with which they are the same but

not identical implies that Socrates is characterized in a secondary sense by his inherent properties, including, to follow our example, *thinking*.

Numerical sameness without identity is central to Brower's resolution of the tension between the Aristotelian account of form and our belief that things can be successively characterized by certain properties. Here's how it helps: On Brower's account, when a material subject like Socrates is characterized by a property he can lose, he bears *being the same as without being identical to* something that has that property as a constituent part, i.e. that is an accidental unity primarily characterized by that property. Numerical sameness is such an intimate relation that things that bear it to each other can inherit (so to speak) certain of each other's characteristics. Thus, Socrates can be characterized by *thinking*, even though *thinking* primarily characterizes the accidental unity thinking-Socrates and not Socrates himself. We say in those cases that Socrates is secondarily characterized by *thinking*, or that *thinking* inheres in him. Socrates fails to be characterized by properties he can lose when he fails to bear *being the same as without being identical to* the relevant accidental unities. Numerical sameness without identity is a relation that Socrates can successively bear to things, and he can do so without any violation of the Aristotelian principles at stake. Thus, numerical sameness without identity (along with the distinctions between material subjects and accidental unities, constituent properties and inherent properties, and primary and secondary property characterization) makes possible successive property characterization.

The problem, of course, is that the theory as a whole implies that both Socrates and thinking-Socrates are thinking, and that latter in the primary sense. It seems that if we put our title question—If I am a hylomorphic compound, who thinks my thoughts?—to

Brower's theory, it will return the following answer: *primarily* something of which you are a part, and derivatively, you do, too. That is a seemingly explicit violation of not only the Single Thinker Principle, but also the Priority Principle, and so we have solid grounds for pressing charges.

Before closing this section, I want to highlight an important commonality between the cited passages. Both feature theoretically simple resolutions to otherwise puzzling phenomena. Such resolutions are among the main draws of hylomorphism, and so modifications that render hylomorphism unfit for solving the puzzles greatly reduce hylomorphism's market value, perhaps more so than does rejecting our plausible principles. Thus, whatever changes the hylomorphist makes in avoiding the charges laid out above should remain sensitive to the problems hylomorphism is typically sold as being able to solve.

3. Modifications to Hylomorphism

One feature of Brower's account that leaves it susceptible to the charges laid out above is that there are two ways a property can characterize something. On Brower's view, since many properties (most relevantly, contingent mental properties) both inhere in a material substance and constitute an accidental unity, there are two things that many contingent mental properties characterize.

One temptation, then, is to eliminate one of the ways something can come to be characterized by a property. That kind of modification would require restructuring some of the components of Brower's view in order to ensure that eliminating a mode of property characterization does not amount to eliminating the corresponding characterizing properties along with it. In general, the result of any modification should

allow that material substances are characterized by what we expect them to be characterized by. Thus, if we eliminate constitution as a way of being characterized by a property, we have to relocate (so to speak) Socrates' constituent properties, like *human*. If we eliminate inherence, we have to relocate properties like *thinking*.

Skrzypek (Forthcoming) considers both options. Eliminating inherence requires recasting accidental properties as a material substance's constituents. On this view, *thinking* (partly) constitutes Socrates, and so Socrates thinks in the primary sense. As Skrzypek points out, however, even if inherence can be eliminated without excessive theoretical cost, accidental unities cannot be.⁷ And so on an inherence-eliminated model, Socrates is not the only thing constituted by *thinking*. An accidental unity is, too. And it thinks in exactly the same sense that Socrates does because it stands in exactly the same kind of relationship to *thinking* that Socrates does. Thus, though eliminating inherence satisfies the Priority Principle, it fails to satisfy the Single Thinker Principle. In light of this problem, Skrzypek proposes a principle according to which if a material substance possesses its properties via constituency, then "no part of [that] material substance [...] itself possesses any of those properties via constituency."⁸ Thus, accidental unities, which on this model are parts of things that possess their properties via constituency, do not themselves possess any properties. Skrzypek acknowledges that more needs to be said

⁷ Specifically, they play a key role in the Brower's responses to the puzzling phenomena—about temporary intrinsics and accidental change—mentioned above. Here's Skrzypek on that role: "First, accidental unities provide an account of accidental change (Brower 2014, Ch. 4). According to this account, an accidental unity is what is generated or corrupted when a material substance undergoes various changes in its accidental properties. Second, accidental unities can help to provide an alternative solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics (Brower 2010; 2014, pp. 174-181). According to this solution, a material substance persists through time by virtue of maintaining the same metaphysical parts, and it changes through time by virtue of being a constituent of various accidental unities at different times." Skrzypek (Forthcoming, 15).

⁸ Skrzypek (Forthcoming, 19)

about the principle and how to apply it. (Here's one problem with it: a leaf partly constituted by *green* seems to have parts partly constituted by *green*, but not if the principle is true.)⁹ His point is just that if something sufficiently like it could be made to work, the inherence-eliminator can avoid violating both the Priority Principle and the Single Thinker Principle.

Skrzypek also considers eliminating constituency instead. The benefit of this model is that it allows that Socrates is the only thinker of his thoughts in the primary sense. On this view, *thinking* inheres in Socrates, and inherence is the primary mode of property characterization.¹⁰ One cost of this model is that it isn't very hylomorphic. Eliminating constituency, Skrzypek argues, seems to require that individuals like Socrates are identical to their substantial forms (or essential property-tropes) and are therefore metaphysically simple.¹¹ So on an inherence-eliminated model, individuals like Socrates are simple, not built out of both matter and form. But overall, Skrzypek recognizes this model as "very promising indeed."

There seems to be a significant problem, however, with the elimination approach in general. The problem is that given that Socrates can survive accidental change, some of the properties that characterize him must stand in the following relation to him: the relation that distinct forms successively bear to something that gains and loses them in change. That's key to Brower's explanation for how material substances can survive

⁹ Thanks to Alex Pruss for the example.

¹⁰ Skrzypek doesn't mention the fact that on this model, accidental unities also turn out to be characterized—though in a secondary sense—by accidental forms like *thinking*. I take this to be another cost of the model, though perhaps not as great as the consequence that multiple things think Socrates' thoughts in the primary sense.

¹¹ Skrzypek (Forthcoming, 12-13). Skrzypek cites Lowe (1998) as defending the view that material substances are identical to their substantial forms.

change. But inherence is just defined as that relation, so inherence cannot be successfully eliminated.¹² But neither can constituency be eliminated, for that relation is, by definition, the relation that a form bears to the material substance of which it is the substantial form, a relation distinctive of hylomorphism generally.

So at least two carefully considered modifications of hylomorphism fail. The reason they fail is that they overlook the connection in Brower's theory between inherence and successive property possession on one hand, and between constitution and essential property possession on the other. That connection is important. It is key to a much simpler resolution to the charges brought against hylomorphism, a resolution that does not require modification to hylomorphism's underlying metaphysical structure.

4. Hylomorphism is Compatible with the Priority Principle

Consider again the Priority Principle— that “we human persons have mental properties (like *hoping for rain*) in the primary and nonderivative sense. We think our thoughts in the primary and nonderivative sense.”¹³ According to Bailey (2015), the principle is to be understood in such a way that its main rivals are: that we think our thoughts because something else thinks our thoughts for us; that we are not the subjects of our *de se* thoughts; that we ‘borrow’ our mental properties; that we think our thoughts only by proxy, and so forth.¹⁴ We have strong intuitions that the principle is true. And consider again the problematic Browerian claims: that the accidental unity composed of the accidental form *thinking* inhering in Socrates will be characterized

¹² See Brower (2014, 72) and our present discussion in Section 2.

¹³ Bailey (2015, 165).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

primarily by *thinking*, and that Socrates himself is characterized by *thinking* in a derivative or secondary sense.

There is a straightforward reading of these passages on which Brower fails to violate the Priority Principle. The type of primacy referenced in the incriminating Brower passages is not the type in play in our intuitions that we are the primary thinkers of our thoughts. Nothing in the Brower passage implies that Socrates thinks his thoughts because something else is thinking them for him, or that Socrates is not the subject of his *de se* thoughts, etc. Granted: Brower says that Socrates is not characterized by *thinking* in the primary sense. But recall that Brower's discussion of primary and secondary characterization occurs in the context of solving a puzzle about accidental change. A closer look at that context suggests that what it means to be derivatively characterized by a property is just to have that property successively or accidentally. And it is no violation of the Priority Principle to suggest that we have our contingent mental properties accidentally.

In solving the puzzle about accidental change, Brower appealed to the two ways a property can characterize a subject: first, by being one of the subject's constituents, and second by being a constituent of something with which the subject is numerically the same but not identical. The first way makes sense of non-successive or essential characterization because a compound cannot survive the loss of one of its constituents. The second way makes sense of successive or accidental characterization because a subject can successively stand in that *same as but not identical to* relation to an accidental unity. And that's about all that the distinction between these two ways amounts to. Thus, if Brower's claims about primary and derivative property characterization violate the

Priority Principle, the Priority Principle must imply that I am non-accidentally characterized by *thinking*. But that is not what the Priority Principle implies, so Brower's claims do not violate it.

A further clue to this end is a footnote where Brower introduces the distinction, in which Brower claims that the distinction between the two types of characterization corresponds roughly to the standard medieval distinction between *per se* and denominative predication, which is basically the distinction between accidental and essential predication. Of course, Brower describes the types of characterization as primary and derivative, but nothing much would have been lost had he used different words, and had he used different words, it would be hard to make the case that he violates the Priority Principle.

That's not to say, however, that Brower's chosen terminology is unfitting. There is some kind of priority that constituency enjoys. It is the relation that holds between things and their essential properties (like Socrates and his *humanity*). These are the properties of which a thing cannot survive the loss. Such properties are, in a sense, a thing's more important properties. We might say that they are the properties by which a thing is first and foremost characterized, where "first and foremost" doesn't mean *explanatorily first* or *temporally first*, but just *mainly* or *most importantly*, as it does when Ringo Star claims, "First and foremost, I am a drummer. After that, I'm other things." Thus, when Brower says that "subjects are characterized, *primarily* or *in the first instance*, by the forms (or properties) that they possess as proper parts or constituents"¹⁵ we should read it like this: subjects are characterized *first and foremost* by the forms (or

¹⁵ Brower (2014, 94)

properties) that they possess as proper parts or constituents. And when Brower implies that thinking-Socrates is characterized primarily by the form or property *thinking*, we should understand him to mean that thinking-Socrates is characterized *first and foremost* by thinking. Contrast this with Socrates himself, who has a lot more than thinking going on. Such a reading is perfectly natural, and on such a reading, characterization by constituency is indeed primary, but not in a way that runs afoul of the Priority Principle.

There is another way in which characterization by constituency is prior to characterization by inherence (but not problematically so). On Brower's account, characterization by constitution is definitionally prior to characterization by inherence. Consider the second of the pair of incriminating passages above, and Brower's "Thomistic Analysis" of ordinary predication:

Essential predication: Ordinary essential predications of the form '*a is F*' are more perspicuously represented as of the form '*a is identical to something, b, having the property F-ness as a constituent*'.

Accidental predication: Ordinary essential predications of the form '*a is F*' are more perspicuously represented as of the form '*a is numerically the same as (but not identical) to something, b, having the property F-ness as a constituent*'.
(Brower 2014, 142)

On these analyses, constituency is the more theoretically fundamental relation. But again, it is not more fundamental in a way that is problematic given the Priority Principle, the motivation for which is the intuition that something else thinking our thoughts is not a reason or explanation for our thinking our thoughts or that someone else thinking our thoughts is how we get our thoughts. Thus, there are at least two ways in which characterization by constituency is primary but not in a troublingly way.

5. *Hylomorphism is Compatible with the Single Thinker Principle*

With respect to the Single Thinker Principle, there also seems to be available a less revisionary response. In this section, I suggest four promising options.

First, since on Brower's view, Socrates and thinking-Socrates are the same material object (*numerically* the same; there's only one), the fact that both are characterized by *thinking Socrates' thoughts* turns out not to imply too many thinkers of Socrates' thoughts.¹⁶

Second, there is a distinction between being characterized by a property and being characterized by having that property as a constituent. If something has a property as a constituent, it is characterized not by that property, but by having that property as a part. For example, thinking-Socrates is characterized by *having thinking as a constituent* but not by *thinking*. (This view requires that Socrates is characterized not by *humanity* but by *having humanity as a constituent*.)¹⁷

Third, Brower's admission that accidental unities are in some sense characterized by their constituent properties is unnecessary. My impression is that Brower feels forced to make the admission since he wants to say that there are *some* things—like Socrates—which are characterized by their constituents—like *humanity* (which is a constituent, not an inherent, of Socrates). And he sees no principled way to allow that some particular things are characterized by their constituents and not others.¹⁸ But he could defend a principle like this: no particular that has constituent (token) properties inhering in another

¹⁶ I think that at least one place where Brower tries to pursue this kind of move is Brower (2014: 164).

¹⁷ Thanks to Alex Pruss for this suggestion.

¹⁸ See, again, Brower (2014, 164). There may be other pressure, too (see Chapter Four).

particular is characterized by those properties. Then thinking-Socrates would not be characterized by *thinking* because *thinking* inheres in a particular (Socrates). But Socrates could be characterized by *humanity* because *humanity* does not inhere in a particular, but rather in prime matter.

The fourth possibility requires revision to the STP as stated to remove the “derivatively or otherwise” clause. Though the revision violates the letter of the STP (as stated), it may not violate its spirit. Maybe accidental unities think analogically to the way material substances think and it shouldn’t necessarily be an affront to our intuitions for there to be someone who thinks our thoughts in an analogical sense. The idea behind this possibility is that two thinkers of Socrates’ thoughts is too many only if both think in the way that Socrates does (in Brower’s terms: only if there are two things derivatively characterized by thinking Socrates’ thoughts). One bit of support for this idea is that accidental unities are theoretical objects, not things we naturally or normally have direct contact with as the things that they are, and so we have no respectable intuitions about whether one of them having thinking Socrates’ thoughts as a constituent turns it into a thinker in a way that threatens what’s really important about Socrates’ singularity.

6. Conclusion

As Bailey pointed out in his defense of the Priority Principle, in light of the principle’s significant plausibility, we might use a view’s transgression of it as a way of ruling out the view as a contender in the debate about the metaphysics of the human person. Bailey argues that (materialist) animalism and Cartesian dualism make the cut but that hylomorphism does not. Here, I have argued that hylomorphism—even a variety of it that countenances two ways of being characterized by a property, and two hylomorphic

compounds for every instantiation of a contingent mental property—does make the cut. The accidental unities that I am a part of (if indeed there are accidental unities that I am sometimes a part of) do not think my thoughts first or on my behalf. I think them. I share them with an accidental unity, on the picture I considered, but not in a way that implies that I think in virtue of something else thinking or that something else thinks my thoughts at all.¹⁹

¹⁹ Thanks to Brad Rettler, Jeremy Skrzypek, Chris Tweedt, and the participants of the Society of Christian Philosopher's 2017 Pacific Meeting for helpful conversations on earlier drafts of this chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

Final Thoughts

One of the main aims in this dissertation is to remedy the persistent ambiguity that has impeded a clear discussion and adequate evaluation of animalism. To that end, in Chapter Two, I have developed a taxonomy of different varieties of animalism and argued that there are substantive differences between them. In earlier debates about animalism, the previously elided distinctions that my taxonomy makes clear create unnecessary confusion and disagreement. My taxonomy resolves some of that confusion, systematizes the disagreement, and provides the parties to the debate with a conceptual framework for importantly distinct accounts of personal identity. I have also evaluated animalist arguments in light of the distinctions my taxonomy tracks. Specifically, in Chapter Three, I have identified which arguments support which varieties of animalism. The most popular varieties, I argued, are critically under-supported. All rely on a tacit presupposition that ‘animal’ is a natural kind term or a substance sortal. The supposition is a reasonable starting-point but questionable, and animalists are under some pressure to reject it. Thus, my evaluation prompts a refocusing of the standard defenses of animalism to prioritize or at least explicitly include the tacit presupposition. Finally, I defended a hylomorphic (and so in contemporary discourse, an overlooked) variety of animalism from two objections: first, in Chapter Four, I have defended it from the objection that if animalism is true, then human persons cannot survive death, or at least they cannot exist in an intermediate, disembodied state between their deaths and resurrections (if indeed they are to be resurrected). I did this by arguing that given hylomorphism, animals can

become immaterial, and that this is less an affront to intuition and mereology than it might seem. Second, in Chapter Five, I have defended a hylomorphic variety of animalism from an objection advanced by Andrew Bailey: roughly that if it is true, we are not the primary thinkers of our thoughts. The criticism is that if hylomorphism can solve certain puzzles (for example, the problem of temporary intrinsics), the resolving of which is one of the main points in hylomorphism's favor, the view will imply that every one of our contingent mental properties characterizes multiple subjects and characterizes something other than *us* primarily. I argue that this criticism turns on a misunderstanding of how the hylomorphism at stake solves the relevant puzzles and that it can do so without major modification.

Where does that leave someone with at least vaguely animalist intuitions, who suspects that our animality has *something* really important to do with who we are, or who finds arguments like the Thinking Animal, Animal Ancestors, and Association Arguments persuasive? A central question for those with animalist leanings is whether we are firmly animals or whether we are just currently animals. One benefit of the latter account, that is, of phase animalism, is that it is much easier to argue for than firm animalism. Another benefit of phase animalism is that it can accommodate the possibility that we can survive the demise of the animals with which we are associated, which is suggested by many of the intuitions that non-animalists leverage *against* animalism. In particular, phase animalism allows us to say both that we are animals and that we can survive our deaths (and it can do so without committing us to the possibility of there being disembodied animals). But the downside of phase animalism is that it does not provide a complete account of our persistence conditions. It doesn't fully, non-trivially,

and informatively answer one of the core questions an account of personal identity is supposed to answer: what relation obtains between person-stages that are stages of the same person? (That's not a reason to think non-firm animalism is false, but it is a strike against the view.)

Firm animalism, however, does answer that core question. For that reason, as I pointed out in Chapter Three, it is a much stronger claim and therefore harder to argue for. In fact, the primary animalist arguments on offer do not get us all the way to firm animalism. What they support is *we are animals, at least for now*, and it takes another principle, which I called AHA—animals “have to be” animals—to connect the conclusions of the main arguments for animalism to firm animalism. Firm animalists have to make a case for AHA, and they should do so in a way that persuades people tempted to think that at least some animals, like humans, defy it. That's a difficult task, but I introduced a few ways that they can do it. Another apparent disadvantage of firm animalism is that given that animals cannot survive their deaths, it seems to imply that we cannot survive our deaths. But as I argued in Chapter Four, that implication does not hold. At least one subspecies of firm animalism, a hylomorphic one, allows that we survive our deaths as disembodied animals, and on this subspecies, the possibility that animals can lack physical bodies is both less counterintuitive and less mereologically problematic than it seems at first glance. Hylomorphic animalism, however, may come at its own costs. One that I considered was that it implies that we are not the primary thinkers of our thoughts. But as I argued in Chapter Five, even given a strain of hylomorphism that countenances a multitude of hylomorphic compounds (accidental unities) for every material substance, this is not a cost that the hylomorphic animalist

needs to absorb. Phase animalism, then, is tempting, but firm animalism answers the question we set out to answer, and its costs are not as great as they seem.

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