

ABSTRACT

Transnational Religion in Greek American Political Advocacy

Eric V. Morrow, Ph.D.

Mentor: Daniel P. Payne, Ph.D.

Contemporary studies of transnationalism are challenging scholarship on the political advocacy of ethnic groups by examining a broader range of connections that shape immigrant identity and engagement with the political systems of host countries. One of these connections is the role religion has in forming new ethnoreligious identities and how this role is influenced by transnational relationships with countries of origin and external religious institutions. In many analyses of “ethnic politics,” religion is either excluded or viewed as a cultural element closely aligned with ethnic identity. This has obscured the significant influence of religious affiliation and religious institutions in the political advocacy of immigrant groups.

This dissertation examines the role of religion in Greek American advocacy and analyzes the transnational elements that have shaped Greek American identity and contributed to the engagement with the United States government on specific foreign policy issues. From a basis in theories of diaspora nationalism and transnationalism and within the larger context of Greek American advocacy, focus is placed on the development of the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in America in defining a unique

ethnoreligious identity and in direct engagement with U.S. policymakers on the issues of the invasion and partition of Cyprus, the Macedonian Question, and the legal status and religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, Turkey. Following a survey of the role of the Church and its leadership in advocacy on these issues, this dissertation analyzes the elements of transnational religion in the Greek American experience in order to develop a methodology for approaching other groups in the United States. With the increase of immigrant religious affiliation and institutions in America and the diversity of engagement in both domestic and foreign policy issues, the analysis of transnational religious connections is critical to understanding identity formation and ethnoreligious lobbying, as well as gauging the impact of this advocacy on the U.S. political system.

Transnational Religion in Greek American Political Advocacy

by

Eric V. Morrow, B.A., M.A., M.Div.

A Dissertation

Approved by the Institute of Church-State Studies

Robin L. Driskell, Ph.D., Interim Director

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by the Dissertation Committee

Daniel P. Payne, Ph.D., Chairperson

Charles A. McDaniel, Ph.D.

Jerold L. Waltman, Ph.D.

William A. Mitchell, Ph.D.

Perry L. Glanzer, Ph.D.

Accepted by the Graduate School
May 2012

J. Larry Lyon, Ph.D., Dean

Copyright © 2012 by Eric V. Morrow

All rights reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
Chapter	
1. DIASPORA NATIONALISM, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND ETHNORELIGIOUS POLITICAL ADVOCACY: AN EVALUATION OF RECENT SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CONTEXT FOR AN ANALYSIS OF GREEK AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVOCACY	1
Diaspora Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Religion Religion and Political Advocacy in the United States Ethnic Interests and United States Foreign Policy	
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVOCACY	50
Greek Immigrant Organizations in the Early Twentieth Century Establishment of Greek American Institutions A Greek American Lobby The Truman Doctrine and Greek American Advocacy	
3. THE GREEK JUNTA AND THE CYPRUS CRISIS	95
The Beginnings of the Crisis The Junta in Greece – 1967-1974 The Cyprus Crisis	
4. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION	132
Claiming Macedonian Identity and History Greek American Advocacy on the Macedonian Question The Greek Orthodox Church in America and the Macedonian Question	
5. THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE	156
Advocacy of the Greek Orthodox Church in America The Order of Saint Andrew Greek American Advocacy for the Ecumenical Patriarchate Concluding Remarks	

6. THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION IN GREEK AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVOCACY	188
Greek American Advocacy and Diaspora Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Transnational Religion	
Transnational Religion and Ethnicity	
Transnational Religion and Assimilation	
Transnational Religion in the Interaction of Faith and Politics	
7. TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION IN AMERICAN POLITICS	220
Transnational Religion and Ethnic Identity	
Ethnic Politics or Ethnoreligious Advocacy	
Challenges of Transnational Religion	
BIBLIOGRAPHY	239

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My academic journey in higher education began twenty-five years ago at Howard Payne University. My parents encouraged me to go to college, and so I chose to join a high school friend who was heading a few hours west to attend this small Baptist school in Brownwood. I began my undergraduate studies with no idea of what I was doing. However, I was soon drawn to religion and ministry. Due to my upbringing in the church and an early inclination to spiritual matters, I followed a course of study, intellectual engagement and spiritual development that has led me to many places and offered great blessings. This would not have been possible without early mentors who introduced me to the rigor of academic work in a manner that was both challenging and nurturing. Dr. Art Allen was both an adept teacher of the Bible and a true friend in Christ who has supported me all of these years. In addition to imparting interpretive and pastoral skills, he helped me to understand the importance of humility in the scholarly process, teaching me never to be too proud to say “I don’t know.” Dr. Wallace Roark taught me how to think about how I think, something that has served me well for many years. Dr. Frankie Rainey instilled in me a deep love for the Greek language and an appreciation for the skills needed to engage the text of the New Testament in a manner that analyzes the text and also leads to spiritual illumination.

My academic success at the undergraduate level was due to these and other professors who recognized potential and encouraged me to pursue it. I did so in the graduate studies program at Baylor University, where Drs. Glenn Hilburn, James Breckenridge, William Pitts, Jonathan Lindsey, and John Jonsson enhanced my research

and writing skills, challenged me with new ideas and perspectives, and helped me to be a better thinker and person. My time at Baylor was also assisted by the staff of The Texas Collection, where I worked for several years as a graduate and library assistant. Kent Keith, Ellen Brown, Kathy Hinton, Michael Toon, and Dorothy Copeland were not only a great group of friends and colleagues, but they were also supportive of my graduate work and my family.

At the conclusion of my studies for an M.A. degree, I was encouraged by Drs. Derek Davis and James Wood to consider the Church-State program. As I began this course of studies, I was also being drawn to attend seminary following my joining of the Greek Orthodox Church and my experiences in the local congregation at Saint Nicholas in Waco. With the guidance of Fr. Ted Tsitsilianos and the encouragement and support of the parish members, my family and I traveled to Brookline, Massachusetts to attend Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology. This time was very formative for me in so many ways, as I made further commitments in the service of the church and had a deeper intellectual and spiritual engagement with worship and theology. At Holy Cross, I was blessed by the leadership and guidance of Rev. Dr. George Dragas and Father Gerasimos Makris, and by my friendship with Rev. Dr. Joachim Cotsonis.

My work at Holy Cross took me from seminary to the national center of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, where I served as an assistant to the archbishop and director of communications. During my time in New York, I was able to engage with so many aspects of the life and work of the Greek Orthodox Church, and I was blessed to work with many who have had shaped my life in significant ways. His Eminence Archbishop Demetrios has been a spiritual, theological and intellectual mentor over the

last decade, offering to me his great wisdom as a pastor, friend, and example. Through my work for him I have nurtured a deep love for the life of prayer and contemplation, tools that are essential to life and the proper use of the mind. My work for the church has also been enhanced by my relationships with Bishop Savas Zembillas (now Metropolitan of Pittsburgh), Marissa Costidis, and Paul Zamora.

When I returned to Texas in 2004, I was able to studies at the J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies. Dr. Davis helped me to return to the program, and I progressed through the courses with tremendous assistance from Dr. Christopher Marsh and Dr. Charles McDaniel. Their insight and critique of my work have helped me to be better equipped for scholarly pursuits. I also have to express my deep thanks to the staff of the Institute. Over the years of my studies, I have been the beneficiary of the dedication of Wanda Gilbert, Suzanne Sellers, and Janice Losak who showed their skills, professionalism, and concern for the students in the program. In addition, I also want to thank Dr. William Mitchell and Rev. Dr. Daniel Payne who have facilitated my completion. Their encouragement and assistance in bringing this project to fruition has been filled with respect and leadership as a reflection of their commitment to Baylor, their adherence to high academic standards, and their concern for their students.

In concluding these acknowledgments, I return to my parents and family. Over the course of my academic journey I know they have wondered at times what I was doing. The ongoing question was, “What will you do when you graduate?” The answer is that I will continue to think, and write, and teach; but I will also be filled with gratitude for the support they have given me. They have asked me regularly about when I will

finish. I can give them a more definitive answer now, but I can also give them so much more in gratitude and love for what they have offered to my life and to my journey.

CHAPTER ONE

Diaspora Nationalism, Transnationalism and Ethnoreligious Political Advocacy: An Evaluation of Recent Scholarship and the Context for an Analysis of Greek American Political Advocacy

On April 6, 2009, recently elected United States President Barack Obama addressed the Turkish Parliament in Ankara on his first trip overseas since taking office. During the course of the speech, President Obama acknowledged the longstanding friendship of the United States and Turkey, and he addressed a number of policy issues that continue to be of mutual concern for both nations. He also affirmed the support of the United States for Turkey's bid for European Union membership. Recognizing the political reforms that Turkey had already made, he emphasized that this "momentum . . . should be sustained." He stated, "For democracies cannot be static; they must move forward. Freedom of religion and expression lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that only strengthens the state, which is why steps like reopening Halki Seminary will send such an important signal inside Turkey and beyond."¹ The President continued the speech by focusing on minority rights related to Kurdish and Armenian populations within Turkey. However, one is struck by the specific mention of an institution under the administration of the Eastern Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate, headquartered in Istanbul.

¹President, Speech, "Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament," April 6, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-The-Turkish-Parliament/ (accessed May 13, 2009).

Formerly an international center for the training of Orthodox clergy, the seminary was closed in 1971 when the Turkish government nationalized all institutions of higher education. This deprived the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey of an educational institution for its leadership, placing at risk the status and the long-term survival of the Patriarchate and the community.²

The reopening of Halki Seminary has been a critical issue for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which has been joined by Orthodox churches around the world in attempts to exert public and private influence on the Turkish government toward this goal. A significant amount of this effort has come from the Greek Orthodox Church in America, an eparchy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.³ Not only have numerous clergy serving the Archdiocese in America received training at Halki, but also the issue has been viewed as critical to the long-term viability of the Patriarchate in Istanbul and its global leadership among Eastern Orthodox churches. Archbishops, clergy and laity of the Archdiocese and members of the Greek American community have used frequent meetings with United States presidents, cabinet members, congressional leaders and State Department officials as opportunities to address issues of religious freedom in Turkey related to the functioning of the Patriarchate and its seminary, churches and institutions. A recent

²Public reports that cite the issue of Halki Seminary and other religious freedom issues of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and minorities in Turkey include: European Parliament, *Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession* (2006/2118(INI), Committee on Foreign Affairs, September 13, 2006: A6-0269/2006; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, *Annual Report* (May 2009).

³Since 1922, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese has been an eparchy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This means that the Patriarchate has direct administrative authority over the Archdiocese including the appointment of the archbishop, the election of hierarchs, the internal structure and status of the metropolises, formulation and changes of the charter and administrative procedures, etc.

meeting between the current Greek Orthodox Archbishop of America, prominent Greek American leaders, and President Obama continued these efforts. On March 25, 2009, President Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and representatives of the Greek American community and the Greek Orthodox Church commemorated the 188th anniversary of Greek Independence in the East Room of the White House.⁴ During a private meeting and at the public event, Archbishop Demetrios addressed several areas of concern and called on President Obama “to cut the Gordian Knot of these unresolved issues, and by so doing, enhance peace and reconciliation among the peoples included and involved.”⁵ The issues mentioned by the Archbishop included the restrictions on the religious freedom of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey, the partition of Cyprus, and the naming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.⁶

The significance of these meetings and the ongoing lobbying efforts of both the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese and the Greek American community is that they are indicative of the political activism of Greek Americans over the last half century. First, from humble beginnings as immigrants spread throughout the country, with larger

⁴For the past several presidential administrations, this has become an annual event celebrating democracy, the ties between the United States and Greece, and the contribution of the Greek American community to American civic, religious, and political life.

⁵“Remarks of His Eminence Archbishop Demetrios of America to President Barak Obama on the Occasion of Greek Independence Day,” March 25, 2009, <http://www.goarch.org/news/archsemetriosaddress-02-25-2009> (accessed April 17, 2009).

⁶Greek Americans have been involved in addressing the partition of Cyprus since the occupation of nearly two-fifths of the island by Turkish forces in 1974. The FYROM issue has been the debate over the use of the name “Macedonia” for the former Yugoslav republic, with Greeks citing that this is not geographically, historically or culturally accurate. Attempts have been made to stall official United States recognition of the country until the name issue can be resolve.

clusters in the major cities, Greek Americans have grown in wealth and status throughout the twentieth century to become the second most affluent group per capita and to have many prominent persons among the political, social, and intellectual elite. This has facilitated efforts by Greek Americans to influence United States foreign policy on issues related to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Second, over the course of the last century the Greek Orthodox Church has become an institutional center for Greek Americans, from local parishes to the establishment of a national Church under the administrative authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Greek Orthodox Church has grown to become the largest of the Orthodox jurisdictions in America, and this contributes to political and ecclesiastical recognition of the Archbishop as the de facto representative of all Orthodox Christians in America.⁷ This growth of the Church, its close administrative ties to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and ethnic ties to the country of Greece have motivated and facilitated political activism by Church leadership toward the goal of full engagement by the United States government in the issues listed above. Third, this collective political involvement has rarely been used to address domestic social or political issues that are either of concern to the Church due to its theological or moral teachings or in response to issues that are having a broad impact on American life and culture. Certainly, the Greek Orthodox Church has joined with other religious denominations to make various statements on issues, and some attempts are being made to have a more direct focus on

⁷While each Orthodox jurisdiction in the United States retains its own internal administrative autonomy, the Churches have formed the Standing Conference of the Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas for the purpose of cooperation in the areas of missions, international philanthropy, and other ministries. The tradition has been that SCOBA is chaired by the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese who is the Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarch and the head of the largest jurisdiction in America. This position has been retained in the transition of SCOBA into the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in North and Central America.

societal and moral issues within and outside of the Greek American community; however, these efforts are minimal compared to the time and resources that have been directed toward influencing United States foreign policy.

The intense focus of Greek American political advocacy on these foreign policy issues raises a number of significant questions about the role of ethnic and religious identity and institutions. One of the primary questions is that of motivations. On the surface it appears that this question could be answered by citing the ethnic identity of Greek Americans and their connections with Greece, either as their country of origin for first generation immigrants or as the place of their lineage and heritage for others. Advocacy directed at political issues such as the partition of Cyprus and the naming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is directed at international issues of great historical and contemporary concern for the government of Greece. Leadership and intervention on the part of the United States government is viewed as helpful if not essential in achieving the desired outcome. Both history and ethnic identity are also related to the religious rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey, but this is also a critical issue of a religious and institutional nature for Greek Orthodox Christians.⁸ These motivations direct analysis of Greek American political advocacy to definitions and theories of nationalism, specifically “diaspora” nationalism or “transnationalism,” for understanding the connections between ethnic and American identity, between a country

⁸It is important to note that the churches of Greece were under the direction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate until the Church of Greece became autocephalous in 1850. Following this, the Patriarchate retained jurisdiction over Greek churches in Ottoman and then Turkish lands, including areas that are today part of the Greek state. In following an ancient tradition in the Orthodox Church, the Patriarchate also served as the administrative center for diaspora Churches, especially those established by Greek immigrants in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

of origin and the “host” country,⁹ and between the policy goals and influence of the Greek government and the level of engagement with the foreign policy agenda of the United States government.

Another response to the question of motivations is related to the role of religion in Greek American political advocacy. Beyond the institutional connection of the Greek Orthodox Church are questions regarding the relationship of religion and ethnicity to the foreign policy goals of Greek American leaders. Why is political advocacy led by many of the prominent persons within the Church in America? Does ethnicity and elements of nationalism supersede religious identity and theological foundations to the extent that the Church becomes a means of foreign policy advocacy? Or is ethnicity and religion, “Hellenism” and “Orthodoxy,”¹⁰ so intermingled in Greek American identity that it is difficult to make distinctions between “faith” and association *with* or sympathy *for* the political issues and challenges of the homeland?

These questions of nationalism and religion in relation to Greek American political advocacy can be addressed within the context of three areas: diaspora nationalism, religion and political advocacy in the United States, and ethnic identity and United States foreign policy. As shown below the recent scholarship in these areas is

⁹“Host” country is the term used in scholarship on transnational migration to refer to the destination and settlement of emigrants even if the “host” country is now their permanent residence and/or that of successive generations.

¹⁰“Hellenism and Orthodoxy” is the phrase used most often by leaders within the Greek American community to connect Greek identity and heritage with religious faith. This relationship is emphasized in many ways, including annual commemorations of holidays that are both religious and national commemorations (e.g., March 25, Greek Independence Day and October 28, OXI Day). It is also the focus of national and parish education programs, with emphasis on both religious and Greek language/culture/history education, and several national Church endowment programs that include in their mission the preservation of Greek heritage within the Greek American community.

significant, and when applied to an analysis of Greek American political advocacy, the results are both substantive insights into the motivations and nature of this advocacy and significant contributions to the study of transnationalism and the role of ethnic groups in United States politics.

Diaspora Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Religion

The primary focus of the study of *nationalism* has been the examination of national identity within the boundaries of the nation state. This is well-represented in the publications of major scholars on nationalism which include Hans Kohn (1946), Benedict Anderson (1983), Ernest Gellner (1983), Anthony Smith (1986, 2003), E. J. Hobsbawm (1990), and Walker Connor (1994). However, in these seminal works on nationalism, only a few authors address the role of nationalism among migrant groups who leave their country of origin, settle either temporarily or permanently in another country, and attempt to maintain transnational connections of identity and influence in their homeland. One of the first to identify and offer a description of “diaspora”¹¹ nationalism is Gellner in his

¹¹*Diasporas*, from the Greek word meaning *dispersion*, is defined in the context of the study of nationalism as migrant/ethnic groups who have left their country of origin and settled in another place. These groups may maintain strong social, economic, and/or political connections with their homeland, but they also seek to maintain their ethnic identity in the host country. A helpful definition and analysis is offered by Rosenau in his Forward to Dimitri Conostas and Athanassios Platias, “Diasporas in World Politics: An Introduction,” in *Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Dimitri C. Conostas and Athanassios G. Platias (New York: Macmillan Press, 1993), 3. “Political scientists have usually defined diasporas in terms of a dyadic relationship between the minority ethnic group and the host-country. In his classic study on diasporas, Armstrong suggests that ‘the term “diaspora” applies to any ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., is a relatively small minority throughout all portions of the society.’ This definition, focusing on the dyadic minority-majority relationship, misses the international dimension of the diaspora phenomenon which is best captured if we define diasporas in terms of at least a triadic relationship involving (a) the minority ethnic group, (b) the host-country, and (c) the country of

formulation of “a typology of nationalisms.” He describes two major types of nationalism, Habsburg and Western, and then identifies a third. “This third species can best be called diaspora nationalism, and it is, as a matter of historical fact, a distinctive, very conspicuous and important sub-species of nationalism.”¹² His initial focus on diaspora nationalism describes the changing roles and challenges of minority groups within evolving societies. In agrarian societies ethnicity was used to distinguish the privileged from lower classes. Minorities performed certain functions, but were considered pariahs and not full participants in political, economic, and social activities nor permitted to adopt communal identity. This status changed in the development of industrial societies in which minorities gain some political and economic privileges. Gellner states, “Under conditions of modernization the erstwhile specialized minority groups lose their disabilities, but *also* alas their monopoly and their protection. Their previous training and orientation often make them perform much more successfully than their rivals in the new economic free-for-all.”¹³ This led to the modern plight of some minorities as they gained in wealth and status. “Now the state has more interest in depriving the minority of its economic monopolies, and, because of the minority’s

origin, i.e., the home country.... According to Sheffer, ‘modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host-countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their home-lands’.” Armstrong is one of the first scholars to give extensive attention to diasporas and politics in “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” *American Political Science Review* 70 (June 1976). See also Gabriel Sheffer, “A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics,” in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

¹²Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 101.

¹³*Ibid.*, 105.

visibility and wealth, it can buy off a great deal of discontent in the wider population by dispossessing and persecuting it....”¹⁴ In Gellner’s analysis, the transition is followed by ongoing tensions and state action against the minority that may include attempts at assimilation. He summarizes the importance of diaspora nationalism by stating, “The problems of social transformation, cultural revivification, acquisition of territory, and coping with the natural enmity of those with previous claims on the territory in question, illustrate the quite special and acute problems faced by diaspora nationalism.”¹⁵

While Gellner offers a more extensive descriptive and theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of diaspora nationalism, several other scholars in the field give casual mention of it. Hobsbawm lists it among his three developments “which gave considerably increased scope for the development of novel forms of inventing ‘imagined’ or even actual communities as nationalities: the resistance of traditional groups threatened by the onrush of modernity, the novel and quite non-traditional classes and strata now rapidly growing in the urbanizing societies of developed countries, and the unprecedented migrations which distributed a multiple diaspora of peoples across the globe, each strangers to both natives and other migrant groups, none, as yet, with the habits and conventions of coexistence.”¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid., 106.

¹⁵Ibid., 108. Diasporas are also address by another noted scholar of nationalism, Walker Conner in “The Impact of Homelands upon Diasporas,” in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 16-46. Connor does not address *diaspora nationalism* in this essay, but identifies elements of “homeland” nationalism as reflected in public attitudes and government actions toward diasporas.

¹⁶Eric Hobsbawm, “Nationalism in Europe,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 183.

In a similar manner, Aviel Roshwald identifies “diasporic nationalism” among Jews and Armenians, who have a “nostalgia for a homeland and yearning for territorial sovereignty.”¹⁷ Less descriptive and more theoretical references to diaspora nationalism are made by John Armstrong and Adrian Hastings. Armstrong hints at it in his relationship of “ethnic collectivity” to class. Within the polity, ethnic groups bargain for position rather than submitting to the dominant elite. This allows space for the existence of ethnic identification, and for “diasporas, equipped with unusually sophisticated elites,” which may be crucial for survival.¹⁸ The relationship of ethnicities to nations as it relates to the forces of assimilation is also mentioned by Hastings. He states, “The pressures of modern government, imposing uniformity in area after area of life, are inherently destructive of many of the particularities which constitute a recognizable ethnic culture. Unless that process can be restrained, it must produce either the erosion of cultural diversity or the stimulation of new-ethnic based nationalism.”¹⁹

These references show that in the larger field of nationalism, the limited amount of work on diaspora nationalism has been focused on the following: the historical presence of migrant groups within societies; the tensions created by political, social and economic status while maintaining a distinct identity either by force or by the rejection of

¹⁷Aviel Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 66. Roshwald discusses diaspora groups in the United States later in his monograph, but in relation to the post-1960s embrace of ethnic heritage and the influence of ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy.

¹⁸John Armstrong, “Nations before Nationalism,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 143-144.

¹⁹Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 182.

assimilation; and/or the roles and challenges of diasporas in Western (European) societies during the political and social transitions to modernity. This initial analysis is needed and helpful in understanding modern diasporas, however, it shows the necessity for more intense research on how theories and typologies of nationalism are related to these groups. This has begun to be addressed in recent years through the study of *postnationalism* or *transnationalism*.

This expansion of the study of nationalism from societies within nation states to migrant or diaspora groups is summarized by Paul James. “Whereas modern nationalism was, and continues to be, expressed at the political-institutional level through social movements of compatriots acting in concern to achieve a *singular* nation-state, one form of postnationalism is expressed as the subjectivity of mobile diasporas of individuals.”²⁰ His examination of nationalism and social theory is one example of recent scholarship on transnationalism from a variety of disciplines. Another is the article entitled “Nations, Migrants, and Transnational Identification: An Interactive Approach to Nationalism,” by Anna Triandafyllidou.²¹ Her research “concentrates on the role that immigrant groups as a particular type of Significant Other play in the formation and development of national identity and nationalism,” and she offers analysis on how immigrant groups “are

²⁰Paul James, *Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In* (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 297.

²¹Anna Triandafyllidou, “Nations, Migrants, and Transnational Identifications: An Interactive Approach to Nationalism,” in *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, ed. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 285-294.

characterized by their subordinate position in the host society, constructed and reproduced through the use of racial, ethnic, cultural and religious markers.”²²

In this relational approach, national identity is conceived as a double-edged relationship. On the one hand, it is inward looking, it involves a certain degree of commonality within the group. It is thus based on a set of common features that bind the members of the nation together. These features include a historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs.... On the other hand, national identity implies difference. It involves both self-awareness of the group but also awareness of Others from who the nation seeks to differentiate itself.²³

Triandafyllidou affirms that this approach of understanding diaspora nationalism and ethnic identity within the context of the host country is in contrast to most other theories. She states: “Diaspora nationalism approaches, with their focus on the diaspora-homeland relationship on the one hand, and on the other, on the presumed alienation (or lack of integration) of the minority into the receiving country, tend to neglect the interaction between the immigrant group and the host nation and the emerging transnational identities among immigrant minorities.”²⁴ This is a more sophisticated approach to the study of diaspora nationalism, marked by growing consensus over the last decade on the use of the term *transnationalism* to describe the phenomenon and to correlate it with the study of transnational migration.

Related research on the transnational dimensions of migrant experience has expanded in recent years, following initial work by Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (1971), and Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence:*

²²Ibid., 285.

²³Ibid., 286.

²⁴Ibid., 290.

Essays on the Transnationalization of World Affairs (1980).²⁵ Globalization in the form of technological advancements, instant communication, international economic and political unity, and transportation have changed the character and increased the types of connections of migrant groups, leading to shifts in interests, influences, and identities. Further, these relationships cannot be analyzed and understood only within the connection of ethnic groups and their country of origin. They must also be analyzed within the context of residency in a host country, which includes connections to social and political issues, relationships with both majority and other minority groups, engagement with the political process, and efforts to influence domestic or foreign policy via access to political elites. Another aspect of the analysis of diaspora groups is transnational connections with other diaspora groups from the same homeland and the efforts to form networks and exert influence at the international level on issues that impact both migrants and their country of origin. These facets of transnationalism in relation to diaspora groups is characterized by Patricia Clavin:

It is better to think of a transnational community not as an enmeshed or bound network, but rather as a honeycomb, a structure which sustains and gives shapes to the identities of nation-states, institutions and particular social and geographic space. It contains hollowed-out spaces where institutions, individuals and ideas wither away to be replaced by new organizations, groups and innovations.²⁶

This statement reveals the challenges of researching groups that are constantly transforming on so many levels, the focus of European and U.S. scholars in two symposia

²⁵A full literature review of transnationalism and a number of related fields is presented in Steven Vertovec, "Migration and Other Modes of Transnationalism: Towards Conceptual Cross-Fertilization," *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003): 641-665.

²⁶Patricia Clavin, "Defining Transnationalism," *Contemporary European History*, 14:4 (Nov. 2005): 438-439.

held in 2000 at Oxford University and 2001 at Princeton. Sponsored by the International Migration Program of the Social Science Research Council, the Transnational Communities Program at Oxford University, and the Center for Migration and Development at Princeton University, the purpose of the meetings “was to assess international research about transnational migration and to redress some of the weaknesses that had characterized some of the scholarship in this area.”²⁷ The major presentations were published in volume thirty-seven of the *International Migration Review* in the fall of 2003. In the introduction to this issue of the journal, Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind, and Steven Vertovec offered seven premises drawn from the work of the presenters in an attempt to bring coherence to the “central concerns and emerging intellectual frameworks characterizing transnational migration.”²⁸ They are listed as representative of the scope and challenges of the scholarship on transnationalism and in relation to the context of the topic of this dissertation.

1. Transnational migrants are embedded in multi-layered social fields and to truly understand migrants’ activities and experiences, their lives must be studied within the context of these multiple strata.
2. States continue to exert a strong influence on transnational migration.
3. Whether or not transnational migration has a “liberating” effect on migrants is a question that needs investigation.
4. Aspects of migrants’ lives that were largely ignored by much of the early transnational migration scholarship ought to be taken into account.
5. Enduring transnational ties are not new but were also a factor in earlier flows, such as the wave of transatlantic migrations at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.

²⁷Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind, and Steven Vertovec, “International Perspectives on Transnational Migration: An Introduction,” *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003): 566.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 567.

6. Not all migrants are engaged in transnational practices and those who are do so with considerable variation in the sectors, levels, and strength, and formality of their involvement.
7. Host country incorporation and transnational practices can occur simultaneously.
8. Questions are being raised by current scholarship on the applicability of the terminologies that have been traditionally used in the emigration-immigration-assimilation paradigm.
9. Recognition is growing that the subjective as well as objective dimensions of transnational practices matter.²⁹

These premises offer direction and enhance the methods of the study of diaspora nationalism. Further, as indicated by other articles in the volume, research designs and theoretical approaches to transnationalism are also being applied to the analysis of religion and political activism among diaspora groups.

In his article “Toward a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism,” Rainer Bauböck suggests two contributions to the field.³⁰ The first is a wider conception of political transnationalism. Bauböck states that the study of political transnationalism extends the boundaries of polities beyond territorial jurisdictions showing that transnational political relations “create overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities. In this understanding, political transnationalism is not only about a narrowly conceived set of activities through which migrants become involved in the domestic politics of their home countries; it also affects collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both receiving and sending societies.”³¹ The second contribution, which he states has hardly been

²⁹Ibid., 567-571.

³⁰Rainer Bauböck, “Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism,” *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003): 700-723.

³¹Ibid., 719-720.

developed, “is an attempt to explain the variation of sending country attitudes towards their emigrants and to evaluate these policies of external citizenship within a normative theory of democratic legitimacy.”³² He shows that countries of origin have different “instrumental” motivations for viewing emigrants as a resource, including their use to promote economic and foreign policy goals. He states, “A transnational perspective that focuses on overlapping memberships can help to explain how patterns of integration into the receiving polity and unfinished projects of nation-building in the homeland shape migrants’ attitudes toward countries of origin.”³³

The role of religion within diaspora groups and in the transnational connections of these groups is also ripe for analysis. In the study of nationalistic identity, this is a step beyond associating religion with ethnicity to examining the dynamics and influences of shared religious identity, practices, and institutional cohesion within transnational relations. This approach is emphasized in another article associated with the conference mentioned above by Peggy Levitt entitled, “You Know, Abraham was Really the First Immigrant: Religion and Transnational Migration.”³⁴ In this article she recognizes that the interest in diasporic religion has grown out of the increasing interest in diasporas. She states, “This work responds to the widespread recognition that social, economic and political life increasingly transcend national borders and cultures and that individuals

³²Ibid., 720.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Peggy Levitt, “You Know, Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant: Religion and Transnational Migration,” *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003): 847-873. For a historical approach to transnational migration and religion in the United States see also in the same volume Charles Hirschman, “The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States,” 1206-1233.

sustain multiple identities and loyalties and create culture using elements from various settings.”³⁵ The study of transnational connections among immigrants has led researchers to challenge conventional wisdom about their political and economic integration.

Further, the study of transnational religion has helped to identify neglected but strong influences on immigrant engagement with both host countries and countries of origin. In recognizing how underdeveloped the study of these connections has been and how the “levels, scope and sites of transnational migration and their position within the global arena have not been well specified,” Levitt offers the following list of the components of the transnational religious field:

1. Individual transnational religious practices, including such things as formal and informal devotional practices enacted alone or in groups and in popular and institutionalized settings, tithing or periodic contributions to home-country religious groups, fundraising, hosting visiting religious leaders, consulting home-country religious leaders, and pilgrimage. Both the objective and subjective dimensions of the religious experience must be taken into account.
2. The organizational contexts in which transnational migrants enact their religious lives.
3. The ties between local transnational organizations and their host and home-country regional, national, and international counterparts.
4. The role of states.
5. The role of global culture and institutions.³⁶

This framework for analyzing transnational religion is very helpful in studying both religion and nationalism among diaspora groups, not only among recent immigrants, but also, as in the case of this project, groups that are in their third or fourth generation within a host country and still maintain both ethnic identity and ties with their home country.

³⁵Ibid., 848. Levitt notes that much more research has been given to diaspora groups and diasporic religion in Europe than in the United States.

³⁶Ibid., 850.

In addition, this research on transnational migration shows that the contemporary place and relationship of ethnic groups within a host country warrants more than the study of ethnicity. Research models of both diaspora nationalism and transnational religion need to be applied to ethnic and immigrant groups in relation to the development of identity in the host country, to the transformation of social networks and religious life and practices, and to political engagement and activism.

Religion and Political Advocacy in the United States

The second area of scholarship that is related to an analysis of religion and transnationalism in Greek American political advocacy is religious political advocacy in the United States. A survey of related analyses of religious activism is important for several reasons. First, since one of the major avenues for political advocacy of Greek Americans has been the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, it is essential to examine how the political role of the Church compares or contrasts with the political activism of other American denominations. Second, this review acknowledges the necessity of examining the role of religion in political activism, especially in this interesting mix of ethnic-religious identity, U.S. foreign policy, and transnational connections. Finally, it is evident below that while much scholarship has been devoted to the domestic policy goals of U.S. religious groups, limited attention has been given to activism on foreign policy issues especially among groups that have strong transnational religious ties.

Religious advocacy has been a part of the political life of this nation even before the founding of the republic. For the early history of the United States, most of this advocacy was directed at state and local governments and involved issues that were of

interest to religious groups: child welfare, prison reform, education, temperance and gambling.³⁷ With the expansion of the power of the federal government throughout the twentieth century, religious advocacy also increased on the national level. By 1920 both the Methodist Church and the National Catholic Welfare Conference had established offices in Washington, D.C. In 1943 the Quakers opened the first full-time religious lobby focused on protecting conscientious objector status. By the middle of the century, at least sixteen religious offices were located in Washington, D.C. representing Protestant, Jewish and Catholic groups.³⁸

National political representation and advocacy efforts continued to grow throughout the last century to include such diverse membership groups as the Christian Coalition and the Interfaith Alliance, denominations such as the U.S. Catholic Conference and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. More recently, religious groups have been represented by organizations such as Catholic Charities and the American Friends Service Committee. Other groups include coalitions of denominations, such as the National Council of Churches and the National Association of Evangelicals.³⁹

³⁷Robert Booth Fowler, Allen D. Hertzke, and Laura R. Olson, *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, & Strategic Choices*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 54-55. For a historical survey of political activism by ethnoreligious groups in nineteenth century America see Robert P. Swierenga, "Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Voting, Values, Cultures," in *Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the Present*, ed. Mark Noll and Luke E. Harlow, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

³⁸Luke Eugene Ebersole, *Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital* (New York: Macmillan, 1951). Ebersole surveys the formative years of religious advocacy in Washington, D.C.

³⁹Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown, *Religion and Politics in the United States*, 5th ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 111.

Weber and Jones identify that by the mid 1990s more than a hundred non-profit organizations were engaged with policy formulation from a religious perspective.⁴⁰ In recent years, many more religious interests have been added to these permanent groups by sending delegations or hiring lobbying firms to petition government periodically on their behalf.⁴¹ Allen Hertzke summarizes this increase in religious activism:

This growth means that the dizzying pluralism of American religion is increasingly represented in national politics, with constituencies feeding on each other. Because liberal Jews had Washington offices, the Orthodox felt the need to do the same; as mainline Lutherans operated in the center, their evangelical brethren from the Missouri Synod felt the need to articulate their alternative concerns, and so forth. Thus, today, a wide variety of religious advocates maintain permanent Washington offices. From competing Muslim groups to Tibetan Buddhists, Southern Baptists to Chinese Fulong Gong members, liberal Catholics to traditionalists, Iranian Bahais to persecuted Christians abroad, faith-based women's groups to ethnoreligious minorities, we see how diverse religious interests vie for influence in the political system. Religious groups, in other words, widen the genuine pluralism of the lobby system.⁴²

The focus and effectiveness of political advocacy by religious groups in the United States are varied and based on a number of factors. Many organizations find it more accessible to focus attention at the level of state and local government where many policy decisions are made that have a direct impact on membership or on issues related to the moral and pastoral concerns of their communities. Advocacy is often very challenging due to the policy agendas and constraints of state and local governments, the

⁴⁰Paul Weber and Landis Jones, *US Religious Interest Groups: Institutional Profiles* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994).

⁴¹Diana B. Henriques and Andrew W. Lehren, "Religious Groups Reap Federal Aid for Pet Projects," *The New York Times*, May 13, 2007.

⁴²Allen D. Hertzke, "Religious Interest Groups in American Politics," in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*, ed. Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt and James L. Guth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 304.

dominant political culture of a state or region, and the role of legislators and officials in relation to their constituents, their term in office, and their professionalism. In the conclusion to a study of religious advocacy at the state level, Allen Hertzke and Kevin den Dulk also note the challenges of diversity and resources among religious groups: “Unlike the lobbying milieu in Washington, D.C., where nearly every religious tradition is active to varying degrees, each state government attracts a unique combination of religious groups. These groups are motivated by a bewildering range of beliefs and interests, and they have widely different capacities to represent their faith in the statehouse.”⁴³

This brief survey of religious advocacy at the state and federal levels points to a number of issues that have been the focus of scholarship in this area: representation, coalitions, access and success, and domestic and foreign policy agendas. The first of these issues, *representation*, has been the topic of field studies, articles and books by Allen Hertzke. In *Representing God in Washington*, he surveys the full range of lobbying activities of religious groups in conjunction with “representation theory”:

⁴³Kevin R. den Dulk and Allen D. Hertzke, “Conclusion: Themes in Religious Advocacy,” in *Representing God at the Statehouse*, ed. Edward L. Cleary and Allen D. Hertzke (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 228. The authors summarize this study of advocacy at the state level by stating, “What emerges from this review is that ‘representing God at the statehouse’ reflects a distinctive political witness. While church groups often join in coalition with secular organizations, they do bring moral voices that, in the American religious context, carry considerable weight. And what the groups lack in money they sometimes can make up in moral legitimacy and intense commitment to the cause at the grassroots and among group leaders.” Further, they summarize: “While groups sometimes compete or oppose each other, collectively they do represent values that transcend those advanced by the economic and professional lobbies that otherwise would dominate the scene. From family policy to gambling, abortion to euthanasia, homelessness to child poverty, sentencing guidelines to treatment of prisoners, religious advocates interject faith-based arguments into the grubby world of state lobbying,” 226.

When viewed collectively the religious organizations in Washington, reflecting as they do the astonishing variety of religious expression in America and articulating widely held but otherwise underrepresented opinions and values, appear to enhance the representativeness of the national “pressure system.” Moreover, by mobilizing their diverse constituencies, religious lobbies provide channels for direct participation and citizen education which are invaluable for the maintenance of a democratic society. Thus, the pluralism and activism of American religious practice is revealed as an important component of American political representation.⁴⁴

Other aspects of representation that have been analyzed by Hertzke are the relationships between elected officials, lobbyists of religious groups, and constituents. In *Representing God in Washington*, he compares the opinion of lay people with the stands made by religious lobbyists. While some depictions tend to convey that religious leaders are out of touch with their members, Hertzke shows that this is not always true.

Lobbyists were most effective on issues for which lay sentiment was either supportive or undefined, or for which they had information valuable to the legislative process (conditions at soup kitchens, the impact of foreign policy on the poor abroad, effects on church ministries). When lobbyists strayed too far from clear lay opinion, on the other hand, they tended to be discounted by members of Congress or got checked by opposing groups. In other words, the context of action determined how and when religious groups successfully advanced their issues. Moreover, the enormous pluralism and intense competition among religious groups, along with the need to generate grassroots pressure for effectiveness, further serve to mitigate the oligarchic tendencies in group leadership.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Allen D. Hertzke, *Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 199-200.

⁴⁵Hertzke, “Religious Interest Groups in American Politics,” 305-306. These relationships and dynamics of religious lobbying are also analyzed in the monograph by David J. B. Hofrenning, *In Washington But Not of It: The Prophetic Politics of Religious Lobbyists* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). He also examines religious lobbying in relation to interest group theories, showing the uniqueness of this type of advocacy. A comparison of his analysis of the character and motivations of religious lobbying by groups in the United States with the ethnoreligious advocacy examined in this project broadens the definition of religious lobbying. On the one hand, his thesis that all religious lobbying is prophetic challenges definitions of ethnoreligious advocacy when motivations for political engagement may be strictly national or ethnic in nature. On the

In relation to Greek American political advocacy and the role of the Greek Orthodox Church and its leadership, this analysis raises several questions. As will be shown in the following chapters, the leadership of the Church in America has and continues to be very active in lobbying on specific foreign policy issues. This is coordinated with both leaders of the Greek American community and professional lobbyists. An initial question is how does the content and focus of this advocacy differ from that of other religious groups? A more direct question in researching the role of religion and transnationalism in Greek American advocacy is the following: to what extent does the advocacy of the leadership of the Church and the Greek American community reflect the policy concerns of their membership and how is this related to national/ethnic identity, religious practices, and the transnational connections they maintain?

The second area of research on religious advocacy in the United States has focused on the formation of *coalitions* among religious groups. Through his research on religious interest groups, Robert Zwier has confirmed that coalitions are necessary because groups may lack resources for advocacy. He shows that groups may share a common identity and values, holding similar positions on political issues, leading them to the strength of coalitions in order to show broader public interest on specific issues.⁴⁶

other hand, his thesis is challenged to incorporate ethnoreligious identities in which religious practices and beliefs are intertwined and distinctions between secular and religious influences are difficult to make.

⁴⁶Robert Zwier, "Coalition Strategies of Religious Interest Groups," in *Religion and Political Behavior in the United States*, ed. Ted G. Jelen (New York: Praeger, 1989), 174-175. Zwier examines coalition activities among religious groups in relation to coalition theories. His research leads him to state that "the coalition activities of religious groups are distinctive," and "their collective behavior is not explained well by traditional coalition theories." His findings show that "despite some evidence that particular faith groups will contribute to a coalition only to the extent that their own priorities are worked

Zwier also shows that many religious groups are drawn to coalitions due to an interest in the process of cooperation, and that often the common denominator in religious advocacy in Washington is “making a moral statement.” “Their foremost concern is not with the results of the policy process (although they would rather win than lose) but with how the process is conducted and with the nature of the debate. Success is defined in terms of whether the moral aspects of public issues have been included in the discussion.” Zwier connects this to the convictions that lead groups to form coalitions, “no matter what the cost or the distribution of benefits. There is a ‘love thy neighbor’ ethic at work within the Washington religious community that is not accounted for by the general theories of coalition behavior.”⁴⁷

This analysis of advocacy coalitions among religious groups offers an interesting contrast to the advocacy of the Greek Orthodox Church. This is examined in more detail in the following chapters, however, it is important to recognize this variance as significant. While the Church has had a lengthy participation in the National Council of

on, there is very little evidence that these groups join coalitions in order to maximize benefits for themselves. Their concern was for solidarity and purposive benefits, for fellowship and the good of the larger society rather than their own organizations. Consequently, coalition theories that assume rational actors in pursuit of material benefits do not fit in this case.”

⁴⁷Ibid., 185. A very brief examination of the challenges of forming coalitions on U.S. foreign policy in relation to “new internationalist” issues (e.g. human rights, economic growth, building democracy, fighting AIDS, famine and disaster relief, and religious persecution) is found in James L. Guth, John C. Green, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and Corwin E. Smidt, “Faith and Foreign Policy: A View From the Pews,” *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* 3:2 (Fall 2005): 9. They show the “religious complexity” of the coalitions which present obstacles to mobilization. Religious groups often find themselves on opposite sides of these issues, thus limiting their effectiveness. Barriers may also be created in domestic advocacy if some religious groups choose to partner with non-religious pressure groups in coalitions that are not acceptable to other religious groups.

Churches, and its leadership has participated in numerous statements and limited coalition advocacy on both domestic and foreign policy issues, efforts in mobilizing membership on these issues have been minimal if at times non-existent. Further, the foreign policy issues that are of the greatest concern to the Greek American community are not necessarily the types of issues that will create broader “non-ethnic” coalitions. This is not completely accurate regarding advocacy on religious freedom for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but even these efforts, as will be shown in chapter five, have been directed at forming political coalitions rather than religious ones. Limited focus on domestic issues via religious coalitions and the strong focus on foreign policy issues connected to Greece, Cyprus, and the Patriarchate lend support to identifying nationalist and ethnic influences as the motivation for advocacy by the leadership and prominent members of the Church.

The third area of research on religious advocacy is the effectiveness of religious groups. As already noted above, while the policy goals of religious groups may be communicated via leaders or lobbyists, the achievement of these goals may not be the major motivation for advocacy. Hertzke has analyzed effectiveness in relation to access to elected officials in Congress and White House staff.⁴⁸ His survey work offers insight

⁴⁸Allen D. Hertzke, “Faith and Access: Religious Constituencies and the Washington Elites,” in *Religion and Political Behavior in the United States*, 259-274. Hertzke has also examined religious group advocacy in relation to interest group politics, noting that scholarship on interest groups largely ignores religious organizations. He states, “However, unique features enable religious groups to enhance the genuine pluralism and representativeness of the lobby system. Religious interest groups, for example, can help represent less advantaged members of society by overcoming the free-rider problem through *transcendent* appeals.... Moreover, the social capital generated in churches can uniquely aid in the formation of groups and social movements that represent less elite Americans. Religious groups thus deserve more attention by mainstream political science.” Hertzke, “Religious Interest Groups in American Politics,” 303.

into how political leaders address religious pluralism, both among constituents and religious interest groups. He also shows how access correlates with the personal beliefs and religious affiliations of political elites. Further, he acknowledges the challenges of religious lobbying and its limited effectiveness. He concludes: “For many groups...the lobbying matrix—the complex web of mutual screening and filtering—inhibits access. The reason, perhaps, may lie in the kernel of truth contained in the statement of a White House official that some groups really ‘don’t want access.’ Or to put it another way, the price of access is too high, the dissonance too great, of making the strategic trade-offs.”⁴⁹

Another approach to evaluating religious group effectiveness is offered in the chapter “The Politics of Organized Religious Groups” in the fourth edition of *Religion and Politics in America*.⁵⁰ The authors present a “model of religious group effectiveness” that includes the following evaluative criteria: traditions and theological beliefs, internal strength and unity, strategic location, constraints and opposition, and the spirit of the times and political context. In applying these criteria they include examples of a variety of domestic and foreign advocacy efforts by diverse religious groups. These criteria can be used to evaluate Greek American political advocacy, especially in relation to the role and contribution of advocacy by religious leaders. An analysis of the effectiveness of Greek American advocacy affirms the importance of this religious element as well as

⁴⁹Ibid., 274.

⁵⁰Robert Booth Fowler, Laura R. Olson, Allen D. Hertzke, and Kevin R. den Dulk, *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices*, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 119-167. This analysis is offered in earlier editions of the book, however, this chapter is updated with more attention given to globalization, religious minorities, and foreign policy advocacy.

highlights the origins and extent of this advocacy within the Greek American/Orthodox community.

The final area of major scholarship on religious advocacy in the U.S. is focused on domestic and foreign policy issues and agendas. Significant attention has been given to advocacy on domestic issues as shown in reviews by Wald and Brown (2007) and Fowler (2010).⁵¹ These surveys also mention the growing attention being given by scholars to religious groups and foreign policy especially in relation to globalization and ethno-religious lobbying. While much of the attention in Wald and Brown is directed at domestic issues, the authors offer a two-page summary of a few studies on attitudes of adherents of major U.S. religious groups on the Gulf War.⁵² In later chapters they also offer a few paragraphs on the Patriot Act in relation to Muslim Americans,⁵³ Catholic and Protestant advocacy on military engagement in Vietnam and Central America, and American Jewish advocacy on U.S. relations with Israel.⁵⁴ In Fowler, similar attention is given to the advocacy efforts of Catholics on nuclear arms and military actions abroad, Jews on Israel, and Muslims on U.S. foreign policy toward Muslim nations.⁵⁵ The

⁵¹Both publications show that much more attention has been given to the study of religious advocacy on moral, social, and economic issues in U.S. domestic politics, but they also reveal how limited analysis has been on the relationship of religious advocacy and U.S. foreign policy.

⁵²Wald and Brown, 199-201. While this emphasizes the connection of religious advocacy and U.S. foreign policy, it certainly shows the limited development of analysis in this area. The authors only address the issue of the Gulf War and studies by Wald (1994) and Jelen (1994) on views among adherents of major U.S. religious groups.

⁵³Ibid., 300-305.

⁵⁴Ibid., 247-282.

⁵⁵Fowler et. al., *Religion and Politics in America*, 4th ed., 135-146.

authors also focus on the politics of religious minorities and the globalization of religious advocacy, noting that “religious minority groups naturally focus on defending their counterparts abroad, thus widening the coalition lobbying on behalf of religious freedom in American foreign policy.”⁵⁶ Mention is given to Muslims for the Palestinian cause, American Baha’is for Iranian Baha’is, Falun Gong practitioners and Muslim Uyghurs for religious freedom in China, and Ahmadis for their persecuted brethren in Pakistan. The advocacy of these minorities and other associated organizations has been facilitated by the development of a “human rights architecture” in American government over the last two decades.⁵⁷ The passage of the International Religious Freedom Act in 1998 and the establishment of a permanent office at the U.S. Department of State charged with reporting on religious freedom around the globe strengthened the position of faith-based advocacy. Coalitions were formed and campaigns launched on such issues as the conflict in Sudan (Sudan Peace Act of 2002), human trafficking (Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000), child exploitation in Cambodia, and AIDS. In addition, greater levels of cooperation and support developed between the Department of State and religious based and denominational relief agencies engaged with disaster relief, economic development, peace advocacy, and human rights issues around the globe.⁵⁸

These chapters within two standard survey texts on religion and American politics represent a current trend in scholarship on religious advocacy in examining the relationships between minority religious groups and U.S. foreign policy issues. In the

⁵⁶Ibid., 146.

⁵⁷Ibid., 149.

⁵⁸Ibid., 150-153.

past decade a number of other publications have noted the need for this type of analysis and offered contributions to facets of this area. In *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics* (2009), James L. Guth offers an overview entitled “Religion and American Public Opinion: Foreign Policy Issues,” in which he affirms how religion as an influence has been ill-treated in political science. He presents data showing the strong influence of religion on “critical religious and political elites: clergy, religious activists, party activists and even legislators.”⁵⁹ Guth examines public opinion studies from the Cold War era to the present, and he draws three conclusions on the influence religion has had on U.S. foreign policy development during this time:

First, there is solid evidence that evangelical affiliation, orthodox doctrine, and high religious commitment fostered anti-Communist attitudes and support for higher defense spending—makings of the dimensions of *militarism* or *militant internationalism* discovered by foreign policy opinion analysts.... Second, “Godless” communism may well have been replaced as a competing value system by militant Islam.... Third, American religious leaders are playing an increasingly vocal role in addressing foreign policy.... A final trend pointing to the heightened relevance of religion is the assimilation of foreign policy issues into structures that shape domestic politics.⁶⁰

In addition to studies of public opinion, other scholars have analyzed the relationship of religious advocacy and U.S. foreign policy in the areas of religious freedom and persecution, religion and violence, NGO’s, missions and relief agencies, and religion and intervention. In *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign*

⁵⁹James L. Guth, “Religion and American Public Opinion: Foreign Policy Issues,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*, 243-245.

⁶⁰Ibid., 248-250. On the nature of these trends Guth concludes: “All this integration has occurred as partisanship and ideology have been infused by religious and cultural factors. This raises the possibility that the religious effect may often be indirect, transmitted through partisanship and ideology, often obscuring the total impact of religious affiliation, commitment, and beliefs.”

Policy (2001), the product of two conferences held by the Ethics and Public Policy Center in 1998, some of these issues are addressed by scholars of religious advocacy. Elliott Abrams introduces the volume by offering the major questions that are raised in this relationship:

Why has the salience of religion for world politics and U.S. foreign policy grown so greatly? Why does the persecution of Christians in Sudan or China, or religious conflict in the Balkans, or the murder of priests in India or East Timor, now quickly become a matter of concern in the foreign ministries and parliaments across the globe. How does religion, and how do religious groups, affect the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy?⁶¹

These questions are answered by the essays that follow, and several of these offer analysis that contributes to the scope of this project. The first is the chapter entitled “Religion in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy” by Leo P. Ribuffo. He provides an overview of the role of religion from the 1790s to the present, engaging with diverse areas such as early expansionism, the challenges of American pluralism and international issues, the politics of American missionary efforts, progressivism in the early twentieth century, the wars of the same century, and interventionism. From this survey he offers four concluding observations that are useful in understanding the context of contemporary advocacy:

1. A strong republican sense of mission thrived apart from the legacies of Reformation era Protestantism.
2. Although religious interest groups at home and religious issues abroad have affected foreign policy, no major diplomatic decision has turned on religious issues alone.

⁶¹Elliott Abrams, ed., *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield and the Ethics and Public Policy Center, 2001), vii. Abrams identifies the role of “ethnic faith” in U.S. foreign policy, mentioning the efforts of Jews and Greeks as prime examples.

3. Serious religious ideas have had at most an indirect impact on policy making—far less, for example, than strategic, economic, or political considerations, perceptions of public opinion, and the constraints of office.
4. Major foreign policies have significantly affected the domestic religious scene, sometimes in ways that no one anticipated.⁶²

In another chapter, J. Bryan Hehir examines the relationship of religious freedom and U.S. foreign policy. Based on his analysis of the development of human rights, activist policy in the U.S., and the relationship of religious freedom, Hehir offers recommendations for a U.S. policy framework.⁶³ It is shown that these efforts should be understood within the larger context of the focus and influence of religious freedom activities in U.S. foreign policy.

Two additional volumes on religion and U.S. foreign policy need to be mentioned: *Liberty and Power: Dialogue on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy in an Unjust World* and *Bringing Religion into International Relations*.⁶⁴ In the former, Hehir and others offer theoretical analyses on themes and challenges when religion engages with foreign policy issues. These themes include realism and intervention, morality and foreign policy, terrorism and justice, faith and ethics, and unilateralism. The volume by Fox and Sandler examines different aspects of the topic by affirming religion as the “overlooked dimension” in foreign policy, and by addressing how local religious

⁶²Leo P. Ribuffo, “Religion in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 20-21.

⁶³J. Bryan Hehir, “Religious Freedom and U.S. Foreign Policy: Categories and Choices,” in *The Influence of Faith*, 33-52.

⁶⁴J. Bryan Hehir et. al., *Liberty and Power: Dialogue on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy in an Unjust World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2004). Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).

conflicts become international issues, the phenomena of transnational religion, and the “Clash of Civilizations” debate. As a conclusion, the authors offer the framework for a theory of international relations and religion. They stress the importance of integrating religion into general international relations theory and suggest that more needs to be done in this field “before the full influence of religion on international relations can be recognized.”⁶⁵ Their recommendations include developing better measures of religion and of criteria describing how religion influences international relations; more exploration of social science literature on religion in the search for concepts that can be translated into international relations theory; examining the influence of religiosity of populations and the influence on the behavior of states and political leaders; research on state institutions and behavior as a surrogate variable for religiosity; measuring religious discrimination and religious freedom; and more study on religion and ethnic conflict, violence, and individual behavior.

These studies along with other recent articles by Daniels (2005), “Religious Affiliation and Individual International Policy Preferences in the United States,” Mead (2006), “God’s Country,” a study of Evangelicals and foreign policy, and Baumgartner, Francia and Morris (2008), “A Clash of Civilizations? The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” show that more attention is being given to the influence and aspects of religious based advocacy in the U.S.⁶⁶ This

⁶⁵Fox and Sandler, 172.

⁶⁶Joseph P. Daniels, “Religious Affiliation and Individual International Policy Preferences in the United States,” *International Interactions* 31 (2005): 273-301. Walter Russell Mead, “God’s Country?” *Foreign Affairs* 85:5 (2006): 24-43. Jody C. Baumgartner, Peter L. Francia, and Jonathan S. Morris, “A Clash of Civilizations? The

strengthens the priority for an analysis of the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in Greek American advocacy for several reasons. First, more attention should be given to trends and transitions in U.S. foreign policy in relation to the emphasis on religious freedom and the access given to religious minorities. Second, in echoing many of the analysts cited above, religious influences on public opinion and foreign policy development have been ignored for too long. In the case of Greek American advocacy, it would be difficult to understand the dynamics and motivations of some of the policy issues from an examination that only addresses political, ethnic, immigrant, or minority perspectives and influences without taking into account the role of religious identity, beliefs, and institutions. Finally, a study of this type also contributes to the broader analysis of the strength and effectiveness of religious advocacy. The pluralistic nature of American society makes it very difficult to form coalitions on issues that may only be the concern of a specific group. This is due to that interesting mix of ethnicity and religion that is evident in the Greek American community. The role of ethnicity adds another dimension to the study of religion and transnationalism in Greek American political advocacy, and a survey of recent scholarship on ethnic and ethnoreligious advocacy on U.S. foreign policy is the third and final element of the context of this project.

Ethnic Interests and United States Foreign Policy

An examination of the relationship of ethnic interests and U.S. foreign policy issues requires an awareness of both the development of U.S. foreign policy institutions and methods over the past half-century, as well as the challenges of foreign policy

Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” *Political Research Quarterly* 61:2 (June 2008): 171-179.

development within the constitutional and institutional framework of American government. This is necessary since foreign policy is not a monolithic national endeavor to which each interest group approaches with goals for specific policy outcomes.⁶⁷ Since World War II, the foreign policy enterprise has grown to include many governmental and non-governmental agencies, has been dramatically influenced by the outcomes of elections, and has engaged with an ever-expanding smorgasbord of world events, geographical challenges and threats to national security. In addition, the focus and role of foreign policy in domestic politics and national interests have been influenced by political agendas, public opinion, budget constraints, varying levels of coordination, partisan debate, the expansion of congressional analysis of foreign affairs and national defense, and changes in the congressional committee process.⁶⁸ All of these influences combined with the tremendous growth of the U.S. foreign policy infrastructure have created challenges of process and focus. Nathan and Oliver evaluate the result as follows:

⁶⁷James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System*, 3rd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 1-28. Nathan and Oliver provide an overview of the institutional changes that challenged U.S. foreign policymaking from the end of World War II through the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union. This review is based on their concern “about the adequacy of the American system for sustaining a cogent foreign policy while serving the ideals of a democratic republic.”

⁶⁸Over two decades major transformations were made to the foreign policy framework of the United States with the creation of the Congressional Budget Office in 1974, an increase in responsibilities of the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in the 1970s and 1980s, increases in analysts in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense divisions. Further, staff available to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee more than tripled during this period. “All of this analytic capability did not make Congress more able to ‘codetermine policy.’ Perhaps the better budgetary information and investigative, research, and even staff capabilities that were at hand after the onset of the 1980s would have made a difference if there had not been the 1970s ‘reforms’ of the committee and subcommittee system.” Nathan and Oliver, 82.

The resulting ‘balkanization’ of the committees and the expansion of committee staff ironically led to even less foreign policy coordination of the executive branch’s appropriations requests. By 1992 a foreign aid bill might have to run the gauntlet of committees and some 148 subcommittees with overlapping jurisdictions. The fractionation of Congress thus resulted in a lack of overall perspective. Institutional fragmentation probably precluded Congress from acting as a responsible counterweight in the budgetary process even had there been a larger consensus regarding either Congress’ role or U.S. policy objectives.⁶⁹

The conclusion of the Cold War and the attacks of September 11, 2001 have made the policy making process much more complex. Contributions to this include the rapid pace and impact of globalization and technological change, major economic crises, trade disputes, and environmental threats. Coordination and implementation continue to be challenging in a multiple front endeavor that includes nation building, the war on terror, nuclear proliferation, revolution and destabilization, and ongoing domestic crises that weaken support for sending resources and personnel abroad. Finally, the process has also been shaped by the increasing diversity of American society, which includes a multiplicity of ethnic groups with strong transnational connections with their countries of origin. These groups have and continue to use the openness of the American political system to seek access and responses by U.S. officials to specific issues related to their home countries. Combined with the growth of the foreign policy apparatus, the expansion of congressional engagement and oversight with the process, and the electoral concerns of the executive, the constant and diverse lobbying by ethnic interests has challenged the effort to define “national interests” and to develop coherent and consistent foreign policy goals.

⁶⁹Ibid., 83.

The identity-based divisions among American society are viewed by many scholars as one of the main reasons why the U.S. government is seen as unable to define its national interests with any degree of consensus. Ethnic identity groups in the U.S., defined by Thomas Ambrosio as “politically relevant social divisions based on a shared sense of cultural distinctiveness,”⁷⁰ often attempt to advance the interests of their countries of origin or kinship groups in other countries through the formation of ethnic interest groups. One of the first scholars in post World War II era to recognize the growing influence of these groups was Lawrence Fuchs. In his 1959 article entitled “Minority Groups and Foreign Policy,” he notes the lack of attention to this topic:

Despite the general awareness of the mutual impact of foreign affairs and the claims of minority groups, there has been surprisingly little systematic examination of the results of this process. A certain amount of textbook treatment of the influence of minority group pressures on individual foreign policies may be found, and considerable attention has been paid in recent years to the effect which foreign policies have had on the voting patterns of minority groups, but there has been no published work on the long-range consequences in American foreign policy of minority group pressures or on the effect which such influences have had on the American political and social systems. Nor has there been any discussion of the normative aspects of these problems.⁷¹

Fuchs attempts to answer several questions that are still relevant today in the research of ethnic/minority influence: what are the consequences of minority group pressures; what is the significance for the American social and political systems of the intermingling of such pressures with foreign issues; and can advocacy by these groups on behalf of other

⁷⁰Thomas Ambrosio, ed., *Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 1.

⁷¹Lawrence H. Fuchs, “Minority Groups and Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 74:2 (June 1959): 161.

nations be justified by democratic theory?⁷² Following a survey of the advocacy of Irish, German, and Jewish American groups, Fuchs concludes that the result has been the diminishing of Anglo-American friendships, the mitigation of economic class conflict, and the elevation of congressional participation in foreign affairs.⁷³

Similar questions and the same evaluation of the lack of scholarship on ethnic groups and foreign policy were echoed by researchers several decades later when more attention was given to the topic. One of the first major books to address the issue through a collection of articles on different U.S. ethnic groups is *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, published in 1977 with a revised edition in 1981.⁷⁴ This volume includes research and essays on “hyphenated” Americans, the Turkish arms embargo of 1974, the Greek lobby, foreign policy toward Eastern Europe, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Black Americans, Latinos, and policy toward Africa. In the same year, Charles Mathias Jr. offered an analysis in a *Foreign Affairs* article “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy.”⁷⁵ He surveys the advocacy efforts of Chinese, Greek, Irish and Jewish groups as well as coordinated lobbying on Eastern European and Middle Eastern issues. These publications were followed by a monograph dedicated to the topic with a specific case study by Paul Watanabe entitled *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy* (1984). In his analysis of the politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo of 1974, Watanabe seeks to answer

⁷²Ibid., 162.

⁷³Ibid., 175.

⁷⁴Abdul Aziz Said, ed., *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1981).

⁷⁵Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., “Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 59:5 (Summer 1981): 975-998.

the following questions: “what is the relationship between rising ethnic consciousness and activism in the foreign policy area; how do the nature of the foreign policymaking process and distribution of power within it affect the opportunities for successful political action aimed at influencing foreign policy; how does ethnic group involvement affect the foreign policymaking process, especially the relationship between Congress and the executive; and how have ethnic American activists equipped themselves to maximize their influence?”⁷⁶ The Turkish arms embargo and the Cyprus question are the focus of another study by Laurence Halley, *Ancient Affections: Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy* (1985).⁷⁷ Halley uses these case studies to examine the mix of ethnicity, government, foreign policy and national interest. Another collection of essays was published in this same year entitled *Hyphenated Diplomacy: European Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1914-1984*.⁷⁸ Again, ethnic lobbying and the Turkish arms embargo is the focus of one of the essays in addition to analysis on lobbying by Polish Americans and Yugoslavs before World War I, and fascism in the Italian American community in the 1920s. In 1987 another collection of essays was published entitled *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*. In addition to some of the policy arenas addressed by earlier works, the essays in this volume offer analysis of Middle East foreign policy, on African

⁷⁶Paul Y. Watanbe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), xii.

⁷⁷Laurence Halley, *Ancient Affections: Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985).

⁷⁸Helene Christol and Serge Ricard, ed. *Hyphenated Diplomacy: European Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Marseille: Universite De Provence, 1985).

Americans and South Africa, Polish Americans and East-West issues, the Mexican American political agenda, Cuban Americans, and Irish Americans.⁷⁹

The increase in scholarship continued through the 1990s with publications that began to examine current ethnic influence in historical context and in connection with transnationalism. In *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy* (1992), Alexander DeConde traces the “ethnoracial” element in the formulation of foreign policy from the colonial period to the present.⁸⁰ This book is followed by the work of Yossi Shain, beginning with the article “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy” (1994) and the publication of the monograph *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homeland* (1999).⁸¹ Shain gives attention to diasporas, their countries of origin, and struggles for democracy and self-determination in the era of transnationalism. His case studies include Arab American identity and transnational challenges, the transnational influences on Black-Jewish disputes, and U.S.-Mexican relations and the Mexican diaspora. Finally, the most recent monograph representing the growing research directed at ethnic lobbying in the U.S. is *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (2000) by Tony Smith.⁸² He

⁷⁹Mohammed E. Ahrari, ed., *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).

⁸⁰Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992).

⁸¹Yossi Shain, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 109:5 (Winter 1994-1995): 811-841. *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homeland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁸²Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

approaches the field with an analysis of the relationship of multiculturalism to U.S. foreign policy and the identification of the historical stages of ethnic group influence. In doing this he shows how “ethnic groups play a larger role in the making of U.S. foreign policy than is widely recognized,” and concludes that “the negative consequences of ethnic involvement may well outweigh the undoubted benefits this activism at times confers on America in world affairs.”⁸³ He also shows how “the contradictions of pluralist democracy are particularly apparent in the making of foreign policy, where the self-interested demands of a host of domestic actors...raise an enduring problem of democratic citizenship: how to balance the rights and interests of the often inattentive many.”⁸⁴

The most recent scholarship has continued the analysis of specific ethnic groups and their advocacy efforts and transnational networks. In *Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States*, Prema Kurien contributes a chapter entitled “Who Speaks for Indian Americans? Religion, Ethnicity, and Political Formation.”⁸⁵ This case study of ethnic lobbying and political engagement by Indian Americans “provides some hints regarding how religion and panethnicity might interact, when and how supranational and

⁸³Ibid., 1-2. In his concluding chapter, Smith illustrates the “failure of the multiculturalists to provide a satisfactory account of ethnic obligations to the greater democratic national community” by looking at three forms multicultural discourse has taken: “the argument for hyphenation, the case made for ‘dual’ or ‘post-national’ citizenship, and the literature on the role of ‘diasporas’ in world affairs,” 136.

⁸⁴Ibid., 2.

⁸⁵Prema Kurien, “Who Speaks for Indian Americans? Religion, Ethnicity, and Political Formation,” in *Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States*, ed. R. Marie Griffith and Melani McAlister (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 233-257.

nation-state forms collide,” and “how globalization, multiculturalism, and new forms of technology shape the goals and methods of contemporary ethnic lobbies.”⁸⁶ Kurien also offers an assessment of the contemporary nature of this advocacy stating, “the involvement of contemporary immigrants in ethnic interest groups or lobbies at the national level is likely to be more consequential, since the context within which such groups operate has changed in significant ways over the past few decades.”⁸⁷

1. Ethnic groups today operate in a context in which globalization and transnationalism challenge definitions of assimilation, patriotism, and citizenship.
2. New forms of technology such as the Internet significantly affect the capacity of groups to disseminate information, to formulate and articulate interests, and to mobilize support of these interests.
3. For both of these reasons, ethnic advocacy organizations of contemporary immigrants are likely to adopt different agendas and strategies when compared to those of the earlier waves of immigrants.

Another recent analysis of the state of ethnic lobbying and foreign policy is offered by Eric Uslaner in the seventh edition of *Interest Group Politics* (2007).⁸⁸ His essay entitled “American Interests in the Balance? Do Ethnic Groups Dominate Foreign Policy Making?” examines recent advocacy efforts by Jewish, Arab, Latino, Greek, Turkish, Armenian, and African and Asian American interests. At the conclusion of his survey and evaluation of the effectiveness of ethnic lobbying, he asks if ethnic politics are dangerous. He first acknowledges that the success of this advocacy is often linked to the size of constituencies and the financial resources available for the lobbying process.

⁸⁶Ibid., 233.

⁸⁷Ibid., 234-235.

⁸⁸Eric M. Uslaner, “American Interests in the Balance? Do Ethnic Groups Dominate Foreign Policy Making?” in *Interest Group Politics*, 7th ed., ed. Allan J. Cigler and A. Loomis Burdett (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 301-321.

Disparity in these areas explain why some groups have more success than others. But he also questions the effectiveness of ethnic advocacy in an era when U.S. foreign policy has begun to look more like domestic policy. He states, “The consensus on what American policy should be has evaporated, and with it went the argument that there was a distinctive moral foundation to our international relations. Interest groups can be of significant importance, but the evidence is simply not compelling enough to argue that interest groups alone can shift foreign policy priorities.”⁸⁹

This analysis represents major questions that have been asked by researchers over the last several decades. What is the role of ethnic lobbying in shaping U.S. foreign policy, and how effective are the lobbying efforts of ethnic groups in the U.S.? The answers to these questions and the means of analysis vary in many ways but also lead to several commonly accepted conclusions.

One of the most extensive evaluations of the role and effectiveness of ethnic lobbying is offered by Irving Horowitz. His main points are summarized as follows with correlations to the research presented in later chapters.

1. Inter-ethnic rivalries tend to minimize any interest group impact by creating a cancellation or veto effect; that is, one ethnic group becoming hostile or remaining indifferent to the needs of another. (This relates to the strength and impact of both Greek and Turkish lobbying. Another application is the challenge to the U.S. government to prioritize ethnic-based issues when so much advocacy is done by so many groups.)
2. The value of ethnic lobbying is reduced by the complexity of international issues. (Both the Cyprus issue and the religious freedom advocacy for the Ecumenical Patriarchate are complicated by U.S. military alliances with Turkey and the prospect of Turkey’s membership in the European Union.)
3. Ethnic politics have secured a place in American politics due to a lack of defined national goals.
4. The breakdown of American national goals has led to a return of pluralism emerging as a secular nationalism that intermingles with ethnic identity and

⁸⁹Ibid., 318.

- choice at a personal level. (This relates to assimilation levels among Greek Americans and identification with American cultural norms in relation to the strength of ethnic identity and ties with Greece.)
5. How do ethnic groups organize their advocacy to maximize both American and ethnic ends? (What is the benefit to the United States of a unified Cyprus or the extension of religious and property rights for the Ecumenical Patriarchate?)
 6. Generational solidarity is a critical issue among ethnic groups and their ability to sustain advocacy. (This is certainly the case among Greek Americans, where ethnic identification may be strong throughout the community but concern for related foreign policy issues is waning or non-existent.)
 7. Crossover points between religion and ethnicity serve to dramatically weaken any direct ethnic impact on political affairs. (This depends on the issue. Horowitz notes the role the Greek Orthodox Church had in dampening opposition to the Greek military junta, even though the Greek American community supported a democratic government for Greece.)
 8. Ethnic politics has not been well-organized due to the long social rather than political character of ethnic communities. (This is true of the history of Greek American advocacy, which has become more organized with the institutional strength of the Greek Orthodox Church and the socio-economic mobility of second, third, and fourth generation Greek Americans.)
 9. The social mobility among many ethnic groups diminishes the solidifying role of achievement in these communities. Questions arise as to what will bring and bind these communities together as American identity is stronger among succeeding generations. (One major question addressed by this project is if the Church has become the binding force for political advocacy.)
 10. The expansion and influence of ethnic politics has been inhibited by the potency of the United States as a centrifugal force. For some groups “the passions for exercising a decisive influence in U.S. policy toward other nations are dampened by a foreknowledge that the country of origin was not so perfect when these people emigrated and is of dubious improvement years later.”⁹⁰ (How is the current economic crisis in Greece affecting support for Greek national interests via the lobbying efforts of Greek Americans?)

One point of agreement among scholars is that seldom have major U.S. foreign policy decisions been affected by purely ethnic considerations.⁹¹ However, there is much broader debate on the impact of ethnic lobbying on defining national interests and on the

⁹⁰Irving Louis Horowitz, “Ethnic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 234-239.

⁹¹See Smith above and Gerson, 28.

character of ethnic groups in the U.S. First, the issue of “national interest” is addressed by several scholars, including Samuel Huntington in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* in a chapter entitled “The Erosion of American National Interests.”⁹² He sees this relationship as one in which ethnic interests have filled a void as American identity has changed and “national interest” has become more challenging to determine.

Efforts to define national interest presuppose agreement on the nature of the country whose interests are to be defined. National interest derives from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.... The end of the Cold War and social, intellectual, and demographic changes in American society have brought into question the validity and relevance of both traditional components (creed and culture) of American identity. Without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as a result subnational commercial interests and transnational and nonnational ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.⁹³

Huntington describes this process as the domesticization of foreign policy, which has become a “conglomeration of the goals and interests of domestic constituency groups.” Waves of recent immigrants, the arguments over diversity and multiculturalism, the growing wealth of ethnic groups, and advancements in communications and transportation strengthen ties between these groups and their countries of origin. “As a result, these groups are being transformed from cultural communities within the boundaries of a state into diasporas that transcend these boundaries. State-based diasporas, that is, trans-state cultural communities that control at least one state, are

⁹²Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” in *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 4th ed., ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 55-65.

⁹³Ibid., 55-56.

increasingly important and increasingly identify with the interests of their homeland.”⁹⁴

According to Huntington, this limits assimilation and puts more pressure on the U.S. government to adopt favorable policies toward a multiplicity of homelands. It also encourages diasporas to mobilize. “Now, ethnic diaspora groups proliferate, are more active, and have greater self-consciousness, legitimacy, and political clout.”⁹⁵

Shain also addresses the debate on the ways ethnic participation affects American national integrity and the definition of national interest. He summarizes this debate by stating, “Opinions range from those which maintain that ethnicity in foreign affairs confuses the real U.S. national interest, creates and encourages subnational loyalties, and opens the door for outside foreign influences to dictate policies, to those which consider the phenomenon to be truly in the spirit of America’s history, nature, and democratic values.”⁹⁶ In contrast to Huntington, Shain represents the later on this spectrum of interpretation:

The analysis presented here debunks fears about the damaging impact of diasporic involvement in homeland-related affairs on U.S. domestic and foreign policies. I have argued that as the United States continues to allow for ethnic voices in the formulation of foreign policy, it recasts these groups not only as marketers of the democratic-pluralist creed abroad, but also as America’s own moral compass, helping to keep a somewhat confused U.S. foreign policy true to its ideals. Yet, the importance of the diasporic factor in U.S. foreign policy runs much deeper than sheer influence on international affairs. It is my contention that diasporic mobilization on homeland-related affairs, which takes place mostly through “official channels” of U.S. foreign policy—that is the electoral system and the lobbying of decision makers—has the potential to direct ethnodiasporan energies in ways that are conducive both to the assimilation or reinforcement of basic

⁹⁴Ibid., 63.

⁹⁵Ibid., 64.

⁹⁶Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad*, 197.

American values, such as freedom and pluralism, and to overall diasporic integration into American society.⁹⁷

This dichotomy of impact represented by Shain and Huntington is very useful in the analysis of the motivations and effectiveness of Greek American advocacy, as well as in determining how this advocacy aligns with stated U.S. national interests. An evaluation of effectiveness cannot acknowledge foreign policy achievements without examining the policy goals or concerns that would be addressed whether or not Greek Americans lobbied for them.

Further, in the review of scholarship on the impact of ethnic lobbying, it is important to note that Shain and others also recognize the effect it has on the identity of ethnic groups in the U.S. Shain mentions “integration” above and continues by stating, “The successful struggle for a legitimate foreign-policy voice is a process that relieves ethnic alienation by helping to create a more positive view of the American inclusionary process and of America’s absorptive capacities. Empowerment, in turn, generates new responsibilities, which come with the shedding of outsider status, involving diasporic integration into established practices and institutions.”⁹⁸ Kurien reflects on this impact as well. “Some scholars believe that globalization and multiculturalism legitimize the pursuit of parochial concerns by ethnic lobbies and will thus further the balkanization of the foreign policy process. Others argue that ethnic advocacy organizations representing the interests of new groups, aided by new forms of technology, will further democratic participation by a more diverse group of U.S. citizens and will also result in the spread of

⁹⁷Ibid., 199.

⁹⁸Ibid.

American values around the world. However, only careful case studies of newer ethnic lobbies can address the question of which of these two scenarios is more likely.”⁹⁹

Kurien has argued in another publication, contradictory to Shain, “that multiculturalist policies, despite their intended goal of facilitating the integration of immigrants and winning their loyalty, seem to often do the reverse, strengthening immigrant attachment to the ancestral homeland and giving rise to a diasporic nationalism.”¹⁰⁰

This additional spectrum of thought on the internal impact of ethnic lobbying and its relationship with nationalism is also identified by Roshwald. He points to limitations on diversity in American national life that may “inevitably come into play even in the most civic-leaning and inclusive nations.”¹⁰¹

The United States’ ever more expansive accommodation of ethnic political lobbies is accompanied by strong socio-political and cultural pressures to adhere to a somewhat constricting ideological and rhetorical paradigm of American patriotism. Be they Irish-, Jewish-, Greek-, or Arab-American, ethnic organizations that celebrate their communities’ cultural heritages or engage in public advocacy for policies favorable to their overseas homelands feel obliged to trumpet their unswerving loyalty to America and their unshakeable belief in the inherent superiority of the American economic system and the infinite promise of the American dream of individual self-reliance and limited government.

⁹⁹Kurien, 235.

¹⁰⁰Prema Kurien, “Multiculturalism and Ethnic Nationalism: The Development of an American Hinduism,” *Social Problems* 51:3 (2004): 362-385. The debate here is the extent to which U.S. foreign policy and the treatment of ethnic interest is multiculturalist or pluralist in character, or whether or not the “domesticization” of U.S. national interest is more a reflection of the progression of a democratic political system that accommodates competing interest. The last decade has shown that the executive can give recognition to ethnic interest while at the same time pursuing definitive foreign policy goals that may or may not coalesce with ethnic concerns.

¹⁰¹Roshwald, 275.

Again, it is within this additional range of thought that Greek American advocacy must be analyzed. Has this advocacy enhanced the transnational connections of Greek Americans with their homeland? Has ethnic interest and lobbying led to broader integration into American society and association with American political and cultural ideals? These questions represent very complex relationships and influences that are explored in this project. In conclusion, though, it is important to list a few summary points from the survey of scholarship on ethnic interests and U.S. foreign policy. First is the recognition of the need for more specialized studies on ethnic groups in the U.S. and their political activities as contributions to the analysis of foreign policy development, pluralism, ethnic identity, and transnationalism. Second, it is very evident in the survey of the literature on this topic that religion deserves greater attention. While some research has examined the religious influences toward specific policy issues, very little attention has been given to the role of religious beliefs and of relationships with transnational religious groups and institutions in shaping the advocacy of ethnic groups. Most researchers either neglect religious influences or interpret these influences strictly from ethnic or political motivations. An exception is offered in Kurien's essay on Indian Americans.

Since religion and religious institutions often play a central role in the process of ethnic formation, they become more important in the immigrant context in the United States than in the home country, increasing the power of such organizations to construct and impose authoritative versions of ethnicity. Having to be the repository of ethnicity also transforms immigrant religion. As de facto ethnic institutions, most immigrant religious organizations also develop regional and national associations to unify the group, define their identity, and represent their interests. Consequently, different religious groups tend to develop definitions of nationality from their own perspective, resulting in variations in the

construction of homeland culture and identity along religious lines, sometimes exacerbating tensions between them.¹⁰²

This analysis of the relationships between religion, ethnicity, and nationalism are a welcome recovery of a very influential aspect of the life and advocacy of diaspora groups. It is within this context of transnationalism and ethnoreligious lobbying that Greek American advocacy is examined together with the role of the Greek Orthodox Church.

This analysis begins with an historical survey of Greek American advocacy in the next chapter, followed by chapters that address the three most recent policy issues that have been the focus of this advocacy: the division of Cyprus; the Macedonian Question; and religious freedom for the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, Turkey. These issues represent different levels of advocacy, different actions and roles on the part of the U.S. government, and varying levels of engagement by leaders of the Greek American community. Following surveys of advocacy on each of these issues, the role of transnational religion is examined using some of the theoretical tools and research designs offered by scholars of transnationalism and ethnoreligious advocacy.

¹⁰²Kurien, "Who Speaks for Indian Americans?" 238.

CHAPTER TWO

The Development of Greek American Political Advocacy

The first Greek community in North America was a colony of approximately seven hundred Greeks from various places throughout the Mediterranean who arrived in St. Augustine, Florida in July 1768. They had contracted to work on a plantation near the city, but soon revolted due to miserable working and living conditions. Within a year those who survived returned to St. Augustine and eventually assimilated with the local population.¹ In the early nineteenth century, American sympathies for the Greek War of Independence motivated several efforts to provide educational opportunities for Greek orphans in the United States. By the middle of the century, more Greeks were appearing on the America scene. In the 1850s, Greek merchants established import-export businesses in New York, Boston, San Francisco, Savannah, Galveston, and New Orleans. Greek sailors began working on ships in the Great Lakes, and others became oyster fishermen in the Gulf states.²

More substantial waves of Greek immigration began in the 1870s and continued until 1910. At one point, more than three-fourths of the male population in Sparta between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five left for the United States, and some for

¹E. P. Panagopoulos, *New Smyrna: An Eighteenth Century Greek Odyssey* (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1978). The book covers the history of the early settlement and the relocation of the colony to St. Augustine. The location of the meeting house for the community is now the St. Photios National Shrine, an institution of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America.

²Charles C. Moskos, *Greek Americans: Struggle and Success*, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 6-8.

Russia, Egypt, Turkey, and central Africa due to economic woes and declines in agricultural production and prices.³ As emigration increased, alarms were raised in Greece concerning the loss of manpower and doubts as to whether those who left for America would return. In addition, reports began to return to Greece that the opportunities and experiences in the United States were not so favorable.⁴

The patterns of immigration to America in the 1870s and 1880s changed dramatically in the 1890s when Greeks began departing from all parts of the country. The causes varied from region to region and throughout the Greek populations of the Mediterranean. In the 1890s the decline in the price of currants, a principle export crop, had disastrous effects on the Greek economy. Natural disasters, government corruption, the lack of resources to cultivate the land and purchase supplies, avoidance of military duty, the dowry system, and many other challenges motivated the journey to the United

³Peter W. Dickson, "The Greek Pilgrims: Tsakonas and Tsintzinians," in *New Directions in Greek American Studies*, ed. Dan Georgakas and Charles C. Moskos (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1991), 35-54. Dickson discusses immigrants from Tsintzina, Vasaras, Krysapha, Agriannos, Geraki, Arachova, and Vamvakou and the establishment of Greek societies in Chicago and San Francisco.

⁴Theodore Saloutos, *The Greeks in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 27-29. For a historical and theoretical study on Greek immigration to the United States see George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Greek Americans* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1997). On this immigration in the context of Greek immigration throughout the world see Iannis Hassiotis, "History of the Modern Greek Diaspora," in *Diaspora, Identity, and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research*, ed. Kokot, et. al. (Routledge, 2004), 93-101. Attention has also been given to the issue of repatriation both early and recent in Ioanna Laliotou, *Transatlantic Subjects: Acts of Migration and Cultures of Transnationalism Between Greece and America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), and in Anastasia Christou, "American Dreams and European Nightmares: Experiences and Polemics of Second-Generation Greek-American Returning Migrants," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32:5 (July 2006): 831-845.

States. In his survey of this early history in *The Greeks in the United States*, Theodore Saloutos states:

A growing belief on the part of some that Greece had been condemned to a life of misery, disaster, and insecurity created such an atmosphere of despair that it caused many to want to leave. These sentiments developed despite the fact that the Greeks, as a rule, loved their country with a devotion and passion that many Americans found difficult to understand. But as one correspondent had earlier observed: “within the twelve months past, or little more, she has rounded a full cycle of calamity—earthquake well-nigh destroying Zante, a constitutional crisis, national insolvency or the next thing to it...”⁵

In the first decade of the twentieth century, immigration began from other regions including Macedonia, Epirus, the island of Mytilene, and the Dodecanese as the result of increasing tensions between Greeks, Turks, and Bulgars. In 1906, a large group left Megara, Thebes, and Corinth for major cities in the United States. During 1907, over twenty thousand immigrants left from Patras, Kalamata, and Zante for New York. A brief hiatus occurred this same year due to the financial crisis in the United States, but as soon as economy recovery began, immigration from Greece continued until the outbreak of the First Balkan War in 1912. Following the second of these wars, almost thirty thousand left Athens in 1914-1915, and following World War I, over twenty-five thousand departed from the port in Piraeus in 1920. Again, while there was some opposition to the waves of immigration, the benefits were more convincing. Saloutos states:

There was scarcely a village in Greece that did not furnish living proof of what America had to offer. This made an effective reply to many of the charges of injuries, unemployment, hostility, and hardships associated with emigration and life in America. The Greek immigrants gained the reputation quite early of sending more money home per capita than the immigrants of any other

⁵Ibid., 32.

nationality.... In some districts the cancellation of mortgages was one of the most important results of immigration.⁶

In the first two decades of the twentieth century approximate 250,000 Greeks immigrated to the United States from the Greek mainland. This did not include the large numbers from Turkey, the Balkan countries, Egypt or Cyprus. Estimates from these areas push the number of immigrants of Greek descent during this period to over 400,000.⁷

The number of Greeks in America and their concentration in metropolitan areas and specific regions around the country contributed to the establishment of Greek communities. As is discussed below, these communities had an important role in the formation of societies, a national Church, and other organizations. In addition, the manner in which these communities were formed, the maintenance of strong ties with the homeland, and the rapid formation of a Greek American identity help to differentiate Greeks from other ethnic groups. Initially, as described by Peter Marudas, these factors inhibited political participation while fostering it in later stages of the Greek American community. He states:

For, unlike other prominent ethnic groups, the Greeks immigrated to the US in relatively small numbers, rarely congregating in permanent ghettos and at first economic chance moving away from their neighborhood of entry.... Thus, by avoiding the pressures and hardships associated with large overcrowded working-class neighborhoods, Greek Americans were not compelled to organize politically either to advance individual gain or for collective community protection. This fact was further reinforced by the small-business economic ethos which overwhelmingly prevailed in the Greek immigrant community. Like all immigrants, the Greeks initially worked for someone else, but most sought and eventually succeeded in owning their own enterprises. Therefore, they rarely looked to government—except in the narrowest instances of licensing or

⁶Ibid., 43.

⁷Moskos, 12.

immigration matters—for jobs or public assistance as part of normal patronage largesse bestowed as a reward for ethnic political involvement.⁸

Over the course of the first four decades of the twentieth century a transition occurred as Greeks became more integrated within the social and political systems of the United States and used this status and their growing numbers to address political issues in Greece. Certainly, they were motivated by their identity and love for their homeland, but they also engaged openly with political issues in Greece with a desire to participate fully in the American political system. This combination of interest and influence in the affairs of Greece and the choice to assimilate to some degree through citizenship and economic means influenced the character of the Greek American community and the manner in which Greeks engaged in advocacy.

This chapter provides a survey of the development of Greek American political advocacy within the context of the formation of a Greek American community in the first half of the twentieth century. This survey is essential to understanding the extent and nature of Greek American advocacy up to the present, and for the purpose of this study, the role of religion, and specifically the Greek Orthodox Church in this advocacy. The chapter begins with an analysis of the attributes of early Greek immigrant communities which were foundational for later political engagement. It concludes with the engagement of the United States government with the affairs of Greece following World War II, the period when the Greek Orthodox Church in America became more prominent

⁸Peter N. Marudas, “Greek American Involvement in Contemporary Politics,” in *The Greek American Community in Transition*, ed. Harry J. Psomiades and Alice Scourby (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1982), 94-95.

as representative of the community and influential in the international affairs that became the focus of Greek American advocacy in the second half of the twentieth century.

Greek Immigrant Organizations in the Early Twentieth Century

The foundations of political advocacy within the Greek American community are found in the formation of organizations among Greek immigrants in the first several decades of the twentieth century. In his history of the community entitled *The Greeks in the United States*, Theodore Saloutos identifies several types of these groups and remarks that many Americans found it difficult to understand this zeal among Greeks for forming societies.⁹ The first type of organization was the fraternal society. Among the Greeks in America, these societies were formed around village or regional identities based on the members' origins in Greece. They were well organized with officers, councils, and even insignia. Saloutos summarizes:

It appears that every village and minute parish in Greece was represented in the United States by a society with an impressive array of banners, lengthy constitutions, and high-sounding names. The majority of these organizations, at least in the beginning, were composed of fifteen to thirty people and governed by councils of twelve to fifteen. Gold tassels and buttons adorned the officers' uniforms, which were worn on every possible occasion.¹⁰

By 1907, approximately one hundred of these societies were in existence in the United States, with thirty organized in New York. In addition to the status and recognition that

⁹Saloutos, 74-79. The monograph by Theodore Saloutos, *The Greeks in the United States*, is the most substantial history of the Greek American community to the post World War II era. As a Greek American, a Fulbright scholar in Greece during 1952-53, and a professor of history at UCLA, Saloutos wrote extensively on immigration. His history of the community has been a standard and is referenced extensively by Moskos, Zotos, and others who have published on the topic. His book is referenced throughout this chapter in conjunction with other studies on specific topics in an attempt to compose a survey of the development of Greek American political advocacy.

¹⁰Ibid., 75.

the societies brought to immigrants who were often living and working in less than desirable conditions, Saloutos recognizes that they “reflected the localism and provincialism of a naturally provincial people, and these traits were transplanted to the United States.”¹¹ Another significant aspect of the Greek fraternal societies that had a bearing on advocacy in later decades was the direct connection many of these groups had with the homeland. Officials and clergy in Greece made frequent appeals to the Greeks in America, asking for support and arousing patriotism leading to the formation of many of the societies in answer to these appeals. However, this contributed to another characteristic of the societies that continually challenged efforts toward unity among Greek Americans. Saloutos states, “This plethora of organizations unfortunately tended to breed suspicion, mutual antagonism, aloofness, stubbornness, and a ‘do it alone’ attitude. They helped to isolate members from strangers and to divide Greek from Greek.”¹² On the one hand, these societies were concerned with charitable activities, raising funds for schools, bridges, churches, and other public works in Greece; on the other, the localism manifested by the numerous societies became a barrier to the progress of the Greek American community. Attempts to diminish this barrier were not only unpopular, but “represented a form of cosmopolitanism that ran counter to local custom and offended the pride, self-confidence, and competitive spirit which the Greeks had in such full measure.”¹³

¹¹Ibid. This provincialism was the result of the difficulties of communication between regions and villages of Greece due to the geography of the country—small valleys and plains separated by mountains.

¹²Ibid., 76.

¹³Ibid.

The second type of organization that was formed among early Greek immigrants to the United States was the *kinotitos*, or community. These communities were established around a governing body for the purpose of organizing a church or school. Members paid dues and elected a board of directors to oversee the organization, the collection and use of funds, the acquisition or construction of a meeting hall, and the hiring and firing of clergy, teachers, and janitors. They also became a forum for addressing both the needs and disagreements of Greek immigrants. Again, this had a negative influence on cohesion and unity, as many of these communities had ongoing feuds that resulted in numerous splits and lawsuits.¹⁴ However, this became the model throughout the United States both for these communities and for many of the early Greek Orthodox churches.¹⁵ Communities were formed for the purpose of fellowship, charity, and the maintenance of Greek culture among immigrants and their children; and with the formation of language schools and the need for religious services, members raised funds and sent for teachers and clergy from Greece.¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid., 76-77.

¹⁵The role of lay authority in the establishment and function of many early Greek Orthodox parishes in the United States created challenges throughout the twentieth century to the ecclesiastical authority of clergy, bishops, hierarchs in Greece, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In addition, this model combined with a spirit of independence and self-reliance fostered by American ideals and culture impacted the controversies regarding the governance of the Greek Orthodox Church in America, efforts for unity among Greek Americans, and the nature of transnational relationships of Greek Americans with political and ecclesiastical leaders in Greece and with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

¹⁶It is important to note that a high percentage of Greek immigrants to America in the early twentieth century were literate due to the efforts in Greece during the late nineteenth century to increase the number of schools. Also, in the practice of the Greek Orthodox Church, the services and sacraments could only be led by ordained clergy. Thus, many communities were in need of clergy for baptisms and marriages, as well as

The third type of organization among Greeks in America was national or patriotic in nature. One of the first of these groups was the Panhellenic Union, founded in New York in 1907. With a vision of enrolling every Greek in the country and influenced by the premise that most Greeks would eventually return to the homeland, the goals of the Union were to help immigrants perpetuate faith and language, and if necessary, to mobilize them for military service. The latter became the main focus of the Union with the inception of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), which created tremendous controversy within the United States. The role of a national philanthropic organization recruiting and raising funds for war in coordination with a foreign government was viewed by some as illegal; and this controversy, along with the international events over the course of the next decade led to the Union's decline. Saloutos states:

The confused political situation in Greece, the prospect that the United States might enter the war [World War I] on the side of the Allies, the hesitancy on the part of many to commit themselves to an organization that could be identified with royalist neutralism, and the growing feeling that the immigrants owed a greater obligation to the United States than to Greece—all contributed in reducing the organization to a cipher.¹⁷

While these international events and the attitudes among Greeks in America destabilized initial attempts at national organization, they also contributed to new efforts to maintain ties with the homeland, to build a unique Greek American community, and to lead Greek Americans into a more intensive engagement with American society and political issues.

conducting regular services on Sundays and feast days. By the time of the establishment of a national archdiocese in 1922, approximately 141 Greek Orthodox parishes had been founded. See Demetrios J. Constantelos, "Introduction," in *History of the Greek Orthodox Church in America*, ed. Miltiades B. Efthimiou and George A. Christopoulos (New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1984), 4.

¹⁷Saloutos, 77-78.

Toward a Greek American Community

The conclusion of the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of world war in 1914 had tremendous repercussions on Greeks in America. Just as their homeland was split between factions either supporting the Allies—the Venizelists—or in favor of neutrality—the royalists—they began to divide along similar lines and organize in support of their positions and against each other. The Venizelists followed Greek prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, who believed the future of Greece and the opportunities to regain lost territory were tied to the success and support of the Allies. The royalists, proponents of the King of Greece, Constantine, held a position of neutrality. By March 1917, the struggle between the two factions permeated the Greek American community, with each accusing the other of “disloyalty to the Greek cause, stupidity, and base motives.”¹⁸ Greeks formed “Liberal Clubs” (Venizelists) and “Loyalty Leagues” (royalists), with each organizing meetings and issuing proclamations affirming their loyalty to the United States. Further, the conflicts were carried into their fraternal societies, communities, and churches. On some occasions, violence erupted as each side attempted to disrupt the events of the other. In addition, both groups attempted to influence the policies of the United States toward Greece in support of their positions. For the Venizelist, support came from a mission from Greece led by George Kafantaris and Panos Aravantinos. The purpose of this mission changed with the ongoing strife in Greece, but essentially it was to rally Greeks in American in support of the Venizelos government. In February 1917, Kafantaris and Aravantinos were invited to address the Liberal Club of Chicago. Following the quelling of a riot with Chicago Loyalty Leaguers

¹⁸Ibid., 150.

by city police, the meeting proceeded with over twelve thousand Greek Americans in attendance. Saloutos summarizes the results:

The resolutions adopted by the mass meeting lived up to the fondest expectations of the revolutionary committee. They endorsed the Salonika government of Venizelos, denounced the 'unconstitutional and courtier government of Athens' for surrendering Greek territory, people, and forts to the Bulgars, asked for an Allied victory, and informed the President of the United States that those in attendance were prepared to serve under the American flag whenever the call came. Finally, asserting that three fourths of the Greek population in the United States was Venizelist, the President was asked to recognize the Salonika government in order to serve the interests of the Greek Americans.¹⁹

The royalists responded with attempts of their own to influence the United States position on Greece. While cables were passing between the American ambassador to Greece and the Secretary of State regarding the possible recognition of the Venizelos government, Greek royalists were making their case. Demetrios J. Theophilatos, a supporter of King Constantine, accused Ambassador Garrett Drovers of partisanship in the matter. He stated that recognition of the Venizelos government would harm the United States by keeping Greeks in America from joining the armed forces as they might have to fight against "their brothers" in Greece. He recommended the President appoint an impartial committee to examine the conditions in Greece.²⁰ Another prominent Greek American, Demosthenes T. Timayenis, wrote letters to numerous individuals and groups in an attempt to influence U.S. policy. In May 1917, he sent a letter to the Secretary of State, indentifying himself as both consul general of Greece and an American citizen. Following complaints about the activities of Kafantaris and Aravantinos, he insisted that most Greeks in America supported the king, and he asked for the end of Allied coercion

¹⁹Ibid., 149.

²⁰Saloutos, 152-153.

of Greece. With a similar emphasis as Theophilatos he added, “There are many Greeks in this country who are not desirous of serving their adopted land in the same way. I think I speak in the interests of the United States when I urge upon Mr. Secretary that our government be not involved in activities on Greek soil and concerning Greek politics.”²¹ The letter was shared with the royalist Greek chargé in Washington, resulting in a reprimand of Timayenis, but all of this was of no consequence due to the events happening in Greece. On June 12, 1917, Constantine abdicated, and the pro-Venizelist Prince Alexander became king. Allied forces entered Athens to preserve order, and Venizelos became premier.

This first major rift among Greeks in America created an environment that challenged them to consider their allegiances with their homeland in relation to the opportunities and values promoted in the United States and how to engage in U.S. foreign policy interests, specifically concerning Greece. While the royalists had a base of support, it is apparent that the Venizelists were much more successful. Certainly, this can be attributed to their support for the policies of the Allies in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe combined with their hopes for a new political era in Greece. In addition, the turmoil in Greece led members of the Greek American community to engage extensively with U.S. officials. While some of this was encouraged and facilitated by officials in Greece, it signified the growing strength of the Greek American community in relation to the role of Greece in U.S. foreign affairs. Further, as Saloutos describes, the Greek American community was beginning to form its own identity even in the midst of internal strife and major political controversies.

²¹D. T. Timayenis to Lansing, May 2, 1917, in Saloutos, 153.

The declaration of war in no way interfered with the loyalty of the Greeks to the United States. The Greek-language press, liberal and royalist alike, did its part in making the people conscious of the war and its meaning. Both factions published war dispatches, echoed and re-echoed the policies of Woodrow Wilson, and urged their readers to grow more food and purchase war bonds. Rarely, if ever, was there any overt expression of opposition to the policies of the federal government. Allegiance to Old World political favorites, royalist as well as liberal, was portrayed as being consistent with the war aims of the United States.²²

With the entrance of the United States into World War I in 1917, many Greeks in America saw an opportunity to demonstrate the affection and loyalty they had begun to feel for the country. Saloutos documents these sentiments with published quotes of the day. The February 7, 1917 edition of *Loxias* offered, “We are, as a race, Greek, and will remain so, but America is our country, America is our home, our estate, our family, our church, our education, and everything we possess. Therefore, it is our holy duty to fight and protect our country which is our life.” The *Chicago Tribune* of February 10, 1917 republished a quote from the Greek newspaper *Hellinikos Astir*: “Now it is no longer a question of being pro-Ally or pro-German, but it is a question of pure Americanism. And we, the Greek-Americans—loyal Americans—are here to stand by the flag—the flag that flies over ‘land of the free and the home of the brave.’”²³ This connection with the United States and the beginnings of the psychological and sociological transition toward identifying America as their new home, prompted Greeks to organize for military service, to urge their societies and individuals to purchase liberty bonds, and to show loyalty to the country in any possible way.²⁴

²²Saloutos, 151.

²³*Ibid.*, 161.

²⁴Initially, requests were made by the government of Greece for assistance by the United States for mobilizing Greek nationals to return to their homeland for military

With the victory of the Allies and the conclusion of World War I, Greeks in America were hopeful for stability in Greece and for progress toward the reconstitution of “Greater Greece.” Referred to as the “Great Idea,” the desire was the freedom of all Greeks and their lands from Ottoman rule.²⁵ These lands included the Smyrna district of Turkey, the Bulgarian littoral, Macedonia, Epirus, the Dodecanese Islands, and Cyprus. Also, as Saloutos describes, “This Great Idea, the hope for a Greater Greece, was a national ideal that transcended party lines. The American Venizelists supported it with as much passion as the American royalists.”²⁶ This shared vision for the homeland and for the freedom of their “enslaved brothers” prompted Greeks to organize efforts and form organizations focused on making it a reality.²⁷ Now that Greece was firmly considered

service or to organize as separate divisions in the United States army led by officers from Greece. Both requests were denied by the War Department, eventually leading to the encouragement of the Greek government for Greeks to volunteer for the armed forces of the United States. Estimates of Greeks that served in the U.S. military in World War I are difficult to determine since the War Department did not keep lists by nationality. Estimates that have been proffered range from 22,000 to 70,000. See Saloutos 167-168.

²⁵The origins of the “Great” or “Megali Idea” are found in the Greek Independence movement of the early nineteenth century. Once this independence was gained, the vision was of the restoration of Greater Greece and the freedom and unity of all Greeks under Ottoman rule. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the wave of independence in the Balkans in the late nineteenth century strengthened Greek hopes for a realization of the Idea. Following his successful leadership in the liberation of Crete and his election and prime minister of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos led his nation in 1912 to join Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro against Turkey in the hopes of regaining more territory and islands. In 1913, Disputes over the gains that were achieved led to the Second Balkan War between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia and later Romania and Turkey.

²⁶Ibid. 169.

²⁷One of the first organizations formed in the United States with this goal as its objective was the American Hellenic Society in November 1917. Its founders were not Greek, but Philhellenes, and the membership of prominent scholars and educators included Nicholas Butler, president of Columbia University, Charles W. Eliot, president

an ally of the United States, many believed the time was ripe to encourage more direct government involvement in these issues. Saloutos states:

For the Greek-Americans to support the territorial claims of the mother country was the logical aftermath of the war. Had they not struggled to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Allies? Had they not as Venizelists and royalists stood solidly behind President Wilson? Was not Wilson the friend and champion of all subject peoples, including the Greeks?²⁸

In addition, these sentiments were encouraged by the first minister of the Venizelos government, George Roussos, who expressed hope that the United States would have a positive influence in uniting the Greeks of Asia Minor and Greece.²⁹

One of the first Greek American groups to organize for the sake of the territorial claims of Greece was the Pan-Epirotic Union. By 1919, branches of the organization were established in twenty-six cities with the stated goal of uniting all of northern Epirus with Greece and “informing American public opinion regarding the Hellenic character of the province.”³⁰ The efforts of the Union in publicizing the plight of the Epirotes in Greece and the additional four million Greeks of Thrace and Asia Minor led to the launch of a nationwide aid campaign on July 1, 1918. “Each Greek in the United States was

emeritus of Harvard, and Jacob Schurman, president emeritus of Cornell. The Society stated “its aims were to defend the just claims of Hellenism; to further the educational and political relations between the United States and Greece; to promote the establishment of exchange professorships between the two countries; to spread a knowledge of the literature and political institutions of the United States throughout Hellas; and to encourage the study of ancient and modern Greek language and literature in America (*New York Times*, January 28, 1918, in Saloutos, 170). Saloutos identifies the group as “a propaganda organization dedicated to publicizing the territorial claims of Greece.”

²⁸Ibid., 169-170.

²⁹Ibid., 170

³⁰Saloutos, 170-171.

asked to contribute one day's wages to redeem Smyrna and Constantinople, to aid the Cross in conquering the Crescent, and to make Greece a united nation numbering nine million."³¹ The effort was aided by the arrival in America of a contingent of Greek leaders who came with hopes of enlightening the public and the United States government on the claims of Greece. The mission included Nicholas Kyriakides, the president of the Central Committee of Unredeemed Greeks, Christos Vassilakakis, and the Metropolitan of Athens, Meletios Metaxakis. At the beginning of his tour of the nation, Kyriakides stated, "We rely upon this great American Republic and our Allies for help and support in shaking off this hateful yoke."³² Vassilakakis journeyed to Washington D.C. and met with Vice President Thomas Marshall who introduced him to Henry Cabot Lodge and Gilbert Hitchcock, the Senate Republican and Democratic leaders respectively. Both expressed their interest in hearing the case for the Greek cause. However, this was preempted by the announcement that Venizelos was planning to visit the United States. Vassilakakis met with the Foreign Relations Committee instead, and unfortunately, Venizelos did not follow through with the visit.³³ The third leader of the mission, Metropolitan Meletios, encouraged the efforts of the Greeks in America at a dinner given in his honor just prior to his departure for Greece. Saloutos states,

The metropolitan expressed the conviction that the people of the United States wanted the Hellenic territories restored to Greece as a means of helping her achieve national unity. He also assured his listeners that Greece was better prepared to govern and care for Constantinople than the original thirteen colonies

³¹Ibid., 172.

³²Nicholas F. Kyriakides, *The Unredeemed Hellenism* (New York, 1918).

³³Saloutos, 173.

were to govern themselves when they gained their freedom. “I am eagerly waiting for the time...when the children of Greece will be able to enter their historic temple of St. Sophia and complete their long unfinished prayer.”³⁴

Greek American leaders responded to these calls to sway American public opinion by organizing rallies, one of the largest occurring on August 10, 1919. Twelve to fifteen thousand representing one hundred and twenty-six societies met at Mechanics Hall in Boston to inaugurate a nationwide campaign for the Greek territorial claims. Presided over by the Massachusetts Secretary of State, Albert P. Langtry, the meeting adopted a long list of resolutions on related issues. On August 19, more than one hundred and fifty representatives from communities throughout the United States gathered in Washington as “Friends of Greece” in an attempt secure the aid of President Wilson in keeping Thrace from being apportioned to Bulgaria. From this group, a delegation of seven was selected to meet with the President and leaders of the Senate to discuss the issues. The lobbying for the support of the United States government intensified with a full-page advertisement in the *Washington Post* on August 20 entitled “Will America Deny Justice to Greece?”³⁵ In addition, President Wilson was inundated with telegrams and letters in support of Greece, and additional advocacy came from over two hundred American college and university professors who sent representatives to Washington to present the President with a statement on behalf of Greek territorial claims.

³⁴Ibid., 173-174. *New York Times*, October 30, 1918.

³⁵*Washington Post*, August 19-22, 1919. Saloutos quotes the endorsement of Senator George Moses of New Hampshire: “We ask for the Greek people only those lands where Greek blood is still preponderant. We ask only for those lands where Greek ingenuity and Greek enterprise have made the Greek name famous; and we rebel at every suggestion that the beastly nation of Slavic origin shall take from the Greeks that which is rightfully theirs.”

The following year lobbying efforts were directed toward the United States Senate. In January a resolution was adopted by the Senate declaring that all territory in Thrace surrendered to the Allies by Turkey and Bulgaria should be awarded to Greece. In May another resolution was passed supporting the granting to Greece of northern Epirus, the Dodecanese Islands, and the Greek portion of the west coast of Asia Minor. This support for the claims of Greece, which was in contrast to the lack thereof in the Paris Peace Conference and among the major European powers, gave satisfaction to Greek Americans and strengthened their advocacy. Further, the attention Greek causes received from American political and academic leaders and the ability of Greek Americans to organize rallies and raise resources for a shared cause facilitated cohesion in the Greek American community. Saloutos concludes:

Never before had Greek-Americans taken such a vigorous stand over the claims of the mother country. They had learned the value of the lobby in the political arena, the wisdom of winning the cooperation of influential segments of the American population, and in part the need for becoming United States citizens. They were beginning to realize the power of the vote and the value of taking a more direct hand in the political affairs of their communities.³⁶

Establishment of Greek American Institutions

The strength of these communities and their political engagement was also related to the growth of the Greek population in the United States. By 1913, this number had reached a quarter of a million, and estimates by 1922 range between three hundred thousand and half a million. The 1920 census reported 175,972 foreign born Greeks, thus indicating a growing second generation. This growth combined with the recognition by many of a Greek American identity contributed to the establishment of national

³⁶Ibid., 184.

organizations representative of a majority of Greeks in the United States. Further, in keeping with the function of fraternal societies and communities, these organizations continued an emphasis on maintaining Greek culture and language while at the same time becoming means by which they could engage both with the American public and with political issues.

One of the most significant events for the national community was the establishment of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America in 1922. The first local churches in the United States had been organized as early as 1862 in Galveston and 1864 in New Orleans, with many more to follow in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth. Following the administrative traditions of the Orthodox Church, most of these communities were under the spiritual aegis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey. On March 8, 1908, the Synod of the Patriarchate placed the Greek parishes in the United States under the administration of the autocephalous Church of Greece. However, due to distance, the challenges in Greece, and the manner in which many of the American communities had been organized, most of the parishes remained very independent in their function with little or no ecclesiastical supervision.³⁷ This lack of central authority led to confusion and dissension in many communities, causing lawsuits and splits. Saloutos states:

Court involvements, the spending of tens of thousands of dollars, and misspent energies paralyzed the resources of scores of communities. Each community considered itself a miniature democracy, but frequently it gave the impression of being a miniature kingdom.... Churches were built too large and too small, often

³⁷Constantelos, 5.

incomplete and flawed. Constitutions and bylaws confused clerical duties with lay responsibilities....³⁸

An initial attempt was made to establish order among the Greek Orthodox communities in the United States with the visit in 1918 of the Archbishop of Athens, Meletios Metaxakis.³⁹ During his three month mission, he made contacts with the clergy and communities, created a Synodic Trusteeship, and appointed Bishop Alexander as his representative in America. This manner of episcopal leadership existed until 1920 when Meletios was deposed as Archbishop of Athens with the renewal of struggles in Greece between Venizelos and supporters of the crown. Meletios found refuge among the Greek Orthodox in America, where he acted as the canonical Archbishop of Athens with Alexander serving as his auxiliary. In 1921, he organized the first congress of clergy and laity of the communities in the United States; and under his leadership a constitution was drafted and a charter of the Archdiocese was issued by the State of New York on September 17, 1921. In addition to establishing a seminary in Astoria, New York to train clergy, a “philanthropic treasury” for the poor, and a weekly journal, the *Ecclesiastical Herald*, Meletios engaged U.S. officials on behalf of the Christian minorities in Turkey.⁴⁰ In a letter dated December 8, 1921, he pleaded with Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to protect the minorities in Anatolia.⁴¹

³⁸Saloutos, 136.

³⁹For a biography of Patriarch Meletios IV see Vasil T. Stavridis, “Two Ecumenical Patriarchs from America: Meletios IV Metaxakis (1921-1923) and Athenagoras I Spyrou (1948-1972),” *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 44 (1999): 55-84.

⁴⁰Constantelos, 15.

On November 25, 1921, Archbishop Meletios was elected to the throne of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Knowing the strength of the Greek Orthodox Church in America, one of his first decisions as Ecumenical Patriarch was to annul the tome of 1908 and bring the Church under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. On March 1, 1922, the Synod confirmed this decision. In May, Patriarch Meletios announced the elevation of Alexander to Archbishop and the Church to the status of an archdiocese.

While this marked the official beginning of the archdiocese, and the tenure of Archbishop Alexander continued until 1930, the unity of Greek Orthodox communities and stability for the national Church was very difficult to achieve. With the deposition of Meletios as Archbishop of Athens, the Synod of the Church of Greece appointed Bishop Germanos Troianos of Sparta as their representative in America. His arrival in the United States was well-received by the royalists, broadening the rift between the factions in the Greek community. Further, even though the rift between the Church of Greece and the Patriarchate was mended by the end of 1922, forces were already at work within the Greek Orthodox Church in America in favor of autocephaly and the formation of a national church which would be free from the political transitions in Greece. Saloutos states:

In view of the political turmoil and the restoration of the monarchy, the best interests of the Greek-Americans were endangered. They had to seek their own salvation and relinquish all thoughts of preserving the national unity of Greece. The formation of an independent church organization offered the surest and most practical way of accomplishing this. The more enthusiastic hoped that the new organization would be a success and serve as a model eventually to be adopted by the Greek nation for which they had endured so much.⁴²

⁴¹Paul G. Manolis, *The History of the Greek Church in America: In Acts and Documents*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: Ambelos Press, 2003), 573.

⁴²Saloutos, 289.

This strife among the Greek communities continued with the arrival of Metropolitan Vasileos Komvopoulos following the departure of Bishop Germanos. Vasileos, a royalist, had been reassigned to the Metropolis of Chaldea by Patriarch Meletios, but refusing the position he traveled to America with hopes of rallying the support of royalist parishes. On May 10, 1924, Vasileos was defrocked by the Synod of the Patriarchate, and due to his popularity, divisions among the Greek Orthodox communities widened. Adding to this were competing visions along class and generational lines regarding the character of the Church in America. Quarrels occurred over language, music, pews, the authority of the clergy, and every other aspect of parish life. Communities continued to affirm their independence and to show little concern for the problems and needs of other communities, and national leadership was ineffective in fostering cohesion.⁴³

The civil war within the Greek Orthodox Church in the United States continued through the decade of the 1920s. The lack of unity among the communities and the challenges and turmoil related to the governance of the Church consumed so much energy and resources, that the Archdiocese had no significant role in political advocacy on behalf of the concerns of Greek Americans or Greece. This role and steps toward stability in the Church began with the appointment of Metropolitan Athenagoras of Corfu in August 1930 as the successor to Archbishop Alexander. In spite of significant internal challenges, divisions, and resistance by local communities to the extension of the authority of the Archdiocese into their affairs, Athenagoras was able to strengthen the unity of the national Church during a time of tremendous social and economic crisis. He also worked to establish connections with U.S. officials, meeting with President Herbert

⁴³Ibid., 296.

Hoover and other political and civic leaders soon after his arrival. These relationships became very important with the outbreak of World War II and the increase in the role of the Greek Orthodox Church as a national representative for Greek Americans. Before examining these developments and the role of the Archdiocese in political advocacy, several other national organizations that were critical in the history of Greek American advocacy deserve attention.

These indigenous organizations arose out of the changes in identity and perspectives that reflected the attachments Greek Americans were forming with their new home and the relinquishing of aspects of their relationships with the homeland. Harry Psomiades summarizes this transition in relation to struggles in Greece and the end of the Great Idea.

For at least the first century after [Greek] independence in the nineteenth century, the modern Greek state and much of the Greek Diaspora viewed the overseas communities simply as Greeks living abroad who would one day return and whose task was to serve as an important arm of the nationalist, irredentist, expansionist struggle inspired by the Megali Idea. Their duty was to promote the interest of the Greek state, which expected and demanded their allegiance. With the defeat of the Greek army in Asia Minor in 1922 and the uprooting of the Greek population in Anatolia and eastern Thrace, fundamental changes took place....⁴⁴

One of these changes was the recognition among Greek American leaders that most Greeks in the United States were here to stay. In addition to establishing businesses and starting families, many had acquired citizenship and were on a path of assimilation with the broader American society and culture while organizing communities and programs to pass on Hellenic culture to their children. In addition, successful Greek American

⁴⁴Harry J. Psomiades, "Ethnic Politics in America: Greek-Americans," in *Reading Greek America: Studies in the Experience of Greeks in the United States*, ed. Spyros D. Orfanos (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2002), 139.

businessmen, many operating restaurants and other types of endeavors that offered them high levels of interaction with the general public, began to show interest in local and state politics.

This environment and an unsuccessful pattern of strife and localism that had characterized many Greek organizations contributed to the founding of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) in 1922 by a group of Atlanta businessmen. The headquarters of the association moved to Washington, D.C. in 1924, and by 1928, AHEPA had over 17,000 members and 192 chapters throughout the United States. Regarding the success of the association, Moskos states: “The growth of the AHEPA is to be understood in large part as an answer to the prevailing feeling against foreigners in postwar America. One of the objectives of the AHEPA was ‘to advance and promote pure an undefiled Americanism among the Greeks of the United States.’”⁴⁵ To accomplish this, English was made the official language, and membership was not limited to those of Greek descent. Early in its history, the organization had a practice of initiating prominent members, including governors and United States presidents. In

⁴⁵ Moskos, 40. The Preamble to the Constitution of the Order of AHEPA states, “We, American citizens of Hellenic descent desiring...to inculcate loyalty and patriotism to and for the country in which we live...” The “Objects, Principles and Ideals” of the Order in the Constitution include the following: To promote and encourage loyalty to the United States of America, allegiance to its flag, support to its Constitution, obedience to its laws and reverence for its history and traditions; To instill in every one of its members a due appreciation of the privileges of citizenship and the sacred duties attendant therewith, and encourage its members to always be profoundly interested and actively participating in the political, civic, social and commercial fields of human endeavor, and always strive for the betterment of society; and, To promote throughout the world, and especially the United States of America a better and more comprehensive understanding of the Hellenic Peoples and Nation, and to revive, cultivate, enrich, and marshal into active service for Humanity the noblest attributes and highest ideals of true Hellenism.” See George J. Leber, *The History of the Order of AHEPA: 1922-1972* (Washington: The Order of the AHEPA, 1972), 147-148.

addition to assisting the social aspirations of Greeks who were striving to be “real Americans,” Ahepans also hoped to move beyond the “morass of intercommunal fighting which had become synonymous with Greeks in this country.”⁴⁶ As a truly American organization, AHEPA hoped to be removed from political battles, such as the conflict between Venizelists and royalists, and as a secular association to remain out the factionalism in the church. These aims were partially missed with the early formation of competing groups within AHEPA; however, this did not derail the group’s efforts in advocacy to the American public on behalf of Greek Americans and engagement with political leaders on behalf of the concerns of the community. At some of the organization’s earliest conventions, resolutions were passed regarding the naturalization of Greeks in America and requesting the U.S. government to offer loan assistance to Greece. In addition, Ahepans offered public gestures of loyalty to America and its history, such as the laying of a wreath at Lincoln’s statue at the 1925 convention in Chicago.⁴⁷ In 1929, the governing board of AHEPA, the Supreme Lodge, met with President Calvin Coolidge at the White House. This was followed by participation in the inaugural parade for President Herbert Hoover on March 4, 1929. In the fiftieth anniversary history of AHEPA, George Leber writes, “This was a ‘first’ for any Greek organization in America, and AHEPA was the only organization of its kind given the privilege of participating in the parade, along with the American Legion, Daughters of the American Revolution, and other patriotic groups.”⁴⁸ In 1930, the Lodge not only

⁴⁶Ibid., 41.

⁴⁷Leber, 188.

⁴⁸Ibid., 228.

returned to the White House for a visit with President Hoover, but the organization's first national banquet was held in Washington, D.C. The toastmaster for the banquet was Senator William H. King, and in attendance were seventy-five members of Congress, a number of federal department heads, governors and other prominent visitors. In 1931, New York State Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt became a member of the Order of AHEPA, thus opening the door for successive White House visits and advocacy on behalf of Greek American interests throughout the 1930s and through the period of World War II.

Another Greek American organization that formed during this period was the Greek American Progressive Association (GAPA). Founded in December 1923, GAPA chose to use Greek as its official language and to offer its support to the Greek Orthodox Church. As noted by Stephen Zotos in his work *Hellenic Presence in America*, "GAPA's members had conceived of the idea that Americanization meant the abolition of Greek traditions and thereby the elimination of Greek language and to a certain extent of Orthodoxy as a 'must' religion for the Greek-Americans."⁴⁹ Saloutos states that the "philosophy of GAPA was idealistic, romantic, and somewhat impractical,"⁵⁰ and it was not able to acquire the strength of membership as AHEPA. Even though the organization had more than fifty chapters across the United States by 1928, the "overpowering influences of assimilation, the failure to attract the young, the inability to implement their principles with an effective program of action, and the death of the older and more earnest members made it difficult for the organization to grow.... The most that it could

⁴⁹Stephen Zotos, *Hellenic Presence in America* (Wheaton: Pilgrimage, 1976), 144.

⁵⁰Saloutos, 254.

hope for was to provide a social outlet for persons of identical ethnic-religious backgrounds.”⁵¹

While GAPA and AHEPA were at odds with each other in terms of the relationship of Greek identity and Hellenism with Americanization, they both recognized that Greek Americans were in the United States permanently. Both organizations undertook efforts to raise much needed aid for the people of Greece and to join with the Greek Orthodox Church and numerous other Greek American organizations in support of Greece during the occupation and struggles of World War II.⁵²

A Greek American Lobby

The plight of Greece during World War II had a tremendous impact on Greek Americans in several ways. First, following the attack by Italy on October 28, 1940, and the heroic stand made by Greeks which altered the timetable of Axis aggression, Greek Americans who had removed themselves from affairs related to their homeland due to incessant infighting and divisions began to reengage with both their identity and efforts to help Greece. Second, this was encouraged within the American environment due to a shift in public opinion. At times, Greeks in the United States had been viewed “with contemptuous amusement or as undesirable aliens.”⁵³ However, the position of Greece against totalitarianism brought dignity and status to the Greek American community. Saloutos states, “Newspapermen, cartoonists, political leaders, poets, scholars, all helped to popularize the Greek cause. Greece had become Belgium of World War Two. Now it

⁵¹Ibid., 256.

⁵²Zotos, 144-145.

⁵³Saloutos, 344.

was ‘the glory that is Greece,’ not ‘the glory that was Greece.’”⁵⁴ Third, the invasion of Greece and the struggle that followed united Greek Americans in a manner that had not occurred previously.

The big question was whether the Greek Americans could coordinate the efforts of their widely scattered clubs, societies, and national organizations into one effective unit. But the response was unmistakable. Community and church leaders, businessmen, professional groups, wage earners, and housewives rallied to the call. More than aiding Greece was involved—there were not conflicting loyalties, for the cause of Greece was the cause of the Allies.⁵⁵

The first example of this unity was the establishment of the Greek War Relief Association (GWRA). On November 7, 1940, less than two weeks after the Italian invasion of Greece, community leaders gathered to found the effort and launch a drive to raise ten million dollars in assistance for the people of Greece. Following the incorporation of GWRA by the State of New York on November 9, its head, Spyros Skouras, president of the National Theaters Company, began a national tour to promote the cause. By November 15 over 350 Greek communities and 2,000 voluntary associations had joined, and a few months later the association had organized 964 local committee chapters.⁵⁶ This level of participation covered all of the major groups of the Greek American community, including local churches, the hierarchs of the Greek Orthodox Church, and chapters of AHEPA, GAPA, the Pan-Arcadians, the Messinians, the Cretans, etc. Of these organizations, the members of AHEPA took the lead in

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., 345.

⁵⁶Alexandros K. Kyrou, “Ethnicity as Humanitarianism: The Greek American Relief Campaign for Occupied Greece, 1941-1944,” in *New Directions in Greek American Studies*, ed. Dan Georgakas and Charles C. Moskos (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1991), 112.

organizing the nationwide effort. Because of the strength of AHEPA, it was able to supply the manpower needed to move the work of the GWRA beyond the metropolitan areas. Further, with strong connections with the political establishment in Washington, D.C., the group was a ready advocate for the relief cause. In April 1941, the officers of the Supreme Lodge of AHEPA made their annual visit to the White House and discussed the needs of Greece with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Following this meeting, the President issued a very clear statement on the position of the United States in relation to Greece:

During the Hellenic war of independence more than a century ago, our young nation, prizing its own lately-won independence, expressed its ardent sympathy for the Greeks and hoped for Hellenic victory. The victory was achieved. Today, at a far more perilous period in the history of Hellas, we intend to give full effect to our settled policy of extending all available material aid to a free people defending themselves against aggression. Such aid has been and will continue to be extended to Greece. Whatever may be the temporary outcome of the present phase of the war...the people of Greece can count on the help and support of the government and the people of the United States.⁵⁷

In addition, AHEPA offered leadership in organizing the first Pan-Hellenic Congress, which was held in Cincinnati from August 17-19, 1941. With a stated objective of contributing “not only to the downfall of dictatorship and the liberation of Greece, but also to its proper restoration and the binding of its wounds,” a call was issued to Greek American organizations to formulate a unified policy on behalf of the relief efforts and in support of U.S. objectives. The congress of 461 delegates was opened by speaker of the House of Representatives, Sam Rayburn, who read the above statement of President Roosevelt. Resolutions were passed approving of a U.S. goal “to wipe nazism and

⁵⁷The statement was published in *The Ahepan*, January-June 1941, 6, and is quoted in Saloutos, 346.

fascism from the face of the globe,” and the “United States Bill of Rights, Constitution, and democracy were lauded as the greatest protectors of the rights of the people.”⁵⁸

It was evident by the deteriorating conditions in Greece that these efforts were critical. Following Mussolini’s losses in Albania in his attempt to invade Greece, Hitler intervened and began an invasion on April 6, 1941. By the beginning of June, all of Greece had been occupied by German, Italian and Bulgarian troops. In response, Britain closed all shipping lanes to Greece with the intent to shut off Axis supply channels; but for a country that imported approximately thirty-five percent of its food needs, the blockage led to shortages, famine, and starvation. Kyrou adds:

The situation was worsened by the anemic grain harvest of 1941, which produced roughly 200,000 tons less than the prewar average. Furthermore, as domestic production declined, foodstuffs were held back in villages or vanished into black-market channels. The Axis expropriation of food stocks intensified the crisis, and the division of the country into Bulgarian, German, and Italian occupation zones disrupted the prewar systems of material dissemination and supply. The ingress of refugees into urban centers, especially the Athens-Piraeus area, further strained already acutely diminished resources.⁵⁹

When reports of starvation in Greece began to appear in the Greek American press in July 1941, frustration and anger ensued, and efforts were initiated to loosen the blockade and get aid through. Following a barrage of Washington with telegraphs and letters asking for intervention by the United States, Spyros Skouras met with representatives of the State Department on August 21, 1941. With the support of the executive director of the American Red Cross, Norman Davis, and the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, Skouras made a request for approval of a trial shipment of wheat to Greece to

⁵⁸Saloutos, 347.

⁵⁹Kyrou, 113.

be delivered by private rather than public means. The Near East Division of the State Department agreed to permit the venture for both humanitarian and diplomatic reasons. As Kyrou describes, “The Division’s intelligence sources had concluded that the food crisis was more acute in Greece than in any other part of Europe and that it was commonly viewed that Britain, and secondarily the United States, had a distinct obligation to save a nation in the democratic camp from famine.”⁶⁰ Further, the lack of aid being provided to Greece had created diplomatic issues with the Turkish government, which believed the Allies had abandoned Greece. This created an opening for the GWRA to get aid to Greece by purchasing resources in Turkey and arranging for shipment. Through the assistance of the International Red Cross and with assurances from the German and Italian occupation authorities that the resources would be distributed, the steamship *Kurtulus* arrived from Istanbul in late October. On October 26 the authorities permitted a communiqué to the media which stated that “the generosity of American relief organizations has made it possible to make distribution among the Greek population of large food supplies which have been purchased and transported from abroad.”⁶¹ While the GWRA was not mentioned in the statement, and the recipients were most likely unaware of the role of the association, the group continued to seek ways to send aid to Greece. With the first shipment, over 2.8 million pounds of food were distributed. Another shipment of three million pounds followed in November, and a regular process of shipping food and medical resources continued through the early

⁶⁰Ibid., 115-116.

⁶¹United States Department of State 868.48/1171, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Greek War Relief Association, November 25, 1941, in Kyrou, 117.

winter of 1941-42. In January 1942, facing shortages in its own reserves, the Turkish government severely restricted the food aid shipped out of its country. In response to the hampering of relief efforts, the GWRA asked the permission of the British and U.S. governments to begin direct shipments to Greece. London did not agree due to its strategy in using the blockade and limiting resources available to the Axis powers in the region. Kyrou summarizes:

The British authorities feared that Turkey's resources might be utilized by the Germans. As a result, London favorably regarded arrangements which diverted Turkish foodstocks and goods to Allied nationals who would consume supplies that might otherwise become available to the Axis. This having been accomplished the British were less responsive to renewed GWRA pleas for direct aid to Greece.⁶²

The cessation of relief efforts and the deteriorating conditions in Greece had devastating results. Reports reaching the United States in January 1942 stated that as many as one thousand persons were dying daily from starvation. In response, the Greek American community directed their advocacy efforts toward the ending of the blockade. The call to lobby on behalf of Greece came from all segments of the community, as illustrated by the words of the editor of the Boston publication *Ethnos* in the February 4, 1942 issue:

It is therefore the duty of us all—the Greek press...our Church (archbishop and priests), the Ahepa, the Gapa, all our Communities, Organizations, and Groups and in general of every Greek, to make known to President Roosevelt and to the Government in London—with resolutions, telegrams...to DEMAND that the blockade of Greece be withdrawn and that the sending of food into Greece be permitted from every part of the world where it can be bought. There must be an organized effort on the part of all of us, of every one of us. This must be done now, immediately.⁶³

⁶²Ibid., 120.

⁶³*Ethnos*, February 4, 1942, in Kyrou, 121.

This intensification of efforts to secure the intervention of the United States government was taken up by the Greek American press which emphasized that the needed resources were available in the U.S. as well as the means to transport them to Greece. Kyrou adds, “Implicit in the press’ calls for the mobilization and concentration of efforts toward relief was the understanding that the issue depended totally on the public insistence of the Greek American community.”⁶⁴ Greek Americans focused on lobbying elected officials, and the campaign combined with intelligence reports from the region began to motivate a response. President Roosevelt and the State Department questioned the viability of the blockade, which was becoming a reason for German propaganda critical of Britain due to the humanitarian crisis it was creating. On December 3, 1941, a formal request to Britain was issued by the United States to provide information on the blockade and to address the allegations of its role in the famine. No reply was received, and on January 5, 1942, the request was made again. A response was issued by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden exonerating Britain, denying its role in the famine, and stating that the blockade was aiding the Greek government in exile. However, the Greek government had already been in communication with Washington asking for intervention to alleviate the crisis in Greece. By the end of January, world opinion was becoming a factor in the dispute over strategy, and Britain began to reevaluate its policy. On February 22, 1942, London informed the United States government that it was willing to lift the blockade. Further, permission was granted for the GWRA to charter a ship to transport aid to Greece. The GWRA was joined by the American Red Cross and the Medical Surgical Relief Committee of America in sending 2.5 million pounds of flour, 9 tons of medicine, and

⁶⁴Kyrou, 121.

500,000 vitamin-concentrate units. With the success of this operation, the GWRA attempted to organized additional efforts for sustained relief shipments to Greece in coordination with the International Red Cross under the name “Operation Blockade.” Disagreements between British and United States authorities over the role of the Red Cross, eventually led to the formation by August 1942 of a Joint Relief Commission coordinated by officials from neutral Sweden. Based in Athens and Piraeus, the commission assisted with processing the relief shipments and with allocation and distribution throughout the country; and by the end of the year the aid operation included “25 executive Swedish and Swiss officials, over 1, 200 Greek employees, approximately 3,000 local volunteers, 5 Swiss and 42 Greek physicians, several Swiss nurses, over 1,000 ancillary Greek medical volunteers, and a motorized pool of approximately 100 major transport vehicles.”⁶⁵ This organization permitted the regular shipment of relief supplies, facilitated by as many as twelve Swedish ships delivering monthly shipments of 15,000 tons of wheat, 3,000 tons of dried vegetables, 100 tons of powdered milk and other materials from the United States and Canada. Most of the costs for purchasing and transportation were covered by the GWRA with assistance from its sister association in Canada, and later the American Red Cross, and U.S. and Canadian governments. By March 7, 1945, the GWRA facilitated 101 individual fleet shipments, preventing any additional widespread crises after the winter of 1941-42 and possibly as many as one million deaths in the winter of 1942-43 had aid not arrived.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Ibid., 126.

⁶⁶Ibid., 127.

The successful lobbying and relief efforts of the Greek American community on behalf of the struggles of their homeland enhanced their political prestige and showed that the resources of the community both in terms of financial assistance and influence could be used in a significant way. Psomiades identifies the period of World War II, the advocacy of Greek Americans, and the success of the GWRA as “the first Greek-American lobby.”⁶⁷ This new status of the community was critical for political advocacy of the U.S. government for intervention in the turmoil that engulfed Greece once the nation had been freed and the war drew to close.

Before the withdrawal of Axis forces and the landing of the Allies in 1944, several Greek American organizations began to lobby on behalf of their plans for a liberated Greece. Relief was continuing through GWRA and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, but the impact of the war left many obstacles to overcome to stabilize the country. In addition to a shattered economy, disease and malnutrition were widespread. Further, a tremendous amount of political uncertainty was evident. Already a new faction had formed, the Ethnikon Apeleutheritikon Metopon (EAM), or National Liberation Front, which began actively soliciting support of Greek Americans in 1943. In 1944, a pamphlet entitled *Greece Fights for Freedom* was distributed in the United States, calling on the Greek people to unite and rid the country of royalists and fascists. The goals of EAM were to prevent the return of the monarchy and to form a constitutional government that reflected the will of the Greek people. The organization also labeled the Greek government in exile as pro-Nazi and pro-King.

⁶⁷Psomiades, 140.

Once the Allies landed, the pace of advocacy increased. In October 1944, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the Greek American newspaper, the *National Herald*, stating:

I am glad to have this opportunity to reassure my friends of Greek origin and Greek birth everywhere that it is the desire of the American government to help Greece to the utmost of its capabilities. It is the further desire of our government that the Greek people who have fought so valiantly for democratic ideals, will be able to exercise as soon as possible the right of all democratic people and choose for themselves a form of government under which they will live.⁶⁸

A few days later on October 28, approximately twenty-five thousand Greek Americans rallied in New York City to celebrate the Allies' landing in Greece and to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the stand against Mussolini. Speakers called on the Allies to provide significant financial aid to Greece and for Greek Americans to put their political differences aside and unite in rebuilding their homeland.

The challenge, though, was disagreement on what form of government should be established, as it appeared the battle between the Venizelists and the royalists was beginning again. One group, which attempted to rally the support of Greek Americans and showed its support for the EAM, was the Greek-American Labor Committee. Leftist in political orientation, the group had been involved throughout the 1930s in advocacy on behalf of Greek workers in the United States. Eventually changing its name to the Greek-American Committee for National Unity (GACFNU), members began to be more involved in lobbying for political changes in post-war Greece. In late 1944, the president of GACFNU and the son-in-law of Venizelos, Stelios Pistolakis, was part of a Greek American delegation that met with U.S. State Department officials. After the meeting he claimed assurance that American policy toward Greece would remain unchanged. The

⁶⁸*New York Times*, October 25, 1944.

delegation also included representatives from other Greek American labor committees, worker's unions, and societies, but not AHEPA⁶⁹, GAPA, the Pan-Arcadians and other groups. The GACFNU kept up its efforts to promote the program of the EAM to the American public through rallies, petitions, and literature. On January 25, 1945, leaders once again met with the State Department and the embassies of Greece and Great Britain. As before, AHEPA and GAPA were not present as the delegation requested Greece be treated in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, the Moscow Agreement, and the Teheran Accord. The delegation attacked British intervention as the cause of the ongoing turmoil in Greece. They called for the restoration of a democratic process as soon as possible, with free elections under the supervision of the United Nations, and the removal of censorship against the EAM placed upon American correspondents in Greece.⁷⁰

Following these efforts, the GACFNU prepared to organize on a broader scale and re-formed as the Greek American Council on February 11, 1945. The group continued its advocacy as before, focusing its efforts on publicizing "accounts of terrorism and destruction in Greece, the return of the collaborationists to power, the threats to free elections, and eye-witness accounts that portrayed the leaders of the EAM as martyrs to the cause of freedom and the British as ruthless imperialists."⁷¹ These

⁶⁹The president of AHEPA, George C. Vournas, issued a message on December 1, 1944, reminding members that the organization was non-political. He stated, "Whether as individuals or as an organization, we act as Americans of Greek descent, we must do everything we can to help the Greek people in their present plight. But we must never forget that the Greeks take their politics seriously and for us to interfere directly or indirectly in their internal affairs is a breach of duty and a breach of propriety," in *Saloutos*, 358.

⁷⁰*Saloutos*, 359-360.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 361.

struggles were symptomatic of worsening conditions in Greece, and the country was on a course toward full civil war.

During the period of World War II, Greek American political advocacy united behind the common cause of the homeland and the American war effort; and as Saloutos describes this had significant psychological effects on the community. “It enhanced the Greek-American’s status in American society, accelerated the already well-advanced process of assimilation, and increased the confidence of a long-insecure group of people. Few now were prone to view themselves as Greeks or even as Greek-Americans. In some quarters such designations were roundly resented. They had become Americans of Hellenic descent.”⁷² This transformation was shown in the divide in the post-war approach by groups within the community to the turmoil in Greece. Even though GACFNU, and later the Greek American Council, was visible and attempting to influence U.S. foreign policy and American public opinion on the political direction in Greece, other strong, more indigenous groups, such as AHEPA, remained neutral. Certainly, one of the issues behind this response was the uncertainty of the affairs in Greece. Another was the ongoing focus on humanitarian aid, an effort that had engaged AHEPA, the Greek Orthodox Church, and other fraternal societies for four years. A third element was the desire to maintain unity in the Greek American community and to show that Greek Americans were an important part of the fabric of the nation.⁷³ Cooperation

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Concerns over the status and public opinion of Greek Americans were valid due to the social and economic standing that many had achieved by this time in the history of the United States. It was also a concern related to the analysis being conducted by the Department of Justice on ethnic groups whose loyalty to the United States was challenged by war-related issues. On April 12, 1944, the Department published an

and a shared identity had not been easy to achieve, and much of the strife of the past had been caused by political divisions in Greece. However, as the post-war conditions in Greece deteriorated, most Greek Americans realized they could not remain neutral.

The Truman Doctrine and Greek American Advocacy

By early 1947, Greece was engulfed in civil war.⁷⁴ The British government had announced that it would not be able to support the country after March 31, nor maintain its military presence in accord with the 1944 agreement with the Soviet Union.⁷⁵ The Greek government was under attack from the country's Balkan neighbors with accusations of fascism. The economy was still in shambles following the occupation and war; and political divisions were strong and deep between the urban and rural areas of the country. With conditions worsening and the fear that communist leaders would take control of the country, the United States "shifted from a passive policy of political

extensive report by Constantine G. Yavis entitled *Propaganda in the Greek-American Community*. The report was prepared for use by government agencies in relation to the community. It offers a general historical survey of Greeks in the United States, activities of Greek officials and Greek Americans on political issues, the Greek Orthodox Church, fraternal societies, political parties, labor unions, regional societies, relief and cultural organizations, and Greek publications. Excerpts from this report appear in the *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 14 (1987): 105-129.

⁷⁴In addition to negating any recovery from the occupation, the civil war exacted additional heavy losses on the country. Approximately 550,000, or eight percent of the population had died during World War II. The violence of the civil war resulted in 158,000 casualties and over 700,000 refugees. See Theodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropoulos, and Harry J. Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: A Historical Perspective* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976), 117-118.

⁷⁵The objective of this agreement was to keep Greece away from the control of the Soviet Union. Great Britain assumed responsibility for Greece, and Romania and Bulgaria were allotted to the Soviet Union.

idealism to an active realistic role in Greek affairs.”⁷⁶ This policy transition of the United States from a more isolationist or non-interfering stance in peace time Europe, was known as the “Truman Doctrine.” The U.S. government already had some involvement in Greece, including sending warships to the region in 1945 and supporting Greece in the debates in the United Nations Security Council in February, September, and December 1946. Kondis summarizes the broader policy implications of U.S. involvement in Greece as the next logical step in its foreign policy in the region:

The United States perceived the crisis in Greece as part of a Soviet plan to turn Greece into a people’s republic. Moreover, the decision to aid Greece was a crucial prerequisite for stability in Turkey. If the communist guerrillas succeeded in seizing control in Greece, Turkey would have been threatened because of the strategic position of the Greek mainland and islands. World War II had shown that with the Germans in possession of the islands, the Allies had lost control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The same would have been true had the Soviet Union taken them over.⁷⁷

With these goals in mind and with concerns about the strategic location of Greece and Turkey in relation to the oil resources of the Middle East, U.S. officials began pressing Greek leaders in the fall of 1946 for moderation in its policies in exchange for economic aid. This was emphasized in a letter from President Truman to the Greek monarch, King George, offering substantial aid and supplies if the Greek government could persuaded American public opinion that democracy was functioning in Greece and the Greek people were united.

⁷⁶Basil Kondos, “The United States Role in the Greek Civil War,” in *The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective*, ed. Eugene T. Rossides (New York and Washington: The Academy of Political Science and American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 1998), 144.

⁷⁷Kondis, 145.

For Truman, his position on the crisis in Greece and the advancement of U.S. interests in the region was presented in his address to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. Affirming the “gravity of the situation” and announcing the appeal from Greece for economic assistance, President Truman reviewed the extent of the crisis in Greece, the threats to the existence of the Greek state, and the need for immediate assistance. He continued: “The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid, but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.”⁷⁸ After offering the supporting points for assistance to both Greece and Turkey, the President emphasized the main points of this transitional policy and what would come to be known as the Truman Doctrine:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures, I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political process.⁷⁹

His speech concluded with a request for \$400 million in aid for both countries. By the end of July 1947, all of the elements of Truman’s proposal were approved, and by 1950 over \$600 million in assistance was distributed to Greece and Turkey.

⁷⁸President, Address, “Address of the President of the United States Delivered before a Joint Session of the Senate and House of Representatives, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” March 12, 1947, 80th Cong., House of Representatives, Doc. 171, H. Docs., 80-1, vol. 18-63.

⁷⁹Ibid.

The Truman Doctrine and aid to Greece and Turkey did not become a source of contention among Greeks in Americans. Saloutos remarks that “this is difficult to understand, especially in view of their usual ceaseless concern with the affairs of Greece.”⁸⁰ One explanation is that the events leading to U.S. intervention happened so quickly, Greek Americans had insufficient time to form ranks around different opinions. Another was that the focus on relief efforts consumed the attention of the community, and certainly conditions were not improving. Further, it is evident that none of the major organizations such as AHEPA, GAPA, or the GWRA were asked about their views on the Truman policies. Even in the congressional process, only two American Greeks appeared before committees expressing views that U.S. aid would only make the situation worse by supporting the royalist government. In a few Greek American publications opposition articles appeared suggesting that a large portion of the community was opposed to U.S. intervention. However, this opposition did not materialize in advocacy against the aid. In fact, as time passed, more and more support was expressed for the ongoing involvement of the United States in helping Greece achieve some level of economic and political stability. Moskos states, “If Franklin Roosevelt was venerated by most Greek Americans, Harry Truman was much more an object of genuine affection.”⁸¹ Archbishop Athenagoras proclaimed the President to be “a man sent from God,” and directed the churches of the Archdiocese to offer a special service of thanksgiving for Truman and his family.⁸² The AHEPA initiated the President into the order at the White

⁸⁰Saloutos, 368.

⁸¹Moskos, 51.

⁸²*New York Times*, March 17, 1947.

House, and in 1963 the organization erected a memorial statue in Athens.⁸³ These are just a few examples that illustrate the increasing roles these organizations had in representing the Greek American community, especially in fostering and maintaining relationships with Presidents and other high ranking government officials.

This was especially the case for the role that the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church began to assume in addressing issues of concern on behalf of the Greek American community and its advocacy on United States foreign policy toward Greece. During the 1930s, the attention of the Archdiocese had been focused on achieving internal organization and stability. In the early 1940s, efforts were directed at relief efforts on behalf of Greece. However, during this time and his tenure as archbishop, Athenagoras cultivated relationships with Presidents and other U.S. officials. He was respected by Truman, received praise at the White House for his leadership in the work of the Greek War Relief Association, and when Athenagoras was elected Ecumenical Patriarch in 1948, the President provided his plane to transport the new Patriarch to Istanbul. These relationships were further cultivated under Athenagoras' successor, Archbishop Michael who led the church from 1950 until his death in 1958. Michael was the first Greek Orthodox hierarch to participate in a presidential inauguration in 1953, and at President Eisenhower's second inauguration in 1957, he gave the invocation. Further, Eisenhower participated in laying the cornerstone for the Saint Sophia Cathedral in Washington, D.C., was honored by the Archbishop with the Golden Cross of Saint Andrew, and when Michael became suddenly ill at the Grand Banquet of the 1958 Clergy-Laity Congress, he

⁸³Leber, 435-438. Leber provides an overview of the project and includes excerpts from the dedication ceremony.

sent a military plane to transport the Archbishop back to New York.⁸⁴ The recognition that was given to the spiritual leader of the Greek American community also facilitated his role of advocacy on behalf of the struggles of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey. This is addressed in more detail in chapter five on the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in America in lobbying U.S. foreign policy on behalf of the Patriarchate; but to summarize here, Archbishop Michael led these efforts in America following attacks on Greeks and the Patriarchate. He received national media attention in his efforts with other leaders of the Greek American community in expressing their concern and asking the President and Congress to intervene. Patriarch Athenagoras also joined in this campaign, reminding Americans in the press that he “had been an American citizen, loved the U.S. and its ideals and expected his former second homeland to show concern for his venerable office.”⁸⁵ In addition, the Archdiocese published at a cost of \$25,000 a special newspaper portraying the Turkish atrocities at the Patriarchate and distributed the paper to members of Congress and the news media. In combination with other factors, this campaign led to a temporary cessation of Turkish attacks and prevented the possible destruction of the Patriarchate.⁸⁶

The role of the Greek Orthodox Church, and specifically its Archbishop and those who were prominent leaders in the Church and the Greek American community

⁸⁴*A Breath of Spiritual Fragrance: The Treasure of Archbishop Michael of North and South America* (New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2008).

⁸⁵George Christopoulos, “Impact Through Public Relations,” in *History of the Greek Orthodox Church in America*, ed. Miltiades B. Efthimiou and George A. Christopoulos (New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1984), 240.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*

continued under Michael's successor, Archbishop Iakovos, who was enthroned in 1959. His leadership took the Church into the last decade of the twentieth century and through a period which offered numerous connections between U.S. foreign policy and Greek Americans, Greece, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. More political turmoil in Greece, followed by challenges in Cyprus and the eventual Turkish invasion of the island in 1974, led to a more intensive engagement by the Church in attempts to use the prestige and strength of the Greek American community to influence the positions and actions of the United States government.

CHAPTER THREE

The Greek Junta and the Cyprus Crisis

The most prominent issue in Greek American advocacy over the last fifty years has been Cyprus. Beginning with the island's struggle for self-determination and continuing with the challenges created by the Turkish invasion of 1974, this advocacy has focused on influencing United States foreign policy in the region, especially the relationship U.S. administrations and the military have had with Turkey, along with the role Congress has played in shaping policies on foreign affairs. Advocacy on Cyprus has also aided in the cohesion of the Greek American community, as well as contributed to the expansion of the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in the United States, both as a means of communication and engagement on this and other foreign policy issues, and in the role of Church leadership in representing the Greek American community before U.S. officials and lawmakers.

This chapter examines these roles of the Church in the context of Greek American advocacy on Cyprus, beginning with the independence movement on the island and efforts at union with Greece in the 1950s. The chapter also addresses Greek American advocacy during the Greek junta of 1967-1974. During this period of political transition in Greece, Greek Americans were not unified in their views and were challenged by their loyalties to America and its ideals and their connections with the homeland. Church leadership, also conflicted by these loyalties and aware of the potential discord in the U.S. community, did not take public positions on the situation in Greece. However, this changed with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974, opening a period of intense

and somewhat successful lobbying efforts by Greek Americans and setting the stage for ongoing access to U.S. leaders on additional foreign policy issues.

The Beginnings of the Crisis

The beginnings of the crisis in Cyprus can certainly be traced back to the animosities engendered under Ottoman rule beginning with the invasion of 1571. However, the origins of the modern crisis of a divided Cyprus are also rooted in the transitions of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries that began when Great Britain took over administration of the island in 1878 for an annual payment of ninety-two thousand pounds. While the money was intended to pay an Ottoman debt to Britain, the funds were procured by a British tax on Greek Cypriots. Following the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus when the Turkish government aligned with Germany. This was formalized in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne and Turkey's relinquishment of any claim to Cyprus. In 1925, Great Britain designated the island as a Crown Colony.

The struggle of Greek Cypriots for self-determination began in earnest in 1950 when a plebiscite on union with Greece was held in which ninety-six percent expressed their favor. Greece affirmed its support for *enosis* in 1954 with an appeal to the United Nations, but Great Britain continued to ignore and reject popular demands for unity. Further, the issue of union challenged the legitimacy of the Greek nationalist government in Athens and Greece's relationship with the United States and NATO. Gregoriou states, "The more the nationalist leaders made demands on Greece's allies and failed, the more they were exposed to the charges of being 'agents' of NATO, the Pentagon, and the CIA. These charges...were gradually becoming the ideology of the popular masses in

Greece.”¹ Basically, the pursuit of national interest and the union of Cyprus with Greece conflicted with the regional interests of the United States, the main benefactor of Greece, and with those of NATO countries Britain and Turkey.

Diplomacy on the issue ended on March 31, 1955, when the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) began their armed conflict with British authorities. In the “name of God and Mother Greece,” the nationalist-church leadership of the EOKA appealed to Greek Cypriots to fight against colonialism and for union with Greece.² The initial intensions of the uprising were to persuade supporters among the British and Americans to be more conciliatory; however, it became a struggle of Greeks around the world against Great Britain. The members of the EOKA where called “freedom fighters,” and Greek Americans lobbied Washington for support, reminding U.S. officials that Greece had fought for the Allies in two world wars and that Turkey, in its opposition to the goals of Greece and Cyprus, was not a “true friend” of the United States. They attempted to “convince the American people, the leaders of the free world, and the saviors of Greece from communism, to do what was just and right for Cyprus.”³ With the continuation of violence in Cyprus, Great Britain organized a conference with Greece and Turkey on September 3-7, 1955, to address the crisis. If any progress could have been made toward resolution, it was thwarted on September 6 when anti-Greek riots broke out in Turkey resulting in the destruction of over four thousand Greek and Armenian businesses, seven hundred homes, and eighty churches in Istanbul and Izmir.

¹George Gregoriou, *Cyprus: A View from the Diaspora* (New York: Smyrna Press, 2000), 32-33.

²Ibid., 34.

³Ibid., 35.

Negotiations between British officials and Greek Cypriot leaders continued, but by 1958 widespread violence on the island began between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Some level of stabilization of the crisis came in February 1959 with the signing of the London-Zurich Agreements by Britain, Greece, Turkey and representatives of both Cypriot groups, and in 1960, Cyprus became an independent republic, joined the United Nations, and became a member of the Council of Europe the following year. Peace was short lived, though, with the renewal of intercommunal violence on the island in December of 1963 and the dividing of Nicosia. In response, Turkey threatened invasion, which was met by a UN resolution supporting the sovereignty of Cyprus, peacekeeping forces, and a warning from President Johnson. On March 26, 1965, the UN mediator, Galo Plaza, submitted a report stating that the only viable solution was an independent and unitary Cyprus. The report emphasized the need for protecting minority and individual rights and recommended the demilitarization of the island. The report was accepted by Greece and Cyprus, but was rejected by Turkey, Turkish Cypriots and the United States. The crisis continued to escalate over the next decade and relations in the region were exacerbated when a military junta seized control of the government of Greece in 1967, supporting the destabilization of the Cypriot government and unification with Greece.

The politics of Greek Americans in relation to the crisis in Cyprus of the 1950s and 1960s, as Gregoriou states, reflected an “age of innocence.” “The agenda was to appeal to Washington to help the Cypriot people achieve their freedom and union with Greece. It was a period when Greeks in general and Greek Americans were full of admiration for the United States for saving Greece from communism. Washington’s

opposition to self-determination did not deter the immigrants from trying harder: more letter-writing to newspapers, congressmen, and the President of the United States; bigger collection of signatures, money, and votes; and even bigger threats to fight to the very end until victory.⁴ For the most part, though, they were ignored, both by U.S. officials and the media. One reason for this was that U.S. interests in the region had developed beyond the influence and concerns of this vocal segment of the American population. U.S. policy was directed at broader concerns that were related to the spread of communism and the strengthening of allies and access in relation to the resources of the Middle East. Another reason was that Greek Americans themselves were caught in a contradiction. On the one hand, they supported the role of the United States in the affairs of the homeland, while at the same time they mobilized to champion an independent Cyprus and its union with Greece. Gregoriou summarizes:

It never occurred to Greek-Americans that Washington was not only pro-British, it opposed every anti-colonial and nationalist movement which weakened European colonialism and stood in the way of the United States becoming the neo-colonial superpower. The Greek governments and the leadership in the diaspora were so pro-American they could not devise an alternative policy to begging. The immigrant leadership had only one strategy: appeal to the Anglo-American officials, and do it in a civilized way.⁵

These efforts in the early advocacy of Greek Americans regarding U.S. policy toward Cyprus were joined by calls to action made by the Greek Orthodox Church. Following an escalation of violence against Greeks in Turkey and Cyprus, Archbishop Iakovos issued an encyclical on August 13, 1964, urging clergy and parish leaders around the country to “immediately take the initiative to assure that the Senators and

⁴Ibid., 29.

⁵Ibid., 31.

Congressman of your State are literally flooded with thousands of messages and, if possible, telegrams of protest, regarding the acts perpetrated by the Turks, under the sleeping eyes of our government, and that of our allies, against our brothers....”⁶ In urging Greek Orthodox Christians in America to political advocacy, the Archbishop also called for relief efforts to provide medical assistance, food, and shelter. The plea for assistance was repeated later in the month in a letter to the parishes of the Archdiocese asking for donations to the Cyprus Victims Fund. In both of these letters, the Archbishop appealed to elements that resonated with both Greek Orthodox faith and a Greek American identity.

As a free and prospering people, we have a sacred obligation to face and accept the foregoing dictates of our consciences and our souls. No measure of neglectfulness or indifference is permitted at this time, as thousands of souls are at this very moment in deadly peril in Cyprus and Turkey, and while the ideals of freedom and justice are so flagrantly being violated by Turks, tolerated unfortunately by us, as Greeks and Americans.⁷

Help for these innocent victims will be one way for my fellow Americans of the Greek Orthodox faith to show that they have never, and will not now, forswear or abandon the suffering. It is not permissible for us to leave to Communists the task of protesting the burning of children. Ours has been a national tradition to help the poor, and demonstrate our determination to put an end to any and all acts of violence and injustice.⁸

Throughout the initial decades of the crisis in Cyprus and in response to Turkish aggression toward Greeks on the island and in Asia Minor, the focus of advocacy on the

⁶Archbishop Iakovos, “Protocol No. 125,” August 13, 1964, *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America: The First Fifty Years 1922-1972*, ed. Demetrios Constantelos (Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1976), 1167-1168.

⁷Ibid., 1168.

⁸Archbishop Iakovos, “To the Reverent Priests, the esteemed members of the Boards of Trustees and the communities of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America,” August 27, 1964, *Encyclicals and Documents*, 1169-1170.

part of the leadership of the Archdiocese was on awareness and relief. Other Greek American groups led the way in the engagement with U.S. policy in the region, and they continued to do so with the assistance of strong allies in Congress following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Before this momentous event in the history of the crisis occurred, Greek Americans were challenged by another transition in Greece, and greater political pressure began to be exerted upon the Church as an influential partner in Greek American advocacy.

The Junta in Greece - 1967-1974

On April 21, 1967, military leaders took control of the government of Greece and began arresting and expelling political leaders. Initially, even though an arms embargo was imposed within a few days of the coup, the United States was cautious in responding, and officials expressed their hopes for a quick return to democracy. No serious consideration was given to the use of military force to oust the junta, and with limited political capital to invest in Greece, the Johnson administration attempted to advise King Constantine in resolving the crisis and obtaining concessions. This was a means by which the United States could put pressure on the Greek military leaders and give leverage to the king by designating him as the principle contact between the two governments. In response, the junta's leaders showed very little interest in the concerns or actions of the United States. Their focus was on carrying out a planned program before returning the nation to constitutional power. In addition, the indecisiveness of the U.S. government in responding to the crisis was influenced by several other factors. First, a debate ensued over whether or not to end military aid to Greece. On the one hand, Greek opponents of the junta and their allies in the United States argued that a denial of

aid would cause the junta to collapse. On the other, a majority of American diplomats believed that pressure would not oust the junta and ending military aid would only harm Western defense capabilities. Second, U.S. officials were cautious because they lacked information about the new Greek leaders.⁹

Concerned that he had little time to regain control of the army before it was purged of his supporters, King Constantine made an informal visit to the United States in July 1967. President Johnson, advised of the damage that could result from a counter coup, attempted to restrain the King. He also indicated that the military support of the United States would not be made available, and any aid would be dependent on the approval of Congress. In addition to showing cautious steps in action toward Greece, Johnson's position reflected a direction among U.S. officials toward improving ties with the junta. The embargo had not had a psychological impact, as the Greek people remained unaware of the action due to press censorship. In addition, the Greek government was willing to cooperate with NATO and was clearly anticommunist. Favor was also won with the Pentagon when the junta participated in supply efforts to Israel during the Six-Day War of June 1967. Recommendations were made to lift the embargo, but President Johnson declined, revealing that the U.S. government was unsure about how to handle the situation in Greece.

Following a failed coup against the junta launched by the king on December 13, 1967, the United States had to reassess its relationship with the military leaders in Athens. Phillips Talbot, the U.S. ambassador, advised acceptance that no viable

⁹James Edward Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 149-151.

alternative existed and that Washington should regularize its relationship with Athens. In addition, the junta leaders believed that they had the upper hand, both in Greece and in this relationship with the United States. In a personal letter from the Greek prime minister to President Johnson, the junta leadership affirmed that the government of Greece was committed to the goals of a “Free World” led by the United States. In addition, the letter also acknowledged that while the junta had temporarily suspended the nation’s constitution, “the regime of this country—democracy together with a hereditary sovereign—will remain unaltered.” Assurances were offered that the process of political normalization would begin soon with a new constitution.¹⁰

The response from Washington came quickly, and on January 13, 1968, the State Department instructed Talbot to communicate a desire for normalization of relations with the junta. As an indicator of this, the United States was also willing to end its pressure on Greece for a return to constitutional government while continuing to insist that this be done as soon as possible. Greek officials attributed the new policy direction to challenges in Vietnam and recognition that the regime in Athens had the ability to consolidate its power in Greece. Expressing the argument that was used in defending U.S. policy for the next six years, Ambassador Talbot affirmed that a renewed program of military assistance would assist the more moderate elements in the junta and facilitate the eventual restoration of democracy. Miller summarizes the result of this policy transition:

The U.S. government had begun its slide down a slippery slope into the embrace of the junta. With Talbot in the lead, and despite a measured skepticism among officials in Washington, the Johnson administration began to substitute a policy of suasion for the use of carrot-and-stick tactics in seeking its objectives. While the

¹⁰Ibid., 153-154.

restoration of democracy remained a primary objective of administration policy, it was now premised on a belief that such actions as the arms embargo were having no effect and should be abandoned. The United States...had to find a way to work with [the junta leadership] to achieve democracy. As the process of constitution writing advanced, American officials comforted themselves that the policy was working. At the same time, they began to stress the need for reinforcing Greece's "strategic facilities" to face the Soviet Union.¹¹

The dilemma for American policymakers was quite clear. While some were sympathetic to the hopes of diaspora Greeks to restore democracy in Greece, many more were concerned about the international stability that could be in jeopardy if the junta failed and a new anti-Western government moved Greece toward the Soviet bloc.¹² In addition, the amount of anti-junta pressure being exerted by Greek Americans was limited. As noted above, a major reason for this was the intensity of American patriotism among Greeks in the United States. In his examination of Greek American advocacy regarding both the junta and Cyprus, Clifford Hackett explains:

To question the judgments of the American government was difficult for first- and second-generation Greek-Americans. The seven years of the Greek junta found this community inclined to heed Washington's judgments and ignore those of a few congressmen and senators and the occasional critical voice of the dictatorship's Greek or Greek-American opposition. None of the authority figures for the highly organized Greek-American community—neither the

¹¹Ibid., 155.

¹²Clifford P. Hackett recognizes that the collapse of democracy in Greece was the exception to Congress' obsession with "winning" in Vietnam. He states, "There were several explanations for this exception but these did not include the Greek-American community which largely remained complacent toward events in Greece, with a few courageous exceptions. Outside of Greece itself, concern about the fate of Greek democracy centered on two groups: a small number of congressmen and senators, supported by several small, outside groups and individuals, and a number of European governments and parliamentarians who attempted to influence American policy...." See "Congress and Greek American Relations: The Embargo Example," *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 15 (1988): 7.

Church, nor the major ethno-social organization, AHEPA, nor the American president—ever expressed any concern over the dictatorship in Greece.¹³

This generalization is certainly true concerning the lack of formal positions taken by Greek Americans on the junta. It also represents, as Chris Ioannides affirms, the fluctuation “between sympathy for the junta and condoning its rule, and apathy concerning developments in Greece.”¹⁴ In his reflections fifty-years after the junta seized power, Dan Georgakas expressed his belief at the time that Greek Americans “would be outraged by what had happened in the place they so frequently lauded as ‘the cradle of democracy.’”¹⁵ Instead he discovered how little Greek Americans knew about politics in Greece, or that others considered the country “so backward that it needed an occasional law-and-order dictatorship.” Others in the community were more concerned with protecting their business or professional interests or that opposing the junta would bring harm to their families. Georgakas also states, “I was most shocked by the silence of the Greek American establishment, including the Archdiocese. Individuals, of course, worked behind the scenes, but for a myriad of reasons, most organizations would not speak out until the colonels murdered university students at the Polytechnic in 1973.” Those who were anti-junta activists, especially Greek nationals exiled in the United States, accused Greek Americans of supporting the junta by their lack of concern. Elias P. Demetracopoulos who lobbied heavily in Washington remarked, “Greek Americans

¹³Ibid., 12-13.

¹⁴Chris P. Ioannides, *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, Modern Greek Research Series (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2001), 48.

¹⁵Dan Georgakas, “Greek Americans Against the Junta Then and Now,” in “The Greek Junta: A Retrospective,” special edition of *The National Herald*, April 21, 2007, 11.

are not my cup of tea. Eighty percent of them backed the junta.”¹⁶ Elaborating on attitudes that may have contributed to this, Moskos states:

Indeed, for many older people the Greek regime—with its clamping down on disturbances, its anti-hippy stance—was doing what ought to be done in this country. Speaking on their behalf, a sixty-eight-year-old immigrant was quoted as saying: ‘America is a great country with many good things, except for one thing, it gives too much freedom.’ It ought also be remembered that the well-born Greek elite has customarily looked down on Greek Americans and their peasant background. The junta, partly composed of Greeks of more modest origins than Greece’s traditional ruling class, struck a responsive chord among self-made Greek Americans.¹⁷

Second generation Greeks Americans did not want to be entangled with Greek politics, and many argued that their support for the junta was a means of keeping lines of communication open with the homeland.¹⁸ But just as Greek Americans were unable to take a firm position on the political situation in Greece due either to apathy, American loyalties, or the complexity of the situation, their leaders were also aware of the internal conflict that such positions might bring to the community in the United States.

Regarding the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in America in any advocacy on this issue, the dilemma of how to respond was revealed in exchanges between Archbishop Iakovos and several anti-junta activists. The first of these was exiled General Orestis E. Vidalis, who was expelled from Greece in 1968 for his participation in the counter-coup launched by King Constantine in December of the previous year. During his exile in the United States, Vidalis attempted to rally Greek American support against the

¹⁶See Russell W. Howe and Sarah H. Trott, *The Power Peddlers* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1977), 461.

¹⁷Moskos, 108. The quote is from the *Orthodox Observer*, July 7, 1976. Moskos notes that the “quotation was prefaced by an editorial plea for ‘law-and-order’ Greek Americans to be more supportive of civil liberties and minority rights.”

¹⁸Ibid.

junta through regular correspondence and meetings with Greek American leaders and organizations and lobbying of U.S. officials. In his diary of these efforts, Vidalis includes a letter from the archbishop he received on July 17, 1969 in response to his of July 1. In his remarks on how to proceed in dealing with the junta, the archbishop chastises those who have expected the Greek American community to shoulder the responsibility of the crisis in Greece. He states:

Where are the politicians and the soldiers? Why must the Greeks abroad—this extension of metropolitan Hellenism—bear the full burden of responsibility or take the full curse of the homeland? To help? Yes. They did it in the revolution of '21. They did it in the disaster of '40. They did it again after the wars, both the first and the last one. They will do it again, through church guidance and influence. But, in which direction? In cooperation with whom? To what purpose? And should any action or endeavor fall flat, then what? Then the overseas Greeks, as a symbol of home and influence, also will be lost. Coordination is needed. Who will draw up the battle plan? Shouting and slogans and abuse never won a battle. The battle must be fought. And it must be fought in both capitals, Washington and Athens. Simultaneously. Fiercely, decisively. The capitals of Italy and France must be aware if it. London and Bonn must be mobilized. That is when the Greeks of America will be needed. I assure you that they will not desert the cause. This time, too, they will be present.¹⁹

Vidalis replied with a lengthy letter explaining his case for Greek American involvement against the junta, and followed with a meeting with the archbishop on August 6.

According to Vidalis' report of the meeting, Iakovos described a meeting with Costas Aslanidis, one of the lieutenant colonels of the junta leadership and Secretary General of Athletics. Vidalis states: "Clearly, Iakovos told Aslanidis that the best thing they [the junta leaders] could do was remove themselves from power. They were not going to gain anything. When Aslanidis asked him to intercede with the administration, he replied, 'It is not the job of the Orthodox Church in America to intervene either for or against the

¹⁹Letter of Archbishop Iakovos of America to Orestis E. Vidalis, July 17, 1969, in Orestis E. Vidalis, *Confronting the Greek Dictatorship in the U.S.: Years of Exile: A Personal Diary (1968-1975)* (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2009): 45-46.

regime.” Vidalis expressed his concern that many Americans wanted a solution to the dilemma in Greece while many Greek Americans remained indifferent. However, Iakovos affirmed a stance of not dividing the Church, one in which he indicated affirmation from Secretary of State William Rogers. Vidalis responded, “There is a difference between the Church and the community. Obviously the Church cannot make statements, but the community?” His concern was with the upcoming AHEPA conference in Athens, a sign of either indifference or support toward the junta from the Greek American community. Vidalis queried, “Can’t they at least remain neutral?” The archbishop agreed to apply pressure on the AHEPA leaders.²⁰

Vidalis also included in his diary another document which offers some insight into the status Archbishop Iakovos had attained in the view of U.S. officials, as both a person of influence within the Greek American community and someone to consult regarding U.S. foreign policy toward Greece. The document was an account of a meeting of the archbishop, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger on January 22, 1970.²¹ After stating the current position of the United States, one of persuasion rather than isolation, President Nixon asked the archbishop his opinion. Archbishop Iakovos recorded his reply:

I answered that I am not a political person and, therefore, have no political opinion. I am of Greek origin...and my interest and concern derive from the stressful conditions under which the Greek people are living, both here and in Greece. This is because we know something the Colonels, apparently, are ignoring. That there is such a thing as a disciplined democracy, as was the case under Mr. Karamanlis. Such a disciplined democracy could come after the

²⁰Vidalis, 51.

²¹Ibid., 74-76. Vidalis received the document from Princess Irene, the sister of King Constantine II. She had received it from Archbishop Iakovos, and gave it to Vidalis when she met with him in Detroit on February 3, 1970.

present situation instead of the bloodshed awaiting Greece if the present dictatorship is removed by force.²²

President Nixon made a second request for the archbishop's opinion and expressed his desire to know the views of both King Constantine and the former prime minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis. Even though Iakovos had expressed his apolitical position, it was clear from the comments he offered that he had very clear preferences. He stated:

I know the King will not return unless the revolutionaries announce a specific time for elections. As for Mr. Karamanlis' opinion, for a long time he has believed that a transitional government, backed by the army... must be formed. This government will rule for at least one year, revise the constitution and proceed to free, open, and fair elections. I also know that at one time he was willing... to head such a government, to guarantee the military's smooth (without revenge) return to their barracks, take the country to elections, and retire from political life, believing this the ultimate political service to his country.²³

The Archbishop wrote that the President responded favorably to this, stating that Karamanlis was a "remarkable Greek politician." At the conclusion of the meeting the President expressed his relief from the conversation with Archbishop Iakovos and asked the hierarch to convey his greetings to King Constantine. Iakovos answered, "I will be glad to do so at the first opportunity, Mr. President, and I am at your disposal for any service I can provide as an American citizen."²⁴ Although the level of contact of Archbishop Iakovos with some of the highest officials continued, he maintained an outward position of neutrality regarding the role of the Church in these affairs. In a September 3, 1971 letter to Vidalis he states, "The Archdiocese is doing what it can (and there is not much it can do in the political sector) to discourage involvement that is not

²²Ibid., 74-75.

²³Ibid., 76-77.

²⁴Ibid., 77.

advantageous to the present or future of Hellenism in America. The subject is very delicate and great attention is necessary, but it is also serious and demands being handled with prudence....”²⁵

By mid-1973, both governments were facing crises that had a significant impact on foreign policy efforts. President Nixon’s political career was collapsing as the investigation on the Watergate break-in proceeded, directing his attention away from foreign affairs. In Greece, the junta leader George Papadopoulos was facing challenges to his authority from Greek students, unrest in the military, and the rise of opposition leaders. These crises provided an opportunity for Karamanlis to denounce the regime and call for the restoration of democracy. Papadopoulos responded with attempts to restructure the government and solidify his position via talks with the opposition and the offer of elections. The discord in the Greek military and the possibility of rigged elections initiated cautious efforts within the U.S. government to consider modifying its policies toward Greece and push toward democratic reforms. Proposals for action on the part of the United States began to appear in the Senate, but congressional leaders were divided. At the same time, Archbishop Iakovos sent a very strong letter to Secretary of State Rogers in response to remarks the Secretary had made about the crisis:

I have never addressed such a letter to you, nor would I have done so now, were it not for the statement made by you two days ago pertaining to the official policy of our Country towards Greece. This statement on the tyrannical situation in Greece contradicts both our political philosophy and the interests of our country, which interests should lie with the people, and not in the hands of the leaders who form an unacceptable, self-imposed and self-perpetuating oligarchy.... Our present “hands off” policy is not one which is consistent with the global interests and concerns of our Country. The abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a military democracy is not “internal” nor is it the personal matter of the self-imposed dictators of Greece. Greece...deserves both our respect and our

²⁵Ibid., 166.

concern.... My motivation in addressing this letter to you, Mr. Secretary, is purely American, purely Christian, and purely moral, for as a clergyman, I must at all times, stand for the freedom and dignity of the God-made man.²⁶

In addition to increased efforts on the part of Greek American leaders and members of Congress to pressure the U.S. government to act, attention was also being given to the role of the Church. On December 12, 1973, Vidalis met again with Archbishop Iakovos together with Babis Marketos the publisher of the Greek American newspaper *The National Herald*. Marketos pressured the archbishop for an official response from the Archdiocesan Council emphasizing that a clear stance from the Church would influence Greek Americans and have an effect on Washington. He asked Iakovos to address this in his Christmas or New Year's encyclical.²⁷ Vidalis expressed his view on the role of Greek Americans and the Church in addressing the crisis. He stated, "I also don't agree with the view...that the Greek-Americans have no effect. All these years various administration officials have literally tortured me with the argument that the Greek-Americans favor the regime. All those...who say that they have no effect, are saying so to discourage you from initiatives that could mobilize Greek-Americans because they do

²⁶Ibid., 290-291. The archbishop sent copies of this letter to Vidalis, which he included in his diary.

²⁷In official Archdiocesan documents, there is no record of Archbishop Iakovos taking a public position on the junta. It is not mentioned in his addresses to the biennial meetings of the Clergy-Laity Congress of the period, and it should be noted that the 1968 Congress was held in Athens. For these addresses see Demetrios J. Constantelos, ed., *Visions and Expectations for a Living Church: Addresses to Clergy-Laity Congresses 1960-1996*, vol. 1, The Complete Works of His Eminence Archbishop Iakovos (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998). For encyclicals of the period see Demetrios J. Constantelos, ed., *The Torchbearer: Encyclicals: Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Subjects, Administration, Education, Culture*, vol. 1 (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1999).

not want to be bothered.”²⁸ Vidalis continued by emphasizing the role the Church had played in critical moments.

Today the nation is going through the greatest crisis in its history and the Greeks, who in 1973 proved in every way—the navy, the Chiefs of Staff, the fake referendum, the Polytechnic, workers, young people, the press, the politicians—that they will not compromise with the dictatorship, would be much encouraged if the free part of Hellenism living in this country would now, at least now, demonstrate active involvement. The time has come for your Reverence to undertake the difficult yet historic task to awaken the Greeks of America.²⁹

Vidalis recorded that the archbishop listened carefully and stated that both he and the Archdiocesan Council would follow through. However, this did not happen. On May 24, 1974, Vidalis penned another letter to the archbishop asking for the prelate to encourage the response of Greek Americans. In response, he received a letter in which the Archbishop tersely described the reasons that this is not possible. He states: “The Greeks of America are apolitical as far as the issue of Greece is concerned. They are interested in (and offer much to) American political affairs but not to Greek political affairs.” Iakovos expressed his concern that if Greek Americans appeared to be more concerned with the affairs of their homeland, this might reignite the prejudice that had been shown toward Greeks in the past, “just as there was against the Italians and Japanese. Just as anti-Semitism exists (and is increasing) today.” He also indicated that U.S. officials wanted “fewer political headaches,” following Kissinger’s principle to “let sleeping dogs lie.” He states, “I have reason to believe that the vast majority of Congress trusts Kissinger and his political or diplomatic philosophical precepts.” The Archbishop concludes, “The situation in Greece will not change unless the Greeks of Greece change

²⁸Vidalis, 323.

²⁹Ibid., 324-325.

it. If you have a different opinion, i.e., that the Greeks in America can change it, you do not have me in agreement.”³⁰ The exchange continued with a lengthy reply from Vidalis clarifying his position and affirming that Greek Americans should take a position on the junta in terms of advocacy of Washington following the archbishop’s example of his letter to Secretary of State Rogers. He stated to Iakovos, “I believe that the right-minded majority of the Greek-American could appear on the historical stage in the interests of both Greece and America...and say ‘that’s enough, after seven years of humiliation of Greece and the Greeks, it bothers us as free people, as Americans.’”³¹ Vidalis concluded his letter by stating that he respected the archbishop’s views but disagreed with him. He also added, “I have done what my duty compelled me to do. Perhaps some day I will be accused of a lack of realism in seeking the support of Greek-Americans, but I will not be accused of inertia.”³² Iakovos’ response of June 13, 1974, was short and direct affirming that Vidalis knew his positions on the subject. The focus and role of the archbishop and Greek American advocacy changed, though, in a few short weeks with the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey on July 20 and the fall of the junta.

Just prior to this dramatic transition in Greece and Cyprus and in U.S. policy in the region, another anti-junta activist met with Archbishop Iakovos and tried to persuade him to lead the Church in responding both to the humanitarian crisis in Cyprus and the junta in Greece. On July 18, 1974, Professor Theodore Couloumbis addressed these issues to the archbishop following a letter he sent to the hierarch criticizing him for the

³⁰Ibid., 361-362

³¹Ibid., 363.

³²Ibid., 364.

lack of public concern by the Church on human rights.³³ In the meeting Couloumbis made several recommendations to Iakovos, including the appointment of a human rights person at the Archdiocese and regular pronouncements by the Church on human rights issues in Greece and around the world. Regarding the junta in Greece, he asked that the archbishop suggest to the AHEPA leadership to include Greek democratic leaders in their upcoming convention in Athens to balance the junta leaders who would be present, and that he organize a committee of clergy and laity to address the welfare of the families of political prisoners in Greece. Iakovos thanked Couloumbis for his presentation, but rejected the recommendation for making a public plea for human rights, stating as the professor recorded, “that he could do a better job by direct and quiet interventions.” He also told Couloumbis about the response to the letter he had sent to Rogers. After the letter was leaked, the junta asked the Patriarch of Constantinople to punish him. Iakovos stated that the Church in America had too many interests in Greece—summer camps and a seminary in Salonika—to risk disturbing relations with the government of Greece. Regarding other efforts on his part, Iakovos informed Couloumbis confidentially that he had written letters to Kissinger and the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim stating that the policies of the junta were challenging peace and stability in the region. He also emphasized his frequent contacts with junta leaders and his interventions for people who were imprisoned or sentenced to death in Greece. As he had with Vidalis, he also expressed his disappointment with the people of Greece for not taking matters into their own hands and offering serious resistance.

³³Theodore A. Couloumbis, *The Greek Junta Phenomenon: A Professor's Notes*, Modern Greek Research Series (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2004), 249-252.

Iakovos continued by focusing on the Greek American community and the reasons he had not gone public with a position. He classified the community in three categories: recent immigrants, old timers, and American-born members of the Church. He claimed the recent immigrants stayed away from the church and cared only about making money and taking frequent trips back to Greece. Regarding the “old timers” Couloumbis recorded, “They care about good business, good cocktail parties, and so forth, and backslapping with any Greek government.” In response Couloumbis noted to himself, “At that time I was thinking how different was all of this from the attitude of Iakovos himself who was willing to sacrifice his concern for human rights for summer camps and the like.” With respect to the Ahepans, the Archbishop added, they are mostly pro-junta and trying to influence them in any way would be difficult if not counter productive.” On the American-born church members, Iakovos stated that they do not want to get involved in Greek politics. He said he had received some criticism from them on the Rogers letter. The archbishop did indicate he would follow the recommendation of a human rights function in the Archdiocese and that he would appoint an advisory committee on general political matters.

Near the end of the conversation Iakovos addressed a few political matters, including his support of Karamanlis and his “tough” exchanges with Vidalis over the roles of Greeks and Greek Americans in opposing the junta. Couloumbis told the archbishop that he “expected the junta will fall soon and that pragmatism dictated that he as the ethnic-leader (of Greek-Americans) should go public so that the ‘image’ of the Greeks vis-à-vis the Greek-Americans could be salvaged even at the last minute. This image, of course, would be one of hostility because the Greeks see Greek-Americans as

either indifferent to the Greek plight or as fervent supporters of the oppressive Greek junta.” Iakovos replied that “he did not expect the junta to fall, that the Greeks were irresponsible and fanatical and that the latest Karamanlis offer to return to Greece would fall into a vacuum.”³⁴ In less than a week after this meeting, the junta fell, three days after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The Cyprus Crisis

On July 15, 1974, a coup was led against the sitting government of Cyprus and its President, Archbishop Makarios, by military officers of Greece with the assistance of the junta leaders. Believing that the coup endangered the Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish government launched an invasion. Within a month, Turkish forces controlled approximately forty percent of the island, and over 180,000 Greek Cypriots, one-third of total Greek population of Cyprus became refugees. In response, the Greek American community organized almost immediately for relief aid and in opposition to U.S. policies in support of Turkey. Specifically, Greek Americans lobbied Congress against the provision of American arms to Turkey. Advocacy cited the “rule of law,” affirming that the use of the arms against the people of Cyprus violated the agreement between Washington and Ankara on shipping U.S. supplied arms out of Turkey. Led by Greek American Congressmen John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes, and by notable members Thomas Eagleton of Missouri and Benjamin Rosenthal of New York, legislation was passed in February 1975 imposing an arms embargo on Turkey. In its final form the embargo was basically a suspension of arms shipments until progress could be made on a

³⁴Ibid., 252.

solution for Cyprus.³⁵ Regarding the success of the Greek American efforts, Moskos states: “The mobilization of the Greek-American community was impressive in its own right, but its successes were also in large part due to factors independent of ethnic politics. Opposition among Greek Americans to military aid for Turkey coincided with the new Congressional mood to reassert its foreign policy prerogatives.”³⁶

Following the invasion of Cyprus, the advocacy role of the Greek Orthodox Church changed significantly as the organization of the Archdiocese throughout the United States provided a network to facilitate both relief efforts and lobbying of policymakers on U.S. foreign affairs. Under the leadership of Archbishop Iakovos, committees were established throughout the United States to distribute information on the crisis, encourage contact between Greek Americans and U.S. government leaders, and to raise money for refugees. In the months following the invasion, the Church raised over

³⁵This is recognized by many scholars as an excellent example of ethnic lobbying given the success of the effort and the media attention it received. As an example see “New Lobby in Town: The Greeks,” *Time*, July 17, 1975, 31-32. For major studies on the Turkish arms embargo and Greek American lobbying see Ioannides above; Christos Kassimeris, “The Inconsistency of United States Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Cyprus Invasion: The Turkish Arms Embargo and its Termination,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26:1 (May 2008): 91-114; Fiona B. Adamson, “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” *Political Science Quarterly* 116:2 (Summer 2001): 277-303; Laurence Halley, *Ancient Affections: Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985); Helen Christol and Serge Ricard, eds., *Hyphenated Diplomacy: European Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1914-1984* (Marseille: Universite De Provence, 1985); Abdul Aziz Said, ed., *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1981); and Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, Contributions in Political Science No. 116 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984).

³⁶Moskos, 121.

one million dollars in contributions for this effort.³⁷ Leaders of the Archdiocese also directed efforts at securing authorization for U.S. funds for humanitarian assistance in Cyprus. On October 20, at the archbishop's annual name day dinner in New York, Congressman John Brademas served as toastmaster and Senator Edward Kennedy was the main speaker. Iakovos also presented a check for \$150,000 to Archbishop Makarios, the former leader of Cyprus who was in attendance. By the end of November the Archdiocese had given \$500,000 to Cypriot officials to assist with the refugee crisis. In mid-December, Archbishop Iakovos announced a Foster Parent Plan to aid thousands of homeless and orphaned Cypriot children. Administered by the Archdiocese's National Philoptochos Society, the program facilitated sponsorship of children in Cyprus for twenty dollars per month. On December 17, Archbishop Iakovos testified before a Senate subcommittee stating:

The graveness of the situation does not lie so much in the intolerable conditions in which they live, not even in the fact that they are being sustained with basic, yet very costly foodstuffs, but in the fact that they feel abandoned, even betrayed by their friends. In an age when we speak and strive for human and civil rights, for social justice, for equal opportunities and for a new society wherein righteousness dwells, we, the very same persons, keep silent on a highly humanitarian problem."³⁸

The Church was joined in this effort by the mobilization of all of the major Greek American organizations. In addition to having its national headquarters in Washington, D.C., AHEPA had grown to approximately 50,000 members among 450 chapters across the nation. An additional 20,000 members belonged to auxiliary organizations for

³⁷ Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus Part II, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connect with Refugees and Escapees*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., December 17, 1974, 6-7.

³⁸ *Orthodox Observer*, July 1999, 9.

women and young people. The size of the organization combined with its extensive resources enabled AHEPA to have both significant contact and influence among Greek Americans. At its 1974 convention, the Ahepan leadership organized for the effort with its Justice for Cyprus Committee. The committee had been established in 1955 to lobby for U.S. government support of the Cypriot struggle for self-determination. The role of the committee was to monitor U.S. policy in the region in relation to the interests of the Greek American community, and it began to have an important role in communicating both with Congress and the public about the crisis in Cyprus. Within the year following the invasion, delegations of the committee had four meetings with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the leadership of AHEPA testified before Senate and House committees in 1974 and 1975.³⁹

Another organization that took the lead in advocacy on behalf of Greek Americans was the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) and its public affairs committee (AHI-PAC). Established after the invasion, AHI consisted of prominent members of the Greek American community including businesspeople, lawyers and academics. Its official mission was to be “an organization for strengthening trade and commerce between the United States and Greece, the United States and Cyprus and within the American Hellenic community.”⁴⁰ However, the focus of the organization quickly shifted to the crisis in Cyprus and the role of the United States in facilitating a “free and

³⁹Paul Watanabe, “Greek-American Activism and the Turkish Arms Ban,” in *Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Dimitri C. Conostas and Athanassios G. Platias (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), 36-37.

⁴⁰From an AHI brochure quoted in Watanabe, 37.

sovereign Cyprus with a unitary economy and social stability.”⁴¹ Under the leadership of Eugene Rossides, a law partner of former Secretary of State and Attorney General William Rogers, AHI and its public affairs committee became extensively engaged in the push for a U.S. arms embargo against Turkey.⁴² It hired professional staff to monitor congressional activities by following major legislation that might affect the Greek American community, maintained records on the voting records and policy positions of members of Congress, and developed strategies in using influential Greek American constituents to approach legislators on key issues. Watanabe summarizes this approach:

AHI-PAC was especially adept at coupling its own unique resources, information, and leadership abilities with the large-scale, grassroots activation network of AHEPA. By using AHEPA’s channels to and from the Greek-American community at large, AHI-PAC could remain structurally small, profession and tightly coordinated, but not isolated. AHI-PAC’s leaders wisely recognized that no other organizations could match AHEPA’s and the Church’s capabilities to generate at propitious moments avalanches of letters, telegrams, telephone calls and personal visits urging congresspeople to lend their support to particular measures. By mostly complementing rather than competing, major Greek-American organizations markedly enhanced their contributions.⁴³

The United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC) was another national organization which formed in June 1975, drawing its membership from some of the leading activists in the Greek Orthodox Church. UHAC was formed with the encouragement of Archbishop Iakovos as a forum for coordinating the activities of the various Greek American organizations in the effort to influence U.S. foreign policy.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Watanabe notes from his interview with Rossides that in addition to becoming the only registered Greek American lobbying organization, “Rossides unabashedly admitted that the model for AHI-PAC was Washington’s most power ethnic lobbying organization, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee,” 38.

⁴³Ibid.

UHAC organized large public gatherings in support of the arms embargo and in support of relief efforts for Cypriot refugees. The organization was also able to coordinate extensive grassroots letter writing and telephone campaigns and running advertisements in major newspapers in support of the embargo. Leaders of UHAC also testified before Congress. Based out of Chicago, UHAC was founded and led by prominent Greek American businessman Andrew Athens, who also in 1974, began over two decades of service as the lay-leader of the Archdiocesan Council of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America.⁴⁴ As the main clergy-lay administrative body of the Archdiocese, this relationship signified close ties between Archbishop Iakovos and other leaders within the advocacy efforts.⁴⁵

In addition to the lobbying organizations of Greek Americans, advocacy advanced through the Church on two levels. First, as Watanabe notes, in the local parishes of the Archdiocese, “the arms issue was a constant topic of discussion in church services and social functions. It was not uncommon, for instance, to hear sermons emanating from

⁴⁴Andrew Athens has also served on the boards of many other Orthodox Church organizations and institutions in the United States and is co-founder of the Washington based National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes which will be discussed below. He also served as the first president of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) from 1995-2006. SAE was established by the president of Greece in 1995 “to consult and advise the Greek State on issues concerning the Greeks abroad. “SAE at a glance,” <http://en.sae.gr/?id=12378&tag=SAE+at+a+glance> (accessed January 23, 2012).

⁴⁵Other organizations that were established following the invasion of Cyprus for the purpose of advocacy and relief efforts included the Hellenic Council of America, the Pan-Hellenic Emergency Committee, the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement, the Free Cyprus Coalition, the Americans for Cyprus Committee, the United Hellenic Association, the Action Group for Greece and Cyprus, and the Cyprus Solidarity Committee. Watanabe notes that these “smaller groups organized demonstrations, prepared brochures, encouraged contacts with congresspeople...and despite their size, some of these organizations wielded impressive influence in certain sections of the country,” 39.

pulpits reminding congregations to support friendly congresspeople and condemning opponents.”⁴⁶ The other level was through the archbishop himself. Aware that the Church had a significant role in influencing Greek American opinion, President Gerald Ford invited Iakovos to meet with him and Secretary Kissinger on October 7, 1974. The purpose of the meeting was to convince the archbishop that, contrary to the efforts of members of Congress with the support of the Greek American lobby, the continued provision of arms to Turkey by the United States would not have negative effects on the Greek government. Kissinger claimed both the new Prime Minister, Karamanlis, and his Foreign Minister, George Mavros, had indicated to U.S. officials a willingness to tolerate the arms shipments. They also told the archbishop that the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit had ‘leftist tendencies’ which might bring Turkey closer to the Soviet Union if American aid was terminated.⁴⁷ Iakovos refused to agree with the argument as presented by the President and Secretary.⁴⁸ In addition, the archbishop began to draw attention to what he deemed serious moral and legal concerns in American foreign policy and in the U.S. response to Cyprus. At the hearing of the Senate subcommittee cited above, Iakovos stated:

I have a feeling that our whole attitude toward Cyprus and towards our Cyprus brethren has not been in the best tradition of American morality. I don’t think for instance that by sending through the Red Cross or through the United Nations special funds...we can be proud of ourselves for having done what we ought to

⁴⁶Ibid., 34.

⁴⁷Hackett, 21.

⁴⁸The meeting was described in an article by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Mr. Ford and the Greek Archbishop,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 1974. See also the descriptions of the meeting in Watanabe, “Greek American Activism and the Turkish Arms Ban,” 34-35.

do, and I don't think that by discussing the problems of Cyprus extensively in the press or over the TV or among high officials that we can say that we have done our part.⁴⁹

Through its relationships and contacts with leaders of the Orthodox Churches in Greece and Cyprus, the Church in America also became a source of information on what was happening in the two nations. On numerous occasions, the refugee subcommittee staff of Senator Edward Kennedy in their fact-finding efforts contacted Archbishop Iakovos and leaders within the Church.

The role of Archbishop Iakovos and the Church in influencing policy analysis and evaluation was an integral part of the larger effort staged by Greek Americans in ongoing support for the embargo. Kissinger, called by more militant Greeks as the “killer of Cypriots” for his leanings toward Turkey, stated that the pro-Greek legislators “were doing nothing more than simply playing ethnic politics,” and risking “unraveling the entire fabric of our foreign policy.”⁵⁰ However, the lobby was also recognized as influential in passing the legislation and keeping it in force for three years. Attempts to repeal the law failed, and Turkey responded by closing twenty-six bases and listening posts maintained by the U.S. and its allies.

The success of the lobby and the opposition to the embargo by Ford and Kissinger transferred to Greek American attitudes in the presidential election of 1976. Moskos states that the animosity toward the President and Secretary of State “was so deep in the Greek-American community that there would have been enthusiastic endorsement for

⁴⁹*Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus Part II*, 11-12.

⁵⁰Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and Foreign Policy*, 129, 156.

whomever the Democrats nominated.”⁵¹ The community and its organizations rallied behind Jimmy Carter, and strategists estimated that 87 percent of the Greek American vote went to him.⁵² This support was short-lived. On March 24, 1978, President Carter invited a group of congressional leaders, including John Brademas, to inform them of his decision to support lifting the embargo. The following week the story broke in the *New York Times*, with emphasis given to the lack of demands for concessions from Turkey on the Cyprus issue. This came as a shock to the Greek American community, which had been assured in a White House meeting on November 18, 1977, that the Carter Administration would keep its promises on Cyprus. At the meeting, Vice President Mondale told Archbishop Iakovos and other Greek American leaders that “in a very short time, we should be able to convey to you some good or encouraging news.”⁵³ The American press recognized the about-face as a “major policy change” and “the reversing of [Carter’s] campaign position.”⁵⁴ The Greek American press and publications of major organizations such as AHEPA, denounced the position of the President with headlines like, “President Carter Betrays the Greek-Americans and the People of Greece and Cyprus.”⁵⁵ On June 14, 1978, President Carter identified the lifting of the embargo as one of the most critical foreign policy issues before Congress, and even though many

⁵¹Moskos, 122.

⁵²“Greek-Americans Score Big in Carter/Mondale Campaign,” *Greek World*, Nov.-Dec. 1976, 11.

⁵³*Orthodox Observer*, December 7, 1977.

⁵⁴*New York Times*, April 2, 1978. “Military Aid Bill: Turkey Arms Ban Lifted,” *1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., vol. 44, 416.

⁵⁵*The AHEPA Messenger*, April 1978.

Greek American leaders hoped that Congress would not agree, the administration's effort for repeal was successful.

Thus, Greek American advocacy of U.S. foreign policy in relation to Cyprus had both success and failure. The initial success, while the result of multiple factors, showed the strength and political maturity of the Greek American community. In recognizing the cohesion that this effort brought to the community Marudas states, "What the Greek Americans discovered from the Cyprus crisis was that well-organized political action, combined with able leadership and the right issue, could affect national policy."⁵⁶ The failure to maintain the strength of advocacy was also due to a wide range of factors, but as identified by Ioannides, it was also precipitated by complacency: "The Greek American lobby did not initiate a massive, coordinated reaction to President Carter's wavering concerning the embargo throughout 1977 and early 1978. In turn, this Greek American complacency tended to encourage the administration to move gradually in the direction of lifting the embargo."⁵⁷

The success and failure of Greek American advocacy on the Cyprus crisis influenced the course of the community's lobbying of U.S. foreign policy over the next three decades. First, the influence of the community continued to be evident in relations with White House Administrations. For example, in his acceptance speech for the 1988 Republican Presidential nomination, George Bush mentioned AHEPA specifically as an example of the best of America's voluntary organizations. Moskos notes, "As Bush did not mention the lodge in any Greek context, it is unlikely that more than a handful of

⁵⁶Marudas, 107.

⁵⁷Ioannides, 225.

people in the Louisiana Superdome knew to what he was referring. Yet, the lodge's symbolic importance in Greek America received public recognition when the Vice President felt that he must touch base with the Greek-American community on nationwide television in what may have been the most important speech of his life.”⁵⁸ Regarding the relationship and visibility of the Greek Orthodox Church, leaders have continued to make regular visits to the White House. The most prominent event has been the annual observance of Greek Independence Day, March 25, marked by official exchanges of both presidents and archbishops on the shared legacy of democracy in Greece and America and the strength of relations between the two nations. In this forum, the Greek Orthodox archbishop has clearly been seen as the representative of the Greek American community, and this has been considered by Greek American leaders as an opportunity for advocacy on issues of concern to the community and their counterparts in Greece and Cyprus.

Second, the Greek American lobby has continued to remain a force in Washington. While the success of the lobby has been mixed, as shown above and in the following chapters, it has kept up its pressure on U.S. lawmakers regarding relations with Turkey. In addition, as noted by Moskos, the lobby has taken several approaches to its advocacy. “The Greek lobby consists of diverse elements that can, with some oversimplification, fall into two groups. One group emphasizes personal lobbying in Washington, including raising campaign funds for members of Congress who are sympathetic to the Greek-American position on Cyprus and the Aegean islands. The other essentially seeks to mobilize grass-roots activities among Greek-Americans and

⁵⁸Moskos, 162-163.

their friends around the country.”⁵⁹ Direct lobbying has been led by the major Greek American organizations. AHEPA has continued to list the Cyprus issue at the top of its foreign policy concerns, and to recognize this and other issues related to Greece and Turkey as priorities for congressional action.⁶⁰ The American Hellenic Institute (AHI) also continues its focus on the Cyprus issue and others. For the past two decades the institute has sponsored conferences of academics and political leaders addressing the crisis and U.S., Greek, and Turkish policy in the region. It has also published policy statements on Greek American issues directed at government officials and the media.⁶¹ AHI has continued to facilitate the publication of books, convening of forums, meetings between Greek and American officials, and monitoring of Congressional activities on U.S. foreign policy. The other organization that has kept the Cyprus issue front and center, is the Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH), which issues regular press releases on Cyprus and other related policy issues of interest to Greek Americans and sponsors the annual Cyprus and Hellenic Leadership Conference in Washington, D.C. in coordination with the International Coordinating Committee Justice for Cyprus (PSEKA). This conference provides a forum in which leaders of the Greek American community meet

⁵⁹Ibid., 166-167.

⁶⁰See the “Foreign Policy” page under “Issues” on the organizations website, <http://ahepa.org/dotnetnuke/Issues/ForeignPolicy.aspx> (accessed January 25, 2012).

⁶¹*2010 Policy Statements on Greek American Issues*, (Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 2010). The report addressed issues of maritime and border disputes in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey, the name issue of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (addressed in the next chapter), protection of the Greek minority in Albania, Cyprus, the Ecumenical Patriarchate (chapter 5), recognition of the Greek Pontian genocide in Turkey and the mistreatment of minorities on the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. This report can be viewed online at the AHI website together with the Institute’s *Annual Report 2010*, <http://www.aheworld.org/>.

with Department of State officials, ambassadors, and key members of Congress to address related issues and U.S. policies. The conference has also included the participation of Greek Orthodox archbishops. In 2009, Archbishop Demetrios, the current leader of the Church in America, attended and presented along with CEH leaders and attendees a special award to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “in light of unprecedented steps that have been taken in this very short period of time in the right direction on Hellenic and Orthodox issues.” In her remarks following the presentation, Secretary Clinton stated, “We are committed to the reopening of the Halki Seminary, to the unification of Cyprus as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, and we know these are difficult issues,” and she affirmed the Obama Administration’s commitment to make progress on them.⁶²

Third, the consistent advocacy by Church leaders regarding Cyprus has been to use opportunities to meet with presidents and other U.S. officials as a regular forums to affirm the significance of these issues. They have also sought to cultivate these relationships in order to increase the effectiveness of communication in times of crisis. In addition to the annual visits to the White House for Greek Independence Day, Archbishop Sypridon, the successor to Archbishop Iakovos, sent letters to President Clinton each year on the anniversary of the invasion of Cyprus. In a July 17, 1998 letter, the archbishop wrote to the President,

I know from my personal contact with you that you are a fair and just man. I want you to know that I earnestly pray for the enlightenment of all whose hearts have been hardened to the voice of Cyprus’ long suffering division. I pray that your powerful office and reputation for fairness may prevail against the forces of

⁶²“Archbishop Demetrios Presents Award to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,” May 23, 2009, www.goarch.org/news/awarctoClinton-2009-05-23 (accessed January 26, 2012).

darkness and oppression. It may be that you are the only hope left, as the political leader of the United States, the standard bearer for democracy and human rights in the world. Please do not forget the people of Cyprus.⁶³

The following year, in observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the invasion, Archbishop Spyridon joined with over sixty prominent Greek American leaders in a letter to President Clinton calling for resolution.⁶⁴ The signers addressed the issue in the context of NATO involvement in Kosovo:

Following NATO's action in Kosovo, the division of Cyprus can no longer be marginalized by the United States or the world community. The time for settlement of Cyprus has come. Settlement of the Cyprus problem will, in addition to restoring the freedoms and human rights of the people of Cyprus, better secure America's security interests in the region. A just and viable Cyprus settlement will contribute greatly to the establishment of peace and security in the volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean and contribute to the improvement of relations between U.S. allies Greece and Turkey.⁶⁵

In its conclusion the letter places the responsibility of resolution before the President. "In your hands, lays the chance for an end to the tragic division of Cyprus and a better and brighter future for the people of Cyprus and their children, Greeks and Turks alike. A Cyprus settlement can allow Cyprus to again become a shining example of the kind of world so often envisioned in your statements—a world governed by the principles of

⁶³Archbishop Spyridon asks President Clinton to Move Towards Settlement in Cyprus," July 17, 1998, www.goarch.org/news/goa.news594 (accessed January 25, 2012).

⁶⁴Archbishop Spyridon and HALO Send Joint Letter of Appeal to President Clinton for Peaceful Solution of Cyprus Issue," July 19, 2012, <https://goarch.org/news/goa.news430> (accessed January 26, 2012). HALO stands for "Hellenic American Leaders and Organization." The letter was signed by an impressive list of leaders, including the majority of the heads of Greek American organizations, leaders within the Church, and prominent Greek American entrepreneurs and politicians. The Archbishop's signature is listed first both as a matter of etiquette and in recognition of his leadership role in the Greek American community.

⁶⁵Ibid.

ethnic and religious tolerance, multiculturalism, democracy and full respect of human rights.”

In his tenure as Archbishop since 1999, Demetrios has continued advocacy on the issue. In addition to regular meetings with Greek and Cypriot officials and leaders of related fraternal organizations in the Greek American community, he has addressed the issue with Presidents Bush and Obama at the White House observances of Greek Independence Day and in meetings and correspondence with administration officials. One of the most recent exchanges related to Cyprus was a letter of the archbishop to Secretary Clinton following the forced closing by Turkish Cypriot police of an Orthodox church in northern Cyprus during services on Christmas Day 2010. The Archbishop wrote, “[O]n one of the most holy days of Christianity, the day of the Nativity of Jesus Christ, when billions of Christians celebrate freely worldwide, these handful of people were forcibly denied the expression of their faith. Clearly the religious freedom and human rights of the people in the Saint Synesios Church were violated!”⁶⁶ In affirming the related international agreements on human rights, the archbishop called on the action of Secretary Clinton “so that international laws on religious freedom and human rights are not violated, and similar incidents do not occur again in Cyprus or in any other part of the world.” The Secretary responded by affirming that the incident was taken seriously. She wrote, “Our embassies in Nicosia and Ankara have conveyed our deep concern to the appropriate parties.... We have strongly conveyed our position that all

⁶⁶“Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Responds to Archbishop Demetrios’ Letter about Religious Freedom Violations in Cyprus,” February 4, 2011, www.goarch.org/news/hillaryclintonresponse-02042011 (accessed January 25, 2012).

efforts should be made to ensure that this does not happen again. The Secretary also thanked Archbishop Demetrios and affirmed that she always valued his insights.⁶⁷

All of these exchanges are examples of the level of access that Greek American leaders, and specifically Greek Orthodox Church leadership, have maintained in the decades following the invasion of Cyprus. As recognized above, this issue has been at the heart of Greek American advocacy and has provided the foundation for continued lobbying efforts on other issues. It is also evident, that the Greek Orthodox Church and its archbishop have played an increasingly visible role. The rallying point of the crisis in Cyprus brought Greek Americans together, and the network of the Church provided a means to mobilize for relief and political action, as well as local parishes becoming forums for sharing information and promoting engagement. In addition, the recognition given by top U.S. officials and lawmakers to Archbishop Iakovos at the onset of the crisis not only contributed to the rising position of the archbishop throughout the Greek American community, but set a mode of engagement by government leaders that would carry through to Iakovos' successors. Certainly, this leadership role in political advocacy, in contrast to the period of the junta, was strengthened by unanimity within the community on the issues at hand; but it is also clear that since 1974, this advocacy by Greek Orthodox archbishops and the Church in coordination with Greek American leaders and organizations has been more open and consistent. This is characteristic of advocacy on two additional issues, the Macedonia Question—the dispute over the name of the former Yugoslavian state—and in advocacy on religious freedom for the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey.

⁶⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Macedonian Question

Greek American advocacy on United States foreign policy interests turned to the Macedonian Question in 1991 with the breakup of Yugoslavia and the claims of one of its states. After declaring their independence, the people of Macedonia sought recognition in the international community as the “Republic of Macedonia,” setting off a firestorm of protest by Greece and Greeks around the world. At the heart of the dispute was the use of the name “Macedonia” and what Greeks identified as the appropriation by the Slavs of the region of Skopje of an identity and history that belong only to Greeks. In support of this protest, the Greek American community began intensive lobbying of the United States government to withhold recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) until the name dispute could be resolved. In these advocacy efforts, the Greek Orthodox Church had a prominent role, both at the inception of the Macedonian Question in the early 1990s, and when the issue resurfaced on the U.S. policy agenda in 2004 when the Bush Administration announced its recognition of FYROM by its constitutional name, the “Republic of Macedonia.” This chapter presents an overview of the issue, and offers an analysis of Greek American advocacy and the role of the Church. It is evident that advocacy on the name dispute built on the unity and strength the community gained on the Cyprus Crisis, and that the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church acquired even more prominence both among Greek Americans and by recognition of government officials as representative of and influential in the Greek American community in the United States.

Claiming Macedonian Identity and History

The conflict over the name of Macedonia is rooted in the longer dispute over Macedonian identity, one which has dominated Balkan history and politics for more than a century. The outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912 was the result of claims to Macedonia by Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece in an attempt by each state, as described by Loring Danforth, “to legitimate its territorial claims with arguments concerning the national consciousness, ethnic identity, linguistic affiliation, and religious loyalty of the inhabitants of the area.”¹ The present international boundaries of Macedonia were established in 1913, and at the end of World War II, the People’s Republic of Macedonia became one of the states of Yugoslavia. Since that time, the focus of the Macedonian Question has been twofold: does a distinct Macedonian nation exist; and, are there Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece? In the early 1990s the Question became the dominant issue in Balkan politics when the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia and sought recognition from both the European Community and the United Nations. During meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Macedonians from northern Greece claimed that the Greek government had violated their human rights, thus bringing to the forefront the dispute over Macedonian identity. Both Greeks and Macedonians in the Balkans asserted that they each had the right to call themselves Macedonians. Danforth notes that this conflict took place on a variety of levels and contexts:

It involved politicians, scholars, journalists, and leaders of local ethnic organizations; it filled the pages of government press releases, academic publications, public relations pamphlets, and both national and local newspapers;

¹Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28.

and it provoked press conferences, academic seminars, and political demonstrations in Athens, Thessaloniki, Skopje, Brussels, New York, Toronto, and Melbourne.²

The conflict escalated following the admission of Macedonia to the United Nations on April 8, 1993, under the temporary name of the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” The compromise of the name was due to pressure by Greece and diaspora Greeks over the name of “Macedonia.” Greeks insisted that the name was such a part of Greek heritage that it could not be “usurped” by others. The response by Macedonians to the UN admission and the name was mixed. Many were satisfied at finally gaining recognition, but the name provoked widespread anger. Protest rallies were organized in Skopje, Kocani, and Resen, and hundreds of intellectuals rallied in front of the Assembly building. The close vote in accepting the name and the fear among many that the mention of Yugoslavia opened the possibility of FYROM rejoining the Serbian dominated country led to the calling of a confidence vote in the government. By a narrow margin, 62 deputies in the 120 seat Assembly, the government survived.³

The name compromise was the result of an initiative led by Britain, France, and Spain to move beyond the deadlock that existed between Greece and Macedonia, one which has continued even with the use of the “temporary” name. In May 1993, Greece rejected a proposal of negotiators Cyrus Vance and David Owen for the name “Nova Macedonia” and “Upper Macedonia.” The Greek preference was for “Slavomacedonia,” but this name was rejected by the Albanians living in and outside of Macedonia. In response to the conflict, Greece imposed trade restrictions in 1994, but ended them the

²Ibid., 28-29.

³Hugh Poulton, *Who Are the Macedonians?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 177-178.

following year and recognized the state's independence. This led to some easing of tensions between the two countries, but Macedonia became engrossed in internal ethnic conflict while at the same time working for broader international recognition. In addition, the conflict in Yugoslavia and Kosovo captured the attention of the world community. Again in 2001, ethnic violence erupted in Macedonia with Albanians demanding equal rights, a dispute which ended with the Ohrid peace agreement. The country attained greater stability with the drafting of a new constitution, which recognized Albanian as an official language and facilitated access of ethnic Albanians to public sector jobs. Increased security and stable internal relations contributed to the move for European Union membership in 2004, and by December 2005, Macedonia was a candidate. An invitation to join NATO followed in 2006, but the name dispute resurfaced when Greece blocked the invitation at the organization's summit in April 2008. The most recent international development occurred in December 2011, when the International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled that Greece was wrong in blocking NATO membership over the name dispute.

To understand this dispute and its significance as a foreign policy issue, it is important to examine the claims that have been made by both Greeks and Macedonians. The Greek opposition to the use of the name was made clear by approximately one million Greeks who rallied in the streets of Thessaloniki on February 14, 1992. At the demonstration they carried blue and white signs affirming the Greekness of Macedonia: "Macedonia was, is and always will be Greek!" "Macedonian History is Greek History!"

“Macedonia = Greece!” “Real Macedonians Are Greeks!” “No Recognition of the Skopian Republic under the Hellenic Name ‘Macedonia’!”⁴ Danforth states:

The Greek position could not be more clear: Macedonia and everything associated with it are not only Greek; they are exclusively Greek and nothing else. As the president of Greece, Christos Sartzetakis, said during a visit to Australia in 1998, “We Macedonians are Greek precisely because we are Macedonians.” Greece and Macedonia constitute such a perfect historical and cultural unity that the name “Macedonia” is, in the words of Stelios Papatthemelis, former Socialist minister of Northern Greece, “an inalienable and eternal possession of Hellenism, a piece of its soul.”⁵

This deep connection with the name rests on several perspectives commonly held among Greeks. First is the belief of some that the geographic region of the “historical” Macedonia is the approximate location of the present border between Greece and the former Yugoslavia. This is a perspective that has changed since the name conflict surfaced in the early 1990s. Prior to Macedonian independence and adoption of the name, “Macedonia” was used by Greeks as a geographic term to designate this general region of the Balkans that included a variety of ethnic and national identities. The initial argument, as described by Danforth, was that the “Republic of Skopje,” as identified by Greeks, “has no right to name itself the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ than a country in Europe has the right to name itself the ‘Republic of Europe’.”⁶ As the name dispute arose, the argument for an “historical” Macedonia came to the forefront with the affirmation by Greeks that the “Republic of Skopje” lies completely outside of the area

⁴Danforth, 30. Another overview of the Greek and Macedonian positions on the name dispute is provided by Victor Roudometof, “Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14:2 (1996): 253-301.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., 31.

that was known in antiquity as Macedonia. Thus, only Greece has the right to use the name to describe a region of its state. Second, the claim rests on the connection of history and identity. Danforth summarizes the main argument: “because Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians were Greek, and because ancient and modern Greece are linked in an unbroken line of racial and cultural continuity, only Greeks have the right to identify themselves as Macedonians.”⁷ Since most of the inhabitants of the southern portion of the former Yugoslavia are the descendents of Slavs who settled in the region in the sixth century, Greeks are adamant that they cannot claim a name that does not belong to them either ethnically or historically.

Third, for Greeks this lack of a historical connection to Greek antiquity and the fact that the state of “Macedonia” consists of a mixture of non-Greek cultures makes the nation an “artificial creation.” They cite the act of Tito, the post-war Communist leader of Yugoslavia who “baptized” a “mosaic of nationalities” (Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Vlach, Greeks, and Gypsies) and gave them the name “Macedonians.”⁸ He used a geographic term in creating a new nationality. A fourth related point of the Greek perspective is language. Since the ancient Macedonians spoke Greek, the language used by a non-Greek Slavic people cannot be called “the Macedonian language.” Regarding the philological debate Danforth describes the Greek argument:

Before World War II the “so-called Macedonian language” was completely unknown. The language used by the Slavic speakers of Macedonia was “an idiomatic form of Bulgarian...with a very scanty vocabulary of no more than one

⁷Ibid., 32.

⁸Ibid., 33.

thousand to one thousand five hundred words” many of which were corrupt borrowings from Greek, Turkish, Vlach, and Albanian.⁹

On this basis Greeks consider “the linguistic idiom of Skopje” to be based on “a spoken collection of words, without syntax, without grammatical components, without spelling”¹⁰ and a rural Slavic dialect that Tito turned into a national language. From all of these perspectives, Greek nationalists consider the use of the name “Macedonia” by the people of “Skopje” as a “felony,” an act of “plagiarism” against the Greek people. “By calling themselves ‘Macedonians’ these ‘Slavs of Skopje’ are ‘stealing’ or ‘hijacking’ a Greek name; they are ‘embezzling’ or ‘appropriating’ Greek culture and heritage; they are ‘falsifying’ Greek history.”¹¹

Macedonian nationalist ideology and responses to these Greek perspectives are characterized by the affirmation of their uniqueness as a people with their own history, culture and identity. They also seek recognition from other governments, academics, international organizations, and world public opinion.¹² The arguments for both

⁹Ibid. Danforth cites *The Macedonian Affair: A Historical Review of the Attempts to Create a Counterfeit Nation* (Athens: Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies, n.d.), 26.

¹⁰Chris Popov and Michael Radin, *Contemporary Greek Government Policy on the Macedonian Issue and Discriminatory Practices in Breach of International Law* (Melbourne: Central Organizational Committee for Macedonian Human Rights, Australian Sub-Committee, 1989), 46.

¹¹Danforth, 34.

¹²In addition to the claims of Greeks, Macedonians have also been confronted by challenges to the name and territory by Serbs and Bulgarians. See Loring M. Danforth, “Claims to Macedonian Identity: The Macedonian Question and the Breakup of Yugoslavia,” *Anthropology Today* 9:4 (Aug. 1993): 3-10. Macedonian identity in terms of historiography and language is also the focus of a collection of essays edited by Victor Roudometof, *The Macedonian Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics*, East European Monographs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

affirmation and recognition are directed first at the issue of ethnic identity. Danforth summarizes:

In asserting their “ethnospecificity” Macedonians in the Balkans and the diaspora insist that they are not Serbs, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, or Greeks. In addition, they deny that there is any such thing as a Yugoslav-Macedonian, a Bulgarian-Macedonian, or a Greek-Macedonian. They reject these hyphenated terms as “divisive labels” indicative of a “partition mentality” that must be overcome.... The use of such terms negates the existence of the Macedonians as a unique nation....¹³

Second, this uniqueness relates to the manner in which Macedonians distinguish between the use of “Macedonian” as both a geographical and ethnic or national term. Contrary to the Greek argument, Macedonians affirm the term can be used in both ways. In addition to the country encompassing an area that correlates with the historical boundaries of antiquity, they cite the modern use of the term “Macedonian” as referring exclusively to Macedonians of Slavic descent. It is held that Greeks and Bulgarians can only use the term as a regional or geographic indicator since their ethnicity is already identified.¹⁴ This position of affirming Slavic identity is more moderate in comparison to some extreme views in Macedonia that believe in a non-Greek and non-Slavic origin in antiquity or that the modern Macedonians are the result of the intermarriage of invading Slavs with the indigenous ancient Macedonians in the ninth century. Along with these views are demands to recognize not just the modern state of Macedonia, but also an

¹³Danforth, 43.

¹⁴Ibid, 44. Danforth cites the work of Michael Radin and Chris Popov, *Macedonia: A Brief Overview of Its History and People*, (Adelaide: Australian Macedonian Human Rights Committee, n.d.), a:3. Danforth also outlines the “more extreme Macedonian nationalist position, that modern Macedonians are not Slavs; they are the direct descendants of the ancient Macedonians, who were not Greeks. This claim is at least in part an attempt to refute the Greek claim that ‘Skopians’ are Slavs and not Macedonians. According to extreme Macedonian nationalists ‘Slavism’ is a destructive doctrine that ‘aims to eradicate Macedonism completely,’” 45-46.

identity that includes a long history of struggle and oppression in the midst of forces of assimilation, denationalization, and cultural genocide. The goal of some of the extreme nationalist groups has been the creation of a “free, united and independent Macedonia in which the parts of Macedonia occupied by Greece and Bulgaria will be liberated—and all three regions—Vardar, Pirin, and Aegean—will once again be reunited.”¹⁵ In contrast, more moderate Macedonians “realize the impossibility of redrawing international boundaries, recognize the inviolability of Bulgarian and Greek sovereignty, and explicitly renounce any territorial claims against Bulgaria and Greece. They do however, demand that Bulgaria and Greece recognize the existence of Macedonian minorities within their borders and grant them their basic human rights.”¹⁶

Greek American Advocacy on the Macedonian Question

When the Macedonian Question became an international issue in 1991 following the declaration of independence by the People’s Republic of Macedonia, the Greek government voiced its opposition to any recognition of the new state among the international community. By the middle of the decade, the dispute had a less visible role on the international political scene, but this followed an intensive period of advocacy by Greece and the Greek diaspora.¹⁷ As Victor Roudometof affirms, “the Macedonian

¹⁵Ibid., 46-47.

¹⁶Ibid., 47. Danforth’s thesis in examining the roots of Macedonian identity is that “it begins in the nineteenth century with the first expressions of Macedonian ethnic nationalism on the part of a small number of intellectuals in places like Thessaloniki, Belgrade, Sophia, and St. Petersburg. This period marks the beginning of the process of ‘imagining’ a Macedonian national identity and culture,” 56.

¹⁷For analysis of the policies and actions of the Greek state during this initial period of the dispute see Nikolaos Zaharidadis, “Greek Policy Toward the Former

Question became a transnational conflict, as various immigrant associations of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Macedonians were involved in lobbying for their particular side. In Australia, Canada, and the United States, states with considerable numbers of southern European immigrants, these issues became important rallying points for the mobilization of the local communities.”¹⁸ The dispute provoked strong emotional responses among the Greek diaspora.¹⁹ In addition to the large rallies in Greece in February 1992 and March 1994, organized protests were held in Munich, and according to the Hellenic American Council, over 20,000 Greek Americans gathered in Washington D.C. on May 31, 1992. The community in the United States also issued a plea to President George Bush in advertisements in the *New York Times* on April 26 and May 10.

The focus of this advocacy was to influence U.S. officials to withhold recognition of the new state. This was a very challenging policy proposition given U.S. interests in the region following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991. The two major issues facing U.S. policy makers included the questions of recognizing as separate states the four republics that had chosen independence and how to respond to the aggression by Serbian

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991-1995,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14:2 (1996): 303-327. This issue is examined in the broader context of the relationship of Greece to political transition in the Balkans in Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades, and Andre Gerolymatos, eds., *Greece and The New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities* (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1999). On the relationship of Greece with other European countries on the issue see Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). See also James Pettifer, ed., *The New Macedonian Question* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

¹⁸Victor Roudometof, *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question* (Westport: Praeger, 2002).

¹⁹Anastasia N. Panagakos examines the Greek response to the dispute in Canada in “Citizens of the Trans-Nation: Political Mobilization, Multiculturalism, and Nationalism in the Greek Diaspora,” *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 7:1 (1998): 53-73.

authorities regarding the borders of each state. In addition, both the Bush and Clinton Administrations were concerned about the impact if violence moved outside of the borders of the former Yugoslavia. Following the European Commission recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and as the possibility of war in Bosnia increased in spring 1992, the Bush Administration began to review its policies in the region. The U.S. Ambassador to the former Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, recommended that the United States recognize all four republics. However, Secretary of State James Baker presented the President with a plan to recognize only Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia. The plan was adopted, and the State Department worked through the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to establish a mission in Skopje staffed by CSCE diplomats and military officers.²⁰ The position of the U.S. government on Macedonia was attributed to the intensive lobbying led by Greek American members of Congress, Representative Michael Bilirakis and Senator Paul Sarbanes, and the efforts of the Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH), AHEPA, the American Hellenic Institute (AHI), the Pan-Macedonian Association USA, and the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese.

When President Clinton took office, he followed through with his campaign promise to withhold recognition, and as Swigert notes from his interviews, “word was passed throughout the State Department by incoming Administration officials to expect that promise to be kept. Under Clinton, prominent Greek-Americans gained easy access to senior policy makers at State and the NSC [National Security Council]. The Clinton Administration adopted an approach of vetting important actions on FYROM with

²⁰James W. Swigert, “Greek Roots to U.S. Democracy: Influence of the Greek-American Lobby Over U.S. Policy Toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Washington, D.C.: National War College, 1994), 3-4. Swigert interviewed many of the key persons in the development of U.S. policy on the issue.

Senator Sarbanes. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff quickly gained a reputation as the in-house ‘gatekeeper’ for ethnic Greek concerns.”²¹ This access to the Administration and the position taken by President Clinton resulted in delayed consideration by the UN Security Council for Macedonian membership until a compromise on the name issue could be reached.

However, while the official policy was withholding recognition, the U.S. presence in Macedonia continued to increase. In July 1993, U.S. officials sent 300 troops to FYROM to aid in the UN peacekeeping mission. The Greek American lobby did not register any opposition to the deployment. Swigert states, “Just as the Bush Administration employed the CSCE spillover mission to get around the absence of diplomatic relations, the Clinton Administration used participation in the multilateral UN operation to enhance the U.S. presence and signal its support for FYROM’s stability.”²² The presence of U.S. troops increased the contacts with the FYROM government, which included regular visits by military and Department of Defense officials and members of Congress. In December 1993, a U.S. liaison office was opened in Skopje to provide assistance to the increasing number of visitors.²³

Soon after the office opened, six European Union states—Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy—established diplomatic relations with FYROM. Secretary of State Warren Christopher recommended a review of U.S. policy, advocating the

²¹Ibid., 5.

²²Ibid., 6.

²³Swigert states that before the Clinton Administration announced the opening of the liaison office, officials consulted Senator Sarbanes who requested a change to the announcement. Also, only a deputy director of the State Department represented Washington at the office opening.

Administration follow the EU nations in order to help stabilize the region. Greek Americans voiced their opposition to the proposed policy shift, but on February 9, 1994, the White House issued a public announcement that diplomatic relations would be established once “certain assurances” were obtained.²⁴ However, the process was put on hold within twenty-four hours as officials were inundated by strong, grassroots opposition from Greek Americans. The row between the White House and Greek Americans also resulted in a meeting on March 9, arranged by Greek American lobbyist Andrew Manatos, between prominent Greek Americans and President Clinton. As Swigert notes the meeting took place one day after the publication of a *New York Times* editorial which expressed sympathy with Macedonia over Greece’s trade embargo.²⁵ The Administration did not proceed with normalizing diplomatic relations, an apparent reversal of policy under the pressure of Greek American advocacy. In addition, the return to a policy of non-recognition was affirmed during the visit of the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Panpandreu in April. President Clinton responded to questions from Greek reporters stating, “I think it’s obvious that we’ve shown a real concern for Greek concerns.” Papandreu responded by stating that he considered Clinton “a friend of Greece and whatever Greece signifies.”²⁶

In relation to U.S. policy, the name dispute resurfaced in late 2004 when the State Department announced plans to recognize FYROM as the Republic of Macedonia. This

²⁴“U.S. Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, February 21, 1994, 98.

²⁵Swigert, 8. “Mischief in Macedonia,” *New York Times*, March 8, 1994, A:20.

²⁶“Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu of Greece,” *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 30:6 (April 25, 1994): 883.

recognition followed further movement earlier in the decade by European Union member states to normalize the country's international standing, the expanding role of NATO in the region, and the inability to attain resolution with Greece over the Macedonian Question. The State Department announced that the decision underscored the "U.S. commitment to a permanent, multi-ethnic, democratic Macedonian state within its existing borders" and U.S. support for the Macedonian government's "courageous decision to carry through with decentralization."²⁷

As expected, the decision was met by strong protest from the government of Greece and by Greek Americans. All of the major Greek American organizations responded with releases, letters, and calls to action. AHI issued a release on November 4 contradicting the policy change with the assurances Institute leaders had received in a letter of October 29 from the Director of the Office of Southern European Affairs. In the letter the director stated, "The United States formally recognizes the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by that name." The release noted that the letter was dated the day after the 2004 presidential elections, and quoted the AHI President, Gene Rossides, as calling the policy shift "a diplomatic blunder at best and a betrayal of Greece to the detriment of U.S. interests."²⁸ CEH launched an initiative to secure the signatures of members of Congress on a letter to Secretary of State Powell requesting a return to the

²⁷Julie Kim, "Macedonia (FYROM): Post-Conflict Situation and U.S. Policy," June 17, 2005 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service – Library of Congress), 16.

²⁸"As Late as October 29, 2004 State Department Letter to AHI Confirms No Change in U.S. Policy Regarding FYROM," November 5, 2004, www.aheworld.com/media-center/press-releases/2004/750-as-late-as-october-29-2004-state-department-letter-to-ahi-confirms-no-change-in-us-policy-regarding-fyrom.html (accessed January 28, 2012).

previous policy position and stating, “This unilateral U.S. action mitigates away from peaceful, constructive efforts to negotiate this issue. As well, it contradicts the historical facts about Macedonia and unnecessarily injures the culture of our faithful ally, Greece.”²⁹ On November 17, the Pan-Macedonian Association USA issued a lengthy list of resolutions urging President Bush “to reconsider this misinformed and ill-advised policy, to instruct the State Department to withdraw recognition of FYROM as Macedonia, and to encourage FYROM to continue its diplomatic dialogue with Greece on the name issue in line with UN and EU policy.”³⁰ These few examples are representative of the flood of releases and petitions that followed in the months and years after the policy change. In addition, numerous bills and resolutions were introduced by Greek Americans and Greek supporters in Congress in attempts to legislate a policy reversal. Further, Greek American organizations kept up their lobbying of the State Department on the issue. At the forefront of this effort was the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church, which was very visible in advocacy on the Macedonian Question after the name dispute arose in 1991.

²⁹“CEH Leaders Continue Efforts in U.S. Congress to Admonish Administration’s Policy-Change Regarding FYROM,” November 9, 2004, <http://en.sae.gr/?id=12617&tag=CEH+Leaders+Continue+Efforts+in+U.S.+Congress+To+Admonish+Administration’s+Policy-Change+Regarding+FYROM&type=print> (accessed January 28, 2012). The text of the letter also recognized by name the request of Archbishop Demetrios, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church, for U.N. sponsored efforts to reach a resolution of the name dispute.

³⁰“A Dutiful Declaration, Objection and Petition of the Pan-Macedonian, New England District to Our Most Honorable President Mr. George W. Bush and to Our USA Government,” November 17, 2004, www.panmacedonian.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=134:why-greek-americans-object-to&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50 (accessed January 28, 2012).

The Greek Orthodox Church in America and the Macedonian Question

In addition to offering support for the advocacy efforts of Greek Americans in Congress and leaders of the various national associations, Archbishop Iakovos and Church leadership took an early and public position on the name dispute. On February 6, 1992, the archbishop sent out a lengthy letter affirming the Greek national position on the issue and speaking on behalf of Greek Americans in an appeal to President Bush, the Greek government, and the United Nations. The archbishop opened the letter stating,

As Americans of Greek ancestry we have had our heritage attacked by the anti-Hellenic propaganda orchestrated over the years by the communists of Skopje. They have usurped the historic Greek names of “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” in order to be given more attention and at the same time promote claims over territory which is not theirs. They have even laid claim to our culture and identity, not hesitating to misrepresent as their own even such world-renown Macedonian Greeks as Alexander the Great or his teacher, the philosopher Aristotle that the world history knew and respected over the centuries.³¹

Archbishop Iakovos continued by outlining the current political threat to Greece by “Skopje’s expansionists.” He also chastised the U.S. government for its actions in favor of Macedonian independence.

It is incomprehensible that the U.S. Department of State Press Release of January 29, 1992, entitled “The Acting Secretary’s Meeting with Macedonian President Gligorov” should completely disregard not only the situation in Greece but also the fact that the promotion of “Macedonia’s independence” is no more than a post-mortem vindication of Communist Tito’s dream to expand south at the expense of democratic and pro-Western Greece.³²

³¹Archbishop Iakovos, February 6, 1992, *The Complete Works of His Eminence Archbishop Iakovos, Primate of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America 1959-1996*, vol. 3, *The Torchbearer, Part 2: Encyclicals: Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Subjects, Administration, Education, Culture – 1978-1996*, ed. Demetrios J. Constantelos (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001), 321.

³²Ibid.

In concluding the letter, the archbishop called on President Bush and administration officials to “extend no recognition to Skopje, and most especially under the name of Macedonia.” He also firmly stated, “We will ever protest the falsification of history and will not tolerate the anti-Greek propaganda and the expansionist claims of a “Nation of yesterday comprised of various ethnic groups.”

A few weeks prior to the demonstration by Greek Americans in Washington D.C., the archbishop issued an encyclical inviting all of the clergy, parish councils, Philoptochos leaders, youth, and teachers and fraternal organizations to participate. He stated, “The purpose of this rally is to stress the fact that Macedonia has always been Greek. This is attested by history and even the Holy Bible. The renewal of Hellenic Independence in 1821 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-14 validate this reality even more.... All of you should feel the obligation of being in Washington for this expression of solidarity and faith.... Let us all come together on May 31, 1992 in Washington and thus respond to this holy cause.”³³ In addition to this direct appeal to advocacy, the archbishop mentioned the plight of Greeks in Macedonia regularly between 1992 and 1995 in the annual encyclicals of March 25—the Feast of the Annunciation and the commemoration of Greek Independence Day—and October 28—the Greek national commemoration of OXI Day when Greek leaders made a stand against the demands of Axis occupation. The text for March 25, 1992 presents the issue in the biblical context of the annunciation to the Virgin Mary by the Archangel Gabriel and the theological affirmation that the Church “never loses hope.” In conjunction with this focus on the feast, the archbishop wrote that the reality of hope and new life also “exists in our other

³³Archbishop Iakovos, “Protocol 19,” May 18, 1992, *The Complete Works of His Eminence Archbishop Iakovos*, 382.

annunciation. This is the annunciation of the rebirth of our nation which existed in a state of ethnic and political humiliation for 400 years. It was faith, also, that great power which saves and gives new birth to man, which stood up bravely for the beginning of our ethnic salvation.” In his recounting of this struggle for freedom the archbishop called the faithful to a time of “intense prayer.” He wrote, “The hours and the days before us must be a time of prayer. We have so many national issues before us: the Cypriot, the Albanian, the Skopje, and many more.... We will succeed if we fill our lungs with faith in God and in human rights.... Stand firm and with conviction. Be worthy of the martyrs of Christianity and of our nation.” He signed the encyclical “with the wish that we will not neglect our Christian and ethnic obligations.”³⁴ Again, in the March 25 encyclical of 1995, Archbishop Iakovos addressed the Macedonian Question in the context of the feast and the sacrifice and victory of Greeks in their 1821 struggle for independence. He wrote, “Where God wills, the order of nature is overcome.... This ‘overcoming of the natural order,’ of what has been the accepted rule, or order, or constitution, we shall see prove true of Cyprus, and of the laughable Skopjians.”³⁵

The next intensive period of advocacy by the Church began in November 2004, following the announcement by officials that the United States government was changing its position and recognizing FYROM as the “Republic of Macedonia.” Upon hearing the news of the policy change, Archbishop Demetrios issued a statement affirming the position of Greek Americans and the Greek Orthodox community:

³⁴Archbishop Iakovos, “Protocol Number 9,” March 25, 1992, *The Complete Works of His Eminence Archbishop Iakovos*, vol. 3, 189-190.

³⁵ Archbishop Iakovos, “Protocol Number 5,” 25 March 25, 1995, *The Complete Works of His Eminence Archbishop Iakovos*, vol. 3, 204-205.

I was very much saddened by the news of the unexpected, untimely and arbitrary recognition of the State of Skopje as “Republic of Macedonia,” a name that defies history. This is a very negative development of an issue, which causes grief and is of the immediate concern to the Greek-American community and to Hellenism around the world. I am particularly saddened, because the long-time efforts to falsify and forge the historic truth about Macedonia have found fertile ground amid the circles of the American government, and particularly during an inopportune moment and juncture.³⁶

The archbishop concluded his statement by affirming that the Greek Orthodox Community in America, “as it has done time and again, when critical issues of national interest were at stake will use all its might and every means at its disposal to defend this just cause.... We are confident that God will justify our sacred struggle.” At the same time this statement was released, Archbishop Demetrios also sent a letter to President Bush expressing his feelings as presented above, and asking the President to reconsider the recognition and to support the resolution of the dispute through the efforts of the United Nations. President Bush responded in a letter dated November 29 in which he outlined the reasons for recognition of “Macedonia” by its constitutional name. He wrote: “The United States made this decision in order to enhance stability in the Balkans, and it should in no way be perceived as directed against Greece.” Mentioning that the U.S. had to act quickly due to a referendum on November 7 that had the potential to destabilize the region, the President continued, “Our decision was aimed exclusively at bolstering stability in Macedonia as its citizens made a crucial choice about the future of their country. Our underlying goal was to help avert a resurgence of inter-ethnic conflict with potentially tragic repercussions throughout the Balkans. I am confident that Hellenes in the United States and around the world share this goal.” In addition to

³⁶“Archbishop Demetrios Issues Statement on the U.S. Recognition of FYROM as Macedonia,” November 4, 2004, www.goarch.org/news/goa.news1228 (accessed January 25, 2012).

affirming the importance of the U.S. relationship with Greece, the President pledged the support of the U.S. for the United Nations efforts “to find a solution to the Macedonia name issue, and will endorse any solution that emerges from these negotiations.”³⁷

On November 15, the archbishop led a delegation to Washington for meetings with Secretary of State Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. The delegation of prominent Greek Americans included Andrew Athens, president of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE) and national chairman of the United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC); Sotirios Proios, president of the Pan-Macedonian Association USA; Franklin Manios, president of AHEPA; Michael Jaharis, vice chairman of the Archdiocesan Council; Andrew Manatos, president of the Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH); and Archdiocesan public affairs liaison, Father Alexander Karloutsos. Following the delegation’s private meeting with Secretary Powell and Undersecretary Marc Grossman, the archbishop stated, “Both listened to us carefully and they have full knowledge of the difficulties and the pain caused to the Greek Orthodox community in America and the people of Greece. They promised that they would work towards the final solution and the overcoming of the problem that has been created. We believe in the power of God’s intervention in difficulties, and while we pray fervently, we continue in every humanly possible way to offer as much as we can.”³⁸ In addition to the White House meeting with Condoleezza Rice in which she affirmed the cooperation of the U.S. in the ongoing dialog of Greece and Macedonia under the aegis of the United Nations, the

³⁷“President Bush Responds to Archbishop’s Letter on Macedonia,” *Orthodox Observer* (Dec. 2004): 5.

³⁸“Archbishop Meets with Powell, Rice Over Macedonia,” *Orthodox Observer* (Oct.-Nov. 2004): 1-2.

archbishop met with Karl Rove, the senior advisor to the President, many of the National Security Advisors of the Administration, as well as Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and Speaker of the House, Congressman Dennis Hastert.

The meetings in Washington, D.C. were followed on November 17 by a petition issued by the members of the Holy Eparchial Synod of the Archdiocese for distribution and signature by members of Greek Orthodox parishes. The Synod requested that the following petition be presented on Sunday, November 21, 2004 for signature following the Divine Liturgy.

A Petition to the Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

We, the undersigned Americans of Greek Orthodox Faith, hereby protest the recent decision of the United States Government to recognize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M.) with the name “Republic of Macedonia.” This decision constitutes a de facto acceptance of a falsified and distorted understanding of the history and present reality of a vitally important region in the Balkans. Instability and conflict will surely result from the adoption of such a policy. The name “Macedonia” is historically associated with a large northern province of contemporary Greece that coincides with the ancient territory of Hellenic Macedonia.

Therefore, we register our deep concern and urge our government to reconsider its decisions and facilitate the ongoing process of discussion between Greece and F.Y.R.O.M., under the aegis of the United Nations, for finding a name for F.Y.R.O.M. acceptable to both involved countries. Such a position would certainly advance the cause of peace and justice in the Balkans, an area heavily inhabited by Orthodox faithful.³⁹

These efforts by Church leadership and the Greek American community did not result in a reversal of position by the Bush Administration. Advocacy continued, though, through ongoing meetings with U.S. officials and mention of the issue in public forums, including the annual visit of the archbishop and Greek Americans to the White House in

³⁹“A Petition to the Secretary of State Colin L. Powell,” November 19, 2004, www.goarch.org/news/goa.news1241 (accessed January 25, 2012).

commemoration of Greek Independence Day. The community has also found support for reviewing the U.S. position on Macedonia in relation to the name dispute in the Obama Administration. Both prior to his election and in office, President Obama has expressed his support for the Greek American position. In 2006, then Senator Obama was one of three co-sponsors of a Senate Resolution that urged the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to work with Greece in the United Nations process to find a mutually acceptable name for the country. Also, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, a long-time friend of the Greek American community, has expressed her support that the name dispute be resolved.⁴⁰ While the U.S. government continues to recognize the country under the official name “Republic of Macedonia,”⁴¹ officials are cognizant of the challenges the name dispute presents both to relations with Greece and advocacy efforts by Greek Americans and the leadership of the Greek Orthodox Church.

In comparison with advocacy by the Church on the issues of the previous chapter, the ethnic and international characteristics of the Macedonian Question contrast with the internal and political aspects of the Greek junta. Also, the name dispute and the Greek conflict with Macedonia over history, geography and culture, are very different from the initial humanitarian issues and ongoing dispute regarding the invasion and division of Cyprus. While issues of ethnicity in relation to these issues and their advocacy within the Greek American community will be addressed in chapter six, it is important to note here

⁴⁰Secretary Clinton attended and spoke at the enthronement of Archbishop Demetrios in September 1999, as then First Lady and representative of President Clinton at the event. As a Senator and now as Secretary of State, Clinton has expressed support for Greek American positions on all three major policy issues of Cyprus, the Macedonian name dispute, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

⁴¹See the U.S. Department of State web site for Macedonia at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26759.htm (accessed January 29, 2012).

that the unity and strength of advocacy gained over the Cyprus Crisis became the foundation of advocacy on the Macedonian Question. This was seen in the increased level of coordination among Greek American organizations in the lobbying effort, and by these organizations with the Church. One explanation for this was that many leaders of the organizations have and continue to be prominent members and leaders in the Greek Orthodox Church. Another aspect of this relationship has been the recognition by these leaders, their organizations, and Greek Americans in general of the leadership role of the archbishop in addressing political issues before U.S. officials. Again, part of this relates to the personal relationships the Greek Orthodox archbishops have developed with U.S. Presidents and other high-ranking Administration officials. It is also due to the recognition given the archbishop by officials as the leader of the Greek American community.

Another aspect of the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in advocacy that is presented in the engagement with the Macedonia question is the difference in approach by the two archbishops, Iakovos and Demetrios. While both used their office and public forums to address the issue on behalf of the Church and Greek Americans, Iakovos also placed the issue within the context of Orthodox theology and Greek nationalism. He did this in the manner in which he used the annual March 25 and October 28 encyclicals, framing the issue both in religious and nationalist language. Demetrios has avoided this approach. While he has issued the annual encyclicals, and the texts clearly show connections with nationalist and ethnic identity, he has not used them as a means of communicating views on the issues. He has done this in separate letters and statements. While some of these statements included above have made specific references to God,

and affirmed support for positions on the basis of justice and peace, the archbishop has shown some separation by not addressing political issues with an intermingling of ethnic and nationalist views with biblical and theological references. This will be addressed in more detail in chapter six on the elements of Greek American advocacy, but it is a distinction that is very clear in terms of the role of religion in political advocacy. It also provides a contrast between the manner in which Church leaders have addressed U.S. foreign policy on political and national issues of Greece and the topic of the next chapter, the status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey. This is an issue related directly to the administration of the Church in America and the historical relationship of Orthodox Christians to the primacy of this see for all Orthodox Churches around the world.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Ecumenical Patriarchate

Since 1922 the Greek Orthodox Church in the United States has been under the administration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. From its headquarters in Istanbul, Turkey, the Synod of the Patriarchate has had the authority to appoint the hierarchs of the Church in America, review and approve its charter,¹ and address any other ecclesiastical or administrative affairs related to the structure and function of the Archdiocese. While this authority and the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in relation to all Orthodox Churches in America has many aspects, the main ecclesiastical premise for this relationship is the historical role of the Patriarchate as the administrative See for all Orthodox Churches in diaspora. This position had its roots in the recognition of the See among Orthodox as the first among equals in relation to the three other ancient Patriarchates of the East: Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.²

¹For documents on the significance of the charter of the Archdiocese in relation to the administrative role of the Patriarchate, visit the official charter website of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of American at www.goarch.org/special/charter/index_html.

²The word “ecumenical” was initially used as a honorific title for senior hierarchs. John the Faster (d. 595) was rebuked by Pope Gregory I when he began the use of the title “Ecumenical Patriarch” in official correspondence. It eventually became the formal title of the Patriarch of Constantinople, linked to his status as bishop of the imperial capital and seniority among the eastern patriarchs. See “Ecumenical Patriarch,” *The Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity*, ed. Ken Parry and others (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 172. For general histories on the Ecumenical Patriarch see J.M. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Marios Philippides, *Emperors, Patriarchs, and Sultans of Constantinople* (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1990); Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

With the location of the capital of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople, the Patriarchate attained significant status in the administration of ecclesiastical and some civil affairs. By the fifth century the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate extended over the whole of Asia Minor, and by the eighth century the southern Balkans, the Greek islands, Sicily and parts of Italy. Through the efforts of missionaries from Byzantium to the Slavs, the Patriarchate established more dioceses under its jurisdiction among the Bohemians, Moravians, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Russians.³ While some of these eventually became autocephalous Churches, the role of the Patriarchate in the administration of missionary regions was firmly established.

With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the position of the Ecumenical Patriarch was relegated to that of being the head of a separate and autonomous religious and ethnic entity of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The jurisdiction of the Patriarchate still covered areas of the Balkans, the Ionian and Aegean island, Asia Minor and parts of Russia, however, church authority was limited to managing ecclesiastical and inter-ethnic civil affairs among Orthodox Christians with the charge of keeping these populations in subservience to the Ottomans. With the rise of nationalist movements in the nineteenth century, the Patriarchate granted by means of Tomes an autonomous, autocephalous, or patriarchal status to many of the Churches. Also during this period and with the increase in migration of Greek Orthodox Christians from Greece and Asia Minor, the Ecumenical Patriarchate delegated ecclesiastical authority of diaspora Greeks to the Church of Greece

1968); George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957).

³Vasil T. Stavrides, *A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate*, trans. George D. Dragas, *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 45:1-4 (2000): 63.

in 1908. It resumed its responsibility for the Church in North and South America in 1922 along with the Metropolis of Thyateira (and Great Britain since 1964), and in 1923, the Patriarchate granted autonomy to the Churches of Finland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, and Latvia-Lettonia which remained under its jurisdiction.

Certainly, the status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate under Ottoman rule was characterized by constant political pressure, legal restrictions, and outright persecution. In addition, the pressures over the centuries contributed to the gradual decline of the Greek population in Asia Minor. These pressures were increased with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the nationalist movements in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and with the success of the Greek independence movement in the 1820s. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish state a century later, the position of the Patriarchate was even more precarious. Assurances were secured with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and with later bilateral agreements between Greece and Turkey for the Patriarchate to remain in Istanbul, but challenges to the status of the Patriarch as a leader of Orthodox Christians outside of Turkey, confiscation of property, and restrictions on the function of the Patriarchate continued to the present.⁴

With the growth of the Greek Orthodox Church in the United States, the rise in prominence of Greek Americans, and the establishment of the United States as a world superpower in the twentieth century, the position of the Church as an advocate for the

⁴For a detailed analysis of the legal issues between the Turkish government and the Ecumenical Patriarchate since 1923 see Maria Burnet et. al., *Turkey's Compliance with its Obligations to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Christian Minority – A Legal Analysis* (New Haven: The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, 2005). See also Chrysostomos Konstantinides, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchs from the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) to the Present," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 45:1-4 (2000): 5-22.

Patriarchate developed significantly. Beginning with formal pleas for intervention, the efforts of Church leaders were enhanced under the leadership of Archbishop Iakovos and with the confidence engendered by the success of the Greek American lobby on matters pertaining to Cyprus. Further, lobbying on behalf of the Patriarchate has also been facilitated by the increased attention given to human rights and religious freedom by the U.S. State Department and global political entities, as well as by the requirements put forth by the European Union in the process of considering Turkey's membership. All of these aspects, in addition to the longstanding strategic relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, represent the larger context in which the Greek Orthodox Church in America has and continues to engage U.S. policymakers on the problems facing the status and function of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

Advocacy of the Greek Orthodox Church in America

Advocacy of the Greek Orthodox Church in America on behalf of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has its origins in the response to the plight of Greeks in Anatolia following the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922, which ended with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the exchange of populations between the two countries. Over one million Greeks were displaced as a result of the "Asia Minor Catastrophe" in addition to those who were already forced out of their communities or lost their lives during the conflict.⁵ Following the period of exchange, significant numbers of Greeks remained in the new nation of Turkey, mostly concentrated in and around Istanbul and on islands in the Mediterranean.

⁵See John E. Rexine, "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey," in *Orthodox Theology and Diakonia: Trends and Prospects*, ed. Demetrios J. Constantelos (Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1981), 155-173.

As the conflict intensified and with the institutional establishment of the Archdiocese in America under the leadership of Archbishop Meletios Metaxakis, the Church became more engaged with the struggles of Greeks in Asia Minor. As mentioned in chapter two, Archbishop Meletios lobbied U.S. officials on behalf of Greeks and other Christian minorities in Turkey in a letter to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes on December 8, 1921. Less than two weeks before, Meletios had been elected Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, a position that made him the leading hierarch for the Greek Orthodox Christians of that region. With the letter Meletios provided documents sent to him from the Patriarchate describing the “slaughters and persecutions...committed against the Christian Greeks and Armenians that are still left under the domination of Mustapha Kemal in Asia Minor.”⁶ He continued:

The humane interest which Your Excellency, as true spokesman of this Christian civilized country of the United States of America has shown during the Conference of the Great Nations now deliberating under your chairmanship...is sufficient reason for me to trust that the sufferings of the remaining Christians of Asia Minor will attract your attention and sympathy. The Oecumenical Patriarchate in sending me these documents...dares hope that this Great Country has the power to stop the bloody scimitar of the Turk, before completing the destruction of the Christians who bow still under the Turkish yoke.

Following Patriarch Meletios’ departure in 1922, the annulling of the 1908 tome placing the Archdiocese under the administration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the elevation of Alexander to Archbishop, an even stronger connection between the Archdiocese and the Patriarchate was established, assuring the role of the Church in America as an advocate. Archbishop Alexander continued the effort with regular pleas to the clergy and communities of the Archdiocese and to other Christian groups in raising

⁶Paul G. Manolis, *The History of the Greek Church in America: In Acts and Documents*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: Ambelos Press, 203), 573.

funds for the Patriarchate and for the relief efforts for the Orthodox Christians in Asia Minor.⁷ This work was continued by his successor, Athenagoras, who lobbied by means of his personal contacts with U.S. officials. In 1948, he was elected Ecumenical Patriarch, and his tenure was also a time of intense persecution of Greeks in Turkey. Following the anti-Greek riots of September 6-7, 1955, which destroyed hundreds of Greek-owned businesses and Greek Orthodox churches and schools, Archbishop Michael sent a telegram to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asking for U.S. intervention.⁸ Writing “on behalf of over one million American citizens of Greek descent” and addressing the atrocities against Greeks and the Ecumenical Patriarchate he stated:

...We ask you, sir, in the name of moral decency, and your well known lively interest in securing freedom of worship throughout the world as we enjoy it here in our truly democratic country, to take every measure for the immediate rehabilitation of the colossal damages brought upon our Greek Orthodox brethren in Turkey, and the prevention of any recurrence of such unbelievable catastrophes that stigmatize modern civilization.

As Michael’s successor and a former deacon of Patriarch Athenagoras, Archbishop Iakovos made substantial advocacy efforts on behalf of the Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Asia minor, and he was considered by many Greek Americans as a major force in the strengthening the position of the Patriarch as a world religious leader.⁹

⁷See the official correspondence of Archbishop Alexander on behalf of the Relief Committee for the Greeks of Asia Minor in Demetrios J. Constantelos, ed., *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America* (Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1976), 30-91.

⁸Ibid, 703.

⁹The role of Archbishops Michael, Athenagoras and Iakovos in strengthening the Ecumenical Patriarchate together with the contributions of laity is surveyed in Silas Koskinas, “The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Development of the Orthodox Church in the New World,” in *Orthodox Theology and Diakonia – Trends and Prospects*, 212-248.

Iakovos facilitated this support on a variety of levels. Through encyclicals and letters he kept the challenges of the Patriarchate and the Greeks in Turkey before the faithful in America. Using the forum of the October 28, OXI Day, encyclical in 1964, he called on Greek Americans “to enlighten public and official opinion” on the struggles in Cyprus and Turkey. In his text he also offered a justification for political engagement by Greek Orthodox Christians in America.

The struggle of our Cypriot brothers for an unshackled self determination...as well as the silent and painful struggle of the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey for the rights that are due them, should arouse the universal conscience to an extent of which the Turkish Government should take note, and show respect for the treaties and covenants that guarantee justice and human dignity. And these guarantees and rights should be held up for all to see in the light of historic truth, so that they may be reflected in the public opinion of our great American nation.

Believing fully, as a matter of conscience as well as tradition, in the principles of freedom, justice and peace, it is our duty to uphold at all times the prevalence of these ideals. Our efforts and our activities to enlighten the public and official opinion towards this end is not a matter of politics. It is an obligation of conscience and character.

We therefore appeal to your hearts and consciences, dearly beloved brethren, to do your utmost to enlighten American public opinion with the true facts of this great cause, through the modern media of press, television and radio, and through public lectures and personal discussions. Our entire effort in this vital matter should be characterized by objectivity and motivated by a well intentioned patriotism. For we know that public opinion in this land of ours is most sensitive and receptive to the objective truth.¹⁰

¹⁰*Encyclicals and Documents*, 1173-1174. The following year in the October 28, 1965 OXI Day Encyclical, Archbishop Iakovos addressed at length the plight of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the face of intense persecution by the Turkish government calling the Greek Orthodox Christians in the United States to action: “Join, then, together your souls, your concerns, your efforts and actions and raise your voices in dignified protest towards every lawful recourse against this unacceptable religious persecution: unacceptable not only to us, but to the age in which we live, and to the entire civilized world, but above all to America, the greatness of which has been blessed by its freedom of religion.” Archbishop Iakovos, *The Complete Works*, vol. 2, *The Torchbearer: Encyclicals: Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Subjects, Administration, Education, Culture*, ed. Demtrios J. Constantelos (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1999), 203.

In September 1965, Archbishop Iakovos issued a lengthy public statement in response to increased pressures on the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the Turkish government in the manner of expulsions and seizures of property. In the statement, the archbishop affirmed the critical role of the Archdiocese in informing the American public and officials about incidents in Turkey against the Patriarchate and the Greek minority. Beginning with the riots of 1955, Iakovos listed the expulsion of Greek nationals and hierarchs, the closure of the printing office of the Patriarchate and of orphanages and schools, the control of the finances of the Patriarchate, and the seizure of church properties. The bold statement had repercussions.

In February 1966, Iakovos traveled to Turkey for meetings with Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras and the Synod before attending the World Council of Churches' Central Committee session in Geneva. It was reported that the archbishop was under surveillance by Turkish authorities, and this was confirmed when police informed Iakovos just minutes before a service that he would not be allowed to celebrate the Divine Liturgy in the Patriarchal Church of Saint George because he was not a Turkish national. In response, a letter was addressed to President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk for general circulation and signature on behalf of the Patriarchate.

The letter stated:

We strongly protest the arbitrary order of the Turkish authorities denying Archbishop Iakovos, who is an American citizen, the right to offer Divine Liturgy at the Church of [the] Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. Regarding this new action as a flagrant violation of international morality and of freedom of religion and as a further measure of oppression aiming at the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey, we trust that you will take every possible step to ask the Turkish Government to cease the endless harassments against the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the peaceful Greek Orthodox minority.¹¹

¹¹Ibid., 1199.

Additional advocacy efforts by Iakovos continued as he encouraged support for the Patriarchate among Greek Americans and from the U.S. government. In December 1977, the archbishop sent a packet to every member of Congress offering “information to acquaint you with the very serious new harassment by the Turkish authorities against our Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Greek Orthodox churches and schools and the Greek community in Istanbul” and asking each “to use your influence to stop these flagrant actions against the Turkish citizens of Hellenic ancestry.”¹² In March 1980, Iakovos made another national appeal to the clergy and parish councils of the Archdiocese asking “that you lodge protests in your local newspapers and other news media, and register your protests with your elected, local, state and national government officials and with local religious leaders and organizations.”¹³ Again in August 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Persian Gulf conflict, another national campaign was launched on the basis of U.S. relations with Turkey. Iakovos called on the faithful of the Greek Orthodox Church in America to “protest to our American Government. The Congress, Senators and Representatives, the State Department, Governors, Mayors, and all representatives of our Federal and local governments.... They do not know.”¹⁴ He continued:

Because Turkey is said to be the best friend the United States now has since the end of the Persian Gulf conflict, our nation must involve itself in this threatening

¹²Archbishop Iakovos, *The Complete Works*, vol. 2, 148.

¹³Archbishop Iakovos, *The Complete Works*, vol. 3, *The Torchbearer: Encyclicals: Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Subjects, Administration, Education, Culture*, ed. Demtrios J. Constantelos (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001), 258.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 320.

situation against our Patriarchate, so that it may once again function freely in its spiritual mission as the first Patriarchate of the Orthodox World.

If we, as citizens of this great nation, and our American Government do not act at this time, they and we will be betraying the very principles of freedom and religion and the other basic freedoms on which our democratic Republic is founded....

Please inform me by personal letters and printed information how you respond to this urgent request and plea for the spiritual center of world Orthodoxy. Time is of essence. The barbarian in western attire is at the very door.

Over the last two decades, the advocacy of the Church in America on behalf of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has continued with regular appeals to its membership for support, but it has also included a more direct approach in appealing regularly to Presidents and Congressional leaders. This was facilitated by the visit of Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios in 1990 and his reception by President George H.W. Bush, and the first in a succession of visits by the successor to Dimitrios, Bartholomew in 1997. These visits heightened the awareness of U.S. officials on the issues between the Patriarchate and the Turkish government and encouraged Greek Americans to increase their advocacy. One group within the Church that took up this cause was the Order of Saint Andrew Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Founded in 1966 as an organization of laymen who support the Patriarchate, the Order began to increase its advocacy of U.S. officials in the late 1990s. These efforts are addressed in more detail below, however, it is important to recognize that this increase in engagement in political advocacy was strengthened with the election of Archbishop Demetrios in 1999. A strong supporter of the Patriarchate, Demetrios had already spent years in the United States, receiving a doctorate at Harvard University, teaching at the Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology in Brookline, Massachusetts, and as a visiting professor of New Testament at

Harvard. He was also a member of the delegation of hierarchs sent by the Patriarchate in 1999 to address the conflicts between Archbishop Spyridon and the other hierarchs and lay leadership of the Church in America.¹⁵

In addition to continuing the appeal for support within the Church, Archbishop Demetrios increased the efforts on behalf of the Patriarchate by making it a central issue in his engagement with U.S. officials. He was assisted by the regular visits of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to the United States, visits which always included White House meetings with the President and events with State Department officials and Congressional leaders.¹⁶ But he has also promoted the cause and work of the Patriarchate in other forums. As described in the introduction to chapter one, the main forum has

¹⁵The conflict between Archbishop Sypridon and the other hierarchs and laity of the Greek Orthodox Church in America was the result of numerous issues and challenges including a stronger assertion of the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the affairs of the Church in America, the autocratic leadership style of Archbishop Sypridon, the desire of the bishops of the Archdiocese to have more independence in the administration of their individual dioceses, and the challenges to the high levels of lay involvement in the administration of the Church. While many clergy and parishes tried to find a middle ground in the conflict, the growing rift among the hierarchs and the archbishop, strong challenges to his authority and that of the Patriarchate by parishes, and financial difficulties for the Archdiocese prompted the Patriarchate to move on the matter and forced Spyridon to resign in August 1999.

¹⁶The 2009 visit of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to the United States resulted in a House Resolution passed by a vote of 424 to 0 on October 15, 2009. The bill, sponsored by Congressman Gus Bilirakis (R-FL) who is a Greek American and member of the House Europe Subcommittee, welcomed Bartholomew to the United States and Washington, D.C., included a lengthy list of his accomplishments as a world religious leader, recognized his importance to the United States, and urged “Turkey to grant religious freedom and property rights to the Ecumenical Patriarchate as well as to reopen the theological school at Halki.” Congress, House, *Welcoming to the United States and to Washington, D.C., His All Holiness Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, Ecumenical Patriarch on his upcoming trip on October 20, 2009, through November 6, 2009*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 838, *Congressional Record*, 155, no. 149, daily ed. (October 15, 2009): H11458.

been the annual recognition of Greek Independence Day by the White House. For years, this event was a meeting in the Oval Office between the President and a small delegation of prominent Greek Americans led by the Archbishop. However, under the Bush Administration, the event was changed to a major commemoration with hundreds in attendance and official remarks offered by both the President and the Archbishop.¹⁷ Over the last decade, Archbishop Demetrios has used this forum to emphasize the three critical policy issues for the Greek American community and the Greek Orthodox Church. Characteristic of these opportunities, on March 25, 2009, Demetrios called on President Obama to follow “the brilliant example of Alexander the Great...to cut the Gordian Knot of these unresolved issues, and by so doing, enhance peace and reconciliation among people included and involved.” In listing the issues he addressed first the Ecumenical Patriarchate:

In...full awareness of the tremendous power, both personal and institutional, of the President of the United States, we feel that we can kindly ask you for your special assistance, an assistance in resolving chronic injustices related to issues of religious freedom, human values, peaceful coexistence, democratic rule of law, and the pursuit of happiness. I am specifically referring to the following three cases:

First: The case of the religious freedom of our Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. This means the free and unfettered exercise of His All Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’s purely spiritual mission of leading the

¹⁷The annual meeting at the White House is only one of two that Presidents have consistently held with ethnic groups, the other being with Irish Americans in commemoration of St. Patrick’s Day. The event with Greek Americans has been held consecutively for twenty-five years with five different Presidents. The significance of this and the strength of the Greek American community in maintaining this annual event is highlighted in an article by Andrew Manatos, president of the Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH). See “The Value of the Annual White House Meeting for Greek Independence Day: An Insider’s View on the 25th Anniversary,” March 25 2011, www.americanhellenic.org/articles/2011-03-25_significance_of_mar25.php (accessed February 2, 2012). The article was originally released by CEH on March 24, 2011.

Orthodox Christian world of over a quarter of a billion people. Furthermore, his possibility to proceed freely and effectively in his pioneering work for the environment, and his passionate promotion of inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue.

Second: The case of the well-known issue of the Republic of Cyprus, and

Third: The case of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.¹⁸

These regular appeals have been combined with advocacy by the Archbishop through regular meetings with U.S. State Department officials and personal lobbying as shown in his testimony in April 2005 before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. His presentation was entitled “The Unfair and Unacceptable Treatment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the Turkish Government.”¹⁹ He opened the address by placing the force of the Greek American community behind his words. “I am speaking to you as the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church in America with a constituency close to two million people, a constituency which ecclesiastically belongs to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. As the Archbishop of this Church, I feel that what happens to the Ecumenical Patriarchate has a direct impact on us here both as Orthodox Christians and as American citizens.” Demetrios reviewed both the historical significance of the Patriarchate and the major problems for the institution within Turkey including forced closure of the Theological School of Halki, the confiscation of over 1400 church

¹⁸“Remarks of His Eminence Archbishop Demetrios of America to President Barak Obama on the Occasion of Greek Independence Day,” March 25, 2009, www.goarch.org/news/archsemetriosaddress-02-25-2009 (accessed April 17, 2009).

¹⁹*Orthodox Observer*, March-April 2005, 3. The case of the Archdiocese on behalf of the Patriarchate has also been assisted by a lengthy legal study conducted by the Yale Law School. See Maria Burnet et. al., *Turkey’s Compliance with its Obligations to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Christian Minority – A Legal Analysis* (New Haven: The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, 2005).

properties, and the refusal of the Turkish government to recognize the “Ecumenical” status of the Patriarch. He concluded: “It is my hope that the Commission will give urgent attention to these problems so that the Greek Orthodox community of Turkey, together with all other minority communities in Turkey, such as the Jewish and Armenian communities, may be protected in its lawful right to contemplate a secure existence and a prosperous future.”

The Order of Saint Andrew

The Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was instituted in 1966 as an organization of laymen within the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America who had received the rank of “Archon” by the Ecumenical Patriarch. The title of Archon and the office, or *offikion*, that accompanies it have been bestowed by the Patriarch since 1453 upon individuals who offer exceptional service to the Church.²⁰ In the initial investiture service held on March 10, Archbishop Iakovos conferred upon thirty laymen *offikia* that had been granted by Ecumenical

²⁰The title of “Archon” is from the ancient Greek term *archontes*, meaning “rulers.” It was used to designate specific offices of the state. By the sixth century BC, it was used as the title for any individual who had been elected to civil office, and by 457 BC, men were appointed to the office for a one-year term. Over time the office developed to have more judicial oversight in the areas of family matters and inheritance claims, as well as the organization of public festivals, and during the Roman period (146 BC – 313 AD) the length of service was gradually extended. The office continued in the Byzantine Empire, with the title used for governors, and commonly in reference to those with authority and power. By the ninth century, the office of the archon was in one of four general areas of Byzantine administration: ecclesiastic, court nobility, military, and civilian administration. With the final collapse of the Empire in 1453, the title was retained by the Orthodox Church and became an honorary designation for those who offered substantial contributions to its ministry. George E. Demacopoulos, *The Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate: Defenders of the Faith*, (New York: Order of Saint Andrew, n.d.), 4-5.

Patriarch Athenagoras. Since that time, the service has been held annually, and the ranks of the Order in the United States have grown to over seven hundred current members.²¹ Identifying their mission as “Defenders of the Faith,” the Order has grown both in its profile and activity as a strong advocate for the Ecumenical Patriarchate through educational initiatives, regular pilgrimages to the Patriarchate and significant sites in the history of Christianity, and philanthropic work for the See in Constantinople and the Archdiocese in America. As a part of its educational mission, the Order of Saint Andrew identifies first and foremost its role of political advocacy on behalf of the Patriarchate: “Throughout the twentieth century, and even more recently, the Orthodox Christian Church in Turkey, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate specifically, has suffered from persistent religious persecution. The Order of St. Andrew has worked to inform political leaders in Washington, D.C., and in Europe so that their governments can pressure Turkish authorities to end this unjust oppression.”²² In addition to sponsoring symposia and publications that highlight both the challenges and international role of the Patriarchate, the Order gives attention to human rights and religious freedom through annual awarding of the Athenagoras Human Rights Award. The bestowal of this award upon well-known international persons such as, Presidents Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush, Mother Theresa, Desmond Tutu, Elie Wiesel, and Mikhail Gorbachev, has provided a forum for public and global advocacy for the Patriarchate.

²¹“Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” *2012 Yearbook: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America* (New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2012), 134-139.

²²Demacopoulos, 9-10.

Over the last several decades, the lobbying efforts of the Order of Saint Andrew on behalf of the Ecumenical Patriarchate have been directed at both the United States government and international forums. The impetus of advocacy in the U.S. has several aspects. First, as described above, the Greek Orthodox Church in America has a direct administrative connection to the Patriarchate, thus the security and operation of the institution in Turkey is of critical interest to the leadership of the Church in America. Second, as an Order of the Patriarchate, Archons are commissioned with a direct responsibility to support and “defend” it. Third, the membership of the Order consists of many prominent Greek Americans in the United States who have direct access to government officials who shape and make policy. Finally, these connections are significant in conjunction with the U.S. relationship with Turkey and the larger presence and interests of the U.S. in the region.

The major issues of this advocacy as promoted by the Order of Saint Andrew include the limitations on the religious freedom of the Patriarchate both in terms of the status of the Ecumenical Patriarch as an international religious leader based in Turkey and the challenges and restrictions faced by the Patriarchate in attempting to serve the Greek minority and operate its institutions under the laws of the Turkish state. One of the major issues concerning the status of the Patriarch has been the restrictions placed on the election for the office by Turkish officials. In 1923 and again in 1970, governors of Istanbul issued decrees stating that the Ecumenical Patriarch and the hierarchs who vote for him must be Turkish citizens. In addition to contradicting canons of the Orthodox Church which state that the Patriarch can be elected from among all of the hierarchs of Patriarchate and its jurisdictions, this requirement has significantly restricted the pool of

candidates.²³ As of October 2011, only twenty hierarchs met this requirement, with three applications for citizenship pending consideration by the Turkish government.²⁴ In addition to this limitation on candidacy, a 1970 directive remains in effect that gives Turkish authorities the right to remove any otherwise eligible candidate.

A second issue is the lack of recognition by the Turkish state of the “Ecumenical” status of the Patriarch as spiritual leader of all Orthodox Christians, while other Christian communions, world leaders, and the history of the Church confirm the validity of the title. For almost a century, Turkish officials have identified the Patriarch as only the leading hierarch of the Greek Orthodox community in and around Istanbul, claiming that the Treaty of Lausanne prohibits the title “Ecumenical.” However, the debate has much more to do with the recognition given the Patriarch outside of Turkey, the history of oppression and expulsion of the Greek population of Asia Minor, and disputes over religious properties confiscated by the Turkish government. This is also linked to the legal status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a religious institution in Turkey. While the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne established and defined the rights of minorities in Turkey, the government has denied legal standing to the Patriarchate, restricting its ability to operate churches and institutions, to have property rights, and to address grievances in the state judicial system. Currently, all properties used by the Patriarchate and its churches are owned by minority foundations which the government requires to be administered independently. In addition to prohibitions on purchasing property, the Patriarchate has

²³“Problems Faced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” May 5, 2006, *2007 Annual Report to His All Holiness Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople, The New Rome & Ecumenical Patriarch* (New York: Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle, 2007), 1.

²⁴*2011 Annual Report* (New York: Order of Saint Andrew, 2011), 5.

also seen the confiscation of thousands of homes, apartment buildings, schools and lands over the past century. This included eighteen churches and monasteries and thirty-six cemeteries that are still operated by the Patriarchate on land that is legally owned by the state.²⁵

In conjunction with Turkey's bid for membership in the European Union and due to related pressure to improve on its record of human rights in many areas, the Turkish government has made some movement in recent years to address the property issues. Following a decision by the European Court of Human Rights on July 7, 2008, the Turkish government returned the property of the Patriarchal Orphanage located on Büyükada Island on November 10, 2010; and on August 27, 2011, the government signed a general decree to return confiscated property to religious minorities or to provide compensation if the properties had been sold to a third party.²⁶ These property issues have been a major focus of advocacy on behalf of the Patriarchate, but the banner issue has been the status of the Theological School on the island of Halki. Protected by the Treaty of Lausanne, the school operated until its forced closure by Turkish authorities in 1971 as a preparatory high school as well as a training school for clergy. When it was in operation, the institution provided an educational center for the Greek community and

²⁵“Problems Faced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” 3. For an analysis of the modern dynamics of the relationship between the current Islamist government of Turkey and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in comparison to the secularist Kemalism of most of the twentieth century see Elizabeth H. Prodromou, “Turkey Between Secularism and Fundamentalism?: The ‘Muslimhood Model’ and the Greek Orthodox Minority,” *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* 3:1 (Spring 2005): 11-22.

²⁶*2011 Annual Report*, 5. “Turkey to Return Confiscated Property,” August 29, 2011, www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=508 (accessed January 29, 2012). The decree was the result of a European Union demand and followed a series of court cases against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights.

trained the priests and future hierarchs of the Church in Turkey. In addition, it was also a place of study and preparation for Greek Orthodox clergy around the world. In spite of promises by Turkish officials that a solution is in progress and the significant attention given to the issue both in the United States and international forums, the school remains closed.

These major issues are combined with many other property and legal issues that have challenged the operations of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey. The context for these challenges has not only been the general treatment of religious minorities by the Turkish government combined with the manner in which Turkey has limited the function of religious organizations in offering social and educational programs, but it has also been characterized by a lack of dialog between the government and these groups. In 2006 the Order of Saint Andrew described this challenge:

One of the most difficult things the Ecumenical Patriarchate must endure is the fact that there is no dialogue with the Turkish Authorities about the issues of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, in order to find solutions to the problems. In the past several years, there have been very few meetings between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Turkish Authorities. Additionally, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has written and sent over 30 letters to the Prime Minister, other Ministers and Authorities in Ankara about the problems of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its community, but there has never been even one reply to any of these letters.²⁷

Even when meetings have occurred and grievances presented, the response at times has been encouraging for the Patriarchate, but any significant action has not followed. For this reason, the advocacy of the Order of Saint Andrew has increased substantially over the last decade and has focused on three areas. The first of these has been regular pilgrimages to the Patriarchate, Ankara and historic places in Asia Minor to lobby

²⁷Problems Faced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” 6.

Turkish officials and to confirm publically the support of the Order and Greek Americans for the Patriarchate. These pilgrimages have included religious services in areas that had been restricted by the state, conferences on the Patriarchate and religious freedom issues, and meetings with and banquets for U.S. ambassadors and other diplomatic personnel stationed in Turkey. Two of these pilgrimages in the last decade represent these efforts made by the Order. On October 18-22, 2002, the pilgrimage of the Order included a banquet at the Koc Museum in honor of the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, W. Robert Pearson, with members of the Turkish Grand Assembly among the invited guests. A delegation of Archons also traveled to Ankara and met with the President of Religious Affairs, Mehmet Nuri Yilmaz, on issues of religious tolerance and freedom. During the pilgrimage, the Order accompanied by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Ambassador Pearson attended a presentation at the Halki Theological School entitled “Religious Tolerance in the Context of Interfaith Dialogue.” In his remarks, Ambassador Pearson stated, “The United States continues to encourage Turkey...to let the light shine forth once again here from Halki.” Also speaking at the event was Archon National Commander, Anthony Limberakis, who presented the context of the relationship of the Archons as Americans with the Ecumenical Patriarchate:

Religious tolerance and freedom is a recurring theme that forms the underpinnings of the American way of life. When the colonies were organized into the United States of America, the constitutional draftsmen ensured that the government of that fledgling nation would not interfere with the free exercise of religious beliefs nor promote an official state religion. Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in America expect no less from the government of Turkey.... The canonical head and spiritual father of our Church in the United States of America is the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, and it is an infringement of our rights as American citizens to worship in America when our spiritual father cannot freely, and without government interference conduct his

ministry to serve his flock, a flock that spans the four corners of the world and not just the country of Turkey.²⁸

Limberakis continued by emphasizing how the restrictions placed on the Patriarchate were an “infringement of our rights as American citizens.” He concluded by announcing, “When we return home tomorrow to the United States, we will inform our own members of Congress and the State Department of the current situation regarding the infringements of religious freedom, and it is our hope the Turkish government will address these serious issues of mutual concern with a sense of urgency.”

In February 2004, another delegation of Archons led by Commander Limberakis and Archbishop Demetrios traveled to Turkey and met with officials in Istanbul and Ankara over issues related to the status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, the group met with both the Provincial Governor Muammer Guler and Mayor Ali Gurtuna of Istanbul, and with the Ministers of Education, Interior, and Religion in Ankara. Prior to this visit positions of several Turkish authorities regarding the reopening of the Halki Theological School had been made public, and options to facilitate this were being discussed. At the talks with the Archon delegation, Ambassador Edelman expressed the support of the United States for Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and that U.S. advocacy was based on the importance of religious freedom for all Americans. After the meetings Archon leaders expressed a sense of optimism that the issue of Halki would be addressed by the new Turkish

²⁸“Meetings with Turkish Officials in Ankara Highlight Archon Pilgrimage to Ecumenical Patriarchate,” October 24, 2002, www.goarch.org/news/goa.news770 (accessed January 29, 2012).

government led by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and that the school would reopen soon.²⁹

This ongoing advocacy in Turkey has been coordinated with an intensive effort to keep the issues of religious freedom for the Patriarchate and the reopening of the theological school before officials and lawmakers in the United States. While over the last decade efforts have been aided by frequent visits of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to the United States and meetings with Presidents Bush and Obama and other administration officials, the focus of the Order of Saint Andrew has been to direct lobbying toward members of Congress seeking affirmations and resolutions of the U.S. position in support of the Patriarchate and religious freedom in Turkey. As an additional effort in highlighting the oppression of the Patriarchate under the Turkish government and in an attempt to seek judicial solutions to the status and property issues, the Order established the Archon Legal Committee in 2005. This committee has worked in alliance with the American Center for Law and Justice and its European counterpart in the development of plans to find legal remedies for the Patriarchate. Also in 2005, the Order joined with Archbishop Demetrios and other religious leaders in testifying before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) on the denial of religious freedom and the legal restrictions placed on the Ecumenical Patriarchate by Turkey.³⁰

²⁹“Archon Leaders Return From Ecumenical Patriarchate and Critical Meetings in Ankara,” February 20, 2004, www.goarch.org/news/goa.news1079 (accessed January 29, 2012).

³⁰*2005 Annual Report* (New York: Order of Saint Andrew: 2005) www.archons.org/docs/AR-index.asp (accessed January 29, 2012).

In 2006-2007, the Order combined public advocacy of full page ads in the *New York Times* and *International Herald*,³¹ with meetings with State Department officials, Congressional leadership, and presidential candidates.³² The meetings were coordinated with campaigns to lobby Senators and Representatives to sign letters in support of the Patriarchate. Seventy-five members of the Senate signed a letter to President George W. Bush expressing “our deep concern that policies of the Turkish government pose a grave threat to the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.” The Senators also affirmed the importance of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to America, referencing the awarding of the Congressional Medal of Honor to him in 2004. They concluded, “Please help Turkey understand America’s close ties to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the importance we attach to its welfare. In doing so, we hope you can help Turkey realize our strong desire that the Ecumenical Patriarchate be accorded the religious freedom it deserves and persuade the Turkish government to abandon policies that will lead to the disappearance of this Sacred See.”³³ This letter was followed in May 2007 with a another signed by forty-two of the fifty members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and addressed to the Prime Minister of Turkey, Tayyip Erdogan. The members of the

³¹“Apostles of Peace,” *New York Times*, December 21, 2006, and *International Herald*, December 21, 2006.

³²Meetings were held with Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, Under Secretary Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Ross Wilson, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joe Biden, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Tom Lantos, and 2008 presidential candidates Senators Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and John McCain. *2007 Annual Report*, 4.

³³*Ibid.* A copy of the letter of November 29, 2006 including signatures is included in the *2007 Annual Report*.

committee addressed their concerns regarding “three aspects of Turkish Government policy toward its citizens who are Greek Orthodox—practices which threaten the viability of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in a direct and urgent manner.”³⁴ The three aspects included the unwillingness of the Turkish government to recognize the Ecumenical Patriarchate as “ecumenical,” the involvement in the process of selecting the Patriarch related to citizenship, and the “expropriations” of property belonging to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The letter concluded by stating, “The Ecumenical Patriarchate—the Sacred See, which has survived since its establishment by the Apostle Andrew nearly two thousand years ago—will disappear in the foreseeable future, unless Turkey changes its policies. We urge you, in friendship and respect, to do everything possible to preserve the Ecumenical Patriarchate and to end all restrictions on its religious freedom.”

In June 2007 the Archons launched another initiative aimed at lobbying each of the fifty state legislatures to pass resolutions on religious freedom on behalf of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. By the end of the year, eight states had done so, with advocacy throughout the country resulting in forty-four religious freedom resolutions being passed in thirty-seven states by the end of 2011.³⁵ In order to accomplish this, the Archons appointed key clergy and Orthodox Christians in all fifty states and asked them to coordinate local campaigns for the adoption of the resolutions. This effort has continued since 2007 along with ongoing advocacy of officials in Washington. In April 2009, President Obama met with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew during his trip to Turkey

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵“U.S. States Which Have Passed Religious Freedom Resolutions for the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” www.archons.org/resolutions/ (accessed January 29, 2012).

and addressed the issue of Halki Seminary in his speech to the Turkish General Assembly.³⁶ The following November, the Patriarch met with President Obama at the White House and attended dinners hosted in his honor by Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Additional meetings with House and Senate leaders resulted in the introduction of a Senate resolution calling for the Turkish government to facilitate the reopening of the Halki Theological School. The resolution was introduced just prior to a December visit to Washington by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan.

In the last two years, the Order of Saint Andrew has also issued statements affirming the “Watch List” status of Turkey as designated by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom in its reports to the White House and State Department;³⁷ made additional presentations before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe;³⁸ and conducted another letter campaign in which 89 Senators and 291 members of the House expressed their concern to President Obama over the status of the Patriarchate in Turkey.³⁹ In April 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

³⁶ President, Speeches, “Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament,” April 6, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-The-Turkish-Parliament/ (May 13, 2009).

³⁷“U.S. Commission Places Turkey on ‘Watch List’ for Religious Freedom,” May 8, 2009, www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=310 (accessed January 31, 2012).

³⁸“U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Urges President Obama to Address Reopening of Halki Seminary with Prime Minister of Turkey,” April 6, 2010, www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=390 (accessed January 29, 2012). “U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Co-chairs Welcome Vote for Reforms in Turkey,” September 16, 2010, www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=419 (accessed January 29, 2012).

³⁹“Ecumenical Patriarch’s Religious Freedom is One of U.S. Congress’ Most Highly Supported Issues,” November 22, 2011, www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=521 (accessed January 29, 2012).

made an official visit to the Phanar, the headquarters of the Patriarchate in Istanbul, followed by a visit of Vice President Joe Biden in December. It must also be noted that this regular engagement between U.S. officials and the Ecumenical Patriarchate is highlighted by the Order of Saint Andrew in their international advocacy efforts, which have included regular meetings in Brussels with European Union leaders, a 2009 mission to Central and Eastern Europe to strengthen efforts on behalf of the Patriarchate, and sponsoring an international religious freedom conference in Brussels in November 2010 entitled “Religious Freedom: Turkey’s Bridge to the European Union.”

Greek American Advocacy for the Ecumenical Patriarchate

The Greek Orthodox Church and the Order of Saint Andrew have been assisted in their advocacy efforts over the last several decades by many of the prominent Greek American organizations. In recent years, lobbying on behalf of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been a primary focus of the Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH). Led by veteran Washington lobbyist Andrew Manatos, a member of the Order of Saint Andrew and of the Archdiocesan Council, CEH has helped to facilitate the efforts of the Archons and the Church by promoting the visits of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew among the Washington establishment, lobbying for sponsorship of resolutions and for signatures on letters by members of Congress, and by regular releases to the media on issues related to the U.S.-Turkey relationship and its implications for greater religious freedom. In 2009, Manatos, as president of CEH, testified before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Programs. This testimony on March 26 marked twenty-five consecutive years that CEH leaders have presented before the committee. In addition to addressing Cyprus and

FYROM, Manatos spoke first about the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the challenges the institution faced. He also emphasized Patriarch Bartholomew's efforts to promote dialogue and understanding between the Christian and Muslim worlds. He stated, "The disappearance of the See would also mean the end of a crucial link between Christians and the Muslim world."⁴⁰

AHEPA and AHI have also offered their support and advocacy on behalf of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In its annual meetings and messages, AHEPA leaders have confirmed the strong relationship between Greek Americans and the Patriarchate, and in April 2010, the organization's annual excursion included a visit to the Patriarchate. In addition to attending Holy Week services at the Phanar, leaders met with U.S. diplomats for a briefing on bilateral relations with Turkey and on issues related to religious freedom and human rights in Turkey.⁴¹ The organization has also given regular publicity to lobbying efforts in Washington by Greek Americans, most recently the Foreign Relations Bill for 2012, passed by the House Foreign Relations Committee on July 21, 2011. The bill included provisions on the reunification of Cyprus and the resolution of the FYROM name dispute, and a call for "Turkey to eliminate all forms of discrimination, particularly with regard to religion, and to immediately grant the appropriate recognition to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which will allow for it to perform essential church functions...."⁴² Advocacy by the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) has taken several

⁴⁰"Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH) Testifies before U.S. Congress," April 16, 2009, <http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=10010> (accessed January 29, 2012).

⁴¹"AHEPA's Excursion to Turkey, Greece, Cyprus," *Greek News*, April 11, 2010, www.greeknewsonline.com/?p=12442 (accessed January 29, 2012).

forms. In 1998, the Institute helped initiate legislation for the 1999 Appropriations Bill, which included provisions “calling upon the United States to use its influence with the Government of Turkey to guarantee the security of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul and to reopen the Halki Theological School.”⁴³ AHI has also engaged directly with U.S. officials. Prior to the 2008 White House visit of the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, AHI leadership sent a lengthy letter to President Bush addressing a number of issues concerning Turkey. Regarding the Patriarchate, they affirmed that even though the Administration supported the “universality of the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” very little progress has been made on safeguarding the institution. They also called on the President to speak to the Turkish leader on these issues:

We condemn Turkey’s toleration of assaults against the Greek Orthodox Christian minority, its continuing illegal closure of the Greek Orthodox Halki Patriarchal School of Theology and its illegal seizure of Greek Orthodox Church property. We call on you, Mr. President, to impress on President Gul that the U.S. government will not tolerate such violations from an ally and call on him to have Turkey immediately implement and enforce strictly the guarantees of religious freedom in the Treaty of Lausanne, the UN Charter, and other international agreements.⁴⁴

AHI has also shown its advocacy for the Patriarchate by addressing related issues in its annual policy report.⁴⁵ In the 2011 report, AHI offers a review of critical issues related to

⁴²“AHEPA Applauds Passage of Foreign Relations Bill in Committee,” *The Ahepan* 84:4 (Fall 2011): 9.

⁴³“AHIPAC Initiated Legislation on Ecumenical Patriarchate Included in 1999 Appropriations Law,” October 26, 1998, www.aheworld.com/media-center/press-releases/1998/62--ahipac-initiated-legislation-on-ecumenical-patriarchate-included-in-1999-appropriations-law.html (accessed January 29, 2012).

⁴⁴“American Hellenic Institute Sends Letter to President Bush Regarding January 8 Meeting with Turkish President Gul,” January 4, 2008, www.rietas.gr/research-areas/greek-studies/536.html (accessed January 29, 2012).

Cyprus, FYROM, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but also calls for a critical review of U.S. policy toward Turkey. The introduction to this section states: “Turkey is an unreliable ally. This assertion was proven during the George W. Bush administration when Turkey refused to allow the United States to use bases in Turkey to open a northern front against the Saddam Hussein dictatorship.”⁴⁶ The section continues with a lengthy list of specific instances when actions by Turkey contradicted U.S. interests. In response, AHI calls the United States government to do more than just urge Turkey to respect religious freedom and restore rights to the Patriarchate and other minorities:

The United States, in its own best interests, should critically review and reassess its relations with Turkey. In addition to economic sanctions and an arms embargo, the United States should consider removing trade and other benefits if Turkey refuses to: Remove its 43,000 illegal occupation forces illegally in Cyprus; end its illegal 35 years of occupation of nearly 40 percent of Cyprus; ...implement and strictly enforce the guarantees of religious freedom and human and minority rights set forth in the Treaty of Lausanne, the UN Charter, other international agreements, and U.S. laws; grant legal personality to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and safeguard it; immediately reopen the Halki School of Theology and lift restrictions on the elections of the Patriarch; promptly return more than 1,000 illegally confiscated properties from the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the Turkish government since 1936; and respect human and minority rights in Turkey.⁴⁷

These direct statements on specific policy actions by AHI differ in the tone of advocacy from the calls made by both the Greek Orthodox Church and the Order of Saint Andrew,

⁴⁵*2011 Policy Statements on Greek American Issues* (Washington, D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 2011). For years the Institute’s report has carried with it the endorsement of major Greek American organizations and fraternal groups including AHEPA, the Cyprus Federation of America, the Hellenic American National Council, the Pancretan Association of America, the Pan-Pontian Federation of U.S.A. and Canada, the Panepirotic Federation of America, and the United Chios Societies of America and Canada.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 19.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 20-21.

and even other Greek American groups; and this difference represents some of the challenges facing advocacy of U.S. policy towards Turkey and Greek American lobbying efforts in general.

Concluding Remarks

From the survey above of the advocacy of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Order of Saint Andrew, it is evident that the focus of the efforts have been on “urging” the U.S. government to use its influence with Turkey to ensure the security of the Patriarchate with the hope that ongoing developments in these relations and Turkey’s progress toward EU membership will result in greater freedom for the Patriarchate and restitution of past wrongs. This is in contrast to the direct calls of AHI for radical changes in U.S. policy toward Turkey. Certainly, numerous strategies are being employed by both groups, but the contrast also reveals the strong transnational links between the Patriarchate and the Church in the United States. These connections can be identified as follows. First, from the statements made by the Archbishop, the current approach is to seek greater levels of tolerance and reconciliation with the Turkish government rather than conflict. In a recent meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, Archbishop Demetrios extended his thanks to the Prime Minister for several recent actions by the Turkish government involving the Patriarchate. This included the decision to return properties owned by minorities, the implementation of a process by which hierarchs outside of Turkey can apply for Turkish citizenship, and allowing the

Ecumenical Patriarch to conducted religious services in places restricted in the past.⁴⁸

While some concessions on the part of the Turkish government have been made and others are more likely than at any time in over a century, this approach seems warranted. Second, the nature of the transnational relationship of the Patriarchate and the Church in the United States is also characterized by the emphasis on a religious mission on behalf of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. It is apparent that this mission is understood by both Bartholomew and Demetrios in terms related to the outreach and strengthening of the Church and its members and not as a political mission with purely political goals. This is seen in the nature of the relationships cultivated by the hierarchs with U.S. and other world leaders. Finally, the relationship also presents the balance that the Ecumenical Patriarchate has tried to maintain in having an ally in Greek Americans and their Church. This has at times been a contentious relationship, especially in the late 1990s when the administrative style and demeanor of Archbishop Sypridon was countered with the strong sentiments of independence and synergistic experience of church polity of the laity of the U.S. Church. Under Archbishop Demetrios, the strength and spirit of the Church has been channeled toward greater support for the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a deepening of the transnational ties between Greek Americans and their “Mother Church.”⁴⁹

⁴⁸“Archbishop Demetrios Meets with Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan,” September 27, 2011, www.goarch.org/news/visit-erdoganny-09272011 (accessed January 29, 2012).

⁴⁹While some movements for autocephaly do exist, they have not been able to gain a significant following due to the strong connection of many Greek Americans to a Greek Orthodox Church independent of other Orthodox jurisdictions. The movement to create an “American” Orthodox Church has its roots in the debate over the canonical anomaly of having multiple, overlapping “ethnic” jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere. However, the strong transnational ties of many of the American jurisdictions is as much a factor as the desire of homeland Churches to have their

The relationships with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and with Greece, as presented in earlier chapters, offer a unique case study of the transnational role of religion in American politics. The role of Greek Americans and the Greek Orthodox Church in advocacy on Cyprus, the Macedonian Question and the Patriarchate present a number of aspects of transnational religion that can be identified and applied to other groups in the United States with strong religious identities and transnational connections. This is the focus of the concluding chapters of this project. The next chapter will identify the elements of transnational religion in the advocacy of Greek Americans and examine these in conjunction with theorists of diaspora nationalism and transnationalism. In chapter seven, these elements will be examined briefly in relation to other groups in affirming the priority and benefits of further study of transnational religion in American politics.

American eparchies. The breadth of the “Orthodox experience” provides an even greater field of study for transnational religion and American politics.

CHAPTER SIX

The Elements of Transnational Religion in Greek American Political Advocacy

In a May 2010 *Orthodox Observer* article entitled “Church Leads Hellenic Community to its ‘Finest Hour’,” Greek American leader and lobbyist Andrew Manatos describes the significance of the year’s annual White House gathering of the Greek American community following major achievements on various political issues.¹ These included the end of the requirement for people with Greek or Greek Cypriot citizenship to have a visa to visit the United States, the positive movements by the Turkish government on greater religious freedom for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and “uncharacteristically for U.S. presidents, Barack Obama did not pressure Prime Minister George Papandreou to move toward the Skopjeans on the Macedonian issue.” He asks, “So then, what brought about this ‘finest hour’?”

The answer has a lot to do with religions playing an active role in our nascent democracy and our Founding Fathers insisting that this involvement continue. The Greek Orthodox Church in America has carefully limited its involvement to religious and human rights issues it knows well. Washington’s officials value our churches as shepherds of their religious flocks and the venue for 95 percent of Greek festivals, classes in the Greek language, culture, cooking, and dancing, as well as organization meetings and sports. As former Ambassador to Greece Nicholas Burns said, “we value the additions to our understandings about the Patriarchate, Greece and Cyprus received through the Greek Orthodox Church of America.”

Manatos continues by identifying elements that have enabled this access: the personal relationship that Archbishop Demetrios has developed with each president, the status attained by the Church’s parishioners in terms of income and education, the work of the

¹Andrew Manatos, “Church Leads Hellenic Community to Its ‘Finest Hour’,” *Orthodox Observer* 75:1257 (May 2010): 13.

Order of Saint Andrew, the work of his firm in Washington coordinating advocacy efforts, and Orthodox individuals who began in 1983 to “use targeted political contributions to members of both political parties and to contribute daily to behind-the-scenes Washington work.” His description of the nature of Greek American advocacy reveals conceptions of not only strong ties between the Church and advocacy efforts, but also an interrelationship in which the advocacy is dependent upon Church leadership and its organization. This interrelationship is directly connected to the transnational character of Greek Orthodoxy in America.

This chapter examines the transnational aspects of the Church in the United States by applying theories of diaspora nationalism and transnationalism to the Greek American experience and by identifying the connections between transnational religion and political advocacy. In addition, the transnational character of the ethnoreligious identity of Greek Americans is analyzed on the basis of the development of a unique Greek American identity, the role of the Church in maintaining it, the relationship of levels of assimilation to ethnoreligious political engagement, and the influence of Orthodox theology on political activism.

*Greek American Advocacy and
Diaspora Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Transnational Religion*

The application of theories of diaspora nationalism and transnationalism to the role of religion in Greek American political advocacy provides a much needed analysis for gaining a broader understanding of the significance of religion in the identity of Greek Americans and the nature of their transnational relationships. The first of the theorists, as presented in chapter one, is Ernest Gellner with his “typology of nationalisms.” Diaspora

nationalism is the third of his typologies, and most of his attention is directed at the changing roles and challenges of minority groups within evolving societies.² His description of the shift of minority status and the role of ethnicity from agrarian to industrial societies is somewhat helpful in understanding the overall phenomenon of minorities in America; however, his model looks more to the European experience in which limited groups of minorities immigrated into more homogeneous societies. The multiplicity of ethnic groups in the United States limited this contrast as well as presented an environment where first generation Greek immigrants could begin a process of assimilation and advance socially and economically. While there was some hostility at times toward Greeks, much of this was directed at the inter-community conflict that kept many Greeks at odds with each other. In addition, Gellner's description of diaspora nationalism identifies a transition that occurs when the state creates significant tension in trying to deprive a minority group of the progress it has made and attempts to assimilate it, breaking down the distinctiveness or otherness of the group. This creates "problems of social transformation, cultural revivification, acquisition of territory" and additional challenges that impact diaspora nationalism.³ Again, these issues appear to be more descriptive of a limited number of minority immigrant groups and their identities within a culturally uniform society. Gellner does not give attention to the transnational connections between a diaspora group and its homeland, a relationship that also shapes identity depending on the ongoing levels of exchange.

²Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 101-105.

³*Ibid.*, 106-108.

Other theorists of nationalism who focus on diasporas include Aviel Roshwald, who identifies diasporic nationalism as “nostalgia for a homeland and yearning for territorial sovereignty.”⁴ In relation to Greek Americans, this attribute can be combined with John Armstrong’s idea that ethnic groups often bargain for space rather than submit to the dominant elite, and their distinctive identities survive via the diasporas’ “sophisticated elites.”⁵ This applies to Greek Americans, as their upward mobility and strong levels of ethnic identity with the social and political rise of national organizations and prominent community leaders helped them to establish a permanent place within the broader society. Adrian Hastings also contributes to identifying diaspora nationalism among Greek Americans when he states, “The pressures of modern government, imposing uniformity in area after area of life, are inherently destructive of many of the particularities which constitute a recognizable ethnic culture. Unless that process can be restrained, it must produce either the erosion of cultural diversity or the stimulation of new-ethnic based nationalism.”⁶ The experience of Greeks in America did cause some erosion of cultural difference over time, but this assimilation contributed to creating a unique Greek American identity which combined elements of a diasporic Greek nationalism with American patriotism. This combination of Greek identity and loyalty to America, together with the impact of additional waves of immigrants and the rise of

⁴ Aviel Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 66.

⁵ John Armstrong, “Nations before Nationalism,” in *Nationalism*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 143-144.

⁶ Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 182.

significant political and international issues related to Greece and Greek interests, also helped to shape this unique diaspora nationalism among Greek Americans.

The diaspora nationalism of Greek Americans cannot be analyzed or understood fully within the American context. It also has to be examined in relation to the transnational connections that contributed to its formation. This is one of the main premises of *transnationalism*. The study of diasporas has to include more than the maintenance of an identity within the context of a host country. The identities and interests of ethnic groups are shaped by connections with their countries of origin and diaspora groups in other countries, providing a transnational context for understanding all of the relationships that influence these groups. For Greek Americans, the study of these transnational relationships is essential in analyzing political advocacy in the United States. This is where scholars and theorists of transnationalism offer some insights into understanding the role of transnationalism, and specifically transnational religion, in Greek American political advocacy.

The work of Anna Triandafyllidou as presented in the article “Nations, Migrants and Transnational Identifications: An Interactive Approach to Nationalism,” is very helpful in understanding the relationship of transnationalism and Greek American identity.⁷ One of the main points of her thesis, that national identity is developed, consolidated and transformed through interaction with “Others,” is the following. “The relationship between the national in-group and a given immigrant out-group is influenced

⁷Anna Triandafyllidou, “Nations, Migrants, and Transnational Identifications: An Interactive Approach to Nationalism,” in *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, ed. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 285-294.

by their historical links and present situation.”⁸ As examined in chapter two, the influence of the American context on Greek immigrants was significant in the formation of an independent spirit and their acceptance of American ideals. But Greek Americans also found significant historical connections with their host nation in the support Americans expressed for the struggle for Greek Independence, with the general recognition by Americans of the Greek origins of democracy, and with the strength of intellectual and academic engagement with ancient Greek philosophy, culture, and language. Triandafyllidou also states that “the national identity of the immigrant community is developed and transformed through its interaction—both real and symbolic—with its mother-nation and also with the national majority in the country of settlement.” As stated above, this is a very clear phenomenon among Greek Americans. While Triandafyllidou focuses her research on European case studies in which there has been much more significant conflict in the relationship of immigrant groups to the host nation, her critique of theories of diaspora nationalism and cosmopolitanism as insufficient in explaining the formation of national identities affirms the need for the transnational approach. She states:

In my view, multiple identities are constructed out of a whole range of possibilities made available by the cultural diversity in countries of origin as well as of settlement which...cannot be retained within narrow conceptions of national identities and cultures. In this sense, multicultural repertoires are a reality, and especially so in large city environments. But the context in which migrants move very often includes kinship and ethnic networks which continue to confirm the significance of national identity and “homeland” connections. Thus, rather than assuming the transcendence of nations and nationalism as we have known them in the past couple of centuries, we should investigate the new forms of national and transnational identifications emerging today.⁹

⁸Ibid., 285.

⁹Ibid., 292.

This can be used to describe the transnational character of Greek American identity, affirming the importance of examining all aspects of this identity from a transnationalist perspective.

In their review of scholarship on transnationalism, Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind, and Stephen Vertovec emphasize that “transnational migrants are embedded in multi-layered social fields and to truly understand migrants’ activities and experiences, their lives must be studied within the context of these multiple strata.”¹⁰ They also point to the need for more historical analysis of immigrant groups since “enduring transnational ties are not new but were also a factor in earlier flows, such as the wave of transatlantic migrations at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.” Just as Triandafyllidou acknowledges that diaspora nationalism is not adequate in describing the multiple layers of immigrant identity, they also affirm that “questions are being raised by current scholarship on the applicability of the terminologies that have been traditionally used in the emigration-immigration-assimilation paradigm.” They conclude by stating that in the field of transnational scholarship “recognition is growing that the subjective as well as objective dimensions of transnational practices matter.” Again, all of this affirms the necessity of analyzing the influence of religion, and religious beliefs and practices, as a significant aspect of transnational identity and an influence on political engagement.

Before turning to transnational religion, it is important to address a few aspects of the political dimensions of transnationalism. This is analyzed in Rainer Bauböck’s article

¹⁰Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind, and Steven Vertovec, “International Perspectives on Transnational Migration: An Introduction,” *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003), 567-571.

“Toward a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism.”¹¹ As described in chapter one, Bauböck states that the study of political transnationalism extends the boundaries of politics beyond territorial jurisdictions showing that transnational political relations “create overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities. In this understanding, political transnationalism is not only about a narrowly conceived set of activities through which migrants become involved in the domestic politics of their home countries; it also affects collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both receiving and sending societies.”¹² This characteristic of transnationalism is not only emphasized by all of the theorists cited here, but in terms of this project, Greek Americans provide an excellent example of this. This is analyzed in more detail below, but it is important to emphasize that the views of Greek Americans about Greeks in the homeland and how they manage their political affairs reveals how conceptions of citizenship among Greek Americans have been heavily influenced by their experience in this country.

Another contribution of political transnationalism, which Bauböck states has hardly been developed, “is an attempt to explain the variation of sending country attitudes towards their emigrants and to evaluate these policies of external citizenship within a normative theory of democratic legitimacy.”¹³ He shows that countries of origin have different “instrumental” motivations for viewing emigrants as a resource, including their

¹¹Rainer Bauböck, “Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism,” *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003): 700-723.

¹²Ibid., 719-720.

¹³Ibid., 720.

use to promote economic and foreign policy goals. He states, “A transnational perspective that focuses on overlapping memberships can help to explain how patterns of integration into the receiving polity and unfinished projects of nation-building in the homeland shape migrants’ attitudes toward countries of origin.”¹⁴ As applied to this project, additional study needs to be done on the transnational perspectives found in indigenous Greek views of Greek Americans.

A final aspect of the study of transnationalism related to this project is the analysis of the role of transnational religion within diaspora groups. As theorists affirm, this is a step beyond associating religion with ethnicity to the examination of the dynamics and influences of shared religious identity, practices, and institutional cohesion within transnational relationships. The article by Peggy Levitt entitled “You Know, Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant: Religion and Transnational Migration,” is referenced again.¹⁵ In this article she recognizes that the interest in diasporic religion has grown out of the increasing interest in diasporas. She states, “This work responds to the widespread recognition that social, economic and political life increasingly transcends national borders and cultures and that individuals sustain multiple identities and loyalties and create culture using elements from various settings.”¹⁶ The study of transnational

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Peggy Levitt, “You Know, Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant: Religion and Transnational Migration,” *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003): 847-873. For a historical approach to transnational migration and religion in the United States see also in the same volume Charles Hirschman, “The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States,” 1206-1233.

¹⁶Ibid., 848. Levitt notes that much more research has been given to diaspora groups and diasporic religion in Europe than in the United States.

connections among immigrants has led researchers to challenge conventional wisdom about their political and economic integration. Further, the study of transnational religion has helped to identify neglected but strong influences on immigrant engagement with both host countries and countries of origin. In recognizing how underdeveloped the study of these connections has been and how the “levels, scope and sites of transnational migration and their position within the global arena have not been well specified,” Levitt offers a list of the components of the transnational religious field. The list is repeated together with an application of each point to the role of transnational religion in Greek American political advocacy.¹⁷

1. Individual transnational religious practices, including such things as formal and informal devotional practices enacted alone or in groups and in popular and institutionalized settings, tithing or periodic contributions to home-country religious groups, fundraising, hosting visiting religious leaders, consulting home-country religious leaders, and pilgrimage. Both the objective and subjective dimensions of the religious experience must be taken into account.

Levitt describes many of the facts of the Greek Orthodox experience in the United States, and these transnational connections are even more accentuated by the traditional and hierarchical character of Orthodox Christianity. Most of these dimensions of Orthodox religious experience continue to give Greek Orthodoxy in America a transnational character.

2. The organizational contexts in which transnational migrants enact their religious lives.

This point addresses the hierarchical nature and rigid administrative structure of the Church, which helps to understand the development of leadership roles on behalf of Greek Americans. The survey of Greek American political advocacy shows that as the

¹⁷Ibid., 850.

institutional presence and authority of the Archdiocese increased throughout the country, the position of the Archbishop obtained a more prominent position as leader of the Greek American community. Certainly, this also had to do with leadership styles and personalities, but these were joined with extensive efforts by each Archbishop to bring uniformity and “obedience” among the parishes and lay leadership, as well as acceptance of the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the affairs of the Church. As the history of the Church reveals, this has been a very difficult process with numerous controversies over lay-clergy authority in the local parish, the assessment of parish dues by the Archdiocese, the election of hierarchs, and revisions to the charter.

3. The ties between local transnational organizations and their host and home-country regional, national, and international counterparts.

Levitt is identifying the many levels of internal connections that transnational organizations have, including some of what I described under the point above. However, this also includes the connections of the Church with local and national Greek organizations such as AHEPA or the Order of Saint Andrew, or groups based on regional connections and origins in Greece, Cyprus, Asia Minor, etc. Levitt’s point also includes the international connections formed by the Church and Greek Americans with other Orthodox Churches in the “diaspora,” their diasporic communities (e.g., Greeks in Canada, Australia, etc. and their organizations), and with global organizations that attempt to unite the Greek diaspora (e.g., the International Coordinating Committee – Justice for Cyprus - PSEKA, the World Council of Hellenes - SAE).

4. The role of states.

This aspect of transnational religion includes the relationships between states that both impact and challenge religious groups. For the Greek Orthodox Church in the United

States, the status and issues of U.S. relations with Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, and Macedonia have been the focus of advocacy. In this context of U.S. foreign affairs combined with the ethnic and religious ties of Greek Americans, Church leadership has ongoing ties and frequent meetings with officials, legislators, and diplomats from all of these countries. These connections are also affirmed frequently within the regional metropolises and local parishes of the Church when they host Greek and Cypriot diplomats at major religious and ethnic functions.

5. The role of global culture and institutions.

This last aspect of transnational religion is the global context in which the religious group exists and functions. This context does and can change over time, affecting the parameters by which the group is related to their homeland, host country, and international organizations. For the Greek Orthodox Church an example of this aspect of transnational religion is presented in the impact the global focus on human rights and religious freedom has had on issues related to Cyprus, Turkey, and the status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. While radical changes in state policies have yet to result, the trend is in this direction based on standards of rights and freedoms being pressed upon Turkey by the EU and through the attention given to these issues in a growing number of political forums. These forums represent a growing receptiveness to arguments on behalf of advancing human rights and the use of international pressure to achieve this.

This framework for analyzing transnational religion is very helpful in studying both religion and nationalism among diaspora groups, not only among recent immigrants, but also, as in the case of this project, groups that are in their third or fourth generation within a host country and still maintain both ethnic identity and various transnational

connections. In addition, this research on transnational migration shows that the contemporary place and relationship of ethnic groups within a host country warrants more than the study of ethnicity. Research models of transnational religion need to examine the transnational elements in the relationship of religion and ethnicity, in the role of religion in the process of assimilation within the host country, in the transformation of social networks and religious life and practices and how these are shaped by adaptations to the culture of the host country, and in the relationship of the mission of the Church and its theology to political engagement and activism.

Transnational Religion and Ethnicity

One of the main contributions of the analysis of transnational religion in examining the role of ethnicity and identity in political advocacy is that it moves beyond identifying the motivations only in ethnic interests to a more complex system of relationships and influences. This tendency for what Rogers Brubaker calls “groupism,” “the tendency to take groups for granted in the study of ethnicity, race, and nationhood, and in the study of ethnic, racial, and national conflict in particular,” is apparent in studies of Greek American political engagement as “ethnic politics.”¹⁸ This approach ignores the differences in identity and political attitudes between Greek Americans, Greeks in Greece, and diaspora Greeks, and, in relation to religion, the difference in which the Church and Greek Orthodoxy relate to that identity and its role in political advocacy.

¹⁸Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 8.

Before examining the relationship of religion and ethnic identity, it is important to analyze how Greek American identities have developed. Moskos does this by identifying two competing categories of the Greek American experience—Hellenic Diaspora and American Ethnics.¹⁹

Two versions of the Greek experience in America compete. One is that Greek-Americans are part of a homeland extension, and *omogeneia*, an Hellenic diaspora. The other is that Greek-Americans are entrants and then participants in American history. Which of these...versions are we to accept? There is no simple answer, for each contains part of the truth.

Moskos states that the underlying presumption for the idea of a Hellenic diaspora “is that whether residing or even born in the United States, Greeks in America share a destiny somehow connected with other people who call themselves Hellenes.” This view is reinforced by the strong emotional and personal ties to Greece that were retained by most of the early immigrants and by successive waves throughout the twentieth century. Further, more recent immigrants have come to the United States on a trial basis and leave open the possibility of returning to Greece, either if things do not go well or as a long-term goal of living out their remaining years back home. Moskos also identifies attitudes among some American-born generations “who put their ‘Greekness’ at the very center of their social identity.”

While this diaspora paradigm explains some of the Greek American experience, Moskos believes the more valid understanding of it is within the broader context of ethnic experience in the United States.

Whatever the fullness of their traditional heritage and allegiances to the old country, the Greek immigrants who came to America inevitably reordered their lives; initially to the imperatives of the economic and social structures of the

¹⁹Charles Moskos, “The Greeks in the United States,” in *The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Richard Clogg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 116.

United States, and later, to some degree of conformity with American cultural norms. Among those born in the United States, it seems clear that one's identity is not that of a transplanted Greek, but rather the sensibility of an American ethnic.²⁰

For Moskos, the application of this perspective to the Greek American experience highlights the difference between acculturation and assimilation in which the former “refers to the acquisition by the immigrants and their descendents of the cultural behavior—language, norms, customs—of the new society, and the latter “implies the entrance of the ethnics into the very fabric—the social cliques, business life, civic associations, and eventually, the families—of the host society.” For Greek Americans, acculturation has lagged behind assimilation. In terms of the relationship of religion and ethnicity, Moskos states that “this is the only way to understand the continuing Greek Orthodox affiliation, attachment to the old country, and the baroque structure of organized Greek America in the face of such assimilative measures as educational attainment, economic ascendancy, political representation, and even intermarriage. ...[F]or Greek-Americans ethnic identification is more a matter of cultural choice than a constraint of the social structure.”²¹

In reviewing some of Moskos' earlier work in his article “Greek Americans and the Diaspora,” Gregory Jusdanis adds to this understanding of Greek American identity. In his analysis, Jusdanis affirms a distinction between Greek Americans and other

²⁰Ibid., 116-117.

²¹Ibid., 117. In support of the importance of analyzing the role of transnationalism and in Brubaker's thesis of “ethnicity without groups,” Moskos states that the type of “emergent Hellenism in America...should not be confused with that of the homeland.” He recognizes that this confusion is reflected in occasional debates in the Greek parliament on the “de-hellenization” of Greek Americans. He states, “Rather than viewing Greek-American ethnicity as an increasingly pale reflection of an old country culture, we would be better advised to consider and respect it in its own right.”

diaspora Greeks. He states, “While diaspora Greeks, for instance, strove to make the Greeks modern and western, Greek Americans seek ethnic distinction, or what can loosely be called cultural capital. Their reinvention of the Greek tradition to suit current American realities constitutes their history, symbolically uniting them to other Greeks in the diaspora who are also negotiating their own relation to *ellinismos*.”²² He continues:

Their understanding of *ellinismos* (which may seem imperfect and bastardized to Greeks of Greece), along with their sense of Orthodoxy, allows them to experience themselves as Greeks and to connect their own personal and ethnic stories to the grand narrative of Hellenism in the West. The notion of Greekness, feelings of cultural superiority and a sense of historical continuity and survival unavailable to other ethnic groups—except perhaps the Jews—has played a crucial role in the resistance to assimilation.

This means that the unity of the Greek diaspora is no longer a place, the nation-state of Greece, “but the imagined transcendental territory of Greekness which groups or individuals may appropriate to suit their own needs and interests.” Within the American context, one which views ethnicity as legitimate and respectable, Greek Americans are able to identify their home as the United States, but still see themselves as part of a dispersion via an “imagined” identity that emphasizes their Greek roots and connections to all things Hellenic.²³

²²Gregory Jusdanis, “Greek Americans and the Diaspora,” *Diaspora* 1:2 (1991): 217.

²³Jusdanis also acknowledges that Greek Americans have been able to create a commodity (e.g. Greek food and festivals) out of this identity, 220. Another aspect of the ethnography of Greeks in the United States is their categorization as a “white ethnicity” and how their experience correlates or varies with other ethnicities. This has been the focus of studies by Yiorgos Anagnostou in “Model Americans, Quintessential Greeks: Ethnic Success and Assimilation in the Diaspora,” *Diaspora* 12:3 (2003): 279-327; and his recent monograph *Contours of Ethnicity: Popular Ethnography and the Making of Usable Pasts in Greek America* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009).

It is also important to recognize the generational transitions in the development of Greek American identity as done by Gans and his use of the term “symbolic ethnicity,” Saloutos’ distinctions between “traditionalist” and “environmentalists,” and Kourvetaris use of “Apollonian” and “Dionysian” dimensions.²⁴ While these studies affirm the formation of a unique Greek identity, or identities, within the American context and even address the future of Greek American ethnicity, attention also needs to be given to the role of religion in shaping this identity. Several scholars have done this in recent decades including Gary A. Kunkelman in *The Religion of Ethnicity: Belief and Belonging in a Greek-American Community* and George A. Kourvetaris in his chapter on “Greek Orthodox and Greek American Ethnic Identity” in *Studies on Greek Americans*. In his survey work on a wide range of areas including moral values, marriage and family, parent-child relationships, education, occupation, and success, Kunkelman analyzes the relationship of religion to ethnicity as perceived by Greek Orthodox themselves.²⁵ His observations lead him to describe this relationship based on various attributes of ethnicity which may or may not have correlations with the beliefs or practices of Orthodox Christianity. What he shows is that in this relationship for Greek Orthodox in America, a belief system has emerged that is more “ethnically-based” than “religiously-based.” In his examination of views on various attributes of ethnicity related to the individual, family, morality, success, community and church, he shows that perspectives of Greek

²⁴Herbert Gans, “Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America,” in *On the Making of Americans*, ed. Herbert Gans (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979); Theodore Saloutos, *The Greeks in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 326-343; and George A. Kourvetaris, *Studies on Greek Americans* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 8-14.

²⁵Gary A. Kunkelman, *Religion and Ethnicity: Belief and Belonging in a Greek-American Community* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990).

Americans are much more representative of elements of “Greekness” than they are of Orthodox Christianity. A summary of some of his observations helps to explain. First, he states,

The church has been largely shaped into an ethnic entity that provides a badge of identification, perpetuates Greek distinctiveness, and serves a belonging-providing function. Since being Greek is important and being Greek requires being Orthodox, strong adherence is evident; despite the decline in propositional orthodoxy, there is no decline in attachment. Orthodoxy has ultimately emerged as a public rather than private religion.²⁶

He also identifies in this “religion of ethnicity” a lack of influence of Orthodoxy in shaping a moral code or behavior and the inability of most members to “articulate a cognitive rationale for their religious faith while they are readily able to do so for their ethnicity.” Further, he sees that the systems of ultimate meaning among the Greek Orthodox he surveyed do not revolve around transcendental questions.

Among members of this Greek-American group, ultimate concerns can be categorized as self-realization as expressed by success, and particularly success for one’s children, familism, including perpetuation of a strong family unit; self-expression, as an expression of *philotomo* [*sic*] [honor, pride] and the particularistic view of man; and the perpetuation of community, including the church. These are the very concerns that members invariably define as the attributes of their ethnicity.²⁷

This is the basis for what Kunkelman identifies as a yearning “for a traditional church to perpetuate and reinforce their idea of ethnicity” while at the same time not embracing the extent of Orthodox Christianity. “They want the church to represent Greekness as they define it,”²⁸ which can also place members in conflict with clergy and hierarchy. In addition, this role of the Church in the relationship of religion and ethnicity reflects the

²⁶Ibid., 177.

²⁷Ibid., 179.

²⁸Ibid., 177.

desire of many Greek Americans to fashion a religion in America that does not interfere with class status or conflict with the larger American culture, while at the same time being a religion Greek enough to ensure ethnic distinctiveness.²⁹

It is in the relationship of religion and ethnic identity that transnational connections affirm distinctiveness but also present the potential for conflict. The relationship of Greek ethnicity to Greek Orthodoxy, while different in the American context, offers a connection to Greece, as well as diasporic Greek communities and concerns. Further, the administrative connection of the Greek Orthodox Church in America provides a strong institutional connection that emphasizes various aspects of “Greekness” via the ethnic identity of the Patriarchate, the use of language, and the offering of “Hellenism” as an “authentic” element of Greek Orthodoxy. However, conflict is also visible in these transnational connections. Greek Americans are often criticized by Greeks in Greece for their “Americanization” of Orthodoxy, and conflict can manifest itself in the way in which the Patriarchate and the hierarchy of the Church emphasize elements of ethnicity that may be acceptable to Greek Americans within the walls of the Church but are in conflict with their “American” identity.

Based on his survey work, Kourvetaris explains this transition in a more succinct way. He states:

In the first two generations, Greek ethnicity and Orthodox Christianity converge, but by the third and subsequent generations of Greek Americans, the secular component of Greek ethnicity alternates leaving only the institutional Greek Orthodox identity more prevalent among Greek Americans. It is the thesis of this present study that by the third generation “Greekness”—as measured by language,

²⁹Ibid., 175.

secular Greek traditions, and Greek values in general—give way to “Americanness.”³⁰

This research shows that among third generation Greek Americans, the Church is becoming the focal point of maintaining “Greekness.” In terms of the relationship of religion and ethnicity, it helps to explain some aspects of the role of religion in Greek American political advocacy. Much of this advocacy over the past several decades has been led by second and third generation Greek Americans. If the Church embodies much of their Greek identity, a place where they can connect with their roots and even leave them behind when necessary in the American environment, then this explains one reason why the Church, and its leadership in the person of the Archbishop, has assumed a more central role in political advocacy on behalf of Greek American concerns. In addition, this generational transition in the source of identity is also represented in the leadership role of many prominent Greek Americans in the organization of the Church as well as in the Greek American community. They see the role as one in the same. To be a leader in the Greek American community and address interests of Greek Americans also means being a leader in the Church. Thus, the influence of religion on political advocacy is the manner in which Greek Americans use their religion to identify who they are. Further, the issues of Cyprus, Macedonia, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, are not just of interest

³⁰Kourvetaris, 52. His survey work was among an Orthodox singles group whose membership included third-generation Greek Americans. In his findings Kourvetaris notes that while ethnicity was not equally as important as faith for those surveyed, “it was broadly perceived in subcultural terms, particularly insofar as Greek family patterns, culture and history are concerned,” 63. However, most respondents perceived themselves as both Greek ethnics and Greek Orthodox. In another publication on the subject, Kourvetaris sites a 1968 study that showed that by the third generation, although families continued to identify with the Greek American community, only certain aspects of the Greek culture were maintained. See “The Futuristics of Greek America,” in *Reading Greek America: Studies in the Experience of Greeks in the United States*, ed. Spyros D. Orfanos (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2002), 154-155.

to Greek Americans because of the connections of ethnicity and their concerns for their Greek brothers and sisters. They are larger issues understood within the Greek identity that has been shaped and nurtured by Greek Americans. The ongoing partition of Cyprus as the result of the invasion and occupation of the Turks is experienced in the context of the four hundred years of oppression and struggle under the Ottoman Empire; and that the Church not only preserved Greek culture during this time, but its leadership combined with the Greek love of freedom and self-determination helped Greeks to throw off this yoke and reestablish the Greek nation. The appropriation of the name “Macedonia” by non-Greeks is a violation of the “sacred” history of the Greek people. The persecution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate warrants a cause aimed at the preservation of a Greek presence in a non-Greek and non-Christian environment and at maintaining a connection to much of the history of Greek Orthodoxy.

The role of the Church in shaping a Greek American identity raises questions about the elements of ethnicity that are prominent in the Church and about whether or not these elements remain strong or are gradually disappearing with the passage of time. This analysis is important both in understanding the role of Greek Orthodoxy in Greek American political advocacy, but also in the viability of this advocacy if the role of the Church in relation to ethnicity is diminishing.

Transnational Religion and Assimilation

One of the earliest studies on ethnoreligious identity was conducted among individuals of Greek descent in New York in 1967 by Alice Scourby. In addition to finding a strong attachment of both American born and foreign born Greek Americans to their ethnic identity, she discovered a marked generational difference in the

ethnoreligious and ethnocultural dimensions of this identity.³¹ In terms of the ethnoreligious dimension, Scourby found that among the first generation, 75% expressed an ethnoreligious identity as compared with 58% of the second generation and 42% of the third. When she asked questions that measured identification with the larger ethnocultural dimension of Greek ethnicity, she found the reverse: 25% of the first, 42% of the second, and 58% of the third. In another study conducted in 1985 within the Greek American community in Akron, Ohio, Stavros Constantinou and Milton E. Harvey identified a two-dimensional structure underlying Greek American ethnicity.³² They refer to these dimensions as *externalities*—that which pulls the Greek American toward their place of origin—and *internalities*—that which binds Greek Americans together as a community. Kourvetaris summarizes their findings:

The authors found the first generation to be the most cohesive in its ethnic identity in preserving the Greek language. The second generation was found to be the least cohesive of the three due to its transitional nature. The third generation was found to be less cohesive than the first but showed signs of ethnic revival. The authors concluded no single factor was adequate to define ethnic identity. They examined a number of ethnically related factors, including Greek language, Greek cooking, church membership, family, Greek press, and endogamy, and they found all of these taken together to be the most important dimensions of Greek ethnic identity.³³

Most of these dimensions are addressed in the various roles Greek Orthodoxy has in the lives of its adherents, and these roles are visible in the local parish, in regional and national Church events, and in the function and focus of national leadership. The

³¹Alice Scourby, *The Greek Americans* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984).

³²Stavros Constantinou and Milton E. Harvey, “Basic Dimensional Structure and Intergenerational Differences in Greek American Ethnicity,” *Sociology and Social Research* 69:2 (1985): 234-254.

³³Kourvetaris, “The Futuristics of Greek America,” 156.

question is how strong are these roles and the ability of the Church to retain them in relation to defining and maintaining a Greek American identity? More research needs to be done on the ethnoreligious salience of these dimensions over time in order to show the influence of transnational connections that continue to impact identity. As an example of the role of the Church in shaping this identity, attention is directed at one of the most significant aspects of ethnic identity, language.

The role of the Church in preserving the Greek language has been both significant and challenging. The controversies over the introduction of English into the services of the Greek Orthodox Church are well-documented,³⁴ and debates over the manner in which this should be done has occupied incalculable hours of parish council meetings, general assemblies, and clergy-laity congresses. Further, the issue of language in the Church is also perceived in the context of the role of Greek from the biblical period through the growth, defense, and spread of Christianity in the first millennium of its history.³⁵ This combined with the ethnic identification with language has made this an ongoing issue of the Church in America at all levels. At the national level of the

³⁴Theodore Saloutos, "The Greek Orthodox Church in the United States and Assimilation," *International Migration Review* 7:4 (Winter 1973): 395-407.

³⁵It is important to note that multiple types of Greek are used in the services of the Greek Orthodox Church. Biblical or New Testament Greek is used in the readings of the Gospel and Epistle following an established lectionary. The prayers and petitions of the service are considered "Liturgical" Greek, a combination of elements of classical Greek and New Testament Greek used by theologians and hierarchs beginning in the formative period of the Eastern Church in the third century and continuing until the end of the first millennium. The service may also include "modern" Greek of various levels depending on the language skills of the clergy and whether or not they preach in Greek. While most Greek speaking members can follow a sermon in Greek, what they know of the other types of Greek will be limited to familiar vocabulary and phrases they have also heard read in English on a regular basis.

Archdiocesan administration and in parishes with a more homogeneous Greek American membership, the percentage of Greek in Church services remains high, and support for maintaining the language is also shown in the operation of afternoon Greek schools.³⁶ This is confirmed in recent research conducted by Alexei Krindatch on behalf of the recently formed Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of North and Central America.³⁷ In surveys conducted in 2010 and 2011 among Greek Orthodox parish clergy, Krindatch requested information on the percentage of the average use of English in the Divine Liturgy and sermons.³⁸ The results show that the national average for the

³⁶The role of the Archdiocese in promoting Greek language is significant and includes regional and international training programs for Greek teachers, a national Greek Education Office which coordinates the work of Greek afternoon and parochial schools and develops curriculum. The Archdiocese has also given significant attention to Greek language and culture through sponsoring academic forums and with the publication of *The Future of the Greek Language and Culture in the United States: Survival in the Diaspora* (New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 1999).

³⁷The Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of North and Central America is the successor to SCOBA (The Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas) founding in 1960 as a forum for bringing together the hierarchs of the various Orthodox jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere. SCOBA led the development of coordination among the jurisdictions in the areas of education, international missions and relief programs, prison ministry, and college student ministry. The Assembly assumed the agencies, dialogs, and ministries of SCOBA, following its establishment in 2009 by a decision of the Fourth Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference which followed a Synaxis of all of the heads of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches in the world under the leadership of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. The Assembly was one of twelve established in regions of the world where there is no single Orthodox presence. The region of North and Central America is one of the best examples of this, encompassing multiple well-established Orthodox jurisdictions, each with various levels of transnational connections with their countries or regions of origin, as well as various levels of ethnic identification.

³⁸Alexei Krindatch, *Membership, Church Attendance, Linguistic Situation and Strength of Ethnic Identity in the Various Metropolises of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America*, (New York: Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of North & Central America, 2011), 8-11. In addition to other surveys on the Greek Orthodox Church in America, Krindatch has done significant study on all of the jurisdictions as

use of English in the Liturgy is 66% and for the sermon 86%. While this does present measurable use of Greek, the more informative data is how this usage varies between large metropolitan areas and parishes far from these centers. The survey results show that the average percentage of Greek in the Liturgy is much higher in the Metropolises centered in New York (55%), Boston (42%), Pittsburgh (40%), and New Jersey (39%), and begins to decrease significantly the further south and west these centers are located: Atlanta (31%), Chicago (30%), San Francisco (26%), Detroit (25%), and Denver (16%). This pattern is also confirmed by an additional survey question asked of parish clergy, “Do you agree or disagree with the statement, ‘Our parish has a strong ethnic heritage and identity that we are trying to preserve?’” The nationwide percentage of 67% shows the role of the Church in maintaining Greek American identity, but the results also reveal the geographical variance of this role. The percentages ranked by strong agreement with the question are as follows: Pittsburgh (88%), New Jersey (78%), New York (74%), Detroit (73%), Boston (69%), Atlanta (60%), San Francisco (59%), Chicago (58%), and Denver (39%). When these results on language and ethnic identification are combined they show the strength of ethnic identification in the parishes in the northeastern half of the United States, which are located in or near the metropolitan centers that have had stronger ties to the development of the Greek American community. Further, in applying these demographics on religion and ethnicity to Greek American political advocacy, most of the prominent leaders who are engaged in this advocacy are from the regions that exhibit a stronger ethnic identification within the Church. While gradual assimilation has

represented by his article “Orthodox (Eastern Christian) Churches in the United States at the Beginning of a New Millennium: Questions of Nature, Identity, and Mission,” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41:3 (Sep. 2002): 533-563.

occurred within the Church over the past several decades, and more so among parishes that have either a greater multi-ethnic or non-ethnic membership, it has been easier for Greek Americans in large, multi-cultural environments to maintain a Greek identity within their parish community. Certainly, more research is needed, especially focusing on how other elements of Greek American identification, such as food, festivals, family, education, national observances and marriage are related to maintaining this identity. The findings may also point to varying levels of assimilation and a regional basis for the role of the Church in maintaining ethnic identification. This would strengthen the premise that this identity maintained within the Church has strong connections with the political advocacy of Greek Americans. Research may also show that levels of advocacy in relation to identity may diminish significantly, as it appears to do in parishes where the level of ethnic identification is low, as the result of greater levels of assimilation by future generations.

Transnational Religion in the Interaction of Faith and Politics

The relationship of transnational religion and political advocacy among Greek Americans is also related to two additional aspects of their ethnoreligious identity. The first of these is the connection that Church leaders and prominent Greek Americans make between Greek Orthodox Christianity and “Hellenism.” The term is marked in quotations here and above because it is an aspect of Greek American identity, and even Greek identity, that is not clearly defined. While the concept of Hellenism has a significant engagement by scholars, which is certainly a starting point for addressing its role in identity, the focus of its influence in the role religion in Greek American political advocacy is directed at how it is understood as an element of Greek American and Greek

Orthodox identity. “Hellenism” is recognized as such in speeches by Church and political leaders, and its preservation and promulgation is affirmed as the goal of national Church endowments and ministries; however, most Greek Americans are not able to define what it is. As a part of studying ethnic identification and its relationship to the practices of the Church, questions need to be asked about “Hellenism” as part of this identity and of the role of religion. Based on initial observations, many Greek Americans view the concept of “Hellenism” as a characteristic of the Greek identity they should affirm, and that it describes the relationship of this identity and Greek Orthodoxy down through the centuries, creating a synthesis of ethnicity and religion. By this interpretation, “Hellenism” can be used within the Church as the reason for many things: it is a natural connection of ancient Greek political ideals with American democracy, thus encouraging the marriage of Greek and American identities; it represents the best of what is Greek, that when combined with Orthodoxy is a witness of the potential of humanity on all levels of experience; it is language, art, music, architecture, philosophy, science, and so much more that should inspire gratitude from the rest of the world; it is the inspiration for championing Greek causes; it is embodied in maintaining some level of connection with Greek identity. These perceptions of “Hellenism” affirm the transnational character of the idea and why it remains an important part of the rhetoric used by Greek Americans in affirming their identity.³⁹

³⁹Challenges to these perceptions of Hellenism and its role and influence on modern Greek Orthodox identity is found in the thought of John Romanides and Christos Yannaras. Their challenges through politico-theological arguments are analyzed by Daniel Payne in *The Revival of Political Hesychasm in Greek Orthodox Thought: A Study of the Hesychast Basis of the Thought of John S. Romanides and Christos Yannaras* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011). Payne’s work is an example of the critical analysis that is needed of the social, historical, and nationalist influences that have shaped modern

The other aspect of the relationship of religion and politics is how Greek Orthodoxy in America addresses political engagement from its theology. As shown in earlier chapters, Archbishop Iakovos attempted to do this in a limited way in encyclicals on March 25—the Feast of the Annunciation and the commemoration of Greek Independence Day. Archbishop Demetrios has done so, but by taking ideas of freedom, justice, peace, self-determination, and courage as presented in Scripture and relating these to the stories of Greek Independence and OXI Day. He has not called for the levels of political engagement that Iakovos did, but has led by example in his personal advocacy on issues. A few others have made some connections between faith and politics in an effort to help Orthodox Christians engage political issues and concerns from theological foundations; but it is evident that these connections do not have a strong influence on contemporary Greek American political advocacy.

One of the more comprehensive correlations of faith and politics is presented by Stanley Harakas. He emphasizes the relationship that Orthodox Christianity has had with government throughout its history, stating that “the Church has always supported a range of attitudes which allow it to become involved in the political process on the one hand, while retaining its clear distinction from, and transcendence to it, on the other.”⁴⁰ For Harakas, the Church does this by “upholding its own vision of the Kingdom of God.” This does not mean the submission of the state to the Church, but that the state should in fact and practice be “under God” since the kingdom of God addresses all aspects of

Greek identity. In addition this type of analysis provides the foundation for addressing the limited development of political theology among Greek Orthodox in America.

⁴⁰Stanley Harakas, “The Stand of the Orthodox Church on Controversial Issues,” in *A Companion to the Greek Orthodox Church* (New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1984), 226.

human relations. Harakas also states that the Orthodox Church must lead its members to adapt to the political realities of time and place since Orthodox Churches around the globe exist in different political realities. In these environments the Church should foster certain modes of political relationship including “good citizenship, pursuit of Church rights, official non-partisanship, preference for lay leadership, support of justice, limited advocacy for the right of revolution, and the unique case of ethnarchy.” In offering an explanation of each of these, Harakas does make several interesting transnational connections. In discussing the role of the Church in encouraging good citizenship he states, “To this category belongs the fostering of appropriate ethnic and cultural identification....” Harakas also makes a case for ethnarchy, which occurs when the highest ecclesiastical leader of the church in a given area assumes political leadership. He sites examples of post World War II Greece and Cyprus as examples that justify this role. He states, “When only a Church leader seems to be able to embody the identity of the people of a nation, the hierarch may assume political and government leadership by general consensus. It is all-important that such an exercise of political power should be only temporary and exceptional, until the regrouping of political forces in the nation allows the resumption of power by the lay leaders of the nation.”⁴¹

The relationship of Orthodox Christianity and politics is also addressed in an article by another noted Greek American Orthodox theologian, Emmanuel Clapsis. In “Politics and Christian Faith,” Clapsis admits that his “thoughts on this topic reflect my anxiety to relate politics with religion without reducing or surrendering one to the other

⁴¹Ibid., 229.

or vice versa.”⁴² The root of his anxiety is how he views the Church’s mission in the world. He states:

In Christian circles, the Church’s mission to the world is often contrasted with its proper religious mission. It is advocated that the Church, through political actions and involvement, skirts from its primary religious responsibility. It substitutes immanent for transcendent concerns. It replaces the gospel of love and forgiveness with social reform, legislative change, and political programs. Thus, insofar as churches increasingly engage in social or political matters, they increasingly fail in their proper mission. They become inauthentic.

He continues with this contrast that challenges the role of the Church in political advocacy, but he also affirms that “politics as a reflection and an embodiment of the values and the principles that govern the collective life of the people cannot be ignored.”⁴³ He recognizes that “there is an intimate connection, without confusion, between the Christian faith and politics,” and that “while evangelization is the essential mission, the distinctive vocation and the deepest identity of the Church, at the same time, actions for justice are a constitutive dimension of the Church’s mission.” Clapsis affirms that in the engagement with political issues the Church cannot forget its essential task “to convert the world...into the reality of God’s kingdom,” to accept its prophetic role as the “voice of the voiceless and the advocate of the poor,” and for clergy to be cautious about their role in politics, but not to neglect their task of making “their people sensitive to what enhances and what diminishes a truly human life.”⁴⁴ In conclusion, Clapsis affirms that when the Church’s credibility in the political arena “depends not on what she

⁴²Emmanuel Clapsis, “Politics and Christian Faith,” *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 37:1-2 (1992): 99-103.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 100.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 101-102.

proclaims to be, but on what she does. It is her praxis that authenticates her message and vice versa.”⁴⁵

From a summary review of the theology of political engagement offered by Clapsis, it is evident that some of this is in conflict with the transnational nature of some aspects of religion in relation to Greek identity and political advocacy. This represents a significant challenge to Greek Orthodox identity, because this understanding of the mission of the Church and of political engagement moves beyond an ethnic identification to the contribution Orthodox theology can make in addressing political issues and challenges. In her article entitled “Religious Pluralism in Twenty-First-Century America: Problematizing the Implications for Orthodox Christianity,” Elizabeth Prodromou attempts to take this discussion to that level. She states:

Orthodox Christianity possesses a set of ideational, or theological, resources that may be especially relevant to current intellectual debates and legal-political choices about the nature and extent of religious freedom, as well as the core question of the (lack of) porousness of the wall of separation between religion and state, important to the quality of American democracy in this millennium. Orthodoxy’s Trinitarian theology and an associated anthropology of personhood offer rich ideational assets that can be brought to bear on political theorizing and policy formulation on questions about the trade-offs of wealth versus equity and debates about the environment and education as public goods, to name but a few.⁴⁶

While some of these associations are apparent, the work of theologians within the Church in America has been limited. Also limited is theological reflection on the relationship of the mission of the Church in direct connection with the elements of Greek identity and how they either contribute or detract from this mission. This reflection might explain

⁴⁵Ibid., 103.

⁴⁶Elizabeth H. Prodromou, “Religious Pluralism in Twenty-First-Century America: Problematizing the Implications for Orthodox Christianity,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 72:3 (Sept. 2004): 733-757.

why much of the Church's energy and resources have been engaged with foreign policy issues rather than on major domestic issues. The Greek Orthodox Church has issued statements from time to time on domestic concerns, or joined with other denominations in the United States via the National Council of Churches in addressing pressing political challenges via joint statements; but these are very limited in comparison to the attention that has been given to advocacy on the issues presented in this project.

This shows that transnational influences are still very much at work in the Greek Orthodox Church and in shaping Greek American identity. Some of these influences have lost their connections over time. Others have been strengthened. The evidence at this point reveals the strong role of transnational religion, in contrast to the universalities of Orthodox Christian theology, combined with an identity that is not wholly Greek or wholly American but fully Greek American, in motivating Church leadership and prominent Greek Americans to direct their political advocacy at U.S. foreign policy interests.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Transnational Religion in American Politics

Transnational Religion and Ethnic Identity

One of the main reasons for examining the role of religion and religious institutions among immigrant/diaspora/transnational groups in the United States is that this role is very significant in identity formation. As Prema Kurien concludes in her study of Hindu Americans, religion becomes “more important in the immigrant context in the United States than in the home country, increasing the power of such organizations to construct and impose authoritative versions of ethnicity.”¹ Kurien also recognizes that when religion becomes the depository of ethnicity, it is also transformed: “Consequently, different religious groups tend to develop definitions of nationality from their own perspective, resulting in variations in the construction of homeland culture and identity along religious lines, sometimes exacerbating tensions between them.” The significance of this role of religion is also combined with the religious resurgence of new immigrants to the United States in the later half of the twentieth century, a major subject of scholarly attention over the last decade.² These studies show the impact that immigrant religions

¹Prema Kurien, “Who Speaks for Indian Americans? Religion, Ethnicity, and Political Formation,” in *Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States*, edited by R. Marie Griffith and Melani McAlister (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 233-257.

²Recent examples of this scholarship include Karen Isaksen Leonard, *Immigrant Faiths: Transforming Religious Life in America* (Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press, 2005); Peggy Levitt, *God Needs No Passport: Immigrants and the Changing American Religious Landscape* (New York: New Press, 2007); Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Jane I. Smith, and John L. Esposito, *Religion and Immigration: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim*

continue to have on the American religious landscape, the expanding use of immigrant languages in services by denominations, the establishment of thousands of new churches and temples to serve the needs of immigrant communities, and the many more religious gatherings in homes. As Charles Hirschman affirms in his article on religion and immigrant adaptation, these patterns are quintessentially American when viewed in the context of religion and immigrant history in the United States.³ He also recognizes that in addition to religion providing refuge and respectability for immigrant communities, their religious institutions are responsive to the cultural and socioeconomic needs of adherents. Hirschmann states, “These bonds of faith are reinforced when a religious community can provide nonspiritual fellowship and practical assistance for the many problems immigrants face.... This model of religious organization has helped successive generations of immigrants and their children to become American.”⁴

The central role that religion and religious institutions establish among immigrant groups is important in understanding how their identity is transformed as a diaspora

Experience in the United States (Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press, 2003); Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, *Religion and Social Justice for Immigrants* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2007); Richard D. Alba, Albert J. Raboteau, and Josh DeWind, *Immigration and Religion in America: Comparative and Historical Perspectives* (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh and Janet S. Chafetz, *Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations* (Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press, 2000); Jenna W. Joselit, *Parade of Faiths: Immigration and American Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Gregory Rodriguez, Karen Speicher, and James R. Wilburn, *Immigrants, Religious Congregations, and the Civil Society* (Malibu: Pepperdine University School of Public Policy, 2004).

³Charles Hirschman, “The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States,” *International Migration Review* 38:3 (Fall 2004): 1225.

⁴Ibid., 1229-1230.

group, and how this identity and religion impact their relationship with government and their political engagement as they become more integrated into American society. This project recognizes the role religion has had and continues to have in Greek American identity and political advocacy and shows the necessity of considering the transnational aspects and influence of religion.

The question that arises in this emphasis on religion, ethnic identity and political advocacy is what does the study of transnational religion contribute to the analysis of political engagement? First, it recognizes the role religion has in shaping ethnic identity. In many of the studies on the political advocacy of American ethnic groups, very little attention if any is given to religious beliefs, practices and institutions. Following the successful lobbying efforts of Greek Americans for the U.S. arms embargo in response to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, numerous studies were published analyzing ethnic lobbying. While some of these studies mention the interaction of Archbishop Iakovos with President Ford, they do not go any further in exploring the greater advocacy role the Church had, its influence among the Greek American community, or the transnational connections that existed on the basis of shared religious beliefs and institutions. As presented in this study, this role of the Church and its leadership adds another dimension to understanding these connections and the dynamics within the Greek American community that facilitated this effort. Second, the analysis of transnational religion helps to bridge the gap that has existed in the history of U.S. foreign policy due to the limited consideration given to religious influences. The role of religious identity in relation to countries of origin have had a significant impact on the engagement with foreign policy by diaspora groups in the United States. Understanding the role of religion in shaping

ethnic identities helps to move beyond superficial descriptions such as, “Greek Americans only lobby on behalf of Greek interests because they are Greek.” Third, as recognized in the previous chapter, this analysis can also reveal the challenges within an immigrant community in the relationship of religion and political advocacy, showing either the strength of support for specific interests, the impact of assimilation on the nature and focus of political engagement, and the “religious” basis of advocacy if it exists.

Ethnic Politics or Ethnoreligious Advocacy

In the analysis of recent immigrant groups and the re-analysis of transnationalism among older groups, the motivations of political advocacy cannot be explained just in terms of “ethnic politics.” Much more complexity is apparent in the social, cultural, economic and religious connections that immigrants maintain with their countries of origin and redefine in their American context. The analysis of the role of religion in shaping identity and the influence of transnational religious connections reveals that political advocacy by diaspora groups should be referred to as “ethnoreligious.” This is an approach that is lacking in contemporary scholarship. The analysis of “ethnic politics” is quite extensive as shown by the focus on Greek American advocacy in this study. Further, much has been done on the role of religion in shaping views and engagement on domestic issues, and more research is being conducted on religion and foreign policy. However, the convergence of these areas in connection with ethnic groups in the United States is limited. An effort to correct this is found in the analysis of Robert P. Swierenga entitled “Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Voting,

Values, and Culture.”⁵ Swierenga surveys the scholarship on the role of ethnoreligious identity and political engagement through voting patterns, involvement in political parties, and influence in local politics. He states:

Religion, we now know, was the “stuff of political choice” in the nineteenth century, shaping issues, rhetoric, and party alignments. Churches were primary value-generating institutions, and religious beliefs inevitably affected political choices and goals. Voters responded to the theological outlook toward culture of their particular denominations, encouraged by ingroup pressures and the influence of pastors and teachers. For opening this long-overlooked component of American political history, the ethnoreligious scholars deserve accolades.⁶

While the focus here is on earlier immigrant groups and their shaping of American politics, it is evident that the same approach should be applied to groups of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This is supported by the theories that ethnoreligionists have offered to explain how religious group impulses become political ones. The first of these is “reference theory,” which refers to the manner in which groups absorb or react to the political ideas of other groups. When applied to more recent immigrant groups, this theory could reveal the significance of assimilation and other local and regional cultural forces that could influence the manner in which a group engages in politics. It might also help to address the challenges that arise when additional groups of immigrants join communities at later times. The second is the “social analysis of politics.” Swierenga explains, “As Catholic Irish and German immigrants seemed to inundate the United States, for example, native-born Protestants turned to nativist laws to keep Catholic Sabbath desecration or beer drinking in check. This social approach begs the question of

⁵Robert P. Swierenga, “Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Voting, Values, Cultures,” in *Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the Present*, 2nd ed., ed. Mark A. Noll and Luke E. Harlow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 145-168.

⁶Ibid., 161.

the sources of different lifestyles. If groups clashed because of historic antagonisms and conflicting cultural traditions, it was because their religious roots differed.”⁷ This theory might be helpful in approaching political conflict created by ethnoreligious identities that are very distinct from the broader culture in which they reside. The challenges of Muslims in politics in the United States immediately come to mind. Due to both international and domestic events and factors, Muslims in America are receiving greater attention and scrutiny, which has both enabled and limited their political engagement and advocacy. Recent debates over locations of mosques and the media coverage of “Quran burnings” and “fears of Shariah law,” in addition to the generalizations about the “radical” nature of Islam, have fueled antagonisms and exacerbated cultural conflict. How is all of this shaping the political views of the different ethnic and faith groups among Muslims in this country? Is this conflict facilitating engagement in American politics, and what transnational connections are being altered or strengthened? The social analysis of politics as applied to immigrant groups could also help understand the dynamics of diversity within these groups. As the presence of a group in the United States lengthens, generational conflicts arise that can influence the mode of political engagement as well as levels of religious and ethnic identification. Analysis of these aspects can help overcome the generalizations concerning the motivations and nature of “ethnic politics.”

The third theory of ethnoreligionists, according to Richard Jensen, is that “theology rather than language, customs, or heritage, was the foundation of cultural and

⁷Ibid., 149.

political subgroups in America.”⁸ Beliefs about God, human nature, family, and government influenced political choices. Citizens had value systems which guided different lifestyles and different ways of voting and engaging with political issues. In the analysis of contemporary immigrant groups, this raises questions about the sources of engagement with political issues. Is the motivation for engaging with a specific issue ethnic, religious or both? For example, much of the advocacy of Greek Americans and the Greek Orthodox Church on issues related to Cyprus and the Ecumenical Patriarchate have been on the basis of humanitarian concerns and an emphasis on religious freedom.⁹ Do these concerns, ones that are shared by a larger international community, become overshadowed by the label of “ethnic politics?” Do policymakers view these attempts to influence the positions of the U.S. government as only ethnic concerns? Another aspect would be how this political advocacy is viewed by other influential religious groups. Are they dissuaded from engagement because of the presence of an “ethnic-religious” lobby addressing national or international issues? The other aspect of this theory is how the distinction between “ethnic” and “religious” motivations influences grassroots attachment to specific issues. Among adherents in the Greek Orthodox Church, many who are later generations or non-Greek have an aversion for addressing some of these issues within the context of the parish community. One of the main reasons for this appears to be the view

⁸Swierenga cites Jensen’s *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888-96* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 82, 89.

⁹A concise survey of the focus of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America on issues of religious freedom is presented by Alexander F. C. Webster in his work entitled *The Price of Prophecy: Orthodox Churches on Peace, Freedom, and Security*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1995), 144-156. Webster surveys the decisions and resolutions of the biennial clergy-laity congresses of the Archdiocese on human rights and religious freedom.

that these issues are representative of ethnic concerns rather than broader issues of rights and freedoms that engage U.S. foreign policy interests.

In addition to Swierenga's review of ethnoreligious scholarship, more attention is being given to this area in surveys of religion and politics in the United States. While much of this is directed at the engagement of groups with domestic policy, the fact that these groups have strong transnational connections leads to the thesis of examining the role of transnational religion in shaping political advocacy. In their chapter on "Religion and the Politics of Ethnic and Religious Minorities," Wald and Calhoun-Brown include sections on Latino Catholics and Protestants, Muslims, and immigrant groups from Asia.¹⁰ Some of the transnational connections of these groups are identified, but it is evident that this area needs additional analysis. In the fourth edition of *Religion and Politics in America*, Fowler and others recognize the growth of religious lobbying by smaller U.S. religious communities including Orthodox Jews, Muslims, Baha'is, Hindus, Tibetan Buddhists, Sikhs, and Chinese Uyghurs.¹¹ The makeup of these groups include strong ethnoreligious identities as well as transnational connections that continue to have significant influence in shaping these identities in the American context. Further, these groups represent the reasons why this type of lobbying is growing in the United States. First, with the growth of American pluralism is also a "growing sense that such pluralism creates an imperative for religious groups to get organized to protect their collective

¹⁰Kenneth D. Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown, *Religion and Politics in the United States*, 5th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 294-311.

¹¹Robert Booth Fowler, Laura R. Olson, Allen D. Hertzke, and Kevin R. Den Dulk, *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices*, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 121.

interests.”¹² Another reason identified by Fowler is that the impact of government on religious organizations has increased as the size and scope of government’s responsibilities have expanded. Further, additional reasons include the desire of religious groups to promote or defend the values of their traditions and the desire of American groups to attain U.S. influence in support of their persecuted fellow believers abroad.¹³ As shown by this study, this final reason for the increase in religious lobbying can be expanded to include motivations to engage with U.S. foreign policy interests that rise out of issues of identity, transnational influences, and the dynamics of groups in securing and maintaining their place within an American society characterized by a multitude of interests.

The recognition of ethnoreligious advocacy in the study of the political engagement of immigrant/diaspora groups does not negate the contributions that are being made by studies of ethnic politics that focus on transnational influences. One example of this is the monograph by Yossi Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands*.¹⁴ Shain examines U.S. diaspora groups from a transnationalist perspective, and then analyzes Arab-American and Mexican diasporas in this context. He also addresses ethnoracial relations in the U.S. in the disputes between African Americans and Jews. He applies his research to another contribution that this field makes to American politics: the impact of ethnic lobbying on

¹²Ibid., 121.

¹³Ibid., 122.

¹⁴Yossie Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

American interests and how these groups are influenced by the public view of the global role of the United States. Shain states:

How intense or frequent diasporic interactions with homelands remain is not always evident, and issues of politics and economics inside and outside the United States reinvigorate dormant diasporas or hinder the more organized or active ones. One pattern that seems to remain more or less constant, however, is that diasporic elites wishing to have influence on foreign policy work hard to remain within the “acceptable” parameters of the American public’s view of America’s global role.¹⁵

Shain’s thesis also relates to the influence that diasporas have when they accept American ideals, the manner in which they inculcate these in their homelands, and how this correlates with U.S. foreign interests. It is evident from this project that religion has a role in this mix, and its analysis would broaden the understanding of all of the related areas.

Another example of a recent study that moves beyond “ethnic politics” is *Foreign Attachment: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* by Tony Smith.¹⁶ Smith affirms that ethnic groups play a significant role in making U.S. foreign policy; but he also considers if “the negative consequences of ethnic involvement may well outweigh the undoubted benefits this activism at times confers on America in world affairs.”¹⁷ One aspect of this point that is related to this project is the ongoing conflict between Greek and Turkish lobbyists who affirm that their position on the issues is the authoritative source for U.S. policy in the region. By considering ethnic concerns, the fear is that policy devolves into the mode of domestic politics with its parties and

¹⁵Ibid., 200.

¹⁶Tony Smith, *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

¹⁷Ibid., 2.

pressure networks, awarding the group with the most influence the outcome they want. His third concern is as follows: “the contradictions of pluralist democracy are particularly apparent in the making of foreign policy, where the self-interested demands of a host of domestic actors...raise an enduring problem of democratic citizenship: how to balance the rights and interests of the organized few against the rights and interests of the often inattentive many.” How dominant should ethnic groups be in determining how America uses its power around the world? Smith states, “Such claims become particularly problematic in cases where these groups—under the ideological mantle of ‘multiculturalism’—seem to place a higher priority on their sense of ethnic identity than on their sense of identity with the greater American community.”¹⁸ In analyzing the power of ethnic groups, Smith does not give extensive attention to religion, but points of his analysis lend to its inclusion. Since the influence of ethnic groups in making U.S. foreign policy is increasing and many of these groups have strong religious identifications, these connections should be examined and understood in relation to their identity and their advocacy. In addition, this influence should be recognized when the United States becomes the forum for debating competing foreign policy interests. For example, Greek Americans, as other groups, have used their social and economic standing in American society to direct their lobbying efforts at domestic politics, including financial support for candidates for public office.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., 3.

¹⁹Two additional resources that address issues of identity, religion and politics and include analysis of transnational connections are David S. Gutterman and Andrew R. Murphy, eds., *Religion, Politics, and American Identity: New Directions, New Controversies* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006) and Valerie Martinez-Ebers and

Challenges of Transnational Religion

The interdisciplinary nature of the study of transnational religion in American politics indicates that various challenges exist in attempting to analyze its role and influence. Several of these challenges are described by Victor Roudometof and Anna Karpathakis.²⁰ The first challenge that they highlight in the study of religion and religious institutions is grasping the internal dynamics of an ethnic group. They note that Greek immigrants established their religious institutions in the United States with three goals in mind: “to transmit the Greek Orthodox religion to the American-born generations; to transmit Greek secular culture, history and language to the American-born generations; and to help new Greek immigrants adjust to American society and institutions.”²¹ These developments have created a challenge within the Greek American community in which the Church, with its dual religious and secular role, “inevitably comes into conflict with the more secular interpretations of modern Greek identity.” They explain: “While secular organizations not faced with issues of diverse religious or political affiliations among their membership may accept religion as a criterion demarcating Greek American identity, those groups with members or potential members of diverse religious or political orientations resist this function of religion.”²² Not only does this represent the conflict between members of an ethnic group that may disagree

Manochehr Dorraj, *Perspectives on Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: Identity Politics in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

²⁰Victor Roudometof and Anna Karpathakis, “Greek Americans and Transnationalism: Religion, Class and Community,” in *Communities Across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures* (London: Routledge, 2002), 41-54.

²¹Ibid., 45.

²²Ibid., 46.

over the role of religion in identity or in representing the group in the larger society, but it also reveals the kinds of dilemmas that can arise within a group when political advocacy is led and defined by religious institutions. This can present significant challenges to government officials who may or may not be receptive to religious advocacy or know the dynamics of the group. This challenge is apparent in all ethnic groups in which a percentage of the group do not maintain ethnoreligious identity, but assume a more secular one while remaining loyal to group interests.

In addition to inter-communal conflict, another challenge presented by Roudometof and Karpathakis is inter-generational/transnational conflict in relation to the creation of new identities in the American context. In the Greek American community, they recognize this in how the Church, earlier immigrants, and the American-born who are active in church-related groups “employ perceived cultural differences...to differentiate themselves symbolically from working-class Greeks (and, inevitably, recent Greek-born immigrants).”²³ They describe this process as follows:

To facilitate a bridgehead between Greek and American identities the Church has appropriated American national heroes (such as Jefferson) into its pantheon, through a form of ecumenical particularism. Immigrants and clergy alike emphasize “American” cultural elements, creating a dual heritage in which they are now of America because of their acquisition of American virtues, but still possess Greek virtues distinguishing them from other Americans. While it is simply taken for granted that other Americans lack this glory or the particular Greek virtues, the interesting argument is that the Greek Americans, through the Church, are maintaining the “true” Greek or “Hellenic” identity, heritage, and traditions, and are thereby “more Greek” than the Greeks in Greece.

Certainly, the study of ethnoreligious identity illuminates these conflicts. However, their complexity and influence on political advocacy and the diversity of views on policy issues among Greek Americans and between this community and Greeks in Greece is a

²³Ibid., 49.

challenge. These dynamics are either beyond the vale of the U.S. policy process, or they present disunity or inter-communal conflict that detracts from the political influence of the group.

A third challenge that is presented in the chapter by Roudometof and Karpathakis is by way of a critique in their analysis of Church affairs. The challenge is the knowledge that political scientists and sociologists need of the inner workings of the religious institutions of ethnic groups. At the conclusion of their chapter, the authors discuss their thesis of a changing Greek American identity in the context of the debates between Greek Orthodox Church leaders and a U.S. group advocating for the creation of a autonomous American Orthodox Church. The group, Orthodox Christian Laity (OCL), represents to the authors a shift away from a Greek American/Orthodox identity to a “new potential identity in which religious markers will overshadow the secular,” a shift from churches identified by ethnicity to an Orthodox universalism. Their description here is somewhat accurate, although it leaves out the recognition of a sizeable convert group within the Greek Orthodox Church who do not advocate such radical change. However, their description of some of the events in this debate that lend to their argument are incorrect and over-emphasize the strength of the influence of this group in national Church affairs. In fact, they do not identify some of the sources of the information, but it appears to be more from journalistic accounts. The point is not to detract from what they offer in understanding the role of religion in Greek American identity but to show the challenges that are faced in doing accurate research. If this had been done via interviews, transcripts of meetings, and official documents and publications, they would have seen that the efforts of OCL have found little success among the clergy and laity of the Church, and

that ties to the Patriarchate and on issues related to the role of the Church in maintaining elements of “Greek” identity are still very strong.

Another challenge in addressing the role of transnational religion in political advocacy is measuring religiosity both among ethnoreligious groups and foreign groups and leaders with strong religious identifications and transnational connections with diaspora groups in the United States. While extensive research is available on religious practices and beliefs, the challenge in politics is how to measure religious variables in international relations. This is presented in the research of Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler.²⁴ They affirm that better methods are needed in the quantitative branch of international relations scholarship rather than reliance on measures used in the past—whether two states belong to a different religion or the majority religion in a state. They state:

We need to develop more specific criteria describing how religion influences international relations. As implied earlier, the answers are not in international relation theory, as that body has for too long neglected the topic of religion. Rather we need to explore the general social science literature on the topic of religion, searching for concepts that can be translated into international relations theory. As the lines between international relations and domestic politics are blurring, that the other social sciences focus on events that occur within a state should not hinder this process.²⁵

This development of the tools of analysis is certainly needed to understand the dynamics between countries of origin, their diasporas in the United States, and the political advocacy directed toward U.S. foreign relations. Influences in these arenas are not

²⁴Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 172.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 172-173.

understood by simply identifying religious identities, but in understanding the elements and strength of these identities in conjunction with political activism.

Another closely related area is the influence that religious groups in general exert on the U.S. foreign policy framework on behalf of religious freedom. Research is also extensive on this topic and represented here by the work of J. Bryan Hehir and the 2010 report published by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs entitled, *Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Policy*. Hehir's analysis of the history of religious freedom in U.S. policy leads him to five general principles that should guide future policy development on the issue:

First, as a basic principle U.S. policy should be grounded in the conviction that since the right to religious freedom is universal, U.S. policy cannot be focused on the plight of one or two particular religious groups.

Second, the judgment that religious freedom has not received adequate systematic attention in the past has merit; the argument that this has been due to a kind of cultural conspiracy that disdains religious convictions and those who hold them is much less convincing.

Third, . . . increased attention to religious freedom should not isolate it but give it secure standing in the core group of rights that the United States is committed to pursue and protect.

Fourth, activism is called for in defense of religious freedom, but crusades are neither appropriate or defensible.

Fifth, in the analysis of situations of religious repression, the definition of what constitutes a violation of religious freedom should be both personal and social.²⁶

These principles are cited here as an example of the larger influences on U.S. foreign policy that either blunt the effectiveness of ethnoreligious groups or cast their concerns as very narrow in the greater scheme of policy on religious freedom. This represents a

²⁶J. Bryan Hehir, "Religious Freedom and U.S. Foreign Policy: Categories and Choices," chap. *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Elliott Abrams (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

challenge in gauging the influence of transnational religion in political advocacy, especially when elected officials want to address the concerns of their constituents, thus giving them a forum which may create animosity and alienation due to the perception of “ethnic politics.”

The Chicago report presents another approach to the issue of religion and U.S. foreign policy by offering broader recommendations to the engagement of religion by U.S. officials. These recommendations are targeted at overcoming perceptions that religion is a “problem” that needs to be fixed, but instead is viewed “as a set of beliefs and values that offers opportunities for enhanced dialogue and peaceful coexistence.”²⁷ The recommendations include building the internal capacity of government to engage religion overseas; the training of government officials on the role of religion in world affairs; engaging religion and religious communities effectively on both societal and governmental levels; launching special initiatives aimed to work with religious groups in other countries; confronting religious extremism by engaging with religious political parties; avoiding the use of pejorative or abstract religious terms that reduce complex movements to facile political categories; and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to religious freedom, while clarifying the meaning of the term.²⁸ It is apparent that ethnoreligious groups in the United States could assist with this broader structural engagement with religion by government. Challenges are evident, though, in determining

²⁷*Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy: Report of the Task Force on Religion and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2010), 55.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 56-72.

what this role would be and discerning the influence of motivations rooted in identity, ethnic interests, and transnational influences.

A final challenge related to transnational religion and political advocacy is measuring its effectiveness. This is the focus of Alexander Kitroeff concerning Greek American advocacy. He argues that in this present era of globalization and transnationalism, both effectiveness and range of lobbying efforts are limited. He states, “These limits are rooted, first, in the cultural-based re-engagement of Greek Americans with their heritage and Greece itself. What distinguishes the political from the cultural spheres of transnational interaction is the presence of states, the ways they decide their respective foreign policies, their diplomatic relations and, especially in the Greek case, the way they treat non-governmental organizations including those formed by diaspora Greeks.”²⁹ He recognizes that even though non-state political actors have become more permanent and institutionalized in the foreign policymaking process, states remain firmly in control. A second set of limitations is related to the bilateral relations between the two countries concerned. Citing the critique of transnationalism by Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald,³⁰ Kitroeff notes that states continue to “regulate the transnational activity of migrant groups...by allowing such activities to go on, and will tend to do so when their bilateral relations are amicable or at least peaceful...” A third set of limitations on the effectiveness of political advocacy is the status of relations between all of the participants in a transnational group. This includes government officials of the

²⁹Alexander Kitroeff, “The Limits of Political Transnationalism: The Greek-American Lobby 1970s-1990s,” in *Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700*, ed. Dimitris Tziouvas (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009), 143.

³⁰Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald, “Transnationalism in Question,” *American Journal of Sociology* 109:5 (March 2004): 1177-1195.

country of origin, national and international organizations among diaspora groups, and religious institutions. Division and conflict among competing interests of an ethnoreligious group diminishes a voice of advocacy that is already a small one among so many others. While these limitations reflect other analyses of ethnic and religious lobbying that confirm much variance in effectiveness, the openness of the American political system and the growing presence of ethnoreligious groups will ensure that transnational religious connections will continue to have a role in defining the identity of these groups and motivating their political advocacy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Abrams, Elliott, ed. *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield; Ethics and Public Policy Center, 2001.
- Ahrari, Mohammed E., ed. *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Contributions in Political Science, number 186. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- Alexander, Robert M. *The Classics of Interest Group Behavior*. Belmont, CA: Thomson – Wadsworth, 2006.
- Ambrosio, Thomas, ed. *Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Westport: Praeger, 2002.
- American Hellenic Institute. *Crisis on Cyprus: A Report Prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees for the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.
- . *United States Foreign Policy Regarding Greece, Turkey & Cyprus: The Rule of Law and American Interests*. Columbus: American Hellenic Institute, 1988.
- . *The Rule of Law and Conditions on Foreign Aid to Turkey*. Washington, D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 1990.
- Anagnostou, Yiorgos. *Contours of White Ethnicity: Popular Ethnography and the Making of Usable Pasts in Greek America*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. rev. ed. London: Verso, 2006.
- Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos. *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963*. Trans. Timothy Cullen and Susan Kyriakidis. New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986.
- A Breath of Spiritual Fragrance: The Treasure of Archbishop Michael of North and South America*. New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2008.
- Bennett, Andrew, and George Shambaugh, eds. *Taking Sides: Clashing Views in American Foreign Policy*. Contemporary Learning Series. 4th ed. Dubuque: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

- Christie, Kenneth, ed. *United States Foreign Policy and National Identity in the 21st Century*. Routledge Studies in U.S. Foreign Policy. ed. Inderjeet Parmar and John Dumbrell. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Christol, Helene, and Serge Ricard, eds. *Hyphenated Diplomacy: European Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1914-1984*. Aix-en-Provence Cedex: Universite De Provence, 1985.
- Cigler, Allan J., and A. Loomis Burdett, eds. *Interest Group Politics*. 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007.
- Clogg, Richard. *The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
- Conner, Walker. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Constantelos, Demetrios, ed. *Encyclicals and Documents of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America: The First Fifty Years 1922-1972*. Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1976.
- , ed. *Visions and Expectations for a Living Church: Addresses to Clergy-Laity Congresses 1960-1996*. The Complete Works of His Eminence Archbishop Iakovos. Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998.
- , ed. *The Torchbearer: Encyclicals: Spiritual and Ecclesiastical Subjects, Administration, Education, Culture*. 2 vols. Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1999.
- Constas, Dimitri C., and Athanassios G. Platias, eds. *Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective*. London: Macmillan Press, 1993.
- Coufoudakis, Van, ed. *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict: In Memory of Stephen G. Xydis*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976.
- Coufoudakis, Van, and Harry J. Psomiades, eds. *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999.
- Couloumbis, Theodore A. *Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1980.
- . *The Greek Junta Phenomenon: A Professor's Notes*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2004.

- Couloumbis, Theodore A., John A. Petropulos, and Harry J. Psomiades. *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976.
- Danforth, Loring M. *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992.
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair, and Angelos Themelis. *Ethnic Lobbies in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Comparative Analysis of the Jewish, Greek, Armenian & Turkish Lobbies*. Occasional Research Paper no. 13. Athens: Institute of International Relations, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, 1997.
- Demacopoulos, George E. *The Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate: Defenders of the Faith*. New York: Order of Saint Andrew, n.d.
- Djupe, Paul A., and Laura R. Olson, eds. *Encyclopedia of American Religion and Politics: Updated Edition*. New York: Checkmark Books, 2008.
- Ebersole, Luke Eugene . *Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital*. New York: Macmillan, 1951.
- Fossey, John M. *Proceedings of the First International Congress on the Hellenic Diaspora*. Montreal and Athens: J.C. Gieben, 1991.
- Fowler, Robert Booth, Allen D. Hertzke, and Laura R. Olson. *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture & Strategic Choices*. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.
- Fowler, Robert Booth, Laura R. Olson, Allen D. Hertzke, and Kevin R. den Dulk. *Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices*. 4th ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2010.
- Fox, Jonathan, and Shmuel Sandler. *Bringing Religion Into International Relations*. Culture and religion in international relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Georgakas, Dan and Charles C. Moskos, eds. *New Directions in Greek American Studies*. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1991.
- Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.

- Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America. *2012 Yearbook*. New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, 2012.
- . *The Future of the Greek Language and Culture in the United States: Survival in the Diaspora*. New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 1999.
- Gregoriou, George. *Cyprus: A View from the Diaspora*. New York: Smyrna Press, 2000.
- Griffith, R. Marie, and Melani McAlister, eds. 2008. *Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008.
- Gutterman, David S. and Andrew R. Murphy, eds. *Religion, Politics, and American Identity: New Directions, New Controversies*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006.
- Halley, Laurence. *Ancient Affections: Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.
- Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Hehir, J. Bryan, Michael Walzer, Louise Richardson, Shibley Telhami, Charles Krauthammer, and James Lindsay. *Liberty and Power: A Dialogue on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy in an Unjust World*. The Pew Forum Dialogues on Religion and Public Life. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2004.
- Hertzke, Allen D. *Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Hofrenning, Daniel J. B. *In Washington But Not of It: The Prophetic Politics of Religious Lobbyists*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995.
- Howe, Russell W., and Sarah H. Trott. *The Power Peddlers*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1977.
- Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith, eds. *Ethnicity*. Oxford Readers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Ioannides, Chris P. *Realpolitik in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Kissinger and the Cyprus Crisis to Carter and the Lifting of the Turkish Arms Embargo*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2001.
- James, Paul. *Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In*. London: Sage Publications, 2006.

- Jelen, Ted G., ed. *Religion and Political Behavior in the United States*. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- Karakasidou, Anastasia N. 1997. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
- Kennedy, Paul, and Victor Roudometof, eds. *Communities Across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures*. Transnationalism. ed. Steven Vertovec. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Kim, Julie. *Macedonia (FYROM): Post-conflict Situation and U.S. policy*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005.
- Kohn, Hans. 1946. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1946.
- Koken, Paul, Theodore N. Constant, and Seraphim G. Canoutas. *A History of the Greeks in the Americas 1453-1938*. Ann Arbor: Proctor Publications, 1995.
- Kourvetaris, George A. 1997. *Studies on Greek Americans*. East European Monographs. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Kunkelman, Gary A. *The Religion of Ethnicity: Belief and Belonging in a Greek-American Community*. European Immigrants and American Society. Edited by Timothy Walch and Edward R. Kantowicz. New York: Garland Publishing, 1990.
- Kyriakides, Nicholas F. *The Unredeemed Hellenism*. New York: 1918.
- Leber, George J. *The History of the Order of AHEPA (The American Hellenic Educational Association) 1922-1972: Including Greeks in the New World, and Immigration to the United States*. Washington, D.C.: The Order of AHEPA, 1972.
- Lowery, David, and Holly Brasher. *Organized Interests and American Government*. Critical Topics in American Government. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2004.
- Manolis, Paul G. *The History of the Greek Church in America: In Acts and Documents*. Vol. 1. Berkeley: Ambelos Press, 2003.
- Martinez-Ebers, Valerie, and Manochehr Dorraj. *Perspectives on Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: Identity Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Miller, James Edward. *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

- Moskos, Charles C. *Greek Americans: Struggle and Success*. 2nd ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989.
- Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System*. 3rd ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
- Nurser, John S. *For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005.
- Panagopoulos, E. P. *New Smyrna: An Eighteenth Century Greek Odyssey*. Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1978.
- Pettifer, James, ed.. *The New Macedonian Question*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Polyviou, Polyviou G. *Cyprus: The Tragedy and the Challenge*. Washington, D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 1975.
- Poulton, Hugh. *Who Are the Macedonians?* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- Psomiades, Harry J. *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase: A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968.
- Psomiades, Harry J., and Alice Scourby, eds. *The Greek American Community in Transition*. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1982.
- Pyrros, James G. *The Cyprus File: Washington, D.C.: A Diary of the Cyprus Crisis in the Summer of 1974*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2010.
- Roshwald, Aviel. *The Endurance of Nationalism*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006.
- Rossides, Eugene T. *The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-year Retrospective*. New York; Washington, DC: The Academy of Political Science; American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 1998.
- . *United States Relations with Greece and Cyprus*. 4th ed. Washington, DC: American Hellenic Institute, 2000.
- , ed. *Greece's Pivotal Role in World War II and Its Importance to the U.S. Today*. Washington, DC: American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 2001.
- Rossides, Eugene T., and Van Coufoudakis, eds. *The United States & Cyprus: Double Standards and the Rule of Law*. Washington, DC: American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 2002.

- Roudometof, Victor. *The Macedonia Question: Culture, Historiography, Politics*. East European Monographs. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- . *Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question*. Westport: Praeger, 2002.
- Said, Abdul Aziz, ed. *Ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy*. Rev. ed. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.
- Salisbury, Robert H., ed. *Interest Group Politics in America*. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970.
- Saloutos, Theodore Saloutos. *The Greeks in the United States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- Schlozman, Kay Lehman, and John T. Tierney. *Organized Interests and American Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986.
- Schulzinger, Robert D. *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*. 6th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Scourby, Alice. *The Greek Americans*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984.
- . *Third Generation Greek Americans: A Study of Religious Attitudes*. American Ethnic Groups: The European Heritage. ed. Francesco Cordasco. New York: Arno Press, 1967.
- Shain, Yossi. *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nation*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- . *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Smith, Tony. *Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Stearns, Monteagle. *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992.
- Swierenga, Robert P. *Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital*. New York: MacMillan, 1951.
- Truman, David B. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

- Tziampiris, Aristotle. *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.
- Vidalis, Orestis E. *Confronting the Greek Dictatorship in the U.S.: Years of Exile: A Personal Diary (1968-1975)*. Modern Greek Research Series. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2009.
- Wald, Kenneth D., and Allison Calhoun-Brown. *Religion and Politics in the United States*. 5th ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.
- Watanabe, Paul Y. *Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy*. Contributions in Political Science. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984.
- Weber, Paul, and Landis Jones. *US Religious Interest Groups: Institutional Profiles*. Westwood: Greenwood Press, 1994.
- Wilson, James Q. *Political Organizations*. Princeton Studies in American Politics. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Wittkopf, Eugene R., and James M. McCormick, eds. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. 4th ed. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, Publishers, 2004.
- Zotos, Stephen. *Hellenic Presence in America*. Wheaton: Pilgrimage, 1976.

Book Chapters

- Armstrong, John. "Nations before nationalism." In *Nationalism*. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Champagne, Anthony. "Religion as a Political Interest Group." In *Religion and politics*. Edited by W. Lawson Taitte. Vol. 10. Austin: The University of Texas at Dallas, 1989.
- Christopoulos, George Christopoulos. "Impact Through Public Relations." In *History of the Greek Orthodox Church in America*. Edited by Miltiades B. Efthimiou and George A. Christopoulos. New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1984.
- Conner, Walker. "The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas." In *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, ed. Gabriel Sheffer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
- Constantelos, Demetrios J. "Introduction." In *History of the Greek Orthodox Church in America*. Edited by Miltiades B. Efthimiou and George A. Christopoulos. New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1984.

- Croucher, Sheila. "Globalization and the American Nation." In *Perspectives on Race, Ethnicity, and Religion: Identity Politics in America*. Edited by Valerie Martinez-Ebers and Manoj Dorraj. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- den Dulk, Kevin R. and Allen D. Hertzke. "Conclusion: Themes in Religious Advocacy." In *Representing god at the Statehouse*. Edited by Edward L. Cleary and Allen D. Hertzke. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.
- Dickson, Peter W. "The Greek Pilgrims: Tsakonas and Tsintzinians." In *New Directions in Greek American Studies*. Edited by Dan Georgakas and Charles C. Moskos. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1991.
- Esman, Milton J. "Diasporas and International Relations." In *Ethnicity*. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Gans, Herbert. "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America." In *On the Making of Americans*. Edited by Herbert Gans. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979.
- Guth, James L. "Religion and American Public Opinion: Foreign Policy Issues." In *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*. Edited by Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Harakas, Stanley. "The Stand of the Orthodox Church on Controversial Issues." In *A Companion to the Greek Orthodox Church*. New York: Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North and South America, 1984.
- Hassiotis, Ioannis. "History of the Modern Greek Diaspora." In *Diaspora, Identity, and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research*. Edited by Kokot, et. al. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Hehir, J. Bryan. "Religious Freedom and U.S. Foreign Policy: Categories and Choices." In *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Edited by Elliott Abrams. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
- Hertzke, Allen D. "Faith and access: Religious Constituencies and the Washington Elites." In *Religion and Political Behavior in the United States*. Edited by Ted G. Jelen. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- . "Religious Interest Groups in American Politics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*. Edited by Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. "Nationalism in Europe." In *Nationalism*. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994.

- Horowitz, Irving Louis. "Ethnic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy." In *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Edited by Abdul Aziz Said. New York: Praeger, 1981.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "The Erosion of American National Interests." In *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*. Edited by Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick. 4th ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.
- Kitroeff, Alexander. "The Limits of Political Transnationalism: The Greek-American Lobby 1970s-1990s." In *Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700*. Edited by Dimitris Tziouvas. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009.
- Kondos, Basil. "The United States Role in the Greek Civil War." In *The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective*. Edited by Eugene T. Rossides. New York and Washington: The Academy of Political Science and American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 1998.
- Koskinas, Silas. "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Development of the Orthodox Church in the New World." In *Orthodox Theology and Diakonia – Trends and Prospects*. Edited by Demetrios J. Constantelos. Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1981.
- Kourvetaris, George. "The Futuristics of Greek America." In *Reading Greek America: Studies in the Experience of Greeks in the United States*. Edited by Spyros D. Orfanos. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2002.
- Kurien, Prema. "Who Speaks for Indian Americans? Religion, Ethnicity, and Political Formation." In *Religion and Politics in the Contemporary United States*. Edited by R. Marie Griffith and Melani McAlister. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008.
- Kyrou, Alexandros K. "Ethnicity as Humanitarianism: The Greek American Relief Campaign for Occupied Greece, 1941-1944." In *New Directions in Greek American Studies*. Edited by Dan Georgakas and Charles C. Moskos. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1991.
- Marudas, Peter N. "Greek American Involvement in Contemporary Politics." In *The Greek American Community in Transition*. Edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Alice Scourby. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1982.
- Moskos, Charles. "The Greeks in the United States." In *The Greek Diaspora in the Twentieth Century*. Edited by Richard Clogg. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
- Psomiades, Harry J. "Ethnic Politics in America: Greek-Americans." In *Reading Greek America: Studies in the Experience of Greeks in the United States*. Edited by Spyros D. Orfanos. New York: Pella Publishing Company, 2002.

- Rexine, John E. "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey." In *Orthodox Theology and Diakonia: Trends and Prospects*. Edited by Demetrios J. Constantelos. Brookline: Hellenic College Press, 1981.
- Ribuffo, Leo P. "Religion in the History of U.S. Foreign Policy." In *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Edited by Elliott Abrams. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
- Roudometof, Victor, and Anna Karpathakis. "Greek Americans and Transnationalism: Religion, Class and Community." In *Communities Across Borders: New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics." In *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. Edited by Gabriel Sheffer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
- Swierenga, Robert P. "Ethnoreligious Political Behavior in the Mid-nineteenth Century: Voting, Values, Cultures." In *Religion and American politics: From the Colonial Period to the Present*. Edited by Mark A. Noll and Luke E. Harlow. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna. "Nations, Migrants, and Transnational Identifications: An Interactive Approach to Nationalism. In *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*. Edited by Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar. London: Sage Publications, 2006.
- Uslaner, Eric M. "American Interests in the Balance? Do Ethnic Groups Dominate Foreign Policy Making?" In *Interest Group Politics*. Edited by Allan J. Cigler. 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007.
- Watanabe, Paul. "Greek-American Activism and the Turkish Arms Ban." In *Diasporas in World Politics: The Greeks in Comparative Perspective*. Edited by Dimitri C. Conostas and Athanassios G. Platias. London: Macmillan Press, 1993.
- Zwier, Robert. "Coalition Strategies of Religious Interest Groups. In *Religion and Political Behavior in the United States*. Edited by Ted G. Jelen. New York: Praeger, 1989.

Journal Articles

- Anagnostou, Yiorgos . "Model Americans, Quintessential Greeks: Ethnic Success and Assimilation in the Diaspora." *Diaspora* 12:3 (2003): 279-327.

- Armstrong, John. "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas." *American Political Science Review* 70 (1976): 393-408.
- Baubock, Rainer. "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Nationalism." *International Migration Review* 37:3 (2003): 700-723.
- Baumgartner, Jody C., Peter C. Francia, and Jonathan S. Morris. "A Clash of Civilizations? The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East." *Political Research Quarterly* 61:2 (2008): 171-179.
- Christou, Anastasia. "American Dreams and European Nightmares: Experiences and Polemics of Second-Generation Greek-American Returning Migrants." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32:5 (July 2006): 831-845.
- Clapsis, Emmanuel. "Politics and Christian Faith." *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 37:1-2 (1992): 99-103.
- Clavin, Patricia. 2005. "Defining Transnationalism." *Contemporary European History* 14:4 (2005): 421-439.
- Constantinou, Stavros, and Milton E. Harvey. "Basic Dimensional Structure and Intergenerational Differences in Greek American Ethnicity." *Sociology and Social Research* 69:2 (1985): 234-254.
- Danforth, Loring M. 1993. "Claims to Macedonian Identity: The Macedonian Question and the Breakup of Yugoslavia." *Anthropology Today* 9:4 (1993): 3-10.
- Daniels, Joseph P. "Religious Affiliation and Individual International Policy Preferences in the United States." *International Interactions* 31 (2005): 273-301.
- Fuchs, Lawrence H. "Minority Groups and Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 74:2 (1959): 161-175.
- Guth, James L., John C. Green, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and Corwin E. Smidt. "Faith and Foreign Policy: A View from the Pews." *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* 3:2 (Fall 2005): 3-10.
- Hackett, Clifford P. "Congress and Greek American Relations: The Embargo Example." *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 15 (1988): 5-31.
- Haney, Patrick J. and Walt Vanderbush. "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation." *International Studies Quarterly* 43:2 (1999): 341-361.

- Hirschman, Charles. "The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States." *International Migration Review* 37:3 (Fall 2003): 1206-1233.
- Kassimeris, Christos. "The Inconsistency of United States Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Cyprus Invasion: The Turkish Arms Embargo and Its Termination." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26:1 (2008): 91-114.
- Konstantinides, Chrysostomos. "The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchs from the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) to the Present." *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 45:1-4 (2000): 5-22.
- Krindatch, Alexei. "Orthodox (Eastern Christian) Churches in the United States at the Beginning of a New Millennium: Questions of Nature, Identity, and Mission." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41:3 (Sep. 2002): 533-563.
- Kurien, Prema. "Multiculturalism and Ethnic Nationalism: The Development of an American Hinduism." *Social Problems* 51:3 (2004): 362-385.
- Levitt, Peggy. "You Know Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant: Religion and Transnational Migration." *International Migration Review* 37:3 (2003): 847-873.
- Levitt, Peggy, Josh DeWind, and Steven Vertovec. 2003. "International Perspectives on Transnational Migration: An Introduction." *International Migration Review* 37:3 (2003): 565-575.
- Mathias Jr., Charles McC. "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 59:5 (1981): 975-998.
- Mead, Walter Russell. "God's Country?" *Foreign Affairs* 85:8 (2006): 24-43.
- Panagakos, Anastasia N. "Citizens of the Trans-nation: Political Mobilization, Multiculturalism, and Nationalism in the Greek Diaspora." *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 7:1 (1998): 53-73.
- Prodromou, Elizabeth H. "Religious Pluralism in Twenty-First-Century America: Problematizing the Implications for Orthodox Christianity." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 72:3 (Sept. 2004): 733-757.
- . "Turkey Between Secularism and Fundamentalism?: The 'Muslimhood Model' and the Greek Orthodox Minority." *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* 3:1 (Spring 2005): 11-22.
- Roudometof, Victor. "Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14:2 (1996): 253-301.

- Saloutos, Theodore. "The Greek Orthodox Church in the United States and Assimilation." *International Migration Review* 7:4 (Winter 1973): 395-407.
- Shain, Yossi. "Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 109:5 (1994-95): 811-841.
- Stavrides, Vasil T. "A Concise History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate." Trans. George D. Dragas. *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 45:1-4 (2000): 57-153.
- Vertovec, Steven. "Migration and Other Modes of Transnationalism: Towards Conceptual Cross-fertilization." *International Migration Review* 37:3 (2003): 641-665.
- Waldinger, Roger, and David Fitzgerald. "Transnationalism in Question." *American Journal of Sociology* 109:5 (March 2004): 1177-1195.
- Yavis, Constantine G. "Propaganda in the Greek-American Community." *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 14 (1987): 105-129.
- Zahariadis, Nikolaos. "Greek Policy Toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1991-1995." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 14:2 (1996): 303-327.

Reports and Speeches

- American Hellenic Institute. *2010 Policy Statements on Greek American Issues*. Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 2010.
- . *2011 Policy Statements on Greek American Issues*. Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 2011.
- . *Annual Report*. www.ahiworld.org/.
- Archbishop Demetrios. "Remarks of His Eminence Archbishop Demetrios of America to President Barak Obama on the Occasion of Greek Independence Day." March 25, 2009. <http://www.goarch.org/news/archsemetriosaddress-02-25-2009> (accessed April 17, 2009).
- Burnet, Maria et. al. *Turkey's Compliance with its Obligations to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Orthodox Christian Minority – A Legal Analysis*. New Haven: The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, 2005.
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs. *Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy: Report of the Task Force on Religion and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2010.

- European Parliament. *Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession* (2006/2118(INI), Committee on Foreign Affairs. September 13, 2006: A6-0269/2006.
- Krindatch, Alexei. *Membership, Church Attendance, Linguistic Situation and Strength of Ethnic Identity in the Various Metropolises of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America*. New York: Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of North & Central America, 2011.
- "Military Aid Bill: Turkey Arms Ban Lifted." *1978 Congressional Quarterly Almanac*. 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. Vol. 44:416.
- Order of Saint Andrew, Archons of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. *Annual Reports*. New York: Order of Saint Andrew, 2005-2011. www.archons.org/docs/AR-index.asp.
- Popov, Chris, and Michael Radin. *Contemporary Greek Government Policy on the Macedonian Issue and Discriminatory Practices in Breach of International Law*. Melbourne: Central Organizational Committee for Macedonian Human Rights, Australian Sub-Committee, 1989.
- "Problems Faced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate." May 5, 2006. *2007 Annual Report to His All Holiness Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople, The New Rome & Ecumenical Patriarch*. New York: Order of Saint Andrew the Apostle, 2007.
- Swigert, James W. "Greek Roots to U.S. Democracy: Influence to the Greek-American Lobby over U.S. Policy Toward the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." Report, National War College, Washington, D.C., 1994.
- United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. *Annual Report*. www.uscirf.gov/reports-and-briefs/annual-report.html.
- U.S. Congress. House. *Welcoming to the United States and to Washington, D.C., His All Holiness Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, Ecumenical Patriarch on his upcoming trip on October 20, 2009, through November 6, 2009*. 111th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 838. *Congressional Record*, 155, no. 149, daily ed. (October 15, 2009): H11458.
- U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*. February 21, 1994.
- U.S. President. Address. "Address of the President of the United States Delivered before a Joint Session of the Senate and House of Representatives, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey." March 12, 1947. 80th Cong. House of Representatives. Doc. 171, H. Docs., 80-1. Vol. 18-63.

U.S. President. "Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece." *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 30:6 (April 25, 1994).

U.S. President. Speech. "Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament." April 6, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-The-Turkish-Parliament/ (accessed May 13, 2009).

U.S. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. *Humanitarian Problems on Cyprus Part II, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connect with Refugees and Escapees*. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. December 17, 1974.

Press Releases, Magazine and Internet Articles

"AHEPA Applauds Passage of Foreign Relations Bill in Committee." *The Ahepan* 84:4 (Fall 2011): 9.

"AHEPA's Excursion to Turkey, Greece, Cyprus." *Greek News*. April 11, 2010. www.greeknewsonline.com/?p=12442 (accessed January 29, 2012).

"AHIPAC Initiated Legislation on Ecumenical Patriarchate Included in 1999 Appropriations Law." October 26, 1998. www.aheworld.com/media-center/press-releases/1998/62--ahipac-initiated-legislation-on-ecumenical-patriarchate-included-in-1999-appropriations-law.html (accessed January 29, 2012).

"American Hellenic Institute Sends Letter to President Bush Regarding January 8 Meeting with Turkish President Gul." January 4, 2008. www.rieas.gr/research-areas/greek-studies/536.html (accessed January 29, 2012).

"Archbishop Demetrios Issues Statement on the U.S. Recognition of FYROM as Macedonia." November 4, 2004. www.goarch.org/news/goa.news1228 (accessed January 25, 2012).

"Archbishop Demetrios Meets with Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan." September 27, 2011. www.goarch.org/news/visit-erdoganny-09272011 (accessed January 29, 2012).

"Archbishop Demetrios Presents Award to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton." May 23, 2009. www.goarch.org/news/awardtoclinton-2009-05-23 (accessed January 26, 2012).

"Archbishop Meets with Powell, Rice Over Macedonia." *Orthodox Observer* (Oct.-Nov. 2004): 1-2.

- “Archbishop Spyridon and HALO Send Joint Letter of Appeal to President Clinton for Peaceful Solution of Cyprus Issue.” July 19, 2012. <https://goarch.org/news/goa.news430> (accessed January 26, 2012).
- “Archbishop Sypridon asks President Clinton to Move Towards Settlement in Cyprus.” July 17, 1998. www.goarch.org/news/goa.news594 (accessed January 25, 2012).
- “Archon Leaders Return From Ecumenical Patriarchate and Critical Meetings in Ankara.” February 20, 2004. www.goarch.org/news/goa.news1079 (accessed January 29, 2012).
- “As Late as October 29, 2004 State Department Letter to AHI Confirms No Change in U.S. Policy Regarding FYROM.” November 5, 2004. www.aheworld.com/media-center/press-releases/2004/750-as-late-as-october-29-2004-state-department-letter-to-ahi-confirms-no-change-in-us-policy-regarding-fyrom.html (accessed January 28, 2012).
- “CEH Leaders Continue Efforts in U.S. Congress to Admonish Administration’s Policy-Change Regarding FYROM.” November 9, 2004. <http://en.sae.gr/?id=12617&tag=CEH+Leaders+Continue+Efforts+in+U.S.+Congress+To+Admonish+Administration’s+Policy-Change+Regarding+FYROM&type=print> (accessed January 28, 2012).
- “Coordinated Effort of Hellenes (CEH) Testifies before U.S. Congress.” April 16, 2009. <http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=10010> (accessed January 29, 2012).
- “A Dutiful Declaration, Objection and Petition of the Pan-Macedonian, New England District to Our Most Honorable President Mr. George W. Bush and to Our USA Government.” November 17, 2004. www.panmacedonian.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=134:why-greek-americans-object-to&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=50 (accessed January 28, 2012).
- “Ecumenical Patriarch’s Religious Freedom is One of U.S. Congress’ Most Highly Supported Issues.” November 22, 2011. www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=521 (accessed January 29, 2012).
- Georgakas, Dan. “Greek Americans Against the Junta Then and Now.” In “The Greek Junta: A Retrospective.” *The National Herald*. April 21, 2007.
- “Greek-Americans Score Big in Carter/Mondale Campaign.” *Greek World*. Nov.-Dec. 1976.
- Manatos, Andrew. “Church Leads Hellenic Community to Its ‘Finest Hour’.” *Orthodox Observer* 75:1257 (May 2010): 13.

- . “The Value of the Annual White House Meeting for Greek Independence Day: An Insider’s View on the 25th Anniversary.” March 25 2011. www.americanhellenic.org/articles/2011-03-25_significance_of_mar25.php (accessed February 2, 2012).
- “Meetings with Turkish Officials in Ankara Highlight Archon Pilgrimage to Ecumenical Patriarchate.” October 24, 2002. www.goarch.org/news/goa.news770 (accessed January 29, 2012).
- “A Petition to the Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.” November 19, 2004. www.goarch.org/news/goa.news1241 (accessed January 25, 2012).
- “President Bush Responds to Archbishop’s Letter on Macedonia.” *Orthodox Observer* (Dec. 2004): 5.
- “Remarks of His Eminence Archbishop Demetrios of America to President Barak Obama on the Occasion of Greek Independence Day.” March 25, 2009. www.goarch.org/news/archsemetriosaddress-02-25-2009 (accessed April 17, 2009).
- “Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Responds to Archbishop Demetrios’ Letter about Religious Freedom Violations in Cyprus.” February 4, 2011. www.goarch.org/news/hillaryclintonresponse-02042011 (accessed January 25, 2012).
- “Turkey to Return Confiscated Property.” August 29, 2011. www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=508 (accessed January 29, 2012).
- “U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Co-chairs Welcome Vote for Reforms in Turkey.” September 16, 2010. www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=419 (accessed January 29, 2012).
- “U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Urges President Obama to Address Reopening of Halki Seminary with Prime Minister of Turkey.” April 6, 2010. www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=390 (accessed January 29, 2012).
- “U.S. Commission Places Turkey on ‘Watch List’ for Religious Freedom.” May 8, 2009. www.archons.org/news/detail.asp?id=310 (accessed January 31, 2012).
- “U.S. States Which Have Passed Religious Freedom Resolutions for the Ecumenical Patriarchate.” www.archons.org/resolutions/ (accessed January 29, 2012).