

ABSTRACT

Courageous Activity and the Virtue of Courage

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Chapter one uses vignettes to illustrate a set of distinctions central to this work. I claim that the full exercise of the virtue of courage, what I call paradigmatic courageous activity, is exhibited only when a courageous action is performed with a courageous manner for an appropriate reason. Chapter two engages and criticizes rival accounts of courage that reduce the virtue of courage to good dispositions regarding some but not all of the excellences of courage identified above. For example, I discuss views on which paradigmatic courageous activity involves, on the one hand, overcoming one's emotions by means of will-power and, on the other, emotionlessness. Chapter three employs an account of emotion to argue that a courageous manner of acting requires the contributions of the emotions of fear, hope, and daring. Fear is necessary for properly responding to a significant threat, hope is necessary for properly pursuing a significant but obstacle-laden goal, and daring is necessary for properly confronting the significant threat as a means to attaining the significant goal. Each emotion principally assists at a stage of courageous activity. An advantage of my view is that it can account for how courageous activity requires both fear, an emotion of suspect value to some, and fearless daring, a common view of courage, and how the transition from

fear to fearless daring is both good and accomplished without suppressing fear by means of will-power. Chapter four lays the groundwork for defending the counterintuitive claim that courageous activity requires pleasure. This groundwork consists in a general account of pleasure, an account of courageous action, and a defense of my way of distinguishing naturally virtuous agents from continent agents on the basis of the distinction I made above between a reason for action and a manner of action. I further defend the difference between naturally virtuous and continent agents on the basis of their experiencing different kinds of pleasure in the choice of their actions. I apply these accounts to defend the surprising claim that courageous activity requires at least two kinds of pleasure: the pleasure of the naturally virtuous and the pleasure of the continent. Chapter five develops the claim of chapter four that courage requires two kinds of pleasure and evaluates other candidate pleasures that may be required for courageous activity. While I identify an additional pleasure that is characteristically present, I argue that no other pleasure is required.

Courageous Activity and the Virtue of Courage

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To my father,
one of the few, the proud, and the brave
and a man of God in whom mortal threat revealed sterling character

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Terms and Distinctions

The virtue of courage and its activity is the subject of this work.¹ Courage concerns the doing of difficult and worthwhile actions amidst threatening situations. More specifically, it concerns the doing of actions made difficult because of the risk posed to things cared for by some threatening aspect of the situation. However, the term ‘courage’ is put to a variety of seemingly incompatible uses. For example, John Wayne (reportedly) expresses one common view when he says that “Courage is being scared to death – but saddling up anyway.”² Courage here is essentially conquering one’s fear in order to accomplish one’s ends. Ernest Hemingway expresses another common view when he says that “Courage is grace under pressure.”³ Courage here is essentially acting coolly, calmly and collectedly without the burden of emotions like fear in situations of significant threat and difficulty. In this work, I show what is correct about the two common views expressed above as well as other views in the course of developing a distinct account of courage.

What follows in this introduction is a series of vignettes that illustrate a set of distinctions central to this work on courage. The basic distinctions are between an action of a certain type (e.g., between a courageous action and a non-courageous action), an action done in a certain manner (e.g., between an action done in a courageous manner and an

¹ Specifically, human courage is the subject of this work.

² Geoffrey Scarre reports this in his *On Courage* (Routledge, 2010), 18.

³ Geoffrey Scarre, *On Courage*, 23. The quotation seems to be from Hemingway’s interview with Dorothy Parker, *New Yorker*, 30 November 1929.

action that is not done in a courageous manner), and an action done for a certain reason (e.g., between an action that is done for the right reason and one that is not).⁴ An agent may be disposed to perform certain action types, perform actions in a certain manner, and perform actions for certain reasons. So, these three distinctions can apply to the dispositions of agents and the actions of agents. These distinctions yield a variety of combinations. The vignettes illustrate the combinations to be discussed. There are other relevant distinctions, but keeping these three in mind as applied to dispositions and actions will keep the reader oriented. After the vignettes, I will explain what the character from each vignette illustrates about courage. After that, I clarify the key assumptions I make regarding virtue in general and courage in particular. For now I will say that I take courage to be a special kind of moral virtue, where a moral virtue is a stable and robust character trait that makes its possessor good regarding actions and emotions, where, following Aristotle, such actions and emotions occur at the right times, with reference to the right objects, with the right motives, and in the right ways.⁵

Peter is an 8th century Briton and a leader in his town. He learns of an imminent Viking raid. Fear at learning the news focuses his attention as he learns of the details of the impending attack. But his fear is not so great as to hamper his quickly considering suitable

⁴ The reason for which an action is done can also be described as the motive of the action. I think that the virtuous person, when evincing virtue, will perform virtuous actions in part for the reason that such actions are morally good (or in accord with right reason or intrinsically valuable). I do not have a view on how this must be expressed in the individual's mind. The person may choose the action because it is "noble," "right," "fitting," "my duty," "appropriate," "to be done," "just," etc. Also, I do not hold that this is the only right or good reason for a courageous action even though I think that the truly courageous person will always perform actions in part because he thinks they are right or good to perform. I do not think that all courageous actions are obligatory nor that the courageous agent will always hold them to be so. I discuss this condition more in chapter four.

⁵ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II.6.11, 1106b. Aristotle, along with Aquinas, is a principal influence of my thinking about courage in particular and moral virtue in general. This project can be understood as developing insights I have gleaned from Aristotle and Aquinas.

responses to the situation. He is responsible for the safety of this town and he knows that he can best ensure its safety if the townsmen stay and fight rather than flee. It is true that he and the other men could probably escape, but the children and elderly would not be able to keep up. He does not even consider such a course of action. It is his duty to do his best to ensure the town's safety, and for this reason he gladly chooses to stay and fight. He weighs his options and promptly and accurately selects a plan of defense that has a reasonable chance of success. Buoyed by his hope that he can avert disaster, he commands the other members of the town accordingly and, with his mind made up and the execution of his plan commencing, he feels a surge of energy and daring as he thinks about the enemy to be faced and defeated. This daring serves him in completing his preparations and serves him when he begins to fight. From the perspective of the townspeople, Peter is alert and focused on the danger, careful but deliberate and reliable in his planning, and prompt and energetic in his execution. He clearly has the best interests of the town as a whole in mind in his preparations. He is a trustworthy and courageous leader.

Caleb is a young man who looks up to Peter. When Caleb hears the news of the Viking raid he is terrified. He feels the urge to flee and save himself, but he forces his fear down and reminds himself again and again that to flee would be wrong. His responsibility is to stay and obey Peter's commands. With strong effort of will, he forces himself slowly to the town's center where Peter is giving orders. Despite his body's protestations, he knows that he must stay and fight. It is the right thing to do and he will do what is right.

Cadfael, Caleb's brother, hears of the raid and feels no fear. He simply recognizes the threat and, knowing what his duty requires, moves to the center of the town to await his orders. He feels neither hope upon hearing the plan for defense nor daring when he must

fight. He coolly and calmly does what he must. It is the right thing to do and he will do what is right.

Nathan hears of the Vikings approach and feels fear. But his fear does not debilitate him. He has affection for his town, but he sees this attack as his great opportunity to prove himself in the eyes of Peter and win honor in the eyes of his fellow townsmen. He quickly makes his way to the center of the town, buoyed by his hope that he'll be able to help protect his town from destruction and so win honor. He listens carefully to his orders from Peter, then promptly and enthusiastically sets off to obey them. When the fighting begins, he does so with daring. There is glory to be won!

Nehemiah, Nathan's brother, hears of the Vikings and feels fear but his fear does not debilitate him. His training in the town's militia has formed in him the habit to rise above his fear and he walks quickly to the town center to hear his orders. He will obey his orders promptly and execute them with daring. He does all this automatically and without thinking. He acts as he does because it is what he has been trained to do.

William hears of the Vikings and is terrified. But his training in the town's militia kicks in and he forces his fear down. He must please his father. He will not be seen to be a coward. With strong effort of will, he forces himself slowly to the town's center.

Frederick, William's brother, hears of the Vikings but feels no fear. He simply recognizes the threat and decides to follow Peter's instructions. He moves to the center of the town to await his orders. He feels neither hope upon hearing the plan for defense nor daring when he must fight. He coolly and calmly acts. He might as well, this will please his father.

Adam hears of the Vikings and feels fear but his fear does not debilitate him. He acts quickly. He sees that the chances of his death are greater if he stays to fight than if he flees.

But he does not wish to be judged a coward and so he carefully and quickly thinks of a plausible excuse for why he failed to go to the town center. Alighting on a plausible alibi and buoyed by hope for his safety, he executes his plan and flees, even daringly evading the Vikings on his way out of town. He is secure in his knowledge that his plan is well-executed, that his alibi will hold, and that he will be able to return to the town without losing face in the eyes of his townspeople.

I frame my discussion of the vignettes by distinguishing between natural virtue, continence, and genuine or true virtue. Though I use Aristotle's terminology, my account of these distinctions is my own. I do not claim to be describing Aristotle's view. An upshot of my account is that it illuminates the application of these general distinctions to natural courage, continent courage, and genuine courage. My way of drawing the distinctions through the use of plausible characters illuminates the phenomena of courage by distinguishing the various excellences that compose courage.

Peter is the paradigm of courage. He possesses the *virtue of courage* and so is a *courageous agent*. The virtue of courage enables reliable performance of paradigmatic courageous actions, which are paradigmatically virtuous actions. Paradigmatic morally virtuous action involves doing the right thing for the right reason in the right manner.⁶ So, *paradigmatically courageous action* involves doing the courageous thing for the right reason in a courageous manner, where, I shall defend in chapter three, a courageous manner of action involves acting with proper emotions. I do not say "for the courageous reason" because I do not think there is a reason unique to courage. I also do not think that a person need self-reflectively judge that the action he is considering, choosing, or performing is courageous.

⁶ I make this Aristotelian assumption in this work and see how much understanding of courage is yielded by supposing it be a paradigmatic moral virtue in this sense.

But he must judge that the action is right or intrinsically good and choose it (at least in part) for that reason.

The other agents illustrate partial aspects of the complete excellence that Peter possesses. I summarize the distinctions I now draw between them in a table below. Caleb and Cadfael perform courageous actions but not in a courageous manner. They exhibit two forms of *continentence*. There are two forms of continent action in my view: will-power actions and emotionless actions. If a continent agent was disposed to perform continently courageous action, he would be a *continently courageous agent*. *Continently courageous action* is courageous action done for *the right reason* but not in a courageous manner. Caleb acts rightly but slowly in the face of contrary inclinations and emotions by means of a great exertion of will-power. Cadfael stoically acts rightly without contrary inclinations and emotions, but he also lacks inclinations and emotions that would assist his action (so he also acts without the promptness and energy that virtue requires).

Nathan and Nehemiah illustrate *naturally courageous actions* that are courageous actions done in a *courageous manner* but not for the right reason.⁷ Nathan acts *reflectively*, but he does so just as a means to attaining glory rather than at least in part for its intrinsic value. Nehemiah

⁷ My account of natural virtue is distinct from the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's view of natural virtue, which is that natural virtue is simply those aspects of one's temperament that disposes one to more easily acquire some virtues. For example, the irascible person finds it easier to act courageously. My view involves more wherein not only one's natural dispositions but also one's trained dispositions (or second nature) can be part of natural virtue. The naturally courageous is one whose emotions have been formed in some way the agent is not responsible for but which still enable the person to act in a courageous manner. The naturally courageous has these emotion dispositions but they are not put in the service of the intentional and knowing pursuit of a noble end as such. The naturally virtuous lacks the understanding and motivation necessary for genuine virtue. In contrast, the continent agent knowingly and intentionally pursues the noble end but lacks the trained appetites and emotions to enable him to do so in a virtuous manner. In contrast again, the fully virtuous knowingly and intentionally pursues the noble end and possesses the trained appetites and emotions to do so in a virtuous manner. My way of understanding natural virtue was in part influenced by Howard Curzer's interpretation of Aristotle in his *Aristotle and the Virtues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

acts *unreflectively* and chooses his action neither for its intrinsic value nor because it is the right thing to do. Because Nehemiah and Nathan are disposed to perform naturally courageous actions in a courageous manner they are *naturally courageous agents*. Although naturally courageous actions possess an aspect of emotional excellence (in virtue of being done in a courageous manner) that continent courageous actions lack, continent courageous actions have a moral excellence that naturally courageous actions lack (in virtue of being done for the right reason). For (I assume that) doing a virtuous action for the right reason without a virtuous manner is of greater moral value than doing a virtuous action in a virtuous manner without the right reason.

William and Frederick illustrate bare *courageous actions* that are done neither for the right reason nor in a courageous manner. William's action is not done in a courageous manner because he feels too much fear and, given that he is debilitated by it, must exert great will-power to correct for his fear and act. Frederick's action is not done in a courageous manner because he feels no fear when fear is appropriate. He lacks inclinations and emotions which, as I argue in chapter three, if present and proper would assist his action. Despite these defects, both of which involve the lack of proper emotions, both agents still perform courageous actions (or, perhaps more accurately, courageous-type actions). However, even if they are disposed to perform such actions, because they do not perform them in a courageous manner, they are not naturally courageous agents, and because they do not perform them for the right reason, they are not continently courageous agents. If they are disposed to perform bare courageous actions, but neither in a courageous manner nor with the right reason, then they are *barely courageous agents*.

Adam illustrates a mere *act of natural courage*. An act of natural courage is an action that is performed in a courageous manner but is neither a courageous action nor done for

the right reason. Adam's action is not a courageous action because the action is not intrinsically good.⁸ It is intrinsically wrong. Nehemiah, Nathan, and Adam exhibit various kinds of what I call *natural courage*. Nehemiah and Nathan exhibit this natural courage through performing a courageous action, while Adam exhibits it through performing a cowardly action.

I use the term *courageous activity* to include not only paradigmatic courageous action but also responses to a courage-apt situation that I think should be part of an analysis of the complete exercise of the virtue of courage. For example, the fear that Peter feels at learning the news of the imminent raid is part of the complete exercise of the virtue of courage even if, according to some views of action individuation, it is not part of his courageous action.⁹ Further, the manner in which he deliberates about what action to perform is also part of the complete exercise of the virtue of courage and so of courageous activity. The virtue of courage is a reliable disposition to perform courageous activity. A *courage-apt situation* is one that would elicit courageous activity from the courageous agent.¹⁰ The characters above illustrate my definitions and my way of organizing these distinctions so as to bring order to the complexities of courage.

I now summarize the terminology just introduced. A *courageous action* is an action with intrinsic value performed in response to a courage-apt situation but that need not be done for the right reason (i.e., chosen partly for its intrinsic value or for features that constitute

⁸ I mean to remain open to a variety of positions on the value of actions. Examples of intrinsically valuable actions are what Aristotle calls noble actions and what Kant calls actions in accord with one's duty. Adam's action lacks intrinsic value because it is morally wrong. Distinguishing a courageous manner of acting from a courageous action is how I would explain the controversial case of the "courageous" robber or villain.

⁹ I use the term activity to remain neutral on accounts of action individuation.

¹⁰ I discuss particulars of courage-apt situations in chapter one.

such value) or in a courageous manner.¹¹ Everyone but Adam performs a courageous action. Adam performs a cowardly action. The rest perform courageous actions, whether natural, continent, or paradigmatic, but in different manners and for different reasons. I shall discuss the nature of this action in greater detail in chapter four. William and Frederick illustrate two forms of bare courageous action. William performs his action by means of a great exertion of will-power. I will argue that this is a deficiency that excludes performing an action in a courageous manner. Frederick performs his action without will-power, but also without emotion. This lack of emotion is also a deficiency that excludes performing an action in a courageous manner, for he does not gain the assistance that excellent emotions would provide to the execution of his action.

A *courageous manner* of acting (or action *courageously done*) is an excellent way in which a difficult action in a courage-apt situation, whether truly courageous or not, is done. This excellent manner includes reliability, stability, promptness, ease, pleasure, and other relevant excellent qualities (e.g., proper emotions) that are part of the splendor of virtue.¹² Adam, Nehemiah, Nathan, and Peter act in a courageous manner. Note that Adam acts in a courageous manner even though he performs a cowardly action. Each of these characters possesses the emotional excellences that make performance of action in a courageous

¹¹ I disagree with those who, like Aristotle, wish to reserve specific forms of “virtuous action” for action in accord with virtue accomplished by means of virtue. What I mean by “courageous action” is more limited. I distinguish a courageous action from a courageous action done in a courageous manner or with the right reason. A courageous action is an action in accordance with courage, that is, it is the action courage would produce if it were present. But I think one can perform such an action prior to being disposed to perform it, or perform it in a particular manner, or with the right reason. It is this possibility that makes the acquisition of courage possible. For, since courage is a disposition, it cannot be formed without the performance of the acts proper to it prior to the possession of courage.

¹² I hold that Peter’s manner of acting is greater in excellence than Nehemiah’s, Nathan, or Adam’s because he will experience some pleasure that they will not. I will discuss this in later chapters and did not introduce it into my taxonomy here to prevent unnecessary complexity at this stage.

manner possible. I shall discuss the emotional excellences required for courageous manner in chapters two and three. In chapters four and five, I shall discuss the counterintuitive claim that pleasure is required for courageous manner despite such actions' difficulty and pain.

A mere *act of natural courage* is a non-courageous action done in a courageous manner. Only Adam illustrates this. Adam risks being caught by the Vikings as he flees the town, or ostracized by his town even if he succeeds. His flight is wrong. But the prompt and energetic manner in which he handles the riskiness of his action is in part what makes it an act of natural courage and its being done "in a courageous manner." A person who lacked this natural courage might, for example, be overcome by fear and paralyzed by the threats in the situation.

Naturally courageous actions are courageous actions that are done in a courageous manner but are not done for the right reason, whether this lack of right reason is a result of reflective choice or not.¹³ Nathan reflects and chooses to perform the courageous action merely for the sake of glory. Nehemiah acts automatically and without reflection, for no particular reason beyond his inclination to do so.

Acts of natural courage and naturally courageous actions exhibit various aspects of *natural courage*. Adam, Nehemiah, and Nathan are examples because of the promptness, energy, and emotional excellence they exhibit in the performance of their actions. However, Nehemiah and Nathan have greater overall excellence because their emotions assist the performance of courageous actions while Adam's assist the performance of a wrong, cowardly action.

Continently courageous actions are courageous actions performed for the right reason but not in a courageous manner. Caleb and Cadfael illustrate this in two distinct ways similar to

¹³ Nehemiah and Nathan perform naturally courageous actions.

the ways that Frederick and William illustrate bare courageous action. Caleb acts by means of a great exertion of will-power and Cadfael acts without emotion. Both lack proper emotions. Caleb has emotions that are too intense and Cadfael does not have emotions at all. Caleb is hindered by his emotions and Cadfael is not helped by them. For these reasons they do not perform their courageous actions in a courageous manner.

Paradigmatic courageous actions (or complete courageous actions) are courageous actions done at least in part for the right reason in a courageous manner. Peter's action is the paradigm of courageous action and illustrates this complete excellence. While Peter possesses the virtue of courage, which is necessary for reliably performing paradigmatic courageous actions, one need not possess the virtue of courage to perform paradigmatic courageous actions. *Courageous activity* includes paradigmatic courageous action and any other excellent responses to a courage-apt situation that are part of the complete exercise of the virtue of courage. The *virtue of courage* is the dispositional excellence to reliably engage in paradigmatic courageous activity. Peter illustrates these excellences by means of his proper fear at learning the news of the Viking attack, which promotes caution in him but does not paralyze him. In fact, he is energized by the fear to think quickly but accurately about how to reasonably handle the situation. His sound deliberation is buoyed by the emotion of hope and his motives are pure. When he executes his action, he does so with energy, promptness, and daring. In sum, his virtue of courage disposes him to perform the courageous action and to have the proper emotions that help him throughout his excellent responding, thinking, and acting in the face of the threat. Given this, the virtue of courage is a human excellence that enables reliable success of good action in significantly threatening situations by assisting the response to the situation, deliberation and choice of action in the situation, and

execution of that action.¹⁴ Peter's virtue of courage enables him to reliably perform courageous activity. Importantly, my view is that only Peter evinces the virtue of courage. The others evince only aspects or parts of courage.

The *courageous agent* is one who has the virtue of courage. The *barely courageous agent* is the one disposed to perform barely courageous actions, i.e., courageous actions without a courageous manner and without the right reason. The *naturally courageous agent* is one disposed to perform naturally courageous actions, i.e., courageous actions in a courageous manner but without the right reason. The *continently courageous agent* is one disposed to perform continently courageous actions, i.e., courageous actions with the right reason but without a courageous manner. A *courage-apt situation* is a situation that would initiate courageous activity in the courageous agent.

To tie this terminology back to the initial story in summary form, a table follows of the characters from the story and the aspects of courage they illustrate. An overarching goal of this work is to unpack the concepts and defend to various extents the distinctions these characters represent in service of a coherent and plausible account of courage. It is beyond the scope of this project to give equal attention to defending every aspect of the general view these distinctions represent. The claim of this work as a whole is that the virtue of courage enables reliable performance of paradigmatic courageous activity. Paradigmatic courageous activity is the complete exercise of courage in a courage-apt situation. It involves doing the courageous action for the right reason in a courageous manner. I focus especially on explaining the *manner of action* necessary for courage.

¹⁴ I partially agree with James Wallace, *Virtues and Vices* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1978) who says that "The function of courage, then, is to preserve practical reasoning and enable it to issue in action in the face of danger (81)." I say partially because I think this is only one function of courage.

Table 1: List of Characters

Character	Description	Type of Action	Reason for Action	Manner of Action
Adam	Act of natural courage	Non-courageous	Not right	Courageously done
Frederick	Bare courageous action	Courageous	Not right	Not courageously done (emotionless)
William	Bare courageous action	Courageous	Not right	Not courageously done (will-power)
Nehemiah	Naturally courageous action	Courageous	Not right (unreflective)	Courageously done
Nathan	Naturally courageous action	Courageous	Not right (reflective)	Courageously done
Cadfael	Continently courageous action	Courageous	Right	Not courageously done (emotionless)
Caleb	Continently courageous action	Courageous	Right	Not courageously done (will-power)
Peter	Paradigmatic courageous action	Courageous	Right	Courageously done

I will return to the vignettes to do so and use the characters to illustrate rival views of courage. So, these characters will continue to play a role in my project.

Assumptions

Any discussion of a specific virtue will require making many assumptions. I now note some assumptions of my inquiry. I make others throughout the text but provide seven here at the outset. First, I assume a virtue is a good disposition¹⁵ with the following

¹⁵ Dispositions are notoriously difficult to analyze, and to engage all of the literature attempting to do so would be another project. I'm sympathetic with what Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 8-9, says,

Thus, although it is natural for us to think of a virtue as a disposition, we should be careful not to confuse this with the scientific notion of disposition, which just is a static lasting

characteristics: stability and robustness.¹⁶ A virtue is a character trait that requires time and activity to develop as well as to alter. As Robert Roberts says, such “traits of character are not datable occurrences in a person’s history, but dispositions: temporally extended qualities that are *exhibited* occurrently in action, intention, desire, thought and emotion.”¹⁷ Once acquired, a virtue is *stable* over time. This stability is across time in two respects, between opportunities to exhibit a virtue and during an episode of a particular exhibition of a virtue.¹⁸ A character trait is *robust* if the “trait will exhibit trait-relevant behavior across a broad spectrum of trait-relevant situations.”¹⁹

tendency. A classic example is that glass has a disposition to break under certain circumstances. This is not the notion we need, since glass does not have a disposition by way of *doing* anything, nor can it learn to develop selectively as a result of encounters with different circumstances. A virtue is not a static condition like this; it is a disposition as a result of which Jane acts and thinks in a certain way, and which is at any time strengthened by her generous responses and weakened by failures to have them. If she is generous, her generous actions and feelings both come from a virtue and fortify it.

¹⁶ Each of these conditions has been challenged by what is called the Situationist critique - the critique that social scientific research regarding the influence of situational features on behavior has undermined the viability of positing robust dispositions in persons. Prominent philosophers who advocate this critique are Gill Harman, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1999), 315–31, and his “The Nonexistence of Character Traits,” in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 100 (2000), 223–26, and John Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” *Nous* 32, no. 4 (1998): 504–30, and his *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior* (Cambridge University Press, 2002). This critique has received a number of responses, including from Gopal Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” *Mind* 111, no. 441 (January 1, 2002): 47–68, Dana Nelkin, “Freedom, Responsibility, and the Challenge of Situationism,” in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 29 (2005), and Christian Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” *The Journal of Ethics* 7, no. 4 (2003): 365–92, and Christian Miller, *Moral Character: An Empirical Theory* (Oxford University Press, 2013). I do not have space to address this issue and will assume that the Situationist challenge can be met.

¹⁷ Roberts, Robert. “Narrative Ethics.” *Philosophy Compass* 7, no. 3 (March 1, 2012): 174–182.

¹⁸ For example, a person with the virtue of justice will not merely exhibit stability in exemplifying justice in one scenario but in many.

¹⁹ The names of these characteristics are commonplace but they are helpfully organized in Kevin Timpe’s encyclopedia article on “Moral Character” (Timpe, Kevin. “Moral Character.” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2008). <http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-ch/>. The quoted material is from that article.

Second, I will discuss physical courage – the courage needed for dealing with a threat of physical harm – rather than other forms of courage such as the courage needed for dealing with a threat to social status. I'm very interested in the relation between physical and social courage but will limit myself to the simpler physical courage here.²⁰ I do not limit physical courage to the battlefield. This focus raises the question of how different kinds of courage are identified. One possibility is that the kind of courage is identified by the good for the sake of which the threat is faced, i.e., the good for the sake of which one pursues the threatened good. Another is that the kind of courage is identified by the good that is threatened. Combining these first two possibilities, one could face a social threat for the sake of one's physical well-being, face a physical threat for the sake of one's social well-being, face a physical threat for the sake of one's physical well-being, or face a social threat for the sake of one's social well-being. A third possible way to identify kinds of courage is by the source of the threat. For example, one may exercise a kind of courage when dealing with bears, another when dealing with snakes, and a third when dealing with aggressive salespersons.²¹ I will focus on facing physical threats (i.e., threats to one's physical well-being) for the sake of any genuine good, whether physical or social.²²

Third, a situation apt for courage is one of perceived danger, i.e., one that involves a threat to something one cares about. I will assume that in order for a person to act with courage she must perceive herself to be in a threatening situation. However, not every situation a person perceives as threatening is threatening enough to evince the virtue of

²⁰ I believe that most if not all of what I will say can apply or be adapted to apply to social courage.

²¹ I prefer to individuate courage on the basis of the good threatened, but I do not address individuation issues in detail in this work.

²² Additionally, I will only discuss courage as an acquired, natural virtue and not as an infused, supernatural virtue.

courage. For example, we encourage a very young child to overcome her fear when learning to walk. When the child does overcome her fear she grows in ways that are praiseworthy and that do contribute to her growth in courage, but the child does not evince the virtue of courage. We might say that she is a courageous child – and so relativize our courage ascription to her stage in life. But I will reserve ascribing the virtue of courage without such qualification for situations that both the agent and mature adult humans in general believe are threatening. Doing so will enable us to focus on the general human virtue of courage rather than the valuable quality that resembles it indexed to a stage of life, activity, or occupation (e.g., toddler courage, sailing courage, or lawyerly courage).

Fourth, situations of courage are situations that one perceives to be significantly threatening. I say “significantly” because there are situations that are threatening that do not require courage. For example, I may perceive that running down to the lake to save my child’s life will expose me to the threat of mosquito bites. This sort of threat is not significant enough to require courage.²³ One reason to suppose this is because the threat is not sufficiently significant for appropriate fear. We are inclined to judge someone afraid of mosquito bites as a bit too concerned about physical comfort. I am not claiming one should not be averse to mosquitos. But fear seems inappropriate and so courage unnecessary. To motivate this claim, consider that Aristotle thinks that action on the battlefield is the paradigm situation for courage. I take it this is because courage-apt situations involve the potential loss of some of the greatest goods including one’s life, family, and *polis*. To respond to and act well in a situation that threatens the loss of these things is a human excellence. The threat to one’s bodily comfort posed by the mosquito is meager by comparison.

²³ I will address courage in the face of a phobia in the following chapter.

I do not believe that courage requires that the situation actually be threatening. A courageous person could be subject to a large scale hoax in which she evinces courage but does so without actually being in danger. But the person must perceive the situation as significantly threatening. This has the consequence that a person does not evince courage who acts well in a situation generally thought by mature adults to be threatening but which the person does not believe to be threatening. If the person has truly acted well, then the person must have some resource that makes the situation significantly less threatening to her. For example, a trained fighter who is about to fight an untrained one may not believe himself in a threatening situation (and it is in fact not threatening for him) even though mature adults generally believe fights to be threatening. In such a situation, the trained and courageous fighter need not employ his courage to act well. However, his prior employment of courage may be necessary for his ability to now act without it.

Fifth, I assume that courage is a moral structural virtue. I shall discuss some reasons for this throughout the work. I will briefly explain how I use the terms moral and structural virtue. Some hold that a structural virtue is such that it may serve any end whatsoever. For example, Robert Adams says,

“Courage is a structural rather than a motivational virtue. That is, it is not principally a matter of what one is for, but of how one organizes one’s life around whatever ends one is for. I take courage to be a matter of one’s ability and willingness to face fears and risks in governing one’s response to them in accordance with what one sees as demanded by aims that are in fact among one’s most important.”²⁴

I think the way Adams’s distinguishes between motivational and structural virtues is not as helpful as distinguishing between moral and non-moral virtues and holding that motivational and structural virtues can be potential species of either. Moral virtues are such

²⁴ Robert Adams, *A Theory of Virtue*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 175. Importance, for Adams, is measured by subjective value or commitment.

that they must be rightly used for good actions with good motivations in order to operate as virtues. An example is justice. Non-moral virtues may be used for bad ends and with bad motives. An example is Aristotle's intellectual virtue of *episteme*. Motivational virtues supply their own motivation. For example, being compassionate motivates a person to perform acts of compassion. Structural virtues do not provide their own motivation. For example, being perseverant does not motivate a person to perform acts of perseverance but enables a person to persevere in the actions she chooses. However, in order for a structural virtue to function as a moral virtue it must be rightly used and serve good motivation. Hence, I distinguish a *non-moral structural virtue*, which is one that need not be rightly used or motivated, from a *moral structural virtue*, which is one that must. I assume that courage is a moral structural virtue such that courage serves good actions done for the right reason in situations apt for courage.

The disagreement between those who hold that courage is a moral virtue and those who think it is not comes down to a fundamental disagreement about the nature of virtue. On the one hand, some hold that courage must serve the excellence of the agent as a whole. Its possession is part of what makes a human good *qua* human and, to function as a virtue, it must serve rightly motivated, good action. On the other, some hold that the virtue of courage is more like a skill and its full possession does not depend on its contributing to the goodness of the human *qua* human. This is not a disagreement I intend to settle. Those like me who think courage is a moral virtue can grant that those who think courage is a non-moral virtue akin to a skill have identified a legitimately valuable human trait while denying that this trait should be called the virtue of courage. I require a higher standard for the trait to count as the virtue of courage. I am interested in courage as a moral virtue because it is a

more excellent trait than so-called non-moral courage. Further, I am interested in the paradigm of (moral) courage, which is courage in its fullest exercise.

To illustrate but not defend the assumption that the virtue of courage is a moral structural virtue, consider the difference between the art of blacksmithing and the skill of ably swinging a hammer. A blacksmith's art will involve more knowledge and skill than merely the ability to swing the hammer well. Furthermore, even the skill of swinging the hammer well will require nuanced development to contribute to the art of blacksmithing. Merely being able to hit an object with the hammer will not suffice. That skill must be specifically trained. I think a view on which the virtue of courage is a non-moral structural virtue that requires no moral direction to contribute to moral action is analogous to the mere ability to swing the hammer, while courage that is directed and trained to contribute to moral action is analogous to blacksmithing. Just as blacksmithing is more excellent and virtue-like than being able to merely swing a hammer, so moral structural virtue is more excellent than non-moral structural virtue.

I shall address an objection to the claim that only Peter evinces courage in order to explain my sixth assumption, which relates to the previous assumption. One might object to my claim that Peter is the only character to evince courage by claiming that Peter is not merely a courageous person but a fully virtuous one. The appeal he has as a paradigm of courage comes from his possession of justice and prudence in addition to courage. But considering a fully virtuous person does not help us identify what is distinctive to courage. It conflates courage with other virtues such as justice and prudence.

My response is that Peter need not be fully virtuous to evince courage. He is a paradigm of courage and not, necessarily, the paradigm of every virtue. To defend this claim and answer the question this objection raises, I will say in what sense I assume that there is a

unity to the virtues. The virtue of courage is a configuration of dispositions that includes what have been called the general cardinal virtues. But these general cardinal virtues are not specific virtues in the sense in which I am interested in the virtue of courage. They are general attributes that are needed for the excellent performance of any excellent action. To distinguish them from specific virtues I shall call them general cardinal excellences. But I do not think the courageous person must possess these excellences in every domain. Rather, the courageous person must possess them in the domain of courage-apt situations. My view is that the specific virtue of courage requires the general (although domain specific) excellences of good deliberation (general prudence), having the right reason for acting along with a proper assignment of values to goods (general justice), moderation in concern for basic bodily goods such as health and comfort (general temperance) and resoluteness (general courage).²⁵ Note that the general excellence called courage is not the virtue of courage. Resoluteness in general falls short of the virtue of courage. So also do the general excellences of prudence, justice, and temperance fall short of the specific virtues of prudence, justice, and temperance.

With this view of general excellences in mind, I do not require that the courageous person also have the other *special* virtues. For example, Peter may succumb to temptation when it comes to matters of chastity. He can be a courageous leader while also being an unfaithful spouse. That is, he can lack the specific virtue of chastity and still be a paradigmatically courageous person. So, I do not affirm that there is a unity to the virtues such that the possession of one specific virtue entails the rest. I only affirm that the specific virtue of courage requires the general cardinal excellences for its exercise and that these

²⁵ This is the view of Aquinas according to Ed Houser, *The Cardinal Virtues: Aquinas, Albert and Philip the Chancellor* (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2004).

general cardinal excellences obtain in the domain of courage. The general excellences are essential to courage when they operate in the evincing of courage for they are necessary for performing the courageous action in the right manner for the right reason. Hence, my sixth assumption is that the courageous person possesses these general cardinal excellences as essential to his courage and they contribute to his performing the courageous action (which requires general prudence to identify the action and means to it) for the right reason (which requires general justice) in a courageous manner (which requires general temperance). Given this assumption, a holistic account need not conflate courage with the specific virtues of justice and prudence and Peter can legitimately stand as the paradigm of courage.

Seventh, the courageous activity I have in mind involves confronting the threat not just avoiding it or merely enduring its presence.²⁶ The inclusion of this confrontation enables us to examine the full exercise of courage. Aristotle says that courage is “for when we can use our strength” and it is that sense of courage with which I am concerned here.²⁷ Courage, in its full exercise, is for confronting the threat, for *facing* the object of one’s fear rather than fleeing it or ignoring it. There are many ways a person could confront or face a threat without directly attacking it. For example, a person who has to cross through deadly enemy terrain in order to deliver needed medical supplies confronts the object of his fear despite never firing a bullet at the enemy.

²⁶ Paradigmatic courageous activity involves confronting the threat, whether to overcome it or thwart it, for such situations require courage’s complete exercise. In *Summa Theologiae* II-II.123.6, Aquinas distinguishes two acts of *fortitudo*: endurance and aggression. I focus on confrontational cases in order to examine all the excellences courage involves. Confronting the threat may sometimes be for the purpose of averting it by means of flight. One can make a daring escape. I think that sometimes courage assists averting a threat through prudent flight without any confrontation of the threat. I do not think that cases in which the threat is never faced are paradigmatic of courage because they do not require its complete exercise or the utilization of all the dispositions that constitute courage.

²⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II.6 1115b5.

In summary, the situation of courage I address involves facing a significant physical threat that would be judged so by humans in general as well as by the individual evincing courage, which is a stable and robust disposition, for the sake of a worthwhile good. I shall call such situations courage-apt situations. Aristotle's claim that courage is paradigmatically evinced on the battlefield in defense of one's *polis* is useful for illustrating my assumptions.²⁸ Although criticized for doing so,²⁹ one reason he may locate courage here is because the threat is life-threateningly significant and must be faced for the sake of one of the most significant goods, the safety of the *polis*. The significance of the threat both individually, in the potential loss of life and limb, and collectively, in the loss of friends, family, or city, will produce great fear in most humans. Further, the significance of the stakes in the situation makes it such that paralyzing fear is a real possibility. I am assuming that the person has judged it best to face the threat rather than flee it. The person is not simply reacting to the fear, whether to run or immediately strike out, but has judged that confronting is the best course of action and intelligently elected means to fulfilling that aim. If a person's passion for confronting difficulty overwhelmed this wisdom, he would be rash and so evince the lack of courage. Sometimes, of course, wisdom demands we flee dangerous situations. If he flees in an orderly and controlled way, then he may still evince the virtue of courage even if that virtue is not exercised to its fullest extent. However, my focus is on courage fully exercised, although, again, I do not limit courage to the battlefield or to males. Given the assumption that courage requires facing the threat, a basic, albeit incomplete, definition of courage that captures widespread beliefs about courage and is consistent with the rival accounts of

²⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, III.6 1115a.

²⁹ For example, he is criticized by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, "The Two Faces of Courage," *Philosophy* 61 (236) (1986: April 1): 151–171.

courage that I will engage is as follows. Courage is a virtue for achieving one's significant ends in a situation made difficult by the apparent presence of a significant threat by means of confronting rather than fleeing the threat.

Itinerary

Chapter two engages and criticizes rival accounts of courage that reduce the virtue of courage to good dispositions regarding some but not all of the excellences of courage identified above. For example, I discuss views on which paradigmatic courageous activity involves, on the one hand, overcoming one's emotions by means of will-power and, on the other, emotionlessness. Chapter three employs an account of emotion to argue that a courageous manner of acting requires the contributions of the emotions of fear, hope, and daring. Fear is necessary for properly responding to a significant threat, hope is necessary for properly pursuing a significant but obstacle-laden goal, and daring is necessary for properly confronting the significant threat as a means to attaining the significant goal. Each emotion principally assists at a stage of courageous activity. An advantage of my view is that it can account for how courageous activity requires both fear, an emotion of suspect value to some, and fearless daring, a common view of courage, and how the transition from fear to fearless daring is both good and accomplished without suppressing fear by means of will-power. Chapter four lays the groundwork for defending the counterintuitive claim that courageous activity requires pleasure. This groundwork consists in a general account of pleasure, an account of courageous action, and a defense of my way of distinguishing naturally virtuous and continent agents on the basis of the distinction I made above between a reason for action and a manner of action. I further defend the difference between naturally and continently virtuous agents on the basis of their experiencing different kinds of pleasure

in the choice of their actions. I apply these accounts to defend the surprising claim that courageous activity requires at least two kinds of pleasure: the pleasure of the naturally virtuous and the pleasure of the continent. Chapter five develops the claim of chapter four that courage requires two kinds of pleasure and evaluates other candidate pleasures that may be required for courageous activity. While I identify one additional kind of pleasure that I think is characteristic of, but not necessary to, paradigmatic courageous activity, I argue that none of the other candidates considered are necessary for such activity.

CHAPTER TWO

Rival Accounts of Courage

Courage involves the coordination of our appetitive powers in service of reason. More specifically, the emotions coordinate with a good will in service of reason through each phase of courageous activity, contributing to the excellence of the courageous manner of acting. For courage to be evinced, one must reason well, will the right thing in the right way (chapter four),¹ and experience the proper emotions at the right time (chapter three). I call this a holistic account of courage. Here I discuss some rival views that affirm just part of this account as sufficient for evincing courage. I argue that accounts that involve merely an excellence of the will do not adequately distinguish a state of continent courage from true courage. I also argue that accounts that involve merely an excellence of the emotions do not adequately distinguish a state of natural courage from true courage.

Introduction

In the last chapter I gave a basic definition of courage. Courage is a virtue for achieving one's significant ends in a situation made difficult by the apparent presence of a significant threat by means of confronting rather than fleeing the threat. Now I discuss various accounts of courage that fall under that definition. I think that misunderstandings of the nature of courage often arise from making sufficient for courage an excellence that is only a part of courage. While such excellences are components of courage, I argue that they do not, alone, constitute courage. Since the account I defend affirms the necessity of each of

¹ My account of the pleasure of courage (to be discussed in chapter four), which helps to distinguish the continent from the naturally virtuous, requires that the agent will the right thing.

these excellences in coordination, I call my account of courage a holistic account. I call it holistic rather than perfectionistic because I do not argue that the virtue of courage requires the maximal degree of any of these excellences.²

In chapter one, I distinguished between a courageous action, the right reason or motive for acting, and a courageous manner of acting. I claimed that the virtue of courage is a disposition to perform courageous activity, where courageous activity includes a courageous action performed in a courageous manner for the right reason (i.e., paradigmatic courageous action). The accounts I consider below are different explanations of what constitutes a courageous manner of action. According to these accounts, some characters in my introductory vignettes other than Peter could count as fully courageous (given the assumption that each character evinces a disposition to act as he does). But according to my view, Peter is the paradigm of courage and the only character that is truly and fully courageous. The other characters are at different stages on the way to courage. My purpose in this chapter is to organize these rival views using my taxonomy from the first chapter and highlight their shortcomings.

Accounts

Views of courage can be helpfully distinguished according to whether they hold courage to be an excellence of the reason, will, or emotions. James Wallace identifies two different accounts of courage, which he calls the Platonic account and the Kantian account.³

² Christine Swanton, *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* (Clarendon Press, 2003) uses the language of ‘good enough’ in her account of a virtue and that seems correct, for it allows for the possibility of growth in virtue once one has surpassed the threshold needed to possess virtue. Hence, my view of courage is that it both comes in degrees and is attained only after passing a threshold.

³ Wallace, James D. *Virtues and Vices*. Contemporary Philosophy. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1978. p.65.

He says that the Kantian account makes courage about self-mastery or about strength of will. According to Wallace,

[Kantian] courage is the ability to do what one's reason dictates in the face of fear. According to the Platonic account of courage and cowardice, however, the coward gives too much weight to dangers in his calculations, and therefore is deterred from a threatening course of action when he should not be.⁴

The Platonic account makes the virtue of courage about reason appropriately assigning value to goods, risks to those goods, and assessing potential action plans.⁵ Wallace says that on the Platonic view of courage there is no opposition between what fear inclines a person to do and the dictates of his reason for the emotions necessarily obey reason. On this view, then, cowardice is fundamentally a failure of reason that results in improper fear. We can introduce an independent Aristotelian⁶ account of courage on which courage consists in the excellence of the emotions themselves but that does not hold that they necessarily follow reason. We can also introduce a Stoic account on which courage consists in the elimination of the emotions because they cannot obey reason.⁷

In summary, on this way of dividing accounts of courage, the Kantian view is that courage requires the will's mastery over contrary inclinations and emotions so as to correct for their influence.⁸ The Stoic view holds that the emotions are competitors to reason that cannot obey reason and so courage consists in the elimination of these emotion dispositions. The Aristotelian view, like the Platonic view, requires excellent emotions in the exercise of

⁴ Wallace, *Virtues and Vices*, 65.

⁵ Wallace, *Virtues and Vices*, 65.

⁶ I think that Aristotle, and perhaps Plato, held a kind of holistic account.

⁷ I do not claim that these divisions accurately represent the views of Plato, Kant, Aristotle, or the Stoics.

⁸ When I say contrary emotions, I mean emotions that hinder one's responsiveness to the situation, one's deliberation, or one's execution of an action plan.

courage. But unlike the Platonic view, the Aristotelian view denies that right reason is sufficient to guarantee such excellent emotions and that courage is principally an intellectual excellence.

I shall show how each of these families of views captures something correct about the nature of courage. I refer to them as cognitional, volitional, and emotional accounts rather than referring to them as Platonic, Kantian, Stoic, or Aristotelian. These views can be further specified by identifying particular excellences of cognition, volition, or emotion. To do so, let us return to the vignettes from the first chapter.

In the vignettes, I distinguished a type of action, a reason or motive for action, and a manner of action. I classify different views of courage according to their different accounts of what courage requires concerning the type of action, reason or motive for action, and manner of action. Given these differences, the various views will judge that different characters evince courage. My view judges that only Peter evinces courage. But other views will judge that other characters do as well. The next page contains the table from chapter one for reference.

With regard to a type of action, the nature of the situation and whether the threat is faced in part determine whether or not a courageous action is performed (as I discussed in my assumptions in chapter one). On some accounts, whether the relevant action is intrinsically good will also in part determine whether or not a courageous action is performed.⁹ In Aristotle's language an intrinsically good action is a noble action. In Kant's language an intrinsically good action is an action in accord with duty (that is also done for

⁹ I do not defend an account of intrinsic valuable action although I discuss it in more detail in chapter four. The claim here is that courageous action is a species of morally virtuous action and morally virtuous action is a species of intrinsically good action.

the sake of duty).¹⁰ A view on which a person could evince courage while performing an intrinsically evil action would deny that courageous action must be intrinsically good. Such a view would hold courage to be what I call a non-moral structural virtue and might entail that Adam evinces courage.

Table 1: List of Characters

Character	Description	Type of Action	Reason for Action	Manner of Action
Adam	Act of natural courage	Non-courageous	Not right	Courageously done
Frederick	Bare courageous action	Courageous	Not right	Not courageously done (emotionless)
William	Bare courageous action	Courageous	Not right	Not courageously done (will-power)
Nehemiah	Naturally courageous action	Courageous	Not right (unreflective)	Courageously done
Nathan	Naturally courageous action	Courageous	Not right (reflective)	Courageously done
Cadfael	Continently courageous action	Courageous	Right	Not courageously done (emotionless)
Caleb	Continently courageous action	Courageous	Right	Not courageously done (will-power)
Peter	Paradigmatic courageous action	Courageous	Right	Courageously done

With regard to the reason for action, an account of courage may hold either that the right reason for action (or good motive) is necessary or not. In Aristotle's language, such an action is done for the sake of the noble. In Kant's language, such an action is done for the

¹⁰ I discuss noble actions done for the sake of the noble and actions in accord with duty done for the sake of duty in chapter four.

sake of duty. A view on which a person evinces courage when performing an action motivated purely by the fame and glory such action would bring him would deny that the right reason for action is necessary.¹¹ Such a view would entail that Nathan evinces courage and may or may not entail that Adam does as well. If an account of courage requires that the action be intrinsically good and done for the right reason then it is an account of courage as a moral virtue. As stated earlier, I am discussing courage as a moral virtue.

If courage is a moral virtue, then the principal factor distinguishing views of courage is the nature of the manner of action required for courage. Although the proponents of the views I examine take different stances on whether or not courage is a moral virtue, those differences are not relevant to identifying their respective accounts of the nature of a courageous manner of action.

I now specify a cognitional account, volitional account, and two emotional accounts according to the place of the emotions in each. The cognitional account posits that courageous manner of action results from the necessary submission of the emotions to reason. Hence, the emotions play a submissive role to reason in courageous manner. The volitional account posits that courageous manner of action results from a powerful will that corrects for the emotions, which, when present, would impede the manner of action if left unchecked (e.g., as in the cases of William or Caleb). Hence, the will corrects for the emotions in courageous manner. The first emotional account also supposes that courageous manner of action is impeded by the emotions but posits that the emotion's elimination produces a courageous manner of action (e.g., as in the cases of Frederick and Cadfael). Hence, this is an eliminative account of the emotions. The second emotional account posits that courageous manner of action results from the contribution of the emotions (e.g., as in

¹¹ I discuss this case and the case of mixed motives in chapter four.

the cases of Peter, Nehemiah, Nathan, and Adam). Hence, this is a contributive account of the emotions.

The submissive and contributive accounts alike hold that the emotions in a courage-apt situation contribute to the activity, but the first holds that they do so merely in virtue of the agent's knowledge while the second holds that the emotion's contribution to action requires more than knowledge. On the contributive account the emotions are independent of reason in such a way that they must be cultivated to contribute. The corrective and eliminative accounts alike hold that the emotions in a courage-apt situation hinder the activity, but the first holds that the emotions are to be overcome or mitigated while the second holds that they are to be eliminated.

A political analogy helps to locate each of these views. Suppose that a person's reason is the ruler of the city of his soul and the emotions are a segment of that city's population. The submissive view holds that reason should rule the emotions as a submissive extension of itself (like the way a human rules his arm). The corrective view holds that reason should rule the emotions with an iron fist; the emotions are independent and unruly and must be kept in line but are still valuable and not to be utterly crushed. The eliminative view holds that reason should rule without the emotions, which are independent rebels that must be crushed. The contributive view holds that reason should rule with the emotions, which are independent enough to make their own contribution. I shall discuss the corrective, eliminative, and contributive accounts in greatest length, but will briefly consider the cognitional-submissive account.

Cognitive-Submissive Account

On a cognitive account, courage is essentially an accurate perception and evaluation of a courage-apt situation and the factors required for taking rational action in it. Courage is evinced when a person gathers all the relevant information and makes proper value calculations and risk assessments. A coward assigns improper value to his own safety versus some other more valuable good to which his safety should be subordinate. A rash person assigns too little value to his own safety. A person may also make faulty inferences about the likelihood of his plan of action's success.

To illustrate the view, imagine a person who is in a threatening situation. One way out is to fight a threatening antagonist. Suppose that the person foolishly counts on luck to give him success. For example, suppose the person has never been in a fight before. He knows that his assailant is a trained fighter. But our foolish friend thinks that he's a lucky fellow and that surely his luck will get him through. What's gone wrong here is at least that he has failed to properly estimate his likelihood of success. This is a cognitive failure and counts against his courage on this view.

This view reduces courage to calculative excellence – where what is calculated is the value of the goods threatened, the risks of potential courses of action, and the chances of success of potential courses of action. One feature that gives the view plausibility as an account of the moral virtue of courage is that it supposes that if the values are calculated correctly, then proper fear (and perhaps other emotions) will result. Given this, the view involves more than cognitive excellence but emotional excellence as well. If the Platonic assumption that knowledge is sufficient for virtue is correct, and virtue involves emotional and other appetitive dispositions, then this view is very plausible. However, one need not

adopt the implausible Platonic assumption that knowledge is sufficient for virtue.¹² What is correct about this view can be captured by other accounts. This account is correct to identify reason as the proper head of the virtue of courage. Further, I agree, with Robert Adams, that a, “lack of courage can be manifested in distortions of one’s judgments of probability and value.”¹³ However, while courage does (I shall argue next chapter) require that there be no opposition (suitably understood) between fear and the dictates of reason, emotions do not immediately obey reason’s assignment of values. Emotions require concern-dispositions to motivate such responsiveness and these concerns are not a part of reason. The assumption that a proper emotional response will result from a proper judgment of value depends on a false view of the emotions. On a correct view of proper emotions (to be discussed in chapter three), cowardice is not merely a failure of reason nor courage merely a matter of having correct judgments.

What’s right about this cognitional account is that courage does require accurate perception of value and estimation of one’s chances of success. But it does so because the virtue of courage preserves the operation of practical reason from internal impediments and not because courage is reduced to practical reason. A purely epistemic and non-culpable mistake need not constitute a defect in courageous activity. Rather than thinking that courage is principally a cognitive excellence, the attractiveness of this view is better explained by endorsing the view that moral virtues must support and be directed by excellent practical reason, or prudence. The idea may be illustrated by analogy with a skill. Imagine a person that has exercised his arms, wrists, and legs. He now has very strong arms, wrists capable of

¹² It is implausible in part because it cannot adequately account for *akrasia* or weakness of will.

¹³ Robert Adams, *A Theory of Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 177.

very precise movement, and strong legs and good jumping ability. These are all good aspects of his health. But these are not sufficient for the agent to be good at shooting a basketball through a hoop, although they do assist it. Accomplishing this is not simply a function of his power but of his development of a skilled use of such power directed toward the end of shooting a basketball well. There is a kind of intelligent direction that must guide the use of the arms, wrists and legs to accomplish that task. Virtues are linked with reason in this way. A virtue that is not directed by reason is not a virtue at all. A defense of the claim that moral virtue requires the direction of excellent practical reason is beyond the scope of my project here.¹⁴ But assuming it, another aspect of what is correct about this cognitional view can be retained while the liability of its assumption about knowledge being sufficient for virtue can be left aside.

I have assumed for this work that such intelligent direction requires a good will, which involves the choice of an intrinsically good action for the right reason (or with good motivation). This assumption is in part motivated by my view that for a moral virtue to be complete it must contribute to the common good of the organism such that it must be put to good use directed by practical reason. I turn now to views of courage on which it is an excellence of the will.

¹⁴ Although I do not defend it here, I hold to something like Daniel Russell's 'direction' view on which moral virtue requires *phronesis*. For a virtue to function as a virtue it must be intelligently directed by the person *all things considered*. See Daniel, Russell, *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), 342ff. Daniel Russell provides four arguments for this claim. His first is that given that humans are essentially creatures with the potential to act for reasons on the basis of deliberation and choice, human excellence must be a kind of intelligent success in practical reasoning and action. If courage is a component of this human excellence and a realization of our nature as rational beings, then it must make us reliable in so acting well. But it will do so only if it is directed by *phronesis* and not if it is a mere tendency to act (what Russell calls the trajectory view).

Volitional-Corrective Accounts

The following accounts identify courage as an excellence of the will. I will discuss accounts on which courage is present if the will is powerful enough to control adverse inclinations and emotions in order to act in courage-apt situations. In the words of John Wayne, courage is to be scared to death but saddle up anyway.

Will power accounts emphasize the will's power and control over adverse inclinations or wayward emotions such as fear and overconfidence. I will focus on Robert Roberts's subtle account of courage as a virtue of will power, although I also depart from his view to discuss neighboring views, particularly the view of Philippa Foot.¹⁵ Roberts distinguishes motivational virtues from virtues of will power. The basic difference between these two is that the former require that the virtue supply good motivation and the latter do not – they only require that the virtue supply the power to accomplish whatever ends one pursues. Roberts argues that courage is a virtue of will power in this sense. I prefer the language of non-moral structural virtues to capture the idea of a virtue that enables an excellent performance of an action regardless of the end for which one acts and think of a virtue of will-power in Roberts's sense as a species of non-moral structural virtues.¹⁶ Roberts's will power virtue is a species because it specifies a means by which the structural excellence is achieved. But other means could be employed.

¹⁵ Robert C. Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues," *Philosophical Review* 93, no. 2 (1984). Philippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Others such as Robert Adams, in *A Theory of Virtue*, who says that courage is "the danger-related strength of rational self-government (177)" and David Carr, "Two Kinds of Virtue," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series*, 85 (January 1, 1984): 47–61, hold similar views.

¹⁶ A will power account of courage could also hold courage to be a moral structural virtue. A structural virtue could still require to be rightly used in order to operate as a virtue even if such motivation is not supplied by the virtue itself.

I focus on his account of how courage contributes to a courageous manner of action and leave aside the issue of whether or not courage is a non-moral virtue (in my sense). Roberts's view of the nature of courageous manner of action is compatible with courage being a moral structural virtue. Again, a structural virtue is contrasted with a motivational virtue.¹⁷ Virtues of will power are a species of structural virtues that supply the will power to act in the face of contrary inclinations and emotions, which hinder one's responsiveness to the situation, one's deliberation, or one's execution of an action plan. On Roberts's will power view virtues such as

courage and self-control are (in large and basic part) the capacities to manage our inclinations, when they are wayward, to flee dangers and seek pleasures....the virtues of will power are *corrective* in the significant sense that, in our present psychological condition but not in every imaginable one, they are needed to keep us on the path of virtue and our higher self-interest.¹⁸

It is to Philippa Foot's corrective account that Roberts refers in this quotation when he says that virtues of will power are "corrective in the significant sense."¹⁹ She holds that virtues are corrective in that they are needed because of defects. For example, courage is needed because fear acts as a temptation to do the wrong thing. In contrast, justice and charity are needed for a defect in motivation (the end a person acts for is not actually good). Roberts identifies virtues such as courage as corrective in a significant sense not because they correct for a lack of good motivation like justice but because they correct for inclinations contrary to the ends that courage serves. Virtues of will power are significantly corrective virtues in this sense. So, courage, on this account, ensures that whatever motivation one

¹⁷ Motivational virtues supply virtuous motivation while structural virtues supply the power to act on the end one pursues.

¹⁸ Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues," 233.

¹⁹ See Philippa Foot's, *Virtues and Vices*.

chooses to act on wins out over fear (or overconfidence or other contrary inclinations or emotions).

Powerful strength of will: conquering contrary emotions and inclinations. On the account of courage as a virtue of will power the power can take two forms: strength and skill. I will address what is meant by these two terms, but first I will discuss will power in general. The notion of will power that Roberts has in mind is helpfully described by the psychologist Roy Baumeister. For Baumeister, will power is a general, glucose-dependent resource of energy that is depletable and rechargeable by which a person may exercise power over impeding thoughts, emotions, impulses, or during performances.²⁰ One's will power is trans-situational, meaning depletion as a result of one activity will result in poorer performance in a consequent activity that requires will power, whether the same or a different activity. Baumeister calls this ego depletion. One's will power capacity is increasable through practice of concentrated discipline, manageable goal setting, and preconditioning. In virtues of will power, the object of will power is contrary thoughts, emotions, impulses, or other internal difficulties.

Roberts discusses both strength of will power and skill in its use in his discussion of virtues of will power. *Strength* of will power is the amount of will power a person possesses. A person expends a particular amount of her will power when she resists wayward thoughts, inclinations, or emotions. If she has more will power, she will be able to resist more. Will power *skill* is the ability to control the wayward thoughts, inclinations, or emotions by

²⁰ See Roy F. Baumeister and John Tierney, *Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength* (Penguin Group (USA) Incorporated, 2011) for a discussion of the character of will power.

mitigating or eliminating them through self-management strategies.²¹ We might say that will power involves managing wayward thoughts, inclinations, or emotions either by overpowering them with strength or by mitigating or eliminating them with skill.

Baumeister argues that will power is a trans-situational and limited resource. Given these assumptions, I will show that courage cannot consist in strength of will power. Roberts does not claim that it does, but seeing why this is so will help us identify why the best hope for the view that courage is a virtue of will power requires that it be skilled use of will power.

I now argue that courage cannot be mere strength of will power to overpower one's fear and act in a threatening situation. Suppose that courage does consist merely in such strength. Imagine a situation fit for courage in which one's adverse emotions (e.g., fear) requires ten units of will power strength to overcome. If one has that much will power in reserve, one will be able to act courageously, but if not, then one will not. If one overcomes, then it was entirely dependent on whether the amount of will power available at the time of action was sufficient for success. But this is too general, too fragile, and too dependent on the situation to explain a specific, stable, and robust trait such as courage. Why? First, if courage is merely a function of resource availability at the time of perceived threatening situations, it is difficult to see how courage is a trait of character. Yet courage is a trait of character. The availability of will power is not a character trait itself but more of a general resource like one's muscular strength. Further, will power availability is largely determined by when one last ate and one's energy expenditure since then. A person may act courageously one day but the next day, after skipping a meal, may fail to perform courageously in the same activity. This does not showcase the stability (across time) and robustness (across situations)

²¹ Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues," does not articulate his view in quite this way. But here I am making use of his distinction between kinds of control on page 245 in order to distinguish will power views into one of strength and one of skill.

of a virtue. I do not deny that acting courageously requires energy. All action requires energy. But courage is not simply, or primarily, a matter of the internal resources available at the moment courageous action is called for.

Perhaps courage is not merely the capacity to use will power in the situation fit for courage, but includes the possession of a significant amount of will power? On this account, whether or not an agent has courage, and perhaps to a greater or lesser degree, depends upon the *strength or amount* of will power she possesses. This will not do either. The problem with this is that it does not preserve the view that the virtue of courage is a particular trait or capacity that is developed through practice of a characteristic activity. If will power is a trans-situational resource that can be strengthened through a variety of loosely related means, as it is thought to be, then it is possible that a person have great courage without ever practicing courageous actions. If courage is the possession of a significant amount of will power and the capacity to use it in courage-apt situations, a person could develop large amounts of will power through actions entirely unrelated to courage and then use that will power to act courageously. One need never regularly conquer one's fears as long as one has developed enough will power through other means. This does not fit the human experience that despite great will power in some areas, a person may be unable to muster the strength of will to perform an action with which he has little experience. One response to this may be that situations fit for courage require such a great amount of will power that sufficient strength of will is never had without repeated practice of conquering one's fears. But this response is ad hoc. It assumes that conquering one's fears requires greater will power than other activities and that conquering one's fear will increase one's will power to a greater degree than other activities. But why think this is true? Further, even if it is, it is plausible that a person with will power courage may still not be able to muster the will power to resist a third piece of

cake. But if overcoming one's fear requires the most amount of will power and is the greatest way to increase one's will power, one should expect that this simple case of temperance would not be a problem.

I suggest that what these criticisms reveal is that thinking of courage as a virtue of will power merely in terms of its strength or amount is insufficient to account for a virtue like courage. We may praise great will power, but possessing such will power is not itself a specific virtue. However, thinking of courage as strength of will power does highlight that situations that call for courage are difficult ones fraught with obstacles. If courage is not a matter of the amount of will power possessed, what about its efficient use?

Powerful skill of will: controlling contrary emotions and inclinations. Perhaps courage depends on the *efficient* use of will power, where efficiency is determined by something like skilled utilization in situations fit for courage. Roberts argues that courage is an importantly skill-like kind of virtue, a self-management skill. The relevant self-management skills allow a person to engage in an activity with more efficient use of will power. So, we can characterize Roberts's account of courage as the self-management skill that allows a person to engage in situations fit for courage with very efficient use of will power. This is a more promising thesis because the virtue of courage can be tied to a specific trait (i.e., the disposition to skillfully use will power in courage-apt situations) rather than to mere application of a great quantity of will power in courage-apt situations.

How does this skill work? It must enable the person to act courageously using less will power than a non-courageous person. Using less will power partly depends upon the power of the opposing forces against which the will power is used. These are the contrary inclinations in the person. So, this skill allows the person to mitigate or eliminate contrary

inclinations or emotions: the greater the skill the greater the contrary inclination that can be mitigated or eliminated. Roberts discusses the use of self-talk and opposition behavior in order to mitigate or eliminate these contrary inclinations and emotions. There could be a host of such self-management strategies that employ less will power than a direct attempt to dominate and conquer the contrary inclinations. If the strategies are successful, the contrary inclinations will be ignored, circumvented, diminished, or eliminated and the person will be able to accomplish her end without great use of will power. The courageous person has the skill and knowledge of how and when to put strategies such as these to use in situations that call for courage.

I think this account of courage as a skilled use of will power is superior to the account of courage as mere strength of will power. It seems correct that a virtue would enable less expenditure of will power than a non-virtuous capacity for the same function. This excellence will make possible greater reliability, stability, and robustness of the virtue.

The skill account partly fits with the common insight that virtue imparts ease in acting well. The skilled will power account of courage implies that a person who must use large amounts of will power to act courageously is not, or at least is less, courageous than a person who requires little will power to perform the same action. The excellence of a virtue partly tracks the ease with which the virtue enables its characteristic function and this ease is measured, at least under a will power account of courage, by the amount of will power needed to act well.

Continence argument against volitional accounts. In criticism of both will power accounts, I claim that a person will not be as reliable over time if the source of his reliability derives largely or entirely from will power, even skilled use of it. This is because will power, as we've discussed it, is used to overcome difficulties within the self. An agent would be in a more excellent state if he did not require will power (or very little) in this sense because the agent would not have to conquer contrary inclinations or emotions. The energy that would go to supply will power could be entirely used against external obstacles. Insofar as virtue is perfective of the whole person, it is plausible that virtue does not consist merely in the control of contrary inclinations and emotions but either in their elimination or their cultivation. So eliminated or cultivated, these inclinations and emotions will no longer be internal impediments. Hence, there are two possible solutions to dealing with these internal impediments. We will look below at both solutions. If either state is achieved, then the person may focus entirely on overcoming external obstacles, as the best athletes do not let their fear of failure dampen their spirits but utilize all their energy to jump higher, throw farther, and run faster. However, just as the athlete who can harness his emotions to contribute to his performance can achieve greater success than one who is emotionless, so I shall argue that a state in which courage involves the contribution of the emotions is superior to one in which it involves their elimination. If such a state is possible, it is a more likely candidate for courage because it is more excellent.

In my view, while developing the virtue of courage initially involves doing courageous actions as a function of will power, this is only a stage along the way to the point where one no longer has contrary emotions to conquer, mitigate, or eliminate. Again, when I say contrary emotions, I mean emotions that hinder one's responsiveness to the situation, one's deliberation, or one's execution of an action plan. Although proper fear will pull one

back and so in a fashion offer resistance, such “pull” will contribute to one’s caution rather than hinder one in acting. In the next chapter, I discuss the nature of proper fear and argue that the resistance it offers does not constitute an internal impediment. I think my account of courage is the culmination of (among other things) an agent skillfully applying his will power to the point where he requires little internal correction and is able to focus entirely on the situation and task at hand.

Another way to state this criticism is that the will power view identifies courage with self-control in a courage-apt situation. But insofar as virtue is more than continence, courage is more than self-control. In comparison with the continent, one with virtue acts with greater ease or less difficulty, and some satisfaction or pleasure or at least less pain, as the capacity for virtuous action is second nature to him. The continent acts with strain, and with a mixture of satisfaction and sorrow, as the capacity for courageous manner of action is still developing. If the will power accounts were correct, then Caleb would more courageous than Peter. Given that a distinction between continence and virtue applies in the case of courage, will power accounts do not adequately distinguish continence from the virtue of courage. I think the continence / virtue distinction does apply in the case of courage, although I wait until the next two chapters to give reasons for this claim.

Foot on continence and true virtue. Philippa Foot holds to a volitional account of courage on which it sometimes consists in correcting for errant emotions and sometimes consists in the lack of errant emotions. She offers a sketch of the distinction between continence and true virtue that centers on the agent’s responsibility for her character. If correct, her view may provide the proponents of the will power view a way to deflect the objection that their view amounts to affirming that courage is a state of continence. Foot says of courage,

What, for instance, should we say about the emotion of fear as an obstacle to action? Is a man more courageous if he fears much and nevertheless acts, or if he is relatively fearless? Several things must be said about this. In the first place it seems that the emotion of fear is not a necessary condition for the display of courage; in face of a great evil such as death or injury a man may show courage even if he does not tremble. On the other hand even irrational fears may give an occasion for courage: if someone suffers from claustrophobia or a dread of heights he may require courage to do that which would not be a courageous action for others. But not all fears belong from this point of view to the circumstances rather than to a man's character. For while we do not think of claustrophobia or a dread of heights as features of character, a general timorousness may be. Thus, although pathological fears are not the result of a man's choices and values [sic] some fears may be. The fears that count against a man's courage are those that we think he could overcome, and among them, in a special class, those that reflect the fact that he values safety too much.²²

As I understand her, Foot's idea is that the continence/true virtue distinction applies when the difficulty that causes internal struggle in action is a result of the agent's character, which is something for which he is responsible. But if the difficulty that causes internal struggle is not a result of the agent's character, then such struggle is not continence but can be a sign of true virtue. The account is clearly volitional because whether or not courage is present depends on the will and that for which one is responsible (i.e., one's character) and not on the emotions except insofar as they are a result of one's will. So, in cases where the internal difficulty is caused by a feature of one's character for which one is responsible, then a state of continence is revealed. In cases where the internal difficulty is caused by some feature of the person that is not part of his character (e.g., a pathology like a phobia), then the harder it is to act the more virtue he shows in so acting.²³ The benefit of Foot's account

²² Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 12.

²³ Rosalind Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 95-96, speaks of the continence/true virtue distinction applying in some cases but not in others. But I think this is a misreading of Foot. I prefer the interpretation that the distinction applies generally but its application looks different in different cases. Hursthouse says,

So, how are we to resolve the conflict between the thoughts 'the harder it is for a man to act virtuously, the more virtue he shows if he acts well' and 'the harder it is, the less virtue he shows'? Foot's answer is that each may be true with respect to different cases, depending on what it is that 'makes it hard' to act well. Some things that 'make it hard' for

is that it can account for the moral admiration that we have for a person who overcomes intense fears for the sake of the good. In response to the objection that a will power view cannot account for the continence/virtue distinction, proponents of the will power view could say that in cases where will power is needed to correct for errant emotions or inclinations, if those emotions or inclinations are not a part of the agent's character, then correcting for them is virtuous rather than continent.

Reply to Foot. What is plausible about Foot's account of the distinction is that her view correctly sorts the cases she considers according to our admiration of the individuals. We admire more the person who overcomes a phobia that is not part of his character than a person who overcomes his own timorousness of character. We sometimes even admire more the person who overcomes a phobia than the person who has no phobia or timorousness to overcome at all. But, I do not think that the basis for this difference in admiration is sufficient to distinguish continence from true virtue. The phobic is more admirable not because he is virtuous and the timorous is continent, but because the phobic lacks a character defect that the timorous person possesses.²⁴ The lack of that defect is not sufficient for true virtue.²⁵

someone to act well 'show that virtue (in him) is incomplete', less than full virtue, for what 'makes it hard' pertains to his character. These are the cases of which it is true that 'the harder it is for him, the less virtue he shows', and the ones that the continent/fully virtuous distinction—which is a distinction between different characters—applies to. But other things that 'make it hard' for someone to act well do not pertain to their character; rather, they are circumstances in which the virtuous character is 'severely tested' and comes through. These are the cases of which it is true that 'the harder it is for him, the more virtue he shows', and here the continent/fully virtuous distinction does not apply (95–96).

²⁴ I assume that the phobic is not morally responsible for the fear he overcomes.

²⁵ I thank Lindsay Cleveland for conversation on this point.

I want to defend the superiority of a different way of understanding the continence / true virtue distinction that can still account for our greater admiration of the agent who overcomes his phobia. Here I will set out the basic idea. In the next two chapters I will develop the view. The primary difference between continence and true virtue is that the emotions and inclinations of the continent do not help him to do what he judges right (whether by hindering him or just not helping him) while the emotions and inclinations of the truly virtuous do help him do what he judges right.

I now explain how this general idea is consistent with our admiration in the case of the phobic. I hold that an agent can exhibit volitional excellence in action despite lacking emotional excellence, or emotional excellence despite lacking volitional excellence, or exhibit both volitional and emotional excellence. Volitional excellence is exhibited by a person whose character is such that he is disposed to do the right thing for the right reason. He can exhibit this excellence whether or not he possesses emotional excellence, i.e., proper emotion dispositions. Suppose he lacks emotional excellence and suffers from a phobia for which he is not responsible. How does he compare to a person with well-formed emotions not subject to phobias? If the latter lacks volitional excellence, the phobic will be more admirable. This is because volitional excellence is more admirable than *mere* emotional excellence.²⁶

Volitional excellence is superior to emotional excellence when that emotional excellence is not a part of a good character. However, an agent that possesses both volitional and emotional excellence is generally superior in overall excellence to one that possesses only volitional excellence. I contend that the continence / true virtue distinction captures this fact. A state of true virtue is one of both volitional and emotional excellence. This is not to

²⁶ I think this value claim is plausible, but I shall not defend it. I think Foot would grant it.

say that some cases of overcoming pathological fear should not elicit great admiration. Struggling against a debilitating emotional defect can manifest the goodness of a person's will in a unique way that warrants great admiration. But this admirability should not be confused with the admirability that comes from witnessing true virtue. Strenuous exertion of will power to overcome errant emotions *reveals* commitment to one's end in a way that is not revealed by the relative ease of action that the truly virtuous exhibits. But it is not the difficulty of the action itself that explains the moral worth of the action but the intensity with which the person strives for the good that is his end that the difficulty requires and reveals. The evidently good will such struggle reveals explains our admiration. But the virtuous could just as intensely will the good, although the intensity of her willing would not be as evident. Foot mistakenly holds that the basis for admiration in the will power case is sufficient for virtue. She's mistaken because such internal struggle will diminish the stability, robustness, promptness, and ease with which a person performs a courageous action. The agent with emotional excellence will act in a manner that is more stable, robust, prompt, and easy, given the assumption that such emotions may assist a courageous manner of action. The difference in admirability that Foot rightly identifies is not sufficient for the distinction; there can be different states of continence that correspond with different degrees of growth toward true virtue. A good will alone cannot guarantee an excellent manner of performance. Like an athlete that must train his body, the inclinations and emotions of the agent must be trained for him to perform courageous actions with the promptness, ease, and pleasure that virtue provides. If Foot's account of the distinction fails, then the will power view of courage is still subject to the objection that it describes a state of continence rather than true courage.

In summary, virtues of will power are general capacities to manage wayward or resist adverse inclinations and emotions in pursuit of one's aims in virtue of inner power of will.

Courage is a capacity to manage fear, timidity, overconfidence, or other contrary inclinations or emotions in pursuit of one's aims by means of strength or skill of will. As in what Wallace calls Kantian virtue, self-control is central. I have rejected that this control is merely a matter of strength and that the management is merely a matter of brute force. I have suggested that the skilled use of will power in this management is the more plausible version of this account. The will power accounts of courage capture some important features of courage. First, courage-apt situations are difficult. Second, all else being equal, for two actions of the same type, the greater the internal difficulty (where internal difficulty is the difficulty to overcome internal conflict) the less the virtue of the act (if it is virtuous). This point may be lost because to successfully perform an internally difficult act is usually admirable. But such admirability is best explained by the good will that the struggle reveals rather than that such difficulty indicates true virtue. Corrective accounts rightly hold that a person does not employ courage in a situation that is not difficult for them but wrong that such courage consists in the control of internal difficulties rather than the dealing with external ones. But these corrective accounts do not adequately distinguish continence from true courage. The lesson is that just as courage as a skilled use of will power makes courageous action easier to perform, by mitigating internal conflict between contrary inclinations or emotions and the will, and so is superior to courage as strength of will, so courage that does not require will power at all because of emotional excellence would make courageous action easier to perform and so is superior to courage as skilled use of will power. If such a state is psychologically possible, then it is the better candidate for virtue and skilled use of will power is best thought of as a state of continence. The continent / true virtue distinction captures the difference between an agent disposed to perform morally good action without the proper manner that emotional excellence allows and morally good action with such

proper manner. True virtue indicates a state of both moral and emotional excellence that is a part of one's character. I now turn to courage as emotional excellence.

Emotional Accounts

Unlike volitional accounts, emotional accounts identify the virtue of courage with the lack of improper emotion dispositions, or the presence of proper emotions disposition, or both. Again, I will discuss what makes an emotion proper next chapter. First, I will discuss accounts that identify courage with fearlessness. Second, I will discuss accounts that identify courage with the positive contribution of emotions.

Eliminative account: emotionless. On eliminative accounts, courage is fearlessness, or the lack of the disposition to feel fear (or other contrary relevant emotions) at all in courage-apt situations. Nancy Sherman quotes Cicero and Seneca who endorse this view of courage as utter grace under pressure.²⁷ Cicero says, “We want the happy man to be safe, impregnable, fenced, and fortified, so that he is not just largely unafraid but completely.”²⁸ Seneca says, “And what is bravery? It is the impregnable fortress for our mortal weakness; when a man has surrounded himself therewith, he can hold out free from anxiety during life's siege; for he is using his own strength and his own weapons.”²⁹ If this view were correct, then Cadfael would be courageous rather than Peter.

Is courage the complete lack of fear in courage-apt situations? Although I think there is an insight to this claim, it is false as it stands. The complete lack of fear is not courage – a

²⁷ The following quotes are from Nancy Sherman, *Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 101.

²⁸ *Tusculan Disputations* 5.40—41, as quoted in Long and Sedley 1987a, 63L.

²⁹ *Epistles* 113.27.

rash or brutish man may lack fear even in terrible circumstances. Fools and brutes are not courageous. Foot suggests this modification to the view when she says that, “Since men in general find it hard to face great dangers or evils, and even small ones, we may count as courageous those few who without *blindness* or *indifference* are nevertheless fearless even in terrible circumstances.”³⁰ However, a surgery to remove the part of the brain responsible for emotions might result in the lack of fear. But this would not be courage. But Foot, Seneca, and Cicero are correct to hold that courage requires a lack of a certain kind of fear. We might call it cowardly fear. Cowardly fear strongly induces the person to flee the danger despite the fact that the person believes she ought to stand fast. The coward’s fear is often based on a disordered concern for safety. The courageous lacks this disordered fear because he is properly concerned for his safety.³¹ If the courageous person did not lack it, she would at best be continent rather than virtuous if she still managed to stand in the face the danger.

One phenomenon I believe might motivate Foot’s claim about fearless is that the courageous person may even lack this caution-inducing fear in a courage-apt situation. But there are alternative explanations of this phenomenon. If the courageous person does lack this fear, she may be so skilled at acting well in the specific kind of threatening situations that she rightly judges it not to pose a threat to her. This is a sign of a skill and it is easy to see how this state would be made possible by previous courageous actions. Imagine the well-trained soldier who knows he has far superior weapons and skill to his enemy. Even though warfare is a paradigmatic situation for courage, the well-trained warrior facing the vastly inferior foe does not evince courage if he is properly unafraid. He does not need courage. So, in some courage-apt situations, a skilled person may not need to evince courage to

³⁰ Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 10. Emphasis mine.

³¹ I shall discuss the character of proper fear in chapter three.

perform a courageous action. This is so even if it is only in virtue of previous courageous action that he has attained this admirable state. In sum, a particular skillset, unnecessary in itself for courage, may enable a courageous agent to perform a courageous action without the full exercise of her courage because the situation, while significantly threatening to humans in general, is not significantly threatening to her.

A criticism of the emotionless account is that it is still a species of continence. Emotionlessness is still continence because although there are no internal impediments to action, the state does not provide the aids that proper emotions bring. Without such aid, excellent courageous manner is not attainable and so neither is courageous activity. Hence, while a will power account also confuses courage with a state of continence, it is not the only account to do so. Any state in which the emotions fail to contribute, either by hindering or by not helping, will not achieve the excellence needed for a courageous manner of action, given the emotions can be formed to so contribute. So, a state of pure emotionlessness will also count as a state of continence.

The emotionless account is correct to hold that courage involves the absence of the dispositions to be motivated by fear characteristic of cowardice or rash overconfidence. But the lack of these dispositions to experience cowardly fear or rash overconfidence is not sufficient for courage. Adams is correct to say that, “The virtue of courage must be an excellence, not just the absence of a particular fault.”³² There is more to emotional excellence than the lack of defects. There are dispositions to courageous fear and other emotions besides. I detail the emotions of courage in the next chapter. Now I briefly consider a final emotional account.

³² Adams, *Theory of Virtue*, 178.

Contributive account. A contributive account of courage holds that to act in a courageous manner in a courage-apt situation requires responding well to that situation and this includes perceiving the situation well. In the courageous individual, perceiving well a situation with a significant threat involves proper emotions. Proper emotions contribute to courageous activity. So, acting in a courageous manner in courage-apt situations involves proper, contributive emotions.

One reason to prefer a contributive account to an emotionless account is expressed by Thomas Aquinas who says, “it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.”³³ In other words, courage, like other virtues, involves the training and elevation of lower powers like the emotions to accord with reason and the will and to contribute to courageous activity by assisting the ease and supplying the energy of courageous manner of performance. James Wallace says, “The function of courage, then, is to preserve practical reasoning and enable it to issue in action in the face of danger.”³⁴ I agree and think that the emotions that courage perfects perform this beneficial function and others. The emotions aid rational action rather than hinder it.³⁵ For instance,

³³ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II 59.5. Here is the entire quotation,

it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.

³⁴ James Wallace, *Virtues and Vices* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1978), 81.

³⁵ Howard J. Curzer, *Aristotle and the Virtues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) defends this as Aristotle’s view saying, “Fear does not incline courageous people to shirk courageous acts, but rather it pushes them to guard their safety by being careful about performing courageous acts. It makes a useful contribution. But fear in continent people pushes them toward performing cowardly

the fear of the courageous person induces caution but fades when it is time for decision and is replaced by the emotion of daring when it is time to execute action. I will defend the plausibility of these claims by giving a model for how this process works in the case of courageous activity, including the relation of fear to daring, in the next chapter.

Natural virtue argument against emotional accounts. The main potential problem for emotional accounts of courage is the possibility of having the emotion dispositions proper to courage without being disposed to perform a courageous action for the right reason. Foot is correct to say that courage involves one's character and one's will. She might claim that having well-formed emotions may be the result of good fortune and outstanding education but that the person does not thereby have the virtue of courage. We can imagine a person being trained to develop very excellent emotion dispositions from a young age such that the agent was not responsible for these emotion dispositions. But, the criticism goes, a state of non-moral emotional excellence is merely a state of natural virtue. So, such a well-formed person would be merely in a state of natural virtue and not true virtue.

I think a successful emotional account of the emotions must answer this charge. Whether or not an emotional account can meet this challenge depends on what emotional excellence is. If emotional excellence consists in mere fit to the situation independent of an essential relation to the will and reason, it will not avoid the charge of natural virtue. To answer the challenge, an emotional account should hold that the emotional excellence does not merely consist in dispositions to experience emotions that fit their objects but that the experience of such emotions must be coordinated with a good will in service of right reason

acts. Thus, it is an obstacle that must be overcome (64)." David T. Echelbarger, "Aquinas on the Passions' Contribution to Moral Reasoning," ed. Michael Baur, *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 86 (2012): 281–93, argues that Aquinas's view is that fear plays a vital role in deliberation.

in execution of the virtuous action.³⁶ Aristotle says that as cleverness is to practical wisdom so natural virtue is to true virtue.³⁷ I hold that just as cleverness is a part of practical wisdom but not sufficient for it, so emotions that fit their objects are part of courage but not sufficient for it. In line with Aquinas's claim above, the emotions must be intelligently directed to assist a good will and reason. As the view of courage I defend requires that the excellent emotions bear a relation to reason and a good will, I call my account a holistic account.

A Holistic Account

Courage, I claim, involves the coordination of our appetitive powers in service of reason. Specifically, proper³⁸ emotions coordinate with a good will in service of practical reason through each phase of courageous activity. Hence, courageous activity involves cognitional, volitional, and emotional excellence. I provide a model of such courageous activity in the next chapter. A virtue is a property of a whole person. It is an excellent character trait of a person. It is not merely an excellence of a single faculty (e.g., the will) although it requires such excellence. This account is not perfectionistic except in the sense that it requires the complete coordination of the relevant powers. It does not require the maximal function of those powers but only function that is good enough.³⁹ This allows me to affirm that a person can grow in a virtue like courage while also affirming that there is a

³⁶ This idea of an emotion fitting an object and the direction of the emotions by reason will be discussed in the next chapter.

³⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI.13, 1114a24-30.

³⁸ Again, I discuss the nature of this properness in the next chapter.

³⁹ I do not identify exactly where this good enough line is. One possibility with regard to the emotions is that it is achieved once the emotions are cultivated to the point where they play a contributing role. But courage can grow when they are cultivated to play a greater contributing role.

definite distinction between the possession of courage and its lack. The holistic account I endorse is distinct from sainthood.⁴⁰

Cognitive accounts get right that courage requires good practical reasoning. Strength of will power accounts get right that courage enables the accomplishment of difficult tasks. Skill of will power accounts get right that courage imparts a certain ease of manner and the subordination of the emotions to the will. An eliminative emotional account gets right that courage involves the lack of emotions that hinder responsiveness, deliberation, and action. Contributive accounts get right that courage requires emotions that help rather than hinder. As I am considering courage as a moral virtue, courage requires performing a courageous action for the right reason as well. A holistic account, or a suitably developed contributive emotional account, brings all these conditions for courage together. From my vignettes, only Peter manifests all of these goods together. Hence, only Peter evinces courage.

Conclusion

The claim of this work as a whole is that the virtue of courage enables reliable performance of paradigmatic courageous activity. Paradigmatic courageous activity is the complete exercise of courage in a courage-apt situation, i.e., a situation involving the perception of an apparently significant threat. It involves doing the courageous action for the right reason in a courageous manner. In this chapter I focused on rival accounts of the nature of a courageous manner of performance.

⁴⁰ A state of virtue need not be a state of superhuman sainthood. In a state of continence, fear is an obstacle, contrary to the will. In the state of virtue, fear is an aid that is beneficially used by the will. In the state of sainthood, there may be no fear at all because of the person's faith and hope in God. The saint may even long for death in order to see God face to face. This longing is not a part of normal human virtue but a divine gift.

In the next chapter I'll argue that the proper emotions of courage enable a human person to reach her potential in a courageous manner of action through assisting her appreciation and assessment of the situation, aiding her deliberative response to it, and helping her execution of a plan of action. Without proper emotions, action is either hindered (if improper emotions occur) or at least not assisted (if no emotions occur). In either case, the lack of proper emotions will prevent complete excellence of one's manner of acting. But proper emotions must be accompanied by a good will and coordinate with that will in service of reason.

CHAPTER THREE

The Emotions of Courageous Activity

I argue that fear, hope, and daring are necessary for paradigmatic courageous activity. In brief, fear is necessary for properly responding to a significant threat, hope is necessary for properly pursuing a significant but obstacle-laden goal, and daring is necessary for properly confronting the significant threat as a means to attaining the significant goal. An advantage of my view is that it can account for how courageous activity requires both fear, an emotion of suspect value in some views of courage, and fearlessness, a common view of courage, and how the transition from fear to fearless daring is well-ordered and serves rational activity.

Introduction

Aristotle says, “The man, then, who faces and who fears the right things and from the right motive, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case in whatever way the rule directs.”¹ I contend that this claim is correct albeit incomplete – in addition to fear and confidence (or what I refer to as daring), hope is part of courage. My main thesis is that fear, hope, and daring are necessary for a courageous manner

¹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.7, 1115b18–20, David Ross’s translation, which has been revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). It may be that by confidence Aristotle had in mind what I call hope. In that case, my claim is that daring is also required for complete expression of courage. Howard Curzer’s description of confidence in Aristotle conflates confidence with both daring and hope as I use them. See Howard Curzer, *Aristotle and the Virtues*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31ff. I shall identify another sense of confidence that may be a part of hope but which is distinct from daring.

of acting. And since paradigmatic courageous activity requires a courageous manner of action, as I discussed last chapter, it follows that fear, hope, and daring are necessary for paradigmatic courageous activity.

Vignette

Let me begin with another vignette to illustrate courageous activity. Whereas my vignette of Peter, my first paradigm of courage, included his emotional states, the following vignette makes no mention of emotions. I will defend that my account of the emotions of courageous activity best explains the excellence of the character's action and use the vignette to illustrate my model.

Philippa and her daughter Julia are hiking in the woods. Suddenly a grown black bear appears to the side of the path. Alert and with focused attention, Philippa quickly surmises the situation. As she considers what to do, the bear begins to approach in an aggressive manner. Philippa promptly considers her best course of action. She weighs her options and selects a plan of action with reasonable chance of success. She does not consider fleeing and leaving her daughter to distract the bear. She remembers that she should not play dead with a black bear. Instead, she chooses to confront it and energetically begins shouting, raising her arms, and throwing rocks at the bear. From the perspective of Julia, Philippa appears alert and focused on the danger, careful but quick and deliberate in her planning, and prompt and energetic in her action execution.

Supposing that Philippa evinces courage, what is the best explanation of what is going on inside of her to enable her to act in this courageous manner? One common view is that she can act in such a way because she is fearless. Her behavior starkly contrasts with her daughter Julia who cowers behind her. Fear, this view holds, is an impediment to action.

True courage requires fear's elimination. So, Philippa has eliminated fear as a response to threats. A second common view holds that fearlessness is unrealistically idealistic. This second view admits that fear is an impediment to action but holds that courage principally involves overcoming this internal impediment. This view of rational self-conquest is the willpower view discussed last chapter. In contrast, my view is that an emotion such as fear does play a crucial role but it can be properly formed to contribute to rather than hinder courageous activity. I argue that courage involves proper fear as well as other emotions. My view thus sits between, on the one hand, stoic views in which fearlessness is necessary, and, on the other, views like Robert Roberts's on which fear is necessary for a display of courage but functions as an impediment to acting courageously that must be corrected for by means of will power.² My view is also distinct from that of Philippa Foot, who claims that "the emotion of fear is not a necessary condition for a display of courage."³ My own account will explain why fear is necessary, why a kind of fearlessness is also necessary, and the proper way this transition occurs. The view I defend will also answer the following questions. Are other emotions necessary? Why these emotions? And how exactly do they contribute?

In this chapter, I will follow Aristotle and Aquinas in holding that courageous activity does involve proper emotions. But distinct from them,⁴ my thesis is that fear, hope, and daring are all necessary for paradigmatic courageous activity.⁵ By attending to the details

² Robert Roberts, "Will Power and the Virtues," *Philosophical Review* 93, no. 2 (1984), 227–247.

³ Philippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 10.

⁴ Aquinas explicitly denies that courage is properly about hope in *Summa Theologiae* II-II 123.3.ad.3. However, he leaves an exception clause, saying "except in so far as it is connected with daring."

⁵ Against, as mentioned in chapter one, the courageous activity that I discuss is narrower in scope than what Aquinas identifies as the activity of fortitude.

of the moral psychology of courage, I give a model that provides a principled way to identify these three emotions, how they relate to one another, and how they contribute to courageous activity by making its manner excellent. I utilize Robert Roberts's theory of emotions, Thomas Aquinas's particular definitions of fear, hope, and daring, and research from contemporary neuroscience on the fear response to develop and defend my model. Further, I give two upshots of my model of courageous activity. First, it accounts for what is correct about the two common views of courage just mentioned and discussed last chapter. Second, the model suggests a way to substantiate the claim that the distinction Aristotle makes between continence and the true virtue of temperance applies to courage as well. Courage is a virtue that some have thought an awkward candidate for a general distinction between continence and true virtue.⁶ I will provide reason here and in the next chapter to think that the general distinction nevertheless still applies to courage.

Assumptions

I am still operating with the assumptions I set out in chapter one. I will discuss the activity of physical courage – the courage needed for dealing with a threat of physical harm – rather than other forms of courage such as the courage needed for dealing with a threat to social status. Again, I do not limit physical courage to the battlefield. The courageous activity I have in mind involves confronting the threat, not just enduring its presence, since such confrontation enables us to examine the full exercise of courage. The activity that is the full expression of the exercise of the virtue of courage is paradigmatic courageous activity. Paradigmatic courageous activity refers to a kind of activity performed in a particular

⁶ Rosalind Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 96.

manner. The virtue of courage enables paradigmatic courageous activity, which requires both courageous action and a courageous manner of performance.

Basic Definition of Courage and Phases of Courageous Activity

I also employ the basic albeit incomplete definition of courage from the first chapter that courage is a virtue for achieving one's ends in a situation made difficult by the apparent presence of a significant threat by means of confronting rather than fleeing the threat. Using this definition and an account of the practical reason's operation, I identify three parts or phases of courageous activity.⁷ The first part involves the apprehension of the threat and the intention to pursue a good to which the threat is an obstacle. In the vignette, for example, Philippa sees the bear and intends to preserve her life and that of her daughter in the face of the threat. The second part (usually) involves deliberation about what to do and (always) involves choice of the means to accomplish the end. Part of this plan will involve confronting the threat. Philippa considers and rejects running away and instead chooses to stand her ground and show the bear she is not its prey by yelling, making herself look larger, and throwing rocks. The third part is the execution of this plan of action, which includes facing the threat. Philippa waves her arms, yells, and throws rocks. I employ the basic definition of courage and these three phases to support my thesis and provide the explanations I promised at the beginning. On the next page is a simple table of these phases.

In sum, courageous activity involves the apprehension of a physical threat and intention to pursue some good end made difficult to obtain by the presence of the threat, a

⁷ My identification of these phases was inspired by Aquinas's view of the operation of practical reason as explicated by Daniel Westberg, *Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 131ff.

deliberative choice of means to that good but difficult end that involves the confrontation of the threat, and the execution of the chosen action-plan.

Table 2: Phases of Paradigmatic Courageous Activity

Paradigmatic Courageous Activity		
Apprehension of Threat and Motivational Response Phase	Action Planning and Choice Phase	Action Execution Phase

It is conceivable for a person to perform an action under this description without emotion. However, I hold that without proper emotions it will not be performed in a courageous manner because it will lack the emotions' positive contribution. A courageous manner of acting requires the contributions of the emotions of fear, hope, and daring. I give a model of courageous activity to support this claim. My model maps the emotions of fear, hope, and daring principally (although not necessarily exclusively) onto these three phases. Fear is necessary for properly responding to a significant threat in the first phase, hope is necessary for properly pursuing a significant but obstacle-laden goal in the second phase, and daring is necessary for properly confronting the significant threat as a means to attaining the significant goal in the third phase.

To defend these claims, I will employ Robert Roberts's perceptual theory of emotions and Aquinas's accounts of the intentional objects of fear, hope, and daring. I first set out Roberts's general account of emotions. Second, I explain some relevant ways in which an emotion can be proper. Third, I discuss Aquinas's account of fear, hope, and daring and explain how they properly contribute to courageous activity.

On the perceptual view of emotions, emotions are cognitive-affective states. A perceptual account of emotions is called “perceptual” because it assumes that an emotion is a kind of evaluative perception. But this evaluative perception is not a judgment, although it may sometimes be caused by or followed by one.⁸ The perceptual view of emotions thus sits between judgment theories, which claim that emotions are intellectual judgments (e.g., Robert Solomon 1993), and non-cognitivist views, which reduce emotions to mere feelings or gut reactions (e.g., Jesse Prinz 2004, more accurately perception of one’s own affective and bodily state). Roberts’s account posits that emotions often involve bodily sensations and gut reactions but does not reduce emotions to them. Like perceptions, emotions are individuated by their intentional objects. Parenthetically, I think that what Roberts’s calls a construal Aquinas’ would call an operation of the cogitative power (or particular reason) to assign particular intentions to an object of perception. A dual-process theorist of cognition like Daniel Kahneman would assign these processes to System 1.

Before explaining the view in more detail, I note that I will assume Roberts’s account and direct the reader to his work for a defense.⁹ While my account of the emotions necessary for courage does not depend on the truth of the perceptual account, the perceptual account

⁸ Following some work in contemporary psychology, we might think of the relevant cognitive process as functions of System 1 rather than System 2. See, for example, Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

⁹ This is no place to offer a defense of the account of emotions to be discussed. See Robert Roberts, *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Peter Goldie identifies nine desiderata of a theory of emotion. Any theory must explain the emotions’ diversity, consistency with human evolution, applicability to beasts and babies, intentionality, feelings and phenomenology, importance, rationality, connections to action, and the agent’s responsibility for emotions. In favor of it, the perception theory I discuss meets these desiderata. Peter Goldie, “Emotion,” *Philosophy Compass* vol. 2 (6, 2007): 928–938. The reader may also judge this account at least in part on the fruitfulness with which it allows us to explain the emotions involved in courage.

identifies the relevant functions and concepts I need to defend the emotional excellence of courage, and its terminology is clear and coherent.¹⁰ Further, Roberts's view has two strengths relevant to my project here. First, it individuates emotions by intentional objects allowing me to consistently employ Aquinas's view of the intentional objects of fear, hope, and daring. Second, it is not committed to faculty psychology, which makes it have greater appeal. I myself am more sympathetic to faculty psychology, but my thesis will be more persuasive if I do not need it.

Roberts's view is that emotions are concern-based construals. Roberts says,

On the view of emotions that I endorse, [emotions] are concern-based construals. That is, they are perceptions, in the construal sense of the word, in which one or more of the elements going into the construal is a concern.... The idea that emotions are concern-based construals is that, for example, you will never feel fear if you don't care about the thing that you see as threatened, nor anger if you're not concerned about the thing you construe as offended against, nor shame if you don't care about being worthy of respect. You come into a situation that has emotional potential for you with a dispositional (or possibly occurrent) concern or desire, or an attachment; you then construe the situation in the terms characteristic of some emotion type, and the situation emotionally appears to you as it does because the terms in which you see the situation impinge on, connect with, that concern.¹¹

An emotion is a concern-based construal. A concern is a caring or disposition to care for something. A care can be a desire or a value. It can be instinctive or learned. A concern or set of concerns is the basis for the emotion. So, any emotion token has a basing concern or set of concerns. This claim is akin, I think, to Aquinas' claim that love is the principal cause of all the passions.

¹⁰ While judgment accounts would also be helpful for accounting for how the emotions tie to virtue, they fall to strong objections. Non-cognitivist accounts struggle to explain the relation between virtue and emotion in part because they offer little means to discuss the intellect and will's relation to the emotions.

¹¹ Robert Roberts, *Emotions in the Moral Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 46. The following is taken from this work and Roberts, *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology*, *passim*.

A construal is a perception (“seeing as”) that is more than sensory. A construal involves applying aspectual features to sensible reality (although it need not only involve sensible reality). Examples of these aspectual features include seeing the image of the duck-rabbit *as a duck*, seeing a piece of bread *as desirable*, seeing a wolf *as threatening*, or seeing an action *as unjust*. The construal of an action as unjust is not the same as a judgment that an action is unjust. The construal of the duck-rabbit as a duck is not the same as a judgment that the duck-rabbit is a duck. While one may construe the sensible image of the duck-rabbit as a duck or as a rabbit without any particular emotion, the construal of an action as unjust is typically emotionally charged in virtue of a concern for justice. Hence, the construal that is an emotion is a value-colored perception. An example of a concern-based construal is my seeing a piece of meat *as edible* and *as desirable*. If I’m hungry, seeing a piece of meat as edible and desirable will elicit my appetite or desire. My desire for the meat is based on a concern or disposition to care for something, in this case, food.

The construal is organized in a particular way by its object’s intentional features (e.g., *as this* thing, *as desirable*, *as unjust*, etc.) and their relation to the basing concern. This organized perception is the emotion’s *intentional object*. Because the intentional object can be conceptualized each emotion type has a defining proposition. This is a statement of what the emotion is in propositional form, which characterizes the structure of the emotion type. The defining proposition characterizes the *formal object* of the emotion along with a formal specification of the emotion’s consequent concern. For example, the defining proposition of fear for some object Y for Roberts is, “X presents a threat to Y of a significant degree of probability; may X or its threatened consequences for Y be avoided.”¹² A particular emotion

¹² Cited in Roberts, *Emotions in the Moral Life*, 47 with reference to Robert, *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology*, 195 modified.

token can be defined by a material proposition, which is the first part of the defining proposition with the X and Y variables replaced with names of the appropriate objects in the situation. A token consequent concern is defined by suitably replacing the X and Y variables in the second part of the defining proposition. However, this proposition need not be believed or thought of or even able to be thought of for an emotion token to be experienced.

A person can experience the intentional object of an emotion token without knowing the nature of its material object(s), i.e., what the emotion is actually about. For example, a person can be afraid in a situation without realizing what it is in the situation that is threatening. In this case, the situation as a whole is the material object of the emotion but the person has not yet been able to discriminate between the features of the situation that correspond to her perception of a threat and those that do not.¹³

Different emotions are associated with different unintentional behaviors and concomitant somatic sensations produced by the autonomic nervous system. These are called behavior and autonomic determinations. For example, fear often produces the behavior of physically shrinking back and also involves increased heart rate and breathing rate, muscle tension, and so on. A person experiencing an emotion is not necessarily conscious of these behaviors or somatic effects. These effects are distinct from an emotion's affect.

¹³ Mikko Salmela, "Can Emotion Be Modelled on Perception?," *Dialectica* 65, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 1–29, criticizes perceptual theories for being unable to substantiate an emotion's intentionality in cases where the somatic feelings of an emotion are not identified as being part of a particular emotion or about a particular object. But at least the latter part of this criticism fails. An emotion can be about a situation without the person consciously realizing which features of the situation play what roles in her construal.

Affect is a feature of conscious emotions. Roberts defines the affect as “the coloration that the construal derives from the integration of the concern.”¹⁴ It is the evaluative “feel” particular to the emotion. In the experience of an emotion token, the construal impinges on the concern in such a way that the construal has such an affect. This psychological feel or affect has positive or negative meaning to the subject and is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant.¹⁵

The positive or negative meaning is determined by the construal’s impingement on the basing concern, as to whether that concern is satisfied or promoted or frustrated. So, the affect is a feeling about whatever the emotion is about as good or bad. The character of the emotion’s affect depends on the construal’s impingement on the basing concern whether the person experiencing the emotion is aware of that concern or not. The affect may be about the external situation or the concomitant somatic sensations or both.¹⁶ For example, Jack may be glad (construe as good) that Jill made it to the top of the hill first, winning the race. He may also be glad (construe as good) at the sensation of tears of joy he experiences at her reaching the top of the hill first and winning the race. The affect is not reducible to the concomitant somatic sensations because the latter cannot explain the former’s character or intensity. Roberts provides two examples to defend this claim: the intensity of the joy at the birth of one’s healthy child and the intensity of sorrow at one’s child’s death cannot be

¹⁴ In *Emotions in the Moral Life*, Roberts says of the affect and the pleasantness or painfulness of an emotion:

On the present account, emotional pleasures and pains are a matter of the meaning (“positive” or “negative”) that a situation has for the emotional subject, not the sensations of his body. And that meaning is a function of the synthesizing, constructing, qualifying, of factual perception in terms of concern (48).

¹⁵ Roberts, *Emotions in the Moral Life*, 48.

¹⁶ For a discussion of these two aspects, see Peter Goldie, “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality,” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1, no. 3 (2002): 235–54.

explained merely by the pleasantness or painfulness of the bodily sensations that accompany these events.¹⁷

Every emotion involves a basing concern. The construal of the situation's impingement on the basing concern of the emotion may produce a consequent concern, which is a specific desire. The desire can motivate action and its satisfaction counts as the satisfaction of the emotion.¹⁸ In virtue of its motivating force, this consequent desire is an action determinant. For example, in a case of fear the basing concern is for one's well-being and the construal of oneself as in danger produces a consequent concern that motivates one to avoid the threat to protect one's well-being. This motivation differs from motivation by the emotion's affect — in the case of fear, a motivation to stay out of scary situations so as to avoid the unpleasantness of fear.

Finally, emotions come in varying strengths. The strength of the emotion is determined by the strength of the concern (i.e., how much one cares for the object of concern that is part of the emotion token), the vivacity of the construal (i.e., the degree to which it is the focus of attention), and the rate of impingement on the concern of the terms of the construal (e.g., if one's friend has a terminal illness one's concern for one's friend's well-being is impinged on to a greater degree than if she had merely a broken leg). While these are the determining factors of a particular emotion token's strength, that strength has four dimensions or spheres of influence. Any emotion has varying behavior and autonomic determinations, varying action determinations, varying felt hedonic intensity (i.e., a degree of

¹⁷ Roberts, *Emotions in the Moral Life*, 48.

¹⁸ It may be that there are some emotions that do not produce a consequent concern and so do not motivate. Roberts suggested to me that this is true for happy nostalgia. My purposes here do not require that I take a stand on this issue because the emotions that are part of courage do motivate.

pleasantness or painfulness), and varying depths of personality ingress: the degree to which the basing concern is central to the personality (e.g., the more central or explanatorily fecund the concern is to the individual's personality, the greater the emotion's depth). The greater the strength of an emotion, the greater (usually) the behavior, autonomic, and action determinations it involves.

Felt hedonic intensity need not correspond to emotional depth. For example, the healthy sports fan can feel intensely elated at the moment of his team's victory even when his concern for the team's performance is relatively shallowly seated in his personality. That same fan may feel intense disappointment at a loss but quickly get over it. A concern could be shallow but produce an intense emotion if the construal is particularly vivacious and the rate of impingement is high. Sports games can rivet the attention and, if victory is the principal concern, then the game's loss decisively impinges on the concern. If the disappointment the loss produced were to overshadow the person's next few days or weeks so that he walked through the world in a depression, then his emotion would be deep (and his basing concern strong) as well as hedonically intense.

In summary, for Roberts an emotion involves the following:

1. Basing concern – a disposition to desire or value something
2. Construal – an evaluative perception that can be more or less the focus of attention, is subject to conceptualization, and has positive or negative meaning to the subject; this is the intentional object of the emotion
3. Impingement of construal on the basing concern – a relation that can be to a greater or lesser degree
4. Affect – the psychological feel of an emotion and is experienced as pleasant or painful in light of the evaluative perception of the situation as good or bad

5. Consequent concern – a specific desire the emotion produces, the satisfaction of which motivates action and counts as the satisfaction of the emotion; not all emotions have consequent concerns
6. Bodily concomitant – the behavior, autonomic, and other somatic responses produced
7. Emotional strength – varying as a function of the interaction between the strength of basing concern, vivacity of the construal, and the construal’s rate of impingement on the basing concern; emotional strength has four dimensions: behavior and autonomic determination, action determination, hedonic intensity, and depth in the personality

Proper Emotions

Courage, I claim, involves the coordination of our appetitive powers in service of reason. Those appetitive powers are the will and the emotions. For the emotions to serve reason, the emotions must be proper. I focus on three of the ways in which emotions can be proper.¹⁹ Emotions can be proper in construal, concern, and time.

An emotion is proper in construal when its intentional object is an accurate rather than a distorted construal of the actual object, given the situation and one’s rational aims.²⁰ For example, Julia’s fear is improper in construal if when walking in the wood she sees a

¹⁹ Roberts identifies seven in his *Emotions in the Moral Life* (chapter 2). The three that I identify are related to although not directly taken from his list.

²⁰ This evaluation has been called emotional truth by Ronald De Sousa in his *Emotional Truth* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2011). If the intentional object of fear is of a situation as involving a threat to some good that is difficult to avoid, then the intentional object will be veridical just in case the situation is as it is construed. This takes two aspects, semantic satisfaction and success according to de Sousa. He denies that emotions require semantic satisfaction in order to be true. But see Roberts for compelling criticism of De Sousa on this point in Roberts’s 2012 review of *Emotional Truth*, by Ronald de Sousa. *Mind* 121 (483) (July 1): 795–798.

squirrel and is terrified because she construes it as harmful to her. Her mother may sensibly say, “Julia, don’t be afraid of the squirrel, it will not hurt you.”

An emotion is proper in concern when the concern (or love) that is its source is rightly ordered; it is cared for neither too greatly nor too little. An emotion that is too intense may reveal an improper concern (although it may also reveal an improper construal). For example, suppose a grown man has been poisoned but fortunately has the antidote ready at hand. He is terrified to receive the antidote because he must receive it by a shot. The intensity of this fear may reveal too great a concern for his bodily comfort. An upshot of requiring proper concerns for emotions that are part of courage is that a connection between a kind of general temperance and courage is revealed. To feel appropriate fear one must not care too much for bodily comfort. But neither caring too much or too little for bodily comfort is regulated by temperance. This confirms the view discussed in the last chapter that there are general excellences corresponding with each cardinal virtue necessary for every courageous action.

Finally, an emotion is proper only if it occurs at the right time and for the right duration, which depends on the agent attending to what is appropriate given the situation. For example, the agent who is afraid could defectively fixate on the object of fear for too long, wasting emotional energy and his time to respond, or he could prematurely cease paying attention to the object and fail to gain additional information about the threat. These defects may not be signs of a defect in the concern or construal of the emotion but of its reasonableness as a part in a coordinated whole. By this I mean that the third sense of “improper” concerns not the emotion’s fit to the object alone but rather the emotion’s role in a larger rational activity. I contend that the emotions of fear, hope, and daring each play a necessary role at different temporal phases of paradigmatic courageous activity. Just as the

virtue of courage is an excellence that must contribute to the perfection of the organism of which it is a part, so proper emotions must contribute to the perfection of the courageous activity of which they are a part. This third way for an emotion to be proper accounts for the emotions' role in virtuous activity to preserve and promote the operation of practical reason and coordinate with the will. Given the emotion is proper in concern and construal, a defect in this role results from a defect in practical reason. I will explain how this works in the case of courage when I present my model of courageous activity below.

Here is another way to make this point. Following Roberts, we can distinguish two ways of evaluating an emotion: pragmatic and non-pragmatic.²¹ An emotion is pragmatically wrong if it is detrimental to the person in the situation. Roberts's example is of a person who encounters a rabid dog. It might be pragmatically wrong to feel fear of the dog because that increases the likelihood of its attacking. But the dog is genuinely threatening, so it is non-pragmatically right (fitting to the object) to feel fear. In the case of courage, I think it non-pragmatically correct to feel fear but pragmatically correct only to feel fear for the appropriate amount of time, neither fixating too long on the threat nor prematurely focusing on it. I will combine both pragmatic and non-pragmatic evaluations of each of the emotions. The pragmatic evaluation depends on the emotion's role in the larger practically rational activity that the virtue of courage enables.

To act in a courageous manner in a courage-apt situation requires responding well to that situation and this includes perceiving the situation well. In the individual who has proper concerns, as the courageous person does, perceiving well a situation with a significant threat involves proper emotions. So, acting in a courageous manner in courage-apt situations

²¹ Roberts, *Emotions in the Moral Life*, 91. D'Arms and Jacobson draw a similar distinction in "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61, no. 1 (July 1, 2000): 65–90.

involves proper emotions. Proper emotions increase the reliability of performing courageous actions by making the manner of performance more excellent. That excellence will take different forms depending on the emotion. It will usually involve making the action more energetic, prompt, or easy. Without proper emotions, action is either hindered (in the presence of improper emotions) or at least not assisted (in the absence of emotions). I'll now argue that the proper emotions of courage specifically assist the agent's appreciation and careful assessment of the situation, aid her prompt deliberative response to it, and help her energetic execution of a plan of action. I turn now to partial accounts of three specific emotions that do so.

Aquinas on Fear, Hope, and Daring

Those emotions are fear, hope, and daring. I follow Robert Miner's interpretation of Aquinas on the intentional objects of the emotions of fear, hope, and daring, although I introduce my own modifications.²² I explain each emotion and then I explain its place in courageous activity. While Roberts's view of the emotions differs from Aquinas's in identifying exactly which of these components constitutes the emotion and in a few other ways, the formal structure is similar enough for my purposes.²³ Hence, I think Aquinas's

²² Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48* (Cambridge University Press, 2009). The relevant section of the *Summa Theologiae* is I-II 40-45.

²³ One difference is that Aquinas holds to a faculty psychology that posits a division between apprehensive and appetitive powers. Although these are interdependent, for Aquinas the emotions are alterations of the appetitive powers, with alterations of the sense appetitive power being paradigmatic. They are altered by intentional objects presented to the person via his or her apprehensive powers. The external sensation or imagination provides the sensible data while the memory or cogitative power applies intentions to the sensible construct making a perception. The appetitive alteration is specified by the intentional object of the perception. This perception seems identical to a construal in Roberts's language. Because Aquinas wants to maintain the distinction, at least analytically, between apprehension and appetite, he would not (I think) identify the emotion with the perception upon which it depends. Roberts does so, claiming that the emotion is the construal. But as the construal is an evaluative perception the emotion combines apprehension and

account of the emotions of fear, hope, and daring can be consistently combined with Roberts's general view of emotions.

Before explicating fear, hope, and daring, I will situate them in Aquinas's account of emotions. Fear, hope, and daring are part of a class of emotions whose intentional objects share a different aspect than emotions such as love, hate, desire and aversion. The former set concerns intentional objects that are not good or evil *simply* but good or evil with some aspect of *difficulty*. The latter set concerns intentional objects that are good or evil simply. Further, each intentional object is an object of pursuit or avoidance in itself (what I'll call good or evil *per se*) or an object of pursuit or avoidance by reason of something else (what I'll call good or evil *per accidens*). For example, hope, the object of which includes some difficulty, takes a good *per se* as its object. Aquinas distinguishes the sensitive appetite into two powers, concupiscible and irascible, on the basis of these two kinds of emotions. In virtue of the natural or acquired state of our sense appetite, we are drawn to what we apprehend as sensibly good simply (where this is what is sensibly pleasing or useful to us) and repulsed by what we apprehend as sensibly evil simply (where this is what is sensibly painful or harmful to us).²⁴ The apprehension of good or evil *moves* our appetites either by attraction or repulsion. By our concupiscible power, we love things as pleasant, desire them when attainable, and take pleasure in them when present. We also hate things as painful, are averse to their coming, and are pained when they are present. The sensible good considered simply is naturally attractive and the sensible evil considered simply is naturally repulsive. The sensible good cannot be repulsive and the sensible evil cannot be attractive to our

appetition. I will follow Roberts here and will evaluate the construals as part of emotional evaluation, but I think the view I defend could be recast in terms of Aquinas's position.

²⁴ I will speak of an appetite *desiring* for the sake of economy, but this is strictly false. It is by the appetite that a whole person desires, etc.

concupiscible power. The passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished by their intentional objects, i.e., by whether an object is construed as good simply or as evil simply and by whether it is present or absent.

Here is a table of the fundamental concupiscible passions or the emotions that concern a sensible good listed in the *Summa Theologiae*.²⁵

Table 3: Concupiscible Passions – affections of the sense appetite moved by something sensibly *good or evil simply*

Passion/Emotion	Appetitive Movement	Distinguishing Formal Object
Love (<i>amor sensitivus</i>)	inclination to motion toward	a good
Hatred (<i>odium</i>)	inclination to motion away from	an evil
Desire (<i>desiderium</i>)	actual motion toward	a good not yet present
Aversion (<i>abominatio</i>)	actual motion away from	an evil not yet present
Pleasure (<i>delectatio</i>)	response to (“resting” that we usually do not want to stop)	a present good
Joy (<i>gaudium</i>)	response to (“resting” that we usually do not want to stop)	a present good
Pain (<i>dolor</i>)	response to (“resting” that we usually do not want to stop)	a present evil
Sorrow (<i>tristitia</i>)	response to (“resting” that we usually do not want to stop)	a present evil

The formal object of the irascible power is the *difficult* good or evil, i.e., a good or evil with the additional aspect of being either difficult to attain or difficult to avoid. Aquinas holds that movements of the irascible power are for the sake of the concupiscible and rational appetites.²⁶ So, hope for a future, difficult good requires sensible or rational love for

²⁵ There are more emotions than these. For example, there are embarrassment, shame, gratitude, envy, anxiety, jealousy, remorse, resentment, respect, awe, wonder, annoyance, pity, pride, compassion, *Schadenfreude*, and more. Aquinas holds that other emotions can be explained as specifications or combinations of these basic eleven types. For example, envy is a kind of pain or sorrow at another’s good in virtue of construing the other’s good as one’s own evil (e.g., as a hindrance to one’s own excellence *ST* II-II 36.1). I leave it to the reader to decide whether this strategy would work for the others.

²⁶ One way to interpret this claim is that difficult goods are desired not for their own sake but for the sake of non-difficult goods. Hence, difficult objects must be considered as either useful or harmful. So, the irascible passions are dependent on the concupiscible or rational appetites (which

a simple good. To illustrate, consider that when the good that is the object of hope is achieved, the emotion of hope ceases. This is because the aspect of future and difficulty that is part of the intentional object of hope is removed. What remains is the love for the simple good that is now joyfully possessed without the aspect of future or difficulty.

The irascible power, unlike the concupiscible power, can be drawn to a painful object. But this is only because the evil (e.g., the painful vaccine shot) is considered useful to the good (e.g., health) and not good as such or simply. Or, in another example, I can be drawn to running a race in which I experience great amounts of bodily pain (an evil) for the pleasure of victory or setting a personal best or helping my team or growing in self-discipline. So, the irascible passions are emotional responses to situations construed as useful to the attainment of either rational or sensible goods or harmful to such goods. Table 4 below illustrates Aquinas's view though with some of my own interpretive liberties. I have added an "Affect" column to indicate hedonic affect although I do not know of a place that Aquinas discusses hedonic affect as such. Because of the difficulty involved, the pleasantness or painfulness of these emotions are not as pure as those of the concupiscible passions. The appetitive movement column indicates the appetitive affect.

I do not assume that Aquinas's taxonomy is exhaustive. This model provides perspicuous definitions of the emotion types of fear, hope, and daring in virtue of their

are movements towards simple goods). To illustrate this view, consider the case of Hilary the mountain climber. Hilary hoped to climb the mountain (difficult good) in order to know his limits or rest in the accomplishment or earn bragging rights with his friends or to know that he has done something difficult or merely take joy in having done it. His appetite cannot rest in a difficult good itself. Once the mountain has been conquered, the difficult aspect of it is gone. His hope ceases and is replaced by satisfaction or joy. The good, say, of self-knowledge in this case is a non-difficult good attained in virtue of attaining the difficult good of climbing the mountain. This interpretation is disputed by Peter King, "Aquinas on the Passions," *Aquinas's Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann*, edit by Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1999), 101–32. King holds that difficult goods can be pursued as ends in themselves and not merely means. But I think he does not attend to the distinction between, say, climbing the mountain and climbing the mountain as a means to knowing that one has successfully climbed the mountain as one's end.

distinguishing formal or intentional objects and appetitive movements. Importantly for the task of this chapter, this model not only enables a clear way to distinguish fear, daring and hope but also provides a powerful explanation of their relations to one another. On this model, daring is caused by hope, which presupposes love. Daring is caused by hope because daring is a movement toward an evil, which can occur only if there is some good attached to the evil. This good is the overcoming of the evil as a means to the object of hope.

Table 4: Irascible Passions – affections of the sense appetite moved by the sensible *good or evil as difficult* to attain or avoid

Passion/Emotion	Appetitive Movement	Affect	Distinguishing Formal Object
Hope (<i>spes</i>)	motion toward	Positive	future, difficult but attainable good
Despair (<i>desperatio</i>)	motion away from	Negative	future, difficult but nearly unattainable good
Fear (<i>timor</i>)	motion away from	Negative	future threatening evil too difficult to avoid or successfully confront ²⁷
Daring (<i>audacia</i>)	motion toward	Positive	future, threatening evil difficult but within one's power to successfully confront ²⁸
Anger (<i>ira</i>)	motion toward	Mixed	Harming (e.g., offensive), difficult evil ²⁹ (the attack of which is useful to obtain the good of vindication)

In the case of courageous action, this object of hope depends on there being a threat to another good, which accounts for the object of hope having the aspect of the difficult. This

²⁷ Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 255 describes the formal object of fear as a “threatening evil apprehended as difficult to resist in a way that surpasses our power (without yet being judged absolutely impossible).”

²⁸ Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 255 describes the formal object of daring as a “threatening evil that is difficult to resist, yet within our power to overcome (if just barely).”

²⁹ The use of ‘harm’ and ‘attack’ is very broad. A friend may harm your feelings and your desire to attack may be constituted by desire that he or she feel sorry for it.

threat is the object of fear. I will now develop these claims in the next section on these emotions' contribution to the manner of courageous action.³⁰

The Emotions of Courageous Activity

Figure 1 on the following page illustrates my model of the role of fear, hope, and daring in courageous activity. It uses the three phases of courageous activity I identified at the beginning of this chapter to organize the principal roles of fear, hope, and daring in courageous activity. I urge the reader to refer back to it while reading the text to come. On the left column of the chart I only represent the operation of construing. For simplicity's sake, I do not represent judgment although that is surely going on during the activity. I have rows for the basing concern, occurrent emotions, and acts of volition. On the remaining vertical axes, I intend the phases to correspond to the three parts of courageous activity that I identified from the basic definition of courage and the operations of practical reason.

Fear

In a token of fear, a person construes a situation or features of a situation (to include a thing, person, state of affairs, action, event, etc.) as posing a significant threat to some

³⁰ This model, with its distinction between concupiscible and irascible emotions, is analogous to the distinction between motivational and structural virtues discussed earlier. The irascible is ordered to the concupiscible and, while not reducible to it, depends on the concupiscible appetite or the will. The structural virtues are also ordered to the motivational virtues but not reducible to them and depend upon them for their good motivation. The irascible emotions rely on a love or concern for a simple good to specify the good or evil that it is useful to pursue or avoid (hence their more complex intentional objects). The dependence of the irascible emotions on the concupiscible is analogous to the relation that obtains between structural and motivational virtues. Some emotion based virtues, such as courage (a structural virtue), bear this relation to what have been called motivational virtues.

	Paradigmatic Courageous Activity					
Operation	Apprehension of Threat and Motivational Response Phase		Action Planning and Choice Phase		Action Execution Phase	
↓	<u>Intentional Object</u>	<u>Appetitive Response</u>	<u>Intentional Object</u>	<u>Appetitive Response</u>	<u>Intentional Object</u>	<u>Appetitive Response</u>
Construal →	future threatening <i>evil</i> too difficult to avoid or successfully confront		Future difficult but attainable <i>good</i> to which the threat is an obstacle		future, threatening <i>evil</i> difficult but within one's power to successfully confront	
Concern →		Concern for good threatened		Concern for good to be pursued		Concern for good to be pursued
Emotion →	<i>Fear</i> that induces caution, heightens awareness and focus, and motivates avoidance of the threat		<i>Hope</i> that motivates choice of means to avert the threat by confronting it and produces daring as its effect		<i>Daring</i> that energizes action execution in confronting the threat	
Volition →		<i>Intention</i> for a good the pursuit of which requires averting the threat		<i>Deliberative Choice</i> of means, including confronting the threat		<i>Execute</i> plan and confront threat

Figure 1: Complete Paradigmatic Courageous Activity

good (i.e., the object of the prior concern), and so as an evil to be avoided.³¹ In particular, the intentional object of a token of fear is a future threatening evil too difficult to avoid or successfully confront (given the current circumstances). This is not a judgment but an immediate construal. The construal as “too difficult to avoid or successfully confront” involves a construal of the evil as currently presenting a threat of significant degree of

³¹ I say a person can construe an entire situation as threatening to account for cases when a person cannot identify the threat specifically.

probability or at least of sufficient uncertainty. I do not specify a particular degree of probability beyond which the threat is deemed too difficult and I do not know how. I think the probability of the threat is not construed as 1 for I do not think that fear occurs in the face of a construal of inevitable harm (although it may in the face of a judgment of inevitable harm), although my analysis does not depend on this assumption. I do think that the fear often involves uncertainty regarding the nature of the threat and its likelihood of obtaining although I do not think uncertainty is sufficient for fear if the uncertainty regards an insignificant threat or if the uncertainty regards a very low degree of threat. But fear does require an immediate construal of the threat not merely as difficult to avoid or confront but as “too difficult” to do so (perhaps in virtue of being too uncertain in a relevant respect). Although the language partially suggests it, this is not a construal of the situation as hopeless. A judgment of a threat’s uncertainty is sometimes sufficient to construe it as too difficult (although it is not necessarily judged so given the uncertainty). This construal of “too difficult” is not a judgment and may alter rapidly as one thinks of how to respond. The phenomenology of fear gives us reason to think this specification of the construal as “too difficult” is accurate rather than merely construing the object as a threat. Fear involves an appetitive movement *away from* the future evil. The movement away or feeling of shrinking back from the threat is indicative of the construal including the aspect of being “too difficult,” wherever that threshold probability lies. In contrast, an emotion such as daring “pushes” us toward a future difficulty that we construe as within our power to confront. This does not require that the object no longer be construed as a threat or a difficulty. Instead, it requires that the difficulty be construed as not too great. Hence, I characterize fear as construing the evil as “too difficult.” The intensity of fear will in part track the probability of the threat that is construed. If the fear is intense enough it may cause despair,

as a result of construing the threat as nearly inevitable. But I do not think such intense fear is required for courage and so I do not think courageous activity must begin in despair. Fear and despair are distinct emotions because fear concerns a threatening evil while despair concerns an (nearly) unattainable good. I will now briefly identify fear's role in courageous activity with reference back to our initial vignette about Philippa and the bear and then provide a more detailed account.

Fear occurs in the first phase. Philippa spots the bear and construes it as an evil in the sense that it threatens some good that she cares for. In this case, the concerns on which the bear impinges are Philippa and Julia's safety. Since the fear is about a threat rather than a present harm, the threat is construed as future. This is so even if the threat is the angry bear staring her in the face. For, the threatened harm of the bear's bite has not yet arrived. Before developing my explanation of fear's role in courageous activity, I will look more closely at the fear response.

To flesh out fear, I present a description of a fear response on the basis of the neuroscience research of Joseph LeDoux. Understanding the psychology behind fear will help us to understand fear's role in the virtue of courage. The California Science Center describes a basic fear response to a physical threat as follows. Sense data of a potential threat is sent to the thalamus where it is crudely processed and sent along a short path to the amygdala and a long path to the sensory cortex.³² The initial data received by the amygdala along the short path is of a fuzzy impression of the potential threat. It prepares the body to respond to the threat and activates areas in the brain stem to trigger the body's freeze response, signals facial nerves to show fear, and alerts the hypothalamus to begin the body's

³² The sense data includes a construal of the situation as involving a threat. This initial determination is necessary for the initiation of the fear response.

hormonal response, releasing pain suppressing endorphins and adrenaline. The flight or fight response is primed. This response includes elevated heart rate, elevated blood pressure, and sweating. The crudely processed sensory information is also sent along a long path from the thalamus to the sensory cortex. The sensory cortex processes that information at a higher level and signals the amygdala, which either continues the fight or flight response or deactivates it depending on whether the threat is confirmed or disconfirmed by the higher level information from the cortex. The threat alert also reaches the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex, which create a memory of the situation for future responses. The prefrontal cortex also functions to inhibit an overactive amygdala's response if it is inappropriate for some reason in light of higher-level information or past experience.³³

I will focus on two features of this description of a basic fear response. First, the apparent threat initiates the fear response prior to confirmation of the threat and initiates bodily systems that aid both fleeing and fighting. Second, the amygdala's threat response is subject to some measure of higher level control by the prefrontal cortex. I do not require the accuracy of this account's identification of what portions of the brain perform what functions. However, my view is confirmed by the process and functions it identifies.

I identify two ways the first feature, which is that the apparent threat initiates the fear response prior to confirmation of the threat, confirms my view. First, fear is the natural initial response to an apparent threat of significant magnitude. I assume that courage is a virtue for situations that appear significantly threatening. Given this, there is reason to hold that fear is part of an account of courage. The fear of the courageous person is distinct from

³³ See the California Science Center, http://www.fearexhibit.org/brain/brain_structures for a helpful illustration of this response. My summary is taken from this illustration and Joseph E. LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (Simon & Schuster, 1998), chapter six, on which the illustration is based.

the fear of the cowardly person because the cowardly person's fear is based on too great a concern for his safety. This will make his fear more intense than is proper even if he has an accurate perception of the significant probability of the threat. Second, the perceptual impetus of the fear response occurs (at least sometimes) prior to a judgment about the situation. The fear response is a result of a perception and while it may be that action awaits a further judgment, fear does not require such a judgment. This supports the perceptual account of emotions.

Fear's priming of the body's flight or fight response system at the first hint of threat puts the body in a state that optimizes a rapid response. This may be valuable if the threat is real and potentially an unneeded expenditure of resources if it is not.³⁴ The bodily responses of fear involve heightened sensory awareness and a cautious state. This is where fear can assist in action. The heightened awareness enables greater detection of the nature of the threat and of resources for dealing with it. This caution is a product of fear's motivational component or appetitive movement away from the evil. Fear's appetitive movement away from the threat slows one down so that one does not move into danger unprepared. If the fear is too great, caution may be replaced by paralysis.

The second feature is that the amygdala's threat response is subject to some measure of higher level control by the prefrontal cortex. This confirms the view that the emotions are influenced by higher order thinking and subject to rational training. The courageous person

³⁴ I say only potentially because experience does provide for better discrimination between apparent and real threats and it is plausible that the hyper-aware state produced by the fear response increases the strength of the memory of the situation, thus improving one's fear response in the future. Given this, the training of the fear response occurs best after updating one's threat assignments after a situation of fear.

exercises reasonable control over his fear response, presumably by means of his memory and imagination, preventing his fear from becoming too intense or not intense enough.³⁵

The second feature is also consistent with the view that fear provides an initial appetitive movement to avoid the threat that is neither a judgment nor an intention. I suggest that a judgment and intention follows (or at least should) the completion of higher level processing of the cortex that will allow for greater accuracy in determining the nature of the threat and how to avert it. But fear is not an intention to avoid the threat. The construal of the threat as too difficult to be successfully confronted is not initially a judgment to this effect, although such a judgment or a contrary judgment may follow the higher level processing. Once such a judgment is made, the fear will continue or dissipate depending on whether the threat is judged real.

In sum, the fear occurs prior to a judgment of the situation (although a judgment could happen almost instantaneously in some situations) but assists the formation of a judgment of the situation's level of threat (through heightened sensory awareness), the fear induces caution that helps ascertain the best means to avoiding or confronting the threat, and the fear prepares the body to respond rapidly. Following Roberts's terminology, the consequent concern of the fear is to avert the threat in some way. The good of averting the threat (e.g., accomplishing the safety of Philippa and Julia from the bear) is the object of hope. Hence, the emotion of fear naturally leads to the second phase of courageous activity, in which hope is the principal emotion.

³⁵ This control is important when the significant threats faced are not merely physical, as are the threats I am discussing here. In societies where threat of physical danger is relatively rare, and social threats are predominant, this initial fear response may require more training than a fear of snakes, for example.

Now I apply this to the vignette. In response to the bear, Philippa both feels fear and also intends to protect her and Julia's lives. Her fear is proper, the bear is fear-worthy and she feels the fear neither too strongly (and is paralyzed) nor too weakly (and is incautious). How does fear help here? As discussed above, it primes her fight or flight response for rapid response. This elevates her heart rate and blood pressure, releases pain suppressing endorphins and adrenaline, and so on. The fear also induces caution and increases her sensory awareness for gathering salient information for dealing with the threat. All of these assist the performance of her response at this phase of courageous activity. The courageous person will use the good effects of fear to her advantage but will neither fixate on nor distract herself from the discomfort such fear produces. Her fear will be proper in virtue of caring neither too little nor too much for her or her daughter's safety, construing the situation aright, and focusing on the threat for the amount of time needed to gather the relevant information for handling the situation.

Hope

Now we move to the second phase of courageous activity. In this phase, the agent deliberates (if necessary) about the means to accomplishing her end and chooses means. The intentional object of a token of hope is a future difficult but attainable good. A token of hope involves an appetitive movement toward that future, difficult but attainable good. The attainment of the good can be neither construed as certain³⁶ nor as impossible. It must have suitable prospects. Philippa's intention to protect her and Julia's life from the bear will also

³⁶ In his *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology*, Roberts says the defining proposition of hope is, "X presents an attractive possibility possessing a significant degree of probability; may X or its attractive consequences be accomplished (282)." This is necessary for hope, but without further specification, it is insufficient to distinguish hope from desire. Hope seems to be the emotional shape desire takes once an obstacle to the object of desire is perceived such that the object of desire is, due to that obstacle, now construed as having a lesser degree of probability of attainment.

serve as the intentional object of hope. Philippa's hope won't arise immediately but must be built up from her assessing the resources she possesses in herself and available to her for accomplishing her end. Her confidence in these resources will contribute to the formation of hope as she construes the difficult good as attainable in light of these resources. So, Philippa's hope involves an appetitive movement *toward* her and her daughter's safety from the bear construed as a future good that is difficult but attainable. Her construal of this good as attainable depends on her identification of resources available for accomplishing it.

With the growth of hope, fear diminishes. This occurs in part because the rate of impingement on the concern that drives fear decreases as the agent shifts her focus from the threat. But hope and fear can persist together because they concern different intentional objects, fear concerning an evil and hope concerning a good. This diminishment of fear aids deliberation, which is hindered if fear is too intense.³⁷ By inclining the agent toward the difficult good, hope also aids deliberation and choice of means to that end as it signals the presence of a viable means and helps her to endure the discomfort of the stressful situation. Hope motivates Philippa as she makes her deliberative choice of a plan of action to protect herself and Julia by means of confronting the bear.³⁸ Here we see another benefit of hope. It produces daring. The choice of the means to confront the bear for the sake of protecting

³⁷ I agree with Bob Roberts who, in personal conversation, mentioned that there is going to be an inevitable trade-off in some cases between the fittingness of the fear to the object and the intensity of fear that still allows for unhindered deliberation. The consequence of this is that it will sometimes be rational to focus one's attention so as to ignore a feature of the situation in order to lessen the intensity of fitting fear. I do not think this is inconsistent with my view of proper emotions because I hold that proper emotions must be experienced at the proper time.

³⁸ That emotions provide motivation required for good deliberation and action execution is attested to by Antonio Damasio in his treatment of his patient Elliott. Without the benefit of his emotions, Elliott was unable to appreciate salient data, deliberate, decide, and execute action plans. See Damasio's *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, (Harper Perennial, 1995).

their lives will include confronting the bear, which will serve as the intentional object of Philippa's daring in the third phase of courageous activity.

Robert Miner says, "for human hope to be rational, the apprehension of something as possible or impossible requires deliberation."³⁹ While I do not know whether this is correct in every circumstance, it seems correct in most courage-apt situations. Given that the object of fear is an evil construed as too difficult to avoid or successfully confront, to reasonably hope for the good of overcoming such an evil requires discerning at least in part a feasible plan of action to accomplish this difficult task. This plan may be ascertained almost instantly but it will still be deliberative. However, we can imagine cases where confronting the threat was planned for and so it is principally a matter of remembering one's plan rather than creating one in the moment. Hence, I would say that while this phase usually requires deliberation, it may in some cases merely involve a deliberate choice on the basis of a prior process of deliberation. In either case, hope will aid deliberation or remembering for if the person is too fearful, she will be less likely to do either well.

I have mentioned confidence and want to relate it to hope. We could say that what I have been calling hope can be understood as "hope for" while what I've been calling confidence can be understood as "hope in." Aquinas suggests something like this in describing the integral parts of courage.⁴⁰ I suggest that confidence is a sub-species of hope that takes the grounds of hope as its object (rather than the difficult good itself). Aquinas identifies four parts of courage: self-confidence, ability to execute difficult actions with noble purpose (magnificence), resistance to the stresses caused by the threat (patience), and persistence in pursuing the difficult good. The first two assist the aggressive or

³⁹ Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 219.

⁴⁰ *ST* II-II 128.1

confrontational aspect of courageous action and the second two assist the enduring aspect of courageous action. I'll briefly offer a possible account of how the first and last two of these qualities feature in courageous action. I do not claim this is Aquinas' account. First, self-confidence could be an emotion disposition that must be grounded in the actual ability of the agent to execute difficult actions. This emotion disposition enables the undertaking of the courageous action prior to any deliberation about how to respond to the threatening situation. This emotion disposition is not the sole basis for the hope in the courageous action, but this general confidence may become a specific confidence in the agent's ability to utilize the discerned means for executing the courageous action. This ability to utilize the discerned means is at least part of the ground for the hope for overcoming the threat. So, hope at least partly depends on this confidence, which in turn depends on an actual ability to utilize the means available. Second, to endure the difficulty of the threatening situation requires a proper response to the threat and to the difficult good being pursued. Proper fear is the proper response to the threat. But all fear has a painful affect. If the person is unable to cope with the stressful effects of the painful affect, and so gives up or panics, he will fail to act virtuously. So, this resistance to or acceptance of the pain of fear is a quality that the courageous requires. Third, not only must the courageous person be resistant to the painful affect of fear, but he must persist in the pursuit of the difficult good. Hope is the emotion that assists him in this pursuit and produces the daring that enables the accomplishment of the mean to the difficult good.

Daring

The intentional object of a token of daring is a future, threatening *evil* difficult but within one's power to successfully confront. A token of daring involves an appetitive

movement *toward* the future, difficult evil that is construed as within one's power to successfully confront. Daring is the contrary of fear and properly follows after it in courageous activity. Miner states, "Fear and daring, Aquinas says in the *De Veritate*, are contraries 'according to whether the evil surpasses or does not surpass our capacity.'"⁴¹ Fear is the contrary of daring on the basis of their contrary intentional objects and their contrary appetitive movements. Regarding the first, daring is experienced on the basis of the construal of the evil as within one's power to successfully confront whereas fear is experienced on the basis of the construal of the evil as too difficult to avoid or successfully confront. Regarding the second, fear is an appetitive movement away from the threat (i.e., to avoid it) while daring is an appetitive movement toward the threat (i.e., to confront it). The contrary intentional objects and contrary appetitive movements mark the distinction between the two. As daring and fear are distinct and contrary, a person cannot experience daring and fear at the same time with respect to the same object in the same respect.

I do not deny the possibility of cases of mixed emotions in which a person experiences fear and daring as occurring simultaneously. The explanation of this is that the emotions are occurring in rapid succession as a consequence of the agent switching between a construal of the threat as within his power to confront and not within his power. This switching may occur in light of the agent focusing on different aspects of the circumstances. Or, it may occur if the agent is considering two different objects in the situation, one of which is the object of fear and the other of which is the object of daring. But, the agent cannot experience fear and daring regarding the same object at the time and in the same respect. Because of this contrariety and because daring follows after a judgment in the

⁴¹ Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 255 is quoting from *Questiones Disputatae de Veritate* 26.4.co.

second phase about the plan of action to be pursued, daring beneficially rules out fear during the action's third phase or execution. This is beneficial for while fear is not an appetitive impediment in the first phase of courageous activity, it is an impediment in the third phase. It is an impediment because the caution and hesitancy which were useful at the beginning to prevent rash action and to assist careful gathering of salient information are not useful when it is time for confronting the threat. I do not claim that the agent might not properly experience fear after beginning to execute his plan of action and thus begin at phase one again. Many courage-apt situations may require the courageous agent to undergo multiple iterations of these phases if the circumstances are rapidly changing. I am assuming a case without such changes in order to keep my analysis simple. So, I do not claim that it would be inappropriate for fear to recur as new developments arise in the situation. What I do claim is that provided there are no new developments, once the plan of action is in place and the execution of it commences, caution and hesitation will not help that action's execution.⁴² Hence, the third phase of courageous activity is ideally characterized by daring fearlessness.

Daring's dependence on hope reveals how daring depends on the second phase. Daring depends on hope as its cause. This is in part because hope and daring share the same grounds. Daring is related to hope as a means is to an end. Hope concerns an end and is grounded by the agent's confidence in the means to attaining that end. Daring concerns a means to that end and so requires hope as a principle or source. Daring involves an appetitive movement toward an object construed as a future evil within one's power to

⁴² In the first chapter of *The Ball and the Cross*, G.K. Chesterton states this point with his characteristic panache. "And he felt as every man feels in the taut moment of such terror that his chief danger was terror itself; his only possible strength would be a coolness amounting to carelessness, a carelessness amounting almost to a suicidal swagger. His one wild chance of coming out safely would be in not too desperately desiring to be safe...."

successfully confront.⁴³ The evil is the threat. Note that, first, daring, like fear and unlike hope, is about an evil *per se*, i.e., the threat. As daring involves an appetitive movement toward the threat, it involves construing the threat, which is an evil *per se*, as a good *per accidens*, i.e., as difficult but within one's power to successfully confront. In order for the object of daring to be so construed, the object must be seen in light of the agent's grounds for hope. This reveals daring's dependence on hope but does not reduce daring to hope. For, in contrast, hope is about a difficult good *per se*, i.e., safety from the threat. So, hope and daring are distinct. Second, daring requires hope, which is grounded in a plan of action (or some resource for accomplishing the end), in order to construe the threat as within one's power to successfully confront.

To illustrate the difference between daring and hope, consider a boxing match. The object of hope is victory over one's opponent as attainable while the object of daring is one's opponent himself as beatable. There is a distinct phenomenology to the feeling of hope for the prize of victory and the feeling of daring toward the opponent. Hope involves a longing that is absent from daring and feels more like desire. Daring is associated with narrowing of the eyes, clenching of the jaw, and an eagerness for aggressive action.

Hope in victory is prior to the daring to attack one's opponent. If one loses hope, one loses daring. One might think that daring could be the cause of hope because hope and daring share the same grounds. They both are grounded on an assessment of one's ability to defeat the opponent. But as the object of daring is a means to the object of hope, and we desire means for the sake of previous ends, hope precedes and is the cause of daring. Daring

⁴³ In my view Jennifer Herdt's "Aquinas's Aristotelian Defense of Martyr Courage," in *Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics*, co-edited by Tobias Hoffmann with Jörn Müller and Matthias Perkams (Cambridge University Press, 2013) incorrectly conflates daring and hope when she says that "daring is hope of attaining a difficult good, while fear is of the loss of a good under threat (118)."

requires this hope to modify the evil of the threat so as to make it an object of pursuit. The object of daring is an evil and an evil *per se* is not an object of pursuit (confrontation in this case) unless it is modified in some way. It is an object of pursuit (good *per accidens*) in virtue of its pursuit leading to some good. This good is the object of hope. Hence, again, hope in the attainment of this good is prior to daring just as intending of an end is prior to the willing of the means to that end.⁴⁴

A feature of the fear response is that fear initiates the bodily systems called the flight or fight response. It is clear that the concomitant bodily response of daring includes the flight or fight response. Fear and daring share a set of somatic responses. Since the somatic responses are initiated by fear, daring depends on fear at a somatic level in at least courage-apt situations (situations that involve significant threats). I doubt whether every instance of daring must be preceded by fear. It seems that some situations involve a threat that the person initially perceives as within one's power to successfully overcome and attacks it with daring and without fear.⁴⁵ But this would not be an exercise of courage. Paradigmatic courageous activity involves the confrontation of a significant threat, wherein the object threatened is highly valued, the threat to it is great, and the situation contains enough uncertainty that the threat is initially construed (not judged) as too difficult to be successfully confronted. These situations warrant and produce fear. For example, no matter how skilled a soldier, his engaging in combat warrants some fear given the many uncertainties of a particular engagement and the deadly significance of potential threats. This is not to say that

⁴⁴ This does not entail that daring is an emotion that requires judgment. Someone can be rashly daring. However, in the ideal case daring will follow upon a judgment of means.

⁴⁵ The rash person, the overconfident, or the dare-devil may all exhibit this affectivity. But there may be cases where such affectivity is proper. I thank Robert Roberts for discussion on this point.

the excellences that comprise courage do not assist in situations of less significance.⁴⁶ But courage in its full development enables acting well in situations of significant threat. In sum, the emotion of daring follows after the fear if the threat is confirmed to be genuine and hope is taken in the perception that the means for overcoming it may be adequate. Daring follows upon a change of construal of the threat from too difficult to confront to within one's power to successfully confront and makes use of the bodily response that the fear initiated and that hope directed toward confronting the threat.

To return to our vignette, buoyed by hope, Philippa commences the execution of her plan and turns her attention to confronting the bear. As she does so, she feels a surge of energy as she fearlessly and daringly begins to yell, wave her arms, and throw rocks.

This model shows how the emotions coordinate with the will in service of reason through each phase of courageous activity. It shows which emotions are necessary to a paradigmatic case of courage and why. Fear, hope, and daring principally assist at different phases of courageous activity. In the first phase, fear induces caution, readies the body for quick response, and focuses the attention on gathering salient information from the situation. In the second phase, hope moves the agent toward the end, diminishes fear, aids deliberation, and produces daring. In the third phase, daring moves the agent toward confronting the threat, energizes the execution of the plan of action, and eliminates fear.

Let me summarize what I've done. Following Roberts I assume that emotions are concern-based construals. Following Aquinas, I assume that fear involves an appetitive movement away from an imminent threat that the agent perceives as too difficult to successfully confront, hope involves an appetitive movement toward a good perceived as

⁴⁶ It is a sign of the lack of courage that a person is unable to act well in the face of comparatively insignificant anxieties. These situations may serve as the training ground for developing courage.

difficult but attainable with suitable prospects, and daring involves an appetitive movement toward an imminent threat that the agent perceives as within his power to successfully confront. I divide courageous activity into three distinct phases: response and intention, choice of means (which often involves deliberation), and command and execution. Given these assumptions, I argue that fear is a proper first response to a perception of an apparently significant threat. Fear not only initiates bodily responses useful to dealing with the threat, but, in the courageous person who exhibits proper emotional responses, facilitates caution in assessing the resources to handle the threat and deliberation about the best means to do so. The consequent concern of the fear is to avoid the threat in some way. The good of averting the threat is the object of hope. Paradigmatic courageous activity involves averting the threat by some means of confronting the threat. In such cases, hope occurs when the good of averting the threat by overcoming it is perceived as attainable with suitable prospects (where the success conditions for overcoming the threat vary according to the situation and intention of the agent). The hope does not concern the threat as such but the good of averting it. Hope is principally activated when the means for overcoming the threat are discerned. But hope may also facilitate deliberation concerning the means to overcome the threat. Overcoming the threat requires confronting the threat, which is the object of daring. Daring is a product of hope. The object of daring bears an analogous relation to the object of hope as a means to an end bears to the end. Daring properly follows i) after confirming that the threat is genuine and intending to confront it (the phase during which fear is the principal emotion), and ii) after assessing the adequacy of the resources to confront the threat and choosing appropriate means to the good of overcoming it (the phase during which hope is the principal emotion). Daring facilitates the execution of the action and utilizes the body's flight or fight response that was initiated by the fear. Proper fear,

hope, and daring enable the courageous person to act in a courageous manner. But each emotion principally (though not exclusively) does so during different phases of the courageous activity: fear at first response, hope during deliberative choice, and daring during execution.

Objections

I will now address an objection that I call the Alamo objection. The battle of the Alamo, so my Texan friends tell me, involved about 180 men against 1800 men. These friends consider the defenders of the Alamo to definitely evince paradigmatic courageous activity. Suppose they are right. Given the odds and the fact that no reinforcements would arrive, the defenders of the Alamo knew they would die. Could the defenders show courage in the way I've argued when there were no grounds for hope in victory? How could they hope? How could they have daring?

My response is that there can be a variety of proper objects of hope and conditions for successful confrontation. The difficult good which is the object of hope need not be overcoming the threat as such (in the sense that it is reduced to no longer being a threat) but acting well in some other way that still involves facing it. For example, the difficult good might be delaying the enemy, accomplishing a larger military goal, testifying to the rightness of one's cause in the face of sure death, the goal of acting courageously, or something else.⁴⁷ To illustrate one such possible military objective, I've been told that an officer under General Santa Anna remarked that "If we win many more battles like that one, we will lose

⁴⁷ Daring depends on hope which depends on a construal of significant probability of successfully achieving one's end. If that construal is of an insufficient probability, then hope will fade and daring along with it. But, a new goal can be set that has a significant enough probability of success such that hope, and subsequently daring, is restored.

the war.” To illustrate this response with our vignette, suppose that the bear begins to attack Philippa. She may not hope to live but still hope to save Julia by giving her a chance to flee.

The Alamo objection raises another objection. If the good that is the object of hope shifts, then the analysis fails to cover all cases of courageous activity for then the threat, which is relative to the good, is different in the case of daring than it was in the case of the initial fear.⁴⁸

For example, suppose the good in the first case is winning and surviving the battle. But after it becomes clear that one will lose and die, then the good becomes something else such as holding off the enemy as long as possible. But then the enemy is no longer construed as a threat to winning and one’s life, but as a threat to holding off the enemy as long as possible. So, the fear that one feels at the start of the action (which is of the enemy as a threat to winning and one’s life) will not be related to hope in the same way that I suggested in the simple case. For the consequent concern of fear (avoid the threat by winning and surviving) will no longer be the intentional object of hope (which is now holding off the enemy as long as possible). These goods are distinct. Furthermore, the intentional object of daring will no longer be the contrary of the intentional object of the initial fear.

Earlier I mentioned that many courage-apt situations may require the courageous agent to undergo multiple iterations of these three phases if the circumstances are rapidly changing and that I was assuming a case without such changes in order to keep my analysis simple. I do not think that such a simple analysis can cover every case of multiply iterated phases. But I do think my analysis provides the basis for affirming that courage requires excellent fear, hope, and daring. The initial Alamo objection was against the requirement for

⁴⁸ I thank Steve Evans for pressing this objection.

hope. I think my response to it succeeds in this respect. But this second objection requires a weakening of the claims of my analysis. I think that in the event that the case becomes hopeless, then the agent aborts the first action and begins another, restarting the phases of courageous activity. If this occurs, some aspects of the connection between the emotions will be lost that were present in the analysis of the simple case. For example, it may be that fear does not occur in the first stage of the new action given it was already activated in the prior action. But there will be a link between the fear to the first hope, to despair, to the new hope, and new daring.

To apply my response to the second objection back to the Alamo case, in the first action the agent experiences fear and hope before aborting the action. In the second action, the agent experiences hope and daring (but perhaps not fear). I grant that because of the new goal, the nature of the threat that the daring concerns will now be the enemy as a threat to holding them off as long as possible and not the enemy as a threat to winning the battle and one's life.

I think that this does not undermine my claim that fear, hope, and daring are necessary for the full exercise of courage. Hope and daring will still assist the two phases of the second action in the right kind of way, and so still be necessary (just as the fear did in the first action). But the objection is correct that they will not be related to the initial fear in the way that the analysis of the simple case holds. So, in cases of multiple actions the link between the three will be different than in the case of a single action. However, multiple action cases will highlight that the courageous person will focus his attention in such a way that it is the newfound hope and daring that are experienced rather than the old fear.

Upshots

An upshot of my model is that I can account for the insight of the common views of fear's relation to courage with which we begin and answer the following questions. What is correct about the view that courage requires fearlessness? What is correct about the view that courage requires conquering one's fears?

The fearlessness view correctly holds that fearlessness is a part of courageous activity. But fear is absent only during the execution of the action when daring is present. The view is problematic because requiring the total absence of fear is humanly unrealistic, would make the first phase of courageous activity less reliable because it lacks fear's positive contribution, and, given the account of emotions assumed here, would suggest either too little focus on the threat, an inaccurate perception of the threat, or too little love of the good threatened.

The will power view correctly holds that fear is part of courageous activity, that fear must be governed by reason, and that fear should be diminished. However, it potentially misidentifies the means to doing so. Fear should not diminish by being suppressed but by the agent shifting her attention to an end to be pursued in light of the threat, identifying her plan for achieving it, and executing it. Fear should be eliminated when it is replaced by daring in the action's execution. The will power view is problematic because it suggests that fear must be an internal impediment or hindrance to action. I have suggested that it is an impediment at the third phase of courageous activity but not at the first. Fear is an impediment at the first phase only if something about it is amiss. For example, the situation is misperceived, or there is too much focus on the object feared, or too great a love of the good threatened.

My view can account for what is correct in the will power view. I assigned fear and daring different proper times in courageous activity. Fear's proper time is the initial phase of courageous activity and daring's proper time is the final phase, for over the course of courageous activity the assessment of the prospects of successfully confronting the threat change. This explanation of the transition from fear being the dominant emotion to daring being the dominant emotion is superior to the will power view's position that courage consists in overcoming one's fear. There is a genuine transition from the predominance of fear to daring over the course of courageous activity. But this transition is not accomplished by the unnecessarily energy-inefficient act of will power, but by deliberation and proper attention to what is salient to acting well in the situation. This is not to imply that fear is pleasant. It is unpleasant and a person who values comfort too much will likely be unable to deal with fear without will power. But if will power is necessary to overcome the fear, then the fear is acting as a rebel within. But proper fear is not a rebel but an ally.

The second upshot, which I shall merely suggest here (although I will discuss the distinction in greater detail in the next chapter), is that my model provides a substantive way to distinguish a state of continent courage from true courage. Sometimes the general distinction between continence and true virtue is thought to depend on whether the agent finds the performance of virtuous action pleasant. I shall discuss the role of pleasure in courageous activity in the next two chapters. But here I claim, instead, that the appetitive coordination of proper emotions and will described in this model is necessary for true courage. Its lack is at best continent courage. Hence, the two common views we discussed are at best states of continence.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided a plausible explanation of the claim of Aristotle that began this essay. He was correct to affirm that courage requires proper fear and daring. I've also shown why it requires hope. I provided a model of how fear, hope, and daring properly contribute to the excellence of a courageous manner of acting. This model shows what emotions are necessary for paradigmatic courageous activity, how and when they contribute, and how they coordinate with the will in service of reason. I argued that the distinct contribution of each of these emotions is made evident by the formal structure of each emotion. I employed Robert Roberts's theory of emotions, Thomas Aquinas's particular definitions of fear, hope, and daring, and research from contemporary neuroscience on the fear response to develop and support my model. Further, the model captures the insights of two common views about the relation between courage and fear and suggests a substantive way to distinguish the truly courageous agent from the merely continent one. We should affirm that fear, hope, and daring are emotions necessary for paradigmatic courageous activity.

CHAPTER FOUR

Natural Virtue, Continnence, Virtue, and the Pleasures of Courage

“...who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame...”

Hebrews 12:2 ESV

In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for and begin the defense of the seemingly counterintuitive claim that all courageous activity requires pleasure. This groundwork consists in an account of pleasure and a partial account of the structure of moral action, which I extend to an account of courageous action. I identify two kinds of pleasure that courageous activity requires and answer objections to my view.

Introduction

It is common to suppose that virtue enables activity with promptness, ease, and pleasure.¹ But ease and pleasure, at least, seem strange in the case of courage. Courageous actions are difficult and often painful. How could courageous activity require ease and pleasure? I will try to answer this question over the next two chapters. Getting to the answer is no easy (or perhaps too pleasant of a) task. It requires complicated stories about pleasure and action. But the key to the answer, I contend, lies in identifying the different kinds of pleasure that the continent agent and the naturally virtuous agent take in choosing their

¹ Aristotle famously affirms that all virtuous action involves pleasure in his *Nicomachean Ethics* I.8, 1099a16–21 (henceforth *NE*), “...the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, *virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant.*” Emphasis mine. Unless otherwise indicated, I use the W.D. Ross translation available in multiple editions. However, Aristotle qualifies his claim regarding pleasure when he discusses courage in *NE* 1117b10. As I interpret him, he states that courageous action need not be pleasant in its exercise.

actions. I think that when we identify these and combine them, we will arrive at our answer. In choosing her action, the paradigmatically virtuous person experiences, perhaps surprisingly, both the pleasure of the continent and the pleasure of the naturally virtuous. I do not argue that this renders the execution of the action pleasant. So, an upshot and attractive point of my view of the relation of pleasure to virtue is that it illuminates the distinction many contemporary ethicists make, following Aristotle, between virtuous, continent, and naturally virtuous individuals. To defend my thesis about pleasure and illuminate the previous distinction, I shall utilize the distinction made in chapter one between the reason for action and the manner of action.

In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for and begin the defense of the seemingly counterintuitive claim that all courageous activity requires pleasure.² This groundwork consists in an account of pleasure and a partial account of the structure of moral action, which I extend to an account of courageous action. I identify two kinds of pleasure that courageous activity requires. In slightly more detail, I begin with a general account of pleasure. I use this account of pleasure to identify a variety of pleasures, one of which I will argue is necessary for all paradigmatic virtuous actions and another of which is at least necessary for paradigmatic courageous actions. To accomplish these latter two aims, I engage Christine Korsgaard's interpretation of Kant and Aristotle's shared account of the structure of an action and its moral value. I relate these accounts to the discussion of the relation of pleasure to virtue. I argue for a distinct kind of pleasure, noble pleasure, which all virtuous actions require. I defend that paradigmatic courageous action requires what I call pleasure in the end. I defend that both are pleasures according to my definition of pleasure. I

² In this section, when I speak of paradigmatic courageous action or paradigmatic virtuous action I mean to refer to the full scope of paradigmatic courageous or virtuous activity.

answer objections to my claims, including that my view involves problematic self-love and mixed motives in the paradigmatic courageous agent's choice of action. In the next chapter, I identify some other relevant kinds of pleasure to evaluate as the potential candidates for the pleasure that courageous activity involves and develop my contention here that two kinds of pleasure are required.

An Account of Pleasure

My account of pleasure is broadly Aristotelian.³ It is an account of pleasure that covers the distinction between what Aristotle calls pleasures of the soul and pleasures of the body or what contemporary theorists call pleasures of the mind and pleasures of the body.⁴ My purpose is not to defend this account in detail but to state the components that I think are needed for any account of pleasure and employ the account in service of answering questions about the relation of virtue and pleasure.

It is not my purpose to engage in the exegetical controversies surrounding Aristotle's account of pleasure, but I use what Aristotle says about pleasure in *Nicomachean Ethics* (specifically books III, VII, X) and *Rhetoric* (I.11) as a springboard for identifying components of pleasure. According to Aristotle, pleasure *is, supervenes on, or completes*⁵ the "conscious"⁶ "*unimpeded activity of a natural disposition.*"⁷ I distinguish the definition into three

³ It is influenced by insights from Aristotle, Aquinas, and contemporary theorists, although I have not seen an account that includes all of the components I identify.

⁴ Aristotle says, "We may assume the distinction between bodily pleasures and those of the soul." (*NE* III.10, 1117b29). In *NE* X.4, 1174b20–21, he says that there are pleasures associated with any sense faculty and with faculties of thought and contemplation.

⁵ See *NE* III *passim*. I remain neutral with respect to which of these three is correct or which is held by Aristotle.

⁶ *Rhetoric* I.11, 1369b. Here I use the W. Rhys Roberts translation available in multiple editions. According to J.C.B. Gosling and C.C.W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1982), 185, for Plato pleasure is equal to the perception of replenishment of lack. In

parts: pleasure i) *is, supervenes on, or completes* ii) the “conscious” iii) “*unimpeded activity of a natural disposition.*” I call the first the *relation* (whether identity, supervenience, or completion), the second *apprehension* or awareness, and the third is the conjunction of a disposition (which I call an *appetite*), an *activity* of that appetite, and a *manner of possession* (e.g., to possess in an unimpeded manner). I take these to be some of the necessary components of pleasure. To this list I add the *object* of pleasure, i.e., what the pleasure is taken in. While I assume that pleasure has an object, I will not argue for this view.⁸ This object must be *possessed*. The way in which the object is possessed by the agent depends on the object. Now I shall list, explain, and illustrate how I understand these necessary components of pleasure the obtaining of which is also sufficient (given the correct relation) for pleasure. I do not claim that my way of understanding them is Aristotle’s. The components are as follows:

1. *Object* (of pleasure)
2. *Possession* (of the object)
3. *Manner of possession* (of the object)
4. *Apprehension* (or awareness)

her, “Nicomachean Ethics VII.11-12: Pleasure” in Natali, Carlo, *Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII: Symposium Aristotelicum* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 196, Dorothea Frede argues that the *Rhetoric’s* definition is, like Plato’s, medical or remedial while the *NE’s* definition is unimpeded activity and that these are inconsistent. The *Rhetoric’s* definition involves the restoration to a natural state. My account seeks to unify the *Rhetoric’s* account of pleasure with the account in the *NE* by emphasizing the *Rhetoric’s* perception component while ignoring replenishment language. The notion of replenishment seems to me a kind of ‘having’ of a good that needlessly limits the account of pleasure. My use of ‘having’ is intended to encompass a greater scope of pleasures. I do not think Aristotle says enough to ground a great degree of confidence in identifying his precise view of pleasure.

⁷ *NE* VII.12, 1153a14–15.

⁸ I am sympathetic with those who, like Franz Brentano, *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics: Routledge Revivals*, (Routledge, 2009) and Olivier Massin, “The Intentionality of Pleasures,” in *Themes from Brentano*, ed. D. Fissette and G. Frechette (Rodopi, 2013) defend the view that all pleasures are intentional episodes or acts and defend a hedonic monist account of pleasure that applies to both pleasures of the body and mind. I take the difficult cases for this view to be pleasant bodily feelings such as the pleasure of stretching one’s muscles. I take the object here to be one’s own body, whether at a particular bodily location or overall. However, for my purposes here I need not affirm his particular view. But I do affirm that any pleasure has an object.

5. *Appetite* (disposition to possess the object)
6. *Activity* (of the appetite)

Here is an example to illustrate these conditions. Stella satisfies her desire to dance through dancing. She has to be aware that she is dancing and, given her particular desire, she must dance with some skill to feel pleasure. Her desire to dance is her active *appetite*. Her feeling pleasure is, supervenes on, or completes the *activity* of her appetite, a state I call “resting.” We could also call the activity of her appetite the ongoing satisfying of her desire. But this is less economical, so I prefer resting. Her awareness of her dancing is the *apprehension* required. “Dancing” (or the activity⁹ of dancing) is the *object* of her pleasure and she *possesses* the object by dancing. Her dancing with some skill is the *manner of possession*.

Each of these components is required to explain the case. The appetite and object components allow me to distinguish the desire (appetite) for dancing (object) from the desires for fantasizing about dancing or for reading about dancing. The activity component allows me to distinguish cases of pleasure from those of pain or frustrated desire. The possession component allows me to distinguish cases of actually dancing from those of not dancing. The apprehension component allows me to distinguish cases of dancing with attention from those of dancing while distracted. The manner of possession condition allows me to distinguish cases of dancing well from those of dancing badly. Now I will explain these components in greater detail.

First, the object is that which is desirable (i.e., the particular good) the having of which brings the pleasure. But having the object alone does not bring pleasure. The object

⁹ This is not to be confused with the activity of the appetite required for all pleasure.

can be a sensation (e.g., the warmth of a fire), a perceptible thing¹⁰ (e.g., seeing a friend) or activity (e.g., dancing), or an intelligible thing (e.g., a proposition) or activity (e.g., contemplating). What counts as desirable in this sense is specified by the natural or acquired dispositional state of an appetite. In what follows I will discuss two main kinds of pleasure: *sensible* and *intellectual* pleasures.

Sensible pleasure can be divided into *sensational* pleasures (e.g., in the fire's warmth) and *perceptual* pleasures (e.g., in seeing a friend or remembering a stimulating conversation). But this subdivision will not play an important role and I will generally refer to *sensible pleasures* when I do not wish to specify whether one or both are involved. An example of *intellectual pleasure* is pleasure in the justice of a just action. This is not the place to defend a complete account of the distinctions between sensational, perceptual, or intellectual pleasure, and the various hybrid pleasures they can compose. But the basic idea is that pleasures can be individuated by their objects, where sensations, perceptions (such as construals as explained in previous chapters¹¹), and intellections can all take objects of pleasure. Pleasures are often complex and composed of various kinds of objects.

Often, but not always, the object of pleasure is some act (e.g., noticing a lovely color) or some appropriately related series of acts, which I call an "activity" of the agent (e.g., reading a graphic novel).¹² The object of a pleasure may be an activity (e.g., dancing) but

¹⁰ As I am using 'perception' it is the 'perceptible thing' under a formal aspect. The perception is the intentional object. This is how this term was used when I discussed perceptions as a construal in prior chapters. For example, the object of pleasure of a person remembering a pleasant exchange with a friend is a perception.

¹¹ My account of pleasure includes pleasures that are satisfactions of the concerns generated by concern-based construals.

¹² I do not have a precise account of the distinction between an act and an activity. An activity seems to be an ongoing series of acts that are united in some way. I can accomplish my aims by calling everything that I refer to as an 'activity' an 'act.' But this varies from ordinary usage and so I stick with 'activity' where appropriate unless the context makes this a cause for confusion. To ward

need not be. Knitting, dancing, planning, and contemplating are other activities of this sort. Sometimes the object of pleasure is not (only) the activity itself but a product of the activity. Knitting is a productive activity that involves the cooperation of faculties, organs, body parts, etc., that can be enjoyable in itself, but it also has a goal beyond the activity, e.g., the production of a knit article, that one can enjoy achieving. So, there are many different kinds of activities that can be enjoyed for some product of the activity or for the activity itself or for both. The objects of pleasure will be the product, the activity itself, or the activity and the product respectively.

Second, the object of pleasure must be *possessed* for the appetite to rest, or to be in a state of being satisfied, and so for pleasure to occur.¹³ For example, to enjoy a painting, one must see or remember the painting. To see or remember is to possess the painting. The possession component concerns how the object of pleasure is possessed. Objects may be possessed by external senses (sight, taste, smell, hearing, or touch), internal senses (e.g., memory or imagination), or by intellectual reflection. Different objects are possessed in different ways. I do not offer a general account of what is necessary for possessing an object. The notion I have in mind is that if the object of one's pleasure is dancing, then one possesses that object by the activity of dancing. If the object is the proposition that God exists, then the object is had by a relevant propositional attitude towards it. If the object of one's pleasure is money, then one possesses that object by having the money in one's wallet, bank account, or in some way that one recognizes and counts as accessible. I trust that the notion is clear enough. While it might be more appropriate in the case of dancing to use a

off potential confusion, I note that the activity component of pleasure is not the claim that pleasure's object must be an act or activity of an agent.

¹³ I discuss this notion of 'rest' below.

term such as ‘perform’ in lieu of ‘possess,’ I use ‘possess’ as a general term in order to cover cases of pleasure that do not concern activities. For example, a person may take pleasure in a warm bath and we would not speak of performing a warm bath.¹⁴

Third, the *manner of possession* component concerns to what degree the object of pleasure is possessed. An object that is possessed only tenuously does not afford much pleasure if any at all. So, possessing the object in a relatively unimpeded way is required for pleasure because it is needed for the appetite to rest in an unimpeded way. For example, if a person is taking pleasure in dancing well and then begins to dance poorly, then her pleasure in well-performed dancing will diminish or cease, depending on whether her dancing falls below whatever threshold of skill she requires for pleasure.¹⁵ To dance poorly is to possess in a diminished manner the object of dancing. I do not suppose that pleasure requires the entire absence of impediment. For example, a person may take pleasure in playing the piano, even if they often make mistakes and realize they are doing so. But I think that pleasure is often proportionate to the lack of impediment. In sum, pleasure requires an object that must be possessed in some way and to some relatively unimpeded degree.

Fourth, the *apprehension* component amounts to the claim that pleasures require awareness of one’s possession of the object of pleasure. The agent must attend in some way

¹⁴ Here is a story to motivate another way this distinction is useful. Suppose Al deeply desires to marry Linda. He asks her and she says no. That night, he dreams that she said yes and takes great pleasure in her doing so. But upon waking he realizes it was but a dream and is pained by the reality of his rejection. His pleasure in the dream is not a consequence of possessing the object of his desire, Linda’s yes, but of possessing another object, the fantasy of Linda’s yes. But in the dream he does not distinguish this fantasy from reality. Once he realizes his mistake, his pleasure ceases. We can believe we possess a desired object when in fact we possess a different, though related, object instead.

¹⁵ Vagueness concerns arise here. I offer no principled way to identify where the cutoff is between impeded and unimpeded possession. But the notion is plausible even without a theoretical account of the relation. I trust that plausibility is sufficient for my aims here. I think that one who rejected any notion of impeded possession may be able to accept most of what I argue here with little modification.

to her possession of the object in order to have pleasure. This awareness need not be reflective or self-reflective.¹⁶ This awareness can be had in various ways and by various faculties (e.g., interoception, sight, touch, memory, intellectual reflection, etc.).¹⁷ But somehow or other the agent must attend to her possession of the object of pleasure. If such apprehension is distracted, then the pleasure is impeded. This is not to be confused with the possession of the object. For example, if our dancer is dancing well (i.e., the possession component) and taking pleasure in so doing but, while continuing to dance well, becomes distracted by some absorbing thought, then her pleasure in the dancing will stop or diminish. For, she no longer apprehends her possession of the object. In some cases such as intellectual reflection, the possession of the object of pleasure will entail apprehension of its possession. The apprehension or awareness of the possession of the object, as well as the possession of the object itself, must be relatively unimpeded for pleasure to occur.

Fifth, the disposition that I call *the appetite* is that feature of the agent that makes her possession of some object fitting in a way that is pleasant. We could also call it a concern (or disposition to desire or value) but I think that is probably too specific. The visceral disposition to scratch an itch also counts as an appetite.¹⁸ So, I am using appetite in a very broad sense. I wish to include natural and acquired appetites, and so natural and acquired

¹⁶ I distinguish between these. I use reflective to mean an explicit act of the intellect while I use self-reflective to mean an explicit act of the intellect with regard to oneself. I shall discuss this distinction in detail below.

¹⁷ Aristotle says of pleasure in the *Rhetoric* I.11, 1370a6–7

[P]leasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion; but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation...If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected....

¹⁸ The pleasure of scratching an itch involves the satisfaction of a bodily disposition by means of removing the unpleasant somatic sensation of the itch.

desire and values. The appetite must be active rather than dormant when one is taking pleasure. For example, pleasure accompanies the fulfillment of a desire rather than the mere absence of a desire. This does not mean that the appetite must be activated prior to the perceiving of the object of pleasure. Objects can elicit desires.

Sixth, I use the term ‘resting’ to indicate *the activity* of an appetite that every pleasure involves.¹⁹ The agent’s appetite rests or is actively being satisfied when she attends to her having the object. The metaphor of rest captures this actively being satisfied without implying being merely sated. *This resting is the activity that all pleasure involves.* The apprehension of the possessed object brings the relevant appetite into its natural or acquired state of rest. This activity is not to be confused with the object of pleasure, which can be an activity.

With these qualifications I give the following definition:

Pleasure is, supervenes on, or completes an agent’s *appetite’s resting* in her *apprehension of her unimpeded possession of a desirable object.*

“Pleasure is, supervenes on, or completes” is what I call the relation claim on which I wish to remain neutral. “Appetite” is what I call the appetite or disposition component. I use ‘appetite’ in a wider sense than Aristotle’s use of *epithumia*, often translated as ‘appetite.’ “Resting” is the activity of an appetite that every pleasure involves. The agent’s “unimpeded” “possession” includes the manner of possession and possession components. This general account covers the variety of pleasures.

¹⁹ I picked up this term from Thomas Aquinas, who favors it and uses it frequently in his writings. That pleasure is a kind of resting is a notion that includes the platonic insight that pleasure is restorative. This resting need not be ongoing, as in the case of the pleasure of some useful accomplishment that is a means to a larger goal.

Some Kinds of Pleasure

Talbot Brewer observes, ‘All pleasures are vivid seemings of goodness. Sometimes the goodness is found in one’s circumstances, sometimes in one’s ongoing activities, and sometimes in one’s passive experiences.’²⁰ The pithy phrase that pleasures are vivid seemings of goodness expresses well the idea of pleasure I have in mind. Importantly, things can seem good in many ways. In what follows are some examples to illustrate the components of pleasure according to different “seemings of goodness.” I distinguish five kinds of pleasure here. I focus on the last three in this chapter and employ the first two in the next.

Saul takes pleasure in a warm bath. The object of pleasure is the sensation of the warm bath. He has a natural somatic appetite that is satisfied (in addition to any desires he may have had to take a bath). He possesses this object by the response of his tactile senses to the warm water against his skin. If his sense of touch was damaged, his possession would be impeded, diminishing his pleasure. He apprehends this possession by attending to it. To some degree, the more he concentrates his attention on the warm feel on his skin, the greater his pleasure. If he were distracted, his apprehension of the warm water against his skin would be impeded, diminishing his pleasure. His appetite, which we may call in this case his appetite for the somatic sensation of a warm bath, rests in the sensations he experiences.

Sarah takes pleasure in remembering a lovely dinner with friends. The object is the event of the lovely dinner with friends. She possesses it via her memory of the occasion. By actively remembering it she is also aware of her possession of the memory. Her remembering (possession) and her apprehension of the object do not come apart. The appetites or dispositions in question are multiple, including her concerns for her friendships,

²⁰ Talbot Brewer, *The Retrieval of Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 135. I thank Robert Kruschwitz for showing me this passage and discussion of its relation to my project.

good food, and good conversation. The pleasure tracks the vividness with which Sarah remembers the event.

Samuel desires to win a race. The goal or end of winning is the object of his pleasure. In considering whether to enter the local race, he takes pleasure in the thought of winning the race and decides to sign up. In this case, the object of his pleasure is his end of winning the race. He possesses that end by imagining, considering and intending it. He is aware of that consideration because he chooses to act on his end. The more vividly he imagines winning, the greater his pleasure in his end of winning.

Samuel runs the race and wins. Now Samuel takes pleasure in having won the race. The object of his pleasure here is his having won. He desires to win (appetite) and possesses the object by winning the race. If he is conscious or aware of doing so, and hasn't fainted with exhaustion, he apprehends his having won the race. Though running the race itself was painful (we can assume in this case²¹), his apprehending his having won the race is pleasant (his appetite rests).

Søren takes pleasure in the justice of a just action he witnesses. The object of his desire is justice in general and he possesses this object in a particular way through witnessing the performance of a just action and conceiving that action as intrinsically worthwhile in virtue of its being a just action. His appetite, which in this case is his will for justice, rests in the good of the just action that he sees. He takes pleasure in the just action to the degree that he apprehends its justice.

²¹ In reality many runners take some pleasure in the race, especially at the beginning when there is no pain and one's body is performing its task with ease.

In summary, I have distinguished five examples of pleasure.

1. Sensational pleasure (Saul's pleasure in the sensations of his warm bath; tactile sensations are paradigmatic²²)
2. Activity pleasure (Sarah's pleasure in the activity of remembering a lovely dinner party)
3. Pleasure in the end (Samuel's pleasure in the end of his chosen action, which is to win the race)
4. Success pleasure (Samuel's pleasure in successfully achieving his end of winning the race)
5. Noble pleasure (Søren's pleasure in the justice that constitutes the action's intrinsic worth)

These pleasures can be combined in various ways. There are other kinds of pleasure, but I will use this set as the groundwork for my discussion of pleasure in this chapter and the next. In this chapter, I will focus on the last three kinds of pleasure. In the next chapter, I will also focus on the first two and a few other kinds. I now turn to an explanation of how to understand the relation between the structure of intentional action and moral value. This framework will help me relate pleasure to virtuous action and to explain further the last three kinds of pleasure. In what follows, I clarify the structure of a courageous action, the right reason with which a paradigmatic courageous action must be performed, and the pleasure I call noble pleasure that must be taken in virtuous action which is performed for the right reason.

Intentional Action, Moral Value, and Pleasure

Christine Korsgaard argues that Aristotle and Kant share a similar view of the value of moral actions but that they have different views on the relation of pleasure to virtue.²³ I

²² But this may include internal somatic sensations such as a flutter of joy.

²³ Christine Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action," *The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology* (USA:

discuss her claims on both of these topics. On the view of action that Korsgaard attributes to Aristotle and Kant, actions are composed of acts and ends. Actions (the combination of their acts and ends) are chosen (whether intentionally or tacitly) on the basis of a principle of choice. The agent's principle of choice, rather than the end or purpose for which the act is done, explains the value the agent accords to the action.²⁴ An action has intrinsic value if and only if conforms to *orthos logos* or right reason. The agent accords an action moral value or gets moral credit for choosing an intrinsically valuable action if it is chosen because the agent believes it to have intrinsic value. For Aristotle, an action that conforms to right reason is noble (*kalon*). For Kant, an action that conforms to right reason is morally required and so one has a duty to perform the action.²⁵ ²⁶ So, an agent gets moral credit for a noble action or one that is morally required if he chooses to perform that action, at least in part, because it is noble or morally required.

To illustrate this account of action, consider fighting in a battle. Fighting in a battle is an *act*. Fighting in a battle (*act*) in order to defend one's city (*end*) is an *action*. Because the fighting is for an end beyond itself (i.e., the defense of one's city), the act is instrumental. But this *action* is still *intrinsically valuable* (we may suppose) because it is worth doing for its own value's sake. So, instrumentality and intrinsic value can go together. To know the value

Oxford University Press, 2008), 174–230. What follows is a summary of her explication of Kant and Aristotle's view.

²⁴ The action itself has intrinsic value or not whether or not the agent accords it such value. I think the end for which the act is done partially explains the value of the action itself. However, I am here principally discussing the value the agent accords to the action by his principle of choice.

²⁵ In what follows, and throughout this essay, I only address Kant as Korsgaard presents him. Kant's actual views are not my concern. This qualification should be kept in mind when I attribute views to Kant.

²⁶ The scope of the actions conforming to right reason is greater on Aristotle's view than Kant's. That is, there are more noble actions than just those actions that are one's duty (whether perfect or imperfect). I am sympathetic with Aristotle here but do not discuss this point of disagreement.

accorded by the agent to this action we must know why the agent chooses to fight in the battle in order to defend his city. Here is how Korsgaard's Kant would tell the story. If the agent fights in the battle in order to defend his city solely for the sake of honor then the agent accords the action *extrinsic value*. It is not chosen as valuable in itself but as a means to receiving honor. In a different case, if the agent fights in the battle in order to defend his city merely because he wants to or feels like it, then he fights to satisfy what Kant calls an immediate inclination. The 'immediate' here is not concerned with time but with the direct or un-mediated quality of what is attractive. This inclination is toward what is sensibly attractive in contrast to a movement of the will toward an intelligible object which is mediated by the sensible particulars. Despite the fact that the agent fights for the sake of no other good, the value he tacitly accords to his action is still extrinsic because he does not choose the action in virtue of its conformity to right reason but because it satisfies his immediate, unreflective inclination. If the agent chooses to fight in the battle in order to defend his city for its own sake, that is, because this action conforms to right reason (i.e., for Kant, because it is his duty), then the agent accords the action intrinsic value. He values the action itself as intrinsically good. The agent can so value an action only by means of intellectually apprehending the intrinsic value of the action (i.e., its conformity to right reason) and choosing the action for this value's sake.²⁷ He cannot so value the action merely by valuing its immediate suitability or desirability to him. This would, according to Kant, be to choose the action on the basis of a principle of self-love and, therefore, not for the value in the action itself. Now I explain how Korsgaard places Kant's idea of the naturally virtuous

²⁷ I understand the reflection here to be necessary for a choice of an action as conforming to right reason. The reflection necessary is very minimal and need make no explicit self-reference. It is whatever is necessary for intellectually apprehending the action's conformity to right reason.

person in this account. This will move us closer to identifying the relation of pleasure to virtuous action.

Just who the naturally virtuous person is in Aristotle is disputed. A traditional view is that the naturally virtuous person is one who, because of natural temperament, is disposed more readily to some virtues. For example, a person with an irascible temperament may be more disposed to acting courageously than a person who is temperamentally less aggressive. Another interpretation is that the naturally virtuous person is the person who has become inclined to perform virtuous actions (actions that are genuinely noble) but without right reason.²⁸ This person does not choose the virtuous action out of an understanding of its inherent worth or nobility. He is merely naturally inclined to do it, where the ‘natural inclination’ is the result of a ‘second nature’ produced by habituations of various sorts. From the vignettes in chapter one, Nehemiah and Nathan illustrate this interpretation.²⁹ This latter interpretation helps us understand how Korsgaard locates the naturally virtuous person in her account. For Korsgaard, the naturally virtuous is the one who fights in the battle to defend his city because of an immediate inclination to do so. He acts without reflection.

²⁸ Howard Curzer, *Aristotle and the Virtues*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

²⁹ Nathan hears of the Vikings approach and feels fear. But his fear does not debilitate him. He has affection for his town, but he sees this attack as his great opportunity to prove himself in the eyes of Peter and win honor in the eyes of his fellow townsmen. He quickly makes his way to the center of the town, buoyed by his hope that he’ll be able to help protect his town from destruction and so win honor. He listens carefully to his orders from Peter and sets off to obey them with promptness and enthusiasm. When the fighting begins, he does so with daring. There is glory to be won!

Nehemiah, Nathan’s brother, hears of the Vikings and feels fear but his fear does not debilitate him. His training in the town’s militia has become a habit and he walks quickly to the town center to hear his orders. He will obey his orders promptly and execute them with daring. He does all this automatically and without thinking. He acts because it is what he has been trained to do.

Thus, her view of natural virtue is more limited than mine.³⁰ Her naturally virtuous agent's inclination prompts him to do the right action (an action that is intrinsically valuable or accords with right reason) but he does not do it for the right reason, i.e., because the agent believes the action is intrinsically valuable or accords with right reason. In Aristotle's terms, he does not choose it because it is noble. He is inclined to it and so chooses to do it. The fact that he is inclined to do it provides him some pleasure in choosing it and perhaps in doing it, for humans generally take pleasure in what they are inclined to choose and do. But his finding pleasure in the action does not mean that he chooses to do it for the sake of pleasure. However, according to Korsgaard's Kant, his immediate (i.e., unreflective) choice of the action in virtue of his inclination amounts to a consent to and tacit endorsement of the principle of choice, "act for the sake of satisfying my immediate inclination." This, Kant holds, amounts to acting for the sake of pleasing oneself, or self-love. In this way the naturally virtuous falls short of genuine virtue, for he fails to grasp the action's intrinsic value and choose the action on the basis of that value.

Figure 2 on the following page illustrates this entire structure of action with a case of martial action. On the chart I illustrate Korsgaard's naturally virtuous person with the red box with rounded corners. I would place Nehemiah from chapter one in this box. Although in the example below the person acts unreflectively, a person could also act reflectively and reflectively choose his action merely because it satisfies his inclination. In this particular case this might make him worse off, morally speaking, but it does not diminish his natural virtue. According to my view of natural virtue, the yellow box with cut corners may also illustrate a kind of natural virtue: reflective natural virtue. I would place Nathan from the first chapter

³⁰ I allow for reflective acts of natural virtue (as in the case of Nathan) as well as unreflective acts. I also make natural virtue depend on the *manner* of action in addition to the kind of action chosen.




Figure 2: The Value Accorded to Action

Yellow De-cornered = Action for the sake of another good (instrumental = useful)

Red Rounded = Action for the sake of immediate inclination (for its pleasantness = pleasant)

Green Square Cornered = Action for the sake of what is good in itself (for its own sake = noble or required by moral law)

in this box. This agent also does not choose the action for the right reason. Another important difference between my view of natural virtue and Korsgaard's is that I think a state of natural virtue will involve a virtuous manner of acting in addition to the performance of the virtuous action. For example, in the first chapter Frederick and William performed courageous actions without a courageous manner and without right reasons. They do not count as naturally virtuous on my view.

I endorse this general model of intentional action and moral value with some qualifications. I agree that the moral value accorded an act is not determined solely by the end of the act itself but by the principle upon which the act-end pair (i.e., the action) is chosen. For an agent's performance of an action to have full moral value, it must be chosen for the right reason.³¹ The action itself must also be intrinsically valuable and that value will be determined by whether the act-end composition has intrinsic value.³² So, since it is the action that is chosen, the end will partially explain the action's moral value.³³ In what follows, I principally use the account's structure of action. This account requires some clarifications and additions.³⁴

First, it may be thought implausible to require reflection for an agent to accord moral value to an action. To allay this concern, I now discuss the reflectivity involved in moral

³¹ As said earlier, I do not have a view on how this must be expressed in the individual's mind. The person may choose the action because it is "noble," "right," "fitting," "appropriate," "to be done," "just," etc. What is important is that the action is chosen for the sake of its intrinsic goodness however that is to be expressed. I tend to use "noble" as my generic term.

³² I also think it possible that relational properties can determine intrinsic value. For example, if an action is commanded by God, that action has intrinsic worth at least in part in virtue of being so commanded.

³³ Further discussion of this point will take us too far afield of my purposes here. I will say that even if this view is too strong for moral value itself, it is not too strong for virtuous moral action. Virtuous moral action is not chosen thoughtlessly or performed accidentally.

³⁴ Below I discuss the objection that this view requires too much reflectivity.

action. I distinguished between an immediate action from sense inclination and a reflective action from deliberate choice. Only a reflective action from deliberate choice is of full moral value. What kind of reflection is this? It is the intellectual act required for one to identify the action under consideration as intrinsically valuable. I now unpack these claims. I distinguish between two kinds of reflectivity. One is necessary for an action to have moral value to an agent and one is not. The first kind of reflectivity is conceiving of the intrinsic goodness of an action upon perceiving, if perhaps only in one's imagination, the action in its particulars. This act is reflective or mediated because it begins with the perception of the particulars of the situation and, by means of an intellectual act I am calling reflection, apprehends a common or universal object (i.e., the intrinsic goodness of the action). This may be virtually instantaneous and require no self-reflection, which is the second kind of reflectivity.³⁵ Self-reflectivity considers the agent himself in relation to the action. For example, it is the consideration of oneself as doing a courageous action or of the action as suitable to oneself. We can identify the object of this kind of reflectivity with, for example, propositions that can be expressed as, "I am doing a courageous action" or "This action is suitable to me."³⁶ So, the difference between the two kinds of reflectivity is between, on the one hand, conceiving of an action as courageous and, on the other, conceiving of an action as courageous and myself as performing the courageous action or conceiving of the action as courageous along with a conception of what a judgment of courageousness entails about one's psychology. The latter are self-reflective as I use the term and are not needed for an action to have moral

³⁵ My use of these terms may not accord with all common use. Some use "reflection" to refer to the complex self-directed act of cognition that I call "self-reflection."

³⁶ When a person does a just action it is of course true that he is doing a just action and that the action is suitable to him. But these propositions need not be reflected on for the action to be just or suitable to him.

value. It is an additional step of reflection that may or may not accompany the performing of a courageous action.³⁷

Here is a second clarification. Korsgaard notes that there can be acts that have themselves as ends. For example, dancing is an act (it is also an activity). Dancing can be done merely in order to dance. In this case, the end of dancing is the dancing itself. So, the action being considered for choice is dancing (act) in order to dance (end). Temperate acts may have this structure. Temperance is a virtue that involves our desires for immediately pleasant acts, such as eating cake. We sometimes eat cake merely in order to eat cake, because it is pleasant. The temperate person may enjoy eating just one, moderate piece of cake and abstain from additional sweet pleasures merely in order to do so rather than for a further end (although a temperate act may be also done with a further end). The temperate person chooses that action (act of eating + the end of so eating) because it is intrinsically good and not merely because of an immediate inclination, which the temperate person will also have. That the temperate person also has an inclination to act partially explains why the temperate actions of the temperate person are pleasant regardless of whether he does them because they are noble. He wants to perform temperate acts. The act itself is pleasant. I call this *act pleasure* and it is akin to what I called above *activity pleasure*. The temperate person also takes *noble pleasure* in temperate actions. Noble pleasure is what I call pleasure in an object or action as intrinsically valuable. It is for the sake of their intrinsic value that temperate actions are chosen. But, because the temperate person also has inclinations to temperate acts, and the performance of the action brings those inclinations to rest, he takes pleasure in them

³⁷ I shall return to this point about self-reflection in the next chapter when I criticize Erik Wielenberg's defense of self-reflective pleasure as necessary for courageous action.

both as satisfying his inclinations and as being intrinsically valuable. I'll now relate this discussion to courageous action and explore these two kinds of pleasure in greater detail.

Courageous action is not like temperate action because courageous action always includes an act with an end beyond the act itself. Courageous action always involves performing some difficult act for the sake of promoting, protecting, or preserving some good beyond the act itself. This is one reason hope is necessary for courage. For the hope of courage takes as its object a future, difficult good to be attained by means of the courageous act. The act is for the sake of this further end. The act is made difficult at least in part by the presence of some threat. This threat must be taken into consideration in performing the act so that the act includes overcoming or in some way dealing with the threat. This entire action (act plus further end) is chosen for its own intrinsic value's sake, if it is accorded moral value. So, on this model of action, we can account for an important difference between some temperate acts and courageous acts. Temperate acts often concern an easy act treated as an end in itself. Courageous acts concern a difficult act treated as useful to an end beyond the act itself. Given that acts that are their own ends afford a unique pleasure, courageous acts, which are not their own ends, are not pleasant in this way. We should expect, then, that courageous actions are not pleasant in themselves in the same way that temperate actions can be. An act of courage (e.g., fighting a battle) is not its own end but is done for a further end (e.g., securing the safety of one's *polis*). The act of fighting a battle is not pleasant or at least need not be for the action to be a courageous one.³⁸

If courageous action does require pleasure, then it must be due to the end of the action, or to some aspect of the action that I have not considered. Now I shall consider

³⁸ Fighting could be pleasurable for one skilled in it, I suppose, but skill in fighting is not necessary for courage. If the act of courage must be pleasant, it will be in virtue of the pleasure of some activity that is a constituent of every act of courage. I will discuss this possibility below.

pleasure in the end, pleasure in success, and pleasure in the intrinsic value of the action. In the next chapter I consider whether any other aspects require pleasure. For now, if we break down the courageous action into a distinct act, end, principle of choice, and its potential success, we can see how it could be pleasant with respect to these three additional aspects.

1. Act: fighting – not necessarily pleasant
2. End: for the sake of securing the safety of the *polis* – pleasure in the end of the safety of the *polis*
3. Principle of choice: the action (act + end) is noble – pleasure in the nobility of the action
4. Success: pleasure in successfully defending the *polis*

Pleasure is had if the *polis* is successfully defended against the threat. I call this *success pleasure*, which is the kind of pleasure that accompanies achieving one's ends. As such, success pleasure can depend on pleasure taken in the end of the action.³⁹ Pleasure in the end of the action can be had even without success when one thinks of the beloved *polis* as safe prior to engaging in the fighting or if one does so during a lull in fighting. I call this *pleasure in the end*.⁴⁰ Pleasure in the end does not depend on successfully achieving the end. I return to pleasure in the end below, but first say more about pleasure in the intrinsic value of an action or *noble pleasure*.

Pleasure in what makes the action of intrinsic value is what I called above *noble pleasure*. This is a kind of intellectual pleasure. Choosing an action because it is noble is intellectually pleasant because the nobleness of the action, which is known because it is apprehended through a judgment of the action's fit with right reason, is fitting to our will,

³⁹ There is another kind of pleasure taken in success that is self-reflective. In this case, the object of pleasure is one's success itself. I suppose that this pleasure could be had without any pleasure in the end. This pleasure is not what I mean by success pleasure.

⁴⁰ Distinguishing between pleasure in the end and noble pleasure is crucial in the sequel.

which rests in the possession of the nobleness in the action's choice.⁴¹ Two examples of noble pleasures are taking pleasure in a constituent of the end such as the nobility of the *polis* and taking pleasure in the nobility of the entire action itself. There is a potential for confusion here. An end of an action can be pleasant or seem good to an agent in more than one way. Noble pleasure in the end depends on the end (or constituent of the end) seeming noble or intrinsically good. What I discussed in the last paragraph as *pleasure in the end* is pleasing to an agent not as noble but, for lack of a better word, as sensible.⁴² So, the end of an action can seem sensibly pleasing or nobly pleasing to an agent or both. When I refer to *pleasure in the end*, I refer to sensible pleasantness unless I specify otherwise.

Here is how noble pleasure fits with my account of pleasure. The intrinsic value (or nobleness) of the action is the *object*. The mind *possesses* this intrinsic value through a judgment of the action's nobleness. Making this judgment is an act of which one is necessarily aware and so the possession is *apprehended*.⁴³ The will is the *appetite*, which experiences the *activity* of resting, at least at the moment of choice, in the object's possession, which is unimpeded if the judgment is sufficiently confident (i.e., *manner of possession*). This noble pleasure that I have identified is, as Korsgaard notes, a rarified experience that Kant would identify with respect for the moral law.⁴⁴ While this pleasure is certainly not like the pleasures of a warm bath, it is still pleasure by my account above. Action performed without

⁴¹ This pleasure is not necessarily self-reflective. For example, it need not be pleasure in the fact that one is performing a noble action. However, there are noble self-reflective pleasures.

⁴² I mean sensible as opposed to intellectual and not as opposed to foolish. The end need not be solely sensible. It may include non-sensible aspects. However, I am drawing attention to the sensible or at least mostly sensible components of the end.

⁴³ I do not have an argument for this claim, but I cannot think of a sound argument against it. The obviousness of this claim to me may depend on this judgment being a reflective act (in my sense of reflection).

⁴⁴ Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble," 200.

choosing the action because it is noble will lack this kind of pleasure. For this reason, courageous action chosen because it is noble (as I hold that all paradigmatic courageous action must be) will not only possess greater moral value than actions chosen for other reasons, but will also possess this additional pleasure.

Returning to pleasure in the end, must courageous action include pleasure in the end? What of a case in which morality requires defending a person you hate? Consider the following.

1. Act: fighting – not necessarily pleasant
2. End: for the sake of saving your enemy's life– no pleasure in the enemy's life as such
3. Success: potential pleasure in successfully defending the enemy from an unjust death
4. Principle of choice: the action (act + end) is noble – pleasure in the nobility of the action

Suppose your hated enemy is about to be unjustly killed by an assailant and you, at risk to yourself, intervene and save his life because you judge this the noble thing to do. In a case such as this, pleasure may not be taken in the enemy himself, although it will be taken in successfully defending him. But this success pleasure will be different than the success pleasure taken in successfully defending something or someone that is loved. For, in this case, one cares far less, if at all, for the particular good (i.e., the enemy's wellbeing) being protected by the courageous act. If this is so, how can one still take pleasure in success? I suggest that in this circumstance the success pleasure can be a kind of noble pleasure. So, the type and degree of success pleasure is derivative of the type and degree of either pleasure in the end or noble pleasure.

Here is another way to consider the contrast between pleasure in the end and noble pleasure using Aristotle's notion of a matter-form composite. An action is composed of an

act and an end. The particular act and the particular end of an action are that action's matter. But they are also united in a single action that has a form. This form may have intrinsic value. We could say, then, that the pleasure in the end is pleasure in part of the matter of an action (i.e., the particular end). Noble pleasure is pleasure in the form of an action that is intellectually apprehended to be intrinsically valuable. The matter of an object is immediately perceivable while the form is grasped only by an intellectual act of abstraction or reflection. So too, pleasure in the end is pleasure in something immediately perceivable or, perhaps more accurately in the case of the end, imaginable about the action while noble pleasure is pleasure in something abstracted from what is immediately perceivable or imaginable.⁴⁵ So, to apply this mode of description to our particular case, the matter would be the enemy's safety. No pleasure is taken in that as such. But the form of the action has intrinsic value. So, noble pleasure is taken in the fact that the action of fighting to save the enemy's life is intrinsically valuable. The success pleasure does not come from the enemy's life itself (the particular, immediately perceivable or imaginable good) but from him not being unjustly killed (the noble good). So, success pleasure in this case depends on noble pleasure. But in general success pleasure can depend on either pleasure in the end or noble pleasure.

Whether an action is successful or not, I want to defend the stronger claim that the virtuous person will focus on some immediately attractive aspects of the enemy and, finding some good in him, take pleasure in the enemy himself.⁴⁶ He will have cultivated an ability to

⁴⁵ I call these perceptions or imaginations "sensible" in contrast to the abstract intellectual apprehension of intrinsic value which I call "reflective." I only wish to maintain that these perceptions and imaginations are principally sensible. They may include non-sensible elements.

⁴⁶ I think this is the Christian ideal. Perfect charity would involve pleasure in the enemy's good in addition to the pleasure in defending him or her from unjust death. I do not think that fulfilling the duty to love one's enemy, however, requires such pleasure. But I do think it is required to love one's neighbor as oneself perfectly. For one loves oneself, usually, with both the sensible love that grounds sensible pleasure and with the rational love that grounds noble pleasure.

care, at least in some way, even for his enemies. This person will have pleasure in the end in addition to noble pleasure. But is pleasure in the end required for every paradigmatically courageous action? I shall answer this question in the next section.

In this section I have identified act pleasure, pleasure in the end, success pleasure, and noble pleasure. I said that while temperate action will sometimes require act pleasure, courageous action will not require it.⁴⁷ Because I do not think that courageous action must be successful, it does not require success pleasure. I argued that all virtuous action requires noble pleasure and claimed that, at least in the case of courage, it also requires pleasure in the end. I next argue that the paradigmatically courageous person will take pleasure in the end in addition to the noble pleasure a virtuous action affords. I will argue that this claim provides a plausible and appealing way to distinguish the naturally courageous, the continent, and the genuinely courageous person.

Pleasure in the End, Natural Virtue, Continence, and Genuine Virtue

At the outset of this entire work, I distinguished between a naturally courageous agent who performs a courageous action in a courageous manner but not for the right reason, a continent agent who performs a courageous action for the right reason but not in a courageous manner, and a paradigmatically courageous agent who performs a courageous action in a courageous manner for the right reason.⁴⁸ In the last chapter, I suggested that the courageous manner that distinguishes the truly courageous agent from the merely continently courageous agent is characterized by the former exhibiting proper fear, hope,

⁴⁷ I shall qualify this claim in the next chapter when I discuss a kind of act pleasure (i.e., the pleasures of prudence) that I have not yet introduced.

⁴⁸ From my vignettes in chapter one, Nehemiah and Nathan illustrated naturally virtuous actions and Caleb and Cadfael illustrated continent actions.

and daring in courageous activity. My thesis in this section is, roughly, that the naturally courageous agent takes pleasure in the end of courageous action, the continent agent takes noble pleasure in the courageous action, and the paradigmatically courageous agent takes both pleasure in the end and noble pleasure in the courageous action.⁴⁹ Since the paradigmatically courageous agent is the measure for courageous action, paradigmatic courageous action will require pleasure in the end and noble pleasure. In this section I present some reasons to think this claim is true. In the next section I answer some objections.

Here is one argument for the claim that the naturally courageous agent acts with pleasure in the end. Let us return to Korsgaard's Kant's diagnosis of the motivational state of his naturally virtuous agent. If Kant's view on this state is correct, then the naturally courageous agent must take pleasure in the end in order to perform the virtuous action at all. Here's why. The naturally virtuous agent tacitly chooses his action on the basis of an immediate inclination to the action. That immediate inclination is for some sensibly pleasant aspect of the action. As there are two aspects of the action which can be sensibly pleasant (the act and the end), the naturally virtuous must find one or both of these pleasant. It is not plausible that this aspect be the act in every case of courage, for the act may be difficult and painful. The only relevant aspect of the action left is the end. So, the naturally courageous agent must find something sensibly pleasant about the end. The imagination (usually) of this aspect provides the pleasure in the end that explains what motivates the naturally courageous

⁴⁹ I say 'roughly' because I actually think the distinction is not so sharply drawn. These represent ideals of each state. In reality, the continent agent probably takes some pleasure in the end but that pleasure is mixed with the disordered pain he also experiences. The naturally virtuous take more pleasure in the end and experience fewer if any mixed feelings regarding the end. The paradigmatically virtuous probably takes greater pleasure in the end and noble pleasure than either the continent or the naturally virtuous.

to perform the courageous action. So, the naturally courageous agent acts with pleasure in the end.

Here is a second way to support the thesis of this section. The sensible pleasure in the end the naturally courageous agent takes in his action partially explains the excellent manner with which he acts, while the lack of pleasure in the end the continent agent lacks partially explains the lack of excellent manner with which he acts. Why think this is true? Pleasure in the end assists action by providing a kind of motivation to act (to be discussed below), which would otherwise be lacking. This motivation is supplied by inclinations for what is sensibly pleasant. An inclination (of an appetite) for something that is sensibly pleasant can aid action. We generally perform with greater alacrity, energy, or skill those actions that have ends that we are inclined to pursue or find sensibly pleasant. The naturally courageous agent has inclinations that provide her with sensible pleasure in the imagined end of courageous action. That the continent agent lacks this same alacrity in performing the courageous action may be explained by this lack of pleasure. The pleasure the continent agent does take is in the intrinsic goodness of the action (i.e., noble pleasure). This intrinsic goodness is the reason for his choice of the action. But the pleasure he takes in this goodness does not assist his action in the same way as if he were also sensibly inclined to the end. I think this is partially explained by the fact that without these inclinations the proper emotional responses, which aid the performance of the action, are less powerful.⁵⁰ The pleasure of the continent is more rarified and its object is more abstract. The object is thus less able to be imagined and so does not engage the emotions as strongly. Thus, the continent agent does the courageous action for the right reason but fails to do it in a courageous manner.

⁵⁰ See chapter three for my discussion of proper emotions.

The action of the paradigmatically courageous person seems both sensibly good to that person (in virtue of its end) and intellectually good to that person (in virtue of its being judged to accord with reason and be valuable in itself). The paradigmatically courageous person chooses the action because it is right but also has an inclination toward the end of the action. This inclination does not motivate in the sense that it is the reason for which the action is performed. Let me explain the motivation that I have in mind.

Donald Davidson distinguishes a motivating reason for an action and a motivating reason for which an action is performed.⁵¹ The idea is that an agent may have a variety of reasons for an action but may choose to act on some but not all those reasons. I do not need to commit to inclinations providing reasons for action, although I will use his terminology to describe the distinction I wish to draw. In the paradigmatically courageous person, pleasure in the end is a motivating reason for acting but not the motivating reason for which the action is performed. The paradigmatically courageous person does not (or at least need not) choose his action because of its pleasant end. But he is inclined to the end in virtue of finding it pleasant. So, his inclination to the action may be a motivating reason for acting but not be the motivating reason for which the action is performed. So, the performance of paradigmatic courageous actions involves inclinations to act without those inclinations necessarily being the motivating reasons for which the actions are performed. I will call this kind of motivation an inclining motivation.

Here is a mundane illustration. I take (sensible) pleasure in running and in reading. So, I am inclined to run and read. Suppose I have made a promise to a friend to run with him if he calls today, but if he does not call I am more inclined to read and will do so. So, I

⁵¹ Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," *The Journal of Philosophy* 60, no. 23 (November 7, 1963), 685–700.

am inclined to read rather than run but, as I have made a promise, if my friend calls to run, I will run. If I go running, it is not because it is pleasant to me, although it is, but because of my promise (the keeping of which may be pleasant). My friend calls and I enjoyably go for a run. I do so with pleasure because I take pleasure in running. I am inclined to run. But I do not choose to run because it is pleasant but because it is promised. The promise is the reason for which I run. If my inclination for pleasure was the (sole) reason for which I acted, I would read instead. So, I have inclining motivations to run and read but the motivating reason for which I act (i.e., to run) in this case is the promise. One test to identify the difference between the inclining and motivating reason is to determine whether the agent would act on the motivating reason if the inclining motivation were absent. For example, I would go for the run even if I did not feel like it.⁵²

The paradigmatically courageous person may choose to perform a courageous action not for the sake of the pleasure its end has for him, although he finds it pleasant, but for the sake of what makes the action intrinsically valuable and the noble good the action will accomplish.⁵³ For example, the just person who performs an act of truth-telling for the sake of promoting justice may find this particular act of truth-telling pleasant but choose to do it because of its nobility (because it is just).

Here is a third argument in support of the thesis of this section. If pleasures are “vivid seemings of goodness” then the courageous action will seem good to the

⁵² Aristotle made a similar point in *NE* X.3 (1174a) when he says, “And there are many things we should be concerned to have even if they brought no pleasure with them, such as seeing remembering, knowing, possessing the virtues. Even if pleasures necessarily accompany these, it makes no difference, since we should choose them even if no pleasure arose from them.”

⁵³ He may also choose to perform an action partly for the sake of the pleasure it yields because he thinks that pleasure is useful for another end which is good in itself. For example, a person who is worn out and sad may choose to perform a pleasant action for the sake of the pleasure it brings as a means to alleviating his tiredness and sadness so that he is better capable of acting well in what he has to do.

paradigmatically courageous agent in both the way it does to the naturally courageous and the way it does to the continent. It will seem good in both ways because these seemings are essentially linked. The naturally courageous is attracted to courageous action in a way that is good but incomplete rather than in a way that is merely accidental and to be cast aside when understanding of the intrinsic value of the action is attained. The sensible pleasantness of an action is somehow an immature grasp of its noble goodness. The alternative view is that the sensible pleasantness of the action is merely accidentally related to the noble goodness of the action.

To illustrate these two positions, I return to Korsgaard's discussion of pleasure and virtue. A thesis of Korsgaard's essay is that, while Kant and Aristotle do not fundamentally differ in their general accounts of the morality of actions, they do differ in their psychology, particularly their psychology of pleasure. This may well be and I do not challenge it. But I turn to the difference as Korsgaard explains it in order to focus on Aristotle's view, which is a version of the position I articulated in the last paragraph. Aristotle thinks that when something appears sensibly pleasant to us it is perceived as good, and so to be pursued, or when it appears sensibly painful to us is perceived as bad, and so to be avoided. This good or bad seeming is related to the noble goodness or badness of the action. For Kant, according to Korsgaard, sensible pleasure is "stupid." Sensible pleasure tells us nothing significant about the world or ourselves.⁵⁴

Aristotle's view is that to find a virtuous action sensibly pleasant is to have an "inchoate grasp," to use Korsgaard's words, of the action's intelligible intrinsic goodness, i.e., of its nobility.⁵⁵ When discussing temperance, Aristotle writes that "the appetitive element in

⁵⁴ Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble," 203. She cites *NE* 1.2 1095a31ff.

⁵⁵ Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble," 203.

a temperate person ought to be in harmony with reason; for the aim of both is what is noble, and the temperate person's appetite is for the right thing, in the right way, and at the right time, and this is what reason requires as well."⁵⁶ What he calls the appetite in this passage I call the appetites that ground sensible pleasure in the end of action. On my account, a person's reason is that by which an object of intellectual pleasure is apprehended. The will is the appetite that grounds intellectual pleasure. The aim of both the sensible and rational appetites, in the virtuous person, is what is noble, but in different ways. The noble action *as noble* is the object of the will. The noble action *as sensibly pleasing* is the object of the sensible appetite. In more detail, the perceptible features of the action, on the basis of which the action is judged to be noble, constitute the object of the sensible appetites. But these features are not (sensibly) desired as noble (or under that description). This is so because the universal good that the action as a whole embodies is not suitable to the sensible appetites, which are limited to what is sensible, but is instead suitable to the person's will. Only the particular sensible goods desired in the right way, at the right time, etc. are suitable to the person's sense appetites.⁵⁷ Yet, it is clear that there is an essential link between the particular sensible features of an action and that action's intrinsic value. So, when the paradigmatically courageous person takes sensible pleasure in the end of courageous action and noble pleasure in the intrinsic value of the action, he is taking proper pleasure in the action according to both of its proper aspects. We might summarize this using terms from

⁵⁶ *NE* III.12. 1119b15. Aristotle limits his discussion of temperance to the desires and pleasures of touch: sex, food, and drink. However, I take the harmonious relation he affirms between the sense appetite and reason in the virtue of temperance to be present in other virtues like courage, although the nature of that harmony differs in the case of courage.

⁵⁷ The particular thing(s) under the appropriate aspects will constitute the intentional objects of the emotions of courage (see chapter three). Since courageous action requires the emotion of hope, and hope has a pleasant affect, then courageous action will have a pleasant affect (see chapter five).

Aristotelian natural philosophy. A courageous action is composed of matter and form and the paradigmatically courageous person takes pleasure in that action's matter *and* form. If sensible pleasure in the end is pleasure in an aspect of the action's matter and noble pleasure is pleasure in that action's form, then the relation of pleasure in the end to noble pleasure is not accidental. These pleasures together constitute an excellent state that is the full pleasurable appreciation of the courageous action in its entirety.

In a similar vein, a fourth argument in support of the thesis of this section is that pleasure in the end is linked to proper thinking about practical action. Korsgaard writes,

And since the soul never thinks without an image [according to Aristotle]...our conceptions of good and evil must be accompanied by images of our circumstances as pleasant or painful in certain ways. These images provide the material with which the intellect works in conceiving the good. It is because of the way the mind works that the virtuous person must experience pleasures and pains in the right way in order to think correctly about practical matters: thinking of something as good is inseparable from imagining it, so to speak, as pleasant.... The virtuous person's reason...is in unchallenged control of her perceptual imagination.... In the fully virtuous person, the entire appetitive part of the soul serves as a kind of sensorium for reason.⁵⁸

One reason to hold that Aristotle believes that thinking correctly about practical matters requires proper pleasures and pain is because he believes "the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character."⁵⁹ One way to understand this claim is that one's pleasures and pains reveal one's concerns and one's concerns set the ends of action. Under this view, a first attempt to understand Aristotle's argument runs as follows. If one does not experience proper pleasure and pain, then either one does not have proper concerns or one does not perceive the situation aright or both. If one does not have proper concerns, then one will not pursue the proper ends. And if one does not pursue the proper ends, then one

⁵⁸ Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble," 202.

⁵⁹ *NE* III.5, 1114b1.

will not think correctly about practical matters. If one does not perceive the situation aright, then one will not think correctly about practical matters. So, if one does not experience proper pleasure and pain, then one will not think correctly about practical matters. I say a first attempt because the case of the continent person reveals that thinking correctly about practical matters may be a matter of degree.⁶⁰ A continent person may perform the virtuous action (in a non-virtuous manner), which requires some correct thinking about the action and some proper concerns, without all the proper concerns (and so pleasures) or a complete perceiving of the situation aright. Aristotle would surely accept this. So, the argument requires this qualification to accommodate the degreed concerns and perceptions of the continent person. This would also require that I modify my position in such a way that the continent person takes a little pleasure in the end while being in a mixed state of pleasure and pain with respect to the end while the naturally courageous merely (or mostly) takes pleasure in the end. But the general idea holds that there is a link between seeing a situation aright and taking the right sorts of pleasure in it.

While I do not think that a person must experience all the pleasures appropriate to a situation in order to think at least partially correctly about practical matters, I do think she must experience those pleasures in order to think completely correctly about the action and achieve excellence in her manner of action. Performing an action in an excellent manner, as the virtuous person would do, is different from performing a right action. The continent person acts rightly but not excellently. A person may correctly identify what is right to do without all the hedonic response appropriate to the situation. For example, the continent

⁶⁰ As I claimed last chapter, continence is the state of a person who acts for the right reason but not with the right manner. An example of continence would be a moral action chosen because it is noble but performed in the face of improper internal appetitive impediments such as nearly paralyzing fear.

person takes some noble pleasure in doing the temperate action despite the fact that he also experiences pain at foregoing the pleasures he would experience were he to act intemperately. The action seems both good to him in one sense but bad in another. This latter seeming is a defect in the continent person for in fact foregoing the pleasures is good for him. For true excellence, the action must seem good to the agent in the ways it is good. In the terms of the account of emotions discussed earlier, a person may partially correctly construe a situation without all the concerns that would activate the proper emotionally hedonic response to that situation.⁶¹ But despite the partial correctness of the construal, the person's action will be made partially defective by her failure to respond well to the situation emotionally.

For example, the continent person's action does not achieve the excellence of temperance if he does not experience pleasures other than noble pleasure (which the continent does experience, however slightly). The continent person must possess some proper concerns (i.e., for the noble); otherwise he would not perform the temperate action for the right reason. But he lacks those concerns or ways of construing the situation that would give him the other pleasures that the virtue of temperance requires.

Further, that it is possible for a person accurately to construe a situation without the concerns that make that construal a proper emotional response does not mean that the person will be equally able to construe the situation as one with the proper concerns. It is plausible to think that a lack of concern will tend to be correlated with an undeveloped perceptual and conceptual ability to construe a situation properly.

⁶¹ As I am using 'construal' here it is a perception that includes both sensible features (e.g., the hitting of that man) and the apprehension of the non-sensible features of the situation (*the injustice* of the hitting of that man). The injustice will seem bad to the person if the person takes sensible or noble pain in it, which will depend on concern for the injustice's sensible or noble aspects.

For example, a person who has not even attained a state of continence, and hardly cares for justice, will be far less able to identify situations in which it is violated. Such a person may perform an action that is just but will do so almost by accident. He will not perform the action because the action is just (for he has some other reason to perform it) and he will fail to experience any pleasure in the just action. A better person (who has attained continence) may perform a just action for the sake of its intrinsic value (because it is noble). He will experience some noble pleasure because the action will seem nobly good to him. But if he is not also inclined to care for the particulars of a just action (especially its end), then he will not perceive all the features of the situation that would enable a full appreciation of it. To use a metaphor, his lack of pleasure makes his vision less vivid. He is unable to see as clearly as the paradigmatically virtuous. Because of this lack of vivid vision and because of his lack of supporting inclinations, the continent is not able to do the just action in the excellent manner of the just person. He performs a virtuous action for the right reason but not in a virtuous manner.

A person who is naturally virtuous is pleased by the perceptible particulars of just actions and pained by the particulars of unjust actions. A just action seems sensibly good to him. He will respond more quickly and resolutely to promote justice or oppose injustice as the situation demands. However, despite his promptitude and resoluteness, if he merely does these actions because they are sensibly pleasing to him (whether this is a tacit or explicit choice), he will not perform them as fully moral actions (because he has not recognized and chosen them for their intrinsic worth). He performs a virtuous action in a virtuous manner without the right reason.⁶² Nehemiah and Nathan illustrate this in the case of courage; they

⁶² To qualify my view, I do not think that the naturally virtuous can perform a virtuous action in all the ways required for virtuous manner. But they can do so in the ways I am discussing here.

perform courageous actions in a courageous manner without the right reason. But the genuinely virtuous has the good qualities of the continent and the naturally virtuous. Peter illustrated this in my story. He will choose the virtuous action because the action is noble, like the continent, and not merely to increase his sensible pleasure or diminish his pain. But he will also experience sensible pleasure and pain, like the naturally virtuous. He performs the courageous action in a courageous manner for the right reason. The whole action, end and value, matter and form, will seem vividly good to him. This Aristotelian view provides an elegant and plausible way to distinguish the three states of natural virtue, continence, and genuine virtue.

In this section I have given four arguments in support of my thesis that the naturally courageous agent takes pleasure in the end of virtuous action, the continently courageous agent takes noble pleasure in the virtuous action, and the paradigmatically courageous agent takes both pleasure in the end and noble pleasure in the virtuous action. I argued first, on the basis of what is necessary to explain the motivation of the naturally courageous, second, on the basis of the excellent manner of action that is enabled by an inclination to find the end sensibly pleasant, third, on an essential link between pleasure in the end and noble pleasure, and fourth, on the need for pleasure in the end for complete understanding and appreciation of the courageous action. Next, I consider some objections.

Objections to Noble Pleasure and Pleasure in the End: Self-loving, Mixed-motive Acting, and Not Necessarily Pleasing

I have argued that taking noble pleasure in choosing an intrinsically valuable action is required for choosing it for the sake of its intrinsic value. As the genuinely virtuous person does choose to perform intrinsically valuable actions for the sake of their intrinsic value, the virtuous person will take noble pleasure in choosing those actions. I also argued that

pleasure in the end is required for paradigmatic courageous action and that this pleasure partly explains the difference between paradigmatic courageous action and continently courageous action.

I now address three objections that might be raised. First, requiring noble pleasure introduces problematic self-love. Second, requiring pleasure in the end introduces mixed motives. Third, finding something pleasant does not entail taking pleasure in it.

According to the first objection, requiring noble pleasure entails self-love because to find something pleasant is to find it suitable to oneself. Korsgaard's Kant may object in this way to the necessity of noble pleasure. The objection is that to require noble pleasure undermines the claim that noble action is chosen for its intrinsic value, for anyone who chooses an action because it is desirable or suitable (which is required for pleasure) is tacitly or explicitly acting on a maxim (i.e., principle of choice) of self-love.

To clarify the consistency of my claim that noble pleasure is required for virtuous action with the claim that noble action is chosen for its intrinsic value and not self-love, I return to the principles of choice of an action. I will discuss how I understand the suitability or desirability of an object to an appetite, the nature of the principles of choice that the unreflective person tacitly acts on, and the proper role of reflection in noble action.

I begin with a brief review. An action is composed of an act and an end. An act may take an end beyond itself or be its own end. An action may be chosen for the sake of the action's utility (in which case it is accorded extrinsic value) or for its own sake. Korsgaard's Kant thinks that the phrase "for its own sake" is ambiguous. If it is chosen for its own sake, it can be chosen because it is *immediately* (and I think this means sensibly and unreflectively)

desirable to the agent in some way.⁶³ It is chosen for its own sake because it is chosen for no other good beyond it. Or, if it is chosen for its own sake it can be chosen because it is good in itself, i.e., it has intrinsic value. If it is chosen because it is immediately desirable to an agent, then it is chosen as having extrinsic value. The value accorded is extrinsic because the action is chosen, if only implicitly, for the sake of self-love. The objection I am considering assumes that it is not merely this immediate desirability that leads to self-love but that any choice of an action for its desirability is a choice for the sake of self-love. I do not attribute this view to Kant, which is why I only claim he may object in this way.

To illustrate this view, let us return to the story of Nehemiah. Nehemiah unreflectively chooses to fight for the sake of his town. There are two ways, Kant thinks, that Nehemiah might choose this action for the sake of his town. The first way is that he chooses the action for the sake of his own pleasure in the town. Basically, what motivates him is not the value of the town itself but his pleasure in the town (which is how Nehemiah does choose in my vignette). In this case, Nehemiah would be treating the town as having extrinsic value. The second way is that he chooses the action for the sake of the intrinsic value of the town. We could also try to make this distinction by distinguishing between two kinds of love in Nehemiah. Does he love the town merely because of all the pleasures it has afforded him? Or does he love the town for more reasons than that – because it is a truly good town? I may “love” a warm bath in the first sense and love my wife in the second. I claim that in both cases in which the action is chosen “for its own sake,” and not just the first, the action is desirable in the sense that it is suitable to or pleasing to an appetite.⁶⁴ So, I

⁶³ I think ‘immediate’ in this context does not mean temporally instant but by an inclination of the sense appetite, which is more immediate than a movement of the will, the object of which is mediated by the sensible particulars.

⁶⁴ It need not be explicitly desired under the description, “suitable to an appetite.”

leave room for an action that is chosen for its intrinsic value also being an action that is desirable or suitable to an appetite of the agent who chooses it.⁶⁵

I use ‘suitable’ to mean fit to an appetite in at least one of two different ways: merely *good to* the agent and additionally *good for* the agent. An example of the first is the suitability of color to the eye.⁶⁶ Color is *good to* the eye in that it actualizes the eye’s potential for sight. One can take pleasure in a sight without that pleasure being self-oriented. Any fitting object of an appetite is good to that appetite. But at least some objects are additionally desired as good for the agent.⁶⁷ An example of this is the suitability of food to the hungry animal. The food is *good for* the animal (e.g., for the animal’s survival). So, an object may be suitable to an appetite in both of these ways.⁶⁸ Further, humans have different kinds of appetites to which objects may be suitable. When the object is apprehended as noble, it is apprehended as suitable to the will (because judged to accord with right reason) in a way analogous to color’s suitability to the eye. Performing noble actions is, *ceteris paribus*, good for a person but he need not

⁶⁵ Further, I shall later argue that also choosing the noble action for its desirability is unproblematic.

⁶⁶ I take these examples from Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate* 25.1 response, in which he articulates something similar to this distinction. I do not know whether Aquinas would affirm the distinction as I present it.

⁶⁷ It is a matter of controversy whether or not all objects suitable to the rational appetite are also rationally desired as good for the agent. This is an additional claim that I need not to take a stand on here. This debate can be seen in the writings of followers of Aquinas and Scotus, such as David M. Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29, no. 4 (1991): 559–84, Thomas Williams, “How Scotus Separates Morality From Happiness,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (1995): 425–45, Thomas Williams, “From Metaethics to Action Theory,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 332–51, and Mary Beth Ingham, “Duns Scotus, Morality and Happiness,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 74, no. 2 (2000): 173–95.

⁶⁸ The way in which an appetite is like the eye may be more clearly seen if I say that color satisfies the eye’s inclination to see. I don’t think that an eye actually has an inclination to see, but rather that an agent with eyes has an inclination to exercise its visual powers. An example of an object suitable in both ways is food. Food is good to the stomach in actualizing the animal’s potential for absorbing nutrients and digesting and food is good for the animal’s survival.

choose them under that description.⁶⁹ When an object is apprehended as sensibly pleasing, it is apprehended as suitable to one's sensible appetites. It is at least partly in this way that the end of the courageous action appears to the naturally and paradigmatically courageous agent.

In summary, I distinguished two kinds of appetites, the will and the sensible appetites. I have also distinguished between two ways an agent's appetites may be attracted to an object. The agent may be attracted to the object for the object's own sake (good to) or attracted to it for the object's benefit to the agent (good for). Further, an agent may choose to pursue the object in order to satisfy either of these ways of being attracted to it.

This distinction between *good for* and *good to* allows me to affirm that an agent who chooses something noble, desiring it as rationally suitable, need not choose it with the maxim "This action is desirable as good for me" even if it is in fact good for him and he desires it as such. He may also desire it as good in itself and choose it for that reason. This desire is still of the object as good to him (suitable to him), where that means it is good to his reason (i.e., he judges it to be in accord with right reason or noble).⁷⁰ But the maxim of this action need not make reference to this suitability nor must it be self-oriented. So, the maxim may be merely, "This action is noble." He need not reflect in the moment of choice on the fact that the noble is what his reason judges suitable to his will; nor must he judge that this noble action is good for him. So, taking noble pleasure in an action does not rule out choosing that action for its intrinsic value nor require that the action be chosen for self-love.

⁶⁹ Whether or not a person must rationally desire what is noble as good for him, he need not desire it under that description.

⁷⁰ But, again, this need not be explicit to his mind so that he thinks, "This is suitable to me or good to my reason."

The claim that noble pleasure requires suitability to an appetite is also important because it allows me to state more clearly how noble pleasures fit the activity component (i.e., resting) of my definition of pleasure. Further, I can affirm that virtuous action requires noble pleasure with some neutrality regarding some controversies over the nature of the will.⁷¹ Since the object of a noble pleasure is the apprehended intrinsic value of some action or entity, human agents must have an appetite to which this object is suitable so that the appetite can rest in this object. This appetite is the agent's will, i.e., her rational desire for the noble. The will's resting brings noble pleasure. To illustrate this point and the distinction I am drawing, consider Saint Augustine who writes that "we lose all through craving more, by loving our own good more than thee [God], the common good of all."⁷² To love God (the ultimate intrinsic good) and take pleasure in God, the one in whom our hearts can truly rest and be completely fulfilled and satisfied, requires an appetite that can rest in God.⁷³ It

⁷¹ The controversies I have in mind are between eudaimonists and voluntarists. I believe my account thus far is neutral between them. For example, I think my view does not require answers to the following questions. Is the will more than the rational appetite? Does rational suitability entail self-love (or does desirability as good to an appetite entail desirability as good for an agent)? Are all actions that are rationally suitable good for me? Is self-love contrary or unrelated to morality? My view does require that rational suitability as good to is not reducible to rational suitability as good for.

⁷² Here is the quotation in context,

This is what happens whenever thou art forsaken, O Fountain of Life, who art the one and true Creator and Ruler of the universe. This is what happens when through self-willed pride a part is loved under the false assumption that it is the whole. Therefore, we must return to thee in humble piety and let thee purge us from our evil ways, and be merciful to those who confess their sins to thee, and hear the groanings of the prisoners and loosen us from those fetters which we have forged for ourselves. This thou wilt do, provided we do not raise up against thee the arrogance of a false freedom--for thus we lose all through craving more, by loving our own good more than thee, the common good of all (*Confessions*, III.8, transl. Outler).

⁷³ As the appetite does come to complete rest in God, God is also the lover's own good. So, in loving the common good the lover receives his individual good as well.

requires an appetite to which God (a common good) is the suitable object.⁷⁴ Likewise, all noble pleasures require an appetite to which the noble is a suitable object. This appetite is the will.⁷⁵

I can clarify part of what I think is correct about Korsgaard's Kant's view about self-love through the distinction between "*good for*" and "*good to*" suitability and relevant differences in appetites. Kant's view, according to Korsgaard, is that anyone who does an action because it is immediately desirable or suitable is tacitly or explicitly acting on a maxim (i.e., principle of choice) of self-love.⁷⁶ If this also applies to non-immediately desirable actions, then any action that is chosen for its suitability to an appetite is chosen either explicitly or implicitly (i.e., tacitly) as *good for* an agent and *not* as good in itself. Here is what I think is correct about this. The view assumes that the tacit maxim that is acted on is necessarily self-oriented, i.e., the maxim is "I shall choose action x because it is good for me." But this assumption may be questioned if there is a distinction between good for and

⁷⁴ In this case, I understand the appetite to be the will be-fitted with the supernatural virtue of charity.

⁷⁵ I follow Aquinas here who says in *ST I* 82.5,

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good...

⁷⁶ What follows assumes a particular interpretation of the issue of contention. I agree that no action that is explicitly chosen because it is noble is necessarily also explicitly chosen because it is pleasant. In other words, a pleasing good need not be chosen also because it brings pleasure. The pleasure may play no role in the *choice* itself even when the agent recognizes that pleasure will result. For example, the agent would choose the action even if it were not pleasant. I disagree that no action that is explicitly chosen because it is noble is ever also explicitly chosen because it is pleasant. I see no problem with choosing an action because it is noble and because it is pleasant in some cases. I disagree that no action that is explicitly chosen because it is noble is ever suitable to an appetite. I think that all judgments and choice of noble actions require suitability to an appetite, i.e., to the will. But I do not think that the maxim of choice need make reference to this suitability. I take this to be self-reflective in a way that is unnecessary.

good to. One way to account for Kant's claim here is to divide appetites according to whether or not they are necessarily self-oriented in this sense. If appetites are so divided, then whether or not the maxim must be self-oriented depends on the appetite the action is pursued to satisfy. And the appetite involved is specified by the object. Suppose that one's appetite for food, and I mean one's hunger rather than one's desire for a culinary experience, is a necessarily self-oriented appetite. This is plausible because an object that is pursued for the sake of satisfying one's hunger does appear necessarily self-oriented. But an intrinsically good object that is chosen for the sake of one's will for what is intrinsically good, may, but need not, be self-oriented.⁷⁷ The latter case holds true because the agent is capable of desiring the object (via the agent's will) for its intrinsic value, while, of course, the agent is incapable of desiring the food (via the agent's hunger appetite) for its intrinsic value. This shows that the appetite for food is not an appetite to which the noble is a fit object. So, with a distinction between appetites that are necessarily self-oriented and those that are not, I can account for Kant's view that any action immediately performed (without deliberate choice of it for its intrinsic value) is performed with a tacit principle of self-love while denying that this entails that if an action is performed because it is desirable or suitable to an appetite it must be performed for self-love.

If the appetites are so divided, then the self-oriented principle of choice of "desired as good for me" may tacitly attach to things perceived as sensibly desirable to the sense appetites (if we hold that all the sense appetites are necessarily self-oriented). But the choice

⁷⁷ I do not mean "for the sake of one's will" to indicate what is explicit in the mind of the agent. I am not referring to self-reflection. For example, I do not mean that when a person chooses an action for the sake of satisfying his will that he be thinking, "I choose this action for the sake of my will." What I do think is that he chooses an action with some thought. This thought or judgment will be of an object that is suitable to the agent's will. That thought could be characterized in very many ways. But however it is, it will make some reference to the intrinsic value (although perhaps without those words) of the action.

of something as nobly desirable is not necessarily self-oriented. In addition to what I've said above, another reason to think this true is that what is fit to the will is a common and universal good (like justice) rather than merely a particular good as such (e.g., this *polis*). Of course, a particular *polis* can be an object of the will but only insofar as it is willed as in some way related to a common or universal good. For example, the *polis* may be rationally desirable as just.

I have responded to an objection that requiring noble pleasure in an action introduces self-love. I made some distinctions to answer this charge and to substantiate the claim that noble pleasure is not necessarily reduced to pleasure in something *as good for me*, but is pleasure in something that is *good in itself*.⁷⁸ I also used this discussion to provide further explanation for how noble pleasure fits my account of pleasure, which requires suitability to the will. I also suggested that what may be correct in Korsgaard's Kant's view about self-love is that action performed on the basis of an immediate inclination must involve a tacit self-oriented maxim only if the action is performed to satisfy the sense appetites. I now consider, far more briefly, two additional objections.

According to the second objection, requiring pleasure in the end for paradigmatic courageous action entails motivation by sensible pleasure, which brings self-love into the motivation for action. If the argument above is correct, then while noble pleasure can be taken without self-love, sensible pleasure in the end cannot be. But if pleasure in the end is required, and pleasure in the end at least partly requires sensible pleasure, then it appears that the paradigmatic agent has mixed motives. This state of mixed motives is not excellent. So, the paradigmatically courageous agent does not take pleasure in the end. I can answer this in

⁷⁸ Again, I do believe that noble actions are good for the agent.

two ways. First, I can say that it is not actually a state of mixed motives. Second, I can say that even if it is a state of mixed motives, it is still excellent.

First, even if pleasure in the end requires desire for the end as good for oneself, this does not mean that one chooses the action for this reason. Taking pleasure in the end does not entail choosing the action for that pleasure's sake or choosing the action because it is good for oneself. As I said in the previous section, one can have an inclining motivation to perform an action without that inclining motivation being the motivating reason for which the action is performed.

Second, an action chosen for the sake of its intrinsic value *and* for the sake of its pleasing benefit for the agent can be excellently chosen. This state would lack excellence if the order of these reasons were such that the person would choose the action for its pleasing benefit even if it did lack intrinsic value. But that need not be the case. The agent can choose the action primarily because it has intrinsic value and secondarily for its pleasing benefit. I see no compelling reason to suppose these are necessarily problematically mixed.

According to the third objection, my view seems to assume that to find something pleasing requires taking pleasure in it. But I can find something pleasing without taking pleasure in it. For example, I find gelato pleasant but am not currently taking pleasure in gelato. So, the objection goes, while perhaps finding the end pleasing and finding the intrinsic value of the action pleasing are required for paradigmatic courageous action, actual pleasure in the end and noble pleasure are not required. This objection fails because my view of pleasure requires that finding the end and nobility of an action pleasant are forms of pleasure. Both include each of my components for pleasure articulated above. In reflectively choosing an action the paradigmatically courageous person will desire and possess both the sensible goodness of the action's end and noble goodness of the action as a whole. This

choice expresses her desire, requires both her possession and apprehension of the object of choice, and will involve her having in her mind the action's end and nobleness in a clear manner. A better analogy would be my choosing which flavor of gelato to eat when I am currently considering the choice. Pleasure will play a role in this case if I make my decision on the basis of which flavor would afford me greater pleasure. I will ask myself something like, "Which seems more pleasing to me?" and choose on the basis of which is more pleasant to my imagination.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided a general account of pleasure that applies to each of the kinds of pleasure I identified. That account is that pleasure is, supervenes on, or completes an agent's appetite's resting in her apprehension of her unimpeded possession of a desirable object. I identified a variety of kinds of pleasures according to this general account of pleasure. By means of an account of intentional moral action, I identified the parts of an action (i.e., an act and an end), the principle of choice of an action, and the moral value accorded to an action by an agent in virtue of that agent's principle of choice. From this, I identified an immediate, sensible pleasure in the end of action and a reflective, noble pleasure in the choice of a virtuous action. I defended the necessity of both pleasure in the end and noble pleasure for paradigmatic virtuous activity (and so paradigmatically courageous activity as well) and used these pleasures to illuminate the distinction between the naturally courageous, continently courageous, and paradigmatically courageous. I defended that both pleasure in the end and noble pleasure are pleasures according to my definition of pleasure. I answered some objections to my claims, including that my view involves problematic self-love and mixed motives in the paradigmatic courageous agent's

choice of action. In the next chapter I address some other potential pleasures required for virtue. For example, I answer whether or not the courageous person must take pleasure in the fact that he is acting courageously.

CHAPTER FIVE

More Pleasures of Courage?

Introduction

In this chapter, I identify some other relevant kinds of pleasure to evaluate as additional potential candidates for the pleasure that paradigmatic courageous activity involves.¹ The kinds of pleasure I identify provide a plausible (although not necessarily complete) set of candidates that includes those other scholars have posited. I develop my contention from the last chapter that two kinds of pleasure are required and give a new argument for the necessity of pleasure in the end based on my view that a courageous manner of action requires hope. While I identify one additional kind of pleasure that I think is characteristic of paradigmatic courageous activity, I argue that none of the other candidates considered are necessary for such activity.

More Kinds of Pleasure

In the previous chapter, I discussed act and activity pleasure (e.g., in dancing), pleasure in the end (e.g., in defending the *polis*), success pleasure (e.g., in winning the race), and noble pleasure (e.g., in the intrinsically valuable action of fighting to defend one's *polis* because it is noble). In this chapter, I will also discuss skill pleasure (which a kind of activity pleasure), wholehearted pleasure, propositional pleasure, self-reflective pleasure, and harmony pleasure. In this section, I briefly explain each of these new kinds of pleasure.

¹ As in the previous chapters, when I speak of paradigmatic courageous activity I refer to the full scope of paradigmatic courageous activity, to include action that is morally well motivated and performed in a courageous manner.

First, we take pleasure in performing acts with ease due to skill. Dancing well is more pleasant than dancing poorly. So, we can identify one subcategory of act pleasure as *skill pleasure*. This pleasure is attendant to skillfully performing simple or complex acts. One may take pleasure in the movements of one's body while dancing, or delight in skillful badinage, or joy in excellently pursuing philosophical understanding or contemplation.

Wholehearted pleasure is the pleasure taken in the fact that one is acting without any impediment arising from volitional contrariety or double-mindedness. The person's will is set on a single object and does not vacillate between two contrary objects. I consider the pleasure that may result from *acting* itself with such wholeheartedness a species of skill pleasure.

In the last chapter, I identified *pleasure in the end* as a (or mostly) sensible pleasure. It was a pleasure that could be taken in the end of an action by the naturally virtuous agent who does not intellectually grasp his action's intrinsic goodness. In contrast, *noble pleasure* was an intellectual pleasure, although it is taken by means of sensible features. Noble pleasure was the pleasure taken in the intellectual grasp of the action's intrinsic goodness. Intellectual pleasures regard intellectual activities (e.g., in contemplating some philosophical truth) and intelligible objects (e.g., in a mathematical proof or the justice of an action). One kind of intellectual pleasure is propositional pleasure. *Propositional pleasure* is pleasure in some proposition.² Like other pleasures, propositional pleasure can be *self-reflective* or not. Self-reflective propositional pleasure may involve propositions about my desires, intentions, wishes, performances, etc. An example of a self-reflective propositional pleasure is pleasure in the fact that I am acting courageously. An example of a non-self-reflective propositional

² I do not think that all intellectual pleasures are propositional pleasures. But this issue will not be relevant to my purposes.

pleasure is pleasure in the fact that *this* action is courageous. The primary object is the action and not the agent, regardless of whether it is oneself or another intending or performing it.

We can take both intellectual and sensible pleasure in the intelligible and sensible elements of activities and objects. *Harmony* pleasure is pleasure taken in the good of harmony between one's intellectual motivation and sensible inclinations with respect to the action. For example, the temperate person finds temperate action both intelligibly and sensibly pleasing. That he finds it pleasing or good in both respects enables him to perform temperate action with a harmony of intellectual motivation and sensible inclination. This harmony is a further good that can also be the object of pleasure.³ Here, I understand the harmony itself to be the object of pleasure. Apprehending this good requires self-reflection and so such pleasure is self-reflective.

The difference between wholehearted pleasure and harmony pleasure is that the former regards harmony of the will (i.e., of the singleness of the motivation for or the consistency of the motivating reasons for which the action is performed), while the latter regards harmony of the sense inclinations and the will (i.e., of the inclining motivation with the motivation for which the action is performed).

There are comparative sets of kinds of pleasure that I do not address in detail. For example, an action is *completely pleasurable* when the action is entirely pleasant and has no mixture of pain. An action is *overall pleasant* if the sum pleasure present is such as to outweigh the pain of it. It's clear that paradigmatic courageous action does not require the former because courage involves fear and fear is unpleasant. I also think it's clear that courageous action does not require the latter because courageous action is not only painful but can be

³ We may use terms such as "deep joy" to describe the experience of both intellectual and sensible pleasure in an action or object. So described, I do not think this names a distinct pleasure but a combination of two pleasures.

painfully unsuccessful. The pain of the failure may swamp the pleasures taken between intending and executing the action. I shall not address here whether the pleasures of a successful courageous action can also be swamped by pain.⁴

I have endorsed a general definition of pleasure and identified categories of pleasure. I now investigate whether any of these additional pleasures are required for paradigmatic courageous activity. To review, pleasure is, supervenes on, or completes an agent's appetite's resting in her apprehension of her unimpeded possession of a desirable object. Courageous activity may involve sensible or intellectual pleasure, whether self-reflective or not, in

1. Skilled Activities
2. Wholeheartedness
3. Success
4. Ends of actions
5. Intrinsically valuable actions
6. Propositions
7. Harmony

Given the above kinds of pleasure and my discussion of courageous activity from prior chapters, I now evaluate these pleasures as candidates for pleasure necessary for paradigmatic courageous activity. To review, courageous activity begins with the perception of a threat and continues through the initial response to the threat, intention of an end, choice (and often deliberation) of means to that end, and execution of one's action plan.⁵ What I have discussed in the last chapter as the choice of the action falls prior to the execution stage of courageous activity. I shall consider courageous activity to end when the agent's active striving to perform it ceases. The action's success or failure may not occur

⁴ See Nathan Carson, *Appreciation: its nature and role in virtue ethical moral psychology and dialectical moral agency* (Dissertation), for an interesting defense of this position.

⁵ This follows my division of courageous activity into three phases: the motivational response, action planning, and action execution phases.

until far after this point.⁶ To identify the pleasure of courageous activity, we must consider the potential pleasures that arise along each step of the way.⁷

Evaluating More Candidates for the Pleasures of Courage

Act and Skill Pleasure

In this subsection I discuss act pleasure and focus on a kind of act pleasure – skill pleasure. Skill pleasure is pleasure in acting skillfully. As discussed earlier, courageous actions involve difficult acts (e.g., painful fighting) not done for themselves but for the sake of further ends (i.e., defending the *polis*). Because of this it does not seem that any act that is part of a courageous action must be pleasant. But one kind of act pleasure one might think necessary for courage is the pleasure in skillfully performing courageous action. This pleasure derives from one’s awareness that one is performing with facility a valued task one is habituated to perform. I do not mean, as in the martial case, the pleasure of a person who fights well, whose body responds to his training, who, we might say, thrusts and parries with excellence. The activity of performing an action with martial skill is accidental to courage, even courage on the battlefield. A person need not be a skilled warrior to exhibit courage in battle. Further, if this martial skill pleasure were necessary then a person would not act courageously were he killed in the first charge prior to any employment of skill. But that it is implausible. Thus, no bodily skill pleasure of this sort is necessary for courage. Courageous action is too broad a category to necessitate any single bodily skill.

⁶ I thank Robert Roberts for this point.

⁷ I do not agree with Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 2011 when she says, “We recognize the difference between the encratic and the fully virtuous person, and can also appreciate that the virtuous person finds acting virtuously enjoyable; it is obvious, however, that this does not consist in the virtuous person’s having perceptible feelings of pleasure that the encratic lacks (76).” It is not obvious that there is no perceptible pleasure the virtuous person possesses that the encratic lacks. The only pleasure she countenances is what I discuss as a skill pleasure.

A more plausible candidate is the skill pleasure of acting well in itself. Julia Annas applies psychological research of “flow experiences” to skilled activity in general and to virtuous activity in particular.⁸ Using the terms presented so far, flow experiences are engaged in for their own sake and without self-reflection.⁹ This skill pleasure or flow experience is the only pleasure that Annas believes necessarily applies to courageous action.¹⁰

The courageous person does exhibit something like a general skill in responding quickly under pressure, deliberating accurately under pressure, and executing one’s plan resolutely under pressure. Courageous activity involves a series of acts that can be done well or poorly.¹¹ I divided courageous activity into phases of distinct acts: the motivational response phase, action planning phase, and the action execution phase. In the motivational response phase is the act of intending the end. In the action planning phase are the acts of deliberation about means and choice of the means to accomplishing the end.¹² In the action execution phase are the acts of initiating and executing the action. It is plausible to suppose

⁸ Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, follows the work of psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), on “flow experiences.” Annas identifies virtuous activity as a kind of “flow experience.”

⁹ Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, describes flow experiences,

The flow experience has two crucial features. One is that it is what is called ‘autotelic’: the activity is experienced as being its own end, and thus experienced as being enjoyable in itself. Even if it is undertaken to produce a further end, the person can experience it as enjoyable if it is treated as an end in itself regardless of whether the further end is produced....The other important feature is that the person engaged in the activity is not conscious of the self (72).

¹⁰ Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 76.

¹¹ Again, I do not have a precise account of the distinction between an act and an activity. An activity seems to be an ongoing series of acts that are united in some way.

¹² The action (act + end) is chosen at one of these two stages. So, it is during these phases that the principle of choice of the action is chosen. Whether or not this occurs at the first or second stage will depend on the situation. For example, it will depend on whether deliberation is required to achieve the end. If so, and the act or acts needed to achieve the end are not clear, then the principle of choice of the act + end will not occur until after deliberation. I do not think the details of where to locate the principle of choice will matter for my purposes here.

that the acts within each of these stages can be done well or poorly and that well-doing in each of these stages is akin to a skill. One can intend poorly (e.g., have ambiguity in one's aim or contrariety or double-mindedness in one's choice of action), deliberate and choose means poorly (e.g., suffer distraction or hasty attraction to ineffectual means), initiate poorly (e.g., experience hesitancy or inability to begin the action), or execute poorly (e.g., become paralyzed by fear).¹³ I am not now discussing the objects of these acts but the performance of the acts themselves.¹⁴ Intending and choosing well requires a clear goal and an undivided mind.¹⁵ Deliberation and choice of means requires the act of undistracted, careful, and quick thinking through how to accomplish one's end. Initiating and executing the action requires decisiveness and other excellences (the emotional excellences of which I discussed in chapter two). We can call these skills the skills of prudence. Since courageous action is prudent action, courageous action will involve these skills.¹⁶

These skills are not unique to courage but their unimpeded operation in the midst of a courage-apt situation, with its threats, risks, and conflict, will depend on the agent's

¹³ Here is an illustration of a way in which pleasure can sabotage courageous action. In long distance racing, it is crucial not to let the pleasantness of the ease with which one can run the beginning of the race influence one to run faster at the beginning than one can handle for the entire race. If one goes out too fast, one metaphorically "dies." That is, one is unable to finish the race at roughly equivalent speed and must drastically slow down. Going out too hard can result from a number of things, but a common source for the foolish runner is to let the pleasantness of the early ease of action and the confidence and daring this gives him with respect to his opponents motivate him to do more than he can handle for the long haul. The experienced runner keeps his confidence or daring in check. But he also does not spend time worrying or thinking too much. These mental thoughts can distract and drain energy. The courageous person cannot let the pleasure of his confidence, hope, or daring carry him prematurely into confrontation.

¹⁴ I consider later pleasures in the end and pleasure in the action chosen as intrinsically valuable (i.e., noble pleasure).

¹⁵ This lack of an undivided mind, or single-mindedness, is what some call wholeheartedness. I do not distinguish all of these skills into distinct kinds of skill pleasure but group them all under the skills of prudence.

¹⁶ See chapter two for discussion of the relation between prudence and courage.

courage. For example, one cannot deliberately choose and execute action in a prompt and unimpeded way if one is overly fearful, without some hope, or rash. The business of courage includes the emotional excellences that exclude these sorts of impediments to prudence's work. So, in the courageous person, these skillful acts will be unimpeded in part due to the presence of the proper emotions of courage. This prudent activity in the context of a situation apt for courage is enabled by the virtue of courage. So, there is a sense in which the activity of prudence is also an activity of courage or of their combined contributions such that this kind of prudent pleasure is unique to courage-apt situations.

Do these skillful acts necessarily provide pleasure? Again, I am not considering now pleasure in the object of these acts but the acts themselves. As mental acts they do not necessarily involve pleasant sensations, like the skill of dancing. Further, deliberation is not needed for every case of courageous action. Further, while unimpeded activity is necessary for skill pleasure, it is not sufficient for it. Skill pleasure, like all pleasure, also requires apprehension of the possession of the good; it requires attention. In this case the attention is to the task that the skills direct rather than to the consideration of the performance of the skills themselves. Such attention requires an awareness of one's activity going well but is not self-reflective.¹⁷ For example, awareness of choosing well does not require believing that I am choosing well. And these skills do require attention to the task. If this is correct, then courageous action does involve the skill pleasures of the skills of prudence. In summary, the argument presented is that skillful prudent activity provides a form of skill pleasure. Paradigmatic courageous activity requires skillful prudent activity. So, paradigmatic courageous activity requires this skill pleasure of prudence.

¹⁷ I follow Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, here.

One objection to this claim is that some threatening situations that courageous action may involve (e.g., an imminent threat that requires rapid responses without deliberation) do not allow time for any such pleasure. In such cases, acts of intention, choice, and action initiation seem too instantaneous to be pleasant. In such a circumstance, the agent's attention is so riveted by responding to the demanding, high-stakes, fast changing situation that there is no opportunity for pleasure. Since it is implausible in such cases that the attention necessary for the pleasures of prudence is required, it is implausible that these skill pleasures are necessary for courageous action. In sum, the objection is that courageous action is sometimes too demanding, high-stakes, and too rapid to afford any opportunity for pleasure.

In response to this objection, we might consider whether there are analogous skills that survive this objection. Consider the skill of mountain bike racing or race car driving. Does the objection apply to these activities? It seems not. It seems clear that those skilled in these activities take pleasure in the skillful execution of navigating obstacles at fast speeds with little response time available. Further, the pleasure of these activities is heightened by the danger. I do not think this is necessarily a result of a love of danger or dare-deviling, but due to the higher stakes such danger signifies and the pleasure that supervenes on the unerring execution of the demanding activity that is made significant by such high stakes.¹⁸ These activities are like courageous activity in the relevant respects: they are demanding, high-stakes, and require rapid responses. If skill pleasure is always present in the ideal practitioners of these skills, then perhaps it is always present in analogous paradigmatic courageous activity. If so, the objection fails. However, I do not see how to substantiate the claim that such pleasures are *always* present in the case of ideal practitioners of these skills or

¹⁸ Perhaps this involves a series of mini-success pleasures at the going well of the activity.

in the complete exercise of courage. It seems possible that a situation requires such a rapid response that pleasure is absent. Given this possibility, I weaken my claim above to be that prudent pleasure is characteristic of paradigmatic courageous activity rather than absolutely necessary to it.

This discussion raises an issue that will be a constant part of our evaluation. When does courageous action require both the possession of the good and the apprehension of this possession (so producing pleasure) and when does it merely require the possession of the good alone?

I now give one plausible principle for identifying when a pleasure must be felt. A pleasure must be felt in an action if i) the object of pleasure is an object the possession of which is necessary to the action and ii) the possession of that object cannot occur without apprehending its possession. Condition ii) is stronger than is required for skill pleasure. For example, consider the mountain biker who fails to enjoy his mountain biking because he is distracted by anxiety from work. He may still exhibit some skill at mountain biking despite this distraction but feel no pleasure in it because of the distraction.¹⁹ While I think that the paradigmatically courageous person generally will not be subject to irrelevant distractions, I think that the paradigmatically courageous person could be subject to distractions that are relevant to his action but which impede his pleasure.²⁰ Whereas pleasure in the end and

¹⁹ In reality, his distraction is very likely to inhibit his skillful performance of the mountain biking as such performance usually requires focused attention. Perhaps a better example would be something like fishing, in which there is less need for utter focus.

²⁰ Being subject to irrelevant distraction is a defect in courage discussed in chapter three. However, it may be too strong to require complete freedom from irrelevant distraction. Perhaps one with absolutely perfect prudence would not be subject to distraction. Such distraction would count against the perfection of the skills of prudence. But I do not think that absolutely perfect prudence is required for paradigmatically courageous activity. So, while I think that freedom from distraction is a mark of prudence and the paradigmatic courageous person's courage will aid him in acting without distraction, there may be cases where he is distracted and so fails to experience the pleasures of courage. Hence, prudent pleasure is only characteristic of paradigmatic courageous activity.

noble pleasure are necessarily taken at the moment of choosing the action, prudence pleasure is an ongoing activity pleasure. As such, it is more susceptible to disruption and so should be judged to be characteristic rather than required.

So, in the case of skill pleasures condition ii) of the principle is not met. I will return to this principle to aid in assessing the pleasures to follow. In conclusion, I have argued in this section that courageous action at least characteristically involves a kind of act pleasure. This act pleasure is a skill pleasure taken in the skills of prudence. So, courageous action characteristically involves the pleasures of prudence.

Wholehearted Pleasure

Another type of pleasure is pleasure in acting without any volitional contrariety or double-mindedness. Call this wholehearted pleasure. If Kierkegaard is correct that “purity of heart is to will one thing” then this is pleasure in acting with a pure heart. This is a pleasure in acting with singleness of *will* or an unadulterated state of one’s intention for action. While this is an excellence of the act of intending, a skill is not needed for wholehearted willing. Wholehearted pleasure is not pleasure in the harmony between the will and sense appetites. Pleasure in acting with both noble pleasure and sensible pleasure in the end – the union of the will and the sense appetite – is what I call harmony pleasure (to be discussed below). Wholeheartedness is a state of consistency in the reasons for which one acts (i.e., one’s rational motivation) and the absence of rationally attractive contrary reasons for action. John McDowell holds a particularly strong version of this view. He writes,

[The virtuous person’s virtue] not only singles out just the right one of the potentially action-inviting features of a predicament, but does so in such a way that none of the agent’s motivational energy is enticed into operation by any of the others; he has no errant impulses that threaten to lead him astray.... His ...[virtue] is

such as to insulate the attractions of competing courses of action from generating actual urges to pursue them.²¹

I take what I believe is a weaker position. I do not think that wholeheartedness requires the absence of sensibly contrary inclining motivations. For, sometimes the act of a virtuous action is painful and so there is a natural and proper sensible inclination to avoid it. But the sensible inclination to avoid pain cannot be rationally attractive to the agent so that the agent is tempted to refrain from doing the virtuous action.²²

Julia Annas seems to hold that wholeheartedness is necessary for courageous action for she says that “enjoyment is to be found in wholehearted engagement in expert activity, something we have seen by now is found also in virtuous activity.”²³ Broadie attributes to Aristotle the necessity of what she calls wholehearted pleasure in virtuous action, although she is reticent to call it pleasure proper because she thinks sensible pleasure is paradigmatic.²⁴

Is wholehearted pleasure required for courageous action? Whether or not wholeheartedness itself is necessary for virtuous action is a difficult question. I shall assume but not argue that wholeheartedness itself is necessary but deny that wholehearted pleasure is required for courageous action. To determine whether wholehearted pleasure is required

²¹ John McDowell, “Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle,” in *Identity, Truth, & Value: Essays for David Wiggins*, by Sabina Lovibond and Stephen G. Williams (Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 102.

²² It is not clear whether this would be acceptable to McDowell or whether he holds the stronger (and to my mind implausible) view that there would be no sensible repulsion to a painful act in the virtuous person.

²³ Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*, 66.

²⁴ Sarah Broadie, *Ethics With Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 319. She believes that wholehearted pleasure is the pleasure of gladly doing (in the sense of fully willing to do) an action (even a painful one) in contrast to enjoying an action. She does not think that virtuous action requires enjoying an action. I believe she means what I would call taking pleasure in the act. I would agree if this is taking pleasure in the act particular to courage (such as fighting). But I suggested above that taking pleasure in the acts of prudence is at least characteristic of courage.

we must also determine what must be apprehended for wholehearted pleasure. What must be apprehended is one's unimpeded activity of single-mindedly intending and performing an action. But this is ambiguous. To determine the nature of what must be apprehended, I ask whether wholehearted pleasure is an act pleasure or self-reflective pleasure. I shall argue that if wholehearted pleasure is an act-pleasure then it is not a distinct kind of pleasure and that if it is a self-reflective pleasure it is not required.

If it is an act pleasure, then wholehearted pleasure is not distinct in kind from the pleasure of prudence that I already discussed. Wholehearted activity is not a distinct kind of act. Rather, it is a manner in which the acts of prudence are performed. That manner principally involves single-mindedly intending and performing one's action without impeding or distracting alternate courses of action vying for one's choice. Although wholeheartedness is necessary *ex hypothesi* for the skillful performance of an activity, it is not itself the source of pleasure. Rather, it is performance of the skillful activity that is the source of pleasure. And this skillful activity is made up of what I discussed as the skills of prudence. So, if wholehearted pleasure is a pleasure in an act, then it is reducible to a component of the pleasures of prudence.

If wholehearted pleasure is self-reflective, and so distinct from the pleasures of prudence, then it is not necessary. Wholehearted pleasure would then be self-reflectively taken in the fact that one is single-mindedly performing one's action without impeding or distracting alternate courses of action vying for one's choice. What must be apprehended for the pleasure is the wholeheartedness itself. But I hold that no self-reflective pleasure is necessary for every courageous action (I discuss self-reflection at greater length below). So, either wholehearted pleasure reduces to a pleasure of prudence or, if it is a distinct kind of pleasure, is unnecessary for courageous action.

Success Pleasure

In *NE* III.9, in the context of discussing courage, Aristotle says, “It is not the case, then, with all the virtues that the exercise of them is pleasant, except in so far as it reaches its end.”²⁵ The most straightforward interpretation of Aristotle’s comment is that no pleasure is required for the execution of courageous action except the pleasure of successfully overcoming the threat and protecting the threatened good. This makes courageous action pleasant only if successful. But since success is accidental to courageous action, success pleasure cannot be required for courageous action.²⁶ Dorothea Frede’s translation of this passage is: “So not all the virtues give rise to pleasant activities, except to the extent that it touches on the end.”²⁷ This perhaps leaves open that Aristotle had in mind what I have called pleasure in the end wherein the pleasure “touches the end” in ways that involve the agent’s intention and motivation prior to the success or failure of his action. As I argued earlier, success pleasure is derivative of pleasure in the end (whether that pleasure is sensible or noble).

Pleasure in the End

I briefly return to the claim that paradigmatic courageous action necessarily involves pleasure in the end. In the last chapter, I claimed that the end of courageous action seems sensibly pleasant to both the naturally and genuinely courageous persons and that this seeming of goodness involves sensible pleasure. I gave two examples of courageous actions:

²⁵ Aristotle, *NE* (III.9) 1117b10-16.

²⁶ Virtue requires accuracy and reliability but not infallible success. Further, if courage does not require success, then it will not require self-reflective pleasure taken in one’s success either.

²⁷ Dorothea Frede, “Nicomachean Ethics VII.11-12: Pleasure,” in (ed.) C. Natali, *Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book VII* (Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum, 2009), 183–207.

fighting in order to defend one's beloved *polis* for the sake of the noble and fighting in order to defend one's hated enemy for the sake of the noble. In the first case, I focused on taking pleasure in the well-being of one's *polis*. In the second case, I focused on taking pleasure in defending one's enemy from an unjust death. In this second case, I identified the pleasure in preventing the unjust death as a noble pleasure derivative of the justice of the action.²⁸ As I described the case, there was no pleasure in the end (which is sensible as I have defined it) but only noble pleasure. I argued that the virtuous person would focus on some sensibly attractive aspects of saving the enemy and, finding some good in him, take some pleasure in the enemy himself. In this case there would be pleasure in the end that is not merely the noble pleasure in the justice of the action.

In addition to the four arguments I gave in the last chapter for the claim that pleasure in the end is required, another reason to believe that paradigmatic courageous activity requires pleasure in the end is that a paradigmatic courageous manner of activity requires hope.²⁹ This hope involves pleasure in the end. So, a paradigmatic courageous manner of acting involves pleasure in the end. The naturally virtuous and the truly virtuous experience this pleasure in a way in which the continent does not.

The virtuous agent's emotional response of hope, which aids the performance of his action, depends on his finding something pleasing in the action beyond its nobility.³⁰ For, the

²⁸ It seems the virtuous person would take additional noble pleasure in the intrinsic value of his enemy's life as a fellow human being, for his virtue will lead him to delight in what is intrinsically valuable.

²⁹ I argued for this latter claim in chapter three.

³⁰ As I argued in chapter three, the object of this hope will differ depending on context. For example, the object of hope for the defenders of the Alamo at some point changed because defeating the enemy became hopeless. In this case, the object of hope is not overcoming the threat as such but acting well in some other way. For example, the difficult good might be delaying the enemy, or testifying to the rightness of one's cause in the face of sure death, or something else.

hope that courage requires is an emotion that takes a concrete, imaginable object and that has a pleasant hedonic affect.³¹ This pleasant hedonic affect is due to taking pleasure in the object of hope. Hope takes its object in the end of courageous action (i.e., the difficult good to be achieved) and not the act (e.g., the fighting). If hope is an emotion with a concrete, imaginable object, is pleasant, is required for courage, and must be taken in the end, then courageous action will require pleasure in the end. So, courageous action requires pleasure in the end.

Noble Action, Propositional, and Self-Reflection Pleasure

I begin with a restatement of my argument for the necessity of noble pleasure. I then assess a proposal that the courageous person takes propositional pleasure in courageous action. Assessing this proposal will enable me to distinguish plausible from implausible forms of reflective pleasure had by the courageous person.

I argued earlier that virtuous action requires noble pleasure. Noble pleasure is required for courageous action that is also moral action (as I believe paradigmatically courageous action to be). Here is a summary of my argument for the claim that every moral action involves noble pleasure according to my general account of pleasure.³² It is not possible to choose an action for the sake of the noble without noble pleasure. For, the object of pleasure (i.e., the noble) must be possessed (by the intellect) and that possession must be apprehended in order to choose the action on its basis. If the action is chosen on the basis

³¹ See chapter three for my discussion of hope. I generally think the object of hope is imagined. But it could be remembered or perhaps perceived in some way. What is necessary for my claim is that it is in some way sensible in contrast to being merely abstractly known.

³² Earlier, I claimed that choosing an action because it is noble is intellectually pleasant because the nobleness of the action, which is known because it is apprehended through a judgment of the action's fit with right reason, is fitting to our will, which rests in its possession in the action's choice.

of the noble it is because the will (i.e., the appetite) rests in the object (i.e., the object is fit to be chosen). So, every moral action involves noble pleasure. Furthermore, this account of noble pleasure fits the principle I articulated in the discussion of skill pleasure.³³ Now I assess whether pleasure in courageous action requires an elucidation of noble pleasure: propositional pleasure.

One pleasure putatively had during the execution of a courageous action is propositional pleasure. Erik Wielenberg claims that Aristotle holds that the “courageous person takes propositional pleasure in the fact that he is standing his ground and that he may do so despite suffering painful injuries.”³⁴ So, from the first-person perspective the proposition the courageous person takes pleasure in is, “I am standing my ground despite suffering for the sake of what is noble.” Wielenberg claims that the virtuous agent will always take propositional pleasure in the fact that she is performing a courageous action, even when such action is also painful.³⁵ He claims that this pleasure, and no other, is the pleasure necessarily experienced by the courageous.³⁶

³³ A pleasure must be felt in an action if i) the object of pleasure is an object the possession of which is necessary to the action and ii) the possession of that object cannot occur without apprehending its possession.

³⁴ Wielenberg, Erik. “Pleasure as a Sign of Moral Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics,” *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 34, no. 4 (2000): 439–449, 446. Earlier in his essay, he says,

We should understand ...that the courageous person takes propositional pleasure in the fact that he is standing his ground against what is terrible. He is pleased for much the same reason that a temperate person is pleased by his own abstinence. A courageous person recognizes that by standing his ground he is performing a virtuous action, and he values virtuous activity (444).

³⁵ If propositional pleasure was just pleasure in the proposition’s truthmaker, then speaking of propositional pleasure may be otiose. I am sympathetic to this. But I do not take a stand on a theory of propositions and so will keep the term propositional pleasure, even if on the right theory of propositions it ends up being otiose. I thank Bob Roberts for bringing this point to my attention.

³⁶ Part of his reasoning for this claim depends on an attenuated account of pleasure. Wielenberg, “Pleasure,” says,

I address two objections to this view. The first is the natural criticism that taking pleasure in a proposition like “I am standing my ground despite suffering for the sake of what is noble” requires too much self-reflection in the heat of battle – during the execution of courageous action. Call this the no self-reflection objection. The second objection is that requiring any reflection at all for every courageous action is implausible. Might there not be an entirely unreflective courageous action?³⁷ Call this the no reflection objection. Wielenberg responds to the latter objection as follows,

The Aristotelian response to this is that the putative counterexample [of unreflective virtuous action] is impossible. According to Aristotle, a virtuous person recognizes that the best kind of life is a life filled with virtuous activity. Moreover, a virtuous person knows which actions are virtuous and chooses to perform virtuous actions at least in part because they are virtuous. A person who fails to recognize either that what he is undertaking is a virtuous action or fails to recognize the value of virtuous activity lacks the virtue....³⁸

I partially agree with Wielenberg, although I think his view is too strong. While I think the virtuous person must recognize the intrinsic value of her action, she need not have the concept of virtue, or apply that concept to herself, or recognize the value of virtuous activity as virtuous activity. But even if Wielenberg’s view is weakened in this way, I argue below that his view is still subject to the no self-reflection objection. Wielenberg does not make a distinction between reflective action (which is all that I believe is required for action

Consider Aristotle’s claim that ‘the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent.’ The words strongly suggest a view according to which pleasure and pain may have objects. Thus, the words support a view involving propositional pleasure and pain (443).

Wielenberg mistakenly assumes here that pleasure with an intentional object is necessarily propositional pleasure. But this is not the case. For example, one can take pleasure in the intentional object of a construal and a construal is not a proposition.

³⁷ This issue is raised by Robert C. Roberts, “Aristotle on Virtues and Emotions,” *Philosophical Studies* 56, no. 3 (1989): 293–306 and Wielenberg aims to respond to it.

³⁸ Wielenberg, “Pleasure,” 447.

chosen at least partly because it is noble) and self-reflective action (wherein the agent has not merely by reflection identified the intrinsic value of the action but is also reflecting on himself as performing the intrinsically valuable action). Further, Wielenberg does not distinguish between the execution phase and non-execution phases of courageous activity. As I will show, these two distinctions are indispensable to successfully addressing the issue of the reflectivity of virtuous action.

Let me state the dialectic. Wielenberg claims that the performance of courageous action (which includes standing one's ground and suffering injury) requires propositional pleasure. This propositional pleasure is pleasure in the fact that the agent (oneself) is performing a virtuous action. The *no self-reflection objection* is the claim that the performance of a courageous action need not be done self-reflectively. The *no reflection objection* is the claim that the performance of a courageous action need not be done reflectively at all. Wielenberg's response to the second objection is that courageous action must be reflective to be virtuous. He appeals to Aristotle here, as his primary purpose is exegetical. But a distinct argument for this view can be made on the basis of the account of action and reflection above. Here is the crucial premise in that argument. If the moral value of an action depends on the principle of choice of that action, and a moral action is chosen for its intrinsic value, and conception or apprehension of intrinsic value requires some measure of reflection, and courageous action is moral action, then courageous action requires some reflection. The third conjunct of the antecedent (i.e., that conceiving the intrinsic value requires reflection) involves two claims. First, the conception of intrinsic value of an action is an intellectual apprehension of what is generally good in the action (i.e., of the action's conforming to right reason). Second, all intellectual apprehensions are reflective. No additional sort of reflection need be supposed.

But even if identifying a noble action as noble requires some reflection (as I think it does), this claim does not enable Wielenberg's identification of the propositional pleasure in question to escape the no self-reflection objection. Self-reflection is an additional act of the intellect wherein the agent reflects on a more complex proposition. The proposition Wielenberg would have us believe the courageous person takes pleasure in is "I am standing my ground despite suffering for the sake of what is noble." This is a different proposition than "This action is noble." To require reflection on the first proposition during the action execution phase makes his view vulnerable to the charge that it requires too much reflectivity in the heat of battle. This requirement is implausible because it seems nearly impossible to engage in such self-reflection in the heat of battle and because such reflection may be a hindrance to executing action. It is hard to see a reason why it would be necessary in every case. Further, if virtuous activities are best thought of as flow experiences, as Annas argued, then virtuous activities are not self-reflective in their optimal and most pleasant form. Since this self-reflection is what Wielenberg's view requires, his view succumbs to the no self-reflection objection. However, the claim that courageous action requires some propositional pleasure is not thereby refuted.

Wielenberg does not identify when propositional pleasure takes place. Wielenberg's statement of Aristotle's view does not entail Wielenberg's view that that reflection is necessary during the action *execution* phase. Aristotle's statement is consistent with the view that the virtuous person takes propositional pleasure only when choosing the action. This weaker claim is more plausible. The courageous person will, at the moment of choosing the action, take propositional pleasure in the fact that "This action is noble."³⁹ But that he must

³⁹ Or the courageous person will use some other description of the action that expresses that the agent recognizes the action to have value in its own right.

self-reflect on the fact that he is judging the action before him to be the virtuous thing or self-reflect on the fact that he is currently performing a virtuous action is implausible.

My argument above shows that if the virtuous person does choose his action on the basis of this noble reflection, he will experience noble pleasure. A plausible elucidation of this pleasure is the pleasure that is taken in the proposition that expresses the intrinsic value of the action itself. But I shall not argue that such propositional pleasure is required. Even if this noble pleasure is best explained another way, my view that courageous actions require noble pleasure is unaffected.

In summary, the courageous person will take pre-execution propositional pleasure in the fact that “this action is noble” at the choice of the action, but he will not necessarily take such pleasure during that action’s execution nor will he necessarily take self-reflective propositional pleasure at any point.

But the no-reflection objection can be raised even to this weaker claim. Suppose there is a particular type of action that will be virtuous in foreseeable future situations and a person intends (prior to the arrival of the situation) to perform it whenever opportunities to do so arrive. We can imagine a soldier fighting in a just war who has judged that he should not reveal vital information under torture. Let us suppose that he judges that acting in this way is noble and choosing to perform an action of this type in advance will greatly increase his chances of resisting the torture because of the enemy’s likelihood to use mind altering drugs on captured soldiers. He recognizes that his reflection on a particular action’s nobility may be greatly impeded by such drugs and so intends this action type ahead of time for nobility’s sake. Let us suppose that what he intends is a noble and courageous action. Now suppose he is captured, drugged, and interrogated. Does the fact that he does not apprehend, and feel pleasure in, the proposition about the nobility of his action (because of

the drugs) rule out the possibility of his acting courageously? It seems not. So, it looks as if not every courageous action requires noble pleasure.

Here is a way to salvage the claim that courageous action requires noble (propositional) pleasure. Suppose that what I am discussing above as a particular action-type is in fact an act-type (enduring torture in our soldier case) that is part of a single, complex action, the choice of which the agent does take propositional pleasure in.⁴⁰ This complex action is chosen with noble pleasure although the potentially multiple acts of which it is composed are performed without noble pleasure. All of the individual acts (which are merely potential acts of enduring torture) are for the sake of the same end (the safety of the *polis*) and this action (multiple acts plus single end) is chosen for the sake of the noble. The difference between this and other cases we have considered is that the particulars of the acts are not known prior to choosing the action. But the act-type (enduring torture) is known. Noble pleasure is taken at the choice of this complex action but not during the performance of the various acts. The various acts are potential parts of the complex action in which the pleasure is taken. This response raises questions about the individuation of actions that I cannot address.⁴¹ But the solution seems plausible. With this solution, I can preserve the claim that all courageous action requires noble (propositional) pleasure.

So, in agreement with the self-reflection objection, I maintain that the propositional pleasure of self-reflection during the action execution phase cannot be necessary for courageous action. Nor do I think it necessary for pre-execution phases of action. But the

⁴⁰ Recall from the last chapter that an action is composed of an act and an end.

⁴¹ Another way to try this kind of solution is to posit that there can be a larger, complex action that contains within it simpler potential *actions* (acts plus ends). In this case, I would modify my claim to be that noble pleasure is required for courageous action itself or for a larger, more complex action of which that action is a part.

propositional pleasure arising from the reflection needed to choose an action as noble is necessary for the choice of courageous action.

In summary, I have identified two pleasures that are required for courage, sensible pleasure in the end and noble pleasure, and one that is characteristic of courage, the skill pleasures of prudence. The pleasures of prudence are taken in the pre-execution skillful acts of prudence necessary for the execution of courageous action.⁴² The noble pleasure in courageous action can be understood as propositional pleasure, which is taken by the will in the proposition that confronting the threat to the good is a noble action.⁴³ I argued that this is not self-reflective pleasure. Self-reflective pleasure is not required for courageous activity because self-reflection is not required for courageous activity and nothing unnecessary for courageous activity is the basis for pleasure required for courageous activity. Pleasure in the end is taken by the sensitive appetites in the sensible good to be protected, promoted or preserved by one's act. When these pleasures are had, the will and sense appetites are working together in a harmony that is an excellence of the virtuous person. I now consider whether this harmony of appetites itself is a source of pleasure to the courageous person.

Harmony Pleasure

We saw earlier that Aristotle said that “the appetitive element in a temperate person ought to be in harmony with reason; for the aim of both is what is noble, and the temperate person's appetite is for the right thing, in the right way, and at the right time, and this is what reason requires as well.”⁴⁴ In the last chapter, I followed Aristotle and maintained that the

⁴² Although, it seems to me that the pleasures may be involved in the action's execution as well.

⁴³ I do not claim that noble pleasure must be understood as propositional pleasure.

⁴⁴ *NE* III.12. 1119b15.

aim of both the sense appetite and the will is what is noble, but in different ways. The agent wills the nobility of the action and sensibly desires the sensible particularity of the action that, although it is judged noble, is not sensibly desired under that description. This applies to courage in a distinct way for since courage may involve pain in the act of courage (e.g., fighting a battle⁴⁵), there is not a complete alignment as is the case in at least some temperate acts (where the act of temperance is pleasant). But the partial harmony that can be achieved in courageous action is a necessary good of courageous action.⁴⁶ The lack of this inner harmony signals an inner impediment to action that counts against the excellence of the agent's courage.⁴⁷ The lack of this inner harmony will not necessarily count against the action being a courageous one although it will count against the action being performed in a courageous manner. The paradigmatic courageous agent will act with this harmony. If this is so, might there be a pleasure taken in this harmony that is necessary for courageous action?

Is the *apprehension* of, and so pleasure taken in, this harmony itself necessary for the courageous person? No. I posit that although the harmony itself is a good necessary for virtuous action, the apprehension of it is not. The second part of my sufficiency principle for when pleasure must be experienced is that the possession of the necessary object cannot occur without apprehending its possession. But this is not the case for this self-reflective pleasure. That self-reflective pleasure does not meet my principle does not demonstrate that self-reflective pleasure is not present. But, as with all self-reflection, it is very plausible that at

⁴⁵ Of course, I do not think that fighting a battle is the only act or context in which courage occurs. There are many acts that can be part of a courageous action.

⁴⁶ This follows from my claim that all virtuous action involves both noble pleasure and sensible pleasure in the end. Complete harmony would follow if the act distinct to the virtue was also pleasant and that the person experienced no contrary inclinations.

⁴⁷ As I have discussed, this might involve a failure of prudence, failure of rational motivation, or failure of sensible inclination and failure of any of these will impede action.

least some courageous activities may not afford the opportunity to apprehend or notice the harmony. The urgency of planning the proper course of action and executing it may properly disallow the apprehension of the harmony of the appetites with which one acts, for apprehending this harmony is not necessary for virtuous action. When Aristotle says that the brave person delights in or at least is not pained by courageous action, I suggest he is distinguishing between apprehending (and so delighting or taking pleasure in) the having of a good involved in courageous action and not apprehending but having that good (and so not being pained).⁴⁸ This reading of Aristotle aligns with my view. The courageous person must have but not necessarily apprehend the good of internal harmony during courageous action. The person must not have internal disharmony during virtuous action, which she would necessarily notice and which would impede action. The apprehension of internal disharmony is painful and it is this pain that must be lacking. In contrast, internal harmony need not be noticed because apprehending it is not necessary for executing virtuous action. So, the pleasure of internal harmony is not necessary for courageous action even though the good of internal harmony is necessary.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I utilized my general account of pleasure to identify some kinds of pleasures in addition to those I identified in chapter four. I evaluated these pleasures as candidates for the pleasure required for paradigmatic courageous activity and concluded that only two pleasures are required for paradigmatic courageous activity (i.e., pleasure in the end and noble pleasure) and another one is characteristic (i.e., the skill pleasures of prudence). I gave an additional argument for pleasure in the end involving the emotion of hope, which is

⁴⁸ He says that courageous action must be pleasant or at least not painful in *NE* 1104b4–9.

necessary for a courageous manner of acting. I argued that wholehearted pleasure is either reducible to prudence pleasure or is self-reflective pleasure and so is not required. I briefly argued that success pleasure is not required. Further, I argued that no form of self-reflective pleasure is required, including the propositional pleasure that Erik Wielenberg defends, and that, while the good of internal harmony is necessary for courageous action, the pleasure of internal harmony is not required.

The completion of this investigation of the pleasures of courage also brings to a close this work on courage. The claim of this work as a whole is that the virtue of courage enables reliable performance of paradigmatic courageous activity, where paradigmatic courageous activity is the complete exercise of courage in a courage-apt situation that involves responding properly to the courage-apt situation and performing the courageous action for the right reason in a courageous manner.

After setting out the terms, distinctions, and assumptions of this work, I offered a partial definition of courage as a virtue for achieving one's significant ends in a situation made difficult by the apparent presence of a significant threat by means of confronting rather than fleeing the threat. Then, in the second chapter, I addressed some cognitional, volitional, and emotional rival accounts of courage that fit this definition and highlighted their strengths and shortcomings. This analysis suggested the superiority of a holistic account of courage that involves the coordination of well-formed appetitive powers in service of reason. The subsequent chapters discussed the emotional excellence and pleasures involved in such a holistic account, using these discussions to distinguish and account for the states of natural virtue, continence, and genuine virtue.

In the third chapter, I explained how proper emotions coordinate with a good will in service of reason through each of three phases of courageous activity, contributing to the

excellence of the courageous manner of acting. I argued that fear, hope, and daring are necessary for paradigmatic courageous activity; fear is necessary for properly responding to a significant threat, hope is necessary for properly pursuing a significant but obstacle-laden goal, and daring is necessary for properly confronting the significant threat as a means to attaining the significant goal. An advantage of my view was that it can account for how courageous activity requires both fear, an emotion of suspect value according to some views of courage, and fearlessness, another view of courage, and how the transition from fear to fearless daring is well-ordered and serves rational activity. The emotional excellence discussed partly distinguished the continently courageous from the genuinely courageous.

In addition to this emotional excellence, for courage to be evinced, one must reason well, will the right thing in the right way and with the right kinds of pleasure. In the fourth chapter, I provided a general account of pleasure that applies to each of the kinds of pleasure I identified. That account is that pleasure is, supervenes on, or completes an agent's appetite's resting in her apprehension of her unimpeded possession of a desirable object. I identified a variety of kinds of pleasures according to this general account of pleasure. I discussed the parts of an action (i.e., an act and an end), the principle of choice of an action, and the moral value accorded to an action by an agent in virtue of that agent's principle of choice and applied these to courageous action. Using these concepts, I identified an immediate, sensible pleasure in the end of action and a reflective, noble pleasure in the choice of a virtuous action. I argued for the necessity of both pleasure in the end (the pleasure of the naturally virtuous) and noble pleasure (the pleasure of the continent) for paradigmatic virtuous activity (and so paradigmatically courageous activity as well) and used these pleasures to further illuminate the distinction between the naturally courageous, continently courageous, and paradigmatically courageous. I argued on the basis of, first, what

is necessary to explain the motivation of the naturally courageous, second, the excellent manner of action that is enabled by an inclination to find the end sensibly pleasant, third, an essential link between pleasure in the end and noble pleasure, and fourth, the need for pleasure in the end for proper practical thinking in courageous action. I answered some objections to my claims, including that my view involves problematic self-love, requires mixed motives in the paradigmatic courageous agent's choice of action, and is committed to a false entailment from finding something pleasant to taking pleasure in it. In the fourth chapter, I discussed a variety of potential pleasures required for courage, including those posited by other scholars, and argued that no additional pleasure is necessary. My aim was to increase our understanding of the situation, emotions, action, motivations, and pleasures of the paradigmatic activity of the virtue of courage.

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