

## ABSTRACT

### Police Corruption in India: Analysis and Advice Based on Similar Global Situations

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Corruption in the public service sector is one of the greatest challenges for developing countries to fully democratize, a roadblock to creating a balanced social system prioritizing justice and equality and a detriment to economic growth. I argue that police corruption must be reformed in India for their political, social and economic advancement. After careful consideration of scholarly debates, corruption was defined as those actions that abuse public servant positions for private gain where they are in violation of the laws regulating their actions. This was then applied to India to dissect the ways corruption has plagued their history and is prohibiting their economic, political, and social advancement. Once the situation in India was adequately identified, a more global perspective was achieved using scholarly analysis from police journals and corruption reform books to see and overview of how corruption has been combatted internationally in Brazil, New York City and Singapore. Lessons extrapolated from both successful and unsuccessful attempts to reform corruption were then applied to the political context of India to produce a series of broad recommendations for their corruption reform.

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POLICE CORRUPTION IN INDIA:  
ANALYSIS AND ADVICE BASED ON SIMILAR GLOBAL SITUATIONS

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments .....	iv
Chapter One: The Roots and Effects of Corruption.....	1
Defining Corruption .....	2
Corruption in Democracies .....	4
Effects of Corruption .....	9
Politically .....	9
Socially.....	10
Economically .....	11
Chapter Two: The State of Corruption in India.....	13
History of Police and Corruption in India .....	14
British Rule .....	14
Post-Independence .....	16
Anti-Corruption Efforts .....	17
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 .....	17
Central Vigilance Commission Act of 2003 .....	18
Anna Hazare and Jan Lokpal Bill .....	19
Perpetuation of Corruption .....	20
Political Corruption .....	21
Police Corruption.....	22
Can corruption be fixed? .....	23
Chapter Three: Global Corruption Reform Efforts and the Influence of Technology.....	26

Modern Day Brazil .....	28
New York City in the Late 1800s .....	30
Modern Day Singapore .....	34
Technology in the Fight Against Corruption .....	37
Themes of Successful Anti-Corruption Efforts .....	42
Chapter Four: Identifying Recommendations for India.....	44
Structural Reform .....	45
Legislation .....	45
Effective Training and Selection .....	46
Ensuring Accountability .....	50
Enforcement of Reform .....	54
Prosecution.....	55
Promotion .....	55
Barriers to Reform .....	57
Summary of Recommendations .....	59
Appendix .....	61
Bibliography.....	63

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## CHAPTER ONE

### The Roots and Effects of Corruption

Corruption is easy to recognize when you see it. It is the man rotting in prison for a crime he did not commit, awaiting trial for years, unable to pay the exorbitant demands of the police. It is the teenaged girl forced into debt bondage in a fruitless attempt to pay off the debts of her grandparents. It is the everyday citizen who knows that in order to get out of an unreasonable ticket, or have their electricity turned back on, or get that job promotion, an undocumented compulsory deal must be made with those in power. Corruption is no new concept in political organizations and yet it seems to be a vague notion that has no specific parameters. Corruption is the familiar reality for millions of people and despite demands for justice, they're unable to escape its oppression. This doesn't have to be the case, however. Over time, some states have successfully moved from corruption being an insurmountable component of their organizational structure to the ability to isolate and prosecute instances of corruption. This thesis will be looking at the repercussions of corruption, as defined within the argument, and the necessity for India to implement corruption reform. After analyzing the particular situation in India and finding comparable circumstances that have occurred globally, detailed suggestions for improvement will be made and a plan for implementation will be outlined. In order to liberate states from the cycle of corruption, we must first completely understand what we intend to destroy. To name something is to own it. We must derive a specific meaning to the term "corruption" and then begin to look at the ways in which it can be defeated by the will of the general public.



### *What is corruption?*

Ancient Greek and Roman thought understood corruption as a matter of moral degeneracy that had connotations of perversion or decay of personhood. This notion of corruption could be manifested as either the moral depravity of the political elite and population or as specific actions believed to be derived from the more generalized moral corruption (Buchan and Hill 2014). Aristotle worked to solidify this concept when he defined corruption as either moral corruption with political consequences or the insolence of public officials. He spoke out against the deviation of political authority for personal gain as a corrupt practice in his *Nicomachean Ethics*: “The deflection from kingly power is tyranny; for both are monarchies: but there is the greatest difference between them; for the tyrant looks to his own benefit, the king to that of his subjects” (Aristotle 1819, 205). The pursuit of personal profit rather than that of the common good, leads to the perversion of governance and a disproportion of political power. “For Aristotle, then, the political problem of corruption was not defined solely as private misuse of public funds, though he recognized this as a problem, but the larger problem of how to prevent the corruption of the polity itself” (Buchan and Hill 2014, 14). Bribery and extortion were understood as corrupt when they interfered with the preservation of social order and the common good. This idea of corruption being morally degrading persevered throughout historical accounts of corruption. While no detailed listing of acts to be considered corrupt was attempted, an acute awareness of the spiritual and political dangers of corruption was prevalent.

Over time focus shifted from the generalized notion of moral decay to a more explicit defining of political actions to be considered corrupt. The formation of a more

sophisticated British state required a more definite sense of what was meant by corruption. “Notions of degenerative corruption were increasingly unable to accommodate the realities of material progress, commercial prosperity, the changing balance of power between the Crown and parliament, expanding trade and empire, demographic change and an increasingly bureaucratized and centralized state” (Buchan and Hill 2014, 170). Modern definitions that emerged in the 1700s focused on specific activities that undermined the fairness of public officials; actions commonly understood to be corrupt centered around economic injustices such as bribery, patronage and extortion. This material focus digresses slightly from the classical understanding. Some political analysts began to distinguish corruption from other types of particularistic governing because they decided corruption was undertaken for material gain, rather than administrative control or political support (Mikkelsen 2013).

In an attempt to define corruption more concisely, Carl Friedrich consolidated the concept to consist of “deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense” (Friedrich 1972, 15). This definition, accomplishing the desired brevity, fails to encompass the many facets of corruption: how it exists and from which norms, social or political, the behavior is deviant. This can make corruption difficult to contain in a simple definition because of moral and political ideals are highly dependent on the cultural values of the political society in question. The standard to which public officials should hold themselves so as to not partake in corruption has been the subject of debate; formal norms, public interests and public opinion being three of the common measures by which the misuse of power can be assessed (della Porta, Vannucci 2012). Today the Oxford English Dictionary defines

corruption as the “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour; the use or existence of corrupt practices” (“Corruption, N.” 2015). This definition has undoubtedly been influenced by centuries of moral and political expectations of justice as well as the modern political thought on the evolution of corruption.

Although there is no perfectly inclusive definition of corruption, for the purposes of this paper, we will be discussing corruption as it relates to public sector employees and their unique responsibility to uphold laws regulating their professional conduct. In order to negate for cultural and political differences, we will not be focusing on institutionalized moral decay as discussed in classical views of corruption, but rather specific political actions that violate the legal parameters of their public servant positions in a way that is detrimental to society. We will be acting under the assumption that, when analyzing democratic states, laws are the will of the people, enacted for the common good of the entire society; this elevates public officials to a position of being not only servants of the community but guardians of the common good (van Klaveren 1957). Corruption will be considered the organizational deviance from the legal parameters regulating those in political power and their use of authority for personal gain, both financial and political. To better understand the importance of preventing corruption, we will look at how corruption is commonly manifested and the impact it has on states politically, socially, as well as economically.

### *How does corruption exist in democracies?*

Understanding the various causes of political corruption is part of realizing how corruption is perpetuated, especially under the particular political structure of

democracies. Most human action can be explained through the simplified lens of self-interest; corruption is no exception. In all cases, self-interest is the universal and principal explanation for corruption. “Societies differ in the way they channel self-interest. Endemic corruption suggests a pervasive failure to tap self-interest for productive purposes” (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 2). States often control the balance and distribution of benefits and cost through the discretion of public officials. Corruption exists in a government when the institutions of the state that govern the relationship between the state and the public are used for self-interest and the benefit of the corrupt rather than the good of the whole (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Instead of channeling self-interest into free markets and the economy, it is allowed to distort the purpose of public officials and interfere with the goals of the state. “Corruption is an outcome—a reflection of a country’s legal, economic, cultural and political institutions” (Svensson 2005, 20). In order to put an end to injustice, it becomes imperative to identify the structural components of a state that allow corruption to thrive.

Over the years, dozens of case studies have been conducted to test various theories about the potential political, social and economic roots of corruption. Dominant theories included the variables of historical governance (notably British colonization), stages of economic development and the degree of democratization (Treisman 2000). In regards to governance, it was found that a medium-long exposure to uninterrupted democracy, somewhere over thirty years, would decrease corruption levels (Pellegrini 2011). When analyzing an already democratized state such as India, the influence of the wealthy and politically powerful becomes increasingly prominent base of corruption. When comparing states that have experienced heightened levels of corruption, it was

found that British influence was not a predictor of lower levels of corruption as once believed; in cases such as India, the political instability and wealth polarization that resulted from the Indian struggle to political freedom actually contributed to corruption. Wealth polarization was commonly found to increase conflict and open up doors for tyrannical rule. “Wealth discrepancies restricted freedom and suppressed virtue because the wealthy would become preoccupied with materialism and money-making, while the poor would lack the wherewithal to defend either their own liberty or that of the republic” (Buchan and Hill 2014, 26). The government essentially becomes a mechanism of the wealthy. In line with this reasoning, higher wages in public sector positions contributes to lower levels of corruption by distributing wealth to the working class.

We will be analyzing corruption in representative governments where the laws of the state are the will of the people and are believed to be in the best interest of the common good. Assuming the goals of the state are better than those achieved by corruption, corrupt acts result in ends detrimental to the livelihood of the peoples subject to both their direct and indirect consequences. This, then, becomes an issue when corrupt acts become so prominent in a society that they undermine public moral and the effectiveness of the laws they are breaking. The inability of government officials, courts and law enforcement to administer the law creates a volatile and dangerous environment (Funderburk 2012). These deviant behaviors become the primary mechanism of political life. “Participants no longer think very much about their deviance, save for necessary but taken-for-granted precautions” (Ermann and Lundman 1996, 21). Bribery, extortion, and patronage are the most common ways this manifests itself in democratic societies. People grow accustomed to “favors” being a necessary component of all business transactions.

This familiarity with unlawful action does not diminish the negative effects on the political, social and economic health of a state, especially as experienced by the working class. Although corruption needs no formal conception to be recognized when seen, taking time to understand the ways corruption manifests itself and the repercussions of political corruption on a society and state are important distinctions to be made (Lambsdorff 2007).

In family and friend-oriented societies, giving gifts or providing special contracts or jobs to private contacts is a common and valued aspect of engaging in community life. Many people from these highly familial cultures carry this mentality over into the public realm, to the detriment of the general public and national economy. Engaging in commerce and hiring only with friends and family will limit the ability for outsiders to enter the market. “Societies based on strong interpersonal relationships... will have difficulty establishing modern bureaucracies, with civil servants hired on the basis of skills who are expected to separate their roles as officials from their roles as friends or relatives” (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 106). Once the expectation of personal ties to political officials is required to partake in commercial life, patronage and bribery become a cycle of making connections to advance one’s own economic standing. Superiors often hire people in inferior ranks that they can assure will be loyal to them when collecting bribes. “The patronage group will then set up systems for sharing payoffs up and down the hierarchy” (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 106). It doesn’t take long for a political system based off patronage to resort to bribery and extortion to benefit their web of social contacts.

Arguably the most common and easily recognized form of corruption is bribery. Bribery is the exchange of a benefit, commonly in the form of additional money, goods

or special services, for a specific official political action or lack thereof. When political leaders give into to bribes, other companies and individuals will think that they too must pay bribes in order to do business; the public is then pressured into adapting to a system that requires bribery. The prevalence of bribery distorts the state's capacity to truly be democratic. "Bribery is fundamentally the same whether employed in relation to legislators, administrators, judges, other public officials; 'bosses' exercising their power or private individuals acting in agency positions" (Key 1936). Democracies that have fallen to a routine of bribery quickly become governments oriented around the wealthy and politically powerful. When political influence can be exerted through bribes, the entire governmental structure becomes altered to adopt the normative system of organizational deviance. "The expectation of bribes orients public expenditures as well as other public decisions, and the redistribution and reinvestment of illegal profits define political and economic careers" (della Porta and Vannucci 2012, 2). When bribery becomes a routine component of the political system, extortion naturally follows.

Extortion is the requiring of services, goods or money to preform one's job or influence one's decisions (Key 1936). When bribery becomes prevalent in a society, political actors learn they can expect and demand these extralegal favors to preform their duties. "Quite apart from the damage it does to an organization whose officials make such demands, the individuals from whom demands are made suffer a denial of justice unless they pay, with loss of police protection or unfair shares of education or health care or some other harm" (Osborne 2013, 163). This form of corruption disproportionately affects the underprivileged by denying them justice due to their inability to pay illegal fees. In order for extortion to become prominent there must be real or perceived

opportunities to commit illegal acts without penalty. With the rise of technology that is allowing for the communication and unification of all social classes, this injustice increases the risk of political instability as well as damages the moral of society and the advancement of the economy (Osborne 2013). Widespread political corruption has been proven to slow economic growth, decrease the advancement of political institutions and create an overall lack of faith among the populace which weakens the legitimacy of the state (Funderburk 2012). Ideally, upon recognition of the negative effects of illegal payoffs for public servants, acceptable commercial behavior within a culture may change (Rose-Ackerman 1999).

*How does corruption affect a state?*

If allowed to fortify itself within a state, corruption becomes an exceedingly difficult cultural and administrative norm that interferes with democratic ideals and economic advancement of the state. Well-ingrained political corruption will eventually bring about a change in organizational culture. This democratic deviance is no inconsequential side-effect; political instability accounts for about fifty-three percent of the total economic effect of corruption (Mo 2001). A democracy quickly becomes adapted to serve those with enough political or economic power to influence governance in their favor. The public sector no longer serves the people, but instead mocks the equality and justice that democracy supposedly ensures. With the resulting oligarchy, a relatively small group of people possessing power and influence manipulate ineffective political institutions for their own economic opportunities (Ermann and Lundman 1996). The economically underprivileged or the politically unconnected quickly find themselves without a say in their own justice. The inherent violations of inclusion that accompany



corruption signify a deficit of democracy, even when occurring within a democratically structured state (Warren 2004). With this political instability comes a significant decrease in public morale.

“Corruption counteracts the strivings for national consolidation [and] decreases respect for and allegiance to the government. When people became convinced, rightly or wrongly, that corruption is widespread, an official’s incorruptibility will tend to be weakened. And should he resist corruption, he will find it difficult to fulfill his duties. This contributes to inertia and inefficiency in a society” (Myrdal 1968). The changing of political structure to overlook these illegal behaviors, results in a severe lack of respect and morale in the general public that only contributes to the cycle of corruption. “Corruption feeds upon itself and erodes the courage necessary to adhere to high standards of propriety. Morale declines, each man asking himself why he should be the sole custodian of morality” (Bayley 1966, 725). Once perceived by the public, corruption in government leads to a lack of respect and faith in authority. Corruption opens the door for other forms of organized crime and creates a state oriented around lawlessness (Rose-Ackerman 1999). The general public no longer believes in the impartiality of public officials and begins to cultivate their own alliances with people of authority so that they may also have political influence. The energy that could be spent working hard to boost the resume of a potential candidate is instead necessarily spent lobbying and creating special contacts (Bayley 1966). Economic opportunity is often gone to waste and the most qualified candidates might even begin looking internationally to receive fair compensation for their skills. A lack of faith in the government does more than affect

voting habits and produce angry newspaper columnists; it births social interactions based on personal interest rather than trust and fair competition.

Perhaps the subtlest yet most costly way corruption works to the disadvantage of a state is through stalling economic progress. Because trust cannot exist in a state that operates off corruption, the best option for those participating in commerce is to cheat first. “This outcome of mutual distrust would then lead to a preventive collapse of the corrupt exchange, vanishing all of its potential economic advantage” (della Porta and Vannucci 2012, 19). Domestically, bribery alone can be detrimental to the value of work produced within the state. Public sector officials will have little incentive to do their job well because of bribery stipends and the lack of accountability (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Even those legally entering the economic market will be forced to reduce the governmental costs imposed on them in order to afford the exorbitant hidden fees they must pay in the form of bribes. “Corruption represents a rise in the price of administration... The man who is both a taxpayer and also forced to submit to bribing has paid several times over for the same service” (Bayley 1966, 725).

This disregard for regulation and the stalling of economic progress carries into the global economy as well. In studies analyzing the effect of corruption on a state’s national economy, it was found that a one percent increase in corruption resulted in a 0.72% decrease in economic growth (Mo 2001). Levels of corruption nearly determine the ability for a developing nation to find its place on the international market. “Corruption reduces capital flow into the country, harms economic productivity and competition, and lowers government spending on social programs, benefits and development projects” (Funderburk 2012). Transparency International studies of global corruption show that

political corruption discourages foreign investment because it is associated with legal uncertainty, bureaucratic mismanagement and lack of secure property rights (Transparency International 2004). By isolating itself from international markets, a country riddled with corruption deters itself from progressing as an economic force as well as providing the best domestic opportunities for its people.

By examining the political, social, and economic repercussions of corruption, it is clear to see that eradicating corruption, even when customary, is essential for the health of a state, especially that of a developing nation. The kind of growth necessary to advance as a global economic power and to fully democratize a struggling state can easily be stalled in the early stages of progression by the prevalence of corruption. This is the case, as we will see in India. Despite valiant attempts at corruption legislation and the outcry of the general public, India finds itself stuck in a state of culturally institutionalized organizational deviance. In order to contribute to India's objective of removing corruption, I will be analyzing the state of corruption in India and finding similar instances of corruption internationally. These states will then be used as models, identifying the most effective methods of corruption reform, noting practices that are detrimental to anti-corruption efforts, and outlining ways that India could institute these practices. India has the makings of a powerful political and economic force in international relations but it must be able to effectively reduce corruption first.

## CHAPTER TWO

### The State of Corruption in India

The police are supposed to be a force of justice that citizens can turn to when they have been victimized. It becomes difficult to see, then, who can be trusted when the police forcefully manipulate the weakened public into partaking in their corrupt ways. This was the case for one Indian woman from Uttar Pradesh who refused to pay a bribe for her husband's release from the local police station. When it became clear that she would not be bribing the police, she was taken to the sub-inspector's office and gang-raped by approximately four officers for her failure to incentivize the policemen. This event comes at the heels of an array of sexual and physical violence occurring in the area that has not only been overlooked but also partaken in by the police force (Khan 2014). This tragedy is the sad reality of many women, children and underprivileged citizens all throughout India; day after day horrific stories of injustice occur. The police and politicians go on about their lives communing with criminals, participating in immoral acts and paying little attention to any idea of integrity and duty to law. Billions of people are forced to live under the tyranny of these citizens who live above the law while their pleas for fairness are never heard. Transparency International has begun setting up mobile anti-corruption centers in rural Indian villages so that people experiencing corruption may seek legal advice and support for their situation. One afternoon in particular, the three-hour event was expected to draw crowds of hundreds. The center was forced to turn people away after over nine hours of consultations with more than two thousand five hundred rural Indians flocking from nearby villages desperate to have their

stories heard (Transparency International 2015). The people of India are looking to escape this cycle of injustice but it is dangerously ingrained into their culture and political structure. In order to grasp the breadth of abuse the Indian people are suffering at the hands of their own government officials, we must look at the root of corruption in India.

*What is the history of police and corruption in India?*

After one hundred years of varying levels of control, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 threatened the East India Company's dominion over the large territory. Once the rebellion was subdued, the British East India Company's rule was replaced by the Monarchy itself. In an attempt to more closely monitor Indian cooperation with British rule, Queen Victoria became the Empress of India and a long history of unbridled control over the country began. The Indian Police Act of 1861 was enacted as the concrete structure and governing legislation for the police; it definitively placed the police under the control of the state government. Among other declarations of central power, the state's Chief Minister could remove the Head of Police at any time without formal reasoning. This brought about the alignment of the police with political parties in order ensure job security (Daruwala, Joshi, and Tiwana 2005). The police in India quickly distanced themselves from any notion of ever becoming civil servants in order to become the force behind Great Britain's attempts to prevent a revolution. "The people of India, as such, did not have any say in running the government or [the] formulation of its policies. Consequently, people's disgust with the British rule kept mounting, which gave rise to the birth of Indian National Movement" ("Indian Freedom Struggle (1857-1947)" n.d.). After many years of growing discord between the people and their rulers, in 1919 the Indian Imperial Police were vested with the ability to imprison anyone they saw fit

without trial. The public outrage at this obvious injustice led to a peaceful protest by the people of Punjab. On April 13, 1919 thousands gathered to show their dissent. Fearing a loss of his own control, General Dyer of the British Indian Army arrived with his police force and gunned down protestors as they fled. Hundreds of innocent civilians died for expressing their discontent with the British Rule (Chandra 1988). Essentially acting as bodyguards for the British elite, the Indian Imperial Police force became an elaborate showcase of the strength of the Monarchy and method to instill a fear of the administration; the structure of police organization was intended to reflect the grandeur and authority of the Raj (Verma 1999).

“The importance attached by the colonial power to a repressive, efficient and loyal police force to effectively rule a large, diverse colony like India was not surprising” (Dhillon 2005, 23). For decades the presence of the British policemen and elite in India included public exertions of power with little provision for accountability to Indian citizens (Das and Verma 1998). The Indian Imperial Police served to ensure any voices of rebellion were quickly silenced while the Indian elites were courted so that they would choose to not exert any cultural power that they might possess against the Monarchy (McLeod 2015). This technique of bribing the wealthy and suppressing the impoverished is what allowed India to stay under British rule for such an extended period of time. Indian nationalist Mahatma Gandhi became the radical to change the strategy for attaining Indian freedom. Despite police abuse and jail-time, the Indian people continued to rebel and band together to urge the British to leave India. After nearly two hundred years of conquest and much to the credit of Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement, India gained the sympathy of the British government and its independence on August 15, 1947

(“Indian Freedom Struggle (1857-1947)” n.d.).

Indian independence, unfortunately, did not come with many structural changes to the oligarchic system of power established by the British. “Constitutional historians have often remarked that, what occurred in Delhi and Karachi in the humid heat of mid-August 1947, was not so much a celebration of independence as that of transfer of power from a British to an Indian (or Pakistani) elite fraternity” (Dhillon 2005, 25). Independence from British rule also did not rid Indian politics of power struggles; following the establishment of Indian nationalist government, a few strong and strongly oppositional political parties emerged. Still governed by the same organizational structures of British India, the only real change India saw in the first few decades of independence was Indian elites, rather than British elites, being in positions of power. The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru was eventually succeeded by his daughter Indira Gandhi who learned to use India’s elitism to her political advantage. Indira Gandhi lost and regained the prime ministership after serious allegations of electoral malpractice (*BBC* 1975). In an attempt to maintain political power, the Indira Gandhi dynasty of the 1980s, appointed senior police officers in both the national and state level government based on their political loyalty rather than their aptitude. Lower ranking officers were quickly undermined by their new superiors and police brutality increased (McLeod 2015). Corruption continued to plague India, well into independence in both the political and police systems.

Today, the police system is controlled by both state and central governments. The recruitment of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers is undertaken by the central government via a competitive examination. Officers are assigned to state cadres after

being trained for forty-four weeks at the National Police academy in Hyderabad. IPS officers are responsible for filling all senior police positions in both the state territories and the central government. The central government handles all dismissals from service for all IPS and the promotion, transfers and postings of officers working for the central government. States have authority over the postings, transfers and promotions of their officers only, the State Police Service (SPS), which includes all constables. Women have not been fully integrated into the police force; currently, women are primarily in cases that deal with other women or children. (“Police Organisation in India,” n.d.) To this day, the primary document governing the Indian Police Service remains the outdated Police Act of 1861. Several states have proposed new legislation to incorporate more democratic ideals into police structure, but all attempts at reform have either not passed or have been near replicas of the Police Act of 1861. “Occasional proposals from sections of intelligentsia for substantive police reforms never get very far. So the Indian police remains as servile and oppressive, as unpopular and partisan, as useable and exploitable by those in power, as in the past” (Dhillon 2005, 25).

*What efforts have been made to end corruption?*

While most constructive reform legislation has been rejected, there have been four successful attempts at passing anti-corruption legislation through parliament. First in 1946, the Indian government recognized the necessity for a bureau of government that would explicitly tackle the problems of corruption following World War II. The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 was passed to help create the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) that is tasked with investigating all instances of bribery and corruption (Central Bureau of Investigation 2016). Later in 1988, the Prevention of



Corruption Act was enacted to explicitly define what constituted illegitimate use of power by employees of the central government. Offences specifically mentioned within the Act include taking special rewards, monetary or otherwise, in return for doing or forbearing an official act and in return for influencing a public servant. If a public servant violates these conditions they are subject to anywhere from six months to seven years imprisonment and the potential for a fine depending on the severity and frequency of their actions. Investigations into corruption were to be conducted by a police superintendent or an equivalently ranking officer (*The Prevention of Corruption Act 1988*). Unfortunately the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 proved to be largely ineffective. The conviction rate in Indian courts was as low as six percent, thirty million cases were awaiting trial, and the average time it took for the disposal of a case was somewhere between ten and twenty years (Vittal 1999). In order to better enforce the anti-corruption legislation, Indian parliament decided to create an additional governmental agency that would function as part of the CBI to process and conduct corruption inquiries through the Central Vigilance Commission Act of 2003. After obtaining a permit from the central government, the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) investigates charges of corruption in violation of the Prevention of Corruption Act (*The Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003*).

The CVC, however, has yet again been a disappointment to anti-corruption activists with its inability to enforce penalties and the exorbitant amount of time it takes to process corruption inquiries. Prashant Bhushan, a Indian Supreme Court lawyer working with India Against Corruption spoke out against the ineffectiveness of the Central Vigilance Commission: “We have the CVC, which is selected by a committee of

the prime minister, home minister, leader of opposition, all of whom are interested in a weak and pliable watchdog institution which is supposed to be a watchdog on themselves” (“For Want Of A Bribe: India’s Anti-Corruption Push” 2011). Despite the presence of an oversight agency, India is still suffering from a lack of accountability. The central government is perfectly content with the CVC remaining a façade for corruption reform efforts, but the people of India are not. Public outrage ensued when the commissioner of the CVC was forced to resign due to pending corruption charges, blatantly demonstrating the lack of reliability of the CVC (Devraj 2011). The ineffectiveness of the CVC has led anti-corruption activists to focus more on developing a citizen’s ombudsmen instead of perpetuating corruption through a highly political vigilance commission. Endorsed by India Against Corruption’s Anna Hazare, the Jan Lokpal Bill is trapped in an ongoing effort to establish a citizen’s ombudsmen. This bill has been proposed to parliament eleven times since its birth in 1968. The goal of the legislation is to establish an anti-corruption organization at the state level, led by non-political citizens, which would have the ability to make speedy inquiries into corruption cases, remain transparent in the investigation process and prosecute any public servant under their jurisdiction. All investigations would be completed in under a year and penalties would range from five years in jail to life imprisonment (India Against Corruption 2011). Unfortunately, all attempts at forming a substantive citizen’s ombudsmen bill has met serious opposition in Parliament; although the Lokpal Act of 2013 was successful in passing Parliament, the Indian government’s revision of the bill has made it so diluted as to not achieve the goals of the anti-corruption agencies promoting it (Devraj 2011).

Despite attempts to pass anti-corruption legislation and put a government anti-corruption agency into place, little has been done to enact real change. The Indian government has yet to ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and has yet to address the estimated 1.2 trillion dollars of Indian black money that is hidden in international bank accounts. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, seventy four percent of the public believes that corruption increased between 2007-2010, forty-four percent believe the government's efforts to fight corruption are ineffective and fifty-four percent of people report paying a bribe in 2010. (Transparency International, n.d.) Local and national newspapers are littered with stories like those of husbands bribing their way out of jail for beating their wives, merchants having to pay police to participate in markets or townspeople bribing their way out of driving on no license (Burke and Delhi 2015). To the western world, it is shocking that corruption could be so socially ingrained into a modern democratic way of life. In order to understand how to alleviate the Indian people from this perpetual greyness between heinous crime and normalcy, we must first analyze the ways in which it has managed to thrive in a federal republican India.

### *How is corruption perpetuated?*

Corruption, undeniably, existed in India long before its birth as an independent democratic state. The problem they inherited has seeped itself deep into the political structure of the nation and into the very fiber of how life operates for the every-day Indian. As a country, India is considered the eighty-fifth most corrupt nation in the world. In recent years, India's national integrity score fell from a 3.5/5 to a 3.4. For a democracy with an exceedingly large population, these statistics are frightening reminders of the

state of corruption that billions of people find inescapable. Despite attempts to elect politicians to enforce reform, Indian people find themselves entrapped in a cycle of governmental criminality. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Indian political parties received a 4.2/5 corruption rating placing them among the most corrupt government officials in India (Transparency International, n.d.). “Politicians can serve their own interest by resorting to tactical law and policy making. It involves passing laws and policies which, although ostensibly increase public welfare, also give politicians plenty of opportunity to take advantage of the loopholes” (Pethe, Tandel and Gandhi 2012). In India it is no secret that police are often hired out as private forces for the elite. It was reported in 2009 that twenty-eight percent of parliament was charged with crimes and almost half were considered heinous crimes. With corruption prevailing in political sphere, it is difficult to enforce reform in the police force. Many Indian politicians are satisfied with maintaining a weak police system so that they can live outside the law (Jauregui 2013).

The politicians, no doubt, have played a large role in perpetuating the criminality of government employees, but it is in large part the fault of the police force for allowing this system of bribery and political privilege to continue. The Indian people have demanded legislation against corruption and, in a mockery of the legislative system, the politicians feel confident that they can pass anti-corruption legislation without being held accountable to it themselves. “The success of any social legislation depends on the effectiveness of its enforcement and police have a protective as well as promotional role to perform in this sphere” (Srivastava 1999, 217). The loopholes in legislation would be far less pervasive if the Indian police force was not working in tandem with politicians to

create a system that serves the well connected rather than the general public. Corruption Perceptions Index data shows that sixty-four percent of people who recently dealt with the police were coerced into paying a bribe (Transparency International, n.d.). The country is facing a stark dilemma to reform where corruption laws are being ambiguously made and are simply not being enforced. Currently the police are perpetuating corruption in India, with very little prospect for change.

Traditionally, policemen are highly respected as protectors of peace and guardians of the public. In a nation facing the deep seeded corruption that India is currently experiencing, policemen are unwelcome and disliked members of society. The Indian public has simply lost their trust and respect for men in IPS uniform. This undermines public interest in pursuing careers in the police industry. The loss of competition for police positions results in under-qualified and already corrupt men eagerly seeking illegal payments and alignment with political figures (Raghavan 2003). The few men who do enter the police force with good intentions for instituting reform enter at such a low position and are so enveloped by corruption that their efforts are quickly drowned out by the traditional system of immorality. This leads to a pervasive culture of criminality in the police system. Policemen willingly overlook the crimes of the politically powerful and anyone willing to pay them the most to absolve their crimes. In some Indian towns slavery is still allowed to exist, even though it is internationally illegal, so long as the policemen are being paid a generous compensation for overlooking the unpaid labor and debt bondage of the poor. In India, police have become distributors of force rather than public servants (de Guzman and Kumar 2011).

In an interview with Chief Yost Zakhary, the former president of the International Police Chiefs Association, we reviewed his visit with Indian dignitaries to discuss the potential for police reform. As a nation, they are trying to advance economically and politically but they are encountering a roadblock in the form of their own massive population, many with little education. Chief Zakhary emphasized the challenge that poverty has posed for corruption reform in India. The technology for reform and advancement is there; the problem is that many of India's best talents are either moving out of India or not working in the public sector (Zakhary 2015). With lucrative private industries on the rise in India, police jobs are not highly sought after by well-qualified candidates. High levels of unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and overpopulation have consistently attracted the wrong people to police jobs in India (Jauregui 2013). While corruption occurs deeply on many levels of Indian government, it is allowed to prevail through the ineffectiveness of the Indian Police Service. Before the corruption reform can be effective, India will need to be proactive in implementing changes to the structure and composition of their police force.

*Police corruption is a serious problem that is holding India back but can it be fixed?*

Boasting a population of over 1.25 billion people, India has become the world's largest democracy with a federal republican government consisting of twenty-nine states and seven union territories (CIA 2015). Many ruins of the British Raj remain in the way India has structured its politics, while attempting to apply their own culture and Indian nationalist values. Unfortunately, although the country operates by fair elections, it is apparent that the politically connected are still able to buy their way into favors or out of trouble. Corruption exists in many levels of the government and often the Indian Police

Service is under the direct control of politicians. The politically charged management of the Indian Police Service in recent years has resulted in a severe loss of trust and respect from the Indian public (Bayley 1983). For being a young democracy, India has a healthy GDP and a positive outlook for the future of their economy, but there are several political issues that are holding it back from being an economic powerhouse. “The outlook for India's long-term growth is moderately positive due to a young population and corresponding low dependency ratio, healthy savings and investment rates, and increasing integration into the global economy. However, India has many challenges that it has yet to fully address, including poverty, corruption, violence and discrimination against women and girls” (CIA 2015). In order to grow as an international icon of democracy and economic power, India needs to overcome the obstacle of corruption so that they can move forward as a fair and truly free egalitarian state.

Today, the lack of sufficient poverty alleviation in India is a direct result of inadequate criminal justice systems. The local violence that occurs every day as a result of being under the authority of corrupt and unqualified police has succeeded in keeping the poor from advancing economically (Haugen and Boutros 2014). While trapped in a cycle of poverty, this extreme perversion of justice that rewards dishonesty prevails as a part of the daily routine for many Indian people. In order to break the cycle of corruption, the Indian people must continue to push for corruption reform. Fortunately, Gandhi's influence on anti-corruption ideals is just as pervasive among the Indian people today as it was during the Indian revolution. Anna Hazare, a follower of Gandhi, led a massive fast in New Delhi, a culturally symbolic means of demonstration, to demand an end to corruption (“For Want Of A Bribe: India's Anti-Corruption Push” 2011). The people

clearly want reform and are willing to do what it takes to obtain it. With this attitude, certain principles of reform can be integrated into the Indian public service sector in order to put a halt to the tradition of corruption. A look into similar global instances of ingrained police corruption where corruption reform has been attempted will provide a basis for how India can institute change. The Indian people successfully obtained democracy. In less than one hundred years of independence, their economy and innovation is on the verge of flourishing. It is time for the Indian people to take the next big step towards self-determination by enforcing justice and regaining their right freedom from oppression of corruption. It is surely possible, through the right corruption reform mechanisms paired with India's desire for change, for India to right the wrong of generations past and create a new safe-haven for their citizens.



## CHAPTER THREE

### Global Corruption Reform and the Influence of Technology

Corruption is not a new phenomenon. It plagues the pages of history as either a villain to be fought or a friend to be used for advantage. For centuries, states have been working to eradicate the corrupt practices that work against the best interest of their people, exist at every level of policing, and threaten the structure of their governance. In order to suggest a process of reform for India, it will be helpful to understand the success stories and failures of corruption reform historically. Many states, through trial and error, have been able to limit the corrupt practices of government officials and reduce crime rates through more stringent enforcement of the law. Although varying in their strategies, each state has made a deliberate effort to reduce the corruption that threatens the trust and faith of their people in the fairness of their governance. For the purposes of this assignment we will be looking at countries or large cities facing police corruption as a pervasive issue in their cultural and political lives.

In order to focus on those places most similar to India, we will be looking at countries that have representative governments and laws that explicitly forbid acts that have been outlined as corrupt. In these countries, corruption is/was prevalent though a cultural acceptance of illegal behaviors and a police force that does/did not enforce the law. We will be looking at the efforts of Brazil, New York City, and Singapore to analyze the ways they have experienced police corruption and the methods used to reduce the widespread instances of corruption. We will learn from the mistakes of Brazil who has experienced corruption since the birth of their republican government and despite anti-

corruption legislation, has seen little to no enforcement. We will observe the ways that New York City is able to reduce corruption during periods of time where public concern is high but allows corruption to return once abuse of power is believed to be resolved. Finally, we will observe the ways that Singapore has managed their anti-corruption efforts from independence to present day; what Singapore lacks in democratic ideals, they make up for in effective reform. Successful attempts, as well as lessons learned from failure, will be extrapolated from their political context and the general principles and methods of reform will be adapted to fit the situation in India.

The fight against corruption can be a daunting, seemingly fruitless task. Many economically and politically powerful states have struggled to reduce the corruption that stifles their growth. Despite the grueling effort required, the importance of anti-corruption efforts remains essential to the health of a democratic state. Corruption becomes increasingly detrimental to the state as it begins to reinforce social inequalities through unequal application of public policy or unequal distribution of public power because of factors such as wealth, caste or other socio-economic circumstances. When these factors are allowed to influence the application of law to the general public, the standards of democracy are irreconcilably threatened. “Corruption does its most damage to the intangibles of democracy—to the values of trust, forbearance and justice so essential to the making our system work” (Johnston 1982, 177). A system with significant instances of institutionalized corruption puts these essential democratic values under severe strain. “The costs of serious cases of corruption are so grave that they justify strong efforts against corruption. But these efforts must be carefully thought out, not hysterical; they must take into account the difficulties of reform...” (Johnston 1982). The

democracies we will be analyzing were all, at some point, endangered by the imposition of corruption on their democratic values. Their strategies and successes vary while their overall theme of striving to protect their democratic ideals remain.

*Why has corruption increased in Brazil despite anti-corruption efforts?*

Corruption in Brazil reached the peak of public concern in 1992 when Brazil impeached its first democratically elected president, Fernando Collor de Mello, after generations of military rule. Working under a new constitution and just beginning to act democratically, Brazil was faced with horror and uncertainty of the future after their attempts at election resulted in a president charged with corruption. Since then, Brazil has been tangled in the fight against the obvious presence of corruption. “Commissions of Inquiry and court cases have multiplied, but punishment of offenders has been uncertain and erratic” (Rosenn and Downes 1999). Recognizing the necessity for change, in the early 2000s Brazil began participating in international anti-corruption campaigns sponsored by the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations (NGO). In 2002, the Brazil’s leading presidential candidate signed Transparency International’s anti-corruption pledge and began to incorporate anti-corruption efforts into his platform (Funderburk 2012). Although appearing to combat corruption, Brazil only initiated one case under the Convention on Combating Bribery between 2002 and 2012 (Richard 2014). In recent years, progress has been made in the number of investigations and convictions taking place, but, despite these efforts, corruption continues to plague Brazil’s attempts at democracy.

In 2013, Brazil passed an anti-corruption law, the Brazilian Clean Companies Act (BCCA), to make individuals and businesses liable for participating in bribery. The law

was the first of its kind in Latin America, and posed more severe punishments than many anti-corruption legislations of its sort. The legislation was praised for its strong hand against corruption. It was a promising anti-corruption effort that was met with disappointment over its lack of enforcement and clarity (Richard 2014). The BCCA contains terms with no stated definition leaving interpretation open to public officials and the courts. “Although many international organizations and foreign governments have praised Brazil's new anti-corruption law as a positive step forward, skepticism remains about effective enforcement” (Richard 2014, 362). Today, Latin America’s largest democracy possessing one of the world’s largest economies is left paralyzed by the country’s problem with corruption (Funderburk 2012). Research conducted by Freedom House estimated that corruption costs Brazil almost \$5 billion annually (Fleischer 2002). As of 2010, fifty-four percent of Brazilians feel that their government’s recent efforts to fight corruption have been ineffective and sixty-four percent believe that corruption has increased from 2007 to 2010. Political parties, parliament and the police are all perceived by the public to be affected by corruption. In 2015, Brazil only received a thirty-eight out of one hundred in their corruption perception index and was the single country to experience the greatest increase of corruption between 2011 and 2015 (Transparency International 2016).

Brazil and India face similar struggles against the corruption standing in the way of their abilities to fully democratize. Both countries have combatted said corruption with numerous, vague and ill-enforced acts of anti-corruption legislation. Brazil is an example of the ways that corruption can thrive even in a country that purports to be working to end political corruption. The best acts of legislation are dead without outlining a clear

plan of implementation and following through with enforcement. The clarity of terminology and the willingness to follow through with anti-corruption efforts are necessary elements to effectively combatting corruption. If India is to take their fight against corruption seriously, they should learn from the mistakes of Brazil and create a system of legislation that is easily understood and quickly enforced.

*How did New York City temporarily reform corruption in the late nineteenth century?*

Situated in a democratic country with radically conflicting political views and an extremely diverse population, New York City in the late 1800s shares many structural similarities to India. In the last half of the nineteenth century, the United States had been a democracy for a little over one hundred years and large cities were growing rapidly as a result of the industrial revolution. Immigrants fled to this land of opportunity where hard work could make dreams come true, and New York City was often their starting point. The diverse cultural and religious society of New York, as the hub for American immigration, closely resembles the varied linguistic, religious and ethnic groups within India. New York City experienced severe income inequality and working conditions for the poor were tremendously dangerous in this era of industrialization. Similar to the factory work of modern day India, the working class was paid very little for their hard labor and was forced to work overtime in poor conditions to make a living wage while the wealthy paid their way above the law. Speaking varied languages and spending their last dime to travel to the States, many of New York City's newest citizens were impoverished and left to the rule of well-established New Yorkers. New York quickly formed their own bourgeois class that controlled city officials with their purse strings.

The people of New York City also experienced the lack of enforcement of culturally unpopular laws and the ability for the wealthy to hide from justice (Zacks 2012). Politicians were the handymen of American aristocracy and the police force was equally as political. The police force was presided over by the Police Commissioner, an appointed position that was left to the discretion of the city mayor. In the late 1800s, politics in New York had been largely controlled by Tammany Hall, a democratic party political machine that worked to ensure their own politicians would remain in office at all times. Multiple successful mayoral elections lead to plenty of time to hire and establish a police force centered on political advantage and backhand deals. Police officers quickly learned how to manipulate their positions of authority for monetary gain through extortion and accepting bribes from the elite. Brothels, gambling rings and gangs ran rampant in the city and were guarded by the police force itself. “The Lexow Commission investigation in 1892 unearthed organized extortion, bribery, sale of office and corruption in the enforcement of gambling, liquor, and prostitution laws” (Johnston 1982). Officers would sleep on duty, ignore the crimes of the well connected and act aggressively when their power was threatened. During this time, the New York Police Department was thought to be the most corrupt in America (Benson, Maaranen and Heslop 1978). After a series of sermons from the fiery Reverend Parkhurst, a notable clergyman in the city in his time, police corruption became the talk of the town. Public outrage resulted in the temporary outcasting of Tammany Hall; a new Mayor was elected in hopes of reform and Theodore Roosevelt was selected as New York City’s new Police Commissioner in 1895 (Andrews 2006). Theodore Roosevelt’s mechanisms for improving the police system and

increasing lawful behavior during his time as commissioner create interesting points of consideration for India.

In his two years as president of the Police Commission, certain methods of reform stand out as effective from a historical perspective. Roosevelt made it a priority to remove politics from policing. Instead of being contingent upon election, officers would be hired based on talent and remain in their position of service solely based on performance. Officers were promoted for reducing crime rates and were recognized with medals and honorable mentions for acting ethically. Negligence claims were regarded with exceptional seriousness during Roosevelt's commission; all complaints were filed and investigated. Officers would be monitored often and observed at random occasions to ensure no blind eye was turned for officers that were engaging in illegal activities or failing to perform their duties. Policemen were held accountable for their behavior on duty and were punished with fines, penalties or the loss of their job for poor police behavior. Another interesting observation Roosevelt made was that officers were being selected for their brute force rather than their ability to reason through the difficult challenges of a policeman (Zacks 2012). Policemen, up until this point, were cookie-cutter athletic men of European decent, primarily Irish or Italian, with large physical frames. Diversity and aptitude of the police force became an immerging consideration for those looking to reduce the abuse dealt from the hands of the police. Roosevelt began replacing the corrupt with men from varying ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds and physical characteristics. While selecting women for the position was not yet a consideration, in just twenty-five years the first African American policeman would be integrated into the police force (Secret 2015). Roosevelt felt that the diversification of the

police would lead to fewer instances of police brutality against minorities and higher aptitude would reduce the frequency of officers falling into the persuasion of criminals. “Strong desires to climb the status ladder might make these sorts of officers more receptive to making money wherever they can” (Johnston 1982). Roosevelt, in his short term, managed to enforce minute laws and create a system that encouraged upright police behavior and eradicated all officers who were openly neglecting their duty to the law and the people.

While reform was not absolute and was implemented in one city alone, an immense improvement was seen in the level of police corruption under Roosevelt’s leadership as Police Commissioner. As cities grow and become more technologically advanced, so do the opportunities for public officials to become more covert in their illegal use of police influence. A continuous effort to strengthen and hasten the response to police corruption is an ongoing effort for New York City. In 1970, Police Commissioner Murphy announced his stern position against corruption to his department: “Except for your paycheck there is no such thing as a clean buck. It is just as corrupt to tolerate the bookmaker as it is to ignore the drug pusher. Department-wide posture must reflect scrupulous honesty. Indications of corruption must be exposed and expunged” (Brown 1972). Historically, police corruption in New York City appears to cycle through generational periods of reform and scandal following periods of apathy towards regulation (Johnston 1982). Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from New York City is the importance of following through with and enforcing anti-corruption efforts even after reform has been successfully, if only temporarily, reached.



### *How did Singapore successfully reform corruption?*

Corruption was pervasive in Singapore during both British colonization and Japanese occupation during World War II. Anti-corruption efforts began in 1871 during British colonial rule after a series of public complaints against the ineffectiveness and criminal behavior of the Singapore Police Force (SPF); after years of protest, the Commission of Inquiry was established in 1879 to, ideally, investigate SPF activities. The Commission concluded that the corruption of the SPF was pervasive and deeply ingrained, reaching all the way to the highest levels of command. Despite this investigation, the British government resisted legislating anti-corruption acts for another sixty-six years (Quah 2013). For all the corruption that was present during colonial rule, conditions worsened during the Japanese Occupation from 1942 to 1945. The low salaries for civil servants during this time compelled police officers to enter into illegal side business to provide for their families. Learning from the mistakes of their foreign rule, Singapore reinvented their anticorruption efforts and redirected their future.

Situated just southeast of India and sharing many of the same historical lineages, Singapore has a very different story of corruption. Culturally, both states contain diverse populations with varying religions, languages and ethnicities. Singapore currently hosts a large percentage of Chinese, Malay and Indian people; Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Hinduism and varying forms of Christianity all compose significant portions of Singaporean society (CIA 2016). Structurally, both are republican states operating relatively new governments after contemporary independences from foreign rule. While much debate exists as to the level of democracy in Singaporean elections, it is well known that there are significant barriers to entry in competing for parliamentary seats

against the historically dominant People's Action Party (Andrews 2015). Recently some public unrest has lead Singaporean officials to question the fairness of elections, but in general, the Singaporean people are content with the success of their incumbent party in economic development and providing for the public welfare (Barr 2014). While the obvious difference in land mass, population and authoritarianism of the leading political party contributes to the ability of the government to regulate corruption, Singapore's similar historical background and cultural constitution makes it's anti-corruption efforts important in the planning of India's strategy.

This year Singapore ranked an amazing seventh out of the 175 states being monitored by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for their ability to deter corruption. This compared to India's ranking as eighty-fifth creates a series of questions as to how Singapore has managed to keep their corruption rates so low. Only nine percent of Singapore's residents reported paying a bribe in 2010 and the police are believed to be even less corrupt than the media, business and private sector employees and other public officials (Transparency International). Singapore has a remarkably better health care and social welfare system, leading to an overall higher quality of life for the Singaporean citizens than their Indian counterparts. The stand-out amongst all Southeast Asian countries, Singapore has remained relatively corruption free for the last decade (Jones 2009). We will be looking at Singapore's anti-corruption efforts in order to determine what methods adopted by Singapore helped them avoid the corruption that has riddled India.

Singapore owes a large part of its anti-corruption success to the successful integration of transparency methods. In 1952, Singapore created the Corrupt Practices

Investigation Bureau (CPIB) with only thirteen employees and minimal governmental support. Within seven years, however, politics had changed and the newly elected Peoples Action Party government was dedicated to the eradication of corruption. They passed the Prevention of Corruption Act that strengthened the CPIB by increasing personnel and funding; Singaporeans had seen the cost of ineffective anti-corruption investigative branches and were determined to create a system of true transparency and accountability (Quah 2013). Perhaps one of the understated reasons that Singapore's Prevention of Corruption Act has been so successful is its clarity of language. Singapore has put noticeable effort into creating clear definition of corruption and equally as clear language in anti-corruption legislation (Jones 2009). The CPIB has the authority to investigate corruption complaints, make arrests and attempt to prevent corruption through thorough examinations of the practices and procedures of all public officials (CPIB 2016). The effectiveness of the CPIB to enforce transparency and accountability measures has clearly contributed to Singapore's successful approach to reducing corruption. "Over the years, the public commitment of the Peoples Action Party government of Singapore to combat corruption has been matched by effective action in bringing to book any politician, official or business leader involved in corruption through the enforcement work of its anti-corruption agency, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau" (Jones 2009, 169). Public officials, including police officers, are subject to punishment at the hands of the courts when found guilty of corrupt acts. Additionally Singapore has increased efforts for the selection and training of police officers by incorporating psychological training to enhance the compatibility of officers with their duties.

“The Singapore Police Force has succeeded in minimizing police corruption by improving salaries and working conditions, cooperating with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, enhancing its recruitment and selection procedures, providing training and values education for its members, and adopting administrative measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption” (Quah 2014, 186). The political will of the people set the stage for Singapore’s successful anti-corruption efforts. Their ability to enforce anti-corruption legislation through investigative practices and a willingness to prosecute illegal behaviors has solidified their accomplishments. The lessons Singapore offers to states suffering with corrupt public officials, specifically policemen, are not trite. India will face some particular challenges that Singapore has been fortunate to avoid: the large size, both geographically and in population, will make enforcement more difficult on a national scale, the fluctuating political parties create an inconsistency in political willingness to pursue anti-corruption efforts, and the severe poverty of the general public threatens the public morale towards working for change. Despite these drawbacks to adhering to the procedures of Singapore’s anti-corruption methods, innovative practices in the fight against corruption are making it possible for a large, diverse, impoverished country like India to succeed in reaching their goal of reducing corruption.

*How is technology influencing the fight against corruption?*

Modern democracies are increasingly turning to civilian oversight operations as a mechanism of accountability for corrupt police forces. As far back as the sixties, American cities such as New York City have used civilian oversight boards to provide for minority representation in police conduct (Kaste 2015). Although met with early

disapproval in favor of internal investigation of police conduct, civilian boards or ombudsman have become a norm in large cities with diverse populations. Over two hundred civilian oversight organizations exist within the United States alone with the intent of additional accountability. Kansas City's peoples' ombudsman to police conduct has been in place since the 1970s; it became apparent that the previous system of internal inquiry was contributing to corruption and the retention of bad officers. The ombudsman position allowed a third party investigator to seriously examine police complaints and detect officers that were neglecting their duties or acting unlawfully. Highly successful civilian boards have locations away from police stations so that citizens may feel safe and confidential when filing a complaint (Kaste 2015). This process, so long as it is understanding of the complex decisions and duties of officers and armed with the ability to follow through with action, is an effective method for rooting out entrenched corruption. The ability of technology to document police behavior has added to the possibility for the general public to review police actions and call into questions specific practices. Technological advances have paved the way for greater civilian oversight.

In an effort to have their voices heard, the Indian people have taken to non-traditional use of technology to file complaints of corruption against the police. A cellular application, WhatsApp, allows users to communicate easily and cost efficiently. Once it was estimated that nearly fifty million Indians are now using this app as a primary means of communication, the Delhi police established a hotline to file complaints against their local police force. In a matter of one week the hotline received almost four thousand messages, over six hundred calls, three audio messages and two video recordings through this one application alone ("Five Police Investigated after Delhi Launches WhatsApp

Anti-Bribery Campaign” 2015). Using this new hotline and cheap methods of communication, Delhi citizens may now record, photograph or otherwise document instances of corruption and use it as evidence when filing their complaints. The citizens were asked to send audio or video messages to the hotline if they witnessed a police officer seeking a bribe or otherwise harassing an individual. Officers’ actions are then investigated and charges can be made through the Prevention of Corruption Act if sufficient evidence exists. Studies conducted by Transparency International suggest that a third to one half of the cases of corruption in India could be eliminated through the use of technology and other resources to increase transparency (Transparency International India 2005).

One study conducted between people of varying classes in New Delhi proved that appealing to the right to transparent police conduct resulted in quicker service from public officials than if they were left unaccountable. When transparency is increased, public service accountability results in greater efficiency and less corruption even in those communities with immense inequalities between government officials and the least advantaged members of society (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010). In an attempt to monitor the behavior of public officials, some Indian bureaucratic offices have installed electronic monitoring systems that log employees’ times in and out off the office and make them available to the public. Currently India suffers from such a severe lack of accountability that government officials often spend their work days at a country club or on vacation while still being paid full salary and not recording their absence from office. The easy-going mentality of many Indian public officials has caused serious problems when the general public is needing assistance and cannot track down the employee “on duty.”

While not nationwide at this point, more than fifty thousand government employees are currently having their working hours recorded on this digital dashboard to help hold them accountable for the public servant position they have undertaken (“Indians Give Nod to Surveillance of Govt Officials” 2014).

Technology can also be used to help police act more effectively and efficiently. The Indian police, although receiving an increase in governmental funding each year, are struggling to keep up with the expanse of their duties to the state; Indian police officers are not only responsible for maintaining local order but also for the control of terrorism, insurgency and organized crime. India is experiencing a rapid increase in the crime rate that the police simply cannot address without the increase of efficiency (Kumar, Kumar 2013). In an attempt to improve productivity, in the early 2000s the Ministry of Home Affairs increased funding specifically for the modernization of police equipment as well as to provide additional training programs for officers. “The police departments which have more modern communication equipment and which are spending more money on the training of their police personnel are doing better” (Kumar and Kumar 2013, 57). In 2011, India began using technology to advance their citizen record keeping capabilities with a goal of scanning the eyes and recording finger prints of over 1.2 billion citizens. The initiative has a plan to reduce “the inequality corroding India’s economic rise by digitally linking every one of India’s people to the country’s growth juggernaut” (Polgreen 2011). Citizens will now be assigned a twelve digit ID that will help give their people an identity outside their villages. This electronic identification system will make it harder for corrupt government officials and police officers to steal citizens’ benefits or charge them with crimes they didn’t commit. The Prime Minister of India is hopeful that

this system will be the answer to many of Anna Hazare's demands. "Technology, its supporters believe, could solve these problems because it would provide people with a way to interact with the state without depending on local officials who are now the main gatekeepers of government services" (Polgreen 2011).

Research conducted in Australia analyzing the impact of information technology to the operations of police showed that police are "investing in information technology to increase their capacity to store and process large volumes of data; improve their intelligence and investigative capabilities; and provide access to criminal records and other crime-related information" (Chan 2001, 140). The increased capacity for record keeping as well as the ability for the general public and police superiors to hold their officers accountable makes technology an important aspect of the future of policing. Historically, laws regulating police conduct have fallen just shy of being able to effectively monitor their behavior but with the integration of information technology, police superiors are now able to manage the actions of their police force while also maintaining cost control, efficiency and the decentralization of management. Police will be able to be inspected both internally and externally using technology as a means of policing the police. "The majority of survey respondents agreed that information technology has led to a closer scrutiny of their work by their supervisors and that information technology has made their supervisors more aware of their day-to-day activities and workload" (Chan 2001, 152). While some officers are fearful that their professional discretion is being restrained by the increasingly popular use of surveillance, the benefits of efficiency, better communication and increased technical skills among officers outweigh the cost of demanding additional caution from policemen.



*What overall themes exist for successful anti-corruption efforts?*

Structurally, certain steps must be made for the reduction of police corruption. Anti-corruption legislation should be concise and easily understood. There should be simple laws to draw a clear line of what is and what is not an abuse of police authority. This clarity is essential for the enforcement and application of laws in court, but also for the understanding of the police force itself. Officers should be able to plainly distinguish lawful behavior from unlawful corruption. Additionally, it will be helpful to diversify the police force in a way that prejudice and patronage are inherently reduced. Choosing officers from a group of qualified men and women coming from varied religions, ethnicities, castes, and ages will allow officers to connect more with the general public without fitting into an officer stereotype.

Perhaps the step that most countries recognize as important but have difficulty implementing is the establishment of trustworthy accountability methods. While institutional or governmental accountability efforts are a beginning point, it can be counterintuitive to have an institution monitoring its own accountability. If the upper-echelon of the police force is engaged in the corruption taking place, the system of accountability must come from outside the department. Using the innovative means of technology, transparency within a police force is no longer such an impossible feat. Governments are now able to set up confidential hotlines or stations where reports of police misconduct can be submitted. The general public is now able to take justice into their own hands without fearing backlash from the political elite. The confidentiality that accompanies these police conduct reports will encourage increased accountability on the part of the police due to the extreme likelihood that their actions are being monitored.

With modern equipment, police actions can be more closely supervised to make sure that officers are doing their jobs and abstaining from illegal side business.

Lastly it is crucial to enforce the legislation and guidelines placed on officers as well as the public they police. This enforcement does not end with the investigative phase begun through the accountability measures. Increased transparency allows for not only the prosecution of officers that are abusing their public power, but also the reward of officers who are committed to serving their community. This is a critical step in creating a new set normal police practices. Constructing a new police culture will be the final necessary component to keeping corruption from being a culturally accepted norm. “These informal norms become crucial in high-pressure situations where formal standards of conduct are unworkable, ambiguous or non-existent. On the job socialization- the values and behavior a police officer learns from his or her colleagues- is a critical influence on corruption. New recruits and veterans alike need guidance and support of others who understand” (Johnston 1982). The continual prosecution of police acting unlawfully and the promotion of honorable officers will help secure lawful police behavior. This trend must continue for corruption to be kept at bay.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Identifying Recommendations for India

Police corruption in India is going to be a challenging puzzle for those government officials charged with the task of making India fair again. Although some steps may seem rudimentary from an outside perspective, each stage of India's progress to corruption reform will need to be intentional and well-executed. Even simple tasks start with the necessity for the arduous process of building legislative-backing. Currently the Indian Department of Personnel and Training is trying to promote a new set of rules that would allow state governments to take action against government servants who have not reported to their jobs in over a month. Currently the Department of Personnel and Training is reporting ten officers within All India Services, which includes the Indian Police Service, that are taking an unauthorized leave from their duty (Express News Service 2015). As a nation, India is rightly becoming increasingly dissatisfied with ease of which police officers are able to abuse their positions for private gain to the detriment of society. The people are pleading for reform and are doing everything from protesting the current ineffective anti-corruption efforts to supporting party platforms that advertise their willingness to reform corruption; Indian is ready to make a change. In this final chapter, we will discuss the specific ways India can alter their governing documents and adjust the management of their police force so that anti-corruption efforts become more operative. While some legislation reform and alteration of police selection and training is necessary, a lot of the much needed corruption reform efforts should come in the way of accountability for officers and enforcement of legislation. Realistically, however, we

must recognize that there will be inherent barriers to reform that India must tackle in order to progress their efforts to reform, democratize and advance economically and socially. With the support of the public, and democratic reform, the reduction of corruption is a goal that India could feasibly achieve with a few necessary initiatives.

*What are immediate recommendations for reform?*

Before a state can begin more substantial steps to reform, they must possess a strong foundation for anti-corruption efforts to succeed. Historically, having the right legislative framework and a strong police force are the basics of successfully reducing corruption. If India is to seriously combat corruption they must increase the effectiveness of anti-corruption legislation and reevaluate their methods of selecting and training officers and constables. These steps will be essential to the more advanced and laborious anti-corruption strategies' success. While India has plentiful anti-corruption legislation, they will need to make changes to the strength and language of the laws forbidding corruption if public servants are going to be forced to abide by them and administer them. Clarity of language, the explicit defining of the parameters of legal behavior, and written expectations for enforcement and punishment will be the keys to creating a legal system where anti-corruption reform can succeed. Simultaneously, the police force needs to be composed of properly selected and well-trained individuals. This is perhaps one of the biggest challenges India faces due to the stigma against the police and the culturally ingrained corruption within police hierarchy. Indian police perspectives will have to undergo stringent evaluation to ensure that they are mentally capable of maintaining the stability required of this position but also that they understand what is expected of them in regards to lawful behavior. In this new system, corruption will not be tolerated from

the ground up and proper selection and training of officers will be key. Perhaps the first step in corruption reform is having the right persons tackling law enforcement.

One particular NGO, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative promotes the idea that anti-corruption efforts have been sound, but rather it is the foundation of the police force that is outdated. While it has become apparent that there are some minor changes in anti-corruption legislation that need to be fixed, the sentiment urgency surrounding the reformation of the police force is well justified. The Police Act of 1861 grants too much unregulated discretion over the appointment and transfer of officers while establishing little accountability for officers; it allows widespread indiscipline within the police force and a lack of responsibility to the duties of their own positions (Daruwala, Joshi and Tiwana 2005). The Indian police force would do well to learn from international examples of police force reform coming as a result of more effective hiring and training. “Many departments are improving integrity and raising the standards for officers by improving the way they hire and train officers in ethics and cultural awareness” (National Institute of Justice (U.S.) and United States 2005). By crafting a set of ethical standards to help guide both the selection and training process, creating an effective system of attracting and interviewing well qualified candidates and providing continual educational resources to current officers, India would see a radical change in the moral fiber of their police force.

It is a fundamental step in the development of any organization that a philosophy and mission are established to help guide the policies and actions of employees. The selection of employees should be intimately informed by the mission and philosophy of the organization as a whole (Henderson 1979). Indian police should let their goal of

reducing corruption and providing fair and equal protection to their people be the guiding force in their officer selection process. While there is no perfectly proven method of selecting new police officers, research suggests that a combination of cognitive tests, personality analysis and physical fitness exams are the most effective way at culling the list of potential candidates. Interviews, while occasionally helpful in identifying poor candidates, typically do not aid in the identification of good candidates (Annell, Lindfors and Sverke 2015). Candidates should undergo more intentional testing to assure that they are capable of the demands of the job. While maintaining the physical capabilities of the force is important, it should not be achieved at the expense of creating a unit comprised of people from varying backgrounds and skills that can contribute to the role of the police. The intentional diversification of the police force will help to end the cycle of selecting bulky men of average-intelligence that seem to commonly fall into a pattern of violence and prejudice. India recognized the importance of diversification in the role of the citizen's ombudsman; there exists a requirement that at least half of the Lokpals should be people of diverse castes or tribes, minorities or women (Ministry of Law and Justice 2014). Although the percentages may not be transferable to the police force, a similar response toward diversification should exist. Women and minorities will be able to provide services to the population that might currently be being neglected and will certainly reduce the amount of favoritism being granted to Indian males in the current system of patronage.

While selection of officers is essential for the quality of the police force, proper training and continuing education courses allow officers to remain sharp on the legal parameters of their duty. "Training... can reinforce the values and expectations of the

organization, the community, and the department, and thus strengthen decision-making by identifying ethical dilemmas and problem-solving models” (Wyatt-Nichol and Franks 2009, 48). While IPS officers are required to go through a forty-four week training program in Hyderabad, the majority of officers work at the constable level which receives little training aside from the physical preparation for their job. The combination of both effective selection and educational training will increase the ethical decision making within the police force. Constant educational resources that aid in the maintenance of a well informed police culture is essential to establishing any sense of morality within the police force. Officers at all levels of command should be well aware of the laws regulating their official behavior as well as the expectation of integrity that their superiors intend to hold them to. Continuous courses on ethical standards should be required for officers of every ranking. Officers should participate in an ongoing an informational program that presents them with constantly updated scenarios they might encounter and the real life solutions or train of thought that can help them make ethical decisions under pressure. With this, officers should be taught both the rules and the disciplinary threats of violation and made to understand them in such a way that they support their fairness (National Institute of Justice (U.S.) and United States 2005). Training is such an effective tool in explaining the mission of the police force and the legislation regulating police conduct in such a way that officers are supportive of anti-corruption efforts.

To review, India has four primary pieces of anti-corruption legislation: the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946, the Central Vigilance Commission Act of 2003, and the Lokpal Act of 2013. The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988 attempted to define the parameters of lawful

behavior and list instances of corrupt actions. It also outlined punishments for corrupt acts ranging from six months to seven years imprisonment as well as the potential for monetary fines (*The Prevention of Corruption Act 1988*). The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946 was established to investigate instances of bribery and corruption after World War II. This act became the governing foundation for the creation of the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation that is currently in charge of investigating cases of corruption as defined by the central government. This act was amended in 2003 for the creation of the Central Vigilance Commission to oversee the investigation efforts of the CBI. The CBI and the CVC are explicitly granted the power of investigation and the ability to arrest suspects of illegal activity (Central Bureau of Investigation 2016). Finally, the Lokpal Act of 2013 is the remnant of the more strongly structured Jan Lokpal Bill that struggled to make its way through Parliament. The Jan Lokpal Bill aimed at strengthening the punishment for the corruption of public servants as well as create a citizen's ombudsmen that would more effectively and transparently be able to investigate reported instances of corruption (India Against Corruption 2011). The Lokpal Act passed in 2013 did in fact require the creation of citizen's "Lokpals" (ombudsmen) to be established in each state that consist of both an inquiry and prosecution wing. At least half of all Lokpals must have some judicial experience and the jurisdiction of the act is extended to the prime minister, his officials and members of parliament. All inquiries are to be completed within six months of being reported to the CBI (Ministry of Law and Justice 2014). Still pending in parliament, however, are bills concerning whistle blower protection and judicial accountability (Roy and Singh 2014).



While the bones of strong legislation are in place, India must be critical of the vague terminology and lack of accountability built into anti-corruption laws. Both the Police Act of 1861, which established the police force, and the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1988 were not made in serious efforts to practically reduce corruption. A careful analysis of these texts should be undertaken by Parliament to identify the locations where terminology is vague or no longer applicable to the situation in India. Specific parameters as to what is meant by “bribery”, “extortion” or “patronage” should be clearly defined as to not allow injustice to slip through weak defenses. Singapore, for example, prohibits gifts of any sort or amount in return for political favors (Pickworth and Williams 2013). Although it will be up to the Indian political system to define exactly what they are willing to consider corrupt, these scenarios must be vetted so that the police and judicial systems can more properly apply the laws. Additionally, some research suggests that a more state-centered approach of anti-corruption efforts correlates with lower levels of corruption (Joaquin 2004). Perhaps each state should take it into their own hands to amend their local anti-corruption efforts so as to target the areas of corruption that they are experiencing. In any case, the laws must be specific enough that they are easily applied in every scenario. Less ambiguity leaves more room for accountability efforts to root out corruption.

*What are intermediate recommendations for reform?*

Once all legislation is proofed for weaknesses, it can easily be used to hold officers accountable to the duty of justice they swore to uphold. Police should be responsible for maintaining their status as defenders of the law and enforcers of justice. Currently the two most time and money efficient ways to institute systems of accountability for officers

it through the passage of right to information initiatives and the establishment of oversight boards. India has been diligent in pursuing both these efforts, but improving public awareness and taking the role of ombudsmen seriously could drastically improve their effectiveness. India also faces a uniquely challenging issue of recording citizen information and activity. With the advancement of technology, India should seize this opportunity to begin tracking the identity and status of their citizens. When millions of people are unmonitored, it makes it extremely difficult, amongst the best intentions, to ensure them social welfare privileges and due process under the law. By pursuing the progression of right to information activism, promoting the development of effective oversight boards and initiating continual efforts to more closely monitor the status of citizens across India, the police will more openly be held accountable to their duty as public servants.

Right to information initiatives are a method of anti-corruption accountability that grant individual citizens with the ability to question the denial or delay of rights or benefits they are rightly granted through the national or state constitution. After implementation a Right to Information Act in Delhi in 2001, there was a noticeable improvement in the effectiveness of public officials when they were subjected to, or even threatened with, an investigation under this legislation (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010). Luckily, the success of this program led to the adoption of a national accountability initiative under the Right to Information Act of 2005. The Right to Information Act of 2005 is capable of holding officers responsible for their behaviors by allowing ordinary individuals to examine their bureaucratic processes (Webb 2013). While India has successfully passed the Right to Information Act, it is important that the general public is

aware of their rights and the impact it could have on their ability to see justice. Some scholars suggest that the full integration of these corruption recourses could negate existing social, cultural and economic disadvantages (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010). Awareness about the process of engaging one's right to information should be disseminated to the general public in a way that expresses the potential it possesses to ensure the police are held accountable to the law.

Following the Right to Information Act, the Lokpal Act of 2013 is a promising step forward in the fight against corruption. Promoted by Indian Against Corruption and their leader Anna Hazare, the Lokpal Act seeks to establish a citizen's ombudsman that would work on behalf of the Indian people to deter corruption and seek justice for grievances. This is a great example of the types of civilian or ombudsman oversight boards that are reducing corruption globally. By creating a force of outside accountability that has the ability to investigate and prosecute police action, police departments are more successfully held responsible to their positions. "Many departments are improving integrity and raising the standards for officers by soliciting community input through citizen review boards, ombudsmen or community problem solving initiatives" (National Institute of Justice (U.S.) and United States 2005). Despite this, civilian oversight boards are often met with discord between the general public and the police. The qualification of civilians to judge the actions of police is often rightly questioned (Kaste 2015). In order protect the already fragmented relationship between the police and civilians, the oversight board should be composed of elected officials unaffiliated with the police. It is also important that the police feel the duties of their demanding positions are understood by the oversight committee; these accountability officials should be trained in police

protocol and anti-corruption legislation so they have an accurate foundation by which to judge police action. Civilian complaints should be directed to this official board and dealt with in a timely manner. The physical location of the oversight board should not be within sight of the nearest police station in order to ensure that the public feels secure that their complaints will be kept confidential and that they can report instances of corruption without the threat of police retaliation. While the Lokpal Act does well in establishing the ombudsman position to hear civilian complaints and ensuring that members have some legislative background, it could improve its effectiveness by requiring police training and ensuring a safe distance from police quarters. Additionally, the ability to investigate and prosecute instances of corruption is necessary for the effectiveness of the oversight function.

Finally, India must start addressing the issue of civilian recordkeeping. With a population as large as India's, keeping identity records is no small feat, but without a consistent system of identity records the arrest and prosecution process cannot be effective. In order for police to properly investigate crimes and to be held accountable to arresting the correct suspect, India needs a way of tracking personal records and housing. In 2011, India began an initiative to record the name, year of birth and address of over 1.2 billion citizens. Indian people were assigned a twelve-digit code and received a scan of their thumbprint as well as each iris that can then be used to identify them anywhere across the country. Only time will tell, but Indian government officials as well as anti-corruption activists are hopeful that this system will help increase Indian officials' accountability to the Indian people. "By allowing electronic transmission and verification of many government services, the identity system would make it much harder for corrupt

bureaucrats to steal citizens' benefits" (Polgreen 2011). By maintaining these data records, police will no longer be able to imprison someone under a wrong identity or ignore their rights as civilians; each person will have a unique identity that will allow them to pursue justice. All of these efforts set the stage for the enforcement of anti-corruption reform.

*What are long-term recommendations for reform?*

Accountability efforts set the stage for the next essential component of reform: enforcement. Identifying corruption is only the first step to ending the cycle; even the best anti-corruption legislation and the most effective accountability efforts are rendered useless without the equal application of the law. Once illegal activities are easily identified through the use of accountability measures, it is imperative that justice be served through the prosecution of unlawful usages of public service positions. Enforcement of lawful behavior is the only way to reverse the deviant culture existing in the police force. As seen in New York City in the late 1800s, enforcement is a critical step in fighting corruption but it is most beneficial when coupled with reinforcement. Using the accountability measures, primarily established to root out illegal manipulation of public authority, officers who can be identified as exemplary should be rewarded for their efforts. Perhaps the best way to reward these law-abiding officers is through fair compensation for their duties. Police work can be a dangerous and taxing business; if officers are not being justly rewarded for their work, many will seek illegal compensation elsewhere. Officers who exhibit excellent behavior over an extended period of time should be promoted to fill superior positions within the police force. Only through

allowing non-corrupt officers to rise the ranks will the police force consist of qualified and honest officers.

Prosecution is a necessary component of creating a new culture of ethical behavior that will allow reform to occur. The National Institute of Justice publishes suggested methods of integrity improvement and prosecution for illegal action is listed first among recommendations. “Address and discipline minor offenses so officers learn that major offenses will be disciplined too. Open the disciplinary process to public scrutiny” (National Institute of Justice (U.S.) and United States 2005). Instilling a fear of punishment will likely be enough of a deterrent for those officers who are using the corrupt system for a moderate boost in compensation; as soon as the risk outweigh the benefits, corruption will begin to decrease. The sternness of either the national or state government that is overseeing police behavior is the key to making a difference in corruption among even the highest officials in the police force (“Cleaning up India’s Police: Here’s What Can Remove Corruption among Top Cops” 2015). The size of the punishment should be in direct proportion to the harm of the corruption and the probability of detection; the larger the bribe or the less frequently crimes of the sort are able to be prosecuted, the larger the penalty. “If expected penalties do not increase along with the benefits of corruption for bribers and bribes, government may be caught in a trap where high corruption levels beget high corruption levels” (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 55).

On the opposite end of the spectrum, it is equally important to reward ethical behavior among exemplary officers. Achieving this through promotion and fair compensation for their honorable efforts goes a long way in attracting the best candidates for the hiring process as well as retaining gifted public servants. “Attracting the right

applicants is the first step in creating an organization that has excellent employees” (Lawler 2000). Some of the most qualified people seek jobs in either the private sector or abroad to receive fair compensation and recognition for their achievements. Even those trained by the government often end up looking for jobs elsewhere in order to be properly compensated for their qualifications, leaving the lesser qualified or experienced behind (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Going back to the necessity for India to improve their selection of officers, one of the best ways to improve the overall quality of their police force is to attract qualified applicants. In order to increase the sheer number of applicants, the job must be desirable and in order to improve both the attractiveness of the position from afar as well as the willingness of employees to devote themselves to their duties, certain motivational features must be present within the workplace.

Research shows that the most effective work-related motivation comes from a balance of positive behavioral psychology and incentive compensation. In establishing a healthy work place for officers, the management must consider the fulfillment of their basic psychological needs: empowerment, positive reinforcement and focus. Professional empowerment can be achieved through support systems, strong team building exercises and the overall accountability within the workforce. Reinforcement is even easier to provide by simply respecting, communicating and giving feedback to each individual employee. Focus requires each officer receiving proper training and discipline as well as understanding the overall sense of mission. These simple initiatives go a long way in inspiring employee morale and boosting performance (McCoy 1992). The other necessary half to performance improvement is extrinsic incentive compensation in the form of pay, bonuses or benefits. Individual pay for performance allows employees to see

the direct correlation between their performance and their financial compensation (Lawler 2000). These physical forms of compensation help make the job reasonably worth the hard work and potential stress the officers will be devoting to it. Currently, India faces a large problem with policemen looking to external sources of illegal income to subsidize their low salaries. “If public sector pay is very low, corruption is a survival strategy” (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 72). A former IPS officer wrote about the motives he sees for Indian police officers to engage in illegal activities: “The first is the desire to build a palatial house, and the second is to give the best of education to one's children...” Beyond financial stipends, corruption is viewed as a necessary method of advancing one's police career due to the high levels of corruption in the superior officer positions. If promotion was made possible through reward for lawful and loyal behavior, the incentives for corrupt behavior would all but disappear (“Cleaning up India's Police: Here's What Can Remove Corruption among Top Cops” 2015).

*What is India's primary barrier to reform?*

Unfortunately the recognition of the need for reform, and even a clear plan of implementation, is not enough to achieve tangible results for the Indian people. If the billions of Indian citizens are to ever see their dreams of justice realized, action must be taken to correct the cycle of corruption. In order to analyze the potential for India to overcome these barriers to action, it is helpful to understand the common obstacles to fighting corruption. “All reform efforts encounter five problems more or less inherent in corruption: a lack of information on corruption, sporadic and transitory public concern, the sheer complexity of politics, problematic extended consequences of reform, and systematic roots of corruption” (Johnston 1982). Historically, reform cannot exist without



the support of both the general public and the government itself (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Having already shown in detail the data available for Indian police corruption and the growing and consistent public outrage, India is left to face the difficulty of passing legislation through a similarly corrupt legislative body and overcoming the culturally ingrained aspect of corruption. In the past, both of these issues have plagued India's anti-corruption efforts but the same frustration that sparks a desire for change can win elections, pass legislation and rewrite a cultural tradition.

The size and structure of Indian government is one that poses difficulties for the implementation of legislative reforms. Even if a piece of legislation is passed at the level of the central government, it can be challenging to effectively enforce and monitor the enforcement of anti-corruption efforts on the more local level (Quah 2008). Luckily for the enforcement of new regulations, the same accountability measures set in place to monitor police behavior will also help ensure their implementation of the latest anti-corruption efforts. With the increasing innovation in technology, the implementation of legislation across the country will be more easily monitored and executed. This is taken for granted, however, India's greatest struggle to corruption reform: the willingness of public officials to fight corruption. The Indian people are doing the most they can to fight institutionalized corruption but their efforts are in vain without the support of politicians and police. True cultural reform "... can be [done] neither through slogan shouting, nor by displaying boards and hoardings, but by strict and equitable laws and their firm enforcement without fear or regard for any one's status or position" (Lall 2007). Many experts have asserted that curbing corruption in India will not be possible until politicians actively engage in the implementation of anti-corruption efforts (Quah 2008).

In years past, the work of the CBI and CVC has been nominal at best. With the recent election of party officials promising corruption reform, however, changes are in the beginning stages of making anti-corruption legislation effective and monitoring enforcement. Politicians are beginning to realize fighting corruption is a desire of the people and an advantageous platform for their political campaigns. Parliament is increasingly addressing the issue of corruption, which can be seen through their constant revisions of Lokpal Bills. In the last year, over two thousand government senior officials were put under official inquiry and 101 cases of extortion were registered into the CBI's system. These numbers are nearly double the amount of inquiries placed in 2014 and represent the largest number of charge sheets in the last five years ("2,200 Corrupt Govt Officials Identified in 2015, CBI Says - Times of India" 2016). Many hope that statistics such as these, signify that Indian police and politicians are becoming more willing to hold each other and themselves accountable to anti-corruption legislation. If India was able to, in fact, create a state made of politicians who wanted true reform and police who enforced corruption legislation, their dreams of a fairly regulated society could be realized. Only time will tell if Indian officials are truly willing to make this cultural change, but they are the only force holding India back from becoming the economic and political powerhouse it could be.

### *Conclusion*

Immediately India should begin reforming the selection and training of their officers. Through the diversification of their police force and a focus on not only their physical capabilities but also their mental and emotional strength, India can create a stronger police force from the ground up. Constant training should be provided on both

ethics and anti-corruption legislation awareness. The minor instances within current anti-corruption legislation that are vague or open for interpretation should be more minutely specified so to provide ease in accountability and enforcement. Once these reform efforts have been successfully achieved, India should focus on the promotion of their Right to Information Act and Lokpal oversight institution. By allowing citizens to be informed about the actions of the police and giving them an outlet to express concerns or file reports of wrong doing, the government can more closely monitor the behaviors of police. The Lokpal boards should be placed in discrete locations and their right to investigate and prosecute instances of corruption should be emphasized. It will also be helpful for India to further develop their methods of citizen identity recordkeeping; by closely granting individuals with the ability to assert their individualism, they will more easily be able to stand up for their own rights. Finally, India must crack down on the enforcement of their anti-corruption legislation. With the information gathered through accountability efforts, India should sternly prosecute those policemen in violation of anti-corruption laws. Fair compensation and the ability for bonuses or promotions should be made available to those officers who prove their diligence to lawful behavior. The fear of punishment and the incentives for behaving lawfully will be the final step in ensuring corruption reform. Unfortunately, all of these efforts require the support of the political body. While the general public remains favorable to corruption reform, only time will tell if the workings of democracy produce politicians willing to allow corruption reform to occur.

## APPENDIX

## APPENDIX

### Acronyms

BCCA- Brazil Clean Corruption Act

CVC- Central Vigilance Commission

CBI- Central Bureau of Investigation

CPIB- Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau

IPS- Indian Police Service

NGO- Non-Governmental Organization

SPF- Singaporean Police Force

SPS- State Police Service

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