

ABSTRACT

Civis and *Civitas*: Roman Citizenship in the Late Republic and Early Empire

Josiah D. Stephens

Director: Daniel Hanchey, Ph.D.

This thesis concerns Roman citizenship in the late Republic and early Empire, examining how the Roman definition of citizenship evolved and expanded as a reaction to internal and external tensions, citing heavily the Gracchi and Cicero. It applies the patron-client framework to the municipal aristocracy system, noting how Rome used this framework within Julio-Claudian grand strategy to make the grant of citizenship into a highly effective political tool.

APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS:

Dr. Daniel Hanchey, Department of Classics

APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM:

Dr. Elizabeth Corey, Director

DATE: _____

CIVIS AND *CIVITAS*: ROMAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE LATE REPUBLIC AND
EARLY EMPIRE

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

Baylor University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Honors Program

By

Josiah Stephens

Waco, Texas

April 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Chapter One: Three Citizenship-Framing Stories	3
Chapter Two: Vocabulary and Legal Distinctions	11
Chapter Three: The Italian Peninsula: Development	17
Chapter Four: Rising Political Tensions and The Gracchi	25
Chapter Five: The Social War	34
Chapter Six: Municipal Aristocracies.	40
Chapter Seven: Cicero's Articulation of Roman Citizenship	50
Chapter Eight: Citizenship as a Tool of Grand Strategy in the Empire	64
Conclusion	91
Works Cited	94

INTRODUCTION

One of humankind's most fundamental desires is to belong, either in family, tribe, or creed; *ethnos*, *gens*, or *patria*. Historically, humans have sought to define the particular ways in which they belong to the world around them. Generally, a man or woman belongs within their country within the context of a thing often labeled citizenship. The Romans, architects of one of the largest and greatest empires the world has yet known, tried their hand at building a governing system that included and venerated citizenship status. I was first drawn to the question of Roman citizenship because it seemed clear to me that Rome's legacy as a global authority was somewhat unique in human history within the realm of citizenship. People often longed to belong to Rome as a citizen, even if they saw Rome as an invader of their own territory. And so, I began to question: what is it that made Roman citizenship so very enticing for so many?

As I charted the evolution of Roman citizenship across centuries, peoples, and cultures, I began to grasp the reality that there was a dizzying array of possible answers. The *socii* revolted for the citizenship due to a complex situation of misplaced Roman attention, heightened by the political tensions brought by men like the Gracchi. During the Late Republic, municipal aristocracies all over Italy furthered Romanization and the desire for citizenship through the patron-client framework. Cicero argued, about that time, that Roman citizenship was a glorious reward for those lucky enough to join Rome. And in the Early Empire, Rome continued to use the patron-client framework as a key part of her global grand strategy, using the promise of citizenship as a highly effective

tool in her struggle for hegemony. My own personal conclusion is that Rome used the offer of citizenship best when she remembered that, as some have put it, “Rome is an idea.”

As this thesis spans many centuries, people groups, and geographic eras, it should certainly be classified as a survey work, not a precise study. Because it is a survey work, I chose to have multiple small chapters, instead of a few large ones, to allow readers to maintain focus within the breadth of the work. In it, I use primary sources, epigraphs, and secondary scholarship. My hope is that it will serve as an introduction to the Roman definition, evolution, and methodology of citizenship in the Late Republic and Early Empire.

CHAPTER ONE

Three Citizenship-Framing Stories: Solon, Lycurgus, and the Tabulae Duodecim

The Hellenistic culture that spread throughout the Mediterranean and ultimately consumed Rome incorporated stories as a key pedagogical component.¹ This would undoubtedly have impacted the unspoken conception of citizenship. A well-educated Roman would have held, carefully imprinted within their memory, the three stories of Lycurgus, Solon, and the Twelve Tables to shape their attitudes towards citizenship. These three legendary stories, representing Athens, Sparta, and Ancient Rome, functioned as legal and cultural stepping-stones and shaped legal theory and practice for centuries.

Lycurgus the Spartan lived sometime between the eleventh and eighth centuries, and elevated the definition of citizenship within the Spartan sphere. Lycurgus was held in high esteem through most of antiquity, being (as Herodotus says) *a δοκίμον ἀνδρὸς*.² Herodotus also helpfully notes that Lycurgus entered the halls of the Oracle of Delphi and was immediately pronounced a god.³ Greek tradition heavily incorporated the idea of the ‘Lycurgan constitution’ in discussions on the ideal state.⁴ Clearly Lycurgus’ cultural

¹ Zajko, Vanda, and Ellen O’Gorman, ‘1 Introduction: Myths and their Receptions: Narrative, Antiquity, and the Unconscious’, in Vanda Zajko, and Ellen O’Gorman (eds), *Classical Myth and Psychoanalysis: Ancient and Modern Stories of the Self*, Classical Presences (Oxford, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 23 May 2013), <https://doi-org.ezproxy.baylor.edu/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656677.003.0001>

² Herodotus, *Histories*. 1.65

³ Herodotus 1.65

⁴ Plato, in his *Republic* and *Laws*, certainly did so.

innovations struck a booming chord in the hearts of his viewers.⁵ Plutarch, at least, is honest enough to warn us that ‘there is nothing indisputable to be said’ about the life of a man whose deeds were clouded both by the sheer temporal distance of history and the obscuring aspects of legend.⁶

Lycurgus’ great achievement was the establishment of the Spartan way of life. He reformed the way Sparta operated so thoroughly that it became unrecognizable. He created a constitution, established unwritten laws or codes of conduct, and organized Sparta’s unique method of education.⁷ Lycurgus brought civilization and a distinguished, well-defined culture to Sparta.⁸ Civilization, for Lycurgus and the Spartans, came through Sparta’s demanding qualifications of citizenship. Spartan citizens existed in stark contrast to the helot class, a group of serfs whose primary job was to till the public land. Sparta’s helot economy necessitated that Spartan citizens remain a small percentage of the population. While scholars currently debate about the precise population numbers and ratio of citizen to helot, the numerical imbalance was significant enough for Thucydides to attribute Spartan infrastructure to its existence.⁹ Thus the limited number of citizens within Sparta were forced to take their citizenship status very seriously.

⁵ His legacy remains strong. His image is depicted in marble within the chamber of the US House of Representatives today.

⁶ Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus* 1

⁷ There is quite a bit of controversy on whether or not Lycurgus actually established a written constitution. He is, of course, a semi-legendary figure. The real value of studying Lycurgus does not lie in whether or not he actually *did* a particular thing, but rather in gaining an idea of what an educated person in antiquity might have associated with him and his noble example. Plato, (Leg. 3,691e-692a) Pindar, (P. 1,63ff.) and Hellanicus (FGrH 4 F 116) all have different ideas on what the historical life of Lycurgus may have been.

⁸ Plutarch., *Lyc.* 1

⁹ Luraghi, Nino, and Susan E. Alcock, eds. 2003. *Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures*. Hellenic Studies Series 4. Washington, DC: Center for

Plutarch writes that as Lycurgus strove for peace, virtue, and equality within the Spartan citizenry, he pooled all the land in Sparta and divided it up again equally.¹⁰ He tried, too, to divide up personal possessions like furniture, but met with so much opposition that he gave it up.¹¹ Despite his crippling inability to ensure that all citizens had an equal number of tables and chairs, he managed to reorganize the labor market so completely that he allegedly put an end to luxury, greed, and strife.¹² Under Lycurgus' rule, the Spartans earned for the first time the creation of their adjective. Their lives truly were Spartan, devoid of anything unnecessary, fully equal, at peace with all except for their enemies.¹³ A Spartan citizen held immense pride in their citizenship, and felt a sense of undying loyalty. The famous refrain would have resounded in the ears of the people of antiquity: 'with your shield or on it.' They gave their all to their state. Plutarch writes that

οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἦν ἀφειμένος ὥς ἐβούλετο ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐν στρατοπέδῳ τῇ πόλει καὶ δίαιταν ἔχοντες ὠρισμένην καὶ διατριβὴν περὶ τὰ κοινά, καὶ ὅλως νομίζοντες οὐχ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι διετέλουν.¹⁴

Hellenic Studies. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_LuraghiN_AlcockS_eds.Helots_and_Their_Masters. 2003.

Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 4.80.2–4

¹⁰ Plutarch, *Lyc.* 9. Notice the precedent for land distribution and a concept of an *ager publicus*.

¹¹ Plutarch, *Lyc.* 9

¹² Plutarch, *Lyc* 31

¹³ Plutarch, *Lyc* 9

¹⁴ Plutarch, *Lyc* 24. This and all other translations are taken from Plutarch, Waterfield, and Stadter, *Greek Lives*. "Life in the city was like life in a military camp: people lived in a prescribed way and spent their time on communal concerns, because it never occurred to them to regard themselves as autonomous rather than as subject to their country."

Their state, in turn, brought them military greatness over all the Aegean.¹⁵ Lycurgus' vision for Spartan citizenship was that of a numerically small population bloc which possessed a passionate fervor to live, fight, and die for their state.

Another great player in the Aegean, Solon of Athens, a sixth-century BC legislator and ruler, constructed a legacy so magnificent that jurists for centuries referred back to his intentions.¹⁶ He, too, managed to reform his city-state so completely that it became unrecognizable by the time he was finished with it. His great innovation was the Athenian law-code, which would partially survive throughout antiquity. Like Lycurgus, Solon remained concerned with equality within the citizenry. He penned a line in one of his many poems which remarked that ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι/ νικᾶν δ' οὐκ εἶας' οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.¹⁷ Under his guidance, Athens became a timocratic system, with the requirements for holding office linked to wealth, not lineage. By breaking the political control of the landed aristocracy, who had remained unshakably in power despite attempts from non-aristocratic landowners and merchants to involve themselves politically, Solon attempted to mitigate tensions between classes.¹⁸ Significantly, the men and women of Athens were no longer allowed to sell themselves into slavery in order to pay off political debts.¹⁹ Athenian citizens were to some extent now 'set apart,' and were expected to treat themselves as such.

¹⁵ This military greatness can most clearly be seen in the fifth century, after their victory over Athens.

¹⁶ Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 44.

¹⁷ Plutarch, *Solon* 18. "I stood protecting rich and poor with my stout shield/And saw that neither side prevailed unjustly." This and all other translations are taken from Plutarch, Waterfield, and Stadter, *Greek Lives*.

¹⁸ Plutarch, Waterfield, and Stadter, *Solon* 43

¹⁹ Plutarch *Solon* 15

Even the poorest members of Athenian society were included in the political apparatus. While they could not be anything greater than a juror, the influence of a juror in Athenian society could work incredible wonders.²⁰ Plutarch characterizes the Athenian jurors as the ‘masters of the laws.’²¹

Solon’s law code was excessively detailed. Men were allowed to create wills, but only if they had no children and were free from any illicit influences.²² Women who happened to be outside could not wear more than three items of clothing, nor could they travel at night except on a cart with a lamp on the front.²³ People could not visit the tombs of people they were not related to, except during the actual funeral procession.²⁴ He even ordered the council of the Areiopagus to ensure that each and every citizen was keeping busy with worthwhile work.²⁵ To Solon, Athenian citizenship was much more than a legal definition or a tax requirement. It was a way of life that came with moral and social requirements. Both Solon and Lycurgus’ definition of citizenship incorporated this idea of citizenship being a type of selected status, given to a lucky population who would be expected to have an according level of loyalty and commitment to their fatherland.

The Mediterranean’s first real brush with Rome and Roman legal thought came through the arrival of the Twelve Tables, the final product of the ~450 BC conflict

²⁰ Plutarch *Solon* 18

²¹ Plutarch *Solon* 18

²² Plutarch *Solon* 21. Solon includes the persuasive powers of a woman as an example of a negative influence on a man that would cause his will to be null and void.

²³ Plutarch *Solon* 21

²⁴ Plutarch *Solon* 21

²⁵ Plutarch *Solon* 22

between the Roman patricians and plebians.²⁶ The story of the Twelve Tables parallels both Lycurgus and Solon in that it is shrouded in historical mystery and often took on quasi-legendary status within listener's minds. The historical reality of the Twelve Tables is hotly debated. While there is evidence that the Tables actually existed, the *idea* of the Tables, irrespective of their literal reality, loomed large in Roman tradition.²⁷ The famous second century AD jurist Gaius wrote a six-book commentary on the Twelve Tables.²⁸ Even during the formation of Justinian's law code, the Twelve Tables were still referenced as formational texts for Roman legal discourse.²⁹ Cicero notes that schoolchildren happily learned them by heart.³⁰

Livy writes in book 3.31-35 that the creation of the Twelve Tables came from intense conflicts. The tensions between the patricians and the plebians in Rome had become so intense that it was decided the current state of affairs could not go on. Previously, codified law was available only to the upper classes, and possibly known only to select groups of priests. Now, laws would become publicly available to all. A study group traveled to Athens in order to study Solon's laws.³¹ Ten men (*decemviri*) were commissioned to create the new code. The final product was the *lex duodecim*

²⁶ Steinberg, Michael. "The Twelve Tables and Their Origins: An Eighteenth-Century Debate." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43, no. 3 (1982): 379–96. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2709429>.

²⁷ Schieman, Gottfried (Tübingen). 'Tabulae Duodecim'. In Brill's New Pauly, edited by Hubert Cancik and, Helmuth Schneider, English Edition by: Christine F. Salazar, Classical Tradition volumes edited by: Manfred Landfester, and English Edition by: Francis G. Gentry. Accessed November 23, 2022. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e1128170.

²⁸ Gaius, *Ad legem duodecim tabularum*

²⁹ Schieman

³⁰ Cicero *De Legibus* 2.23

³¹ Livy 3.31. It is interesting to notice here that the Romans were actively, intentionally, structuring their legal system to adhere to the Greek ideal discussed here previously.

tabularum, written on twelve oak tablets and known to all Rome. Through the Twelve Tables, Rome became a country of order. Any person connected to Rome would know how they would be expected to behave if they only took a moment to learn the Twelve Tables. Dionysius Halicarnassus reports an essentially similar version of the same story.³²

The text of the Twelve Tables survives only in fragments. It, like Solon's law code, delves into moral, economic, and criminal questions. There are decisions regarding the extent of paternal power (a father is allowed to kill a deformed child on sight) and supernatural ability (enchanted away another's crops is not encouraged.)³³ Property rights were strenuously protected, except in the case of women, who owned property only within the context of their guardianship under a male family member.³⁴

Unlike the reformational nature of Lycurgus and Solon's laws, the Twelve Tables functioned to clarify preexisting laws and norms and make them universally accessible through their codification. The legacy of the Twelve Tables, however, connected Romans throughout the centuries. This founding myth functioned as a cultural touchstone, fueling a Roman culture of citizenship that valued personal investment. Juvenal's recipe for the good citizen was that one should "be a good soldier, good guardian, honest arbiter, unperjured witness."³⁵

The three legal 'founding myths' of Lycurgus, Solon, and the Twelve Tables, known throughout antiquity, share a few commonalities. States defined two broad classes of people: citizens and non-citizens. Citizens might exist within a hierarchical class

³² Steinberg 379

³³ M. H. Crawford, *Roman Statutes*, II, London, 1996, pp. 555-721, n. 40. 4, 8.

³⁴ Crawford 5

³⁵ Juvenal *Satires* 8.75

structure, such as patrician and plebian, but their status as citizens entitled them to certain rights and privileges, including fair and honest treatment. While citizens had to adhere to the dictates of the law, the law protected them in turn. Most notably, there is a distinct feeling of honor, virtue, and order attached to citizenship. A citizen was above all else a patriot who would happily fight for the good of the community.

The clearest thread that weaves through these founding myths is that of exclusivity and exceptionalism. To Sparta, Athens, and Rome, an individual wanted to possess the citizenship because theirs was a community ‘set apart’, better, stronger, and more virtuous than any other polity. Nowhere does this cultural habit emerge stronger than in Rome. Throughout Roman history, Rome held an exceptional pride in the status of citizenship. To a Roman, there could be no legal status more desired or more profitable than that of citizenship. After the Social War, this cultural tendency to idealize citizenship intensified as Rome grew into her empire. Borrowing on the Hellenistic tradition of civic pride, Rome placed herself on a lofty pedestal of authority throughout the Mediterranean. Especially to the far-flung tribes whom she conquered, Rome represented civilization, beauty, and order, and Roman citizenship offered entry into this seemingly ideal *civitas*. As Roman authorities discovered and fostered this dynamic, they learned to use citizenship as a tool for global domination.

CHAPTER TWO

Vocabulary and Legal Distinctions

Rome's offers of citizenship across the Mediterranean functioned as an exceptional tool partially because of the highly complicated, hierarchical world of status distinctions present at that period that left those closer to the bottom of the pack aching for advancement. In Late Republic Italy, Rome's legal world operated under a dizzyingly complex web of status designations. Legal status informed a person of their inherent rights and duties and significantly shaped the course of their life as they navigated what was and what was not permitted for a person of their status. In the same way that a people-watcher in a public park might easily judge a passerby's occupation based on the type and condition of their clothes, so too could a Roman quickly categorize and judge an individual based on their legal status.

One's legal rights were largely determined by three factors: free status, citizenship status, and geographic residency.³⁶ A free person fell under three possible distinctions: a Roman citizen, or *civis Romanus*, a Latin, or a peregrine.³⁷ A peregrine was a free subject of a province who was not a citizen.³⁸ If someone was a permanent resident of a particular place, but not a citizen, they were an *incola*.³⁹ A person who was free from

³⁶ Crook 37. Crook, John A. *Law and Life of Rome, 90 B.C. - A.D. 212*. 4. print. Aspects of Greek and Roman Life. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1994. 37

³⁷ Crook 36

³⁸ Crook 36

³⁹ Crook 37

birth was an *ingenus* while a freedman (someone who had been granted freedom from slavery) was a *libertinus* or *libertusi*.⁴⁰ Parental status, too, played a significant role in determining the legal status of a child.⁴¹

There is no agreed consensus in scholarship currently about what ‘double citizenship’ (the ability to both be a privileged member of one’s original citizen community and of Rome) would have meant. There is debate if such a legal status ever existed.⁴² Cicero argued in his speeches *Pro Balbo* and *Pro Archia* that a double citizenship cannot exist as such a concept undercuts Roman authority.

All of the Italic peoples alike were called either *socii* or *socii et amici* by the Romans. These titles cut neatly through the dizzying array of possible markers of Italic status to simply, loosely, draw a line of demarcation between Roman and Roman subject.⁴³ Sherwin-White defines a *socius* as “a member of a city-state or a tribal unit which, in most instances, had agreed to ‘respect the majesty of the Roman people.’”⁴⁴

A Roman citizen is either independent (*sui iuris, suae potestatis*) or in the power of someone else (*alieni iuris*).⁴⁵ Many women fell into the second category, but still operated with their own complex set of rights and abilities.⁴⁶ Marriage status and the

⁴⁰ Crook 36

⁴¹ Crook 38

⁴² Crook 38-39

⁴³ Sherwin-White, Adrian N. *The Roman Citizenship*. Repr. of the paperback ed. 1980. Oxford: Hassell Street Press, 2021. 160

⁴⁴ Sherwin-White 117

⁴⁵ Crook 36-39

⁴⁶ Crook 36

number of children attached to the marriage legally affected both men and women.⁴⁷ To be a Roman citizen by birth, one must have been born to parents within a Roman law marriage, *iustae nuptiae* or *iustum matrimonium*.⁴⁸ A marriage was considered a Roman law marriage if both parents possessed *conubium* (the legal right to contract a true marriage).⁴⁹ In a *iusta nuptia*, children followed the status of the father.⁵⁰ Within all other marriages, or *iure gentium*, a child followed the status of the mother.⁵¹ Practically, this meant that to be a Roman citizen by birth, the father had to be a Roman citizen, and the mother either had to be a Roman citizen or possess *conubium* in some way.⁵²

A slave manumitted in the proper way (either by will or before a magistrate) became a Roman citizen.⁵³ While a manumitted slave was a second-class *civis Romanus libertinus* instead of *ingenuus*, they possessed the private right of *conubium*, or the ability for the next generation to be a citizen by birth.⁵⁴ The right of *conubium* was considered an exceptional privilege as it allowed families to increase their power, wealth, and prestige through their inclusion in the Roman machine of citizenship.

The *civis Romanus* possessed an enviable set of rights. A citizen held the right of suffrage, which was both nominally important and, by Cicero's day, controlled in

⁴⁷ Crook 36

⁴⁸ Crook 40

⁴⁹ Crook 40

⁵⁰ Crook 40

⁵¹ Crook 40

⁵² Crook 40.

⁵³ Crook 40

⁵⁴ Crook 40

practicality by an uncomfortable mixture of patronage and bribery of political bosses.⁵⁵ Importantly, only a citizen could stand for office.⁵⁶ Rome eventually used this aspect of citizenship all over the empire as an enticement towards Roman rule. A citizen also held the right of appeal. The right of appeal has become familiar to modern audiences through the famous scene in the Christian New Testament where the apostle Paul appeals to Caesar during a conversation with the governor Festus.

Then Paul made his defense: "I have done nothing wrong against the Jewish law or against the temple or against Caesar." Festus, wishing to do the Jews a favor, said to Paul, "Are you willing to go up to Jerusalem and stand trial before me there on these charges?" Paul answered: "I am now standing before Caesar's court, where I ought to be tried. I have not done any wrong to the Jews, as you yourself know very well. If, however, I am guilty of doing anything deserving death, I do not refuse to die. But if the charges brought against me by these Jews are not true, no one has the right to hand me over to them. I appeal to Caesar!" After Festus had conferred with his council, he declared: "You have appealed to Caesar. To Caesar you will go!"⁵⁷

As seen in Paul's case, the right of appeal was a powerful statement of Rome's authority as higher courts interfered in local squabbles. While the right of appeal declined in practical usefulness over time, it was still hailed as a nominally essential right.⁵⁸

Citizenship also brought with it the private law rights of *commercium* and *conubium*.⁵⁹ While suffrage, the ability to stand for public office, and the right of appeal were considered prizeworthy (especially among the upper class), *commercium* and *conubium* had immediately beneficial effects on the everyday life of a citizen. Thus these

⁵⁵ Crook 255

⁵⁶ Crook 255

⁵⁷ Acts 25:8-12, NIV

⁵⁸ Crook 255

⁵⁹ Crook 256

two rights functioned as major incentives for peregrine communities and other individuals as they moved towards citizenship.

Citizens had a few duties towards Rome, one of which being compulsory military service. All free inhabitants, in all of Rome's dominions, were liable for military service.⁶⁰ The compulsory levy was used as late as the first century AD, but by that time, the numbers had become a bit murky as the levy was also used to sweep up happy volunteers.⁶¹ Additionally, citizens were taxed differently from non-citizens. They, and no one else, had to pay an estate tax, yet they often enjoyed the significant boon that only non-Italic land was taxed.⁶² To a populace who remembered the strict citizenry requirements for Spartans, these citizenship duties must have seemed like a delightfully light burden.

Roman citizenship offered benefits to those of all social classes. Roman peasants, if they fell under the military levy, served in the legions, which were significantly better equipped and considered more prestigious than the auxiliary units. If a Roman man married a female slave, he could be confident that he would pass on the citizenship to his children—thus he felt free to marry whoever he liked. Peasants would also have felt themselves at an advantage due to Rome's occasionally-favorable tax structure towards citizens and through the fact that their citizenship often qualified them for social programs like the redistribution of public land. Middle-class Romans enjoyed all these benefits and added to them the ability to trade and grow wealthy through commerce,

⁶⁰ Crook 256

⁶¹ Crook 256

⁶² Crook 257

enabled by the right of *commercium*. Aristocratic Romans used their citizenship to stand for public office and vote regularly in assemblies. And, of course, those who had aspirations of climbing through the social ranks found their way smoothed in advance by their citizenship status. In a world complicated by questions of legal status, Roman citizenship granted an elegantly simple solution of nominally complete personal benefits.

CHAPTER THREE

The Italian Peninsula: Development

After the Punic War, Rome had slowly spread her authority and influence over the Italian peninsula. By 186 BC, Italy consisted of many small states that were ruled to one extent or another by Rome.⁶³ These states were divided along ethnic and cultural lines, but those lines increasingly had thinned as communities became Hellenized and Romanized. They were divided from one another as well as from Rome. While the name “Italy” had always been a geographical expression, it was only during the Social War that a unified concept of *Italia* arose to fight Rome’s authority.⁶⁴

The process of Romanization within Italy was a slow process, involving give and take and acculturation from both sides. Italy was significantly impacted by Hellenistic culture, which transfigured over time into Roman culture. Eventually, while communities still clung to their cultural legacies, they were often essentially identical to Rome in form and function.⁶⁵ Webster argued for the framework of creolization to be applied to the current scholarship, as creolization accounts for the diverse levels of acculturation throughout both social strata and time.⁶⁶ All further discussion of Romanization should

⁶³ 186 BC is the date of the Bacchic affair.

⁶⁴ Syme, Ronald. *The Roman Revolution*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 286

⁶⁵ David, *The Roman Conquest of Italy*, 140

⁶⁶ Webster, Jane. “Creolizing the Roman Provinces.” *American Journal of Archaeology* 105, no. 2 (2001): 209–25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/507271>.

be viewed through Webster's framework of creolization—while generalizations are helpful, it is necessary to remember that there are always exceptions to any rule.

Military service acted as a key method of Romanization within the Italian peninsula. The allies (or *socii*) in Italy typically supplied most of the war effort the Romans needed in order to pursue their conquests.⁶⁷ They gave more men over to the military levy than the Romans, and then paid their own soldiers through taxation. Since the third Macedonian War, Roman citizens were exempt from this taxation.⁶⁸ A *socius* was bound to assist Rome in any war Rome chose, even if their own interest was not at stake in the conflict.⁶⁹ This dynamic blurred the lines between the individual polities and Rome while making them constantly and keenly aware that a *socius* was always unequal to an actual Roman citizen. While the Romans, of course, felt comfortable with this dynamic, as they had an entire peninsula full of people who would fund Roman wars while remaining in a less expensive or politically demanding sub-citizen status, it led to an increasing feeling of uncomfortable *otherness* in the rest of Italy.⁷⁰ The *socii* increasingly resented their involvement in fights which did not concern them.⁷¹ In some ways, this dynamic parallels the tensions within the American Revolutionary War, with one side feeling themselves to be culturally identical, yet curiously disenfranchised from their contemporaries.

⁶⁷ David, 140.

⁶⁸ David, 140.

⁶⁹ Sherwin-White 114

⁷⁰ David 141.

⁷¹ Syme 287

If the *socii* had been significantly culturally and religiously distinct from Rome, their natural response to this dilemma might have been to remove themselves from the equation. They could have broken their bonds of allyship with Rome, perhaps made alliances with other *socii*, and asserted their independence. And, of course, some communities did during the Social War. While Rome's superior military ability discouraged such a response, the cultural and religious integration, coupled with political interdependence, *ensured* that when it did, the Italian revolution was limited to only some parts of the peninsula. The *socii* did not always want to separate themselves from their Roman company.

One deeply strange episode in Roman history, that of the Bacchanalia of 186 BC, shows that the Romans, either by luck or by skill, had achieved cultural dominance in their peninsula. The year before had contained a portent of doom. The Roman Games, staged by Publius Cornelius Cethegus and Aulus Postumius Albinus, had been a general success, but a poorly secured beam in the circus had fallen over and knocked down the statue of Pollentia.⁷² While the organizers extended the games by a day, along with putting up two new statues of Pollentia covered with gold overlay, Rome remained full of tension.⁷³ Rome was a deeply superstitious state, even during the Empire, and put great stock in these kinds of omens and portents.⁷⁴

In the year following, the consuls Spurius Postumius Albinus and Quintus Marcus Philippus, having been warned by the portent, quickly turned their attention from

⁷² Livy 39.9

⁷³ Pollentia was the goddess of power, might, and victory.

⁷⁴ Syme 256

the affairs of foreign war to the affairs of internal stability. The episode began when an *ignobilis Graecus* arrived at Etruria and proceeded to spread the Bacchic cult over all of Italy.⁷⁵ Livy tells us that *huius mali labes ex Etruria Romam veluti contagione morbi penetravit*.⁷⁶ The actual rites of the Bacchic cults, allegedly dark, evil things, were known only to the initiated and were thus deeply threatening to the Roman aristocracy. Rumors spread about the actual content of the nightly rites, suggesting they included violence, sexual abuse, and occasionally murder. Not only would such rituals be immoral and worrisome, the mystery and covert nature of the meetings provided the perfect opportunity for any type of political scheming to take place. Naturally, this state of affairs would not do. Once the matter was brought to their attention, the consuls acted quickly and with force. Livy writes that

Edici praeterea in urbe Roma et per totam Italiam edicta mitti, ne quis qui Bacchis initiatus esset coisse aut convenisse sacrorum causa velit, neu quid talis rei divinae fecisse.⁷⁷

The Senate assigned the two consuls the special power to root out and punish those who had taken part in the Bacchanalia. The prostitute Hispala who had originally raised the alarm was granted the high honor of Roman citizenship for her service.⁷⁸ As

⁷⁵ It is important to note that while the Bacchic episode has quite a bit to do with the increase of cultural Hellenism in Italy and resulting Roman fears of Greek culture, it also shows clearly that Italy, to some extent, was religiously and culturally united and that Rome set the tone for that culture. Here, the Roman people themselves are the primary driving force behind the Bacchic cults, and the Roman authorities are the primary mitigating influences.

⁷⁶ Livy 39.9. All translations of Livy are taken from Yardley and Heckel. "This pernicious scourge made its way from Etruria to Rome like a spreading infection."

⁷⁷ Livy 39.14. "A proclamation was also to be made in the city of Rome, with edicts sent out the length of Italy, forbidding anyone who had been initiated in the Bacchic rites to hold religious gatherings or assemblies."

⁷⁸ Livy 39.19

the summons went out to the offenders, panic swept the Italian peninsula, and all centers of Bacchic worship were demolished, first in Rome and then throughout Italy.⁷⁹

The incident of the Bacchanalia proves that Italy was not significantly culturally or religiously divided by 186, so much so that Roman authorities considered themselves cultural and moral guardians of Rome first and Italy second.⁸⁰ The Italians were closer to being Romans than they ever were before. They simply lacked the legitimacy of the legal title *civis*.

Rome had begun to usurp the functions of a central government in Rome by the second century.⁸¹ Events like the Bacchic episode or the quasi-regular slave rebellions necessitated large-scale responses from Roman authorities or military commanders.⁸² In emergency circumstances, there was no time for questions of authority to be asked; Rome began to collect more and more power as the allies grew increasingly discomforted at their shrinking power base.⁸³ The Senate worked through local authorities to preserve local formalities while hiding the fact that Italian communities were becoming gradually municipalized.⁸⁴

Inch by inch, Rome's authority crept over Italy. Economic structures increasingly fell under the sway of Rome. Evidence of this can be found in small archeological details.

⁷⁹ Livy 39.17

⁸⁰ David 142

⁸¹ Sherwin-White 120

⁸² David 141

⁸³ David 141

⁸⁴ Sherwin-White 120

Coins no longer bore the inscription “Roma.”⁸⁵ Previously, when Italy had many competing forms of currency, it was a necessary distinction; now, Roman coinage was universally used and there was no need to remark on its Roman origin.⁸⁶ Eventually, during the Social War, the Italian faction would mark their coins in response: *Italia*.⁸⁷

Migrations added to the social tensions of this period. The Punic Wars had simultaneously enriched Rome and displaced and depreciated other Italian peoples.⁸⁸ The lower classes everywhere felt this the hardest, as small landholdings were among those most often collected and assimilated into the *ager publicus* after the Punic Wars and peasant communities were left defenseless against the encroachment of rich, powerful aristocrats bent on profit-making.⁸⁹ There was a rural exodus, too, that significantly weakened the old economic and agricultural systems. Many people left central Italy for Cisalpine Gaul (where they could benefit from potential future land distribution) or to other Roman dominated areas in the Mediterranean.⁹⁰ Rome was a popular destination, growing from about 200,000 at the end of the third century to a figure approaching 1 million by the end of the first.⁹¹ As the lower classes either deserted or were pushed out of their traditional landholdings, opportunistic aristocrats moved into their spaces, often

⁸⁵ David 97

⁸⁶ David 97

⁸⁷ Syme 87

⁸⁸ David 74

⁸⁹ David 94

⁹⁰ David 95

⁹¹ David 95

through the *municipa*.⁹² Local dynasts increasingly became taken up, adopted into, and eclipsed by Roman patricians.⁹³

The displacement caused by this rural exodus led to dangerous population trends. As Italy grew more urbanized, the countryside was faced with an influx of slave labor.⁹⁴ Naturally there were skilled workers; carpenters, estate stewards, and wine makers. Yet there was also a new supply of pure brute force slave laborers, prisoners taken by conquest who would live out their lives working underneath the landowners lucky enough to procure their labor.⁹⁵ These slave laborers failed to become integrated with wider Roman culture and largely kept their own language, religion, and political models.⁹⁶ This lack of social integration helped lead to the many slave rebellions, which occurred regularly all over the peninsula, even though there were no real prospects of their success. Interestingly, freemen often joined the rebellions. A freeman who would choose to take part in a slave rebellion was someone who felt displaced and marginalized from their own traditional community. As we see the number of freemen who participated in slave revolutions gradually increase in the late Republican period, we might correlate that phenomenon to the increasing breakdown of traditional social structures and norms in places where Rome's influence was beginning to be all-powerful; places like Latium, Campania, Sicily, coastal Etruria, and the whole of southern Italy.⁹⁷

⁹² David 97

⁹³ Syme 84

⁹⁴ David 96

⁹⁵ David 96

⁹⁶ David 96

⁹⁷ David 97

Social change created by Rome's influence created a 'mob class' all over Italy, one that was connected only to itself, and that could erupt into uncontrolled violence at any moment. Having no cultural, economic, or religious tie to Rome's new world order, these displaced populations began to represent a serious political problem.⁹⁸ From the cast-offs of society like the 'mob class' to the increasingly dissatisfied *socii* leaders, cultural changes throughout Italy left many desiring the secure foundation of legal protections found in Rome.

In some ways, this Rome paralleled the Rome which existed just before the writing of the Twelve Tables—a world rife with tension, struggling to reconcile class conflict, and looking to potential legal change as the means to bring order to Italy. Into it men like the Gracchi stepped, seeing an opportunity to exert change.

⁹⁸ David 97

CHAPTER FOUR

Rising Political Tensions and The Gracchi

Italy's political tensions did not go unnoticed by politicians. The two Gracchi, living in the second century BC, were some of the first immensely successful Roman politicians to capitalize on the immense power of the people by shifting the state towards populism. Through their efforts, both the Roman populace and the masses of Italy became powerful forces to reckon with. Ultimately, this hastened the coming of the Social Wars. The two brothers, Tiberius and Gaius, were born to a respectable and powerful family. Their father, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, had undergone the typical gauntlet of important positions (censor, and augur, and twice consul). Their mother, Cornelia, was the daughter of Scipio Africanus, and a brilliant politician in her own right. Tiberius was a political generation older than Gaius—Plutarch attributes their political defeats to their lack of political synchronicity—and had been killed for his political machinations by the time Gaius was twenty.⁹⁹

In 133 Tiberius, then tribune of the plebs, enacted an agrarian law. In order to rebuild the Roman peasant classes who formed the primary recruitment pool for the military by supporting their livelihoods, he restricted ownership of the *ager publicus* to 500 jugera, with the addition of 250 per child.¹⁰⁰ The surplus areas would be redistributed to deserving colonists. This law was deeply unpopular in the Italian communities. The

⁹⁹ Plutarch, *Life of Tiberius Gracchus* 3

¹⁰⁰ David 144

ager publicus had been nominally confiscated after the Second Punic War from those who had aided Hannibal.¹⁰¹ Yet, generally, the holders of the *ager publicus* remained Italians who had had these lands in their possession oftentimes for generations.¹⁰² To enrich poor Roman citizens, Rome chose to take from Italian communities that often needed the resources from the *ager publicus*.¹⁰³ By enacting this law, Rome sent a clear message about the superiority of even the poorest Roman citizen over the most aristocratic member of the allies. The allies rose in frustrated defiance, calling in the Roman senator Scipio Aemilianus as their spokesman.¹⁰⁴ While the law was still passed, his advocacy helped for the consequences towards the Italian communities to be mitigated.¹⁰⁵ This contentious dynamic over the Gracchi's *ager publicus* proposal, and the proposals that came afterwards, inflamed the tensions and feelings of inequality that lead to the Social Wars.¹⁰⁶

Of course, the Gracchi were not the first to support social and political improvements for the peasants. Gaius' main political rival, Livius Drusus, also saw the impulse towards populism as a potent political tool. Plutarch notes that

ἀλλὰ ἐν μόνον, ὑπερβαλέσθαι τὸν Γάϊον ἡδονῇ καὶ χάριτι τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ, σπεύδων καὶ διαμιλλώμενος.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ David 144

¹⁰² David 144

¹⁰³ David 144

¹⁰⁴ Appian, *Civil Wars*, 1.19

¹⁰⁵ David 144

¹⁰⁶ David 145

¹⁰⁷ Plutarch, *Life of Gaius Gracchus*, 9.1. All translations of the *Roman Lives* taken from Robin Waterfield's translation. "Just like rival demagogues in comedy, the only thing he was concerned about was doing more than Gaius to gratify the whims of the masses."

To Plutarch, the political situation at the time of the Gracchi could best be categorized as a game of escalation. It had been simultaneously discovered that the people were a powerful political faction and that, so to speak, ‘it is easier to catch flies with honey than with vinegar.’ Thus, the winning politician was the one who promised the most benefits to the people. Plutarch notes, worried, that even the senate was prepared to compromise.¹⁰⁸

It was deeply politically convenient for Tiberius and Gaius to support the peasant classes. Of course, it was true that the life of a peasant was marked by poverty and hardship, and that the redistribution of land would certainly improve many Roman peasants’ quality of life. It was almost impossible for a peasant community, or an individual peasant, to defend themselves from an aristocrat bent on their own financial gain.¹⁰⁹ Yet, what’s more, this improvement would come via crippling the monetary sources of many high-level families dotted throughout Italy, giving the Gracchi and other Roman aristocrats a powerful political edge. While the two Gracchi brothers may have had genuine feelings of generosity towards the people, they were certainly products of the Gracchi family, which was known for being both powerful and power hungry throughout the generations. Cornelia raised her boys to desire significant political power, remarking that she wished to be known not by the excellence of her father, or her husband, but by her success in raising her sons and in being known as the mother of the Gracchi.¹¹⁰ By leaning into populism, the Gracchi solidified their political legacy.

¹⁰⁸ Plutarch, *Gaius* 32.11

¹⁰⁹ David 94

¹¹⁰ Plutarch, *Gaius* 4

By making such a concerted political effort to reach the peasants, and at such a high cost to the aristocratic Italian landowners, the Gracchi created a significant shift in Roman politics over the Italian peninsula.¹¹¹ Italy by this time was increasingly under the sway of the Hellenistic world, and the Hellenistic mindset taught that one of the key ways to display position and power in society was to be a public benefactor.¹¹² Most benefactors (i.e. local Italian aristocrats) typically built streets, towns, or monuments to showcase their power.¹¹³ In the small-scale aristocracies that covered much of Italy, the economic and social authority of the local aristocrat must have felt unshakable. Suddenly, after the passing of the agrarian law, the local scales of power were upended by a message from Rome. There was a good chance that individual peasants, if they were Roman citizens, could gain their own land. Not bread, not money, not admission to a festival—but the means to make their own living and start their own cycle of generational wealth. Rome acted as the most powerful benefactor of all, outranking all local aristocrats to redistribute precious land resources. This decision, dripping with casual authority, elevated Roman desires and Roman citizens far above the *socii*.¹¹⁴ Even the lowest member of Roman society, as a *civis Romanus*, knew now that they possessed a certain level of agency and power over even an aristocratic *socius*, if they happened to be lucky enough to gain the redistributed *ager publicus*.

¹¹¹ David 145

¹¹² David 113

¹¹³ David 115

¹¹⁴ David 145

Both the Gracchi brothers explicitly worked towards this populist shift that elevated Roman peasants above Italian aristocrats. Tiberius used his rhetoric to paint the people as the true wielders of power in Rome. After he passed his agrarian laws, Plutarch writes that he argued against his opponent Octavius, saying that “καὶ γὰρ ἕπατον καὶ δήμαρχον ὁμοίως ὁ δῆμος αἰρεῖται.”¹¹⁵ As for Gaius, Plutarch tells us that, at the height of his power, Gaius chose to speak while turned outwards, towards the forum and the people, while the precedent was for all public speakers to face the senate and the *comitium*.¹¹⁶ He adds that

καὶ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντων δημαγωγῶν πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον ἀφορώντων καὶ τὸ καλούμενον κομίτιον, πρῶτος τότε στραφεὶς ἔξω πρὸς τὴν ἀγορὰν δημηγορῆσαι, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὕτω ποιεῖν ἔξ ἐκείνου, μικρὰ παρεγκλίσει καὶ μεταθέσει σχήματος μέγα πρᾶγμα κινήσας καὶ μετενεγκὼν τρόπον τινὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐκ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας εἰς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὥς τῶν πολλῶν δέον, οὐ τῆς βουλῆς, στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς λέγοντας.¹¹⁷

Tiberius’ choice to speak these words ensured that they could not remain pure rhetoric. To argue publicly for the power of the people against the power of the aristocracy was to empower the people. Now, the balance of power was genuinely beginning to be disrupted all over Italy as it never had been done before.¹¹⁸ People were displaced, angry, and looking for change. It was the beginning of a new era of Roman politics. Plutarch

¹¹⁵ Plutarch, *Tiberius* 15. “It is the Roman people who elect both a consul and a tribune.”

¹¹⁶ Cicero disagrees, ascribing this change to C. Licinius Crassus, tribune in 145. *De Amicitia* 96

¹¹⁷ Life of Gaius 5 “By means of this slight change of angle and posture he raised some critical questions, and in a sense, with the implication that speakers should address the masses rather than the senate, shifted the whole constitution from an aristocratic to a democratic basis.”

¹¹⁸ Brunt 146

remarks that Tiberius' death marks the first time since the revolution against the monarchy that civil strife in Rome ended in bloodshed and the loss of citizens' lives.¹¹⁹

The Gracchi almost extended their vision of equality to the Italian peninsula at large. Tiberius announced in a speech that the Italians were the kinsmen of the Romans.¹²⁰ Gaius supported a scheme to give equal voting rights to the Latins, but it was found to be too offensive to succeed in the general tumult of politics.¹²¹ When Gaius' proposals were put to the vote, Rome was flooded with Italian people who supported his aims. Interestingly, this led to a significantly divisive episode in Roman politics. Plutarch writes that

ἔπεισεν ἡ βουλὴ τὸν ὕπατον Φάννιον ἐκβαλεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους πλὴν Ῥωμαίων ἅπαντας, γενομένου δὲ κηρύγματος ἀήθους καὶ ἀλλοκότου, μηδένα τῶν συμμάχων μηδὲ τῶν φίλων ἐν Ῥώμῃ φανῆναι περὶ τὰς ἡμέρας ἐκείνας.¹²²

Through this senatorial decree, Gaius' attempt to include the Italians served only to divide them further from the Romans. Faced with a potential legal reality where Romans and Latins were effectively identical, the senate realized that the current distinctions between citizen and non-citizen did matter significantly to Rome. The rising tensions of the pre-Social War period forced Rome to self-assess what mattered within the legal and cultural conceptions of citizenship. The senate didn't settle for a simple verbal or legal affirmation of status—instead, non-citizens were effectively humiliated by

¹¹⁹ Plutarch, *Tiberius* 20

¹²⁰ Sallust, *Histories* 1.14

¹²¹ Plutarch, *Gaius* 30.9

¹²² Plutarch, *Gaius* 12 “The senate persuaded the consul, Fannius, to expel from the city everyone who was not a Roman citizen. So the unusual, not to say extraordinary proclamation went out, forbidding any of Rome's allies and friends from showing their faces in Rome for the relevant period of time.”

their expulsion from the city. What's more, news of this occurrence must have traveled all over Italy, to say nothing of the significant population of Romans and Latins who experienced the effects of the proclamation firsthand in Rome. Whether the message was intended to be explicit or implicit, it compounded upon the message sent with the redistribution of the *ager publicus*: non-citizens had no real rights, and would be discarded if needed in favor of true Roman citizens. The Gracchi's efforts to empower and include the Latins in the Roman regime had backfired. Later on, Gaius would attempt to give the Italians identical voting rights as Roman citizens. Appian dates this effort after Gaius' re-election, either in the first year or the year following, about 122.¹²³ This proposal failed as well.

Of course, land distribution had been a typical Roman tool of government for centuries, with varying success. After the second Punic War, the veterans fighting under Scipio Africanus had received land. In 103 and 100, the tribune Appuleius Saturnius proposed agrarian laws that would also reward Marius' veterans.¹²⁴ Yet, the only places these veterans were offered were colonies in the provinces, particularly Africa and Corsica. Keeping the veterans separate from mainland Italy allowed them to be rewarded for their toils without overly disrupting Italian society.¹²⁵ Velleius Paterculus, a first century AD writer, noted that there were no colonies created by Rome at this earlier time period except for military colonies.¹²⁶ The innovative land reforms created by the Gracchi

¹²³ Appian, *BC* 1.23

¹²⁴ David 164

¹²⁵ David 164

¹²⁶ Herodotus 1.15.5

expanded the scope of possible land distribution from only veterans to citizens who were not decorated with any military service. The passive trait of citizenship status now became the essential characteristic above the actions or performance of the individual. The lands available, too, were now prized plots in Italy proper—prime choices of land, not colonial cast-offs. In the social hierarchies of the Italian peninsula, citizens were slowly rising in status. The truly terrifying aspect of this, to the propertied classes, was that many municipal aristocrats found themselves sympathetic to the plight of the oppressed classes.¹²⁷

The Gracchi's meddling in the power dynamics of the Italian peninsula alarmed their peers. Tiberius was killed before he could be really successful. But Gaius passed his laws, and the consul Opimius ultimately repealed them. It was in that debacle that Gaius' fate grew tragic. He was summoned to the Senate, to defend his case. Everyone knew that it was a summons to his own death. Gaius refused to go, sending his son as a herald. Yet his enemies protested, and insisted he appear in person.¹²⁸ Gaius agreed, and signed his own death-warrant. He was attacked on the way, and ultimately opted to be killed by his slave Philocrates rather than be killed by his political enemies.¹²⁹

The Senate knew then just what we know now: the social forces the Gracchi put in motion were new, powerful, and ultimately unstoppable. The Gracchi managed to awaken and disturb two significant forces within Rome: populist tensions within Roman

¹²⁷ Syme 89

¹²⁸ Plutarch, *Gaius* 16

¹²⁹ Allegedly, his head was then cut off by the mob and found to weigh 17 ⅔ lbs. The mob found out the weight of his head because a proclamation had gone out that anyone who brought Gaius' or Fulvius' head back would receive its weight in gold. The head was so heavy because Gaius' brain had been extracted and molten lead had been poured in. Plutarch, *Gaius* 38.17

politics and unhappiness towards Rome within the *socii*. While their contribution to the Social War is rather straightforward—they used the legitimate complaints and fears of the *socii* as a political tool, simultaneously poking at their wounds and leaving them unbandaged—the connection between their populist tendencies and the Social War is more subtle. Yet by sending an ideological message within Rome, the Gracchi sent it all over Italy. If the Roman populace felt empowered to raise their voices and demand the fulfillment of their political wishes, Rome was one step closer to seeing the individual as the primary political unit. The Gracchi were directly responsible for the idealization of the peasant farmer (rich in moral and military excellence, if not profit) that would be lauded in works like Virgil's *Georgics*.¹³⁰ As the aristocrats increased their power, they lost their popularity.¹³¹

As the Roman populace demanded better treatment, so did the *socii*. Roman politicians who were concerned with managing and mitigating populist tensions would have been too distracted to turn their attention to the rising tensions throughout Italy. After the Social War and the resulting incorporation of the Italian communities, Rome would be much more careful regarding tensions related to citizenship as she navigated her role of authority throughout the empire. The quest to raise up Roman peasants and equalize Roman citizens had brought an uncomfortable awareness of greater divisions. The title of Roman citizen had been redefined to be more powerful than ever before. And this meant that to be a *civis Romanus* was to be one of the most desired statuses in the ancient world.

¹³⁰ Syme 451

¹³¹ Syme 451

CHAPTER FIVE

The Social War

Like all the best wars, it started with an assassination. The Social War was the flame that the Gracchi had lit decades prior, the culmination of ethnic argument, and ultimately, the beginning of the end for the Roman Republic, as it catapulted ruthless conquerors like Sulla into social and military power. It solidified the power of the aristocrats across Italy, it unified Italian culture, and made the peninsula into a vast monolithic being governed by an increasingly dwindling selection of oligarchs.

In 91 Marcus Livius Drusus, the plebeian tribune for that year, was assassinated. Scholars traditionally date the war's beginning to his assassination.¹³² Livy (writing very closely in time to the Social War) gives his account thus:

M. Livius Drusus tribunus plebis, quo maioribus viribus senatus causam susceptam tueretur, socios et Italicos populos spe civitatis Romanae sollicitavit; iisque adjuvantibus per vim legibus agrariis frumentariisque latis iudiciariam quoque pertulit, ut aequa parte iudicia penes senatum et equestrem ordinem essent. cum deinde promissa sociis civitas praestari non posset, irati Italici defectionem agitare coeperunt. eorum coetus coniurationesque et orationes in consiliis principum referuntur. propter quae Livius Drusus invisus etiam senatui factus velut socialis belli auctor, incertum a quo domi occisus est. Italici populi defecerunt Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Samnites, Lucani.¹³³

¹³² David 149

¹³³ Livy 71-72. Marcus Livius Drusus, the plebeian tribune, in order the more effectually to support the senate in their pretensions, gained the concurrence of the allies, and the Italian states, by promising them the freedom of the city [citizenship]. Aided by them, besides the Agrarian and corn laws, he carried that also relative to criminal jurisdiction;—that in capital prosecutions the senate should have equal authority with the equestrian order. It was afterwards found that the freedom which he had promised could not be conferred upon them; which incensed and incited them to revolt. An account is given of their assembling,—their combinations and speeches made at their meetings, by the chief men among them. Drusus becoming obnoxious even to the senate, on account of his conduct in this affair, and being considered as the cause of the social war, was slain in his own house, by an unknown hand. The Italian states, the Picentians, Vestinians, Marcians Pelignians, Marrucinians, Samnites, and Lucanians, revolted, the war commencing with the Picentians.

Drusus engaged in the same type of political rhetoric that the Gracchi made so very popular: incredibly ambitious promises to the people coupled by the use of the allies and the Italian states as political bludgeons. He promised citizenship to all the Italians, probably to increase his own political standing.¹³⁴ Then, quickly, Drusus was slain, and the peninsula slipped into the civil war that had been brewing for some time.

The war was generally fought along community lines. Tribes as a whole revolted across Italy, with some of the most contentious fighters being in central and southern Italy, where the negative consequences of the Second Punic War had been most serious.¹³⁵ While there is no clear academic consensus as to why some tribes rebelled while others chose to side with Rome, the two major deciding factors seem to be past poor treatment by Roman authorities and current happiness with a community's relationship with Rome.¹³⁶ Tribes fought as whole units on their chosen side, with scholars finding no clear signs of internal division.¹³⁷ Interestingly, none of the Latin colonies revolted, as the majority of their aristocrats already enjoyed Roman citizenship via magistracies.¹³⁸ Being the most privileged members of the Confederation, they were the best prepared for Roman absorption.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ David 149

¹³⁵ David 150

¹³⁶ David 149

¹³⁷ Sherwin-White 127

¹³⁸ David 149

¹³⁹ Sherwin-White 128

Historically, some allies had respectfully refused the offer of Roman citizenship. The Praenestians who had fought valiantly against Hannibal, for example, preferred to remain in their own ethnic identity and simply consider themselves to be friends to the Romans.¹⁴⁰ In a society that valued ethnic and cultural ties, citizenship could be seen as a type of cultural transplantation that was ultimately unwelcome. Even during the Social War, when citizenship was granted to allied communities who had remained loyal, Naples and Heraclea questioned if such a change of status was necessary.¹⁴¹ Occasionally there were clauses in treaties to Roman allies that Rome bar their members from seeking Roman citizenship without the prior authorization of their home state. (Migration from any given state to Rome both affected the local economy poorly and made it difficult for states to meet military quotas.) Rome was only too happy to oblige, since an influx of new Roman citizens would send shockwaves through the delicate political system that was the political and cliental equilibrium.¹⁴² Conscious separation from Rome, for many states, was seen as a good.

When the Italians demanded better treatment, their initial goal was not citizenship. It seems more likely that they wanted to be free of their fears of increased Roman oppression more than they desired to be incorporated as equals into the Roman body.¹⁴³ While the autonomy of Italian communities was generally respected by Rome, government had become increasingly centralized at Rome, in part because the only court

¹⁴⁰ David 145

¹⁴¹ David 150

¹⁴² David 150

¹⁴³ David 142

that could settle disputes between communities was Rome's.¹⁴⁴ Roman magistrates had committed abuses of power, introducing a fear that the Italian *socii* were not protected against Roman authority.¹⁴⁵ The allies wanted, too, equality of treatment and equality of opportunity in Rome's world order—the world order that they had sacrificed their young men for as soldiers in Rome's army.¹⁴⁶ Yet in many ways, from Rome's point of view, the allies were not only justified, but prepared, to receive the citizenship.¹⁴⁷ They fought with Rome and conducted their public affairs like Rome; for many years, in a way, they had been Rome's pupils.¹⁴⁸

From the beginning, the right of appeal, the *ius provocationis*, was considered as a good alternative to enfranchisement. The Italian peoples were ruled by Roman magistrates who had unchecked and undivided power. Just as the military levy was universal, so too was the oppression offered by local magistracies. The right of appeal could have relieved much of this tension and kept many Italians happy as disenfranchised Roman allies. Yet, as time went on, such a compromise began to be no longer possible. Sherwin-White articulates this best, saying

Although the champions of the allies ended by proposing their complete enfranchisement, they showed in the development of their policy that they knew that neither side regarded this as the ideal solution, and that there was a time when the Italians might have been better satisfied with a great deal less.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴ David 142

¹⁴⁵ David 143

¹⁴⁶ Sherwin-White 126

¹⁴⁷ Sherwin-White 121

¹⁴⁸ Sherwin-White 121

¹⁴⁹ Sherwin-White 129

Thus the citizenship itself began to be considered as the guarantee of equality for the allies. Rome had waited too long to offer a compromise; it was to be either the citizenship or nothing. After the Social War, Rome was forced from necessity to adjust the Roman conception of citizenship to the allied conception of citizenship.¹⁵⁰ Rome learned these lessons well; within the Empire, she kept a tight grip on the concept and distribution of citizenship.

Rome settled the questions of the Social War by fighting for about three years and re-conquering the entire peninsula. Veillius Paterclus wrote of the Roman approach to this problem, saying

Finito ex maxima parte, nisi quae Nolani belli manebant reliquiae, Italico bello, quo quidem Romani uictis adflictisque ipsi exarmati, quam integris uniuersis, ciuitatem dare maluerunt, consulatum inierunt Q. Pompeius et L. Cornelius Sulla.¹⁵¹

After subjugating the Italians and emphasizing the ultimate superiority and dominance of Rome, Rome offered all of them citizenship. Rome granted citizenship to the entire Italian peninsula, community by community. The *lex Julia* granted citizenship to Latins and other allies who stayed loyal, the *lex Plautia Papiria* extended the grants of citizenship, and the *lex Pompeia* gave Latin rights to the Latin colonies in Cisalpine Gaul.¹⁵² Latin and allied states were fully incorporated and generally uniform by 80 at the latest.¹⁵³ This sweeping incorporation of communities into Roman citizenship would

¹⁵⁰ Sherwin-White 130

¹⁵¹ Veillius Paterclus 2.17.1, With the Italian war for the greatest part finished, except the remnants of the Nolan war which still remained, a war in which indeed the Romans preferred to give the citizenship to the conquered and shattered, being themselves disarmed, than (to give it) to them all without exception when they were untouched, Q. Pompeius and L. Cornelius Sulla entered the consulship.

¹⁵² David 152

¹⁵³ Sherwin-White 141

prove to be a rarity within future Roman political strategy of the next few hundred years, as future citizens would often come via individual grants. But for the lucky Italians, they could now say with delight that they, too, were *cives Romani*.

CHAPTER SIX

Municipal Aristocracies

The cultural unification and solidification of Roman authority that led to the Social War occurred via Rome's most potent weapon: the municipal aristocracy structure found all over the peninsula.¹⁵⁴ Webster's framework of creolization should be applied here to better understand how municipal aristocracies gradually acculturated communities. Cultural Hellenization had played a large initial role in unifying the Italian peoples culturally and furthering the municipal aristocracy structure during the third century BC.¹⁵⁵ By the Ciceronian age, there was considerable development of the municipal system.¹⁵⁶ Eventually, Rome would use elements of the Italian municipal aristocracy structure to replicate the Romanization process all over the empire.

After the Social War, the old tribes were simply developed into *municipa*. Bispham defines *municipa* as "communities which functioned as autonomous administrative units within the Roman state."¹⁵⁷ For example, the tribe of the Marrucini became the barely-distinct Teate.¹⁵⁸ Although the *lex Calpurnia* provided for the creation of two new tribes, it was never actually carried out.¹⁵⁹ Scholars guess that there was some

¹⁵⁴ David 97

¹⁵⁵ David 52

¹⁵⁶ Sherwin-White 140

¹⁵⁷ Bispham 1

¹⁵⁸ Sherwin-White 134

¹⁵⁹ Sherwin-White 133

general law that constructed either the details or the principles of the municipal reorganization, but none has yet been found.¹⁶⁰ After the communities voted to accept Rome's authority, their legal structure changed to reflect their new status.

Rome had found ways to exert significant amounts of influence on her allies over the years without the need for explicit legal change. Sherwin-White has outlined three methods by which the Roman government brought various communities under their control.¹⁶¹ First, original charters of the *liberi* were expansive and often included general provisions that the community would be subject to future laws or *senatus consulta* coming from Rome. Second, both *liberi* and *foederati* were influenced by the establishment of Roman provinces; even the more privileged of Roman subjects found their perceived advantages slipping away from them over the years. Third, the Romans primarily operated with a powerful tool of manipulation: advice. The Roman predisposition towards advice can be seen most clearly in the later letters to the provinces. Take, for example, Augustus' letter to Cnidos, where he writes, "I think you would do well if you followed my advice about this."¹⁶² Advice is a subtle political tool, and thus it is quieter on the pages of history than a bombastic military victory coupled with immediate subjugation, but it is no less powerful.

Rome used these tools in the municipal aristocracies found all over the Italian peninsula through one of Rome's fundamental political frameworks, that of the patron-client system. The ancient world had a conception no longer popular—the *clientela*.

¹⁶⁰ Sherwin-White 133

¹⁶¹ Sherwin-White 161-162

¹⁶² Sherwin-White 162

Patrons gave money and political support to their clients, who in return promised political loyalty. Saller formulated three conditions of the institution of Roman patronage: (1) reciprocal exchange; (2) the existence of a personal relationship; and (3) asymmetry, as opposed to friendship between equals.¹⁶³ Patron-client relationships intensified their nature as a key political framework after the Social War.¹⁶⁴ What this meant in practice was that one family or one man rose to power as the ‘public benefactor’ of an area, powerful, honored, and occasionally beloved. A patron of a city would support the arts, donate money to create public buildings, and throw public festivals at his own expense. He gave his fellow-citizens access to wealth, war booty, business connections, and the *ager publicus*.¹⁶⁵ In many ways, he was the backbone of the local state. An aristocrat would have been part of a powerful, rich family, benefiting from and furthering the family name.

These aristocrats did not confine their dealings to their own local municipalities. They had to get their money and connections from somewhere, and that somewhere was Rome. Complex hierarchies formed all over Italy. A local aristocrat had his own complicated web of local clients and privileges, which he, spider-like, presided over with complete power and attention to detail. Then, he would visit Rome or be visited by Roman aristocrats, where he would find his own patron and take his place as a client. The clever municipal aristocrat was constantly solicited by Roman politicians, as he could

¹⁶³ Saller 49

¹⁶⁴ David 172

¹⁶⁵ David 130

sway the policy of his city, influence entire regions of Italy, or even raise an army if necessary.¹⁶⁶

The beauty of the municipal aristocracy system was that it harnessed interpersonal competition as an engine towards Romanization. Within a given community or city, powerful individuals competed for dominance by acting as patrons. Especially after the initial granting of *municipa* status, local authorities could find themselves gaining immense power by acting as agents for change.¹⁶⁷ Yet, any individual who wished to become dominant had to gain a Roman patron and become a client himself. For an aristocrat to successfully gain this patron-client relationship in Rome, he would have had to adhere to Rome's model of aristocratic behavior. Thus, throughout Italy, powerful figures raced other figures to Romanize themselves and their communities quickest and most powerfully. While many chose to stay, contented, as the head of a *municipa*, more ambitious types built up large estates by grabbing up control of land.¹⁶⁸

It was essential for a man who wished to be well spoken in Rome to be trained in the art of rhetoric. The study of rhetoric changed Roman intellectual culture significantly. It allowed—and forced—its pupil to intellectually question ideas about tradition, government, and citizenship. As David puts it, “[Rhetoric] was simultaneously the source of morality and knowledge.”¹⁶⁹ Thinkers and jurists no longer felt comfortable using logical syllogisms about the relationship between man and the gods. They began to think more about the principles of human nature and justice that were easily observable in the

¹⁶⁶ Syme 82

¹⁶⁷ Sherwin-White 135

¹⁶⁸ Syme 14

¹⁶⁹ David 122

natural world. This philosophical upheaval led to the possibility of other types of social upheavals. With tradition no longer serving as the untouchable sacred goddess of Roman intellectual life, anything might happen. And with local aristocrats being trained in the art of rhetoric to perform well in Rome, this feeling of cultural change began to slowly trickle throughout all of Italy.¹⁷⁰

It became popular for aristocrats to embark on agricultural enterprise. Leaders like Cato the Elder and M. Terentius Varro wrote influential agronomy manuals, which promised to offer the reader ways to manage properties in a way which maximized efficiency and profit.¹⁷¹ Archeological research tells us that the stamped wine-bottles found all over Italy with the marks of their makers proves many aristocrats had wine-making empires.¹⁷² Members of the senatorial aristocracy were almost exclusively the beneficiaries of the booming wine trade, and they added their wine profits to their other agricultural spoils.¹⁷³ Naturally there remained many small farmers throughout Italy.¹⁷⁴ Yet as aristocrats, like Seneca and the ‘debauched grammarian’ Q. Remmius Palaemon were noted for the fabulously wealth gained through their trades, they began to depend more and more on the *municipa* structure.¹⁷⁵

Roman social mores also spread through the patron-client relationship. Among the aristocratic classes of Rome, derision was commonly directed towards those from the

¹⁷⁰ David 122

¹⁷¹ David 92, Syme 247

¹⁷² David 93

¹⁷³ David 93

¹⁷⁴ Syme 450

¹⁷⁵ Syme 451

peninsula who could not correctly fit in with proper Roman culture, either because of their lack of manners, good breeding, or wealth. Catullus satirized a man named Arrius, who desperately wanted to appear more sophisticated, but whose Greek accent brought him nothing but embarrassment:

"Chommoda" dīcēbat, sī quandō "commoda" vellet
dicere, et "īnsidiās" Arrius "hinsidiās".
et tum mīrificē spērābat sē esse locūtum,
cum quantum poterat dīxerat "hinsidiās".
Crēdō, sīc māter, sīc līber avunculus eius,
sīc māternus avus dīxerat atque avia.
Hōc missō in Syriam requiērant omnibus aurēs:
audībant eadem haec lēniter et leviter,
nec sibi postilla metuēbant tālia verba,
cum subitō affertur nuntius horribilis,
"Īoniōs" fluctūs, postquam illūc Arrius isset,
iam nōn Īoniōs esse sed "Hīoniōs".¹⁷⁶

If Catullus' poem is any indication, the upper classes in Rome did not hesitate to use mockery as a vicious weapon to ensure conformity. Romans had always been, and would continue to be, deeply hesitant about citizenship grants to outsiders. This often took the form of a bitter dislike of freedmen and foreigners.¹⁷⁷

Significant Roman honors were heaped upon those who managed to improve their towns. One inscription, which was raised to the Alatri around the end of the second century, reads

¹⁷⁶ Catullus 84. "'Hadvantages", Arrius was saying, whenever he wished to say advantages
And ambush he was saying "hambush,"
And then he was hoping that he had spoken wonderfully
when he would say "hambush" as much as he was able;
I believe, thus his mother, thus his free uncle,
Thus his maternal grandfather and grandmother had said.
With this man having been sent into Syria, the ears of all had rested:
They were hearing the same things more softly and more lightly,
Nor afterwards were they themselves fearing such words,
When suddenly a horrible message is brought:
The Ionian waves, after Arrius had gone there,
Were now no longer Ionian but "Hionian."

¹⁷⁷ Syme 256

L. Betilienus Varus, son of Lucius, on the advice of the senate, has undertaken to have the following built: all the streets in the town, the portico giving access to the acropolis, the ground for the games, the clock, the market, the whitewashing of the basilica, the seats, the bathing pool, the reservoir near the gate, supplying water to the town by raising it to 340 feet high, he had the arches built and the water ducts strengthened. For all this, he was made censor for the second time, the senate decided that his son should be exempted from military service and the people offered him a statue and gave him the name Censorinus.¹⁷⁸

Varus had essentially reconstructed Atatri in a modern Hellenistic style on his own expense, and he had done so while listening to the advice of his benefactors, the senate. These types of building projects—motivated by thoughts of hierarchy and constructed in a Roman or Hellenistic style—functioned as a key way that the cultures of Italy became homogenized.¹⁷⁹

Politically, those who rose up from the provinces and attempted to engage in Roman politics faced significant obstacles. Those wishing to make a name for themselves in Rome often found themselves rebuffed. It would take a municipal family two to three generations to produce a consul or a prefect (and more often, they rose to power within the equestrian order).¹⁸⁰ By the time of Augustus, who aimed to make public life safe and attractive, generally only one son of a municipal family entered the senate.¹⁸¹ Even the notable Q. Marius was considered to have come from humble origins though his family had long been clients of the Metelli.¹⁸² Yet it was deeply tempting to jockey for political

¹⁷⁸ CIL, I 2nd edn, 1529 = ILS, 5348 = ILLRP, 528. David 114

¹⁷⁹ David 116

¹⁸⁰ Mouritsen 8

¹⁸¹ Syme 359

¹⁸² Plutarch, *Marius* 4

positions. Those who emerged victorious were considered to be lured by ambition and profit and deeply corrupt and subservient.¹⁸³

Key families slowly amassed municipal loyalty after municipal loyalty, exponentially gaining power until they owned large swaths of Italy. As being a patron of municipal aristocrats was a hugely beneficial way for a Roman family to increase their business and cultural acumen, many notable families did so as much as possible. Eventually, this practice would spread to the provinces as noble families sought clients overseas.¹⁸⁴

While there were significant cultural pressures on aristocrats who desired to merge their behavior with the Roman ideal, Rome did not rush individual communities, who often still clung lovingly to their own culture, to embrace Romanization. Instead, the doctrine of *communis patria Roma* came forth.¹⁸⁵ Its first real articulator, Cicero, wrote of it thus

Ego mehercule et illi et omnibus municipibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam naturae, alteram ciuitatis: ut ille Cato, quom esset Tusculi natus, in populi Romani ciuitatem susceptus est, ita, quom ortu Tusculanus esset, ciuitate Romanus, habuit alteram loci patriam, alteram iuris... Sed necesse est caritate eam praestare e qua rei publicae nomen uniuersae ciuitatis est, pro qua mori et cui nos totos dedere et in qua nostra omnia ponere et quasi consecrare debemus. Dulcis autem non multo secus est ea quae genuit quam illa quae excepit.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Syme 360

¹⁸⁴ Syme 74

¹⁸⁵ Sherwin-White 134

¹⁸⁶ Cicero, *De Legibus* 2.2.5. Translation Sherwin-White. "I hold that all members of boroughs have two fatherlands, one in nature, one in the state. Even as the great Cato was born at Tusculum and received in to the community of the Roman people, so, though he was a Tusculan by origin, he was yet a Roman and had one local and one legal fatherland... We must prefer in affection that one which is called the state and the whole community, for which we must be ready to die, and to which we must surrender our whole being and in which we must place all our hopes, and to which we must consecrate all that is ours. But the fatherland which beget us is not much less beloved than that which adopted us."

Rome chose to take a paternal, welcoming approach to the new *municipa*. Tiberius Gracchus, a forerunner of this doctrine, had spoken of the Italians as kinsmen of the Romans.¹⁸⁷ Like a father with outstretched hands, Rome was happy to allow acculturation to come gradually. Romanization would come through individual enterprise, not through a heavy Roman hand.

While the changes that occurred in these municipal communities could certainly be called Romanization, in many ways they were primarily Hellenistic.¹⁸⁸ These cultural changes occurred slowly and gradually—a member of some municipal communities might not notice that significant change was occurring.¹⁸⁹ Romanization occurred through the municipal communities through the aristocrats themselves. Additionally, while sweeping statements like the ones contained in this section are helpful to gain a generalized understanding of a phenomenon, the municipal communities throughout Rome were diverse in both individual cultures and accurate historical record—scholars have a patchy understanding at best at how municipal aristocracies functioned.¹⁹⁰

The patron-client system installed within every municipal community within Rome at least one client whose personal interest lay in increasing Rome's influence and authority. This outsourced at least some of the business of Romanization to local authorities, making the desire to ultimately unite with Rome as fully Romanized citizens feel relatively organic. While Rome was not overly worried about fitting the *municipa* of Italy into the 'Roman mold', they slowly sculpted local communities into the Roman

¹⁸⁷ Appian 1.35

¹⁸⁸ Bispham 3.7

¹⁸⁹ Bispham 3.7

¹⁹⁰ Bispham 1

image. Eventually, as Rome turned her gaze abroad, she began to think more intentionally about how she might use the frameworks that she was already familiar with to expand the empire.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Cicero's Articulation of Roman Citizenship

Scholars often glean precious facts about Roman citizenship from the speeches of the most beloved of orators, Marcus Tullius Cicero. Cicero thought often about Roman culture and Roman law, and his powerful political position helped to disseminate his thoughts far. His rhetoric stretched beyond himself; Hanchey labeled him as ‘culture-fashioning.’¹⁹¹ By examining his two famous speeches on citizenship in close detail, namely, the *Pro Archia* and the *Pro Balbo*, we can gain a more focused understanding of Rome's approach to citizenship.

While the Romans settled the question of the Social War with the *Lex Julia* of 90, their legal solution led to a new host of interesting administrative problems.¹⁹² The law demolished the old stratified distinctions of Latins or *socii*, preferring to simplify the code with simply “citizen”. A new court, the *Decemviri stlitibus iudicandis*, exclusively oversaw court cases concerning citizenship and freedom status.¹⁹³ Now, to be a Roman citizen, one simply had to be born within qualifying Roman territory. Of course, citizenship was still offered as a prize to deserving individuals around the empire:

¹⁹¹ Hanchey, Daniel. "Typically unique: shared strategies in Cicero's *Pro Archia* and *Pro Balbo*." *The Classical Journal*, vol. 108, no. 2, Dec. 2012, pp. 159+. *Gale Academic OneFile*, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A353321058/AONE?u=txshracd2488&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=bc9929b. 183

¹⁹² For a cultural and historical parallel, see Plutarch's *Life of Romulus* 16.

¹⁹³ Cicero. *Pro Caelio. De Provinciis Consularibus. Pro Balbo*. Translated by R. Gardner. Loeb Classical Library 447. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958. 611

soldiers, poets, politicians, intellectuals. A few of these administrative questions appear in the court cases of Archias and Balbus argued by Cicero.

Cicero (103-43) was perhaps the most prolific and most successful orator ever to be produced by Rome.¹⁹⁴ A master of rhetoric, Cicero is best known for his many dramatic writings and speeches. Yet he personally found his strength to be in his powerful political career. Over time, he and his family built up an aristocratic network over the Italian peninsula until his influence stretched to staggering levels. Cicero helped thwart the Catilinarian conspiracy, receiving the honorific ‘*pater patriae*.’ During the writing of these speeches, he was at the height of his career. Afterwards, he found himself on the wrong side of Roman politics, eventually falling victim to an assassination attempt sponsored by Antony. His head and two hands were cut off and nailed to the *rostra* in a symbolic gesture that can only hint at the fear of his oratory power his opponents must have felt. Antony’s wife Fulvia could not content herself with this ignominious state of his body, desiring to place more shame on his legacy. She pulled out his tongue and jabbed it many times with a hat-pin.¹⁹⁵

. Though Cicero’s rhetorical aims colored his arguments extensively, Brunt has argued that Cicero remains a valuable historical source.¹⁹⁶ While Cicero should not be believed blindly—he had no qualms about simply ignoring counter-arguments, stretching the truth, or introducing novel ways of viewing a given situation—it must be remembered

¹⁹⁴ Petrarch certainly thought so; his love of Cicero’s writings are almost directly to blame for the revival of the classical tradition that led to the Renaissance.

¹⁹⁵ Dio 47.8.4

¹⁹⁶ Brunt, P. A. “The Legal Issue in Cicero, *Pro Balbo*.” *The Classical Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 1, 1982, pp. 136–47. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/638748>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2023.

that he was a powerful litigator who addressed assumedly rational listeners. Of course he played on cultural fears, hinted wildly at urban legends, and mentioned public affairs—scholars are glad he did, because the very inclusion of these rhetorical elements can show quite a bit to the observant historian. Yet if Cicero was constructing an entirely different reality than the one his listeners lived in, then he would simply lose his case. Cicero himself articulated his own strategies in his *De Oratore*, giving scholars insights into his rhetorical mode. Thus we can give Cicero a large helping of trust and legitimacy when it comes to basic facts about citizenship, law, public sentiment, and government machinations. Scholars even use Cicero's speeches to track developments of citizenship in the Greek world.¹⁹⁷

Cicero delivered his speech defense of the poet Archias in 62 BC. While this speech is primarily famous as a panegyric for the arts, it also provides concrete data for the study of citizenship.¹⁹⁸ Archias was connected to Pompey as a sort of “court poet,” as was the fashion of the day for aristocratic families. Meanwhile, L. Licinius Lucullus, who had returned to Rome in 64 after successfully campaigning in the East, searched for any way to do political battle with Pompey and the Pompeian faction. As Watts puts it, “The senatorial party looked to Lucullus to protect them against the encroachments of one [Pompey] who threatened to make himself a despot, and a sort of political guerilla broke

¹⁹⁷ Oliver, James H. "Civic Status in Roman Athens: Cicero, "Pro Balbo" 12.30." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1981, pp. 83. ProQuest, <http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/civic-status-roman-athens-cicero-pro-balbo-12-30/docview/1301491013/se-2>.

¹⁹⁸ Unfortunately for scholars, it does not provide very much data. Cicero's famous loquaciousness was not well aimed at the point of Archias' citizenship status on this occasion.

out between the partisans of each.”¹⁹⁹ And, so, the unfortunate poet Archias found himself in the crosshairs of the Lucullans.

At this time, Archias could either have gained his citizenship by inclusion under the *Lex Julia* of 90, or the *Lex Plautia Papiria* of 89, which granted citizenship to anyone who belonged to a city of Italy having treaty relations with Rome, was permanently resident in Italy, and reported himself to a praetor within sixty days of the passing of the law. It appears that on this occasion, he gained citizenship through the *Lex Plautia Papiria*.

The prosecution opted for a purely technical accusation. They attempted to expel Archias from Rome by using the *Lex Papia* of 65, which allowed for the expulsion of foreigners. This law was originally intended to allow for the mass deportation of foreign rioters, but in later times had evolved to simply be a rather nasty political weapon against individuals with shaky citizenship status. While Archias protested that he was a citizen, the prosecutor countered with the accusations that he had not fulfilled the requirements for citizenship, and additionally that there was no documentary evidence that Archias resided in Heraclea, nor was his name listed on the census-rolls of citizens. Thus Archias called upon Cicero.

Cicero’s response contained facts helpful to the historian about the political process of citizenship. To hear Cicero tell the story, it appears as if once the highly capable poet Archias desired he would pursue the attainment of Roman citizenship, it was a simple matter of getting approval from a few of his powerful Roman friends who recognized his skills. Cicero also notes that there are three requirements for one to

¹⁹⁹ Watts 3

acquire citizenship: 1) citizenship in an allied city 2) residence in Italy 3) an appearance before a praetor within 60 days of the publication of the statute.²⁰⁰ In terms of Archias' actual experience, Cicero writes that

Data est civitas Silvani lege et Carbonis, si qui foederatis civitatibus ascripti fuissent: si tum, cum lex ferebatur, in Italia domicilium habuissent et si sexaginta diebus apud praetorem essent professi. Cum hic domicilium Romae multos iam annos haberet, professus est apud praetorem Q. Metellum familiarissimum suum.²⁰¹

While the citizenship process was naturally complicated, Cicero argued that Archias was fully compliant with all the legal requirements.

The prosecutor's accusations tell us that there was an expectation for accurate record-keeping of individual names of citizens, even in different communities like Heraclea. Cicero's rebuttal honors the requirement for records, arguing that it was only through the unfortunate burning of the archives during the Social War that Archias did not appear on the proper documents.²⁰² Cicero also complains that many undeserving individuals appear on these lists, saying

Etenim cum mediocribus multis et aut nulla aut humili aliqua arte praeditis gratuito civitatem in Graecia homines impertiebant, Reginos credo aut Locrenses aut Neapolitanos aut Tarentinos, quod scaenicis artificibus largiri solebant, id huic summa ingenii praedito gloria noluisse! Quid? cum ceteri non modo post civitatem datam, sed etiam post legem Papiam aliquo modo in eorum

²⁰⁰ Cicero, *Pro Archias* 7

²⁰¹ Cicero, *Pro Archias* 7. All translations taken from Watts. "He was granted the franchise by the terms of the law of Silvanus and Carbo, which enacts "that all who have been admitted to citizenship in federate townships must have been resident in Italy at the time of the passing of the law, and must have reported themselves to the praetor within sixty days." My client had for many years resided at Rome, and reported himself duly to the praetor Quintus Metellus, who was his personal friend."

²⁰² Cicero. *Pro Archia. Post Reditum in Senatu. Post Reditum ad Quirites. De Domo Sua. De Haruspicum Responsis. Pro Plancio*. Translated by N. H. Watts. Loeb Classical Library 158. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923. 4, 5

municipiorum tabulas irrepserunt, hic, qui ne utitur quidem illis, in quibus est scriptus, quod semper se Heracliensem esse voluit, reiicietur?²⁰³

Thus we see a relatively sophisticated administrative system of citizenship.

Cicero's response shows a respectful cultural adherence to bureaucratic motions. The right to grant offers of citizenship are delegated largely to local community authorities, with Rome reserving the ultimate right of authority. The system was not perfect, as corruption's fingers slunk into the lists, adding unworthy citizens to Rome's lists. Yet the lists were largely to be trusted, respected, and upheld. Cicero remarks that the men responsible for these lists felt great personal pride if they were in good order, and great embarrassment if there were any discrepancies.²⁰⁴

Cicero gives Archias legitimacy by listing a long line of Roman names who are pleased with his companionship. Obviously, Pompey acted as his main benefactor and patron. But Archias was not only well-connected, he was well-loved. Cicero notes that

Erat temporibus illis iucundus Metello illi Numidico et eius Pio filio, audiebatur a M. Aemilio, vivebat cum Q. Catulo et patre et filio, a L. Crasso colebatur, Lucullos vero et Drusum et Octavios et Catonem et totam Hortensiorum domum devinctam consuetudine cum teneret, adficiebatur summo honore, quod eum non solum colebant qui aliquid percipere atque audire studebant, verum etiam si qui forte simulabant.²⁰⁵

²⁰³Cicero, *Pro Archia* 10. All translations taken from Watts. "Citizens of the ancient Greek states often went out of their way to associate with themselves in their civic privileges undistinguished men, of unimportant attainments, or of no attainments at all; and you would have me believe that the citizens of Rhegium or Locri, Neapolis or Tarentum, withheld from a brilliant genius like my client an honour which was commonly bestowed by them on play-actors. Others have found some way of creeping into the rolls of the cities I have mentioned, not merely after they had received the citizenship, but even after the passing of the law of Papius; my client does not even avail himself of the presence of his name on these lists in which he is enrolled, because he has always desired to belong to Heraclea; and shall he therefore be rejected?"

²⁰⁴Cicero, *Pro Archia* 9

²⁰⁵Cicero, *Pro Archia* 6, "He enjoyed at this time the warm friendship of Metellus, the hero of Numidia, and of his son Pius; he read his works to Marcus Aemilius; the doors of Quintus Catulus and his son were ever open to him; Lucius Crassus cultivated his acquaintance; he was bound by ties of close intimacy to the Luculli, Drusus, the Octavii, Cato, and the whole family of Hortensius; in a word, so

Of course, popularity cannot grant one citizenship—but it is important to note that popularity does grant social legitimacy. Yet, Cicero frames his argument as if Archias' popularity was the key tool for his gaining the citizenship.²⁰⁶ This smacks of the patron-client system, one of the most important frameworks that a Roman would use to view the political world. Hanchey noted that for each of the claims against Archias, Cicero appealed to one of his noble friends.²⁰⁷ Cicero developed his discussion of the patron-client system further in the *Pro Balbo*, but the stirrings of it are present here.

Archias' defense is based primarily on his value to Rome, Pompey, and Cicero. He was useful to his friends in Heraclea, who flocked to hear his poetry. The joy that he brings Cicero and Pompey through his writings is unparalleled, unmatched, unmistakably the bliss of the Muses themselves. Such a powerful cultural figure should—must—belong to Rome through citizenship. What else could be done? Cicero perfected these cultural themes of belonging, power, and authority a few years later in the *Pro Balbo*.

The *Pro Balbo*, a delightful argument for Roman authority, was delivered in 56, a year after Cicero's return from exile. Like poor Archias, Balbus had been summoned before the committee using the words of the *Lex Papia*. Balbus was a native of Gades, a city in Hispania. He had won his citizenship during his military service under Pompey in the Sertorian War (79-72) and had been enjoying the benefits of citizenship for fifteen years or so. He had spent his time well in Rome, working with Pompey and Cicero

honoured a position did he hold, that he was courted not only by those who wished to enjoy the elevating influences of hearing his poems, but also by those who perhaps feigned a desire for such enjoyment."

²⁰⁶ Cicero, *Pro Archia* 7

²⁰⁷ Hanchey 165

loyally, and spending some time as Caesar's agent in Rome during his time in Gaul. Yet, the closer he grew with Pompey and Cicero, the more ire he faced from the Cesarean faction. Cicero speaks of Balbus as someone who is deeply unpopular with his compatriots.²⁰⁸ This is not a surprising dynamic; a foreigner who rose quickly to almost unimaginable wealth and power must have frustrated those slowly making their way through the *cursus honorum*. Balbus led Gades at the time and possessed power greater than most Roman senators.²⁰⁹ We do not know either the name of the prosecutor of the case (but Cicero does mention a few less than desirable traits about him) nor are we familiar with the name of the president of the quaestio.²¹⁰

At this point in time, the future of the triumvirate appeared uncertain. Enemies pounced: a fellow-townsmen of Gades was enticed to call a case against Balbus, questioning his right to citizenship, in the hopes of removing a key member of the Roman upper crust. When Balbus was summoned before the court, Pompey, then a powerful member of the Triumvirate, acted as his chief defender along with Crassus and, of course, Cicero.²¹¹

The crux of the opposition's case lay at the question of who had control over the question of an individual's citizenship. The community of Gades had not ratified Balbus' transition of citizenship. Balbus could not possibly be a legitimate Roman citizen, the argument went, without the authorization of his home state. They had not given him over

²⁰⁸ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 56-58

²⁰⁹ Syme 72

²¹⁰ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 32

²¹¹ It is probably a good thing for Balbus that he had the notoriously articulate Cicero present to speak for him, as the name Balbus is a well-known Punic cognomen for "stammerer".

to Rome; thus he could not truly be Rome's. Yet, there was no legal precedent for their case.²¹²

Cicero approaches the question of authority regarding citizenship status with scorn. He considered it almost insulting to simply say that an individual's homeland could overrule the wishes of Rome. If Rome offered citizenship, then that was the final word in the matter. As Rome is always the most powerful member of a treaty, she never would have made an agreement that did not reflect her hegemonic status. He argues that

Quid enim potuit dici imperitius quam foederatos populos fieri fundos oportere? Nam id non magis est proprium foederatorum quam omnium liberorum. Sed totum hoc, iudices, in ea fuit positum semper ratione atque sententia, ut, cum iussisset populus Romanus aliquid, si id adscivissent socii populi ac Latini, et si ea lex, quam nos haberemus, eadem in populo aliquo tamquam in fundo resedisset, ut tum lege eadem is populus teneretur, non ut de nostro iure aliquid deminueretur, sed ut illi populi aut iure eo, quod a nobis esset constitutum, aut aliquo commodo aut beneficio uterentur.²¹³

Even within this Roman emphasis on authority, Rome did request the consent of communities occasionally. In the *lex Julia* of 90, community leaders were given the choice to ratify or to reject the offer of incorporation into Rome. Incorporation came with its own set of problems: communities who chose to join Rome joined as citizens, losing any special treatment that may have come from prior treaties. This led Heraclea and Neapolis in particular to strongly debate about the wisdom of changing their relationship

²¹² Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 52

²¹³ Cicero, *Pro Balbo*, 20. The Loeb translation reads as: "How could greater ignorance be shown than by saying that states bound to us by treaty must 'give consent'? For this is a condition which does not apply to states bound to us by treaty any more than to free states in general. In fact, gentlemen, this whole practice was always based upon this principle and intention that, when the Roman People had made any law, if the allied states and the Latins adopted it, and if that same law, which we observed, had, as it were, settled down "on solid ground" in some state, then that state should be bound by the same law. The purpose was, not that our own legal system should be in any way weakened, but that those states either might make use of that legal principle which had been established by us, or might enjoy some advantage or privilege."

to Rome. We know through Cicero that Neapolis eventually accepted the offer of citizenship from Rome.²¹⁴ Yet even the *Lex Julia*, although it allows for a community's opinion, emphasizes Rome's authority. Rome was the player who conquered the Italian peninsula in the Social War, who extended the offer of citizenship, and who set the terms of the citizenship agreement. The only real choice left to a community was to fall into the Roman machine or to be left behind.

Gades did not fall into the category of communities affected by the *Lex Julia*; thus the only way for a man from Gades (like Balbus) to gain Roman citizenship was to show himself worthy of the citizenship in some way to a powerful Roman. There are more than a few cases of individuals across the Mediterranean being given Roman citizenship as a boon. Cicero notes that citizenship is an offer *quae pateant stipendiariis, pateant hostibus, pateant saepe servis*.²¹⁵ The expansive nature of this category only serves to show more clearly the ridiculous nature of the claim against Balbus. How on earth, Cicero asks, could it be that an honorable man from the respectable town of Gades somehow has less rights than a slave?

Of course, then, the question of the community of Gades somehow needing to authorize Balbus' newfound Roman citizenship was completely irrelevant. In the scenario, to Cicero, there were only two relevant parties concerned: Pompey, who had chosen to grant citizenship in the first place as the agent of Rome, and Balbus, who, under Roman law, could either reject the offer of citizenship or, if he so desired,

²¹⁴ Cicero, *Epp ad fam* xiii.30

²¹⁵ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 24 "those honours which are open to those who pay tribute, open to enemies, and often open to slaves".

eventually renounce it in favor of regaining his citizenship at Gades.²¹⁶ The opinion of Gades, therefore, was as such: *Atqui nihil interest*.²¹⁷ Rome, as always, stood superior.

Even before the Lex Julia, people of all types were offered citizenship if they were considered worthy enough. During the Bacchic Crisis, even the courtesan Faecenia Hispala was given citizenship rights.²¹⁸ Cicero mentions many members of Mediterranean society who have earned citizenship one way or the other. We have already discussed here his belief that Archias deserves his citizenship due to his usefulness. In this speech, he mentions Lucius Cossinius and Titus Coponius of Tibur, who gained their citizenship after winning a successful prosecution.²¹⁹ There was a Greek priestess, Calliphana, who performed the rites of Ceres for Greeks very successfully. It was decided that she should perform the rites of Ceres on behalf of the Romans as well, and thus—significantly—it was important that a Roman citizen perform such a benefactory act towards Romans. And so, Cicero tells us,

Mitto vetera; proxime dico ante civitatem Veliensibus datam de senatus sententia C. Valerium Flaccum praetorem urbanum nominatim ad populum de Calliphana Veliense, ut ea civis Romana esset, tulisse.²²⁰

The common thread in all the examples of citizenship grants that Cicero lists is common cultural pride. Deserving individuals possess something called *ingenium*, an

²¹⁶ He could also do so by utilizing the right of exile, or the *ius excilii*.

²¹⁷ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 26

²¹⁸ Livy 19

²¹⁹ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 53

²²⁰ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 55, “Passing over instances from ancient times, I say that quite recently, before citizenship was conferred upon the people of Velia, Gaius Valerius Flaccus, as city praetor, in accordance with a resolution of the Senate, expressly submitted a proposal to the People that Calliphana of Velia should be made a Roman citizen.”

abstract quality possessed by both Archias and Balbus.²²¹ Archias possesses it because of his poetic ability, Balbus for his military ability, and the quality of *ingenium* is proved in both cases by their powerful friends. Those who possess this quality—whether that be fighting, prophesying, or litigating—innately deserve Roman citizenship.²²²

While naturally Rome wants those who are successful to become citizens and marry their success with Rome's, there is also a question of Roman prestige. It would be unseemly for any Roman citizen to be under any sort of benefactor who was not a Roman citizen. Thus, those who rise by their own merit into a superior cultural position must also be promoted into citizenship. Cicero would say that these individuals deserved citizenship all along; the pride of Rome demands that this be the case. This tension becomes overwhelmingly apparent when Cicero discusses the best types of people to make citizens: soldiers who have proved themselves on the field of battle. It must be remembered that these types are the most dangerous to Rome, as they are capable, motivated, and exceptionally militarily adept. And so, he remarks, "*An accusatori maiores nostri maiora praemia quam bellatori esse voluerunt?*"²²³

Cicero insinuates in the *Pro Balbo* that the patron-client relationship is the dominating lens with which Romans viewed social and political interaction. Earlier, in the *Pro Archia*, he argued that Archias' popularity and connections served as a powerful point in his favor when it came to his citizenship. Here, invocations of Pompey bookend the *Pro Balbo*, impressing strongly on the listener just how intensely Balbus' case is

²²¹ Hanchey 167

²²² Hanchey 168

²²³ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 54, "Did our fathers intend that greater rewards should be assured to a prosecutor than to a warrior?"

twisted up within Pompey's protections. To Cicero, Pompey's gift of citizenship to Balbus is simply the latest example of a powerful patron initiating a client relationship.

He establishes that such gifts are the norm, arguing

Hic tu Cn. Pompei beneficium vel potius iudicium et factum infirmare conaris, qui fecit, quod C. Marium fecisse audierat, fecit, quod P. Crassum, quod L. Sullam, quod Q. Metellum, quod M. Crassum, quod denique domesticum auctorem patrem suum facere viderat? Neque vero id in uno Cornelio fecit. Nam et Gaditanum Hasdrubalem ex bello illo Africano et Mamertinos Ovios et quosdam Uticenses et Saguntinos Fabios civitate donavit.²²⁴

Cicero chose to conclude his speech by emphasizing the patron-client relationship between Pompey and Balbus, arguing that the attack on Balbus should be dismissed due to Pompey's greatness. His final sentences argue that the patron-client system at large is really what is on trial.

Accedat etiam illud, ut statuatis hoc iudicio, utrum posthac amicitias clarorum virorum calamitati hominibus an ornamento esse malitis. Postremo illud, iudices, fixum in animis vestris tenetote, vos in hac causa non de maleficio L. Corneli, sed de beneficio Cn. Pompei iudicatuos.²²⁵

The placement of this sentiment at the finale is purposeful, designed to shock the listener.

How could these horrible, manipulative opponents of Balbus attack something so fundamental to the Roman state, so closely intertwined with political reality? If they succeeded, the rule of law itself would be torn apart. The entire patron-client system, to

²²⁴ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 51. "Do you, in this Court, endeavour to invalidate favour, or rather a decision and a deed of Gnaeus Pompeius, who did what he had heard Gaius Marius had done, what he had heard Publius Crassus, Lucius Sulla, Quintus Metellus, Marcus Crassus had done, and, lastly, that for which he had authority in his own house in what he had seen his father do? Nor did he bestow citizenship in the instance of Cornelius alone. For he bestowed it also upon Hasdrubal of Gades after that war in Africa, upon the Ovii descendants of the Mamertines, and upon certain Fabii of Utica and of Saguntum."

²²⁵ Cicero, *Pro Balbo* 65, "Remember also, that by your verdict in this case you are to decide whether you prefer that for the future the friendship of illustrious personages shall be a calamity or a distinction for their fellow-men. Last of all, gentlemen, keep this fixed in your minds, that in this case you are about to judge, not whether Lucius Cornelius has committed an offence, but whether Gnaeus Pompeius has rendered a service."

Cicero, is not only a helpful political framework, but *the* most important aspect of Roman political life. Who is to blame him? From the client states of the Mediterranean, to the municipal aristocracies on the Italian peninsula, building slowly into the grand client-patron relationships enjoyed by famous men like him, his assessment rings true.²²⁶

Cicero articulated in the *Pro Archia* and the *Pro Balbo* a significant emphasis on Rome's authority in the process of citizenship. As Rome was clearly the greatest nation, citizenship was her greatest gift. It was her right—nay, her duty—to bring into her loving arms all those who attained success, that they might increase their fortune and hers alike. Aside from the municipal communities of Italy who obtained citizenship under the Lex Julia, citizenship was a relatively rare boon, to be coveted and envied.²²⁷ This approach to citizenship acted as an enticing magnet, drawing brilliance and success together, fusing Rome eternally with the best the world had to offer, fanning the flame of her glory upwards, intertwined with any individual strong enough to fuel the fire.

²²⁶ Plutarch notes in his *Life of Romulus* 13 that the patron-client system is one of the oldest and most noble systems within Rome.

²²⁷ Those included in this category are so few that scholars can keep relatively accurate lists, albeit a bit long. Of course, to hear Cicero tell it, any old pathetic Greek playwright is included.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Citizenship as a Tool of Grand Strategy in the Empire

This chapter concerns how the Romans used citizenship as part of their grand strategy in the late republican and early empire period. The Julio-Claudian system operated on a client-state basis, using the essential Roman framework of the patron and client. Rome applied this framework within both the military and *municipa*, furthering Romanization throughout the empire. Especially in a martial context, Rome was deeply aware of her potentially precarious position among the allies and used citizenship as a tool of enticement within the army. In many ways, Rome's grand strategy mirrored the *communis patria Roma* ideology of late Republic Italy.

A Brief Digression on Grand Strategy

Of course, to properly follow this thread of discussion, we must first discuss what grand strategy is, and what Roman grand strategy was.

Grand Strategy, as a term usually thought of with capital letters, is a relatively recent academic term. While it has existed for some time, Paul Kennedy popularized the term in his 1991 edited collection *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*.²²⁸

Rebecca Lisner, writing for the *Texas National Security Review*, summarized grand strategy under two definitions:

The first is from Paul Kennedy and draws on earlier work by Edward Mead Earle and Basil Liddell Hart to contend, "The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in

²²⁸ Nina Silove (2018) Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of "Grand Strategy", *Security Studies*, 27:1, 27-57, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073

policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests." The second is by Barry Posen, who draws on a similar strategic tradition and offers an even more succinct definition: Grand strategy is "a state's theory about how it can best 'cause' security for itself." ²²⁹

Notice that both definitions, drawing on the current literature, require grand strategy to be a somewhat explicitly stated plan for the future of a state. Unfortunately, the conclusions from these definitions remain unclear. Academics often quarrel over whether certain states, including both America and Rome, have something that could be properly called Grand Strategy. The term imagines a visionary leader or committee planning a three-hundred-year agenda that will naturally be invariably followed by their state. History shows that great visionaries and leaders who can conceptualize the long term future of their state do exist—Richeileu, Bismarck, Monroe, and Pompey come to mind—but it is hard to find examples of a state that perfectly adheres to a grand strategy of this type over the course of centuries or even decades. Yet all states (supposedly) have *a* plan for their future and all leaders have *a* plan for the future of their own state.

Thus the question: does grand strategy actually exist? The argument of what elevates a state from possessing mere strategy to a grand strategy permeates the current academic literature. Lissner noted that "In many cases, works on grand strategy talk past each other, use definitional quibbles to invalidate competing ideas, and define alternative explanations selectively. Notably, these divergences occur despite a remarkable degree of agreement over the basic definition of grand strategy." ²³⁰

²²⁹ Lissner, R. F. (2018, November 12). *What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield*. Texas National Security Review. <https://tnsr.org/2018/11/what-is-grand-strategy-sweeping-a-conceptual-minefield/>

²³⁰ Lissner

Quibbles about detailed terminology only distract from the purpose of any discussion. Thankfully, the 2018 work of Nina Silove offered a new, broader framework to aid the conversation surrounding grand strategy. Silove conceptualized three different ways—variable, process, and blueprint—of thinking about grand strategy in a state:

The “grand strategy as variable” agenda provides a prism through which academics may study the origins of state behavior, with particular attention to the perennial question of how agency and structure interact to produce grand-strategic outcomes. The “grand strategy as process” agenda foregrounds the importance of grand strategizing, whether as a governmental strategic-planning process or as a more generic mode of decision-making. Finally, the “grand strategy as blueprint” agenda proffers broad visions in hopes of influencing future governmental behavior.²³¹

This framework allows scholars with different research foci to use the term ‘grand strategy’ in ways that compliment, not complicate, their work. The academic conversation surrounding grand strategy is vast, antagonistic, and technical—and, most importantly, outside the scope of this thesis. Wiser academics may quibble about what grand strategy is; this thesis will simply accept the two definitions of Kennedy and Posen above and approach the question of Roman grand strategy as a study of variables.

Roman history in particular seems to resist efforts to clearly articulate a grand strategy or even to define the mere existence of a grand strategy. Much of this difficulty comes from the Roman national character. As discussed previously, the Romans relied heavily on the subtle mechanism of advice as their primary tool of statecraft. When the aspect of advice is combined with the essential patron-client framework, decisions, initiatives, and even laws become elusive. Romans made decisions behind closed doors, making their grand strategy appear almost completely organic. They did not collect thorough records of their committee proceedings, individual decisions, or even their

²³¹ Lissner

personal thought processes. They were a people who ruled almost the entire known world—and yet, historians gather the names and details of their most important laws from casual asides in Cicero’s speeches. Interestingly, Roman authorities themselves had significant difficulty correctly identifying currently valid legislation.²³² The archival systems at Rome were a bureaucratic nightmare, eventually leading Vespasian to create a committee to recover documents (perhaps motivated by potential losses after the firing of the Capitol in AD 69).²³³ Yet it would be a significant overstep to assume that the Romans did not possess a grand strategy. It is simply essential to remember that Rome’s grand strategy would serve an internal Roman definition of good statecraft, and while it would not describe itself clearly by a modern term created using modern conceptions of statecraft, through the work of scholars like Luttwak, clear evidence of a grand strategy emerges. By studying Roman grand strategy through the variable framework—that is, observing how the minute bureaucratic structures in Rome served the larger grand strategy—historians can see grand strategy at work.

Rome began to embrace an intentional, imperialistic version of grand strategy around the early first century BC. Kallet-Marx argued that Rome’s foreign policy, especially in the East, was not one of conscious or intrusive expansionism until third parties, like Mithridates, and other events forced them to embrace a more direct approach.²³⁴ Eventually, they favored empire and the conquest of empire over mere

²³² Crook 32

²³³ Tacitus, *Histories* 4.40.2

²³⁴ Morstein-Marx, Robert. *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* Hellenistic Culture and Society 15. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

hegemony.²³⁵ Mithridates, a determined expansionist, forced the Romans to dedicate significant amounts of money and energy to stopping his efforts. During and after the Mithridatean wars, clever Roman leaders like Sulla and Pompey dedicated time and energy to settling and organizing Roman holdings in the East. Pompey lavished the Eastern territories with significant administrative and military reforms. Pompey clearly thought strategically about the future of the Roman empire, hopefully coupled to his own name. He counted all of Spain as members of his *clientela*.²³⁶ He was planning for longevity and efficiency.²³⁷ With Pompey we see the arrival of a figure who understood that Rome would henceforth operate as an empire. While Pompey serves as a clear example of Rome's changing strategy, he is also a symbol of a larger cultural change within Rome.²³⁸

Edward Luttwak's groundbreaking 1976 work divided the grand strategy of the Roman empire into three distinct phases. The first, the Julio-Claudian system, operated primarily under the client-state system. Rome's borders were constructed of largely self-governed client states, which handled outside incursions primarily from their own military power. Rome used mobile armies, which traveled around the empire, overcoming any large incursions that a client-state might need assistance with and extinguishing any internal rebellions that might have occurred in the client-states. In the second phase, lasting from Vespasian to Marcus Aurelius, the Romans left the client-state

²³⁵ Victor Connerty. "Rome's Imperium in the East." *The Classical Review*, vol. 48, no. 1, 1998, pp. 118–20. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/713731>. Accessed 25 Mar. 2023.

²³⁶ Syme 75

²³⁷ Syme 261

²³⁸ Connerty 120

system and moved to a perimeter defense system. Using permanently installed armies, Rome created *limes*—defined by Luttwak as scientific frontiers or borders, like Hadrian’s Wall. During a conflict, Roman armies would fight in front of the *limes*. While this system was highly effective for small-scale incursions, it left the Roman armies stretched thin and left communities defenseless against large-scale threats. The third and final phase, defense in depth, was used from the third century onward. Defense in depth focused on the creation of strong forts and small outposts close to any territorial periphery. If a large incursion came, armies would immediately retreat backwards to the closest stronghold, losing territory to fight from a place of strength.

During the Julio-Claudian period, under the client state system, the Romans successfully used citizenship as a major tool of their grand strategy to increase their empire in the Mediterranean. Rome favored a ‘carrot and stick’ method of empire, and the concept of citizenship composed significant portion of the carrot. Rome’s careful use of citizenship created an elite class within the client states that idealized Roman citizenship—and thus Rome. It emphasized Roman superiority above all else, increasing Rome’s authority. This led to increased, swift Romanization within the client states that came from internal forces. Rome’s top-down approach to citizenship allowed Rome to interact with each client state individually, keeping them divided and yet moving steadily towards Romanization at their own pace.

The Julio-Claudian System: Overview

Rome relied on client-states to provide a self-defending, self-governing perimeter to the empire. This outsourced many problems of the empire to local communities, who generally valued their own culture and way of life and appreciated Rome’s grant of

relative independence. The symbiotic relationship between Rome and the client-states created a highly effective system of strategic control. Governors of provinces and rulers of client states held large amounts of power. While they were in constant contact with Rome, Rome generally allowed the client states to operate however they saw best. In fact, as long as things were going well, Rome preferred to be as hands-off as possible.

The entire Julio-Claudian system operated according to an economy of force.²³⁹ As will be discussed in more detail later, Rome used a citizen army for their legionary forces. The legionary forces numbered roughly 300,000 in the year 23, a workable but slim number, making it essential for Rome to deploy forces strategically.²⁴⁰ Thus Rome conducted the distribution of the legions primarily from the need to confront internal threats.²⁴¹ Two legions were placed in Spain, two in Dalmatia, and two in Egypt. The legionary distribution shows a fear of internal, not external, threats.²⁴² Instead of attempting to exponentially raise the amount of legionary troops, Rome simply decided to outsource the defense of the perimeter to the client states. This allowed for Roman legions to remain exceptionally mobile, prepared to spring into action and assist client states with large scale threats or quell rebellions within client states.

Client states operated under a strict sense of tradition and a strong instinct of propriety. ‘Rules’ for client states, in a broad sense, did not exist. Clients did not sign explicit contracts; there was no monument at Rome with stone-carved rules for the ins

²³⁹ Luttwak 10

²⁴⁰ Luttwak 11

²⁴¹ Wells, Colin Michael. *The German Policy of Augustus: An Examination of the Archaeological Evidence*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1972. pp 237-46

²⁴² Luttwak 17

and outs for universal client relationship. Like most of Rome's diplomacy, interactions with client states were done delicately, subtly, and on a case-by-case basis. For example, tradition dictated that no client could pursue aggrandizement, for any reason, at the expense of another client, without explicit sanction from Rome.²⁴³ Republican Rome had decreed that any client suffering attacks from another client could only respond with strictly defensive measures until a Roman ruling could resolve the conflict.²⁴⁴ When Herod sent his forces into the adjacent client state of Nabatean Arabia, breaking this rule, Augustus immediately ordered him to stop. Then Augustus wrote to Herod and delivered a crushing blow: henceforth, he could no longer regard Herod as a friend. Herod became a subject.²⁴⁵ When placed in the larger context of Augustus' highly effective diplomatic style towards the client-states, this rhetoric acted as the equivalent of an official, harsh reprimand. The rhetorical formality of friendship was not always considered necessary throughout the empire. We know through epigraphical reconstruction that at least one British chieftain, Cogidubnus, mentioned by Tacitus, referred to himself as "*Rex et Legatus Augusti in Britannia.*"²⁴⁶ If this local and national comfort with dual status is a Claudian invention, as has been suggested, it shows that either Claudius or his policy makers understood the benefits and requirements of indirect rule particularly well.²⁴⁷

²⁴³ Sands, P.C. *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic*. Cambridge Historical Essays, no 16. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1908. p 49

²⁴⁴ Luttwak 32

²⁴⁵ Bowersock, Glen W. *Augustus and the Greek World*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1965. pp 51,53

²⁴⁶ Dudley, Donald Reynolds, and Webster, Graham. *The Roman Conquest of Britain A.D. 43-57*. London: Dufour Editions, 1965. p 184

²⁴⁷ Luttwak 42

Rome, when possible, preferred to maintain local balances of power. This choice simplified the amount of bureaucratic oversight needed in local communities and made it more difficult for large scale rebellions to arise. This layer of separation allowed Rome to foster an atmosphere of grandeur and propriety. Loyal and efficient client rulers ordinarily received the prize of Roman citizenship—winning themselves a ticket into Rome’s legacy of champions.²⁴⁸

Running the Roman client-state empire was an immense task. In order to do so effectively, Rome used constant and responsive management. Client rulers periodically needed to be replaced, either because a ruler had grown too old to rule, had died, or had proven unsatisfactory. The logistic burden to maintain the client states of the empire largely fell on the office of the emperor. Yet this task gave emperors a convenient way to navigate all the complex ambiguities of the client system. Client rulers held immense power in the Julio-Claudian system, and it was necessary for emperors to hold a close grip on their vassals.²⁴⁹

The Julio-Claudian client state system operated best as a masterpiece of delegation. Territories surrounded by sea or desert had no need for a complicated border security strategy. In the East, the tradition of indirect rule helped keep the balance of power stable in the region. This choice, although it led to complicated diplomatic maneuvers, created a stable region and a buffer against outside incursions. In Germany,

²⁴⁸ Luttwak 33

²⁴⁹ Luttwak 42

under Claudius, Nero, and Tiberius, Rome preferred to rely on (occasionally unstable) clients for security.²⁵⁰ Luttwak argues that

The preference for using clients rather than imperial forces to maintain border security and even regional stability was definitely a deliberate strategy, even if it was not passed from emperor to emperor in some codified form, or written down in a document. If so preferred, it might be ascribed to mere instinct—if only because some contemporary scholars are offended by the notion that Roman men could think and strategically too.²⁵¹

Rome's grand strategy during this period was a careful tradition, borrowing significantly from the best parts of her conduct during the Late Republic, that aimed to create a global empire through the management of local bureaucracy.

Rome's Citizen Army

In 216 BC, Hannibal slaughtered roughly fifty thousand Roman soldiers at the battle of Cannae.²⁵² This decisive defeat, somehow, did not translate into a strategic victory for Hannibal. Even though Hannibal declined, perhaps wrongfully, to immediately march on Rome, in any other war, against any other foe, his victory would have changed the course of the war. Yet Rome swallowed the intense loss of an entire army almost without a complaint. She raised another army, chose other generals, and marched on, winning the Second Punic War handily.

Rome's resilience after the battle of Cannae—and her remarkable ability to dominate militarily throughout the centuries—can be partially ascribed to the superior makeup of the army. Rome relied on a citizen army. A citizen army brought a completely

²⁵⁰ Tacitus, *Annals*, 12.27, 28

²⁵¹ Luttwak 40

²⁵² Livy 22.44-50, Polybius 3.110-118

unique spirit to the battlefield, a spirit that could not be replicated easily. Victor Davis Hanson wrote

Scholars attribute this resilience of Rome to its government's remarkable ability to reorganize its legions, mobilize its citizenry, and do so in legal, constitutional fashion that guaranteed the support of even the lowliest farmer...Hannibal would come to learn in Italy that the Roman army was not so much better equipped, better organized, more disciplined, and more spirited than his mercenary forces as far more insidious."²⁵³

Rome's choice to use a citizen army created a militarily superior army and a strong citizen culture that valued the military.

The political idea of citizenship transcended mere notions of ruler, captain, and constitution. A Roman citizen had legal rights—land, representation, rule of law—and in return for those rights, a Roman citizen had responsibilities. Rome had wed Hellenistic ideas about political involvement in a state to a more expansive representational system of government, a marriage which led to entire population bases with full buy-in.²⁵⁴

Compare the citizen army with the mercenary army, or with an army constructed of provincials. To an ally, Rome's call for soldiers would have been a typical part of the natural rhythms of society. In order to live in peace with Rome, the allies and provinces knew that they would have to occasionally respond to a routine levy for troops.²⁵⁵ They would go, and fight, and return, just as naturally and practically as they would have responded to a call for workers in a harvest. When they did fight—perhaps in a land far away from their own—they would have fought from a sense of duty towards their home

²⁵³ Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*, 1. Anchor Books ed (New York: Anchor Books, 2002). 111

²⁵⁴ Hanson 114-115

²⁵⁵ Pfeilschifter 31

province, not out of patriotism for Rome. They were impressed into the army, and they would have known that they were not there out of their own choice. A mercenary army contains even less zeal and patriotism than an allied army. A mercenary fights only for themselves and for their monetary gain. If the battle is rough, or difficult, or dangerous, or perhaps fatal, a mercenary knows that they should shrink back and preserve their own life that they might fight another day. The citizen army knows no such constraints. To a citizen army, the battle is the way in which they keep the pulsing lifeblood of their nation beating. When a citizen fights, he fights for his father's heritage, their own lands and assets and futures, and for the fates of their children. They fight for something more than their own gain—they fight for an ideal and a heritage. This dynamic adds something intangible and yet essential to the army. Just as an idea articulated by someone who genuinely believes in their own words appears as more honest and more attractive to the listener, so too does an army conducted of citizens fight, move, think, and die differently in every possible way than an army constructed of soldiers who do not care for anything more than their ability to die of old age. Rome cared for veterans in turn. Thousands upon thousands of veterans were given public land in Italy by this period, oftentimes operating like small capitalists.²⁵⁶

The citizen-soldier army ensured that Rome remained in a position of strength in the Second Punic War, even after the disastrous defeat at Cannae. As opposed to the Carthaginians, who operated primarily through mercenary armies and who severely limited citizenship to a small number of elites, Rome counted almost everyone in Rome

²⁵⁶ Syme 450

proper a citizen.²⁵⁷ This meant that Rome possessed a significant bank of citizens to draw upon to raise a new army. And Rome did raise a new army, full of citizens ready to fight and die for their cause. When Hannibal's mercenaries fled, or lost heart, Rome pressed on. Polybius directly cites this cultural dynamic for Rome's ultimate victory, noting

τῇ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ιδιότητι καὶ τῷ βουλευέσθαι καλῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας δυναστείαν, νικήσαντες μετὰ ταῦτα Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο μετ' ὀλίγους χρόνους.²⁵⁸

Through the lens of the massacre at Cannae, and the relative ease with which Rome bounced back to win a decisive victory, the intuitively triumphal spirit of the Roman army shines. Rome did not always possess a larger, or cleverer, or more creative set of soldiers, generals, leaders, or tacticians. But she had a spirited citizen army that fought differently and more effectively than anyone else on the European stage.

The success of the citizen army led Rome to eschew mercenaries and prize citizens whenever possible. The legions consisted entirely of citizens, and even when Rome had to fight alongside non-citizens, she was careful to use citizenship as a strategic military tool. The effectiveness of the citizen army created an unparalleled military force, and Rome knew how to preserve and foster the dynamic of the citizen army. While allegiances were weakening by the first century due to the increasing recruitment of citizens from the poorest classes, they were still unquestionably present.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ Hanson 124

²⁵⁸ Polybius Histories 3.118

For though the Romans were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they not only recovered their supremacy over Italy, by eventually conquering the Carthaginians, but before very long became masters of the whole world.

²⁵⁹ Syme 15

Tools of Grand Strategy: Citizenship in the Army

In the late Republican period, Rome used legions consisting of full Roman citizens alongside units constructed entirely from allied soldiers, or soldiers from client-states. These units—both Roman legions and allied cohorts—were kept disunified and were not integrated along lines of race or ethnicity. These divisions created a complex web of hierarchy that created fractures both across ally relationships and among the ‘vertical’ structure of an individual unit, allowing the Romans to isolate unit from unit, commanders from soldiers, elite from non elite, aristocracy from commanders, and favored aristocracy from unfavored aristocracy. Like chess pieces, the Romans treated each division as individual pieces that could be manipulated, according to the unique talents and needs of each, to increase Roman power. This dictatorial style often included the offer of citizenship as a key tool of creating hierarchy—an offer that was not always welcome or accepted. In many ways, the divided nature of the army served both the Romans and the allies. It suited the allies, occasionally, to keep their individuality and remain distant from Roman favor.²⁶⁰

Rome occasionally relied on outside sources of soldiers perhaps more often than was fully comfortable. In the Social War, many of the *socii* had been admitted into the Roman machine partially because Rome relied on contributions to her army in order to be fully functional.²⁶¹ While Roman soldiers operated at a higher capacity than other soldiers (due, in part, to superior training and equipment) the unfortunate reality remained

²⁶⁰ Mouritsen 28

²⁶¹ Mouritsen 29

that there were simply not enough homegrown Roman soldiers to police the Mediterranean effectively. The allies in general significantly outnumbered the Romans.²⁶² The danger, of course, lay in this numerical imbalance. Soldiers who were not Roman citizens, who belonged to a different people in a different land, could theoretically band together with other non-citizens to create a large uprising.

In fact, occasionally the non-Roman identity functioned as a method of unification. Conquest, military service, and urban resettlement all served to strengthen bonds of group identity at ethnic and local levels.²⁶³ This dynamic caused these groups to develop strong sectional interests in the empire, leaving Rome with a delicate balancing act. Group identity, for those in the empire, did not come from an idea of ‘being Roman’ but instead came from a sense of belonging to the Roman machine—partaking in the institutions, materials, culture, and rituals provided by the empire.²⁶⁴ This divided empire made it even more imperative that Rome keep different groups separated and redirect their energies on sparking loyalty towards Rome.

It was necessary to create strict hierarchical lines between the Romans and *socii*. Divisions were emphasized where there were natural cracks and fissures in potential military structures. For example, units were entirely homogeneous. Homogeneous units were the easiest ways to ensure that soldiers could work easily and quickly together under harsh conditions. On the battlefield, it was imperative that soldiers speak the same language and follow the same customs. Pfeilschifter notes that

²⁶² Mouritsen, H. “Italian Unification: a Study in Ancient and Modern Historiography” (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 70). London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1998. 29

²⁶³ Roth 9

²⁶⁴ Roth 10

The army was anything but a melting pot. The individual cohort, one's fellow-countrymen—essentially the people one could talk to—remained the points of reference for the allied soldier, from the levy to life in the camp, combat, marching and, eventually, discharge.²⁶⁵

Basic economics served as another natural dividing line. Somehow, Roman bureaucrats had to find payment and food for legionnaires, centurions, and cavalrymen. It seems likely that the Roman supply train supplied allies and legions alike; it would be almost impossible, not to mention tactically disastrous, to even attempt to have separate baggage operations for divisions within one army. There is no evidence to suggest that the Romans did anything other than provide all food and logistical support to every Roman-affiliated fighter on the field.²⁶⁶ Polybius records alike the food rations of Romans and allies.²⁶⁷

Wages, however, could be paid unequally. Polybius notes exact figures for the wages of legionnaires, centurions, and Roman cavalrymen—yet remains suspiciously silent on the wages of the allies. It seems as if the Romans did not have a standardized system for allied wages.²⁶⁸ This lack of standardization would have given the Romans a significant tool of authority—different communities could be paid less, or more, depending on the need. Roman soldiers enjoyed superior pay and resources. To the allies Rome sent what was required, and to Romans, what was desired.

Allies, if they were smart, capable, and lucky, could rise through the ranks and attain a commanding status. Yet they could not advance higher than *praefectus*

²⁶⁵ Brunt 1987, 19 (Pfeilschifter 31)

²⁶⁶ Pfeilschifter 31

²⁶⁷ Polybius 6.39.12-15

²⁶⁸ Pfeilschifter 31

cohortis.²⁶⁹ To reach higher, they would have to attain Roman citizenship. The ranks just below general, *tribuni militum* and *legati*, were unavailable to allied soldiers, no matter how brilliant they were.²⁷⁰ Allied soldiers fighting within this hierarchical framework would have associated Roman citizenship with the best of all possible fighters. As we have seen previously, Cicero notes in many of his speeches that citizenship was often given as a prize for superior military service, sometimes in the heat of battle. The interpersonal interplay of the Romans and their allies within the military served to emphasize the importance of citizenship and the superiority of Rome.

During the Augustinian period, after the civil wars and subsequent legal rulings that incorporated all of the Italians into Rome, Rome transitioned from a routine levy system to a fully professional force, consisting of citizen soldiers, who were gathered both by levy and by volunteer initiatives. From the first century to the second century AD, citizen soldiers increasingly came from the provinces.²⁷¹ There were twenty-five legions until 14 AD (after which, there were thirty three).²⁷² It was at this time that the art of soldiering began to become truly profitable. Cassius Dio writes that, during Augustus' reign,

χαλεπῶς δὲ δὴ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄθλων σμικρότητα διὰ τοὺς πολέμους τοὺς τότε ἐνεστηκότας οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐχόντων, καὶ μηδενὸς ἕξω τοῦ

²⁶⁹ Pfeilschifter, Rene. Edited by Roth, Roman Ernst, Johannes Keller, and Egon Flaig. "The allies in the Republican army and the Romanisation of Italy," in *Roman by Integration: Dimensions of Group Identity in Material Culture and Text*. Journal of Roman Archaeology, no. 66. Portsmouth, R.I: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2007. 34

²⁷⁰ Of course, like almost everything in history, exceptions could and were made here. Livy 21.48.9 writes of an allied prefect, Dasius of Brundisium, who lived at the beginning of the Second Punic War.

²⁷¹ Campbell, J. Brian (Belfast). 'Legio'. Brill's New Pauly. Ed. Hubert Cancik and et al. Brill Reference Online. Web. 10 Apr. 2023.

²⁷² Campbell

τεταγμένου τῆς στρατείας σφίσι χρόνου ὄπλα λαβεῖν ἐθέλοντος, ἐψηφίσθη τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ δορυφορικοῦ πεντακισχιλίας δραχμάς, ἐπειδὴν ἑκαταίδεκα ἔτη, τοῖς δὲ ἑτέροις τρισχιλίας, ἐπειδὴν.²⁷³

Romans and soldiers alike now expected soldiering to be a lifelong business, one complete with a regular package of benefits and even a quasi-retirement plan. This was a perfectly natural development; Rome considered it an honor and necessity to take care of her citizen-soldiers.

Naturally, during the Empire, Rome shifted how she incorporated the allied soldiers taken from client-states from the way in which she incorporated the allied communities of Italy into the army. Scholars rely on Cassius Dio, who simply notes that

τότε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Αὐγούστου ταῦτά τε, εἴτ' οὖν τρία εἴτε πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ὄντα, ἐτρέφετο, καὶ συμμαχικὰ καὶ πεζῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ναυτῶν ὅσαδῆποτε ἦν: οὐ γὰρ ἔχω τὸ.²⁷⁴

Less is known about the incorporation of the allies within the legionnaire structure than is known about the legions themselves. The Romans likely applied many of the same methodologies and practices to their allies of the Republican period as they would have a half-century later during the empire. Augustus aimed to reorganize and professionalize the Roman army, while maintaining its traditional structure and

²⁷³ Cassius Dio. 55.23.1. All translations taken from Dio Cassius. Roman History, Volume IV: Books 41-45. Translated by Earnest Cary, Herbert B. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 66. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916. "The soldiers were sorely displeased at the paltry character of the rewards given them for the wars which had been waged at this time and none of them consented to bear arms for longer than the regular period of his service. It was therefore voted that twenty thousand sesterces should be given to members of the praetorian guard when they had served sixteen years, and twelve thousand to the other soldiers when they had served twenty years."

²⁷⁴ Cassius Dio 55.24.5 "In the days of Augustus, those I have mentioned were being maintained, whether the number is twenty-three or twenty-five, [that is, the number of legions] and there were also allied forces of infantry, cavalry, and sailors, whatever their numbers may have been (for I cannot state the exact figures)"

equipment, attempting not to recreate a bureaucratic machine that was already highly effective.²⁷⁵

Especially during the Republican period, Rome kept a tight leash on all methods of control surrounding the allies. Allies were routinely placed and kept in lower hierarchical positions, with the only method of advancement available being that of individual grants of citizenship. This stratification of the army allowed Rome to tailor its approach to each community carefully and uniquely. An individual allied soldier would have served in Rome's army with members from his own town, community, and ethnicity. He would have proceeded routinely through the ranks, knowing that there was an upper limit to their success, as he was bound by their lack of citizenship. Then, he would have returned to his community, impressed with a significant feeling of their subordinate place within the Roman hierarchy, yet without any hatred or resentment towards their Roman overlords, as he had been treated decently, if not luxuriously.²⁷⁶ He might go home and dream of one day proving themselves worthy in battle to gain Roman citizenship; he might teach his sons and daughters to aspire to such a prize. As time went on, and Rome offered citizenship more freely to any man who volunteered within the legions, a soldier would have arrived home as a decorated, powerful Roman citizen, possessing an honor that oriented him and his community towards roles as Roman clients. What's more, while in his community, the really powerful tool of Romanization could work: municipal aristocracies.

²⁷⁵ Campbell

²⁷⁶ While there were intense ally/legion rivalries, Rome was always very careful to treat the allies well and reward their accomplishments in battle. While they possessed a lesser place in the army, by no means was their place one of mistreatment or overwhelming hardship. Pfeilschifter 31

Municipal Aristocracies and Citizenship

As seen previously, the client-patron relationship acted as an essential tool of government to the Romans. From the high-level client-patron relationships in the Senate to the smaller client-patron relationships connecting municipal aristocracies all over Italy to the hub of Rome, Romans knew that the subtle, interpersonal dynamics contained within the client-patron framework allowed for significant awareness of detail and control of political relationships.

Aristocratic client-patron relationships functioned as the key to indirect government.²⁷⁷ Within the Italian peninsula, the client-patron relationship furthered Romanization, as local aristocratic leaders (clients) fought for their patron's approval (a distinction that usually included Roman education, acculturation, and building projects) and jockeyed to build their own client base, which required a process involving the further Roman or Latin education of their clients. Rome applied the same framework used with the Italian municipal aristocracies on the grand scale of client-state relationships. Client-states functioned through indirect government, a government which worked primarily through careful manipulation of personal relationships with local elites.

Rome clung tightly to legal and cultural control of her territories. While she might generously allow for individual freedoms in a specific province, it remained deeply important that she remain the authority. In 94 BC Pontifex Q. Mucius Scaevola and his legate P. Rutilius took the administration of Asia. Shortly thereafter, Rutilius was

²⁷⁷ J. Keller. Edited by Roth, Roman Ernst, Johannes Keller, and Egon Flaig. "Rome and Her Italian Allies: Conflicting Interests and Disintegration" in *Roman by Integration: Dimensions of Group Identity in Material Culture and Text*. Journal of Roman Archaeology, no. 66. Portsmouth, R.I: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2007. 50

convicted by an equestrian jury of complete mismanagement and fled into voluntary personal exile. (Scaevola likely escaped due to his seniority). Their crime, fueled in part by their Stoic philosophy and dedication to their profession as jurists, was that Scaevola created a provincial edict declaring that the Greeks of Asia might be treated according to their local laws and tried in their own courts.²⁷⁸ This put a significant amount of economic pressure on the Roman *equites*, and they demanded that the edict be reversed so that they could enjoy their position of local power once more. The episode shows how powerful local Roman interest groups within Roman territories possessed the ability not only to fight initiatives that would limit their power, but even to punish upstanding Roman leaders who attempted to create those initiatives.²⁷⁹ Within the Roman hierarchy, Roman interests would always outweigh local interests.

The interests of the Roman nobility who engaged in the highest level of client-patron relationships did not fundamentally change from mid-Republican times to the Early Principate.²⁸⁰ They desired political power, military glory, and high social status. Livy assesses these successes as *magistratus, sacerdotia, triumphi, insignia, dona, spolia bellica*.²⁸¹ The 218 BC *lex Claudia de nave senatorum* required the Roman elite to narrow their business activities; this eventually fueled the rise of the equites and their domination in the business and economic sphere.²⁸² Within both the highest class of nobility and the secondary class of the equites, Roman citizenship remained a

²⁷⁸ Cicero, Att 6.1.15

²⁷⁹ J. Keller *Rome and Her Italian Allies: Conflicting Interests and Disintegration* 53

²⁸⁰ Keller 44

²⁸¹ Livy 34.7.8

²⁸² Keller 45

requirement. It was exceptionally rare for an Italian family to enter the senatorial class during the mid-Republican period, and even after the Social War, most Italian aristocrats remained only local nobility, no matter how much they strove for advancement.²⁸³

Roman nobility desired individual advancement, loyalty, and, above all, power over the local municipal aristocracies that they held in their hands through client-patron relationships. Thus they would give so much, but not more: they would sponsor individual clients for citizenship, but only if they proved themselves. The nature of the grant of citizenship—that is, the fact that citizenship brought a significant increase in rights and prestige, but certainly not a pathway to the truly elite class—did not matter. To a local aristocrat, Roman citizenship promised an increase of rights, prestige, wealth, and perhaps, after generations, admission into the Roman elite. They were either unaware or unbothered by the harsh truth that the promise of citizenship was not the same as a promise of entry into the elite class.

Romans placed this aristocratic, client-state framework on territories that were in the process of being Romanized. In Belgic Gaul, when Augustus chose to turn his attention towards constructing a *civitas* in 27 BC, he dealt primarily with previously-existing local elites, attached thinly populated areas to their sphere of influence, and ratified once more the *de facto* incorporation of lesser peoples that were made clients by the Caesarian settlement.²⁸⁴ Rome preferred to interact with peoples operating under some form of aristocratic municipalities. This framework heavily paralleled the larger

²⁸³ Mouritsen 8

²⁸⁴ Haselgrove, Colin. Edited by Thomas Blagg, Martin Millett, and Tom F. C. Blagg. “The Romanization of Belgic Gaul: some archaeological perspectives,” in *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, Reprint (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2002). 52

client-state framework. Rome, acting through patron-client relationships, gave significant amounts of power to local authorities, who in return kept order and acted as agents of Romanization. It was a bureaucratic masterpiece.²⁸⁵

Offering Roman citizenship *en masse* to entire communities, as had been done in the Italian peninsula during the Social War, would have led to an overwhelming mess of cultural and logistic problems. Rome had learned during the Social War that not all communities desired citizenship, as many preferred to keep their local communities, laws, and customs intact. The business of the empire reinforced this discovery. Rome ruled a staggeringly diverse collection of ethnicities, cultures, and languages. Romanization, of course, acted as an essential method of maintaining this empire. Yet individual peoples could not be forcibly Romanized—they had to desire Romanization themselves. Rome had answered this problem in Italy long before, with the development of the *communis patria Roma* ideology. Thus Rome learned how to play chess: she used the client-patron framework already in place, dangled the prize of citizenship before the eyes of ambitious local aristocrats, and then watched as, all over the empire, local elites competed with other local elites to Romanize their communities.

This Romanization process can be seen all over the Empire. In Hispania, after just over two hundred years of Roman involvement in the northeast, the indigenous settlement pattern had completely disintegrated.²⁸⁶ Towns competed with one another for social and cultural dominance, and this led, by the end of the first century BC, to public

²⁸⁵ This structural parallelism sounds suspiciously similar to the ideal structure of government described by Dante in his *Monarchy*, within which he argues that Rome under Augustus perfected government.

²⁸⁶ Keay, Simon. Edited by Thomas Blagg, Martin Millett, and Tom F. C. Blagg. "Processes in the Development of the Coastal Communities of Hispania Citerior in the Republican Period," in *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, Reprint (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2002). 140

and private buildings that were essentially Roman. Inter-urban rivalry within these towns also played a significant role in their cultural development and Romanization.²⁸⁷ This competition came from a desire for towns to achieve municipal status.²⁸⁸ Under a municipal status, towns retained their own constitutions and magistrates, but the lucky individuals elected to magistracies achieved the prestigious status of Roman citizen. Within these towns, quick, polished, and distinctly Roman development occurred primarily because powerful local individuals jockeyed constantly for a position of authority that promised Roman citizenship.²⁸⁹ This dynamic showed Roman strategic expediency at its finest. Roman rulers recognized the incredible potential of this method and used it throughout the centuries, community by community—the Iberian peninsula was granted Latin rights as early as Vespasian’s rule.²⁹⁰

Archaeological reports tell us that buildings raised all over the empire, from Hispania, Gaul, Britain, and Lusitania, were modeled after buildings in Rome, while using local materials.²⁹¹ Colonies served as models, or mirror images, of what an ideal Roman town should look like for the benefit of locals and of local elites who might never get the chance to travel to Rome. Cicero observed such a dynamic in Narbo.²⁹² Some provincial capitals, like Augusta Emerita, were developed carefully by Roman authorities to function as models and symbols of Roman power. Other cities, like Conimbriga, self-

²⁸⁷ Keay 140

²⁸⁸ Keay 140

²⁸⁹ Keay 140

²⁹⁰ Latin rights would allow those who held chief magistracies to become eligible for full Roman citizenship. Plin. NH 3.3.30

²⁹¹ King, Anthony. *The Emergence of Romano-Celtic Religion*. 231

²⁹² Cicero *Pro Fonteio* 13

developed their urban center to resemble Roman ideals as a result of their inclusion in the Roman empire.²⁹³ This model system shows that Rome planned for local elites and authorities to be the driving force behind Romanization and the respect of Roman authority. While some accounts, such as Strabo's narrative of the Roman conquest of Lusitania, paint the Romans, in typical rhetoric for the time, as conquerors bent only on destroying and recreating local centers of power, archaeological evidence shows that in general, Romans preferred to maintain the status quo.²⁹⁴ The Romans, whenever possible, maintained their large empire through harnessing previously-existing power structures and gaining personal control of local elites. Rome wanted to exploit all possible resources, and this meant that a light hand was necessary.²⁹⁵

Even after a community had revolted, Romans often preferred to maintain a loose grip on power. After the bloody Boudican revolt of 60 AD, the continued hostility towards Rome was blamed on the oppressive behavior of the governor Paullinius by both the imperial court and the new procurator, Classicianus. Tacitus writes

[Classicianus] in urbem mandabat, nullum proeliorum finem expectarent, nisi succederetur Suetonio, cuius adversa pravitati ipsius, prospera ad fortunam referebat.²⁹⁶

²⁹³ Edmondson, Jonathan C. Edited by Thomas Blagg, Martin Millett, and Tom F. C. Blagg. "Romanization and Urban Development in Lusitania," in *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, Reprint (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2002). 168

²⁹⁴ Edmondson, 173

²⁹⁵ Edmondson 173

²⁹⁶ Tacitus Annals 14.38. Translation taken from Gambash, Gil. "To Rule a Ferocious Province: Roman Policy and the Aftermath of the Boudican Revolt." *Britannia* 43 (2012): 1–15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41725064>. [Classicianus] stated in a dispatch to Rome that no cessation of fighting must be expected unless Suetonius were superseded, attributing that general's calamities to depravity and his successes to good luck.

To Romans, the natural mode of conquering was found in decisive battles, not continuous, harsh authoritarian regimes. Harshness made local peoples unhappy; unhappy people did not wish to be Roman. Since the easiest way of constructing an empire was found in allowing local peoples to be nudged by elites towards Rome, actions like Paullinus' were considered disastrous.

Grand Strategy Conclusions

Roman grand strategy in the late Republican period and under the Julio-Claudian system could be expressed in three words: economy of force. Rome's citizen army fought more effectively than any other army in the Mediterranean. Romans knew that while the citizen army was perceived as an unstoppable force, it was plagued by significant numerical imbalances between native Romans and allied troops. To combat these imbalances, non-citizen fighting forces were separated by any metric possible, including community, ethnicity, language, equipment, and payment. Within the army, Romans dangled the reward of citizenship to create loyalty and emphasize Roman superiority.

Local Roman rule over the empire borrowed the patron-client dynamic of municipal aristocracies that Rome had perfected in the Italian peninsula during the middle to late Republican period. Rome granted citizenship rarely, usually to local elites who proved their worthiness to Rome. Elites, frenzied with this promise of personal advancement, competed with other local elites to accelerate the Romanization process and to rule according to Rome's wishes. Thus Rome was free to take a guiding, not leading, approach within local client-states and direct her energies elsewhere. During this period, there was no greater promise, no stronger tool of manipulation, than the offer of

Roman citizenship. It was more prestigious than money, more lasting than honors, and more powerful than a local position. No other power could offer anything like it.

And so Rome led her client-states into the fold gently, gradually, so that when they discovered they were fully Roman states, they looked about them and decided that they had wanted such a denouement the entire time.

CONCLUSION

Rome used the citizenship best when she understood that the *civis Romanus* could function as an ideal. She benefited from a long tradition of Roman exceptionalism coupled with Hellenistic idealization of legendary citizenship status. And as her authority and power increased, so too did the legitimate reasons to desire the status of *civis Romanus* that were completely divorced from rhetoric. Rome could not have used citizenship as a reward or as a bargaining-chip without incorporation into the Roman machine genuinely being a net positive. Once Rome created an ideology of how citizens might coexist within two cultures (*communis patria Roma*) and perfected the relationship between citizenship and the legions, Roman citizenship became a devastatingly effective tool for empire. All over the Mediterranean, individuals desired to join with conquering Rome as citizens because they had been shown how to believe in the ideal of Roman citizenship.

One gets the sense that for a long time Rome did not quite realize the power of the citizenship until the Social War. Naturally tensions regarding legal status were clear; the Gracchi knew that citizenship was a cultural fracture-point and pushed on that weak spot as Italy split. Certainly, Rome was surprised when the Italian *socii* demanded the citizenship as a balm for their wounds, and while she honored their claim, the experience forced Rome to clearly define citizenship for itself. As Italy and Rome acculturated, Rome constructed a methodology of citizenship that she would later borrow all over the empire.

Of course, Rome had, for a long time, almost intuitively, constructed military and bureaucratic structures that used citizenship effectively. The *municipa* structure of the Late Republic, coupled with the patron-client framework, used a top-down method of Romanization. Pre-Social War, this Romanization also included the acculturation with the idea of Roman citizenship as a deeply desirable status. The citizenship requirements of the legions both made Rome's military highly effective and brought Romanization through allied interactions with the legions. In many ways, Rome knew the contours of citizenship well—why and where it should be used, granted, and culturally impressed.

Thus the dominos fell into place during the Julio-Claudian system. Rome, comfortable with the patron-client framework, expanded it into the client-state system and contracted it within municipal aristocracies all over the Empire. By doing so she borrowed the best parts of the Italian system and added to it a hard-won awareness of how best to manage clients who may or may not desire the citizenship.

While much of this thesis is a synthesis of previous scholarship, I am currently unaware of any attempt to integrate Luttwak's framework with Rome's use of municipal aristocracies, especially within the context of Italian municipal aristocracies. Mine is a slight attempt; more detailed scholarship must be done. Due to concerns of scope, I have not considered the period past the Julio-Claudian era. Roman citizenship develops significantly in this period, and I regret that I do not have the ability to follow these threads further.

At its best, Rome's approach to citizenship could be described as an invitation. Even if there was no 'man behind the curtain' when it came to the total fulfillment of the citizenship ideal, the dream of citizenship motivated many to assimilate themselves and

their communities to Rome. Rome truly could act as *pater*, approaching each community individually, allowing them to acculturate on their own timeline and in their own way. Within the context of citizenship, Rome enjoyed the ability to take a gentle approach to empire.

WORKS CITED

Acts

Appian, *Civil Wars*.

Bispham, Edward. "Allies: Latins and Italians in the Second Century." In *From Asculum to Actium: The Municipalization of Italy from the Social War to Augustus*, edited by Edward Bispham, 0. Oxford University Press, 2007.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231843.003.0004>.

Bowersock, Glen W. *Augustus and the Greek World*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1965.

Brunt, P. A. "The Legal Issue in Cicero, Pro Balbo." *The Classical Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 1, 1982, pp. 136–47. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/638748>. Accessed 11 Feb. 2023.

Campbell, J. Brian (Belfast). 'Legio'. Brill's New Pauly. Ed. Hubert Cancik and et al. Brill Reference Online. Web. 10 Apr. 2023.

Catullus. 84.

Cicero. *Ad Atticus*

———. *De Amicitia*

———. *De Legibus*

———. *Epp ad Fam*

———. *Pro Fonteio*

———. *Pro Archia. Post Reditum in Senatu. Post Reditum ad Quirites. De Domo Sua. De Haruspicum Responsis. Pro Plancio*. Translated by N. H. Watts. Loeb Classical Library 158. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923.

———. *Pro Caelio. De Provinciis Consularibus. Pro Balbo*. Translated by R. Gardner. Loeb Classical Library 447. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958.

CIL, I 2nd edn, 1529 = ILS, 5348 = ILLRP, 528.

- Crook, John A. *Law and Life of Rome, 90 B.C. - A.D. 212*. 4. print. Aspects of Greek and Roman Life. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1994.
- David, Jean-Michel. *The Roman Conquest of Italy*. Repr. with corrections. The Ancient World. Oxford : Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
- Dio Cassius. *Roman History, Volume IV: Books 41-45*. Translated by Earnest Cary, Herbert B. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 66. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916.
- Dudley, Donald Reynolds, and Webster, Graham. *The Roman Conquest of Britain A.D. 43-57*. London: Dufour Editions, 1965. p 184
- Edmondson, Jonathan C. Edited by Thomas Blagg, Martin Millett, and Tom F. C. Blagg. "Romanization and Urban Development in Lusitania," in *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, Reprint (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2002).
- Gaius. *Ad legem duodecim tabularum*.
- Gambash, Gil. "To Rule a Ferocious Province: Roman Policy and the Aftermath of the Boudican Revolt." *Britannia* 43 (2012): 1–15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41725064>.
- Hanchey, Daniel. "Typically unique: shared strategies in Cicero's Pro Archia and Pro Balbo." *The Classical Journal*, vol. 108, no. 2, Dec. 2012, pp. 159+. *Gale Academic OneFile*, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A353321058/AONE?u=txshracd2488&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=bcb9929b.
- Hanson, Victor Davis. *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*. 1. Anchor Books ed. New York: Anchor Books, 2002.
- Haselgrove, Colin. Edited by Thomas Blagg, Martin Millett, and Tom F. C. Blagg. "The Romanization of Belgic Gaul: some archaeological perspectives," in *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, Reprint (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2002).
- Herodotus. *Histories*.
- J. Keller. Edited by Roth, Roman Ernst, Johannes Keller, and Egon Flaig. "Rome and Her Italian Allies: Conflicting Interests and Disintegration" in *Roman by Integration: Dimensions of Group Identity in Material Culture and Text*. *Journal of Roman Archaeology*, no. 66. Portsmouth, R.I: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2007.
- Juvenal. *Satires*.
- Keay, Simon. Edited by Thomas Blagg, Martin Millett, and Tom F. C. Blagg. "Processes in the Development of the Coastal Communities of Hispania Citerior in the Republican Period," in *The Early Roman Empire in the West*, Reprint (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2002).

Keller King, Anthony. The Emergence of Romano-Celtic Religion

Lissner, R. F. (2018, November 12). *What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield*. Texas National Security Review. <https://tnsr.org/2018/11/what-is-grand-strategy-sweeping-a-conceptual-minefield/>

Livy, John Yardley, and Waldemar Heckel. *The Dawn of the Roman Empire*. Oxford World's Classics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Luraghi, Nino, and Susan E. Alcock, eds. 2003. Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures. Hellenic Studies Series 4. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_LuraghiN_AlcockS_eds.Helots_and_Their_Masters.2003.

Luttwak, Edward. The grand strategy of the Roman Empire from the first century A.D. to the third / Edward N. Luttwak Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore 1976

Morstein-Marx, Robert. *Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* Hellenistic Culture and Society 15. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.

M. H. Crawford, *Roman Statutes*, II, London, 1996, pp. 555-721, n. 40

Mouritsen, H. "Italian Unification: a Study in Ancient and Modern Historiography" (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 70). London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1998.

Nina Silove (2018) Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of "Grand Strategy", Security Studies, 27:1, 27-57, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2017.1360073

Oliver, James H. "Civic Status in Roman Athens: Cicero, "Pro Balbo" 12.30." Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, 1981, pp. 83. ProQuest, <http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/civic-status-roman-athens-cicero-pro-balbo-12-30/docview/1301491013/se-2>.

Pfeilschifter, Rene. Edited by Roth, Roman Ernst, Johannes Keller, and Egon Flaig. "The allies in the Republican army and the Romanisation of Italy," in *Roman by Integration: Dimensions of Group Identity in Material Culture and Text*. Journal of Roman Archaeology, no. 66. Portsmouth, R.I: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2007.

Pliny, *Natural Histories*.

Plutarch. *Life of Gaius Gracchus*.

———. *Life of Lycurgus*.

———. *Life of Solon*.

———. *Life of Tiberius*.

———. *Marius*.

Plutarch, Robin Waterfield, and Philip A. Stadter. *Greek Lives: A Selection of Nine Greek Lives*. Oxford World's Classics. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Polybius. *Histories*.

Saller, Richard P. *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511583612.

Sallust. *Histories*.

Sands, P.C. *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic*. Cambridge Historical Essays, no 16. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1908.

Schiemann, Gottfried (Tübingen). 'Tabulae Duodecim'. In Brill's New Pauly, edited by Hubert Cancik and, Helmuth Schneider, English Edition by: Christine F. Salazar, Classical Tradition volumes edited by: Manfred Landfester, and English Edition by: Francis G. Gentry. Accessed November 23, 2022. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e1128170.

Sherwin-White, Adrian N. *The Roman Citizenship*. Repr. of the paperback ed. 1980. Oxford: Hassell Street Press, 2021.

Steinberg, Michael. "The Twelve Tables and Their Origins: An Eighteenth-Century Debate." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43, no. 3 (1982): 379–96. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2709429>.

Syme, Ronald. *The Roman Revolution*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Tacitus. *Annals*.

Thucydides. *Peloponnesian War*.

Victor Connerty. "Rome's Imperium in the East." *The Classical Review*, vol. 48, no. 1, 1998, pp. 118–20. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/713731>. Accessed 25 Mar. 2023.

Webster, Jane. "Creolizing the Roman Provinces." *American Journal of Archaeology* 105, no. 2 (2001): 209–25. <https://doi.org/10.2307/507271>.

Wells, Colin Michael. *The German Policy of Augustus: An Examination of the Archaeological Evidence*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1972.

Zajko, Vanda, and Ellen O’Gorman, '1 Introduction: Myths and their Receptions: Narrative, Antiquity, and the Unconscious', in Vanda Zajko, and Ellen O'Gorman (eds), *Classical Myth and Psychoanalysis: Ancient and Modern Stories of the Self*, Classical Presences (Oxford, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 23 May 2013), <https://doi-org.ezproxy.baylor.edu/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656677.003.0001>, accessed 20 Apr. 2023.