ABSTRACT

The Rhetorical Structure of Disability: Bridging the Gap between What is 'Spoken' and What is 'Said' with Song—Over-Signifying with Personhood Against the Backdrop of Disease-Centric Discourse

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This paper investigates the rhetoric surrounding disability, specifically focusing on how such rhetoric is deployed in legislative texts which attempt to promote the equality of people with disabilities throughout society. In criticizing "disease-centric discourse" within legislative texts the paper argues that there is a gap between what is "spoken" and what is "said" in current state-based actions which attempt to pragmatically secure equality. In order to bridge this gap, the paper focuses on the "rhetorical structure" of language within a vacuum, utilizing the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche in explanation of reason in grammatical structure. Ultimately, utilizing Jean Baudrillard's concept of "over-signification" the paper concludes with the advocacy of traversing the grammatical reasoned structure of the predicate/subject dichotomy which disease-centric discourse is founded upon, and employing a method of performative engagement in the "singing" of people first language when advancing pragmatic actions toward equality.

The Rhetorical Structure of Disability: Bridging the Gap Between What is 'Spoken' and What is 'Said' with Song - Over-Signifying with Personhood Against the Backdrop of Disease-Centric Discourse

by

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CHAPTER ONE

The Rhetoric of Disability

Introduction

Until recently, human "disability" has been conceptually understood as an

abnormal, unnatural, and problematic condition of either the mental or physical self.

Located within the individual, disability detracts, disadvantages, incapacitates and

prevents one from living a full, normal life. Being that disability has been understood as

a diseased condition of the individual, it has often been rendered something to be

regulated, and potentially "fixed" or "cured" by the higher knowledge and reason of

modern medicine. With the emergence of "anti-psychiatry" and critical disability studies

many of the fundamental assumptions of the historical development of "disability" came

into question. Notions of "normalcy," the location of disability within the individual, the

priestly status of modern medicine as unquestionable, along with the claims of scientific

rationality, objectivity and expert knowledge in which the medical model founds its

regulatory jurisdiction, became the target of deconstruction.   The goal of such inquiries

was to improve the lives and status of people with disabilities by renouncing the social

construction of disability as inherent within the "inferior" or "flawed" individual. These

criticisms are also aimed at shielding individuals with disabilities from oppression and

bio-political control by advancing alternative forms of knowledge and sets of

understandings distinct and apart from the hegemonic medical model. Advocates and

critical scholars advancing these perspectives help to create a better world for people with

disabilities by promoting equality, justice and individual autonomy, while also working to eliminate social stigmatization. Recently, many state actors have also embraced this spirit of justice; responding to the demands of people with disabilities by creating legislation mandating equal treatment of individuals throughout society, regardless of individual disability. These state actions represent a concrete and pragmatic attempt to better the lives of people with disabilities by removing the barriers that prevent equal access to the American dream. Unfortunately, while these actions may intend to secure a social world free of discrimination, often times they serve to perpetuate the same notions of injustice the policy was intended to combat. Recent history provides numerous examples of legislation intending to affirm the communal demands of people with disabilities, while discursively constructing these individuals according to a rhetorical structure of terminology which denies equality, reifies stigma, and mandates dehumanization. The rhetorical structure of disease-centric terminology deployed in these legislative texts places a primacy on the individuals' disability, while rendering all other claims of identity and personhood a mere afterthought. Historically, examples of disease-centric rhetoric in legislation include the singular terms of "mongoloid," "lunatic," "retard," "imbecile," and "cripple." More recently, legislative examples include the terms "disabled child," "schizophrenic patient," and the generic all inclusive "disabled people." While modern examples of legislation avoiding disease-centric rhetoric in favor of the more empowering rhetorical structure "people-first language" can be found, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, yet these examples are far from the textual norm in modern legislation.

The rhetoric surrounding disability, particularly as it is embodied in recent Congressional legislation, is an area ripe for criticism and study. The inherent social negativity and connotation of difference associated with the term "disability" itself, along with the ways in which that term is deployed to categorize individuals for no other reason than falling outside the social norms of a given time, circumscribes the rhetoric of disability within a unique sphere of power. Historically, the rhetoric of disability has exerted its power overtly as a justification for mass extermination of entire sections of a population[i]; allowed for state sponsored forced sterilization in the name of social progress[ii]; and has been actively deployed in an effort to link nearly all social minorities with defect and inferiority so to bolster legitimacy for their oppression. Given the propensity for the rhetoric of disability to play an integral role in violence and atrocity, how then is it possible to maintain an infinite commitment to creating a better world for people with disabilities while simultaneously viewing the legislation aimed at pragmatically achieving such a goal under a lens of strict scrutiny for rejecting dangerous rhetoric? How then would it be possible to overcome the gap between the dangers presented by disease-centric rhetoric in what is "spoken" in legislative texts, and still affirm what is "said" by those same texts attempting to make pragmatic gains for people with disabilities in the spirit of equality?

This paper attempts to answer these questions through an examination of the rhetoric surrounding disability in its structure, deployment, and intent. Starting from

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[i] During the Holocaust many people with disabilities or "the handicapped" were forced into concentration camps under the Nazi project of extermination. This project not only called for the present extermination of people with disabilities, but was linked to a larger project of eugenics attempting to discover how to rid the future from disability (Longmore 2003).

[ii] The Supreme Court ruling in Buck V. Bell upheld Virginia's law allowing for involuntary sterilization of people with disabilities, or the "feebleminded" (Mariner 2003)

social constructionist position embraced by many "anti-psychiatrists," critical disability theorists and disability rights advocates, this paper investigates the texts of modern and historical legislation attempting to discover a method of advancing positive pragmatic actions while simultaneously removing the location of disability from the individual in which it rhetorically subsumes in terminology. This position concedes that the use of disease-centric rhetoric can be unconscious; or rather the deployment of such rhetoric generally is not intended to demean or dehumanize people with disabilities. In many instances, the "intent" is quite the opposite; individuals often deploy such rhetorical labels in an effort to affirm equality, without the knowledge that such rhetoric constructs the greatest blockade in achieving such a goal. This "blockade" is not a physical limitation upon pragmatic action, but rather an attitudinal barrier which eliminates the potential for full and equal participation in society. The National Collaborative on Workforce and Disability for Youth (2006) explains.

> People with disabilities face many barriers and, like many minority groups, have fought for equal access "to education, to employment, to public facilities and services, to transportation, to housing, and to other resources needed to more fully realize their rights as citizens" (Tan, 1995, n.p.). The major barriers to achievement by people with disabilities in our society, however, continue to be attitudinal barriers, stereotypical thinking, and assumptions about what people can and cannot do. Stereotypes flagrantly and incorrectly limit the range of an individual's ability. The truth is that the range of abilities of persons within any disability group is enormous. Attitudinal barriers are ideas, fears, and assumptions that impede meaningful communication between people with and without disabilities and prevent people with disabilities from participating fully in society. Most attitudinal barriers are passively learned; unlearning them takes effort and interaction (Miller, n.d., ch. 3).
>
> Labels and language have long reflected society's views of disabilities as abnormal. Although this is changing, some people and institutions continue to focus on individuals' disabilities rather than their abilities and by doing so foster segregation. In the media, people with disabilities have been portrayed as "broken" and treated with pity, scorn, sorrow, or anger. Or, on the other hand, they have been treated as though they had superpowers. Labels have often been used to define a person's potential and value …

> When we hear a person's label, we (mistakenly) think we know something important about him, and we give great weight to the label, using it to determine how/where a person will be educated, what type of job he will/won't have, where/how he'll live, and more. In effect, a person's future is often cast by others, based on the label. (n.p.)

Fueled by disease-centric rhetoric, the societal image of people with disabilities as "inferior" and "broken" fosters cultural attitudes of pity, anger, and ablest supremacy over people with disabilities. These attitudes create a world of inter-relationships predicated on viral difference and hatred. Within this matrix of interaction the other can never be authentically embraced in its infinity or manifest oneself in accordance to anything but its difference. The individual with a disability is not "monstrous" or "savage" within this world, for radical exoticism is overcome through the domestication of the other. "Difference is what destroys otherness (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 127);" all societal interactions involving people with disabilities become premised on "difference," and the societal incorporation of such difference accepted out of pity and compassion. The rules governing this symbolic exchange of "structural interaction of difference" assume that there is a proper use of difference, and that otherness can be negotiated (Baudrillard, 1993). This type of acceptance never facilitates an ethical confrontation with the other, nor can it advance full and equal participation in society, for its viral nature only cause's society itself to draw new lines of demarcation, erect new barriers to equality and find new claims to difference which justifies further segregation. Jean Baudrillard argues "there is no such thing as the proper use of difference (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 130)," and that efforts which attempt to "protect difference" offer no solutions, only serving to threaten communities which society labels as different with annihilation. Baudrillard (1993) further explains:

There is no such thing as the proper use of difference – a fact revealed not only by racism itself but also by all anti-racist and humanitarian efforts to promote and protect differences. Humanitarian ecumenism, the ecumenism of differences, is in a cul-de-sac: the cul-de-sac of the concept of the universal itself. The most recent illustration of this, in France, was the brouhaha over the wearing of headscarves for religious reasons by North African schoolgirls. All the rational arguments mustered in this connection turned out to be nothing but hypocritical attempts to get rid of the simple fact that no solution is to be found in any moral or political theory of difference. It is difference itself that is a reversible illusion…

The risibility of our altruistic 'understanding' is rivaled only by the profound contempt it is designed to conceal. For 'We respect the fact that you are different' read: You people who are underdeveloped would do well to hang on to this distinction because it is all you have left'. (The signs of folklore and poverty are excellent markers of difference.) Nothing could be more contemptuous – or more contemptible – than this attitude, which exemplifies the most radical form of incomprehension that exists. It has nothing to do, however, with what Segalen calls 'eternal incomprehensibility'. Rather, it is a product of eternal stupidity – of that stupidity which endures for ever in its essential arrogance, feeding on the differentness of other people.

Other cultures, meanwhile, have never laid claim to universality. Nor did they ever claim to be different – until difference was forcibly injected into them as part of a sort of cultural opium war. They live on the basis of their own singularity, their own exceptionality, on the irreducibility of their own rights and values. They find no comfort in the lethal illusion that all differences can be reconciled – an illusion that for them spells only annihilation. (pp. 131-132)

Just as disease-centric discourse creates these attitudes, imageries and actions rooted in notions of viral difference and hatred, it seems that any action towards people with disabilities conveyed in disease-centric discourse is premised on a notion of viral difference.   Viral difference manifests itself not only in the actions and attitudes stemming from disease-centric discourse, but also in the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse itself and its general deployment. Actions which place a primacy on difference and its domestication in the acts of "acceptance of difference" are often justified as acts of "compassion," yet acts premised on such notions can never truly overcome difference, nor can they recognize and appreciate the alterity of the other

necessary for ethical encounters. Deployment of disease-centric discourse represents and

independent rhetorical act which, in the words of Emmanuel Levinas, "thematizes"

disability as difference allowing difference to obscure alterity and unique otherness by

"standing in" for the individual subject in all encounters. In other words, difference in

terms of disability subsumes the entirety of the person by reducing the individual to a

mere condition of difference, as Lois Shepherd (2006) explains:

> On the other hand, however, focusing on the condition carries the risk of
> what Levinas calls "thematization." If the condition stands in for the person in
> evoking the right ethical response, i.e., compassion, then the condition may stand
> in for the person in other respects as well. In other words, the condition is the
> person, and thus we need to know nothing more about the person than the
> existence of the condition . . .
>   A compassionate response that focuses on the condition of a person in a
> way that permits us to see her in terms of a theme can result in unfair prejudice
> and discrimination. Even when less noxious results follow, such a response
> inappropriately shortcuts the more intense inquiry that is required to determine the
> needs and desires of that individual and can prevent the ethical response that is
> due . . .
>   . . . A compassionate response that thematizes a person as disabled can
> cause an underestimation of what that person can achieve and can thereby cut off
> opportunities for success, expression, respect, and self-worth. It can also result in
> alienation of people with disabilities as others cannot see beyond the apparent
> physical condition. The emphasis that advocates for people with disabilities place
> on language captures this concern that the focus of attention is properly placed on
> the person rather than the condition; advocates encourage the use of terms such as
> "person with a disability" rather than "the disabled person" so that the person
> comes first. (para.8.)

Founding action towards people with disabilities upon notions of difference,

placing a primacy on difference particularly in the context of incorporation,

domestication, and acceptance of such difference, dooms the struggle for equality to

failure. "Over recent centuries all forms of violent otherness have been incorporated,

willingly or under threat of force, into a discourse of difference which simultaneously

implies inclusion and exclusion, recognition and discrimination (Baudrillard, 1993, p.

129).” Once the Native American “savage” became “accepted” under U.S. law as “human,” or rather a different type of human, it was not long until viral hatred forced new boundaries of difference to be erected, and segregation of such difference to be enacted in the form of the reservation. Where the “savage” or “monster” is never understood, or assimilated, remaining radically exotic to the oppressive guise of society, when “accepted” by society on the basis of “difference” viral racism allows only two options for the future: assimilation or extermination (Baudrillard, 1993). Similarly, modern medicine has facilitated society with an understanding of disability, allowing it to accept the “different” or “disabled” person under law as “human,” more specifically a “disabled human” in which is different from “normal” individuals, but none the less similar. “Madness, once its exclusionary status had been revoked, was caught up in the far subtler toils of psychology (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 129).” As soon as society began to understand and consequently attempt to “accept” the “monster” other, the other traded its quality of foreign “monsterness” for qualities of “feebleness,” with the social acceptance of the others difference, the “monster” soon became the “mongoloid.” “Difference” annihilated the subaltern subject by making all that was foreign and radically exotic within easy reach of societal understanding. With a compassion rooted in pity, and fear founded upon difference, society became locked into a mode of interaction with disability, and the individuals’ disability located itself within, which mandated oppression in the spirit of viral hatred.

Just as the Native was forced out of “normal” society into the state of exception of the reservation, the “mongoloid” (“lunatic” or “imbecile”) was stripped of all possessions and forced into the state of exception of the asylum. The “feeble” were forcefully

sterilized by the state "for their own good," and for the benefit of society as a whole, while even today pregnant women labeled "mentally ill" are subject to being chained to hospital beds while physicians perform court-ordered cesarean sections against their will, under Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the compelling states interest in the life of the fetus and the health of the mother (Ehrenreich, 1993). The "discourse of difference" found within the rhetoric of disability continually multiplies the signs of difference with each medical advancement. Likewise, these "advancements" increase claims of knowledge and understanding over "disability," encouraging the incorporation of these differences into the system of regulated exchange of homogenized difference through acts of compassion and acceptance.

The viral nature of difference guarantees increased efforts of segregation, assimilation, and extermination with each glimmer of similarity recognized. Viral difference, similar to most viruses, operates as "a self-replicating code" which for survival feeds off the living host in which it attempts to destroy. When difference becomes the motivating factor in actions of acceptance and compassion, viral difference must replicate itself, often mutating forms, in the production of more difference which seeks to destroy any similarity created between the self and other (Baudrillard, 1993). Just as health provides energy for viral sickness, similarity provides impetus for viral difference, often when the different other becomes too similar to one's self the individual self must create new forms of difference in order to maintain the identity of the self (Baudrillard, 1993). Congressional legislation aimed at achieving equality for people with disabilities represents a fatal strategy when deploying the disease-centric rhetoric of viral difference. This rhetorical "strategy" of the congressional act is generally

unconscious and unintended, while it is "fatal" in respect to its ironic and self defeating

potential; the language used to compel action towards equality is simultaneously the same

language which creates attitudinal barriers blocking social equality for the group the act

intends to help, people with disabilities.

Given that difference cannot be simply accepted and incorporated "into a truly

seamless and unpatched fabric; increasing unity, falling barriers and great reduction in

real distance must of themselves compensate somewhere by means of new partitions and

unanticipated gaps (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 129)," the advocacy of this paper attempts to

avoid conceptualizations of difference all together. Being that "disability" is by

definition a signifier of difference and cannot be divorced from such representations it

becomes important to sever disability from the subject, rather than engaging in the

impossible task of erasing difference from disability. The growth of modern medicine

along with increased legislation pertaining to people with disabilities has eliminated the

potential for Baudrillard's alternative of "radical exoticism" to become a viable solution

to the problems of difference, or to even have the possibility to exist in the status-quo.

Increased interaction between the state, medicine, and individuals with and without

disabilities has locked us in a position where foreignness has been eliminated and

interaction mandated, so the question now becomes what form of interaction best

facilitates ethical encounters with the subaltern other. In an examination of the rhetoric

surrounding disability, "disease-centric discourse" will be criticized from a variety of

perspectives, advancing the argument that such rhetoric places a primacy on the

difference of a subject according to disability, and hence warrants rejection from

legislation aimed at securing equality. An alternative rhetorical model of "people-first

language" will be advanced as a way to facilitate ethical encounters with the other, a proper replacement to disease-centric rhetoric, and as a means of dislocating difference/disability from the individual. The end goal is to create a framework for action which bridges the gap between what is "spoken" and what is "said," affirming progressive actions towards equality for people with disabilities with rhetorical purity. Pragmatic action by the state can represent a radical responsibility to the other, and when enacted in the rhetoric of people-first language it can simultaneously represent a commitment to alterity.

Section Two: Methodology

The methods used to analyze the rhetoric and construction of disability, in respect to disease-centric discourse and people-first language, will encompass an approach of methodological and theoretical pluralism in three parts. The first focus will apply a textual analysis of historical context under an ideological frame, similar to that which Philip Wander applies in *The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism* (Wander, 1983). Using an ideological frame as foundation, this method departs from Wander in an effort to move beyond the text in analyzing dangerous omissions of indirect and unintentional rhetorical effects when an exclusive primacy is placed on the end goal of "the emancipatory moment (Wander, 1983)." The ideological perspective of historical context, inclusive of unintended rhetorical action, is crucial in the effort to break "through the monopoly of officialdom (Wander, 1983, p.)," and embrace a form of deconstruction liberated from acts of covert redeployment by the oppressive power criticized. Unmasking and renouncing omitted ideological assumptions of text within historical context is a necessary component in assessing the rhetoric of disability and

affirming a pure form of ideological criticism. The social construction of people with disabilities as "broken" or "flawed" and related stigmas attached to the label of disability which perpetuates inequality cannot be allowed to flourish in exchange for promises of "formal equality" by the state if we ever wish to "create a better world (Wander, 1983, p. 16)."

The second portion of methodological and theoretical pluralism applied will approach the rhetoric of disability tied to legislative policy from a Nietzschean perspective of rhetorical structure and performative engagement, or in Nietzsche's words *song* (Nietzsche, 1992). In applying Nietzsche's genealogical and historical criticism of how language gained meaning and the ability to construct specific human understandings according to its structure alone, it becomes possible to uncover theoretical justification for the harms disease-centric rhetoric presents without addressing issues of intent. In addition, application of Nietzsche's methodology facilitates a theoretical grounding upon which alternative rhetorical structuring can be leveled and justified as powerful means to reclaiming personhood, independent and in spite of any oppressive social stigma attached to the construct of "disability." Analyzing disease-centric rhetoric according to the rhetorical structuring of terminology embodied in the discourse itself offers new avenues in rejecting the oppressive discourse and it dehumanizing effects. Given that disease-centric rhetoric is more socially acceptable and unconscious compared to similarly situated modes of discourse embracing identical rhetorical structure, placing an emphasis on structure itself allows disease-centric discourse to be revealed as a tool of dehumanization by analyzing structural parallels between multiple forms of rhetoric currently deemed oppressive. Absent theoretical foundation, it is often difficult to

quantify the harm of disease-centric discourse or persuade others to stop engaging in rhetorical acts viewed as offensive by members of specific communities, making the application of this method crucial in the pursuit of equality.

The third application of methodology combines both the previously mentioned approaches, embracing the ideological frame and a primacy on rhetorical structure in tandem, with the goal of addressing the rhetorical problems of legislation without sacrificing the pragmatic gains in equality such policies offer. By remaining committed to an ideological vision of a better world, without omitting the ideological power of unintentional rhetorical acts and structure, one can formulate, amend and revise policy legislation in order to capture the benefits of equality secured both by the state and through the rejection of disease-centric rhetoric. Inverting the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse by placing the "person" before the "disability" follows the examples of studious play advanced by Nietzsche and Giorgio Agamben, while engaging in a unique form of "over-signification" with reason which ultimately shields the individual from the regulatory power of reason manifested in modern medicine.

Section Three: Outline of Remaining Chapters

The remaining chapters attempt to analyze core issues surrounding the rhetoric of disability through the creation and application of both rhetorical theory and rhetorical criticism. In addition, existing research, literature, and philosophy produced by others both inside and outside the discipline of communication studies will be reviewed and applied to aspects of this project.

The second chapter will review the relevant literature and scholarship surrounding disease-centric rhetoric and people first language. This section will begin by defining

and giving examples of both "people first language," and "disease-centric language," followed by a discussion of the origins of each type of rhetoric. The chapter then moves to identify the current discussion surrounding people with disabilities, including recent scholarship aimed at quantitatively identifying how individuals discuss and refer to individuals with disabilities. Next, the section concentrates on the implications of disease-centric discourse which situates the location of the "disease" firmly within the individual labeled "disabled." This portion offers a preliminary account of how disease-centric rhetoric serves to dehumanize individuals, providing explanation of dehumanization's methods and implications. This discussion then spills over to address anti-psychiatrist arguments which attempt to combat dehumanization by re-conceptualizing mental illness as a social construction. The chapter concludes by analyzing scholarship which renounces people first language, and isolating gaps in the current research to be addressed.

The third chapter engages in textual analysis within historical context in an effort to advance ideological criticism aimed towards renouncing ideological assumptions of legislative text often overlooked, veiled and omitted with criticism mandating a universal call to action. Specifically, this section analyzes the legislative text of House Resolution 285 (2005), and it's over arching call for action increasing the scope and enforcement of affirmative action for all "minorities," specifically mentioning "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women." Using House Resolution 285 (2005) as a platform, this chapter isolates a gap between what is "spoken" in the disease-centric rhetoric of legislative text, and what is actually "said" in its intentions of increasing the status of people with disabilities. An

ideological turn away from rhetoric taking shape as independent action in perpetuating

oppression and stigmatization dooms what is "said" to failure, yet this section concludes

by offering a mode of ideological commitment encompassing both the spoken and the

said in an effort to create the best possible world. One way to bridge the abyss between

what is said and what is spoken, action and the language embraced in the affirmation of

action, is a commitment to acknowledging the harmful effects language can have in a

current context, and strive to remain as linguistically and textually pure in affirming

action as one is in the motives behind action. In terms of the disease-centric rhetoric

inherent within the text of House Resolution 285 (2005), all individuals, including policy

makers, rhetorical critics, and all others, can problemitize and reject such rhetoric. As a

jumping off point, Resolution 285 (2005) potentially offers a unique point of departure

from both an infinite and universal call to action, and dehumanizing disease-centric

language. The "ideological turn" in recognizing the discrimination that people with

disabilities face, and searching for alternatives to such discrimination can be elevated to a

universal call of ideologically responsible action. This chapter attempts to build off of

Phillip Wander's rhetorical theory of ideological criticism, embracing many

argumentative techniques utilized in his "Ideological Turn," and applying them to

language taking form as independent action (Wander, 1983).

Chapter four utilizes a plethora of legislative texts in order to establish a definite

structure tied to disease-centric rhetoric and analyze its social and political effects. This

section applies Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy of language, grammar and reason to the

rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse (Johnston, 1999). Through analysis of

rhetorical structure, this chapter proposes that rhetorical position of the subject in a given

structure of discourse is determined by notions of reason which originally prompted Descartes to create a dualism between the mind and the body. Placing the individual subject before the predicate aligns one with reason and rationality, where as traversing this grammatical structure of reason disallows the separation of the mind from the body. The inversion of the subject and predicate inherent in disease-centric discourse represents a break from traditional notions of reason, and hence signifies the individual subject in opposition to reason and normalcy. Where as notions of reason have been traditionally deployed in an effort to regulate and control society, particularly individuals with disabilities, this section concludes by advocating an over-signification of the individual with such reason. Utilizing the techniques of Lacanian psychoanalysis, absent an attempt to discover any Truth or meaning, this chapter concludes with an advocacy of Jean Baudrillard's conception of "over-signification" with the rhetorical structure of reason Nietzsche discovers in language in an effort to shield the individual from the medical models regulation and authority over reason itself. The final portion of this chapter discusses other relevant portions of Nietzsche's work related to the rhetoric of disability including the issue of pity, and eventually resituates the discussion of people first language in Nietzschean terms of performative engagement, or song.

The fifth and final chapter embraces the significance of rhetorical structure and attempts to draw parallels between disease-centric discourse and racist rhetoric throughout the history of United States Congressional legislation. In drawing similarities between disease-centric rhetoric and racist rhetoric, the goal is to both expose disease-centric rhetoric as founded upon a rhetorical structure which inherently allows for oppression while embracing the structure of modern rhetoric surrounding scholarly

discussions of race as an example of empowering rhetoric. This chapter concludes with a discussion and advocacy of people first language becoming the dominant form of disability rhetoric which should replace disease-centric rhetoric in an effort to foster equality, justice, and autonomy.

CHAPTER TWO

A Review of the Literature

Introduction

"People first language" is a way of speaking and writing, about individuals who

are labeled as fitting within a category of "disabled." People first language is a way of

referencing individuals who are physically or mentally disabled in some way (Tyler,

1993). One example of people first language would be to reference a person traditionally

labeled a "schizophrenic" as a person with schizophrenia. In this example the use of

people first language of "person with schizophrenia" replaces the traditional medical

label of "schizophrenic." People first language emerged, partially in reaction to, a time

when individuals with disabilities were commonly labeled as "mongoloids" or "retards"

(Foreman, 2005). People first language acts as a way to replace such offensive and

degrading forms of speech in reference to individuals with disabilities with a more

compassionate and correct schema that acknowledges that individuals with disabilities

are first and foremost people (Foreman, 2005). People first language attempts to avoid

the notion that individuals with disabilities are inherently "flawed," (Ussher, 1992) that

individual's disabilities define the entirety of their being (Komissar, 1995). Additionally,

people first language attempts to detach disability from the individual, the notion that

disability is firmly rooted within the individual rather than alternative structures which

produce, define, and chain individuals to a singular conception of being or identity

(Shepherd, 2003). This detachment calls into question the origin of disability, if

individuals themselves are ever actually mentally ill, or if society creates the illness within individuals.

Our choice of language in regard to how we identify and discuss individuals with disabilities is incredibly important. Language has the ability to define selfhood, identity and being (Tyler, 1990). Language choice in media and every day speech effects how we become oriented to others and ourselves. The words we use and representations we deploy have the power to change our understanding of others, society, and ourselves. Language creates "otherness" both in our understanding of individuals and others understanding of themselves. With our words, we have the power to both challenge and reify normative assumptions and our interaction with society. People first language is a powerful tool in altering and abstaining from a dominant discourse that creates people with disabilities as "broken" or "inferior," a societal frame that dis-empowers, discriminates, and is complicit with acts of dehumanization (Szasz, 1997). Just as mental illness has become an important issue in the field of medicine, the language surrounding the issue has significant importance for the field of communication studies where we have a responsibility to investigate harmful discursive practices often overlooked by the medical system that deploys them.

This chapter attempts to analyze the very limited research in the area of people first language. Section one of this chapter will discuss what is currently known about people first language, the development of the discourse, where we currently find examples of the language, and reviews studies of how the language may shape our attitudes towards people with disabilities. Section two will examine the implications of disability centric discourse. This section will discuss people first language in relation to

existing theories of identity construction, the medical model, and labeling. This section

will also address how these issues can pragmatically disenfranchise individuals with

disabilities. Section three deals with the potential problems with people first language as

a replacement to the dominant disability centric discourse. This section specifically

addresses current research criticizing people first language in practice and principal, and

attempts to recon the disparities between the dissenters and advocates of people first

language. Section four explores the gaps and problems in the current research dealing

with people first language. This section then locates possible points for future

development and alternative methods in researching and practicing people first language.

The final portion of the paper, section five, is the conclusion. This section reviews the

primary goals of the chapter, and reemphasizes the importance of advocacy and usage of

people first language. After a critical analysis of the current research, section five

recognizes that a call for future investigation and problematization of discourses

surrounding issues relating to people with disabilities is warranted. While there is no

singular solution offered to the problems that people with disabilities face everyday, or an

ultimate conclusion on a universally correct form of language that should be used at

every occasion, section five leaves open the possibility for ethical engagement of people

with disabilities.

Section One: The Current Discussion Surrounding People with Disabilities

Today the practice of psychology and psychiatry has become a multi-billion

dollar business (Ussher, 1992). Everyday individuals are diagnosed with a variety of

mental illnesses, and labeled as "depressed" or "bi-polar" (Ussher, 1992). Students all

around the world study to become psychiatrists and psychologists and at the same time

many are labeled as "attention deficit," and prescribed drugs to "fix" the student so they can reach their goals easier. Television is blanketed with commercials for drugs that allow people to frolic in golden pastures and love life, freeing them from their dreary existence of "being mentally ill." With all of the discussion and research in the area of mental illness it is surprising that there is very little discussion or research about the way in which people with disabilities are referenced or what role communication plays in mental illness. While there are numerous journals that exclusively deal with both psychology and communication, it seems odd that there are such large gaps in the academic research being done on how we communicate issues of psychology and mental illness.

Today the discourse surrounding mental illness is present in almost every aspect of society. Mental illness is said to "exist" in many forms, and hence we have defined an entire population of society as the "mentally ill" (Szasz, 1997). With an increased understanding of the difficult reality people labeled "mentally ill" face on a day to day basis, society and medicine have started to redefine the ways in which they discuss "mental illness." Rather than being "a retardate" or a "mongoloid" people are now "developmentally or educationally impaired." Similarly, we find the medical system dismissing a host of terms such as "vegetable," "imbecile," "insane," and "lunatic" while replacing them with more "politically correct" labels that define people as "schizophrenics," "bi-polar," and "autistic."

While this shift or transformation in labeling appears positive (and in comparison to previous labels it most definitely is), the medical system and society still regard people with disabilities as "the disabled" (Snow, 2007). Individuals are not people with a given

disability, but rather defined by their disability. In adhering to this dominant discourse the disability replaces the individual, it becomes the way in which the individual is socially defined, and her or his identity socially constructed.

While labeling regimes have changed, as recently as the 1970's terms such as "mongoloid" and "imbecile" were considered to be objective and neutral labels for those diagnosed as "mentally disabled (Foundation Level Training)." Around the same time these labels were considered to be correct, and partially in response to such demeaning characterizations, a movement to transform such disability centric rhetoric emerged. The initial step taken by activists was to directly alter the label itself, in an effort to make the terms more palatable and politically correct. During the 1980's activists and advocates for people with disabilities started to take on the broader project of transforming the way the label not only defined the disability, but also the person with the disability.

The "People First Language" movement was spawned in an effort to separate the individual from the disability (Foundation Level Training). Originally created by those involved in activism and advocacy, people first language has slowly crept into various discussions related to mental illness. Today we find pamphlets discussing how people first language should be deployed in the work place and educational system, yet numerous state and federal policies, along with the media and text books, remain filled with disability centric language (Titchkosky, 2001).

Disability-centric language is still considered to be normal and acceptable in the general public. Often individuals engage in such modes of speech without any knowledge that it may be demeaning or offensive to some. Many times individuals do not have prejudice, negative attitudes, or explicit assumptions of inferiority towards

people with disabilities when using such language. Similarly, individuals may use people first language without any knowledge of why it would be a more correct form of speech. Individuals who have not been exposed to criticism of disability centric language often interchange people first language and disability centric language during the course of a discussion related to the issue of disability.

The research related to people first language is very limited. This being said, one group seems to be quite interested in the issue and has conducted two major research projects attempting to analyze attitudes towards people with disabilities, demographics and use of people first language. The original study, conducted by Feldman, Tulbert, Gordon, and Egan-Koffman (1996), attempted to investigate "the effects of demographic variables and *language* usage patterns (traditional disability 1st *language* or *people* 1st *language*) on individual attitudes and behavioral intentions toward the inclusion of persons with disabilities" (p. 2) This study asked 261 students enrolled in undergraduate and graduate level special education classes at a mid-western university to complete a writing sample discussing an interaction with a person with a disability, provide demographic data, and complete a Likert-type questionnaire about attitudes towards people with disabilities. The types of language (people first, disability centric) language was coded and quantified and the questionnaire evaluated along with demographic data. The results showed that most of those involved in the study interchanged people first language with disability centric language, yet over half exclusively used people first language in their writing sample. The second set of results of the study combined the written sample along with the demographic data and responses generated by the questionnaire in an attempt to discover if language choice effected or determined attitude

towards individuals with disabilities. Although the results were mixed they showed that the variable of demographics seemed to have a greater impact on attitudes towards people with disabilities than language choice in referring to people with disabilities (Feldman, Et. Al., 1996).

Feldman, Gordon, White, and Weber (2002) later published a follow up investigation. This experiment followed along the same lines as the first, with similar variables and methods of inquiry including a writing sample, questionnaire and disclosure of demographic data. The 351 participants in the experiment were undergraduate, graduate and doctoral level students of counseling psychology whose age spanned from 18 to 51. While the experiment was similar to the one published in 1996, the results were dramatically different. The first example of this is that only a small percentage of participants in the study consistently used people first language in their writing sample. In addition, while the results were still mixed the study indicated that the variable of language rather than demographics was actually significant in regards to attitudes towards people with disabilities. The results indicated that "*language* usage appears to affect the attitude and behavioral intentions towards persons with disabilities (Feldman, Et. Al., 2002)."

Section Two: Disease-Centric Discourse and It's Implications

In the book, *The Dehumanization of Man* (1983), Montague and Matson cited dehumanization as "the fifth horseman of the apocalypse," "worse than any war, plague, famine or natural disaster on record (p. xi-xii)." Similarly, Martin Heidegger (1965) has claimed that loss or obscuring of being is "worse than nuclear annihilation of humanity (p. 93)," in that even with nuclear annihilation there remains a possibility of being

coming to presence in authenticity, where as a total eclipse of being leaves no possibility

of any life worth living, or being ever manifesting itself in it's essence (Heidegger, 1965).

While these examples of the harms of dehumanization appear a bit exaggerated or

extreme in a pragmatic sense, the real effects of dehumanization are almost incalculable.

Dehumanizing rhetoric, inclusive of the label of "disabled," strips any value from life,

people are seen as merely objects, living a life that affords one only physical existence.

The term dehumanization itself seems to be fairly clear in referring to removal of all that

is human.

       Disability centric discourse, at its core, is explicitly dehumanizing (Forman,

2005). Individuals become the "diseases" the doctors have labeled them; people are no

longer people but rather broken objects of the medical system. Given the nature of

"disability," or the lack of ability, the individual described by disability centric language

is one whose entire selfhood, identity, and being are assumed to be inferior or inherently

flawed in some fashion. This language chains all that is humanness to singularity,

defining the individual in binary opposition to what is normal.

       In discussion of the dehumanizing effects of disease centric discourse, one can

gain much insight from "anti-psychiatrists" scholars such as Jane M. Ussher and Thomas

Szasz. These individuals have repeatedly made the bold claim that "mental illness does

not exist." While at first encounter this statement seems cold, cruel, and patently false in

denying the reality of pain and stigma that individuals with disabilities encounter, upon

closer examination one begins to discover the compassionate true intent behind the

words. In claiming that mental illness does not exist these scholars attempt to resituate

the phenomena of mental illness, displacing and distancing the disability from the

position as inherent within the individual labeled as mentally ill. Ussher (1992) and Szasz (1983) claim that society creates mental illness, and hence it is society that is diseased, flawed, or broken. While the pain and stigma attached to the label of disability is most definitely real, as is pain which often accompanies disability, individuals themselves are never actually "mentally ill." Individuals are not to "blame" for conditions of mental illness, for they are merely responding to an ill society. Mental illness does not stem from a biological condition or failing, but rather society and interactions with society force biological processes to become abnormal. The expression of "mental illness" is merely a natural physical response to the way the external world has applied pressure on, and altered the individual biologically (Szasz, 1997).

One of the most explicit examples of the social construction of mental illness can be seen with a discussion of anorexia (Ussher, 1992). In this example, societies obsession with thinness impacts individuals to the point where natural biological processes become altered. While the medical model defines the bodies altered state of biological process as something abnormal or wrong with the individual, stemming from an inherent flaw of individual biology, Ussher (1992) and Szasz (1997) locate the problem or flaw within the society or environment that causes biology to become physically altered. Specifically, the cause or root of anorexia amongst women, and even men, can be located in a patriarchal society that perpetuates a "beauty myth" that claims to be attractive means to be overly thin. The pressure society exerts on individuals to adhere to this myth forces the biological processes of individuals under such pressure to adapt or respond to the given pressure. In the case of anorexia, society pressures

biological processes to become altered in order to fit within the image of the beauty myth rigidly defined by a patriarchal society (Ussher, 1992).

Ussher (1992) and Szasz (1997) implicate their criticisms with a discussion of how people with disabilities become further stigmatized under the system of the medical model that locates disability and understanding of mental illness as inherent within the individual. Individuals are assumed to be broken, and biologically inferior to all others known as normal. Detaching flaws and disability from the individual and placing them on the society that creates such issues frees individuals from additional stigmatization placed on people with disabilities. In addition, such acts of dislocation of disability allow for real alternatives to emerge by attempting to criticize the problems of society rather than the individual (Ussher, 1992).

Similar to the critique of mental illness made by Ussher and Szasz, people first language also offers a degree of separation between mental illness and the individual. In refusing to locate and define the entire identity, being, and selfhood of the individual as universally disabled, people first language avoids the dominant medical representations and location of disability in a position firmly rooted as inherent within the individual. People first language establishes the individual first, and then allows for discussion of pressures exerted on that individual which alters biological processes. People first language dislocates disability as inherent within individual biology and allows for the roots of its construction to be identified and criticized elsewhere.

Section Three: Dissenting Views: Criticism of People First Language in Practice and Principle.

While existing research relating to people first language is very limited, criticism of the people first language movement is even rarer. Titchkosky (2001) takes the position that people first language reemphasizes difference and abnormality in its separation of the individual from the disability. In addition, the Titchkosy criticizes the way people first language ultimately incorporates core assumptions of the medical model in its claim that disability "just happens," which re-entrenches the notion that disability is rooted within the individual, removing the possibility of understanding disability in a social context. The article discusses all of these issues in reference to a Canadian government document entitled "*In Unison: A Canadian Approach to Disability Issues.*" Titchkosky (2001) further criticizes the way that the Unison article and people first language advocates further otherize individuals with use of terms such as "they" in reference to people with disabilities, and assume the role of the "non-disabled," paternalistically speaking for "the disabled," and claiming to solve the problem of objectification in disability discourse, which merely "damns" further investigation and criticism (Titchkosky, 2001).

Before addressing the specific issues the above article articulates, it is important to locate the impetus of the article's criticism. The article places the primacy of its criticism on the Unison government document, and then attempts to universalize criticism to each and every people first language advocate. To say the least, this attempt to universalize criticism does not effectively translate to the majority of people first language advocates or text relating to the promotion of people first language. In addition, criticism of specific uses of language such as "they" (in reference to what people with

disabilities want, desire, and need) is not intrinsic in most research, discussion and promotion of people first language. While raising an important issue of alternative demeaning discursive practices, it is important to remember that not all forms of people first language advocacy takes form in such a way.

The majority of the Titchkosky's criticism (i.e. the natural, inherently individual conception of disability that reifies the medical model and blocks questioning of social construction) can be corrected by simply abstaining from the practices the article claims are universal. It is important to remember that people first language is a first step, a point of departure from the dominate disability centric discourse that dehumanizes people with disabilities. While people first language may highlight disability and difference in separating it from the individual, it none the less offers a beneficial alternative to the current dominate discourse. This being said it is important to remember that people first language is not a panacea that cures all dehumanization and stigma; it is not a "solution" but rather a positive development in disability discourse. Individuals must be responsible in their advocacy, not to paternalistically define others wants or needs in speaking for or with people with disabilities.

Section Four: Limitations on Current Research

Given that current, existing research is limited, gaps in current research are plentiful. While the Feldman studies ought to be commended for pragmatically examining how people first language correlates to individual's attitudes towards people with disabilities, there still need to be more questions asked and further research on the questions that are currently asked. The Feldman experiments conclude with different results, not only in the relation of people first language to attitudes towards people with

disabilities, but also in the frequency in use of people first language. In order to establish definitive results, further research may be needed.

While the most recent data concludes that there is a direct correlation between language usage and attitudes towards people with disabilities, it is important to remember that absence of correlation of people first language to behavioral intent and attitudes towards people with disabilities does not necessarily negate the demeaning and dehumanizing implications that disability centric discourse presents. As previously stated, many times individuals do not have prejudice, negative attitudes, or explicit assumptions of inferiority towards people with disabilities when using such language. Just as non-sexist individuals may be socialized to use terms that over time are identified as being sexist, individuals may not be aware of the way they are framing individuals with disabilities with use of disability centric discourse. This presents a difficult task for researchers: disability centric language is generally not used out of malice or hate, and hence positivist research drawing a correlation between word choice and attitude may be inadequate in attempting to analyze the harms of the discourse.

Most importantly, there seems to be absolutely no theoretical explanations of how and why the structure and deployment of disease centric discourse serves to oppress individuals with disabilities. In addition, none of the theoretical criticisms of the medical model of mental illness are ever linked to the political process, or applications of disease centric discourse within legislation. Finally, the existing criticisms of the medical model currently do not offer any alternatives specific to people first language, nor is there any explanation of how the re-appropriation of rhetorical structure allows people first language to escape demeaning and oppressive views of people with disabilities.

Section Five: Conclusion

The primary goal of this Chapter is to review the existing research related to the "People First Language" movement. People first language emerged as a way to combat the dominant disability centric discourse that reduces individuals to the disability in which they are labeled. To this day people first language remains an important issue in activism and advocacy for people with disabilities. Advocates continue to lobby for a change in language, mainly in education and public policy (Guth, 1998), in an effort to curb dehumanization and the locating of disability as inherent within the individual.

Language has immense power; it can define selfhood, identity, and being. Language has the power to reduce life to a state of nothingness; it can remove humanness, transform individuals into broken objects, and plague individuals with life long stigma. Language also has the ability to change, just as language has the power to change lives, language itself can become altered and even deconstructed. The use of people first language is a radical departure from the disability centric language that locks people with disability into a permanent position of inferiority. People first language distances or differentiates disability from personhood. This alternative language is not a total or universal solution to the issues faced by people with disabilities, it will not end dehumanization or eliminate flawed representations of people with disabilities, but it is a step in the right direction. People first language flies in the face of disability centric discourse, it functions as an act of performative resistance to the dominant representations of people with disabilities. People first language challenges dehumanization and stigmatization inherent within disability centric discourse, making it clear that above all people with disabilities are people first (Snow, 2004).

The current research on usage and effects of usage of people first language is extremely limited. The research that does exist is incomplete at best, it offers conflicting results, and employs methodology that makes it incredibly difficult to ever truly analyze the implications of disability centric discourse. The samples used are not generalizable, and do not account for actual people with disabilities. To say the least future research is necessary.

CHAPTER THREE

Rhetorical Theory and the Ideological Turn

Introduction

Language "does not represent another tec[h]nique, a new approach to criticism embedded in some European intellectual tradition (Wander, 1983, p. 1)." Language, in some form, has been in existence most likely before Europeans themselves. Language means many things, has many effects and contexts, and is often self-referentially used in the description of itself. Language can house ideology, action, Being, and inaction; simultaneously revealing and concealing different contexts, interpretations and qualities.

Martin Heidegger once said, "Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man (Heidegger, 2001, p. 144)." As a precursor to ensuring the most beneficial discussion of such a quote it is important to note, reject, disengage from, or do whatever one must, to the advocacy, or use, of the gendered language of "man" used in the quotation by Heidegger. While situated in a "historical context (Wander, 1983)," such rhetoric may appear to be used in a less misogynistic fashion, or "stated in the more positive" naturally deployed, when situated or utilized in a present context such rhetoric allows us to "lose sight of the connections (Wander, 1983, p. 5)" between patriarchy and the linguistic representation of women. This being said, the underlying or over arching intent of what is spoken in the quotation is quite thought provoking. One interpretation, and quite a nihilistic one, of this quote

could be that we (as individuals, rhetorical critics, or whatever one may define hirself[iii] as) have no power over language; language seems to float around as some type of phenomena, mysteriously controlling our every action. Another interpretation could potentially construe language similar to ideology; while we toy at shaping ideology in "the critical study of ideas (Wander, 1983, p. 5)," it is ideology itself that drives this creation. A third interpretation, and one that will be discussed in length throughout this essay, makes it possible to conceive the quotation to mean that language, seemingly unknowingly, effects individuals in very specific ways; often language is used as a tool to compel action, while the language itself is regarded as just that, a tool, something sterile, that's only effect is the singular pursuit of the crafters intent. Language makes it possible for us to achieve what we desire, and nothing else; there are no side effects, meanings or interpretations beyond the pure intentions of the crafter, no alternative contexts in which language can be situated, nothing deeper than text itself.

While language is often treated with such mastery by the crafter who places an exclusive primacy on the end goal or intent, shaping language merely to reach an end destination; the language itself can have unintended effects when deployed in a world resembling nothing of a sterile laboratory. Language in this light moves beyond the popular assumption of "shaping reality" as intended, to a plane of specificity where language severs itself from the crafter's intent and delivers us to unintended locations. Language begins to take shape as independent action; isolated from the ideology that originally acts as the impetus for the creation of the goal or the spirit the text was written in. The action of such language has the power to derail even the most well intended

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[iii] The pronouns "ze," and "hir" are used in place of traditional gender pronouns of "he/she," and "him/her" in order to avoid the gender binary paradigm of language which excludes transgender identities.

goals, further perpetuate the same problems the crafter intends to solve, and become the master of the other in which the crafter's action intends to liberate.

While it is difficult to predict a specific time or location in which specific acts of language, words, and phrases, will take this "ideological turn" away from sterility, we must remain open and responsive to such disclosure of the turning. When language is perceived as beginning to negatively effect individuals and entire sectors of society, individuals, and particularly rhetorical critics, must remain as attentive to what is spoken as to what is said; we must responsively remain mindful to the text while engaging in the pursuit of action.

Today we stand on the brink of the abyss[iv]; a world in which one false perception of intent, one independent isolated action, far removed from current goals set forth; just one miscalculation could place us in a world that seems unthinkable. Iran has pledged to "wipe Israel of the map (Fathi, 2005, p. 1)" with nuclear weapons, China boasts it will fully retaliate against any nation that comes to the aid of an independent Taiwan, while India and Pakistan remain on the brink of all out nuclear war. The United States is engaged in a "Global War on Terror," with troops fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. We have in the recent past bared witness to terrorist attacks on American soil, while other terrorist attacks seem to occur almost daily around the world. One must also not forget about the violence we see every night on the local news; murder, rape and hate crimes are committed all within the same hour in different parts of the United States, often in our own towns. Racism, sexism, and various other forms of discrimination and

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[iv] This acknowledgement of worldly harms attempts to parallel Wander's criticism in the Ideological Turn.

prejudice exist in the minds of many, and are intentionally and unintentionally displayed in almost every sector of society. Crisis surrounds us; at every turn new problems and crises emerge and disclose themselves to us.

My point in this discussion of crisis is not to paint a picture of an anarchic or chaotic world in which realist power politics are not only inevitable, but necessary for survival; nor am I wishing to entirely disengage from this world on a philosophical or ontological quest. I do not wish to calculate which issue is of the most importance, or offer a universal or specific solution or alternative to each of issues referenced, for this "I will leave to those more versed (Wander, 1983, p. 7)" in the specific situations. What I would like to accomplish, is however, the creation of an incomplete, brief yet vast, list of scenarios that we are faced with, and that "threaten life on this planet (Wander, 1983, p. 12)." Any one of these issues could be analyzed, researched, and critically studied for a life time, making a universal call of responsibility to each rather troubling. Here, I would merely like to posit "the existence of powerful vested interests benefiting from and consistently urging policies and technologies (Wander, 1983)" that create and fuel such issues, while also positing how perceptions and actions, independent of any overarching goal or intent to create and fuel such events, often do.

It is in this abyss, between the pillar of intentional violence and a pillar of violence isolated from intent, absent a crafter, that I would like to reconsider House Resolution 285, "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the ongoing need to provide every qualified American with equal access to opportunity in education, business, and employment and the indispensability of Affirmative action

programs in securing such equal access (HRES 285, 2005)"[v] and Professor Philip

Wander's "*The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism* (1983)." The criticism will

juxtapose the two texts, parallel their assumptions and dwell in the void of their

omissions. The ultimate effort is to lay the ground work for a bridge between the divide

of what is spoken and what is said by breaking "through the monopoly of officialdom

(Wander, 1983, p. 9)" that is the infinite and universal call to action "beyond the net

words or the 'text' (Wander, 1983, p. 7)."

Throughout this chapter language will be used in multiplicity; rhetoric and

ideology, including specific words and phrases, which both Philip Wander and Martin

Heidegger embrace in many of their works will be deployed in different contexts, and

situated in alternative frames. The "tools" used by each of these scholars will be

embraced in tandem, at times as one; structure, language, ideology and technique will be

permuted as the criticism follows "The Ideological Turn" while it departs from it.

Section One: An Ideological Vision: House Resolution 285

The over arching goal of House Resolution 285 (2005) aims to compel the action

of increasing the scope and enforcement of affirmative action for all "minorities,"

specifically mentioning "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native

Americans, persons with disabilities, and women (H.Res 285, 2005)." The resolution

leaves instances of discrimination in which affirmative action should be deployed

seemingly vague, opening up space for a full-frontal attack on under-representation of

"minorities" in various sectors of society, while offering examples of locations such

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[v] Latest Major Action: 6/22/2005 Referred to House subcommittee. Status: Referred to the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations.

discrimination occurs in stating "Americans are denied their fair share of business opportunity, receive unequal pay, find their career paths capped, and are excluded or under-represented in certain fields of training or education (H.Res 285, 2005)." The call to responsibility, or action, appears similarly vague, calling individuals within the government, particularly the Attorney General and the President, to "expand equity of opportunity…at every opportunity," while specifically citing how the president should "incorporate Affirmative action into the employment, contracting, granting, educational, and program activities of the United States and all its subcontractors and grantees (H.Res 285, 2005)."

Regardless of one's view of affirmative action as an ideological issue, or it's pragmatic effectiveness in improving the lives, or struggle, of minorities in the United States, it is only important to note here that the apparent overarching goal, as intently stated in the "whereas" clause of the resolution, is to improve the lives and social standing of "minorities." It is here where I must make an omission. Due to the lack of information, or ability to obtain such information, partially due to the recent nature of House Resolution 285 (2005) I will not completely move beyond the text, although I would encourage others to do so, this is not the primary goal at this point. If one were to "move beyond the net of words or the 'text' (Wander, p. 14)" of House Resolution 285 (2005) I would most defiantly consider it to be "rhetorical criticism," for I am in no way advocating any type of "extra-ordinary restraint when it comes to (Wander, p. 9)" the piece of legislation. My criticism in no way situates me as a "reporter" or "public relations consultant" attempting to gauge the "effectiveness" of the text of the resolution in regards to its passage.

I do not assume purity of congressional motives in my omission, for in the history of the United States we have seen instances when intentions and over arching goals were veiled attempts to accomplish the opposite of what they appeared. The issue of purity of motives is particularly relevant and troublesome in this specific area of anti-discrimination law relating to employment, as we have seen offensive and violent attempts to use "pure" motives destructively, with efforts to circumvent similar legislation in the past. The motives behind the inclusion of a sex-based discrimination category to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act resembled nothing of "purity" in intention or over arching goals, as southern representatives added the category of sex-based discrimination to the original draft of the bill as an attempt to block the passage of the entire Civil Rights Act. I believe Wander is correct in his urging recognition of "powerful vested interests benefiting from and constantly urging policies" that are dangerous. Ideological criticism is "disconcerting" both in the difficulty of its practice, and in what it often reveals. My omission is not due to a lack of care, nor is it a negligent act of "masking," but rather a concession of sorts; I agree with Wander that the acknowledgement of dangers, and the search for alternatives to those dangers is important. Similar to the way Wander avoids problemitizing a specific non-theoretical danger looming over our heads, or clear a specific path to "search for alternatives" to such a danger; the aim of this criticism is not to specifically or completely move beyond the text of Resolution 285 (2005), or any other issue (such as those crises listed above) for that matter.

House Resolution 285, its text and assumed motives of a "pure" overarching goal and intent, are used as a jumping off point in initiating a discussion of "People First

Language," hopefully bridging textual language and ideology in the "elevated" movement beyond the "net words or the 'text' (Wander, p. 14)" with the addition of a specific focus on specific words or portions of the text. The ultimate goal is to affirm House Resolution 285 (2005), not as a specific piece of legislation, but in its impossibility, as an ideological call to responsibility in creating equality; elevating this call, to a universal plane, allowing the specific rejection of the disease-centric rhetoric inherent within the text, hence advocating action beyond the text with textual purity. This event is a momentary pause in the flash of the "ideological turn," a rupture which breeds turning points in all directions, while maintaining the course of the original. Taking the exclusive focus off the end point of the turn allows for "an encounter with history and the human struggle," along with an encounter with current human struggles that are often driven underground in the call to action; "draw[ing] out the emancipatory moment in (Wander, p 15)" both the text and the action "of concern," in affirming actions from a universal plane of awareness.

Section Two: The conflict between what is spoken and what is said: House Resolution 285 and Disease-Centric Language

While the motive, intent, and overarching goal of House Resolution 285 (2005) can, at least for the purpose of this criticism, be considered a beneficial step "to create a better world (Wander, p. 16)," the language "deployed" in the crafting of the text has largely been ignored, both thus far in this criticism, and by scholars and policy-makers alike. While this language in question is an important component of House Resolution 285 (2005), it is most certainly not unique to just this text. This language can be seen in numerous "drafts of official documents (Wander, p. 14)," textbooks, newspapers, and

medical reports; it is heard in academic and medical institutions along with coffee houses and taverns, often times in much more egregious forms.

The language being referenced here is what I label "disease-centric" language a language, or form of rhetoric, often used to speak of, with, and to people with disabilities. Disease-centric language is a form of labeling, a way of representing, and a tool, mainly unconsciously, used in the act of dehumanization. This language takes a multiplicity of forms and is deployed in a plethora of contexts spanning from historical descriptions of people with learning disabilities as "mongoloids," to presently labeling people with schizophrenia as "schizophrenics," or worse "schizos (Foundation Level Training)." At its core, disease-centric discourse fails to put "people" first, both discursively and ideologically, in its singularity of defining the individual as the "disease" or "illness." With the "existence" of an almost infinite list of mental illnesses defined by the medical model, disease-centric discourse perpetually discloses itself.

The text of House Resolution 285 (2005) offers a very unique platform to introduce a discussion of disease-centric language as a pause in the infinite call to, and primacy placed on, action in the flash of the ideological turn. Thus far, the only quotation of, or references to House Resolution 285 (2005) were made exclusively using "people first language" (placing the term "people" before the label of disease) for good reason, a large portion of the text adheres to a principal of non-disease-centric rhetoric. In fact, the first time the disease-centric term "disabled people" appears is not until the seventh paragraph of the "whereas" clause; previously using a non-disease-centric form of rhetoric: "persons with disabilities," in the text's only two previous references to individuals with disabilities. From this point on, (from the seventh paragraph of the

whereas clause), the disease-centric term "disabled persons" is exclusively used throughout the remainder of the Resolution.

This blending of use, the deployment of disease-centric language and non-disease-centric language or people first language within the confines of the same text, is not an uncommon event. In 1996 a group of researchers conducted an experiment testing the language usage patterns of undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in special education classes. The study asked each participant to complete a writing sample, detailing at least one interaction with a person with a disability that they have encountered during their lifetime. The researches coded the responses according to the degree in which disease-centric language and non-disease-centric language were used. The results came out interestingly mixed, finding that most of those involved in the study frequently interchanged non-disease-centric language with disease-centric language in the single text of their writing sample (Feldman, 1996). From both the text of House Resolution 285 (2005), and the study conducted in 1996, it seems that one could easily reach the conclusion that disease-centric language is often inadvertently or unintentionally used, isolated from ideology, and absent any intent the crafter of the text may have to engage in a demeaning discourse or representation of people with disabilities. Both Resolution 285 (2005) and the 1996 study (Feldman, 1996) represent examples of texts originating from individuals that seemingly wish to enhance the quality of life for people with disabilities. Congressperson Davis, the sponsor of the bill and a proponent of disability rights, claimed discrimination based on "disability undermines our national unity, rends the political and social fabric of our Nation, and distorts and

mutates democracy and government (H.Res, 2005)," while the 261 participants in the 1996 study (Feldman, 2006) all pursued a path in the field of special education.

With a passionate call to action rooted in what are seemingly pure intentions and overarching goals, the crafter appears to deploy language as if it were a sterile tool in an effort to compel beneficial action. The ultimate goal of the action offered is all that is in sight, with little to no acknowledgement of how one becomes blinded to language taking form as independent action. Society is constantly changing and evolving, what was once natural or common practice of rhetoric, situated in a "historical context," can be considered offensive, dehumanizing or repugnant in a current context. Often times, individuals use rhetoric that was once deemed natural in a "historical context" that directly harms or offends individuals that we come in contact with every day, or a group of people that we ourselves identify with. These rhetorical acts can be completely without intention or knowledge that the language deployed has a direct harmful effect on the individuals of a particular group. As seen in House Resolution 285 (2005), engaging in these discursive or rhetorical acts in the deployment of specific types of language (terms, words or phrases) such as disease-centric-language, can perpetuate the discrimination, dehumanization, and stigmatization of those individuals the ideological goal of an action desires to help. When this event occurs, there appears a gap in what is spoken in the text of advocacy and what is said in its intent, no matter how technically "effective" or "beneficial" the outcome of the action may be, it embraces violence in the process, derailing even the best intentions, leaving a "more beneficial" action(s) to be desired.

Disease-centric language, at its core, is explicitly dehumanizing (Snow, 2006). Individuals become interpreted through the lens of the "diseases" they are labeled; people cease to be people but rather broken objects of the medical system. Given the nature of "disability," the lack of ability or "deficiency," the individual described by disease-centric language is one whose entire selfhood, identity, and being is assumed to be inferior or inherently flawed through representation. This language chains all that is humanness to singularity, defining the individual in binary opposition to what is normal. This becomes the way in which the individual is socially defined, and her or his identity socially constructed. The ideology and stigmatizing assumptions perceptually tied to disease-centric language lays the foundation for, and fuels the crisis of, discrimination (Meurrens, 2005).

Section Three: Beyond the Textual: Historical Context, Omission, and Phillip Wander

Just as Phillip Wander notes how "the cultural and political cast of Wichelns' essay" and his affirmation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* "does not detract from the brilliance of his strategy nor its value in legitimizing 'speech' as a field of study (Wander, p. 5)," it is important for this criticism to note how the universal tone of Wander's essay in its call to action beyond the text in the midst of crisis, such as the Vietnam war, does not "detract from the brilliance of his strategy nor its value in legitimizing (Wander, p. 5)" ideological concern as a dominant component in criticism. In this same vein, it is also important to note what is "left out" of these criticisms, and the implications of such omissions. Wander points to "the political significance of what Wichelns left out, the concept of the 'public space' in which he worked… (Wander, p. 6)" noting that such an omission "became mirrored in the neo-Aristotelian tradition (Wander, p. 6)." According to

Wander (1983), this tradition "tended to exclude women, Indians, 'Negro' speakers, and labor leaders…(p. 7)" While it is not explicitly clear whether or not Wander is criticizing Wichelns' omission as a direct result of placing primacy elsewhere or an innocent act of simply not discussing such issues, it is clear that Wander does not place a "sinister interpretation" on such a decision. It is also clear that this omission, at the very least, allowed for a tradition of exclusion; ironically the list of groups excluded in the neo-Aristotelian tradition, provided by Wander, seems to at least in part "mirror" the excluded groups listed in House Resolution 285; "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women (H.Res 285, 2005)." While this parallel may be by chance, Wander subtly allows for the oppression of "minority" groups both in his justification of Wichelns' omission, and more inadvertently in his own.

Wander's engagement in acts of omission, at the very least, allows exclusion; both in his lack of investigating the reciprocal of a "historical context" and the overt primacy he places on "moving beyond the net words or the 'text.'" These omissions seem to clear a space for allowing one to ignore specific instances of dangerous rhetoric, such as disease-centric language, in the universal call to action.

Wander discusses "historical context," throughout his essay, but most specifically in reference to Martin Heidegger, both in linking the similarities of language embraced in *Being and Time* to language deployed by the Nazi party, and through a discussion of Heidegger himself and the Nazi party "struggling for power (Wander, p. 7)" in a similar timeframe. The ultimate goal in linking such individuals, and their "rhetorical strategies," or texts is a general attempt to discredit both Heidegger and his followers due

to their detachment from societal concerns in times of crisis, in addition to specifically attempting to discredit Lawrence Rosenfield and his direct criticism of Philip Wander in a 1974 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. Throughout the text, "historical context" is almost exclusively used to cite and implicate instances of withdrawal from action; the only benefit or advantage Wander ever offers to the situating of historical context is the ability to call out scholars such as Heidegger, Rosenfield, and Hill in their failure to embrace a call to action during times of national or global crisis. Ironically, one example where Wander alternatively uses "historical context" results in the affirmation of a call to action through its negation. In Wander's discussion of Wichelns, a scholar he adorns as one who "preserves an interest in human action (Wander, p. 8)," historical context is used to discover a "sociopolitical context" inclusive of "actions taken by government officials (Wander, p. 10)," in a time of "political radicals (Wander, p. 10);" (an effort not afforded to Heidegger, during similar event) which Wander then advocates to justify Wichelns' lack of responsibility to "suspect immigrants" facing false arrest and a omission to a tradition of exclusion.

It is in this light that Wander's primacy on "historical context," and criticism of "Heidegger's Nazism," appears an effort to discredit specific scholars in an attempt to promote his own "cause" or goal of a universal call to action; a tactic Bruce Foltz, Heidegger scholar and professor of philosophy at the University of Dallas, deems "not surprising, but neither is it of much philosophical consequence (Foltz, p. 112)."

Absent the direct intent of placing primacy on the call to action inherent within the motives of Wander's deployment of a "historical context," there remain other omissions which uniquely serve to disenfranchise people with disabilities and other

similar linguistically represented "minority" groups. "Historical context" represents a state of exception in the blanket denial of textual or linguistic meaning, offering a glimmer of hope in the call to linguistic responsibility that operates in tandem with the overarching goal of any pure ideological action. Unfortunately, this perception of a gain is merely a deception of a loss; Wander's interpretation of "historical context" denies multiplicity, positive historical interpretations of specific linguistic or rhetorical acts, and the possibility for the redeployment of language as an act of deconstruction in a current context.

Just as society is constantly evolving to redefine once natural language as offensive, the reciprocal is also possible; individuals in a current context can embrace certain forms of rhetoric, words or phrases, in attempt to subvert the negative connotations, dominant ideology, and the effects of language in a current context. Examples of this can most easily be found in the groundings of both feminism and race related movements; the term "bitch," traditionally used to degrade women, has been embraced amongst some feminist circles both in an effort to take the power to define out of the hands of males, and to resituate issues of femininity. Today, in a current context, one can find examples of such redeployment of the term "bitch" both in audible exchanges between female friends, and cultural text such as "Bitch: Feminist Response to Pop Culture." The primacy placed on discovering the "historical context" of text coupled with the advocacy of "moving beyond the net words or the 'text'" denies a focus, on any level, of investigating language and its effects, as independent action isolated from intent, in a current context. Moving beyond text, in quest for historical connections and significance, represents an ideological turn away from the present. Under Wander's

conception of moving beyond the text in historical context, ideological issues intrinsic to

words themselves are irrelevant; language is merely a tool to discover historical

connections, and the origins of a singular ideology attached to specific forms of language,

assuming such foundations of intent exist. Historical context may be able to illuminate

such connections, or even offer "an encounter with history and the human struggle," but

only a criticism inclusive of current context can allow for "emancipatory" redeployment

of language while facilitating a platform to reject what can be deemed intrinsically

flawed rhetoric in the continued pursuit of an ideological goal (Wander, 1983)

Section Four: Rhetorical Critics and Public Relations Consultants; Bridging the Gap
between what is Spoken and what is Said, with a Rejection of Disability-Centric
Language

> What would we call one who examines or rewrites drafts of official
> statements so that their impact on specific audiences can be ascertained or
> improved; for whom policy, audience, and situation are a given and the overriding
> question is how to assess the effectiveness of the speech? Not, I suggest, a critic.
> We would be more inclined to call him or her a "public relations consultant.
> (Wander, 1983, p. 14)

Wander's criticism of Forbes Hill represents an "unflinching commitment" to a

total negation of the importance of language in an attempt to completely move beyond

the text in the affirmation of an infinite universal call to action. While the above

quotation is in response to Hill's refusal to consider ideological issues in criticism, it's

powerful questioning of value in textual or language focused criticism serves to deny

possibility in the abridgment of ideological and textual purity. At the very least, the

nature of the question begged operates as an act of omitting any value or impact that

language has in the "effectiveness (Wander, p. 14)" of action.

This term "effectiveness" seems particularly thought provoking: "for whom

policy, audience, and situation are a given and the overriding question is how to assess

the effectiveness of the speech (Wander, p. 14)." One must ask hirself, is action that simultaneously reinforces the stigmatization and discrimination it attempts to alleviate, effective? Would "assess(ing) the effectiveness" of such a rhetorical act, speech or policy be in the best interest of those looking to "create a better world (Wander, p. 16)?" Would it not be in the interest of the rhetorical critic to have a "policy, audience, and situation" lying in front of them, as "a given" and strive to "assess" how we can implement action in the most effective manner, one that creates more positive gains than negative ones? Is it outside of the bounds of the rhetorical critic to analyze the effects that well intentioned, yet discursively violent, texts may have? Assessing the effects and implications of rhetoric is at the heart of responsible advocacy, action, and rhetorical criticism. "Effectiveness" is not intrinsically bound to how well a rhetorical act persuades an audience to advocate the position exemplified by the speaker, but rather "effectiveness" is often framed as the ability a piece of rhetoric has in reaching the goals laid forth by the speaker. In the case of texts that begin with the initial premise and goal of "creating a better world" for individuals who are systematically stigmatized and discriminated against, "effectiveness" is the ability to reach the goals of decreasing such harms. Assessing such "effectiveness" is a refusal to blindly "act" in an effort to "search for alternatives" and open up space for the possibility of more beneficial action. This action, or "more beneficial action," is not a type of utopian idealization, nor does it sever the timeliness of action in an effort to preserve some vague hope for an arbitrary or non-defined "more beneficial action" in the future. Ironically, one can "[rewrite] drafts of official statements so that their impact on specific audiences can be ascertained or improved (Wander, p. 14)." Similar to the initial discussion of gendered language in the

quote from Heidegger at the beginning of this essay, individuals can avoid or reject the use of demeaning, violent, oppressive rhetoric, while simultaneously advocating the spirit or intent of policies or actions that attempt to make the world a better place. It is possible for one to "move beyond the text" while remaining attentive to the text and its inherent qualities. Moving beyond the text requires more than a mere situating of historical context, it must also remain committed to the context that the text has in the present and will have in the future, the implications and effects that the rhetoric employed in the text presents us with. The rhetorical critic is not trapped in a maze in which its only exit leads on the cliff of blind complicity with atrocity. Professor Wander (1983) rightly states that the world presents "policies and technology that threaten life on this planet (p. 5)." We are also presented with policies and actions that, no matter how well intentioned, reinforce stigma and dehumanization. In the face of crisis and on going oppression, individuals, including rhetorical critics, cannot simply remain committed to the idea of infinite and universal action, action that ignores what is spoken in an effort to merely affirm what is said. Individuals cannot allow themselves to "lose sight of the connections among" action and the language embraced in the affirmation of such action.

One way to bridge the abyss between what is said and what is spoken, action and the language embraced in the affirmation of action, is a commitment to acknowledging the harmful effects language can have in a current context, and strive to remain as linguistically and textually pure in affirming action as one is in the motives behind action. In terms of the disease-centric rhetoric inherent within the text of House Resolution 285 (2005), all individuals, including policy makers, rhetorical critics, and all others, can problemitize and reject such rhetoric. As a jumping off point, Resolution 285 potentially

offers a unique point of departure from both an infinite and universal call to action, and dehumanizing disease-centric language. The "ideological turn" in recognizing the discrimination that people with disabilities face, and searching for alternatives to such discrimination can be elevated to a universal call of ideologically responsible action. Often times individuals unintentionally use disease-centric language, hence it is the responsibility of all to momentarily pause and acknowledge the harmful nature of such rhetoric "… such as when a group of friends is laughing at a sexist joke. It is a crucial moment, because the laughter reaffirms the unproblematic patriarchal norms and sexism behind it (Johnson, 1997)." The infinite universal call to action that fails to address problems of language, whether in policy or criticism, such as House Resolution 285 (2005), risks, in the words of Public Policy Specialist at the Nebraska Center for Disability Rights, Law, and Advocacy, Brad Meurrens, "recreating the same problems it attempts to solve (Meurrens, 2005)."

CHAPTER FOUR

Structural Criticism and Song

*Introduction: Nietzsche and the Rhetorical Construction of Disability: Pity, Language,
and Song.*

In *The Birth of Tragedy: Attempt at Self-Criticism* (1992), Nietzsche looks back

on his earlier work and exclaims it "should have sung, this 'new soul'- and not spoken!"

In a similar vein, this paper attempts to reflect on and criticize the language and notions

surrounding the concept of "disability." In the wake of a plethora of new movements and

public policies which attempt to improve the situation of people with disabilities, there

still remains a lack of primacy placed on the language used to discuss, engage, and

represent people with disabilities. While the intent of these new actions may be to

empower those individuals labeled as "disabled," the language used in conveying such

actions may actually serve to dis-empower people with disabilities by reinforcing notions

of pity, weakness, and dependency. Rather than "singing" a universal call of affirmation,

this new revolution of "disability advocacy" speaks to the problems of injustice without

fully embracing the change it wishes to see.

In attempt to remedy this situation and bridge the gap between what is "spoken"

in disability advocacy and what is actually "said" in its implementation, this chapter

attempts to investigate and endorse Friedrich Nietzsche's conception of performative

engagement in the "singing" of "people first language." Through an investigation of

Nietzsche's philosophy of pity, language, and struggle along with current rhetorical

theory, this chapter proposes the thesis that people first language can act as a critical

departure from the dominant disease-centric paradigm of thought and language which mandates pity and denies the struggle of people with disabilities.

This chapter will be broken up into two main sections, with sub-sections under each main heading. The first section begins with a brief genealogy of the language surrounding disability beginning in the 1840's with congressional legislation which refers to people with disabilities as "idiots and lunatics," and ending with current modes of language and policy which refer to people with disabilities as "disabled people." The paper then moves to analyze this rhetoric in light of Nietzsche's philosophy of language, particularly in Nietzsche's critique of Descartes rhetorical separation of the mind from the body in the creation of the mind/body dualism. This portion analyzes Nietzsche's argument that the structure of language can radically alter both the meaning and effect of such language, in addition to reflecting or potentially even creating reality. The paper then moves to discuss how the structure of language, particularly disease-centric language, can evoke notions of pity when used in reference to people with disabilities. Following this interrogation of Nietzsche's work on language, this section then moves to investigate the modern competing justifications for structural transformation, traversal, or inversion of rhetorical structure, attempting to create a proper theoretical frame for inverting disease-centric discourse to form the rhetorical structure of people first language. This section of the chapter will also include a discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy regarding the idea of pity and how such assumptions are born out of the rhetorical structure of disease-centric language, ultimately serving to disempower people with disabilities. Where the previous chapters have offered several justifications for rejecting the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse, this chapter attempts to

build a more theoretical foundation for such rejections, premised on rhetorical structure alone and the harm of pity stemming from such a structure. By isolating rhetorical structure in a vacuum isolated from historical meanings and interpretation, this section attempts to move beyond traditional rhetorical criticism which attempts to uncover intent and motives, to a theoretical criticism interrogating a mode of rhetoric often dismissed and disregarded as pure terminology absent affect. Through a discussion of pity, the rhetoric of disability, and various modes of manipulating rhetorical structure, this section of the chapter attempts to build a theoretical model in which explains the problem of disease-centric discourse according to the rhetorical structure it is founded upon.

The second overarching section of this Chapter revisits current activist rhetorical theory, specifically ideological criticism as presented by Philip Wander in *The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism* (1983). Wander's rhetorical theory will be analyzed under a lens of what it leaves out: the importance of structure and creativity in creating change. This section will then move to discuss how "singing" in terms of performative engagement can avoid Nietzsche's would be criticism of Wander and capture the creative spirit needed to represent people with disabilities absent a view of pity. In an attempt to bridge the gap between what is spoken and said in a move towards ideological and rhetorical purity this section discusses the concept of "people first language" and how such a structure of language embodies Nietzsche's idea of the "new soul" singing in both structure and application. This section will conclude with revisiting the discussion of language structure, specifically in terms of how people first language embraces a structure which avoids Nietzsche's criticism of pity.

Section One: The Rhetorical Structure of Disease-Centric Discourse
A Genealogy of Terms.

In *Language as Symbolic Action*, Kenneth Burke writes, "Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality" (Burke, p. 45). The terminology used to describe individuals during any given time period reflects societies, or at least the user of such terminologies, reality in relation to the other in which such terminology is being applied. Similarly, the reciprocal reality of the other framed by such terminology can also be reflected as the reality of the other in its essence. The power such terminology has in enframing the entire essence of an individual is wielded not only from the constructed reality deployed through the use of a specific term, but also what such a term and applied reality deflects, the reality concealed, the essence and aspects of individuality obscured through the mere selection of terminology. Linking specific terminology with periods of time allows one to discover the assumptions attached to rhetoric. Investigating rhetoric and terminology through genealogy allows the reality of cultural notions and societal conceptions towards those individuals referred to in a given term to come to light, hence allowing one to understand the almost static conception of reality attached to a given term by locating a given point of intersections in the multiplicity of time, culture, place, society, etc. At this point the selection of terminology can be put in context; one can then understand the singularity individuals are chained to when a given term is deployed in representing and consequently defining the reality of an individual. In the same light, investigating the way static conceptions of reality are graphed upon an individual in selection and deployment of terminology, one has the possibility to imagine alternative realities by

witnessing how such realities are deflected. Selecting the term "idiot" or "retard" in an effort to describe a person with a disability reflects an individual's conception and reality of an-other while simultaneously deflecting other realities such as personhood itself in the other. While it is a novel idea that one can utilize genealogy to pinpoint a specific location of all the possible and multiple intersections of reality in the selection, creation, or deployment of terminology in order to create a static or singular meaning throughout time, such an act in itself would negate the idea that the reality surrounding the selection of terminology has an impact on the defining, reflecting, and deflecting power of terminology. Today we see both feminist along with racial rhetoric and terminology being redeployed in various ways traversing the historical static interpretation of the terminology with near opposite present intent. While it may be difficult to blindly extend the reality and meaning of specific terminology through history in an effort to define a static reality of such terminology in the present, genealogical investigations still have value in attempting to understand the reality such terms embody in the present. Rather than deriving reality and meaning from the isolated words themselves, one can discover meaning in the structure of the terminology and how such structure has defined, reflected, and deflected reality in the past and continues to do so similarly in the present.

On January 28th, 1840 Senate Bill 126 of the 26th Congress of the United States was passed in an attempt to remedy issues "concerning the estates of Idiots or Lunatics, and Infants in the District of Colombia" (S. 126, 180). The action taken by the bill is to allow "intelligent and fit" agents of the state take control of property and children of "idiots and lunatics" (S.126, 1840). While the intent of the text is not of primary concern, it shows that even good motives can give rise to discrimination and oppression. The

issue of main importance is the language and structure of such language used to describe people with mental disabilities, and those individuals not with mental disabilities; primarily in the utilization of disease-centric discourse specifically deployed with the terms of "idiots" and "lunatics." In the text of S. 126 (1840) the structure of terminology in the rhetorical labels are used or constructed in order to describe individuals according to a single personal characteristic; mental disability. The historical attitudes surrounding such personal characteristics were extremely negative. The characteristics were rhetorically constructed to define the entirety of the individual with a single word; people with disabilities were redefined as "lunatics" or "idiots." Through such rhetorical constructions individuals became nothing more than the object or characteristic that society found void of value. The structure in the rhetorical construction of these labels served to link personal characteristics with negative societal attitudes, allowing society to interact with the label rather than the individual. Even if one were to separate the historically negative attitude surrounding people with disabilities, the structure of the term "idiot" and "lunatic" as a single word used to define an individual according to a characteristic of "disability" allows one to ignore or deflect the notion that such an individual is a person at all. It is also important to note the all encompassing nature of the terms. "Idiot" and "lunatic" have never been words used to describe a specific disability, but rather the structure of the terms allow for all "disabilities" to be reduced to a single component or label. At this point any individual with characteristics in deviation from what society deems as "normal" through out time can be described and defined with such terms. The open structure of the terminology allows generalizations to flourish creating an us ("normal")/them ("disabled") dichotomy. This dichotomy sets the

foundation for society to relate and respond to such labeled individuals with limited options and similar ends of dehumanization. Under such a dichotomy, a labeled "normal" or in the specific case of S. 126 (1840), the "fit" or "intelligent" individual can either demonize the individual without care or concern, or evoke "compassion" towards the other in the form of pity.

As modern medicine in the form of psychology and psychiatry emerged and gained credibility amongst society we started to see an evolution of the terminology selected to describe people with disabilities. The first step was an increased specificity of labels, individuals once labeled as "idiots" may now be labeled as "schizophrenic" or "bi-polar." When referring to a group of individuals labeled with a disability, terms such as "idiot" and "lunatic" were now replaced with the universal category and terminology of "disabled people." Given that we could now distinguish between different types of disabilities, the universal category and terminology of "idiots" or "lunatics" no longer reflected the scientific image of complexity that modern medicine wished to advance. Deploying the terminology of "disabled people" (H.R. 285, 1840) allowed individuals to recognize that while medicine had advanced to be able to diagnose, label, and treat different, specific variations of the "idiot," each of these individuals shared a common trait of deviant sickness which could be further compartmentalized with more specific terminology. Terms such as "idiot" and "lunatic" were now rejected as "ignorant" and "over simplifications" previously used in a less scientifically knowledgeable time to describe the entire dynamic arena of mental illness. Such terminology (of "idiots and lunatics") were now understood as terms used in the "dark ages" of medicine, a time when "disabled people" were feared and not understood as "they" are now. Justifying

this claim with warrant, one could easily point to legislation such as S.126 (1840) along with a number of other state and medical policies which recommended "idiots and lunatics" be permanently physically detained, while their property and children were seized, becoming the responsibility of the "fit" or "intelligent" individual. Modern medicine has now "advanced" to the point where "disabled people" are "understood" and hence nothing to be scared of, but rather *pitied* for they may never be "normal," "fully functioning members of human society (S.126, 1840)."

  While one may be able to claim such terminology of "disabled persons," "schizophrenic," "bi-polar," "manic-depressive," etc. can be deployed without the intent of evoking pity or dehumanizing attitudes, one cannot claim that such terminology has been rendered obsolete. Official medical manuals, including the current "*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*" of "mental disorders" continues to utilize the category of "schizophrenic," and others while current congressional legislation continues to select and deploy the terminology of "disabled persons" (H.Res 285, 2005). As discussed in chapter three, On May 17th 2005 Congress person Davis proposed House Resolution 285 to the 109th Congress of the United States. House Resolution 285 of 2005, a bill "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the ongoing need to provide every qualified American with equal access to opportunity in education, business, and employment and the indispensability of Affirmative action programs in securing such equal access," (H.Res 285, 2005) attempts to advance the situation of all minority groups, specifically mentioning "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women," (H.Res 285, 2005) through the increase of affirmative action policies.

The text of House Resolution 285 (2005) utilizes a plethora of different terms and labels to describe and categorize individuals in which equality "remains elusive for the great mass of members of these groups" (H.Res 285, 2005). The text begins with a partial list of individuals, or groups of individuals, that the policy cites as historically under-represented in certain sectors of society, "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women," (H.Res 285, 2005) are all noted. From this point on the text groups the first set of individuals mentioned in the above list, "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans," (H.Res 285, 2005) seemingly according to origin of race or ethnicity as "minorities" (H.Res 285, 2005). Labeling by origin of race or ethnicity is significantly different from labeling by personal characteristics; every individual has a racial or ethnic origin, similarly every individual has some type of biological sexual characteristics with which they individually identify. Throughout the entirety of the text the groups of "minorities" and "women" are consistently referenced as such.

Only one label or term used to reference a category or "group" of individuals' changes throughout the text, hence the text utilizes different labels in reference to the same group. "Persons with disabilities" is initially used twice in the description of the specific category or group, both in the specific citation of individuals whose equality "remains elusive," and in the creation of the generic groupings "minorities, and persons with disabilities" (H.Res 285, 2005). Within the text of the seventh paragraph of the "whereas" clause, "persons with disabilities" (as individuals and as a group) become alternatively labeled as "disabled persons" (H.Res 285, 2005). Throughout the remainder of the text of House Resolution 285 (2005) the "people-first" terminology of "persons

with disabilities" is exchanged for the disease-centric terminology of "disabled persons."

Given the nature of the dual use of people-first language and disease-centric language in

the text of House Resolution 285 it can be assumed that such labels are used

interchangeably without any intention or knowledge of the congressperson. This

blending of use, the deployment of disease-centric language and non-disease centric

language or people-first language within the confines of the same text, is not an

uncommon event, as cited in the Feldman study of 1996.

While we can trace the genealogy of the discourse of disability and selected

terminology deployed at different given points in history, along with isolating intended

realities reflected or attached to such terminology it seems extending the reality we

observe being reflected into a present context is problematic on a plethora of levels. One

cannot merely look to past assumptions, realities, and meanings of specific terminology

in order to understand the meaning, reality, or intent such terminology has in the present.

While it can be observed that terminology such as "disabled persons" has been selected

and deployed in a current context without the intent of demeaning or evoking notions of

pity when representing or referencing people with disabilities, one cannot claim that the

act of selecting such terminology has no role in reflecting, deflecting, defining or

chaining the reality of people with disabilities to singularity, in addition to evoking

notions of pity and weakness. While it is important to understand the given reality and

historical situation when a given mode of terminology, or a specific discourse as a whole,

becomes originally constructed, deployed, and selected as the primary mode of

representation, the situation, reality, or meaning of such terminology can be extended to

the present only when one warrants how such terminology continues to illicit similar actions or cause similar effects in the present.

Given that mere reactions by individuals within society may be mixed (as seen in the Feldman study, along with current congressional legislation) potentially due to unawareness in terms of historical reality, or possible distance from/lack of any type of relationship with an individual affected by, or relating to such terminology – one must evaluate the terminology on its own accord. This is in no way suggesting individuals within society should disregard an-other's self chosen mode of terminology in defining themselves and/or their identity. I do not wish to speak for others, but rather remain open and responsible to the other if the other wishes to reveal itself; for the goal of this paper is to facilitate individuals in manifesting their identity on their own accord, without preconceived notions or static interpretations graphed upon them in the construction or bringing forth of identity into presence. This being said, it seems as if applying the scientific method to writing samples in hopes to uncover how specific terminology affects individuals who were never actually sampled in the study may not capture the ability to determine how the sampled and coded terms reflect, deflect, or define the reality of people with disabilities. Similarly, while one can advocate an "ethic of care" in policy intent, a possible absence of a face to face confrontation with the other encompassing terminology may limit strict adherence to a specific terminology selection (Meurrens, 2006). It seems as if in order to investigate the current power of terminology it is almost necessary to place such terminology in a vacuum, absent extending meaning to the present, absent a primacy on present individuals and society's intent in deployment, yet remaining open to and acknowledging how previous selection of

terminology has reflected, deflected, and defined reality and meaning. By focusing on the structure of terminology, rhetoric, and language I believe one can create such a vacuum conducive for understanding such aspects of terminology in a present context.

Nietzsche and Rhetorical Structure

> *"Reason" in language — oh, what an old deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar."*
>   Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

Grammar; the carrier of reason, the structure of language, phrases and terminology, that which orders communication in attempt to facilitate understanding. Nietzsche's application of genealogical and historical critique to language is not an attempt to discover how language evolves, nor is it an effort to isolate specific terminology in a given historical context in order discover how such terminology constructs a fixed Truth or reflects actual reality, but rather a studious and playful mockery of such ideas. Nietzsche wishes to envision life beyond a fixed, static and universal Truth in values and perceptions of reality extended through out time, and hence he reduces our current relationship with, and understanding of language to the result of a single accident in the history of language itself (Johnston, 1999). Similar to a young child playing with his mother's complex surveying tools, Nietzsche embraces language and plays with it in ways it was never "intended" to be used. According to Nietzsche, our understanding of language is one where language is intended as a tool to reveal Truth, it delivers us philosophical systems claiming Truth, and offers us an example of reason to bask in, meaning "we must once have been at home in a higher world" for we possess reason, making it imperative that we must have once been "Devine," and held Truth in the palm of our hands (Nietzsche, 1889).

Nietzsche does not use this rationality intrinsic to language and grammar as a tool to turn such language on its head in a spirit of hyper-rationality, but rather plays with language and grammar in ways which in no way represents a search for Truth. He claims that while language has meaning in the way it causes us to act, understand, and frame things a specific way, it is by pure historical accident that we are lulled into acting in these specific manners due to language. At some point in history it was decided that our western version of language should construct sentences which revolve around a "subject" and a "predicate," and hence grammar found its footing (Johnston, 1999). Following this event we unknowingly became fascinated and enchanted with the "inner self" in our philosophical endeavors, spurring an eruption of philosophical thoughts and writings related to the subject. Such philosophical works are not only conveyed to us in the western language which adheres to a strict grammatical rubric in terms of subject/predicate, but the works themselves were also constructed under the same rubric of grammar and thus fell prey to the trap set forth by the accident in history. It was this accident which allowed us to separate the subject and the predicate in the creation of the sentence and belief structure "I" followed by a condition, action, or label which is to blame for all dualism and dichotomy of the self, as Johnston (1999) further explains….

> He makes the point, for example, that our faith in consciousness is just an accident. If instead of saying "I think," we were to say "Thinking is going on in my body," then we would not be temped to give to the "I" some independent existence (e.g., in the mind) and make large claims about the ego or the inner self. The reason we do search for such an entity stems from the accidental construction of our language, which encourages us to use a subject (the personal pronoun) and a verb. The same false confidence in language also makes it all to easy for us to think that we know clearly what key things like "thinking" and "willing" are; whereas, if we were to engage in even a little reflection, we would quickly realize that the inner processes neatly summed up by these apparently clear terms are anything but clear. His emphasis on the importance of psychology as queen of the sciences underscores his sense of how we need to understand more fully just

how complex these activities are, particularly their emotional affects, before we talk about them so simplistically, the philosophers up to now done. (Johnston, para. 1)

Nietzsche is not advancing the argument that words have no meaning, but rather just the opposite; the meaning of terminology is far to complex to be universally applied as Truth after reduced to a simple claim of relative internal understanding. It is not that grammar has not shaped our reality and relation to the world, as Nietzsche clearly demonstrates this by reducing Descartes' philosophy to grammatical error, claiming the sole impetus for such a philosophy and those similar to it can be exclusively located in the reasoned structure of grammar. Nietzsche's argument is not that the structure of language does not affect reality, but rather he wishes to escape the way it already has. While Nietzsche reduces our enchantment with the inner-self and its predicate indicator to a mere product of "grammar," he does so by acknowledging the way the structure of language affects reality and the ability to define the subject external of the predicate, hence giving "independent existence" to the subject itself (Johnston, 1999). Post the historical accident of subject/predicate rationality in grammar, primacy was placed on the subject while the predicate drew its meaning and value from the subject alone. In his discussion of subject/predicate grammar, Nietzsche engages in his own form of "reflection" and "deflection of reality" in what Burke describes as "the very nature" of "terminology" itself; the "selection" of terminology-(Burke, 1978, p. 45) in this case, the selection of specific subject and predicate terms. By placing a primacy on specific forms of subjects/predicates Nietzsche limits the discussion to the self subject, or the "I", and the "universal" predicate, or faculties claimed to be inherent in all "normal" human beings – in the case of Descartes "thinking" (Johnston, 1999). In this way Nietzsche can

now discuss and "reflect" the subject exclusively in terms of individual relativism and the predicate in terms of universal concepts. "By its very nature as terminology," Nietzsche's primacy on self/universal subject/predicate deflects alternative interpretations of conceptual terminology of the subject/predicate dichotomy. One such "deflection," of primary importance to this paper, can be seen in the omission of the other/individual subject/predicate, more specifically the person/disability dichotomy.

While ultimately this paper concludes by placing great value in a form of the subject/predicate grammatical structure, it does so only in acknowledgement of important role that reasoned grammatical structure plays in reflecting and creating reality. Just as Nietzsche wishes to avoid the individual subject claiming universal Truth and knowledge over predicate of thought, I wish avoid the predicate of disability claiming universal Truth and knowledge over the subject of the person. Similarly, just as Nietzsche wishes to move beyond language dictating our perception and interpretation of "reality" in terms of thinking, willing, etc – this essay wishes to move beyond language dictating our perceptions and interpretations of people with disabilities. While rejecting the subject/predicate of the self/universal allows Nietzsche to separate and objectively investigate "universally" held faculties, such as thought, free from relative absolute claims, it is only through embracing the subject/predicate of the other/individual that we can separate and objectively investigate specific individual characteristics, such as disability, free from absolute claims of knowledge. While the end goal of Nietzsche's and this essays argument are similar, the treatments of the subject/predicate in reaching such goals appear to be in polar opposition, yet the spirit of play remains alive in both.

Nietzsche's "goal" is not one of "infinite deconstruction" (Agamben, 2005) of language, as some categorize portions of Derrida's work, nor is it one of understanding language in total multiplicity, as Heidegger toys with in his later works. Experiencing language without any static (even reasoned) structure, or "value" in which it affirms is not in itself a revelation of values or Truth claims, but it is the "gate that leads to it." Similar to Agamben's discussion of Benjamin and law, Nietzsche's strategy in approaching such a goal is one of embracing grammar "to 'study' and deactivate it, to 'play' with it" (Agamben, 2005). Experiencing such a studious play allows one to free language and thought from the infinite trajectory of reason set in motion by historical accident. Once the value of reason is deactivated in grammatical language the use of such a structure is also freed from controlling and defining our thoughts and reality. One has no need to refuse to engage in such a structure or reject every instance of subject/predicate grammar, for we can now think beyond reason with authentic and untainted thought, without fear of reproducing grammatical structure external to language. Giorgio Agamben further explains this in terms of law, in *State of Exception* (2005)…

> One day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it for good. What is found after the law is not a more proper and original use value that precedes the law, but a new use that is born only after it. And use, which has been contaminated by law, must also be freed from its own value. This liberation is the task of study, or of play. And this studious play is the passage that allows us to arrive at that justice that one of Benjamin's posthumous fragments defines as a state of the world in which the world appears as a good that absolutely cannot be appropriated or made juridical. (p. 64)

An example of Nietzsche's studious and child-like play with language and grammar can be seen in his omission of the subject dictated by grammatical rationality.

Rather than deploying language in a series of lengthy proofs in an effort to disprove the concept of individual and universal Truth throughout time via identifying with and utilizing rational language and standards of grammar, Nietzsche plays with language absent currently deemed rational constructs of grammar. Like a child playing with complex instruments, Nietzsche rearranges words - turning the grammatical dials on the complex tool of language, without ever attempting to secure Truth, he can envision life beyond it. Nietzsche wills language, yet not as the accident in history has intended it to be willed. In doing so he implicates the way grammar has shaped the history of thought and life, while opening the gate to move beyond it as it is conceived as a mandate of universal Truth based in the inner self. Nietzsche shows his engagement with language, even the grammatical structure of said language, is now one where reason is deactivated and thought is unchained from grammatical structure. And thus this "new soul" can sing, and not merely speak (Nietzsche, 1886)!

Just as Descartes defined the subject two fold with the separation of the mind and body stemming from the predicate of thought, medico-legal rationality defined the subject of the other individual with singularity, as the predicate, as disabled. The individual became a myth as both body and mind, for an aspect of the predicate mind was now understood as not conforming to rational standards (Ussher, 1992). Possibly the historical accident of grammar forced us to put such great importance on the mind, as it is the sole barer of universal Truth and existence, that now any perceived defect in it must negate such Truth and existence all together. If one cannot "think" how can one "be" – if the mind cannot conform to absolute "reason", it must not hold any reason, and hence such an-other individual subject is only a subject in its defect. Reason in the system of

grammatical rationality of rhetorical terminology has now created a "state of exception" (Agamben, 2005) where the individual other subject has no protection or guarantee of existence as a subject at all, yet is still mandated to comply with such structures in order to avoid punishment and communicate. Just as Nietzsche playfully removes the subject in effort to deactivate reason, now reason removes the subject in order to deactivate life which does not conform to its standards.

Initially, the early medico-legal terminology of "idiots and lunatics" allowed for a generic and all encompassing eclipse of the individual subject. This terminology denied any ability to reclaim the self/individual subject due to the way such terminology described the individual absent a definable or categorical "disability." Terminology of "idiot and lunatic" could not, and did not, refer to a condition in which an individual was "afflicted with," but rather the individual proper. While we presently feel more comfortable referring to a person with schizophrenia as a "schizophrenic", rather than an "idiot" or "lunatic," such structural differences in terminology are minimal. The main distinction is that terminology of "idiot and lunatic" refers to generic and absolute "defect" which could not be specified or further reduced to an understandable characteristic or condition by medical rationality. Here historical meaning of terms, or asserting some type of definition, is a prerequisite to investigating structure, – particularly when isolated to the historical context alone. "Schizophrenic" is a modern specific term which can be reduced from the more generic term "disability," and directly refers to a given set of characteristics which are understood as well defined by medical rationality. Given medical reason's lack of ability to make "reason" out of "the idiot and lunatic" it can only respond with hyper-rationality in terms of separation and detainment. Such

actions and terminology shield reason from fallibility with reason itself, and hence describes an additional element of fear and consequential stigma associated with such terminology. While the grammatical structure which removes the subject remains, the generic, indefinable and universally applicable nature of the terminology grants it increased overt oppressive power. The subject now ceases to be a subject of any worth, for such worth would have to be comprehendible. Without reason's ability to quantify and describe "what" the subject other "is" absent total opposition to reason in the inability to think, one cannot feel compassion, even pity towards the other, hence one is left with only fear.

As reason increasingly and progressively intertwined itself with medicine in the rise of modern psychology, its terminology also reflected increased specificity and structured grammatical rationality. Generic terminology of "idiots and lunatics" which reflected neither an-other subject nor a definable predicate indicator were replaced with disease-centric and specific terminology of medical labels. Now the "lunatic" ceases to be a lunatic and becomes a type of "lunatic." The reason of modern medicine can now observe, isolate, and diagnose specific qualities, characteristics, or "defects" of an individual and place such findings in neat and precise categories of defect (Ussher, 1992). Modern medicine now understands the lunatic further as "the schizophrenic," "the depressed," or the "bi-polar," and hence such categories reflect themselves in terminology. Now that these conditions are definable by reason, we have the illusion that such conditions can be understood as categories of illness inherent within the individual, yet separate from the individual in the sense that it is a "disease" that shapes and defines the individual. These conditions or diseases are no longer wholly relative, in the sense of

only understood by the lunatic, but rather reason and medicine now possess the ability to have knowledge over such conditions. Just as reason in language once began the search for understanding the ego, it now it has come full circle with reason claiming universal understanding in defining the ego. The subject other "I" no longer "thinks" for such thoughts are definable as schizophrenic, as is the subject other "I". "Reason" which once separated the mind from the body and forced us to be enchanted with the ego, now unifies the mind, body, and ego. "The same false confidence in language also makes it all to easy for us to think that we know clearly what key things like 'thinking' and 'willing' are" (Johnston, 1999) and apply such conceptual knowledge over others. Due to historical accident, we now claim to have knowledge over what thinking, along with defects in thinking are. Just as "I think therefore I am," if one has a definable defect in thinking they cease to "be" (as per normal thought would allow), and accordingly the "I" or ego becomes defined by such defect. Rather than the "person who thinks" we now have the "disabled person," or in more specific instances the "schizophrenic." The individual exists only in singularity as a medical label, the terminology which defines the disability (or the existence of disability) defines the individual. Personhood is predicated by disability in the terminology of "disabled person," while terminology of "schizophrenic" deflects the idea of personhood all together. Just as Nietzsche feared individuals would claim understanding of thought where there was none due to individual relative assumptions, now medicine universalizes those relative notions of thought over others. Where the historical accident of reasoned grammar initially invented the subject, reason now denies it, not in a playful attempt to counter reason, but rather to affirm it.

Given that reason and modern medicine claim to have knowledge over disability, it reflects such an understanding in the terminology of disease-centric discourse, while in doing so deflecting the notion that people with disabilities are people at all. Where we once feared the "lunatic" out of a lack of comprehension, we now pity the "schizophrenic" or "disabled person" for we "understand their pain" in that we can understand their specific barriers to normal thought and personhood. Just as we have seen the terminology of "idiots and lunatics" reflect fear stemming from a lack of understanding, and resulting in the detainment of individuals and state seizure of property in the 1840's, we now see the terminology of "disabled persons" reflect pity stemming from the increased reason in modern medicine's ability to understand disability, and consequently resulting in society taking actions of compassion toward people with disabilities out of pity. While genuine action absent pity is possible, the structure of disease-centric discourse, such as "disabled person" suggests that people with disabilities ought to be pitied (Foreman, 2005). Even when such terminology is deployed without the intent of perpetuating this idea, or the idea that these individuals are "weak" or "incapable," the structure of the language reflects such an understanding and can result in others advocating action out of pity.

"Pity," pragmatically resulting in increased living standards for people with disabilities may on face appear to be a vast improvement over detainment and property seizure out of fear, yet the ideology of pity is equally damning to the subject of pity and the subject who pities. Nietzsche argues pity "increases suffering through out the world," in that "pity makes suffering contagious" (Cartwright, 1984, p. 85). This argument is generally understood from the position of the pitter, as if one should never feel

compassion or responsibility to an-other for such action only serves to make the pitter individual weak, or drag an individual down to the level of who ze may pity. Nietzsche describes this as almost a "sickness" in which one denies themselves, their wills and their passions in the name of the other (Nietzsche, 1968). Here pity is viewed as a moral emotion in which one stands in line with ascetic principals of self denial through gift giving, yet gets nothing in return (Kimball, 2004). While this may seem harsh, Nietzsche understands the other who is pitied as *wanting* to be pitied and one who wishes deny all struggles in life.

This distinction is key in that it frames both the pitier and the pitied in a similar light as individual who wish to deny life rather than affirm it. Acts of pity are "demeaning for both the pitter and the one pitied" in that in both cases individuals embrace weakness as a way of life; the pitier denies themselves while casting their perceptions of weakness upon the other who may not envision themselves as weak (Stocker, 2001). When one does not wish to be pitied, receiving pity serves as "an act of contempt separate from caring and concern" (Kimball, 2004). In *The Will to Power* (1968) Nietzsche claims "if one does good merely out of pity, it is really oneself one really does good to, and not the other (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 199), for while one may be embracing weakness in acting out pity there is still a comforting element of feeling good about ones self in "helping" the other you have constructed as weak. The other is never actually helped, but rather hindered in that they are now locked into a category of weakness where they will be viewed as incapable and almost sub-human. Such actions of pity are "passive" (Kimball, 2004) in that one never looks to fully embrace the other as equal with radical responsibility, but rather "pity is comparative in that we congratulate

ourselves for escaping the pitied person's misfortune (Kimball, 2004, p. 305)." "Pity

includes an element of psychological distancing (Kimball, 2004, p. 304)," in that one

constructs their relationship with the other in totality and almost binary opposition. The

"rational" "strong" and "capable" individual reaches out to help the "irrational," "weak"

"disabled person;" this allows the pitter to feel comfort and strength in the fact the other

who is pitied in no way resembles hirself, or reflects hir own inabilities. Pity destroys

any ability for the individual pitied to ever construct their identity as anything other than

the opposition of the "strong" or "normal," and hence life is lived as a denial of life,

where one has no potential or drive to live life in affirmation. Pity disempowers those

pitied, and perpetuates the oppression of such individuals in almost every aspect of life.

     In the context of the Disability Rights movement, pity and other forms of

paternalism are notions strictly rejected in a call for a celebration of diversity (Smith,

2005). People with disabilities do not *wish* to be pitied, as Nietzsche criticizes, for the

characteristic of disability is fully embraced as natural or a natural response to societal

factors. This being said, action which furthers or improves the situation of people with

disabilities is possible absent attaching pity as a locus for motivating such action.

Nietzsche explains actions stemming from a "superfluity" of power, or action derived

from a decision in which we do not place ourselves in the situation of the other, but rather

one respecting the other's "otherness," (alterity) and act in the name of strength of our

community (Campbell, 2003). Campbell (2003) argues that those who have a superfluity

of power, those in a position which allows them to afford others opportunity, can act to

better the conditions of individuals not out of pity, but rather an affirmation of their own

power along with the others. Action out of pity or charity mandates weakness, while

action that does not necessarily take away power from those who have it can actually reaffirm the will to power. When one does not deny their passions, or feel compelled to act in the interest of others from a call which represents others as "weak," or a "victim" "in need of help" to secure the life in terms of existence, action that helps the other is possible without violating the will to power. Those who embody a strong sense of the will to power allow well being to pour over into well doing (Campbell, 2003). Obligations to the other should be made not out of a feeling of pity towards others, but a feeling of life affirmation of all. When one has this "superfluity of power" they ought to affirm others who embrace a self-sufficient, exuberant view of life even if these individuals face physical barriers in achieving power (Campbell, 2005).

When the call of the other is framed in affirmation of life absent pity, one ought to respond to the other in similar terms. People with disabilities have called out to society for affirmation with the terminological subject face of "people first." While a disability may "exist," in the name of life affirmation and denial of pity the other calls out in the name of personhood rather than a label of medicine's reason. This is not to deny the fact that one has been diagnosed or labeled with a specific disability, but rather a construction of identity where disability modifies personhood, rather than defining it. Terminology of "disabled person" or "schizophrenic" represents reasons linguistic denial of the subject in the name of defining a universal understanding of the individual ego and predicate characteristics with precise reasoned labels of modern medicine (Ussher, 1992). The historical accident of reason in language has now permuted itself with the reason of modern medicine in order to claim complete and singular knowledge and understanding over the individual, thinking, willing, and all other facets of life. Potentially the historical

accident which separated the subject and predicate placed such a primacy on understanding the ego, while granting a false sense of understanding over things such as thinking and willing that we now claim to fully understand the ego according to defects in relative normality.

Our current terminology of "disabled" and "schizophrenic" reflects such an understanding according to reason, while deflecting the notion that people with disabilities are actually people at all, or hold any ability to "be" or characteristics of an individual, other than disability. Nietzsche claims that this accident of grammar set a trap for all thinkers which guaranteed that all thought would follow the trajectory of reason. While this trap cannot be avoided, as language and thought are the closest of kin, it can be moved beyond. In isolating the subject/predicate of the self/universal in grammatical reason and studiously playing with language in presenting an alternative instance of language separate from grammatical rationality in the absence the subject of the self, Nietzsche can envision and embrace of thought beyond constrictions of reason. Now that reason has become so intertwined with all aspects of life, reason itself denies the subject with terminological claims of universal understanding of thought which defines the individual ego in singularity. The drive of grammatical reason appears as if it can no longer be challenged, as singing songs which depart from such a structure in the removal of subjectivity only fuels the structure of reason in claiming a "clear" (Johnston, 1999) and universal understanding of thought. Denial of the subject is no longer an attack on grammatical reason, but rather a tactic of reason- used to reflect absolute objective knowledge and deflect questioning. Given the endless multiplicity of intersections of reason and life, envisioning a world absent structure of reason through Agamben's

conception of studious play is impossible; for each perceptual gain of distance from reasoned structure is only a deception of lost ground.

Given the current position of reason, and the specific context of people with disabilities and the other/specific subject/predicate, one must continue to envision life and thought beyond grammatical structures of reason yet studiously play with grammar differently. Just as Nietzsche playfully embraced language in an effort to move beyond the intention of reason in language to reach Truth, we now must playfully embrace grammatical/logical structures of the subject/predicate in order to move beyond reasons intent to "objectively" and universally define life in totality. Reason is no longer the "gateway" to Truth, but rather reason in itself has become Truth (Agamben, 2005). In order to "move beyond" reason's power to define life and thought in totality, we must not run from such structures with instances of language absent grammatical structure, but rather confront reason with an act involving a dimension of reason "that grounds a decision (to accomplish a hegemonic identification; to engage in a fidelity to a Truth) but cannot be reduced to it" (Žižek, 1999). This process of over identification with the subject/predicate of the other/specific (in terms such as "person with a disability/ schizophrenia/ depression/ bi-polar disorder/etc.) "opens up and sustains the space" for reasoned structure, yet such a strict adherence to the structure threatens to "undermine" reason's ability to define the individual (inclusive of thought) in totality of reason. Slavoj Žižek (1999) further explains this concept of over identification in a discussion of Lacan and the "death drive"

> …and his insistence that the different facets of Evil are merely so many consequences of the betrayal of the Good (of the Truth-Event), is this domain 'beyond the Good', in which human being encounters the death drive at the utmost limit of human experience, and pays the price by undergoing a radical

'subjective destitution', by being reduced to an excremental remainder. Lacan's pint is that this limit-experience is the irreducible/constitutive condition of the (im)possibility of the creative act of embracing a Truth-Event: it opens up and sustains the space for the Truth-Event, yet its excess always threatens to undermine it. (p. 161)

The over identification of "people with disabilities" is one which embraces the concept of subject/predicate in logic (more so than grammar) in an effort to envision life as life beyond a structure of grammatical and medical rationality. While one fully embraces the structure Nietzsche criticizes as allowing for perceptions of total and universal understanding of "thought", such advocacy originates from a spirit of play that seeks to abolish grammatical and medical authority in the power to define all thought and subjectivity. Embracing such a logical/grammatical structure traverses the hegemonic structure of language which reflects the ideology that "disabled people" are merely "disabled" in need of pity and deflects the idea that such individuals are actually people. Such an act does not mandate one become enchanted with the ego, claim clear and universal understanding over thought, or separate the mind from the body; what it does do is to distinguish that "disability" or "defect" does not frame ones entire identity or being in pity when such notions are *not desired*. In answering the call of the other, people first language offers a rhetorical structure which reverses the subject/predicate "disabled people" by situating the "predicate" of "people" as the subject and hence acknowledges that "people with disabilities" are first and foremost "people" who have the ability to affirm life and their own will to power regardless of disability. Such a structural reversal in language reflects a more correct idea that people with disabilities possess the strength to embrace their individual characteristic of disability and overcome adversity, while deflecting the notion that possessing a characteristic of disability is

entirely incapacitating, rendering one's personhood as weak and in need of pity. The rhetorical structure of people first language offers us a new avenue of departure from the wide trajectory of authoritative reason, and leads us to individual empowerment and strength. *And thus this "new spirit" of disability rights and advocacy can sing – and not merely speak!*

Over-Identification / Over-Signification

While embracing Žižek's Lacanian structure of "over-identification" may prove fruitful for advancing equality, respect and dignity in terms of disability rhetoric linking people with disabilities with reasoned personhood, attachment of such a strategy to psychoanalysis may prove inadequate, harmful, and even counter-productive. Žižek's use of "over-identification," or structural traversal, aims to divert discourse *towards* "Truth," an act making it impossible to "deactivate" language from its reasoned trajectory. Traditionally, embracing the "death drive" or confronting the fantasy involves a violent act of self discovery where one gains understanding of their drives, repulsions and psyche. Once this confrontation has taken place, one can "traverse" the fantasy, moving beyond the constant drive towards violence, death and misery in which we sub-consciously fetishize. While one could easily argue the plight for equality and respect does indeed represent a "drive," it seems most psychoanalysis would conceptualize this as maintaining the fantasy that we can actually reach a truly equal, non-oppressive world. The alternative "traversal" may well be to "just give in" to the violence, demonize yourself and others like you, don't fight disease-centric rhetoric but rather label the community you advocate on behalf of with the most stigmatizing rhetoric possible. This version of confrontation and traversal in relation to a specific group of marginalized

individuals can be seen in certain strands of queer theory, such as that proposed by Lee Edelman. In *No Future: Queer Theory and Death Drive* (2004), Edelman argues we should embrace the stigmatization of queers as a "culture of death," acceding to the position of the "sinthomosexual" by embracing and identifying with the most perverse aspects of ourselves and welcoming the stigmatization and abjection which follows.

Edelman continues to advocate rejecting and "aborting" all hopes for the future, for life itself is deferred to a phantasmatic tomorrow as human freedom is sacrificed to the fascism of the baby's face. This act serves as a "confrontation," or "traversal," a truly radical queer ethic which refuses integration into the social order and the logic of intelligibility it presupposes. According to Edelman, embracing this negativity by means making demands against the future exposes the constancy of negativity in the social order itself. In so doing, this act of traversal effectively aborts the continued replication of the phantasy world of the status quo which is always attended by a figure of queerness in need of extermination. It seems embracing queers as a "culture of death" could easily correspond to embracing "disabled people" as a "culture of sickness / death / lunacy / etc." under the same call for traversal, which would, assuming psychoanalysis has something "True" intrinsic to its theory, such a radical act would ironically lead to increased liberation (Edelman, 2004).

While I have general issues with any position claiming knowledge of universality over individuals, their drives, and being, arguing singularity of all these things in addition to phantasy, there are more specific avenues for criticism which do not necessitate disregarding or disproving many successful years and volumes of academic work dedicated to the important discipline of psychoanalysis. One such criticism, leveled

against Edelman, is that sexual practices and sexualities are distinct and different from

identities and ideologies traditionally understood under psychoanalysis, and hence

inapplicable to the psychoanalytic reasoning of the death drive. John Brenkman (2002)

argues:

> What I want to question here is the idea that queer sexualities can be said
> to enact or embody or afford the experience of the underlying mechanism of the
> subject and the signifier, jouissance and the death drive, in the psychoanalytic
> sense. More generally, I am questioning whether any sexual practice can be
> equated with the logic of the signifier, the structure of desire, and so on. This is
> more than a philosophical category mistake, though it is that too.
> First of all, sexual practices and experiences, unlike the logic of the
> signifier or the structure of desire (assuming these are plausible concepts in the
> first place), are carried out by individuals through the whole of their being,
> putting in play their identity formations, their fantasies and fetishes, their social
> embodiment. In short, sexuality is practiced and experienced not by the "subject"
> but by the "person."
> Second, assuming that the second version of jouissance and the death
> drive is the secret of the force within the social-symbolic order that ruptures the
> symbolic and the subject, then this jouissance and death drive are surely at work
> in all sexualities, including the straightest heterosexual practices and experiences.
> Third, while queer sexualities are obviously in this historical moment anti-
> social, it does not follow that they are the very embodiment or enactment of
> asociality or the asymbolic. What has given, for example, anonymous sex its
> value in the gay community—what has made it worth fighting for—is its role in
> creating an alternative sociality. The bars and the baths are a cultural creation, a
> subculture, which makes certain sexual practices and experiences possible.
> Queerness is not outside sociality; it is an innovation in sociality.
> In sum, there is no match between sexualities of any sort and the
> "structure" or "logic" or "mechanism" of the psyche…" (p. 179)

While Edelman undoubtedly offers a very compelling rejoinder, "queerness" is

not the focus of this chapter, nor is it important to this project to prove or disprove it

being "carried out by individuals through the whole of their being," yet this argument

dealing with the totality of identity seems very powerful in regards to disability. Initially,

if one starts or speaks from the position of the anti-psychiatrist or social constructionist, it

seems implausible to assume disability could ever encompass and define the "identity

formations, [their] fantasies and fetishes," along with "social embodiment" of people with disabilities in complete singularity. Speaking from such a position as the social constructionist would mandate the rejection of such notions on face, not only due to the conceptualization of harm such a position would mandate, but more importantly rejection would flow from an alternative understanding of the world, an alternative "Truth" behind the reality biological determinism claims to know. This in no way negates the "Truth" or philosophy of psychoanalysis, rather it negates the application of "disability" to the "drives" and "identities" which Lacan and Žižek found their individual conceptions of the death drive. More over, Brenkman's second argument can also be applied to the context of disability in arguing that even if one assumes a physical location of disability rooted firmly within the individual, the reciprocal (assuming one buys into the binary of psychoanalytic social-symbolic order) "jouissance and death drive are surely at work in all" individuals, even the most "able." Finally, following Brenkman's third argument, disability most certainly does not represent "asociality or the asymbolic," and similarly the "anononomus," or external construction of disability outside the individual is incredibly important for advocates and individuals identifying with the disability rights movement.

A second problem with the psychoanalytic model of symbolic interaction and traversal involves the original exclusion social intelligibility and symbolic worth which makes embracing negativity impossible. Edelman argues from the position of a "reasoned," "able" individual that, in embracing negativity under a radically queer ethic, refuses to become integrated into the system of "intelligibility" which mandates violence upon the individual. While this may prove to be a successful strategy for an individual

forced into the social and symbolic structure of intelligibility or violence, people with disabilities experience their oppression not because society views such individuals as "a threat," but rather that society does not view people with disabilities at all, particularly not holding the power of any "threat." The "threat" to "reproductive futurism" represented by the queer not able to promulgate the hope of the future through reproduction has been socially interpreted in reverse in the context of people with disabilities.

Historically, state actions forcing reproductive sterilization, such as those under Buck V. Bell have been enacted against the same phantasy of "reproductive futurism" criticized by Edelman. More recently, a new round of eugenics has taken form in the prenatal screening for disability and genetic selective abortions, made possible, ironically, under the same Supreme Court precedent which allows for critics such as Edelman to "make demands" of negativity against the future with abortion. Edelman's embracement with negativity in the form of advocating "abortion" of the "fascist face of the child" could never "traverse" or confront any system of oppression related to people with disabilities. Even the Christian right academics that advance reproductive futurism with anti-choice apocalyptic scenarios of "birth dearth," the reverse-Malthusian theory of U.S. birth decline resulting in economic and hegemony collapse, concede the importance of "able" child birth in the maintenance of such structure. It seems "embracing negativity" in an effort to "traverse" the phantasy of the death drive cannot be applied to people with disabilities even remotely close to way other marginalized groups formulate radical ethics of confrontation. If specific "meaning" of drives becomes embraced by people with disabilities in an effort to divert discourse towards Truth, revealing,

traversing and confronting the death drive, people with disabilities risk maintaining the status quo which either ignores or eliminates their existence. More over, embracing a strategy of "over-identification" tainted by psychoanalysis never allows one to "deactivate" language from the realm of reason that has historically oppressed people with disabilities, for directing discourse towards Truth requires the discourse itself be guided by reason.

Where Nietzsche's "play" with the rhetorical structure of language allowed him to free thought from reason itself, an attempt to re-inject the symbolic and rhetorical structure of language grounded in over-identification with reasoned meaning offered by psychoanalysis negates the very purpose of deactivating language. While justifying the inversion of the subject/predicate of disease-centric language with psychoanalysis seems not only inapplicable and harmful, it also seems to also be ultimately self-defeating. Yet, this in no way means that engaging in people first language through the traversal or inversion of disease-centric discourse itself is a flawed strategy in the quest for the American dream of equality. As Nietzsche makes clear, the rhetorical structure of language itself has the ability to guide thought, there is no need to justify the inversion of rhetorical structure with a new theory of reasoned Truth for the play in the inversion itself allows one to conceptualize the world with a different lens. In an attempt to escape the production of truth found in psychoanalytic strategies of over-identification while maintaining committed to the traversal or inversion of the subject/predicate rhetorical structure of disease-centric language, emerging rhetorical theorist and philosophers have advanced a theory of "over-signification" to replace the psychoanalytic theory of "over-identification."

The rhetorical structuring of the subject/predicate according to grammatical reason allowed Descartes to separate the mind from the body, and give birth to a world governed by reason; this implies "rhetorical structure" can govern thought without intent, or meaning. Similarly, the tools of "traversal" and confrontation in which Lacan and Žižek advanced under a theory of "over-identification" embraced a specific structure of alignment and reversal as a means to confront phantasy. One need not honestly invest their identity and beliefs in such a structure in order to reap the benefits from manipulating the symbolic order in the same fashion of Lacan. Within the context of the rhetorical structure of disability and studious play one need not "confront" themselves and their drives towards "personhood," nor does adhering to a system of "reason" (in language) mandate one endorse "reason" as the universal law governing all reality along with the individual. One need not even believe that they themselves are human or worthy of personhood status, but if "signifying" your identity according to such principals grants you some increased power or privilege in a society which marginalizes you, why would one not manipulate the symbolic order? Just as Nietzsche never let the "old deceptive female" of "reason in language" seduce him into the morality of the acetic priest, he often mirrored her beauty to seduce others onto a divergent path from which she laid out thought. Similarly, Jean Baudrillard (1990) strips the meaning from Lacan's structure of "over-identification" in which he used to search for the inner truth of the psyche, replacing the concept of truthful "over-identification" with the amoral lie of "over-signification." This replacement divorces the constant quest for meaning found in psychoanalysis from a strategy of manipulating the symbolic order so to best shield oneself from power and regulation. Just as Lacan and Žižek's strategy of over-

identification structurally allows one to escape flawed notions of pity tied to rhetorical labels of "disabled people," Baudrillard's strategy of over-signification reaps the same benefit without injecting a reasoned truth of meaning into the inversed rhetorical structure. This justification not only remedies the problem of harms caused by reason itself, along with the inapplicable relation of desire to disability, it also liberates thought and the playful strategy of inversion from becoming counter-productive in the quest for equality.

Baudrillard's conception of over-signification embraces the exact same structural inversion as presented by psychoanalysts while completely avoiding their justifications for the act. Rather than locating his approach within the discipline of psychology, Baudrillard grounds his philosophy of over-signification within the discipline of communication, under the categories of rhetorical theory and criticism. Baudrillard often refers this ironic technique of inversion or traversal as a "fatal strategy," one which allows the "object to get its revenge" through the slight manipulation of appearances. Where a psychoanalytic conception of over-identification mandates that the individual with a disability truthfully identify ones self according to the rhetorical structure of grammatical reason, Baudrillard's conception of over-signification allows the individual to merely "appear" as if they are identifying with such a reasoned structure, to symbolically frame ones public identity according to the principals of grammatical reason without ever endorsing such a structure as a proper mode of truth or governing principle of reality. In this way Baudrillard encourages individuals to signify their identity in symbolic ways which maximize the political and social benefits to the individual while never actually subjecting the identity of the individual itself to any static or structural

rules of reason, grammar or truth. This allows the individual with a disability to be

socially perceived as equally embodying and governed by principles of reason while

never justifying such a conception of reason as the defining character in creating

individual identity. Through a process of over-signification the individual "seduces" the

power of equality from society without subjecting oneself to the oppressive management

of identity construction dictated by rational society. Baudrillard offers a strategy to

inverse rhetorical structure which seems to capture the spirit of studious play discussed

by Agamben and performed by Nietzsche, rather than resituating the rhetorical inversion

within the same language of reason which guides social thought of people with

disabilities towards oppression, Baudrillard deactivates language from the realm of

reason tied to the rhetorical structure of grammar. Using Baudrillard's philosophy of

over-signification one can justify advancing the rhetorical structure of people first

language as a means to ensure equality for people with disabilities without justifying the

advancement of oppressive norms of reason in the management and construction of

individual identity (Baudrillard, 1990).

<div align="center">*Section Two: Bridging the Gap with Song*</div>

Preface

Where the first section of this chapter attempted to construct a theoretical

justification for both the harms of the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse

itself, and also one for advancing an alternative model of rhetorical structure, this section

attempts to construct a method for engaging in these practices while simultaneously

affirming the call for pragmatic action towards equality. Often this call for pragmatic

action is unknowingly founded upon the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse,

seemingly situating those concerned with both the pragmatic and independent rhetorical action of the call in a conundrum. In attempt to remedy this situation, and bridge the gap between what is "spoken" in disability advocacy, and what is actually "said" in its implementation, this section attempts to investigate and endorse Friedrich Nietzsche's conception of performative engagement in the "singing" of "people first language." Before discussing the method of song itself and how it can be situated in terms of people first language as a method of embracing purity in rhetorical and pragmatic action, it is important to understand the historical and ideological context in which Nietzsche originally advances the concept.

An Attempt at Self-Criticism; the Melodic Preface to *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*.

"It should have sung, this 'new soul'- and not spoken (Nietzsche, 1886, para.3)!" Nietzsche exclaims about his work of youthful caution, the softened work that extends a polite gesture to those who have already accepted its tenets, the work that attempts to exclude the dissenters and the profane, a first work filled with all the potential for greatness yet "marked by every defect of youth(Nietzsche, 1886, para.2)," the work of *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music* (1871). In a return to his initial work Nietzsche attempts to engage the position from which he initially spoke and criticize his own uncourageous will to conceal. Nietzsche levels many charges against himself, the first of which deals with his initial consideration of science. Here Nietzsche cites the "impossibility" of his book, in that the work is born out of youthful primacy on personal experience which necessitates temperamental encounters with the issue at hand. Nietzsche, although impassionedly, continues to accept his original compulsion to

problematize science and render it questionable, yet acknowledges the daunting task that his original text set to grapple. "The problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science," yet presenting or criticizing science in the context of art lies "close to the limits of communication (Nietzsche, 1886, para.3)." Nietzsche did not sing out with poetic art against science but rather strategized against science in the gray area of the analytic artist, an arena that offers us very little alternatives but to accept the authority of the ideology criticized and play logical games for personal satisfaction.

Forcing art into the realm of rational language not only corrodes ones tools of aesthetics in the attack on science, but also presents difficulty in the rational understanding of the criticism itself. While Nietzsche at the time of writing this book may have possessed the ability to break tradition of the choir to whom he preached and done something truly progressive in the performance of his Dionysian poetic art, he "concealed himself for the time being under the scholar's hood." With this err on the side of caution the Dionysian which he attempted to explain, as well as the Greeks, remained uncomprehend-able and "unimaginable" for it never exposed itself. By speaking the language of authority, that of formulations, Nietzsche remains regretful of lacking "the courage (or im-modesty?) to permit myself in every way an individual language of my own for such individual views and hazards (Nietzsche, 1886, para.6)"

Nietzsche then moves to his next charge, one even more egregious than that just previously explained, one in which he claims "I now regret still more than that I obscured and spoiled Dionysian premonitions (Nietzsche, 1886, para.6)." The problem in which he speaks was his attempt to elevate his philosophy of the Greek situation to apply to "the most modern problems." This mere incorporation of modern problems "spoiled the

grandiose Greek problem," just as his caution "obscured and spoiled the Dionysian."

Rather than letting the "German spirit" live out its imminent death Nietzsche idealized it

in relation to the greatness of the Greeks. "On the basis of the latest German music,"

Nietzsche granted the "German spirit" life support and consequently rendered its

remaining days to that of "mediocrity, democracy, and 'modern ideas.'" Nietzsche had

initially found hope where there was none, and thus he claims "I spoiled my first book

(Nietzsche, 1992, para.6)."

    While Nietzsche initiates his self criticism of youthful caution in terms of science,

he applies it to most all aspects of his first work, and rightfully so. Where as Nietzsche

now stands as Dionysus, a performer of the Dionysian, he himself his own God, and one

who is constantly "augmented" by the Apollonian – he once only sought to merely

explain such phenomena. Even within the context of the Dionysian/Apollonian duality

we can see the early Nietzsche fall into the grey area of explaining process through

formulations rather than willing the "individual language" that sings rather than speaks:

"These two different tendencies run parallel to each other, for the most part openly at

variance; and they continually incite each other to new and more powerful births, which

perpetuate an antagonism, only superficially reconciled by the common term 'art'; till

eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 'will,' they appear coupled with

each other, and through this coupling ultimately generate an equally Dionysian and

Apollonian form of art (Nietzsche, 1886, p. 33)." While this passage is not wholly

unique, it is an ideal representation of how the early Nietzsche seeks to describe art as

formulation, in process rather than performance. Even as the work progresses to where

the Dionysian is chased off by the Socratic, the Dionysian remains vague, as a sign without referent, cautiously explained rather than experienced, spoken rather than sung.

Within the context of science itself one continues to see the early Nietzsche positioning art as explanation, and basking in a system of internal logical contradiction to render science problematic. While the later Nietzsche acknowledges the inability for the problem of science to be recognized in the context of science, the early Nietzsche praises the brilliance of Kant and Schopenhauer in use the tenants of science to renounce its universal validity: "great men, universally gifted, have contrived, with an incredible amount of thought , to make use of the paraphernalia of science itself, to point out the limits and the relativity of knowledge generally, and thus to deny decisively the claim of science to universal validity and universal aims (Nietzsche, 1992, para.18)." But is this really an attempt to understand the problems of science within the context of science, or merely isolating an avenue or mechanism for the deconstruction of scientific totality? Generally I would assume that either or both theories could be correct and Nietzsche's overall objection would still stand, the original work spoke of strategy and process rather than passionately sung the artistic song of renouncement. The way in which art was presented in this context of countering science appears personal, unique, and isolated from the overarching spirit of art; art was shown to prove or explain the internal contradictions and lack of universal validity inherent within science: "Our art reveals this universal distress: in vein does one depend imitatively on all the great productive periods and natures; in vein does one accumulate the entire 'world-literature' around modern man for his comfort; in vein does one place oneself in the midst of the art styles and artist of all ages, so one may give names to them as Adam did to the beasts" Yet this posits art as

merely a tool to explain the problems of science outside the bounds of the context of science, drawing on difficult analogies and ultimately using art not as art to oppose science, but art as analytic explanation. This analytic form of art denies the necessity of the aesthetic in a return to an authoritative discourse. It is here where Nietzsche claims he should have "sung" in the embracement of the Dionysian aesthetic in order to truly renounce the universal validity of science.

Nietzsche's next charge of spoiling the Greek problem with "hasty hopes and faulty applications to the present" was not one in which overcoming caution could have solved for. It was only through Nietzsche's knowledge of how the future of the "German spirit" turned out that allows him to deny the potentiality of such a spirit when "touched by the Dionysian magic." This is not to say that Nietzsche does not originally engage in "appending hopes" which he later criticizes, but rather he would have had no way of knowing the error of his ways in the original text. For Nietzsche blatantly applies the Greek problem to the German spirit in the name of hope: "Let no one try to blight our faith in a yet-impending rebirth of Hellenic antiquity; for this alone gives us hope for a renovation and purification of the German spirit through the fire magic of music (Nietzsche, 1871, para.20)."

Despite Nietzsche's self critique he still finds elements of value in his original text. While not specifically referenced as "brilliance" or "greatness" it seems as if Nietzsche takes pride in initiating the questioning of science, "science considered for the first time as problematic, as questionable (Nietzsche, 1886, para.2)." Even despite his own self criticism of youthful immaturity, Nietzsche claims this original line of questioning science must have some value, for "it is a proven book, I mean one that in

any case satisfied the 'best minds of the time.' In view of that, it really ought to be treated with some consideration and taciturnity (Nietzsche, 1886, para.2)." While those "best minds of the time" may have just been "fellow-rhapsodizers" Nietzsche cherishes the success and claims that the work takes even those on similar paths to new places.

More so than measuring greatness in terms of others opinion Nietzsche continues to truly value the interpretation of the aesthetic phenomenon as the only justification of "the existence of the world." "Art, and not morality, is presented as the truly metaphysical activity of man (Nietzsche, 1886, para.5)," throughout the entirety of the book it is exclusively art that has meaning behind all events. This amoral creative spirit is continuously moving and mutating, always demoting "morality to the realm of appearance" and hence has incredible value to the later Nietzsche's philosophy regarding the rejection of slave morality. Nietzsche himself notes the crucial and fantastic element of such an omission of morality in the name of aesthetics: "what matters is that it betrays a spirit who will one day fight at any risk whatever the moral interpretation and significance of existence (Nietzsche, 1886, para.5)."

Building off of this value to omitting morality in the name of placing a primacy on aesthetics, Nietzsche then applies the concept to Christianity. Nietzsche recognizes that the "instincts" of his first book was closely aligned with his later notion of rejecting morality and Christianity in which he continues to value. This book showed "careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book," not only morality but Christianity itself was omitted in the name of creating a philosophy of the purely aesthetic that affirmed life rather than condemning the world and all its beauty.

Song

Borrowing from Nietzsche's *Attempt at Self-Criticism* (1886), the method advanced in this section, one with the aim of remedying the rejection of disease-centric discourse with a continued commitment to advancing the pragmatic action founded upon such rhetoric, is one I refer to as "song." This method of song simply implies that one engage in pragmatic calls for equality using a rhetorical structure of disability discourse which does not stigmatize or negate the spirit of equality such a call arises from. Engaging in the method of "song" can most simply be described as using people first language when advancing pragmatic actions toward equality related to people with disabilities.

"Singing," or engaging in the method of song, is an act of performative engagement with the call for equality, where both that which is spoken and said by the call itself enacts the spirit of equality in pure form. "Singing" involves more than a call to action, a criticism speaking with only analytic explanation, or a rational plan which only offers alternatives in the language of the problem. What is "said" in the "spoken," rhetoric in the mode of the purely analytic form of aesthetics, is not mutually exclusive with what is said in the song – yet the forms of communication themselves appear to be. A performative engagement of song is an "individual language" which does not "conceal itself under the scholar's hood" or accept the authority of the ideology in which it criticizes; where the spoken assumes one dimensionality in what is "said" as it plays in a rational world of empty sterile symbols, and is hence unknowingly seduced into that authoritarian ideology which it attempts to break from as it simultaneously perpetuates it. The song embraces a "radical exoticism," a position of complete foreignness from that

ideological position in which what is turned from is rooted. As a performance, the song of poetic art cannot be pinned down to a universal, eternal, structural or exact form being that it is always born out of the creative spirit which affirms purity of will, and is facilitated by a playful gesture which unlinks and declines individual essence from the realm of appearances that society can categorize and ascribe meaning according to hegemonic logical systems. The "spoken" is cancerous; it creates a new call of action which only duplicates the flawed notions, language and logic of the original upon itself. Nothing of the spoken can ever "turn" to the point of detachment from the original; it merely incestuously embraces the original structural position as it spirals off into infinity under the guise of "progress." Singing takes "the courage (or im-modesty?) to permit [oneself] in every way an individual language of [ones] own for such individual views and hazards (Nietzsche, 1886, para.6)." Just as the tenants of science and rationality tell us that agreement and concession are never opposition; the singing of a song refuses to "use the tenants of science to renounce its universal validity (Nietzsche, 1871, para.18)" in its turn towards detachment and change.

If singing involves or resembles anything of that mentioned above, how could Nietzsche ever find elements of value in his original work? How would "self-criticism" not incestuously build off and duplicate the original? Would we not be forced to turn 180 degrees from that "considered for the first time as problematic, as questionable" in an effort to fully reverse the original and create something new?

Learning to Sing

Learning to sing does not mandate or even assume reversibility under the auspice of taking a position of (truthful) advocacy in polar opposition to that of the original. In

singing one may very likely even dismiss the entire logical system of binary opposition all together; for even if it could offer some meaning, the song wills itself to no system as it embraces "meaning" only in hiding and shielding its appearance, deceiving entities of its universality and existence. While this essay offers a potential example of "singing" and advocates embracement of its spirit in a specific instance, there remain no boundaries or exclusive strategies that can ever fully capture or explain this spirit in total due to the limits which analytic explanation and disclosure are bound to.

Nietzsche can find value in what his original work strived to challenge, but dismiss his methodology in leveling and disclosing the challenge itself. The spirit which challenges science and rationality is seduced into affirming those structures when it grounds itself within the discrete limits of that context of the structures themselves. The "spirit" which gives birth to the song can be the same which serves as the impetus for the merely spoken, yet when this call, issued from the spirit itself, is answered by speaking alone it falls back into the arms of the priest which performs its own exorcism. Nietzsche's criticism is not directed at the spirit of his youthful soul, but rather his youthful mistakes in communicating such a spirit. The original challenge to science he issued in *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music* (1871) was spawned from a spirit in which he continues to regard as beautiful, yet he now realizes originally he was only able to do this great spirit injustice by forcefully revealing it in the language which mandates its annihilation. The original work forced the spirit into the confines of a system of aesthetic communalization which can never come close to explaining the spirit or will itself, yet by saying too much science became the only referent which one could latch onto in the spoken work to justify the de-justification of science itself; the

tenements of science were tacitly accepted in the unconscious multiplication of sciences

own cancer cells upon one another. The Self-Criticism continues to level the same

challenge towards science in the unspoken, the song which avoids temperamental

encounters with the issue according to its own self referential logic and hegemonic

system of rhetorical limitations. The song of the Self-Criticism detaches "the problem of

science" from "the context of science" and performativly engages in artistic criticism

"close to the limits of communication" itself. The spirit which issues the call for

criticism can only be affirmed when communicated according to the artistic context,

rhetorical appearance and performative engagement of the spirit itself. Listening to the

spirit alone, remaining attentive to all the rules it sets forth for us to follow, and

responding with what ever self manifested signifiers and terminology rhetorically

revealed by the spirit on its own accord, allows for an ethically responsible, pure

confrontation with the spirit in which we can performativly engage and advocate on

behalf of what the spirit wills. This will is embraced in song, detached from all context

and systems which seek its elimination or the spoken which can only de-justify, obscure

and degrade it, although often unintentionally, in a fatal attempt to liberate and advocate

on behalf of the spirit itself.

Just as Nietzsche, this "new soul," first failed to affirm the spirit of his purely

motivated will and artistic call of critical action with the communicative gesture of the

spoken, the song can always reappear, rectifying that which has been obscured by the

spoken and poetically advocate its authentic will. We need not outright dismiss the spirit,

or even on face reject the motives, actions, criticisms or plans it has presented us with

under the flawed signs and rhetorical gestures of the spoken. Learning to sing does not

require the creation of any "new" rhetoric or discourse, only the open embracement and performative engagement with the other, the spirit, that which rhetorically reveals itself can be relayed in song only when we adhere to its own terms when advocating on behalf of its will. Learning to sing, and song itself, occurs in the space of revision; in acts of declination of rhetorical wills in order to remain open to the multiplicity of the other entity, and with a responsibility to embracing and advocating on behalf of the other entities will, both in purity of action and communicative gestures. Through song one can level challenges as an advocate on behalf of an-other that not only affirms an action of challenge, but also a rhetoric of challenge which allows for a total detachment from systems of oppression. Within the context of the rhetoric of disability, advancing and revising pragmatic calls for equality according to the rhetorical structure of people first language represents a performative engagement with equality, an act which affirms the spirit of equality itself in the singing of its song.

Conclusion: The Politics of Rejection, Revision, and Omission.

Chapter Three discussed ideological criticism, as originally conceived of by Phillip Wander in his 1983 essay "*The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism,*" pointing out the flaws in omitting the ideological repercussions of rhetoric absent the crafters intent or any specific historical meaning. In both Chapters Three and Four, House Resolution 285 has been analyzed in a multiplicity of ways and interrogated using different techniques and rhetorical methods in an effort to isolate and point out different elements, characteristics and examples of what such legislation represents. As a text, House Resolution 285 can be understood as an example of motivational purity absent rhetorical focus, an "ideological turn" towards pragmatic reform in the name of social

equality, and as an example state sponsored deployment of discursive violence in the form of stigmatizing and dehumanizing labeling or an individual group. Above all, House Resolution 285 represents a gap between what is spoken and what is said. Chapter Three concludes by stressing the importance of ideological and rhetorical purity in the universal call for action in the name of equality. This element of duel purity can be achieved through the rejection of disease-centric discourse while simultaneously advocating pragmatic reforms which further the pursuit of equality and disability rights.

Unfortunately, given that disease-centric discourse is often deployed without any knowledge of the harm it inflicts, it appears difficult to "reject" such discourse at the exact time and place of legislation taking form as text. Section One of this chapter attempts to present a theoretical foundation and justification for rejecting disease-centric discourse, concluding with an advocacy of traversing the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse in the formulation of an alternative rhetoric of disability known as people first language. Through a discussion of the harms of pity, Section One justifies rejecting disease-centric discourse and the rhetorical structure it is founded upon at each and ever occasion. In addition, through a discussion of psychoanalysis and the philosophy of Jean Baudrillard Chapter Four also attempts to present a theoretical justification for the application of people first language as an alternative rhetorical mode and structure to disease-centric discourse. While these previous chapters attempt to fill gaps in the existing research pertaining to the rhetoric of disability by constructing a theoretical justification for both the rejection of disease-centric discourse and the advocacy of people first language, there still remains a need to construct some type of methodology in remedying the problems of current legislation which has been

constructed according to the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse absent knowledge of the implications. If this method is to retain an ideological focus in an effort "to create a better world" it is crucial that it refuses to dismiss or omit either the pragmatic potentiality of a state based action in rejecting disease-centric discourse and vice versa. Only when the advancement and implementation of pragmatic efforts towards equality are simultaneously accompanied by the rejection of disease-centric discourse can we ever hope to actualize the creation of a better world for people with disabilities.

Although individual action which permutes the rejection of disease-centric discourse with a call for pragmatic state-based action towards equality rarely results in the automatic institutional or legislative change one wishes to see, individual resistance to disease-centric discourse can have a dramatic effect in "creating a better world," or shaping a society free of stigma and discrimination. The arenas in which politics take place are not limited to spaces carved out within the institutional walls of the state. Local gatherings, academic debates and discussions are all critical arenas within the public sphere where political actions are advocated, rhetoric is deployed, and politics occur. In making the claim that individual action does not spur institutional change I do not wish to suggest that individual action within these public spheres of politics is futile or irrelevant, in contrast I wish to advance just the opposite position.

Assuming each location of politics varies in its ability to bring about pragmatic state-based initiatives combating discrimination; individual action must be tailored to the specific location in which the individual fighting for equality speaks from. This requires individual activists fighting for disability rights to locate and analyze the position in

which they speak in terms of the relative power and influence they wield, and then to formulate their strategies against discrimination and inequality accordingly. For example, if an individual activist holds a state position of power which allows that individual to shape state based legislation (both in terms of the course for pragmatic action and the choice in the rhetoric pertaining to disability) one need not dismiss individuals arguments outright which are framed according to the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse. In this situation it seems very simple for the individual to be able to embrace the logic or call for equality presented, while simultaneously severing the disease-centric discourse attached to the position and endorsing the underlying advocacy proposed under an ideologically pure framework of pursuing action while using exclusively people first language. In this situation, it may only be needed to point out that the individuals rhetoric is not the preferred rhetorical structure in which either people with disabilities or the institution enacting the policy ascribe to. This act alone may increase the awareness of the individual who deployed such rhetoric to the flawed nature of disease-centric discourse. In addition, if the activist committed to ideological purity in both rhetoric and action has the final say on the text of the action, there is virtually no risk that the legislation itself will send a counter-productive message of stigma and inferiority to people with disabilities.

On the other hand, when activism is located within a public sphere of politics which does not directly effectuate or bring about the actual state-based pragmatic gains in equality being discussed and advocated, the necessity for rejecting positions framed within the structure disease-centric discourse takes on an increased importance. One example of such a political sphere can be found in academic debate and discussion,

where individuals often "role-play" as state actors who advocate a given policy or social

action as a way to facilitate education about given political acts through competition

amongst their peers. Within this arena, and other similar spheres of political action, it

becomes crucial for those assuming both the role of the individual activist and the

intellectual who facilitates the exercise to hold the rejection of disease-centric discourse

to a higher level of scrutiny. Given that the pragmatic gains in equality advocated by the

individual deploying disease-centric discourse are merely hypothetical, and intellectual

endorsement of the pragmatic advocacy advanced does not translate into any real gains in

equality, there is only a real risk of decrease equality and increasing discriminatory

attitudes by remaining complicit with the oppressive discourse. Within this sphere of

politics it must be the activist and intellectual's first priority to reject the entire premise of

the position advanced with terms of disease-centric discourse. As an educational exercise

in political advocacy, such a rejection is crucial in transforming the entire way disability

is discussed and the interests of people with disabilities are advanced, not only within the

sterile laboratory of the educational institution where the testing of policy options is

taking place but through out society as a whole. As training grounds for future policy

makers, activists and lawyers, a rejection of disease-centric discourse within this sphere

of politics has the potential to spill over to into future rejections within the broader

political realm. As these individuals begin to enter the positions of political power such

exercises prepares them for they will be able to reject disease-centric discourse in the

creation of actual political legislation, or at very least they will have the knowledge

needed to advance political actions without using the discourse themselves. Absent the

benefits to future politics, a rejection of disease centric discourse within this sphere is

crucial on its own accord. Rejecting such a stigmatizing discourse is necessary within all educational arenas in order to foster inclusion within the activity itself and an element of fairness for students with disabilities.

In claiming that this rejection should be the intellectual's first priority there can be no endorsement of advocacy founded upon disease-centric discourse or endorsement of advocacy which only attaches and embraces people first language after criticism has taken place. Just as when students deploy racist or sexist rhetoric, a rejection of disease-centric discourse within this sphere must completely shift the discussion of politics at hand to a discussion of the politics and actions the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse advances on its own accord, often without intent. Only such an explicit rejection can have the potential to impact the individuals deploying disease-centric discourse and prevent them from using it in the future. In addition, while an apology for using such rhetoric serves as an act of good form, it cannot serve as a justification for reverting to the discussion that was previously taking place. If this were to occur it would promote the kind of action criticized in chapter three related to Philip Wander and his omission of ideological action stemming from rhetorical structure alone. Any addendum to the advocacy which only rejects disease-centric rhetoric as an after thought, in an attempt to allow for one to return to the original discussion, endorses the same ideological assumptions that serve as the foundation for a universal call to action while omitting, co-opting, and masking the harms presented by the rhetoric structure of disease-centric discourse itself.

Finally, in acknowledging that disease-centric discourse is often deployed absent any knowledge of its stigmatizing qualities it is important to address the political sphere

of action which took place in the past. While it is not always possible for individuals in

their given position of political power to directly shape the rhetorical outcome of every

legislative action, it is important that all individuals committed to the spirit of equality,

and the affirmation of people first language as song, to constantly urge for previous

formations of legislative texts written in disease-centric discourse to be revisited and

revised. Just as framing a call for action according to a rhetorical structure which rejects

disease-centric discourse does not necessitate a rejection of the entire pragmatic action

itself, revisiting current legislation and revising the rhetoric used within its text does not

invalidate the functioning of the law itself or its historic gains in equality. As will be

discussed in Chapter Five, this strategy has been used to revise legislation originally

written with rhetoric now deemed racist, and continues to be an important element of

advocacy for many groups struggling for state recognition of identity.

In conclusion, this chapter has aimed to construct a theoretical justification for

rejecting the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse absent historical context or

the intent of the rhetor / policy maker in the deployment of such a discourse. By isolating

rhetorical structure alone as impetus for harms arising out of certain forms of rhetoric, it

becomes possible to acknowledge and investigate a way in which language itself takes

form as rhetoric and independent action.   Linguistic terminology and discursive labels

has often been the subject of rhetorical criticism by many scholars, yet when such terms

fail to take on a rhetorical dimension in historical, cultural or ideological context they are

often shielded from criticism and omitted from ideological concerns. By isolating and

analyzing "rhetorical structure" in a vacuum this chapter attempts to add new knowledge

to the field of communication studies by opening up new avenues and forms of rhetorical

criticism to be practiced within the discipline. This form of rhetorical criticism based on rhetorical structure alone presents critics with a new direction and position from which to investigate and analyze a plethora of discursive practices and labels. In addition, creating a theoretical justification for rejecting disease-centric discourse based upon rhetorical structure alone moves beyond the existing explanations for advancing people first language currently adopted by the disability rights movement, allowing the movement to offer new arguments not predicated on identity politics. The second section of this chapter offers an alternative method in the pursuit of equality which does not mandate a trade off between pragmatic state-based gains and the rejection of oppressive discursive practices. In this way ideological criticism can take a brief pause in the turn towards a universal call for action and account for the inequality perpetuated by omission. The method of "song" advanced in this chapter expands on Philip Wander's rhetorical theory of ideological criticism, adding a new perspective to current rhetorical theory within the discipline by including an element of ideological concern for rhetoric taking form as independent action.

CHAPTER FIVE

Introduction

"Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man (Heidegger, 1976, p. 144)." The language we use, as words, labels, and phrases, has the possibility to directly or indirectly define individuals and control lives. Often times language takes form as symbolic action; apart from the speaker's intent, language functions as an act of oppression or a tool in perpetuating dehumanization. In modern society the term "nigger" invokes on face racist assumptions, categorizing an entire race as less than fully human. Historically this term, and other similar terms have been used in the oppression of an entire race. Regardless of intent, the way one labels an individual or group of people has the power to elicit demeaning or degrading attitudes towards those individuals labeled as such. Almost every "minority" group in American history has had a unique experience with the way members of society, external and internal to the minority group, labels or defines the group at large. The utilization of demeaning labeling practices does not only lay the foundation for oppression, but has historically been directly used as a tool of oppressors. Haig A. Bosmajian (1973) notes:

> One of the first important acts of an oppressor is to redefine the oppressed victims he intents to jail or eradicate so that they will be looked upon as creatures warranting suppression and in some cases separation and annihilation. I say "creatures" because the redefinition usually implies a dehumanization of the individual. The Nazis redefined the Jews as "bacilli," "parasites," "disease," and "demon." The language of white racism has for centuries attempted to "keep the nigger in his place." Our sexist language has allowed men to define who and what a woman is. The labels "traitors," "queers," "pinkoes," "saboteurs," and

"obscene degenerates" have all been used to attack students protesting the war in Vietnam and the economic and political injustices in this country…

Through the use of the language of suppression the human animal can seemingly justify the unjustifiable, make palatable the unpalatable, and make decent the indecent. Just as our thought affect our language, so does our language affect our thoughts and eventually our action and behavior. (Bosmajin, pp. 347)

When one is confronted with such tactics of oppression deployed in a current context there arises an ethical obligation to reject any language which that oppression of the other possible. Through a confrontation with language one becomes able to unmask both strategic tactics of the oppressor, and seemingly benign rhetoric and labels that lay the foundation for oppression.

The focus of this investigation is to expose how individuals become blinded to language taking form as symbolic action in the specific instance of "disease-centric discourse." As Heidegger hints at, and Bosjamian (1973) further explains "language affect[s] our thoughts and eventually our action and behavior (p. 347)." Engaging in discursive or rhetorical acts in the deployment of specific types of language (terms, words or phrases as labels) such as disease-centric discourse, can perpetuate the discrimination, dehumanization, and stigmatization of those individuals within a given minority group, even when the ideological goal of a given advocacy utilizing such language is to help those to whom the language refers.

While much has been done in the analysis of race and gender, this chapter wishes to examine a different linguistic domain, but one no less important to achieving the American Dream of equality. This study wishes to call into question the specific terms and labels deployed under the broad construct of disease-centric discourse. Of primarily concern is the currently accepted term "disabled people," often used to reference individuals with physical or mental disabilities. Other labels that identify the individual

exclusively according to his or her disability, such as "schizophrenic," "cripple," "paraplegic," or "retard," will also be analyzed. This Chapter attempts to draw analogies between the discursive practices historically used to describe or categorize two specific minority groups, people with disabilities and people of color, through an investigation of the language used in fragments of text set within their specific historical context. In drawing such analogies, the first section of this article attempts to unmask the implications both discursive practices pose to individuals of each minority group. This section rests with a discussion of "people-first language" as an alternative method in describing, or conversing with or about people with disabilities in analogy to the term "people of color." Using this as a starting point for understanding the demeaning nature of disease-centric discourse, this essay moves to analyze the rhetorical significance of the terms in question in an effort to further understand how such implications arise. This discussion attempts to move beyond a mere condemnation of such terms or description of their implications and analyze why the rhetoric presents such harms. Hopefully, through this analogy and the very arrangement of the terms in question one can gain new insight into how the terms of disease-centric discourse perpetuate dehumanization.

Throughout this entire project different congressional and legislative texts pertaining to people with disabilities have been analyzed from both the position of how the rhetorical structure of terminology deployed is perceived by people with disabilities, and also how the rhetorical structure itself guides individual thought and shapes society at large. Rather than revisiting each of the legislative texts discussed in the previous chapters with great detail and further analysis, this chapter seeks to move away from an exclusive focus on disease-centric discourse to include and analyze other examples of

dangerous terminology within legislative texts. The goal is not to add new insight into

the already rich field rhetorical criticism pertaining to race, but rather to simply accept

the well acknowledged fact that the racist terminology highlighted within these texts

perpetuates inequality, as the chapter then moves to comparatively analyze the rhetorical

structure of these terms parallel to those of diseases-centric discourse. By investigating

and drawing similarities to the rhetorical structure of racist terminology which society has

currently deemed oppressive, the hope is to advance the form of rhetorical criticism based

on rhetorical structure discussed in Chapter Four in an effort to expose the oppressive

rhetorical significance of disease-centric discourse.[vi] In addition, this form of rhetorical

criticism may offer new insights on how best enact strategies traversing the rhetorical

structure of disease-centric discourse, through an examination of how other minority

groups have succeeded in reclaiming acceptable signifiers of identity in the evolution of

rhetorical structure. In an attempt to expand on this form of rhetorical criticism

predicated on rhetorical structure, in addition to expanding on the rhetorical theory of

ideological criticism, this chapter attempts to situate an investigation of rhetorical

structure within different historical contexts. Wander notes "moving into an historical

context, stylistic devices take on the fragrances and hues which make them work in the

lives of real people (Wander, 1983, p. 14)," by incorporating an element of historical

context to a structural criticism of rhetoric, the aim is to add another layer of description

in analyzing the oppressive nature of disease-centric discourse. This permutation of

structural and historical focus seeks to avoid the omission independent and unintended

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[vi] It is not my intent to justify the specific terms of disease-centric discourse as "equally" offensive
to those of racist terminology which follow a similar rhetorical structure. The point of paralleling such
terms is merely to expose similarities in rhetorical structure and historical context which may open new
modes of understanding rhetorical criticism based on rhetorical structure.

rhetorical action while affirming the ideological goal activist criticism which seeks to

"create a better world (Wander, 1983, p. 16)."

Section One: Institutional Oppression: Racist and Disease-Centric Discourse Situated in the Historical Context of 1840-1842

Whereas, notwithstanding all efforts which may be made on the coast of Africa for Suppressing the Slave Trade, the facilities for carrying on that traffic and avoiding the vigilance of cruisers by the fraudulent use of flags, and other means, are so great, and the temptations for pursuing it, while a market can be found for Slaves, so strong, as that the desired result may be long delayed, unless all markets be shut against the purchase of African negroes, the Parties to this Treaty agree that they will unite in all becoming representations and remonstrances, with any and all Powers within whose dominions such markets are allowed to exist; and that they will urge upon all such Powers the propriety and duty of closing such markets effectually at once and forever.

Webster-Ashburton Treaty: Article XI, 1842

Ratified by the United States August 22, 1842, "The Webster-Ashburton Treaty" struck

an agreement with Great Britain in attempting to universally ban the "Slave Trade,"

"closing such markets effectually at once and forever." The document never suggests

any specific reasons why the Slave Trade may be a flawed institution, or explains

individual harms experienced by "African negroes" due to such practices, yet

acknowledges the need for the Slave Trades dismantlement. The effectiveness or intent

of the specific treaty is of little importance to this criticism, yet what is important to note

is the label of "negroes" used to describe persons of color within the text of the treaty.

The American context of the term "negro" used to describe a group of people in its plural

"negroes," stems from the Spanish word "negro," literally meaning "black." The

redeployment of the Spanish word by American civilians and policy makers signified a

way of describing individuals according to a vague category of skin color. During the

early 20th century the label or term "negro" gained capitalization in the form of "Negro,"

generally in reference to United States citizens of African decent. While the word

"negro" most directly correlates to Spanish language, other variations of the term can be found in the French word "negre," or the term "neger" from a Scottish and Northern England dialect. From such terms and words of different dialects (negro, negre and neger) arose the American conception of the word "nigger," a word which "from the earliest usage was 'the term that carries with it all the obloquy and contempt and rejection which whites have inflicted on blacks (Gowers, 1965, n.p.).'" While the term "nigger" itself has been cited as inherently racist and oppressive, it has, within a historical context, been deployed by some absent the intent (or possibly even the knowledge) of demeaning or oppressing the minority group to which it references. President Lyndon B. Johnson was once quoted as saying "Why, hell, boy this country's so goddamn great even a nigger's gonna be President! And you and others like you got to be ready (Oates, 2003)!"

How could Johnson, then President of the United States not only use the word "nigger" but use such language with the preface "even a" (in reference to the word "nigger") in describing the potential for all to become president? How could one not acknowledge the intrinsically racist assumption behind such language or the inherently dehumanizing context of the phrase "even a nigger?" Within a "historical context" such language appears, in some instances, almost natural. Within the historical context of The Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842), not only did the term "negroes" seem natural, but the existence and "temptations for pursuing" slavery seemed equally natural. The text of The Webster-Ashburton Treaty offers a unique window of insight and an arena to examine seemingly benign, yet inherently oppressive, terms such as "negroes" while also offering a possible explanation of why such rhetoric is traditionally rejected in a current context.

The phrase "purchase of African negroes" in the text of The Webster-Ashburton Treaty links the term "negroes" to individuals of both "black" skin color, and individuals of African decent through the historical interpretation of the word and direct application of the term "African" prior to "negroes." More importantly, such a phrase links the term "negroes" (and all its assumptions) to individuals who can be purchased, more notably slaves. This rhetorical connection of the term "negroes" with slaves who can be bought and sold rests on the assumption that people of color, or people of African decent are naturally slaves. Within this context people of color were assumed to be less than fully human, and were consequently purchased and sold under the racist construct of slavery. Linking the term "negroes" to people of color, is not a benign label for a group of people, but rather a way of linking a specific minority group to the assumption that individuals within that group are less than fully human with a single word. Within this historical context individuals deemed less than fully human were linked to and deemed slaves; "slaves" were ideologically, physically, and rhetorically linked to people of color; and "people of color" were linked to terms such as "negroes. Racist rhetoric such as the term "negroes" is independently oppressive, regardless of a speaker's intent. While terms such as "negroes" at one point seemed benign and natural, so did slavery and the oppression of a group of people due to skin color or ethnicity. Using such language that identifies a group of people according to a characteristic historically or currently deemed inferior linguistically perpetuates discrimination.

"A BILL

Concerning the estates of Idiots or Lunatics, and Infants in the District of Colombia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the lands, tenements, and chattels, situate and being within the District of Columbia, of idiots or lunatics, whether such idiots or lunatics be citizens of said District, or any of the States or Territories of the United States, and the custody of the persons of such idiots or lunatics, may have been, or may hereafter be, committed to the proper authority of this District, or any State or Territory, to a proper committee, or curator, according to the law in said District, State, or Territory; such committee, after giving bond and security, in such penalty of the circuit court of the District of Colombia, for the Country in which the said property is situate, or may be, shall direct, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties in the said District, as committee, he shall have the right control and govern, within the said District of Colombia, the person of said idiot or lunatic, and take possession of his or her estates to sue and be sued in relation thereto; and the said estates of such idiots, or lunatics, shall be by such committee safely kept from waste and destruction; *Provided, however,* When the committee of any such idiot, or lunatic, appointed by the proper authority of this District, or of any State or Territory of the United States, shall think the interest of such idiot, or lunatic, and of his family, would be promoted by the sale of the real estate which the said idiot, or lunatic, may own, within the District of Colombia, or of any part thereof, it shall be lawful for such committee to exhibit in chancery to the court of that county, in said District, in which such real estate may be situate, a bill, in which he shall set forth plainly and distinctly all the estate, real and personal, in said county, belonging to said idiot or lunatic, and all facts which in his opinion are calculated to show whether the interest of such idiot, or lunatic, and his family, will be promoted by such sale, or not. The bill shall be verified by the oath of the committee, and the idiot, or lunatic, together with those who shall be heirs to his estate, were he dead, shall be made defendants, and it shall be the duty of the court to appoint some disinterested, intelligent, and fit person to be the guardian ad litem, for the idiot, or lunatic, who shall answer such bill, and who shall be allowed for his trouble, to be paid by the committee out of the estate of the idiot, or lunatic, such reasonable compensation as the court may direct."

S. 126. Sec.1, 26th Congress, 1st Session. January 28th, 1840

S. 126. of the 26th Congress of the United States, attempts to remedy issues

"concerning the estates of Idiots or Lunatics, and Infants in the District of Colombia."

The action taken by the bill is to allow "intelligent and fit" agents of the state take control

of property and children of "idiots and lunatics." While the intent of the text is not of

primary concern, it shows that even good motives can give rise to discrimination and

oppression. The issue of main importance is the language used to describe people with

mental disabilities, and those individuals not with mental disabilities; primarily in the

utilization of disease-centric discourse specifically deployed with the terms of "idiots"

and "lunatics." Throughout the entire text of S. 126. there is no discussion or definition

of who would potentially fall within the category of "idiot or lunatic," or even what such

a category of individuals may look like. While the terms "lunatic" and "idiot" seemed to

be used in binary opposition to the term "intelligent," the bill fails to define either set of

terms. This vagueness or total lack of definition in regard to the terms "idiot" and

"lunatic," can be found throughout history as a way to generically describe or label

people with disabilities. Situated within this historical context, the terms "idiot" and

lunatic" are used to describe people diagnosed or socially defined as having any type or

category of mental disability, from depression to schizophrenia and all others in between.

In a current context, the terms "lunatic" and "idiot" are deemed "offensive to say the

least, such terms represent everything the disability rights movement attempts to reject

and move away from (Meruines, 2005)." While terms such as "lunatic" and "idiot" are

regarded as dehumanizing and oppressive by advocates for people with disabilities, and a

broader community of people with disabilities, such terms remain sporadically used in

current contexts and have been used by many prominent figures in a historical context.

In the specific context of S. 126, the terms "lunatic or idiot" are used to describe a

category of people who deserve their property and children seized by "intelligent" agents

of the state. The terms "idiot" and "lunatic" deployed in the text of S. 126 are used to

create a universal category or label in which individuals with mental disabilities are

defined solely by a generic term without regard to what they have been diagnosed with,

medically or socially. Any one of many personal characteristics deemed as falling

outside the bounds of normalcy can be used to justify the application of such terms or labels to a given individual. Once such labels are placed upon the individual, the "lands, tenements, and chattels" of such "idiots or lunatics" can be justifiably taken by the state; such individuals identified as "idiots or lunatics" are deemed totally incompetent, unable to complete the most basic tasks of a human being. Individuals labeled as "idiots or lunatics" are thus placed under the control of another human being, an individual defined by the court as "intelligent and fit" to control the property and life of the less than fully human "idiot" or "lunatic." With absolutely no definition of such terms, the rhetoric of S. 126 allows the state to "redefine" individuals with little basis or guidelines. As Bosmajian notes, "the first important acts of an oppressor is to redefine the oppressed victims he intents to jail or eradicate so that they will be looked upon as creatures warranting suppression and in some cases separation (p. 347)." The disease-centric rhetoric of "idiot" and "lunatic" in the text of S. 126 is deployed in an effort "suppress," and in some cases "separate" members from society, their family, and their belongings. While individuals are not specifically "jailed" due to criminal deviance, they are "committed to the proper authority of this District, or any State, or Territory (S.126, 1840)" according to "mental deviance." The rhetoric of S.126, specifically with reference to the terms "idiot" and lunatic," acts as a redefinition of the individual, in an effort to justify to all society the oppression of such individuals.

In the text of both The Webster-Ashburton Treaty and S. 126 rhetorical labels are used or constructed in order to describe individuals according to a single personal characteristic, such as skin color or mental disability. In each of these texts the historical attitudes surrounding such personal characteristics were extremely negative. The

characteristics were rhetorically constructed to define the entirety of the individual with a single word; people of color became redefined as "negroes," people with disabilities were redefined as "lunatics" or "idiots." Through such rhetorical constructions individuals became nothing more than the object or characteristic that society found void of value. The rhetorical construction of these labels served to link personal characteristics with negative societal attitudes, allowing society to interact with the label rather than the individual.

Within a current context, racist and disease-centric discourse such as "idiot," "negro," "lunatic," or "nigger" is still used to discredit and demean individuals and ideas. Often individuals using such terms are blinded to the symbolic action such rhetoric performs and to the historical context which allowed the words to come into being. These rhetorical constructions are not merely benign descriptive terms, but rather rhetorical actions used to link an individual to something society deems of little value, hence creating the individual as subhuman. As Philip Wander notes "moving into an historical context, stylistic devices take on the fragrances and hues which make them work in the lives of real people (Wander, 1983, p. 14.)" When placing racist and disease-centric rhetoric in a historical context it is possible to not only draw similarities between the discursive practices, but also to discover the oppressive foundation upon which such rhetoric is built.

Section Two: Reversing and Perpetuating Institutional Oppression: Racist and Disease-Centric Rhetoric within the Near Current Context of 1990 and 2005

> To amend the Act of August 30, 1890 (commonly known as the Second Morrill Act), to remove language purporting to permit racial segregation in land-grant colleges that receive funds... (Introduced in House)

HR 4898 IH

101st CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4898

A BILL

To amend the Act of August 30, 1890 (commonly known as the Second Morrill Act), to remove language purporting to permit racial segregation in land-grant colleges that receive funds under that Act.

> *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. ELIMINATION OF SEGREGATIONIST LANGUAGE IN SECOND MORRILL ACT.

> (a) FIRST SECTION- The first section of the Act of August 30, 1890 (7 U.S.C. 322, 323) (commonly known as the Second Morrill Act), is amended by striking the two provisos and inserting the following: `*Provided,* That if any State or Territory has more than one college which is entitled to receive funds under this Act or the Act of July 2, 1862, then no funds shall be paid out under this Act or the Act of July 2, 1862, to such State or Territory unless the funds to be paid out are equitably divided among such colleges, as proposed by the legislature of such State or Territory and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture.'.
> (b) SECOND SECTION- Section 2 of that Act (7 U.S.C. 324) is amended-
>
> > (1) by striking `, or the institution for colored students', and
> > (2) by striking `or other institutions'.
>
> (c) THIRD SECTION- Section 3 of that Act (7 U.S.C. 325) is amended by striking `, or of institutions for colored students'.
> (d) FOURTH SECTION- Section 4 of that Act (7 U.S.C. 326) is amended by striking `, or of institutions for colored students,'.
>
> <div align="right">H.R. 4898, 1990</div>

On May 23, 1990, Congressperson John Lewis at others introduced House Resolution 4898, a Bill "to amend the Act of August 30, 1890 (commonly known as the Second Morrill Act), to remove language purporting to permit racial segregation in land-grant colleges that receive funds under that Act." The bill attempts to amend the Act of August 30, 1890, by striking or removing specific phrases such as "or the institution for

colored students" from the text of the bill. The intent of House Resolution 4898 is of importance, because the action proposed in the bill is a rhetorical strategy in itself. Noting the harmful assumptions and oppressive characteristics of racist language, the bill attempts to reject language that is "purporting to permit racial segregation." The specific example of House Resolution 285 calls into question the term or label "colored students." "Colored students" is a specific example of a broader construct of racist rhetoric which places the term "colored" before some other characteristic of the individual whom the speaker is referencing. In its most generic form this type of racist rhetoric utilizes such labels as "colored person," or "colored individual." Often gender is added to further specify the individual referenced such as "colored man" or "colored woman." Further specific examples include "colored worker," "colored boy," and "colored priest." While the term "colored student" shows considerable evolution from terms such as "negro" or "nigger," the term is plagued with similar racist and totalizing assumptions. Placing the term "colored" before further explanation of the individual the speaker is referencing does allow for increased specificity, yet continues to first and foremost label such an individual as "colored." Placing the term "colored" before the "person" totalizes the individual according to their race, individuals are not "people" first, but rather "colored"; a term inherently bound to racist assumptions.

The 1990 amendment to the Act of August 30, 1890, attempts to reject the rhetorical construction of "colored students" with the overarching goal of rejecting the phrase "or the institution for colored students." This phrase, situated in historical context, rhetorically links the term or label "colored people" to individuals "purporting" to be worthy of segregation from society. The Act of August 30, 1890, never directly

advocates segregation of "colored students," but rather leaves open the possibility of

segregation by distinguishing between institutions for "white" and "colored" students

with the term "or." The opening statement of intent of House Resolution 285 links those

worthy of segregation with the phrase "purporting to permit racial segregation," noting

the 1890 Act has the "intention" or "purpose" of "permitting racial segregation" Situated

within a historical context where segregation is common practice, or at least acceptable,

the term "colored students" used to reference people of color shows its racist foundation.

Individuals worthy of being segregated are labeled or rhetorically constructed as

"colored," similar in form and implication to the rhetorical linkage of "negroes" and

slaves.

HRES 285 IH

109th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 285

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the ongoing need
to provide every qualified American with equal access to opportunity in
education, business, and employment and the indispensability of Affirmative
action programs in securing such equal access.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 17, 2005

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the ongoing need
to provide every qualified American with equal access to opportunity in
education, business, and employment and the indispensability of Affirmative
action programs in securing such equal access.

Whereas despite the progress which has been made in the past forty years
ensuring equal opportunity for African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific

Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women, equal opportunity in education, business, and employment remains elusive for the great mass of members of these groups;

Whereas as a result of the lack of equal opportunity many, perhaps a majority of, Americans are denied their fair share of business opportunity, receive unequal pay, find their career paths capped, and are excluded or underrepresented in certain fields of training or education;

Whereas when women, minorities, and persons with disabilities are denied full access to educational and economic opportunity, all America suffers from the loss of these discarded and suppressed talents, contributions, leadership, and insights;

Whereas the notion of equal opportunity flows directly from the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and is part of our most deeply embedded American values, and Affirmative action programs arise from, and are consistent with, the need to proactively extend equal opportunity through our public and private institutions;

Whereas the American experience has taught us that no group will, or should, accept anything less than full and equal access to educational, business, and employment opportunity and that the denial of such opportunity on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, or disability undermines our national unity, rends the political and social fabric of our Nation, and distorts and mutates democracy and government;

Whereas Affirmative action is a tool, or set of tools, for overcoming the remnants of prejudice and bias and for achieving fairness and equal opportunity, which provide qualified minorities, disabled persons, and women that equal opportunity, without quotas, without denying fairness and equal opportunity to any other groups or individuals; and

Whereas Affirmative action rejects simplistic notions of ranking on merit, recognizes that there is no single test or measure of merit, and seeks to capitalize on the strengths of our diversity of being, and our diversity of experience: Now, therefore, be it

> *Resolved,*

SECTION 1. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IS, AND OUGHT TO BE, THE LAW OF THE LAND.

> It is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Attorney General of the United States should undertake to protect and expand equality of opportunity for qualified minorities, disabled persons, and women at every opportunity.

SEC. 2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS CONSISTENT WITH, AND NECESSARY FOR, ACHIEVING EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY.

It is the sense of the House of Representatives that--
(1) America still faces significant challenges with achieving equal opportunity for qualified minorities, disabled persons, and women;
(2) Affirmative action is a powerful, effective, and at this stage of our development as a nation, necessary, tool for achieving such equal opportunity without quotas and should be utilized in the public and private sectors to increase diversity and correct patterns of past and current discrimination; and
(3) the laws of the United States shall be construed to recognize Congress's intent to incorporate Affirmative action so as to maximize equal opportunity for qualified minorities, disabled persons, and women.

SEC. 3. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL PROMOTE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ALL EXECUTIVE ACTIONS AND PROGRAMS.

It is the sense of the House of Representatives that the President of the United States shall incorporate Affirmative action into the employment, contracting, granting, educational, and program activities of the United States and all its subcontractors and grantees."

H.Res 285 IH

House Resolution 285 of 2005, a bill "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the ongoing need to provide every qualified American with equal access to opportunity in education, business, and employment and the indispensability of Affirmative action programs in securing such equal access," attempts to advance the situation of all minority groups, specifically mentioning "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women," through the increase of affirmative action policies.

The text of House Resolution 285 utilizes a plethora of different terms and labels to describe and categorize individuals in which equality "remains elusive for the great mass of members of these groups." The text begins with a partial list of individuals, or

groups of individuals, the policy cites as historically underrepresented in certain sectors of society, "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women," are all noted. From this point on the text groups the first set of individuals mentioned in the above list, "African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans," seemingly according to origin of race or ethnicity as "minorities." Labeling by origin of race or ethnicity is significantly different from labeling by personal characteristics; every individual has a racial or ethnic origin, similarly every individual has some type of biological sexual characteristics with which they individually identify. Throughout the entirety of the text the groups of "minorities" and "women" are consistently referenced as such.

Only one label or term used to reference a category or "group" of individuals changes throughout the text, hence the text utilizes different labels in reference to the same group. "Persons with disabilities" is initially used twice in the description of the specific category or group, both in the specific citation of individuals whose equality "remains elusive," and in the creation of the generic groupings "minorities, and persons with disabilities." Within the text of the seventh paragraph of the "whereas" clause, "persons with disabilities" (as individuals and as a group) become alternatively labeled as "disabled persons." Throughout the remainder of the text of House Resolution 285 the "people-first" terminology of "persons with disabilities" is exchanged for the disease-centric terminology of "disabled persons." Given the nature of the dual use of people-first language and disease-centric language in the text of House Resolution 285 it can be assumed that such labels are used interchangeably without any intention or knowledge of the congressperson. This blending of use, the deployment of disease-centric language

and non-disease centric language or people-first language within the confines of the same

text, is not an uncommon event. In 1996 a group of researchers conducted an experiment

testing the language usage patterns of undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in

special education classes. The study asked each participant to complete a writing sample,

detailing at least one interaction with a person with a disability that they have

encountered during their lifetime. The researchers coded the responses according to the

degree in which disease-centric language and non-disease centric language were used.

The results came out interestingly mixed, finding that most of those involved in the study

frequently interchanged non-disease centric language with disease-centric language in the

single text of their writing sample (Feldman, 1996). From both the text of House

Resolution 285, and the study conducted in 1996, it seems that one could easily reach the

conclusion that disease-centric language is often inadvertently or unintentionally used,

isolated from ideology, and absent any intent the speaker may have to engage in a

demeaning discourse or representation of people with disabilities. Both Resolution 285

(2005) and the 1996 study represent examples of texts originating from individuals that

seemingly wish to enhance the quality of life for people with disabilities; congressperson

Davis, claiming discrimination based on "disability undermines our national unity, rends

the political and social fabric of our Nation, and distorts and mutates democracy and

government," while the 261 participants in the 1996 study all pursued a path in the field

of special education.

    In the specific instances of House Resolution 285 (2005) and the disease-centric

rhetoric of "disabled persons" inherent within it's text, investigating historical context of

such rhetoric in attempts to discover how "stylistic devices take on the fragrances and

hues which make them work in the lives of real people (Wander, 1983, p. 14)" becomes

of little direct use. The term "disabled persons" is not offensive or demeaning in a

current context due to a historical situation or connection to flawed or oppressive

assumptions and actions, but rather it gains its dehumanizing element by historical

analogy and in instances of current use. Today terms such as "colored students" or

"colored persons," are traditionally rejected in a due to their historical connection to

oppressive actions justified by the totalizing of an individual according to a personal

characteristic historically looked down upon by society, now more commonly deemed

equal to other personal characteristics of the same sorts. Unfortunately, disease-centric

discourse (in terms such as "disabled persons") is still a commonly accepted rhetorical

practice as evidenced by House Resolution 285 (2005). While racism still exists in a

multiplicity of forms and arenas, the notion, and its supporting language, that dark skin

color is a sign of inferiority justifying segregation is generally rejected in the current state

of affairs, particularly in congressional rhetoric as evidenced by House Resolution 4898.

Similar to the racist rhetoric of "colored persons," in form and implication, disease-

centric discourse in its rhetorical construction of "disabled persons" justifies oppression

and segregation of people with disabilities. "Disability," as a personal characteristic, is

currently defined as "deficiency," or "incapacity," that "prevents normal achievement,"

or an "impairment that can be expected to result in death or to be of long continued or

indefinite duration in accordance with the Social Security Act (Webster, 1996, n.p.)."

With such inherently negative definitions in current society, totalizing an individual

according to his or her disability with the rhetorical label "disabled persons" lays the

foundation for oppression, similar to the way the negative assumptions behind the label

"colored persons" allowed for racial segregation. Through historical analogy the disease-centric rhetoric of "disabled persons" and the racist rhetoric of "colored persons" appear to come into being in the same light.

Whereas, in a current context disease-centric discourse has not been rejected in congressional rhetoric or deemed unacceptable by a large portion of society, the implications attached to such rhetoric continue to occur in different forms. Just as the assumptions inherent in racist rhetoric have historically justified oppression; assumptions that people with disabilities are totalized "disabled persons," defined by a perceived "lack" of ability or total "incapacity" allows one to mentally and physically segregate such individuals from society. In 2002 a lawsuit was filed in Nebraska on behalf of over 100 women who were sexually assaulted and raped by male hospital workers and patients in a hospital for people with mental disabilities. According to Bradley A. Meurines, public policy specialist at Nebraska Advocacy Services Center for Disability Rights, Law, and Advocacy, "when the women first reported the rapes to hospital directors and doctors the charges were carelessly dismissed one at a time by claiming 'its was all in their minds,' once the charges were reported to police officers the allegations were similarly dismissed claiming they [women reporting rapes] were 'delusional' and 'insane.' These women were not people, they were "insane," and "delusional." When an individual is not first a person they can be treated like animals because they are viewed as completely void of rationality." Due to the way doctors and police rhetorically constructed the women reporting rape charges, they were assumed to be less than fully human in that they lacked any ability of rational thought, a condition that "was clearly not the case (Meurines, 2005)."

Section Three: Avoiding Institutional Oppression: The Rhetoric of People-First Language in terms of "People with Disabilities" and "People of Color" in Congressional Rhetoric

While one can gain understanding of the harms disease-centric discourse presents through historical analogy and specific instances of use within a current context, House Resolution 285 (2005) also utilizes people-first language, a rhetorical practice embraced by most disability rights advocates, in using terms such as "persons with disabilities." While congressional rhetoric found in the text of congressional bills often uses disease-centric language, or interchanges disease-centric language with people-first language, a minority of texts exclusively uses people-first language. Ironically, one of the most comprehensive pieces legislation in the area of people with disabilities, the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, is a prime example of text which exclusively uses people-first language.

> SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
> (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
> (1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
> disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole
> is growing older;
> (2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
> individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms
> of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
> serious and pervasive social problem;
> (3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
> such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations,
> education, transportation, communication, recreation,
> institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
> services;…
> (b) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this Act--
> (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
> elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
> (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
> addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
> (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
> enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals

> with disabilities; …
>
> Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 2 1990

Section 2 of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act offers an example of how people-first language can be exclusively deployed throughout the entirety of a piece of congressional text. Terms such as "people with disabilities," and "individuals with disabilities" in the Americans with Disabilities Act serve to replace terms such as "disabled persons" found in other congressional texts such as House Resolution 285 (2005). The rhetoric deployed in the Americans with Disabilities Act was carefully chosen after close consultation with people with disabilities and disability rights advocates (Meurines, 2005). Such a commitment to rhetorical purity represents an infinite responsibility to the other in the formulation of congressional rhetoric.

People-first language acts as a way of referencing individuals who are physically or mentally disabled in some way with non-oppressive rhetoric (Tyler, 1990). While examples of people-first language can be found in the text of the Americans with Disabilities Act with terms such as "people with disabilities," other forms of such rhetoric can be used to reference individuals in more specific instances. Under the construct of people-first language a person traditionally labeled a "schizophrenic" would be referenced as a person with schizophrenia. In this example the use of people-first language of "person with schizophrenia" replaces the traditional disease-centric label of "schizophrenic." People-first language emerged, partially in reaction to a time when individuals with disabilities were commonly labeled as "mongoloids" or "retards." People-first language acts as a way to replace such offensive and degrading forms of speech in reference to individuals with disabilities with a more empowering and correct schema that acknowledges that individuals with disabilities are first and foremost people.

This discursive practice attempts to avoid the notion that an individuals with disabilities are inherently "flawed," or that an individual's disabilities define the entirety of his or her being (Komissar, 1995). The rhetorical terms utilized by people-first language attempt to detach disability from the individual, the notion that disability is firmly rooted within the individual rather than alternative structures which produce, define, and chain individuals to a singular conception of being or identity.

> (B) classroom textbooks and other educational materials do not sufficiently reflect the experiences, achievements, or concerns of women and, in most cases, are not written by women or persons of color…
>
> House Resolution 2505, 1999

> Whereas Johnnie Cochran, Jr., dedicated his life and his legal career, often on a pro bono basis, to advancing the cause of equal access to justice for all persons regardless of their station in life, to overcoming unfairness and police brutality in the criminal justice system, and to ensuring equal opportunities in all walks of life for persons of color…
>
> House Resolution 185, 2005

> Whereas despite the progress which has been made in the past forty years ensuring equal opportunity for African Americans, Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, Native Americans, persons with disabilities, and women, equal opportunity in education, business, and employment remains elusive for the great mass of members of these groups…
>
> House Resolution 285, 2005

Nearly all congressional texts and congressional rhetoric within a current context rejects the use of racist rhetoric in the multiplicity of its terms. As noted above, many racial labels have been replaced with acceptable categories of origin, or placed under broader constructs of the label "minority." Similar to the concept of people-first language, non-racist terms such as "people of color," noted in House Resolutions 2505 and 185, represent a shift away from historically situated racist labels such as "negro" or "colored." Through the use of the language of suppression the human animal can seemingly justify the unjustifiable, make palatable the unpalatable, and make decent the

indecent. Just as our thoughts affect our language, so does our language affect our thoughts and eventually our action and behavior (Bosmajaian, 1973, p. 347)

Through an investigation of racist and disease-centric rhetoric situated within a historical context it becomes possible to understand the harms disease-centric rhetoric presents within a current context. Whereas congressional rhetoric and texts have made great strides in rejecting racist rhetoric, there still remains much needed improvement in the movement away from disease-centric rhetoric within a current context. Within this current context individuals are often blinded to language taking form as independent action, perpetuating the dehumanization and oppression of people with disabilities through disease-centric rhetoric. Uncovering historical rhetorical analogies and specific instances of discourse currently deployed, demeaning elements of disease-centric discourse can be better understood and conceptualized. In terms of disease-centric discourse, investigating the rhetoric of congressional text is of utmost importance; "Congressional documents which label individuals as their disabilities sets the stage for all other members of society to engage in similar practices in all sectors (Meurines, 2005)."

Section Four: Analyzing Rhetorical Significance

The focus of this investigation is not to analyze a specific "strategy" of the oppressor, an intended act of redefinition in which "an oppressor is to redefine the oppressed victims he intents to jail or eradicate so that they will be looked upon as creatures warranting suppression and in some cases separation and annihilation (Bosmajian, 1973, p. 347)." As we have seen, the current use of disease-centric discourse in modern congressional rhetoric is generally not an attempt to suppress people

with disabilities or redefine these individuals with a future goal of separation or annihilation, in most current instances the intended use of such language is just the opposite. Congressional documents and texts, such as House Resolution 285, generally intend to advance the situation of people with disabilities, yet ignore the way language takes form as symbolic action. "Nothing which is spoken is ever what is truly said (Heidegger, 1971, p. 37," the speaking of disease-centric language within current congressional text is not intended to tell people with disabilities that they are inferior or subhuman, but often does. As we have seen in both a historical and current context, deployment of disease-centric terms such as lunatic, delusional, and disabled has contributed to suppression of, and violence towards individuals with disabilities. Just as our thoughts affect our language, so does our language affect our thoughts and eventually our action and behavior (Bosmajian, 1973), regardless of intent.

The intent of paralleling racist and disease-centric discourse is similarly not used to shed new light on how racist rhetoric is oppressive or demeaning, for this teaches those reading this criticism nothing, and would be redundant. Racist rhetoric is discussed in this criticism for the very reason of its understood implications; most understand that its rhetorical deployment has contributed to the suppression of the race's advancement in America. Disease-centric language, on the other hand, is very rarely rhetorically interrogated or even condemned in modern society. There are virtually no critical investigations which specifically analyze how and why the rhetoric of disease-centric language itself is constructed in a demeaning fashion, even from those involved in the people-first language movement. What those aware of disease-centric language do know is that people with disabilities generally reject being defined with such terms. Often we

hear slogans such as "we're people first," and "disability is natural," yet there are very little discussions of why the rhetorical structure of disease-centric language explicitly precludes such perceptions of people with disabilities. In the rare examples of the languages rejection, such action seems to grow out of appeasement rather than a complete understanding of the intrinsically flawed nature of such language in its rhetorical structure. When investigating specific terms of racist rhetoric throughout history we find numerous connections between the terms of racist rhetoric and those of disease-centric language. Such an analogy lays the foundation for a true analysis of disease-centric language rather than a blanket condemnation out of appeasement; it allows us to discover similarities in rhetorical structure which potentially affects the way a person thinks and behaves. This analogy, by the very arrangement of the terms paralleled, offers a window of insight into how the terms of disease-centric rhetoric function to perpetuate oppression.

Section Five: Rhetorical Structure of the Terms Analyzed, the Defining of Essence with Totality

"Negro" and "Nigger,"	"Idiots" and "Lunatics"
"Colored Students" and "Colored People,"	"Disable Students" and "Disabled People"
"People of Color,"	"People with Disabilities"

Understanding that the deployment of disease-centric terminology along with the (intended) value judgments attached to such language are often innocent or pure within a current context, it seems necessary to also analyze other elements of such language in order to fully understand why the terms of disease-centric language are perceived as inherently dehumanizing. While similarities in value, deployment, context and meaning will be discussed later, this section attempts to isolate the terms of disease-centric and

racist language in a vacuum in order interrogate the structure, and similarities in structure of such language. Positing racist rhetoric as a known oppressive discourse we can interrogate how the structure of disease-centric language may similarly perpetuate oppression in its structural resemblance.

Similar to Bosmajian's (1973) claim "Just as our thoughts affect our language, so does our language affect our thoughts and eventually our action and behavior (p. 347)," other scholars place a primacy on the way the mere structure of language affects our thoughts and vice versa. In 1933 Alfred Korzybski presented a version of this theory in the book *"Science and Sanity,"* where he argues language is often structured in terms of absolutes; the structure of language itself can disclose and create totality (Korzybski, 1933). This element of absoluteness in the structure of language appears mainly in the form of "to be" verbs such as "are" and "is." Absoluteness in the structure of language often arises from thoughts of totalized singular identity and correspondently often perpetuates such notions of totality. Rather than the language itself, Korzybski argues the structure of language defines how one understands issues. Korzybski specifically isolates the dangers associated with two usages of "to be" verbs, usage in reference to identity and prediction. From a scientific perspective using totalizing forms of language often yields false results, for a hypothesis can never be proved absolutely true, it can only be accepted. In regards to this criticism Korzybski's theory may be helpful in investigating the way the structure of language, such as the structure of racist and disease-centric language, may stem from and serve to perpetuate totalized conceptions of identity. While the issue of "to be" verbs may not directly be of the utmost importance to this

interrogation, the general theory of structural significance may offer insight to the totalizing nature of certain terms of disease-centric and racist language.

Initially this structure of totality can be seen in the disease-centric and racist terms deployed in the 1840's with the terms "negro," "idiot," and "lunatic." Here singular words are used to describe an entire grouping of individuals. The structure of these labels as single words leaves no room for restructuring the language, nor would an attempt to do so be of any use. As seen in the texts of The Webster-Ashburton Treaty (1842) and S. 126 (1840) such labels were intentionally structured with totalizing the individual in mind. In an effort to represent slaves and those lacking any mental capacity such terms were evoked in congressional rhetoric as a means to identify the purpose of the individual, not the individual as a person. As disease-centric and racist language progressed, single word labels were replaced with two word labels, this time including the idea of personhood. Both "colored people" and "disabled people" are labels which by their very structure describe a personal characteristic which defines a person. The term "colored person" implies the *person is colored*, while the term "disabled person" implies the *person is disabled.* Here "to be" verbs which totalize identity are not explicitly deployed, yet semantically implied; the person becomes defined in total by a personal characteristic. As explained above, when such a characteristic implies "defect" the individual becomes totalized as defective or not having the qualities of a whole human. Korzybski later notes "changing not the language, but the structure of language (n.p.)" allows for individuals to both escape totalizing conceptions and completely re-conceptualize understanding of the individual. Assuming structure actually alters our mental conceptions and understanding, people-first language serves to reorient ourselves

with the notion of disability and individuals with disabilities by reorganizing the structure of language. Through this reorganization disability becomes one of many characteristics of the individual rather than the one characteristic that defines the individual.

Analyzing the structure of disease-centric language in comparison to the structure of racist language reveals an example of how changing the structure of language has corresponded with the advancement of a particular minority group. As the structure of racial language progressed from "negro" to "colored" to "people of color" so did the situation of the individuals referenced. Noting the striking similarities between racial discourse and disease-centric discourse, the structure of language used to describe individuals with disabilities may play a key role in societies understanding of such individuals. As Richard Weaver notes the structure of language and argument reveals ideology, hence rhetoric can indicate ideology in the terms of labels (Gilles, 1996). The totalizing structure of the label "disabled people" may reveal the negative attitudes behind such a term and offer insight to the social stigma behind the concept of disability.

Section Six: Rhetorical Structure as Analysis and Criticism: The Metrical Composition of Terms and Ideas In Parallel

"Negro" and "Nigger,"	"Idiots" and "Lunatics"
"Colored Students" and "Colored People,"	"Disable Students" and "Disabled People"
"People of Color,"	"People with Disabilities"

Analyzing the "rhetoric" of disease-centric language is difficult, to say the least for disease-centric language may quite possibly not be understood as "rhetoric" in the first place. The words and terms utilized by such a language are generally not used with the intent of creating a "desired impression (Burke, 1953, p. 210)" of people with disabilities as inferior, or even persuading or justifying the oppression of people with

disabilities. Often such words or terms are used without knowledge of their rhetorical significance, in an attempt to benefit people with disabilities. Without an intended goal of such language rhetorical analysis that uncovers the reasons disease-centric language is oppressive becomes complicated, yet by placing such mere words or terms of racist and disease-centric language in the same meter, in parallel contexts we become able to discover rhetorical significance through what Burke describes as the dimensions of language (Burke, 1953, p. 19). While terms such as "lunatic" or "idiot" may be rejected in a current context, terms such as "disabled" and "schizophrenic" are commonly accepted. Terms such as the latter are understood as mere names for people with disabilities; a logical term used to describe individuals. This understanding of disease-centric language fails to reach a rhetorical or ethical dimension until one investigates how the terms are used, or what value judgments are attached to such terms. Placing racist and disease-centric terms in the same meter allows us to discover how such terms have been similarly used with similar value judgments attached. This analysis hopefully sheds light on the inherently negative construction of disease-centric language in paralleling such language to other discursive practices currently understood as oppressive.

In Permanence and Change, Kenneth Burke (1984) notes "to think through something is to trace an ever-widening circle of relationships (p. 230)." In an effort to "think through" the rhetorical issue of disease-centric language this criticism hopes to draw similarities between racist and disease-centric terms, in form and function, with historical context. In each section outlined above one discovers numerous parallels between such terms. During the 1840's we see single words used to describe entire groupings of individuals. These words, terms or labels are not benign descriptors;

situated within a historical context one discovers each operates as a symbol which connects personal characteristics of an individual to a societal defined "purpose." "Negroes" are slaves (regardless whether they should be or not), "idiots" are wards of the state. In both instances the deployment of a specific term united social placement or category with natural individual characteristics. As a symbol, such terms evoked specific assumptions and thoughts towards those individuals with the given characteristics; both "negroes" and "idiots" or "lunatics" were naturally controlled by other individuals. Many members of society thought that the individuals referenced were inherently unequal to "normal" members of society; such individuals were in need of direct control both of themselves and their property, such actions were "in the best interest" of the individual. Here, similar labels were constructed with similar purposes or affects; to symbolically create individuals as subhuman. In creating the symbol individuals themselves become created and defined while oppressive assumptions become personified. As a symbol, these terms are not restricted to defining or demeaning the individual with said characteristic. In the creation of terms as symbols, these words or terms can then be extended to demean other objects and ideas; both the terms of "nigger" and "lunatic" or "idiot" were (and continue to be) used to reference things in a negative connotation as non-rational or inferior. Such terms used in the 1840's were deployed in a similar fashion, with similar value judgments attached.

As disease-centric and racist language progressed through time single word labels were dismissed and replaced with terms used to describe the personal characteristic which defined the individual. Both "colored people" and "disabled people" were terms used to describe the individual as the characteristic in which they were born with. These

terms defined "types" of people, people that "are" a specific species of a person, yet still something other than "a" person. The terms are used to create difference; to distinguish individuals as something other than "normal." Adding a personal characteristic as a prefix to the person is to hyphenate personhood effectively creating the individual as something other than an entire person. As we have seen in The Act of August 30th 1890 this differentiation carries with it distinct value judgments. Here the language carried with it the assumption that "colored students" belonged in separate universities from individuals who were not "colored," the language was specifically deployed to allow for such segregation. In 2005 we see similar differentiating terms deployed more positively and attached with more positive value judgments, in House Resolution 285. Here it becomes difficult to ascertain the rhetorical significance in the words deployment, or the ethical significance in the terms value judgments, for the intent seems to be beneficial to the situation of people with disabilities.

When language is isolated and the way one uses a term along with its value judgments clearly defined such as "to provide every qualified American with equal access to opportunity (H.Res 285, 2005)" it is hard to understand how such language can have any rhetorical or ethical significance. It is with this problem that a parallel with racist discourse offers unique insight to rhetorical and ethical significance of disease-centric terminology. Would it be acceptable for the text of House Resolution 285 to deploy the term "colored persons" rather than the term "African Americans" with the same clarification of use and value judgment? At times words take on their own rhetorical significance regardless of defined intent and value judgment due to word structure, historical context and the assumptions the words evoke in a current context.

Tracing the way disease-centric terms have historically been deployed along with the value judgments attached to notions of "disabled" one can discover rhetorical significance in the demeaning nature of disease-centric discourse. Whereas "colored" had historically been understood as a defect or sign of inferiority, so has "disabled." Absent the flawed use of such terms in any context, the value judgment attached remains. The structure of the term "disabled person" relies on notions of difference which has historically allowed other minority groups labeled with similarly structured terms to be segregated from society. When the term "colored person" is paralleled with "disabled person" we begin to understand the similar structure, deployment and value judgments attached to each.

Conclusion

In an attempt to move towards an environment of inclusion, attitudes and language of difference become left behind. The terms "colored" and "disabled" no longer define the person, but rather the person defines the characteristic with the terms "people of color" and "people with disabilities." In most all instances of deployment of such terms in congressional rhetoric one finds attempts to promote the equality and situation of individuals regarded as such. In terms of racist rhetoric we even find attempts to strike language of difference from existing congressional texts such as proposed in House Resolution 4898. In the movement away from racist and disease-centric language the term "people" or "person" is placed before the characteristic held by the individual in each instance. Individuals are first and foremost regarded as "a" whole person, rather than a hyphenated person or a characteristic that signifies inferiority which resembles a person. The value judgments attached to the terms that reveal the individuals

stem from individuals with such characteristics and those advocating on their behalf. When paralleled, each set of terms appear congruent or at least incredibly similar in structure, deployment and attached value judgments. In this third meter the terms seem to mirror each other in all aspects besides frequency of use.

"Poetically man dwells (Heidegger, 1971, p. 219)." By the mere arrangement of words individuals can gain new insights into how terms function and assumptions come into being. Through the metrical composition of terms in parallel one can draw similarities that once seemed distant. Words can be understood in different lights and interpreted in different dimensions. By tracing a relationship between racist and disease-centric language we discover a plethora of similarities in structure and implication. Hopefully we add something new to our knowledge; disease-centric language, similar to racist language, symbolically expresses ideas of dehumanization regardless of the intent in using such language. The term "disabled persons" continues to be commonly accepted as a proper way in referencing people with disabilities. Generally when such terms are used they are deployed without any knowledge of harm or intent to demean. While it is hard to be accountable for what one has no knowledge of, increasing our understanding of how language has rhetorical significance in the lives of real people allows for a responsible encounter with people with disabilities.

The goal of this thesis was to examine the rhetorical and social elements of disease-centric discourse and hopefully add something new to both the strategy of current disability advocacy and the field of communication studies. In terms both of rhetorical theory and criticism, this thesis hopes to introduce and advance a notion of rhetorical structure as an important alternative lens to view rhetoric of all sorts, particularly the

terminology surrounding identity categories. Chapter One introduced the topic, and provided a brief overview pertaining to the rhetoric and construction of disability within modern society, scholarship and political arenas including legislative policy initiatives. This Chapter also discussed the emergence of anti-psychiatry and critical disability theories a as response to the monolithic authority and unquestionable expert knowledge proclaimed by modern medicine. The chapter then presented an overview of the disjunction between what is "spoken" and what is "said" in many state based approaches to secure formal equality for people with disabilities; along with presenting the harms of omitting concern related to disease-centric rhetoric from analysis when the call for equality exclusively focuses on the end result of state based action. The second chapter reviewed the relevant literature and scholarship surrounding disease-centric rhetoric and people first language. This section began with a discussion defining and giving examples of both "people first language," and "disease-centric language," followed by a discussion of the origins of each type of rhetoric. The chapter then moved to identify the current discussion surrounding people with disabilities, including recent scholarship aimed at quantitatively identifying how individuals discuss and refer to individuals with disabilities. Next, the section concentrated on the implications of disease-centric discourse which situates the location of the "disease" firmly within the individual labeled "disabled." This portion offered a preliminary account of how disease-centric rhetoric serves to dehumanize individuals, providing explanation of dehumanization's methods and implications. The chapter concludes by isolating gaps in the current research, particularly the lack of research related to a theoretical explanation of how and why disease-centric discourse is oppressive on its own accord.

In attempt to fill this gap in research, Chapter Three attempts to examine and resituate rhetorical theory with an expanded conception of ideological criticism. This chapter engages in textual analysis within historical context in an effort to advance ideological criticism aimed towards renouncing ideological assumptions of legislative

text often overlooked, veiled and omitted with criticism mandating a universal call to action. Using House Resolution 285 as a platform, this chapter isolates a gap between what is "spoken" in the disease-centric rhetoric of legislative text, and what is actually "said" in its intentions of increasing the status of people with disabilities. An ideological turn away from rhetoric taking shape as independent action in perpetuating oppression and stigmatization dooms what is "said" to failure, yet this section concludes by offering a mode of ideological commitment encompassing both the spoken and the said in an effort to create the best possible world. One way to bridge the abyss between what is said and what is spoken, action and the language embraced in the affirmation of action, is a commitment to acknowledging the harmful effects language can have in a current context, and strive to remain as linguistically and textually pure in affirming action as one is in the motives behind action. In terms of the disease-centric rhetoric inherent within the text of House Resolution 285, all individuals, including policy makers, rhetorical critics, and all others, can problemitize and reject such rhetoric. As a jumping off point, Resolution 285 potentially offers a unique point of departure from both an infinite and universal call to action, and dehumanizing disease-centric language. The "ideological turn" in recognizing the discrimination that people with disabilities face, and searching for alternatives to such discrimination can be elevated to a universal call of ideologically responsible action.

After constructing a rhetorical theory of ideological criticism which encompasses language taking form as independent action, the fourth chapter seeks to offer an explanation for this event by introducing the notion of "rhetorical structure." Chapter four attempts to establish a definite structure tied to disease-centric rhetoric and analyze

its social and political effects; the goal is to create a theoretical justification and method

for engaging in alternative rhetorical structures when discussing people with disabilities.

Through analysis of rhetorical structure, this chapter proposed that rhetorical position of

the subject in a given structure of discourse is determined by notions of reason which

originally prompted Descartes to create a dualism between the mind and the body.

Placing the individual subject before the predicate aligns one with reason and rationality,

where as traversing this grammatical structure of reason disallows the separation of the

mind from the body. The inversion of the subject and predicate inherent in disease-

centric discourse represents a break from traditional notions of reason, and hence

signifies the individual subject in opposition to reason and normalcy. Whereas notions of

reason have been traditionally deployed in an effort to regulate and control society,

particularly individuals with disabilities, this section concludes by advocating a method

of over-signification with grammatical reason itself. Utilizing the techniques of Lacanian

psychoanalysis, absent an attempt to discover any Truth or meaning, this chapter

concludes with an advocacy Jean Baudrillard's conception of "over-signification" with

the rhetorical structure of reason Nietzsche discovers in language in an effort to shield the

individual from the medical models regulation and authority over reason itself.   The

final portion of this chapter discusses other relevant portions of Nietzsche's work related

to the rhetoric of disability including the issue of pity, and eventually resituates the

discussion of people first language in Nietzschean terms of performative engagement, or

song.

   This fifth and final chapter attempts to embrace the significance of rhetorical

structure while engaging in a new form of rhetorical criticism, drawing parallels between

disease-centric discourse and racist rhetoric throughout the history of United States Congressional legislation. In drawing similarities between disease-centric rhetoric and racist rhetoric the goal is to both expose disease-centric rhetoric as founded upon a rhetorical structure which inherently allows for oppression, while embracing the structure of modern rhetoric surrounding scholarly discussions of race as an example of empowering rhetoric. While building on the concept of rhetorical structure, this chapter attempts to engage in a form of praxis which performativly engages the expanded form of rhetorical theory discussed throughout the paper in the act of practicing ideological criticism geared towards the creation of a better world. As an example of how to bridge the gap between what is spoken and what is said in the universal call for equality, this criticism advocates and engages in the singing of both disability rights advocacy and ideological criticism itself.

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H.Res 285 IH, 109th Congress First Session. May 17th 2005, Congress person Davis of Illinois submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

H.Res 2505 106th Congress 1st Session. Educating America's Girls Act. Introduced in the House of Representatives July 14th 1999.

H.Res 4898. 101st Congress 2nd Session. May 23rd 1990, In the House of Representatives May 23rd 1990, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia (for himself, Mr. CLAY, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DIXON, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. ESPY, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. GRAY, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. MFUME, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. STOKES, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. WASHINGTON, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. BROOKS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture

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