ABSTRACT

A Life for Others: The Rhetorical Function of Necessity in Luke's *Bios* of Jesus

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This dissertation investigates necessity in Luke's *bios* of Jesus using rhetorical and audience-oriented criticism. New Testament scholarship has reached a consensus that the gospels are examples of ancient Greco-Roman biography (*bios*). According to the guidelines in rhetorical handbooks and the progymnasmata, most ancient biographies are written using the encomiastic *topoi* lists produced by theorists such as Aristotle, Quintilian, Cicero, and Theon. These guidelines, with the support of ancient ethical material, say that a person should not be praised for acting due to a compulsive necessity. In the ancient Mediterranean world, necessity (in its literary and philosophical dimensions) was thought to be a limiting element on a person's choice. Of utmost concern for biographical and encomiastic works was the person's choice and intention that led to particular actions and deeds. In some respects, however, necessity could also be a requirement or an expectation. If a person wants to be a musician, then it is necessary to learn how to play an instrument.

Another component of the guidelines for writing ancient biography was how to treat a person's external goods, such as a good birth. A biographer should show that a

person uses any advantage that comes from external goods, like a good birth, "as is necessary." This is the necessity of requirement or expectation. A person is not praised for being born into a wealthy family, but if she chooses to use her wealth for the benefit of others, she may be praised. Repeated examples of the same kind of behavior (doing good for others) demonstrate intention, according to ancient theorists.

Jesus is born the Son of God. Luke shows Jesus repeatedly using his great power and offering his great wisdom to others for their benefit. In many cases, necessity is used when Jesus encounters someone whose expectations run counter to his own understanding of his life. Although he is the Messiah, his actions often run counter to popular expectations. When used of Jesus' actions, necessity in Luke's bios reorients the audience to see that his purpose is to give life and meaning to others: to seek and to save the lost.

A Life for Others: The Rhetorical Function of Necessity in Luke's *Bios* of Jesus

by

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A Dissertation

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is no way I could have completed this dissertation without the help and support of many people. I would like to acknowledge my many debts of gratitude to several people. I want to thank Dr. Mikeal Parsons for believing in me and offering his encouragement and guidance along the way and for serving as my mentor. Dr. Parsons has been a more than just an academic mentor; his friendship remains invaluable to me. I also want to thank Dr. Lidija Novakovic for her tremendous insights and suggestions as the project started to take shape. Dr. Sharyn Dowd was also a great source of inspiration to me. No one held my feet to the fire more than Dr. Charles Talbert, whose encouragement helped improve my arguments and my writing.

I would be remiss not to mention two very important people without whose help I would not have gotten started on this journey: Dr. Joel Green and Dr. William Faupel. Dr. Green showed me how to do a close reading of New Testament texts while I was a student as Asbury Seminary. Dr. Faupel became a great friend with whom I have shared many hours of discussion about things related to Pentecostal history.

My mother, Shirley Bass, taught me, by her own example, to love learning. Although she did not have the opportunity to pursue higher education, her love of knowledge and wisdom remains strong to this day. Mom always believed I could finish the project!

Most importantly, I want to offer my wholehearted appreciation to my wife, Tammye, and my two daughters, KaRonna and Kasey. Without their love and support this project would never have happened. Thank you for being there!

To Tammye, KaRonna, and Kasey

You are why I stayed the course

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Assumptions

This project is a literary investigation of the role of necessity in Luke's *bios* of Jesus. It proceeds with certain assumptions. Luke is read as a literary unit of its own value with little concern for how Luke adopted or adapted his sources. Luke is treated as a first century C.E. document that was written to Gentile Christians living in the Greco-Roman world. One assumption, the approach of audience-oriented criticism, requires further elaboration.

Audience-oriented criticism seeks to determine how an original audience would have understood the text. This is done by examining other texts that the author could have expected "his contemporary public to know either explicitly or implicitly."[1] This is not a concern with a *modern* audience's perception of the work as in some types of reader-response criticism, which often privileges the instinctual reaction of any reader to a text over the response of a reader/auditor whose cultural and social profile comes closest to that assumed in the text. As Peter Rabinowitz notes: "Authors can never know their actual readers; but they cannot make artistic decisions without prior assumptions

[1] Hans Robert Jauss, "Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory," *New Literary History* 2 (1970): 19.

(conscious or unconscious) about their audience's beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions."[2] As a first-century author, Luke makes such assumptions.

Although an author has no control over her actual audience, "the flesh-and-blood people who read the book," if she has as one of her goals actually to get her story read, it would be in her best interest "to minimize the distance between the actual and authorial audiences."[3] The reason for this is that every literary work contains information which the author assumes the audience will know or "get." A reading of a literary work set in the early 1800s in America will be impoverished if the reader cannot join the authorial audience in knowing some basic facts about the War of 1812. If an author had to explain every detail of her work, the work itself would lose value.

Rhetoricians in antiquity also recognized the significance of the audience. Aristotle points to peculiar customs in which an audience may participate "and all the tokens of what is esteemed among them" as means of determining what is noble or praiseworthy (*Rhet*. 1367a26). Quintilian writes, "For much depends on the character of the audience and the generally prevailing opinion, if people are to believe that characteristic of which they especially approve are present in the person to be praised, and those which they hate in the person to be denounced" (*Inst*. 3.7.23 [LCL, Russell]). Isocrates knew he was writing a very different kind of work in his *Antidosis* so he took the time at the beginning of the work to explain to his readers what he knew would otherwise impede understanding (*Ant*. 1-13).

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[2] Peter J. Rabinowitz, "Audience's Experience of Literary Borrowing," in Susan R. Suleiman and Inge Corsman, *The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and* Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 241-63, 243.

[3] Peter J. Rabinowitz, "Truth in Fiction," *Critical Inquiry* 4 (1977): 121-41, 126.

To inquire into how an ancient reader/auditor would have heard a text is to observe the assumptions in the text itself. A text that mentions but does not explain a particular element in Jewish religious practice can be assumed to have a target audience of people who understand that practice. Similarly, a text that makes fun of the activities of a particular mystery cult in the ancient world could only succeed if the readers/auditors were familiar with the cult so as to appreciate the humor.

A fine example of this requirement is in the second century C.E. humorist Lucian's *Zeus Catechized*, where Lucian's character Cyniscus questions Zeus about religious things. Cyniscus wants to know about the Fates, Destiny, and Fortune and how they control the lives of humans and gods. Ever more curious, Cyniscus finally asks Zeus if even the gods must be under the control of the powers of inevitability (*Jupp. conf.* 4). Zeus replies: Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Κυνίσκε. Τί δ᾽ οὖν ἐμειδίσας; The audience that would laugh the loudest would be an audience that appreciated the long history of the word Ἀνάγκη, which was the name of the implacable goddess of Necessity in Greek myth and philosophy, but could also simply mean "it is necessary" or "we must." That this fact would have been appreciated by Lucian's authorial audience is seen in the second phrase, which is translated: "But what made you smile?" (*Jupp. conf.* 4 [LCL, Harmon]).

As we turn to Luke's bios of Jesus, necessity in his narrative would have been heard against the backdrop of the Greco-Roman and Hellenistic Jewish worlds. As we shall see, Luke does not explain how he is using necessity so it up to us as readers to figure out what were the presuppositions that Luke's readers may have had about necessity. Charles Talbert has referred to this phenomenon as "knowing something about

the presupposition pool of Luke's Mediterranean audience at the end of the first or beginning of the second century."[4]

History of Scholarship

Scholarship on necessity in Luke or Luke-Acts views Luke's writings as history. It is within the confines of historical assumptions that the δεῖ is interpreted.

Charles Cosgrove produced an article in which he discussed the Lukan δεῖ in the context of God's providence.[5] After reviewing previous literature on the subject, Cosgrove turns to his own analysis. When he attempts to distinguish between "ordinary" and "non-ordinary" uses of δεῖ in Luke-Acts, he indirectly describes "non-ordinary" as "[construed] in terms of any kind of divine necessity or fatalistic compulsion."[6] He observes that δεῖ is "a typical Lukan vehicle for describing the necessity that God's plan, as expressed in Scripture, be fulfilled."[7] Jesus' visit to Zacchaeus' house is Jesus' recognition that he must stay with Zacchaeus in order to fulfill one part of God's plan for his life: to save the lost.

Cosgrove finds four components of the divine necessity in Luke. First, it is an expression of the essential connection between the kerygma and the plan of God. Second, the imperatival nature of necessity suggests a call to obedience, which involves the human interaction with the plan of God. Cosgrove writes, "Jesus, ever cognizant that the divine δεῖ bids him suffer and be rejected on his way to exaltation, virtually engineers

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[4] Charles Talbert, *Reading Luke* (rev. ed.; Macon, Ga: Smyth & Helwys, 2002), 5.

[5] Charles H. Cosgrove, "The Divine Δεῖ in Luke-Acts: Investigations into the Lukan Understanding of God's Providence," *Novum Testamentum* 26 (1984): 168-90.

[6] Cosgrove, "The Divine Δεῖ in Luke-Acts," 172-73.

[7] Cosgrove, "The Divine Δεῖ in Luke-Acts," 174.

his own passion."[8] Third, God ensures the fulfillment of what is necessary by breaking in to human history periodically via miracles. Fourth, Cosgrove finds what he calls "a dramatic-comedic understanding of salvation-history" related to Luke's logic of necessity, where a stage is "set time and time again for divine intervention, so that the spotlight of history continuously turns on God's saving miracle."[9]

John T. Squires has also investigated necessity in Luke-Acts, but under the canopy of the "plan of God."[10] As he notes right from the start, this theme is much more pronounced in Acts than in Luke.[11] In chapter seven, Squires turns to a comparison of Luke's use of necessity with the Greco-Roman belief in Fate. Squires shows some awareness of the problem of projecting a compulsive Fate into the arena of human responsibility, but he thinks Luke comes close to doing just that at times:

> The problems involved in affirming divine providence yet retaining human free-will were not immediately addressed by the early Christians, for it was to be some time in the development of Christian thought before explicit steps were taken to clarify the philosophical issues inherent in the belief in providence and its relation to the notion of Fate. Nevertheless, Luke's history contains a strong expression of the necessity inherent in the events he reports, with certain indications which come very close to the Hellenistic idea of Fate.[12]

There are several indications that Squires understands Luke's use of necessity to be very deterministic, his comments about freedom notwithstanding. Jesus' choices are

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[8] Cosgrove, "The Divine Δεῖ in Luke-Acts," 179.

[9] Cosgrove, "The Divine Δεῖ in Luke-Acts," 190.

[10] John T. Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts* (SNTSMS 76; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[11] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts*, 1.

[12] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts*, 166-67.

not his own, they are controlled by "the inner necessity which drives his every action."[13] He points to the "inevitability of the divine plan" that is marked by Jesus setting his face to go to Jerusalem.[14] Also, Luke's editorial changes to his sources reveal "the essentially inevitable nature of God's plan."[15] In relation to Paul's conversion and subsequent suffering, Squires writes: "This presentation of Paul thus contains a propagandistic aim; by emphasizing the necessity of God's plan, Luke invites his readers to accept the inevitable course of their lives and believe in the Christian message."[16] In the end, Squires claims that Luke "thus signifies the necessity of the plan of God in a way which was understandable to Hellenistic readers. A comparison with similar themes in the Hellenistic histories demonstrates a wide-spread awareness, shared by Luke, of the ways in which divine providence could be expressed in terms of Fate."[17] The Hellenistic view of Fate which Squires has in mind is that of the Stoics. This final observation will be impacted by our discussion in Chapter One.

Another scholar who comes to a very different conclusion about divine necessity in Luke-Acts is Clare K. Rothschild.[18] In chapter six, Rothschild turns to the question of divine guidance in Luke-Acts. Rothschild rejects the notion of a divine plan: "From the

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[13] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts*, 168.

[14] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts*, 168.

[15] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts*, 169.

[16] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts*, 174.

[17] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts,* 185.

[18] Clare K. Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History* (WUNT 2s 175; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004).

perspective of a program of historical rhetoric, however, the author of Luke-Acts' extensive use of δεῖ does not, as is widely held, emphasize divine control of history."[19] For Rothschild, Lukan necessity is a rhetorical device used by Luke to strengthen the credibility of implausible accounts.[20]

Rothschild argues that the δεῖ that Luke uses is much like that of Greek historians: "δεῖ construes unfamiliar and/or implausible events of the narrative—any events for which the historian wishes to strengthen causation—as fulfilled predictions. Although the events narrated with δεῖ are not fulfillments of actual predictions, with δεῖ they possess the virtual certainty of those that are."[21]

A few of examples of her assessment of Luke's use of necessity will suffice. Of Jesus' visit to the temple when he was twelve, she writes:

> Here use of the expression δεῖ aims at bolstering the historical plausibility of this very transparent application of the literary topos of the precocious adolescence of an important individual: Jesus uses oracular language at a young age. By expressing Jesus' presence in the Temple among the teachers in fulfillment language, the historical 'truth' of this patently contrived section of narrative is heightened.[22]

Because Luke wants to show that Jesus is as Pauline as possible, he uses δεῖ in Luke 4:43 so that Paul's ministry of travelling to other cities will be echoed in Jesus' own ministry: "In addition, the author's insistence that Jesus had a ministry to 'other cities' is resolute that Jesus' ministry took him to cities at all—not to mention cities beyond Galilee—in spite of the fact that the events of his narrative up to this point all occur in the region of

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[19] Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History,* 185.

[20] Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History*, 212.

[21] Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History*, 187.

[22] Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History*, 196.

Galilee."[23] In Acts 3, Peter tells the assembled crowd at Solomon's Porch that Jesus must (δεῖ) remain in heaven until the time of future restoration. Rothschild interprets this to mean that "the author insists on the definitive closure to the period of appearances, effectively denying the validity of any such ongoing claims."[24] For Rothschild, Luke's δεῖ a rhetorical strategy for strengthening the credibility of some of Luke's "unlikely" stories. Cyril Bailey says as much of Ἀνάγκη in the works of Heraclitus. For Heraclitus, Ἀνάγκη was "a kind of deus ex machine, called in to produce results which would otherwise seems improbable."[25]

The Need for this Study

As the previous survey of scholarship on necessity in Luke-Acts shows, necessity has been viewed very deterministically, even by those who seek to offset the determinism or inevitability in some way. This deterministic necessity has a very negative effect on the characterization of Jesus in Luke's narratives. These scholars, and many more besides, as we shall see, focus on a predetermined plan of God that compels Jesus to act in certain ways. Even a surface reading of such a view yields a Jesus who has little choice in what he does. But, any view that suggests, directly or indirectly, that Jesus has no choice (which is what happens when terms like "compulsion," "inevitable," and "destiny" are used of Jesus' actions) ignores the genre of Luke's first narrative.

There has been a growing consensus, following the work of Richard Burridge, that the gospels are biographies. There has not been, however, a general acceptance of

[23] Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History*, 197.

[24] Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History,* 203. This would take Paul completely out of the picture in Acts (see 1 Cor 15:8).

[25] Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964), 49.

using the genre to guide interpretation.[26] Many Lukan scholars, even those who heartily accept that Luke is a biography, largely ignore the genre in their interpretation. Also, since the genre of bios in antiquity was acutely interested in the motives and intentions of the subject, any claims that impact the motives and intentions of Jesus in the Third Gospel should be investigated. Divine necessity has been widely assumed but seldom questioned in relation to the activity of Jesus in Luke. Even Charles Talbert, one of the pioneers of the recent interest in the biographical nature of the gospels could write as recently as 2002: "Pagan and Hellenistic Jew alike thought of history as unfolding according to a divine necessity or compulsion that could be expressed in terms of *dei* or *deon esti*. It was in these terms that Luke's language of the *dei* of events would have been understood."[27]

In order to move toward an understanding of how Luke uses necessity in his *bios* of Jesus, we will need to know how Luke's authorial audience may have understood necessity *and* biography, as well as necessity *in* biography. The first issue will be addressed in Chapters Two, Four, and Five as we investigate how necessity is used in texts from the Greco-Roman world (Ch.2), the Hellenistic Jewish world (Ch. 4), and the Early Christian world (Ch.5). Chapter Three will be take close look at how necessity is involved in the rhetoric of the ancient world, with a keen eye toward understanding its role in a *bios*. Chapter Six will be an investigation of Luke's use of necessity in his *bios* of Jesus. Our conclusions and suggestions will be brought together in Chapter Seven.

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[26] Craig S. Keener, "Assumptions in Historical-Jesus Research: Using Ancient Biographies and Disciple' Traditioning as a Control," *Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus* 9 (2011): 26-58 seems to take the genre seriously, but his interest is in the historical reliability of such documents.

[27] Talbert, *Reading Luke*, 265.

CHAPTER TWO

Necessity in the Greco-Roman World

Overview

This chapter is an investigation of necessity in the Greco-Roman world. The literature of the Greco-Roman world reveals ideas that were "in the air" around the end of the first century C.E. when the Gospel of Luke was written. Ideas arose, were discussed, used, sometimes modified, sometimes set aside all throughout the period leading up to the end of the first century C.E. We need not expect that the inception of an idea will be its final form; indeed the "final" form may undergo yet additional changes in later years. What we can expect, however, is that some ideas will be enduring, even though they go through various changes in the process.

Necessity is one of those enduring ideas. In order to understand necessity in the Greco-Roman world, in fact in any ancient setting, we must take the entirety of the worldview(s) into consideration. Stephen Körner writes,

> What a person or society means by its concept of necessity cannot be understood in isolation from the whole conceptual system in which this concept is embedded. It cannot, in particular, be isolated from the manner in which the system serves the differentiation of experience into individual phenomena and categories of such, the predictive connection of phenomena, and the explanation of phenomena in an intellectually satisfactory manner. A person's concept of necessitation clearly depends on the manner in which he individuates phenomena (e.g., whether he places them into unidirectional or cyclical time) and on the categories of phenomena which he acknowledges (e.g., supernatural events).[1]

[1] Stephen Körner, "Necessity," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* 3:352.

Many conceptual systems were in vogue from the 7th century B.C.E. down through the 1st century C.E. The overall movement, however, was one in which, stated all too summarily, myth gave way partially to reason and observation. The ascendency of philosophy, though with no clear "winner," challenged the mythological ideas of the early poets, especially in relation to the creation of the universe. Milton C. Nahm writes, "Philosophy in Greece begins with the attempt to explain the universe in terms of a single principle or cause."[2] Given the existence of the cosmogonies of Hesiod and those called Orphic, the challenge was direct. Hesiod calls upon the Muses to tell him how it all began:

> Hail, children of Zeus, and give me lovely song; glorify the sacred race of the immortals who always are, those who were born from Earth and starry Sky, and from dark Night, and those whom salty Pontus (Sea) nourished. Tell how in the first place gods and earth were born, and rivers and the boundless sea seething with its swell, and the shining stars and the broad sky above, and those who were born from them, the gods givers of good things; and how they divided their wealth and distributed their honors, and also how they first took possession of many-folded Olympus. These things tell me from the beginning, Muses who have your mansions on Olympus, and tell which one of them was born first (*Theog*. 104-15 [Most, LCL]).

Hesiod sought information about the beginning through inspiration, not by observation or reason. On the other hand, Thales, whom Aristotle calls the founder of the earliest philosophy, believed that water was the first principle because of his observations and reasoning about moisture (*Metaph.* 983b [McMahon]).

Religious beliefs continued to impinge upon "science." For example, the natural philosophy that gave rise to astrology saw its physical systems given divine nature and worshipped. Even those who understood what the planets were and their movements

[2] Milton Nahm, *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy* (4th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), 3.

often paid tribute to them as to deities. This is because rationalism and scientific inquiry already owed a debt to religion. Francis M. Cornford noted, "Philosophy inherited from religion certain great conceptions—for instance, the ideas of 'God,' 'Soul,' 'Destiny,' [and] 'Law'—which continued to circumscribe the movements of rational thought and to determine their main direction."[3] This was especially true for the philosophy that followed Pythagoras and saw itself as a way of life more than as "an engine of curiosity."[4]

In time, Greek thinkers turned to consider the role of humans in nature. Following Protagoras, who developed the "man doctrine," how humans know and develop their belief systems became an important topic of consideration.[5] John Burnet notes that "about the same time, the breakdown of traditional morality gave rise to Ethics."[6] The motivations and causes of human actions became very important to those interested in ethics, like Aristotle. Others interested in the causes of human actions and political events include the historians Thucydides and Polybius and the biographer Plutarch. Assigning praise and blame for actions was an important part of rhetorical training and practice beginning with the Sophists and Aristotle.

Neither space nor time will allow for an adequate treatment of the history of Greek philosophy, religion, history, drama, ethics, and rhetoric. But that need not detain us. Our primary concern here is the role necessity played in each of these components of

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[3] Francis M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (1927; repr., New York: Cosimo Classics, 2009), v.

[4] Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, vi.

[5] The "man doctrine" of Protagoras will be explained more fully below.

[6] John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (New York: MacMillian Company, 1920), 1.

Greek thought with an eye toward understanding how readers of Luke's Gospel may have understood his references to necessity. Over the span of several hundred years, the people of the Greco-Roman world encountered necessity in a variety of ways. To that task we now turn.

Greek Terms for Necessity

It will perhaps be wise to say a word here about the relationship between the Greek words δεῖ and ἀνάγκη. Since my ultimate concern is with the δεῖ phrases in Luke's *bios* of Jesus and many of my examples from Greek writings use forms of ἀνάγκη and cognates, the question may arise as to their relationship. Perhaps not everyone is familiar with the close semantic relationship of these two words. Their relationship will be clarified in the discussions that follow as we look at these words in context, but a brief word now may save some consternation.

Semantic studies indicate the close relationship of these two words. Louw and Nida locate them together in the semantic domain of 'mode': 71D – 'should, ought'. They define δεῖ as: "to be something which should be done as a result of compulsion, whether internal (as a matter of duty), or external (law, custom, and circumstances)."[7] For ἀνάγκη: "an obligation of a compelling nature – 'complete obligation, necessary obligation.' Similarly, they are located together in 71E – 'necessary, unnecessary' where δεῖ is "to be that which must necessarily take place, often with the implication of inevitability," and ἀνάγκη is "necessity as a law of human experience – 'inevitability, what is bound to be, to have to be'." Also, Grundmann notes that δεῖ "expresses the

[7] J.P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* (New York: United Bible Societies, 1988).

'character of necessity or compulsion' in an event."[8] In his discussion of ἀνάγκη and its cognates, he says, "Thus the different meanings of the terms are given. Ἀνάγκη is compulsion or necessity and therefore the means of compulsion or oppression; ἀναγκαῖος is that which compels or makes necessary; ἀναγκάζω is to cause or compel someone in all the varying degrees from friendly pressure to forceful compulsion."[9] As we shall see, in the Greco-Roman world, necessity is expressed in a variety of ways using both of these words.

Logical Necessity

The Greek impersonal verb δεῖ is so widely used in Greek literature as to be nearly invisible. Often it simply relates what a speaker wants to do. In his discussion of types of government, Aristotle outlines the four main species: democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. He then states: "Nor should (δεῖ) the end of each form of government be neglected, for men choose the things which have reference to the end" (*Rhet*. 1.8.5 [Freeze, LCL]). There is no absolute requirement for Aristotle to mention the ends or goals of each type of government in his discussion, but it is something that he wants to do. Along the same lines, Polybius, in his account of the wars fought in Italy, describes Italy as a triangle and refers to one particular mountain chain that makes up part of the triangle: "At the foot of this chain, which we should (δεῖ) regard as the base of the triangle, on its southern side, lies the last plain of all Italy to the north" (*Hist*. 2.14.7 [Paton, LCL]).

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[8] W. Grundmann, "δεῖ, δέον ἐστί,"*TDNT* 2.21.

[9] W. Grundmann, "ἀναγκάζω, ἀναγκαῖος, ἀνάγκη," *TDNT* 1:345.

There is one form of necessity that is widespread in the literature: a simple form of conditional necessity.[10] In reality, almost all necessity at some level is conditional, i.e. it may be that the conditions that will obtain if that which is necessary is not done are acceptable by those for whom it is necessary. It is extremely common for writers to say what "it is necessary" to say or do as they make their arguments or tell their tales. Conditional necessity is necessity that comes about due to some other cause; it may also be thought of in terms of conditional necessity: *if* x, then y. If a horse is to fly, then it must have wings. If a house is to be built, then it must have a foundation. Conditional necessity is distinguished from absolute necessity. Absolute necessity is that necessity that comes about due to the nature of the thing itself when considerations from conditions or antecedent causes are removed. Conditional necessity is widespread in Greek writings. We will look at absolute necessity in more detail as we discuss necessity in philosophy.[11]

A brief perusal of nearly any Greek volume of the Loeb Classical Library will reveal the extensive use of conditional necessity. In Plato's *Gorgias,* when Socrates wants to know the real function of rhetoric, he inquires of Gorgias:

> Whether the orator is or is not a match for the rest of [the professionals] by reason of that skill is a question we shall look into presently, if our argument so requires: for the moment let us consider first whether the rhetorician is in the same relation to what is just and unjust, base and noble, good and bad, as to what is healthful, and to the various objects of all the other arts; he does not know what is really good or bad, noble or base, just or unjust, but he has devised a persuasion to deal with these matters so as to appear to those who, like himself, do not know to know better than he who knows. Or is it necessary (ἀνάγκη) to know, and

[10] W.K.C. Guthrie, *Aristotle: An Encounter* (A History of Greek Philosophy VI; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 118; Howard R. Patch, "Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplationists," *Speculum* 10.4 (1935): 396.

[11] These labels need not distract us. The goal of this project is to understand the different ways necessity was used and understood by people in the ancient world.

> must (δεῖ) anyone who intends to learn rhetoric have a previous knowledge of these things when he comes to you? Or if not, are you, as the teacher of rhetoric, to teach the person who comes to you nothing about them—for it is not your business—but only to make him appear in the eyes of the multitude to know things of this sort when he does not know, and to appear to be good when he is not? Or will you be utterly unable to teach him rhetoric unless he previously knows the truth about these matters? Or what is the real state of the case, Gorgias? For Heaven's sake, as you proposed just know, draw aside the veil and tell us what really is the function of rhetoric (*Gorg*. 459c-e [Lamb, LCL]).

Socrates wants to know if having previous knowledge of various arts and sciences is a prerequisite to becoming as rhetorician. In other words, he wants to know if Gorgias' view of rhetoric requires a person to have knowledge of other arts and sciences *if* that person wants to become a rhetorician. Gorgias' answer (460a) reflects that he believes a person should have knowledge of other arts and sciences to be a rhetor. Having knowledge of arts and science is not an absolute necessity, but it is necessary according to Gorgias *if* one wants to be a rhetorician and is thus conditionally necessary. This passage also highlights the near-synonymous use of ἀνάγκη and δεῖ.

Also, when Gorgias is trying to convince Socrates that teachers of rhetoric should not be blamed for a student's misuse of the art, he says, "And, in my opinion, if a man becomes a rhetorician and then uses this power and this art unfairly, we ought (δεῖ) not to [it is necessary not to] hate his teacher and cast him out of our cities" (*Gorg.* 457 [Lamb, LCL]). Gorgias simply uses δεῖ to strengthen his claim that the student, not the teacher, is to blame for the abuse of his talents. It would be necessary to hate the teacher and cast him from the city *if* the teacher, not the student, was responsible for the student's use of rhetoric. Similarly, in Euripides's *Bacchae*, Dionysius tells the audience that Thebes must (δεῖ) learn the bacchic rites whether it wants to or not (*Bacch.* 39). This is clearly a situation in which the city that comes under the sway of this "must" has no choice (at

least as far as Dionysius is concerned). The necessity here, however, is only related to Dionysius' desire that the city of his mother's sisters, who spoke ill of his mother's relationship to Zeus, pay for their idle chatter by becoming exemplary in the Bacchic rites. It is not absolutely necessary that Thebes learn the bacchic rites; it is only so *if* Dionysius is to have his revenge on the city.

Also, various forms of ἀναγκαῖος and ἀναγκάζω may be used to indicate this common form of necessity. In the opening lines of *Antidosis*, Isocrates says that his current discourse is so different from other speeches that "it is necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) to begin by setting forth the reason why I chose to write a discourse so unlike any other" (*Antid.* 1 [Norlin, LCL]). At the conclusion of the introduction, he writes, "These, then, are the things which it was necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) for me to say by way of introduction" (*Antid.* 13 [Norlin, LCL]). The uniqueness of the discourse created the necessity for an explanation. It was necessary *if* the audience was to understand the discourse properly.

The historian Herodotus offers another example of the simple or common form of conditional necessity. When the seven conspirators discover that the person on the throne of Persia is not Smerdis son of Cyrus, but Smerdis the Magus, they meet to discuss how to relieve him of his stolen treasure. Otanes and Darius have an exchange about when to act; Darius wants to act now but Otanes wants to wait until they have more support. Otanes is worried about how to slip past the guards, but Darius devises a way to get them in the palace. Darius says,

> You know there will be not difficulty in passing the guards. Who will dare to refuse admission to men of our rank and distinction, if not from respect, then from fear of the consequences? Besides, I have a perfect excuse for getting us in: I will say I have just come from Persia and have a message from my father for the king. If a lie is necessary (δεῖ), why not speak it? We are all after the same thing, whether we lie or speak the truth: our own advantage. Men lie when they think to

> profit by deception, and tell the truth for the same reason—to get something they want, and to be the better trusted for their honesty. It is only two different roads to the same goal. Were there no question of advantage, the honest man would be as likely to lie as the liar is, and the liar would tell the truth as readily as the honest man (*Hist*. 3.72 [Smith, LCL]).

The lie is only necessary *if* the conspirators want to gain access to the palace so they can attempt to overthrow the imposter.

Second century C.E. writer Lucian has Cyniscus ask Zeus if the gods are under the rule of Fate/Necessity and if they "must needs (ἀνάγκη) be attached to their thread?"[12] Zeus replies, "We must (ἀνάγκη), Cyniscus" (*Jupp. conf*. 4 [Harmon, LCL}).[13] Although this may appear to be cosmic or divine necessity at work, it is the condition of "this is the way it has to be" that gives rise to the necessity rather than some god forcing the arrangement. In another of Lucian's satirical works, *The Dream,* in the course of conversation, Micyllus, the cobbler, catches the rooster with whom he has been conversing in a lie. The rooster has claimed to be Pythagoras. The day before Micyllus had thrown the rooster beans for lunch, and they were apparently gobbled up very quickly. But Micyllus knew that Pythagoras had refused to eat beans, so he says, "So it must be (ἀνάγκη) either that you have told a lie and are someone else, or, if you are Pythagoras, you have broken the law and committed as great an impiety in eating beans as if you had eaten your father's head" (*Gall.* 4 [Harmon, LCL]). The knowledge that Pythagoras did not eat beans created the necessity for an alternate explanation of the situation.

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[12] The Greek is ". . . καὶ ἀνάγκη ὑμῖν ἠρτῆσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ λίνου αὐτῶν." A more literal translation might be: "and it is necessary for you to be hung from their thread."

[13] Or "It is necessary, Cyniscus."

Some writers make the condition even more explicit. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates argues that a person who understands music might correct a person who only knows how to make the highest and lowest note by observing, "My excellent man, while it is necessary (ἀνάγκη) to know these things if one intends to understand the laws of harmony, it's quite possible that a man with your level of expertise might not know the slightest thing about harmony. You see, you know the prerequisites for harmony but not harmonics itself" (*Phaedr*. 268e [Fowler, LCL]). Knowledge of the highest and lowest notes is only necessary if one wants to understand the laws of harmony. A little further on, Socrates tells Phaedrus that, while he cannot say exactly how, he is willing to say something about how one must (δεῖ) write *if* one wants to be as artful as possible (271c). The desire to write as artfully as possible creates the necessity to write in a certain manner.

Conditional necessity is apparent also in rhetorical writing. When discussing objections and how to refute them, second century C.E. rhetorician Apsines observes that there are two types of objections: artistic and non-artistic. The non-artistic are those that "the speaker does not invent . . . from his own thought, but takes the material from what has been defined and what has taken place" (*Art of Rhetoric* 4.1). Artistic objections are those "which the speaker himself has invented and sets out against us; for example, in (Demosthenes') *Against Leptines*: But, by Zeus, (my opponent) will say that 'the richest citizens will pay liturgies as a result of this law.'" Apsines continues: "Thus, for the most part, non-artistic objections are stronger than artistic. Why? Because the former are taken from things that have been defined and are almost agreed, while the orator has invented the latter and they need (δεῖ) to be judged [it is necessary to judge them] (*Art of Rhetoric*

4.2). It is necessary to judge or weigh the value of artistic objections because they do not come from things that are taken for granted or are agreed upon by all parties in a dispute.

These examples provide an important baseline from which to judge other uses of necessity. Since logical necessity is such an important part of language, we should not expect every δεῖ or ἀνάγκη to have cosmic, mechanistic, or divine connections; sometimes necessity is just a part of how we speak about things. Many examples could be provided of how ancient writers find this or that "necessary" to say or do in laying out their argument.

Necessity in the Early Poets

The poetry of Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar provide us with a glimpse into some of the earliest uses of necessity in Greek literature.

Homeric Necessity

In Homer, necessity is often associated a person or persons being forced to do something, either because of the will or power of a divine being, or the will or power of another person. In many of these cases, it is clear that the person did not want to do what he or she was forced to. Also, a situation that may not be traceable to any one person's will sometimes forces people to feel that they must take certain actions.

Overcome By Another Person or Persons. Andromache, wife of Hector, urges her husband to refrain from the most intense battle and station himself on the wall of Troy and his army by the wild fig tree where the wall is most vulnerable (*Il.* 6.430-35). She does not want to be widowed by the Achaeans. Hector responds that his greatest concern is for her when some Achaean warrior will take away her freedom: "Then

perhaps in Argos will you ply the loom at another woman's bidding, or carry water from Messeis or Hypereia, much against your will, and strong necessity (ἀνάγκη) will be laid upon you" (6.456-58 [Murray, LCL]). Hector highlights that Andromache will have to go against her will due to the expectations for captive women.

Once Achilles has decided that he will return to Pthia, he directs the messengers to go inform the elders of the Achaeans that they need to devise some other plan because he will not fight with them. As the messengers are about to depart, he instructs them to leave Phoenix, the kindly old warrior of whom Achilles is fond, behind: "But let Phoenix remain here with us and sleep, so that he may follow with me on my ships to my dear native land on the morrow, if he wishes; but by force (ἀνάγκῃ) I will not take him" (9.427-29 [Murray, LCL]). The same phrase is repeated when Odysseus recounts these events to Agamemnon (9.692).

When Athena visits Telemachus for the first time at the home of Odysseus in Ithaca, she finds him angry with the suitors who continually eat and drink at Odysseus' house without ever bringing food or drink to replenish the stores. After the first meal, at which Telemachus and Athena (Menthes) set apart from the others, the suitors desired song and dance. Of the singer, Phemius, it is said that he "sang among the suitors under compulsion (ἀνάγκῃ)" (1.154 [Murray, LCL]). At first this may seem to be a reference to inspiration, for when Penelope comes down stairs to urge the minstrel to sing some other song, Telemachus warns her that the minstrel sings as his heart is moved by Zeus (1.345-48). Yet, when Odysseus, Telemachus, the cattleherd, and the swineherd finally attacked the suitors, a different source of the compulsion comes to light. Phemius sees the death being dealt out by Odysseus and his men. He ponders whether to try to slip

away or to throw himself at Odysseus' feet and beg for mercy. He chooses the latter saying, "Telemachus too would bear witness to this, your staunch son, that through no will or desire of mine I resorted to your house to sing to the suitors at their feasts, but they being far more and stronger, brought me here perforce (ἀνάγκῃ)" (22.350-53 [Murray, LCL]). This appeal to necessity as an excuse for an action is granted mercy by Odysseus through the intercession of Telemachus (22.354-58).

Overcome By a Divine Being. The will of the gods often seem to control the destinies of humans. Zeus may even force other gods to do what they do not want to do. Zeus declares his intention to fulfill his promise to Achilles, and he lays out his plans for how the war will go (*Il.* 15.50-78). Of particular concern to Zeus are the actions of Poseidon, who has been helping the Achaeans. Zeus tells Hera to send Iris to Poseidon to attempt to convince him to stop his involvement in the war. When Hera comes to where the other gods are gathered, she finds Ares very upset about the loss of his son, Ascalaphous, a Trojan warrior. Ares makes his plans to go among the Danaans and wreak havoc in retribution. Hera warns him against this plan of action: "Are you minded yourself to fill up the measure of manifold woes, and so be forced to return to Olympus – though in great distress (καὶ ἀχνύμενός περ ἀνάγκῃ), and for all the rest sow seeds of great evil?" (15.132-34 [Murray, LCL]) Lattimore translates: "Do you wish, after running the course of many misfortunes yourself, still to come back to Olympus under compulsion though reluctant, and plant seed of great sorrow among the rest of us?" Ares, though a god in his own right, may be forced to yield to the will of Zeus. When Iris does take the message to Poseidon, it is not received well. Poseidon points out that Zeus has no right to threaten him since he and Zeus are equals. He retorts: "His daughters and his

sons it would be better for him to threaten with violent works, those whom he himself begot, who of necessity (ἀνάγκῃ) will listen to whatever he may urge" (15.199). This necessity seems to reflect a social custom or order among the gods.

Perhaps no example of necessity created by the will of a divine being is more clear in the *Odyssey* than the story of Calypso's entrapment of Odysseus for nine years. Calypso rescued Odysseus from the sea after Zeus had struck his ship with a thunderbolt as punishment because his men had eaten some of Helios' cattle. She desired for Odysseus to be her husband (1.15; 9.32). That Odysseus is kept against his will or by compulsion is stated at least four times throughout the poem. When Telemachus visits Menelaus to hear news of his father, Menelaus tells him of his encounter with Proteus. After he and his men had conquered Proteus, Menelaus asked him about his own way home and then about the others who had left Troy for their native lands (4.485-537). Proteus knows specific news of three chieftains from the Achaean army. He tells Menelaus that Agamemnon was killed by Aegisthus and Aius was killed by Poseidon. When prompted by Menelaus about the third, Proteus informs him that he had seen Odysseus held in Calypso's halls by compulsion (ἀνάγκῃ) (4.557).[14] This necessity gives Telemachus a reason for Odysseus' delay: he is being held against his will.

Athena tells a similar story to Zeus when she demands that the gods unite in sending a message to Calypso that it is time for Odysseus to be released. She reminds Zeus what a great king Odysseus is and what a great shame it is for his prayers to be unanswered: "Yet he lies in an island suffering grievous pains, in the halls of the nymph

[14] Lombardo translated *anankē* here as "against his will" (4.585), Homer, *Odyssey*, (trans. Stanley Lombardo w/ introduction by Shelia Murnaghan; Indianapolis: IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000). Likewise in 5:14.

Calypso, who keeps him perforce (ἀνάγκῃ), and he cannot return to his own land" (5.13-15 [Murray, LCL]). Once Calypso has received word from Zeus via Hermes that she is to release Odysseus and speed him on his way to Ithaca, she goes in search of Odysseus. Homer gives a brief description of Odysseus' condition:

> Him she found sitting on the shore, and his eyes were never dry of tears, and his sweet life was ebbing away, as he grieved for his return, for the nymph no longer pleased him. By night indeed he would sleep by her side perforce (ἀνάγκῃ) in the hollow caves, unwilling (οὐκ ἐθέλων) beside the willing nymph, but by day he would sit on the rocks and the sands, racking his heart with tears and groans and griefs, and he would look out over the unresting sea, shedding tears (5.151-58 [Murray, LCL]).

It has become quite apparent that Homer does not want his audience to believe that Odysseus *wanted* to stay with Calypso. The final passage in which Homer has someone declare that Odysseus was kept by Calypso against his will is Telemachus recounting his encounter with Menelaus to his mother, Penelope. He restates what Menelaus had told him of his conversation with Proteus: necessity detains Odysseus at the house of the nymph (17.143).

At one point, Odysseus had to drag his friends back to the ships "under compulsion" when they had eaten of the lotus plant (9.98). The effects of the plant caused them to want to forego the return trip and stay with the lotus-eaters. Due to the strength of the drug, the men were not willing to go with Odysseus, so they had to be forced.

When Odysseus and his men come to the palace of Circe, some of his men drink a strong potion and are turned into swine (10.229-60). Only Eurylochus escapes to report the news to Odysseus. When Odysseus determines to go see what can be done, Eurylochus implore him: "Do not take me there against my will (ἀέκοντα), O fostered by

Zeus, but leave me here. For I know that you will neither come back yourself, nor bring anyone of your comrades" (10.266-68 [Murray, LCL]). Odysseus does in fact come back to the ship, having been aided by a pharmaceutical from Hermes. Circe had sworn to him a great oath that she would do him and his men no further harm (10.345-48). Eurylochus does not trust Odysseus or Circe; he fears that Circe "will change us all to swine, or wolves, or lions, to guard her great house under compulsion (ἀνάγκῃ) (10.433-34 [Murray, LCL]). Eurylochus fears the power of the poisons that Circe uses to compel men to act against their will.

Situational Necessity. The battle was going bad for the Trojan's, and Homer says they were in danger of being "vanquished by their lack of courage" (*Il.* 6.74 [Murray, LCL]). Helenus, whom Homer called "the best of the diviners" urged Aeneas and Hector to rally the troops. While Aeneas and Hector race to protect the gates, Helenus offers to stay in the plain and fight, though he and his men are exhausted from the battle, "for necessity (ἀναγκαίη) weighs hard on us" (*Il*. 6.85 [Murray, LCL]). This necessity is created by the fear that the Achaeans are about to overwhelm Troy. A similar account is related in *Il.* 8.53-59 where Homer tells us that the Trojans were eager to enter into battle, though they had fewer numbers, "through utter necessity (ἀναγκαίᾳ), to protect their children and their wives" (*Il*. 8.56-57 [Murray, LCL]). The protection of wives and children seems to be a factor also at 10.418. Dolon of the Trojan army has been caught by Diomedes and Odysseus sneaking toward the Achaean ships in the black of night. He came on errand from Hector to spy out the ships and to return with news of the activity there. As Odysseus and Diomedes question him, he reveals that only the Trojans are standing watch by the fires back in his camp; the allies who have been called from other

places are not as concerned to keep watch "for their own children are not near, nor their wives" (*Il*. 10.422 [Murray, LCL]).

When Asius attacks the gates of the Achaeans near their ships, he discovers that Zeus will not answer his prayer for victory (*Il.* 12.173-74). The battle rages on and on near the gates, and Homer says that even if he was a god he could not describe all of the fighting that took place there. The Argives, "though in great distress (καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ), were forced to defend their ships" (*Il*. 12.178 [Murray, LCL]). Richmond Lattimore translates this passage: ". . . and the Argives fought unhappily, yet they must fight on, to defend their ships."[15] This same grammatical construction occurs at 14.128 and 15.133.[16] In the first instance, Diomedes responds to Agamemnon's call for counsel that was better than what he had just been rebuked by Odysseus for offering. Agamemnon had suggested dragging the ships out into deeper water under cover of darkness in preparation for fleeing from Troy. Odysseus would have none of it. Diomedes responds: "Come, let us go down to battle, wounded though we are, since we must (καὶ οὐτάμενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ)." He suggests that they not enter directly into the battle, and risk further wounds, but stand apart and urge the others to the fight. They must either fight or be prepared to be vanquished.

Achilles responds to Odysseus when Odysseus tries to talk him into accepting Agamemnon's gifts so Achilles' wrath will be stayed and he will reenter the fight. He asks, "Why must (δεῖ) the Argives wage war against the Trojans?" (*Il.* 9.337 [Murray, LCL]). He points out that the reason they have come is because Menelaus' wife was

[15] Homer, *Iliad*, translated with introduction by Richmond Lattimore (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 263.

[16] For 15.133 see below.

stolen by Paris, and the Achaeans all rallied behind Agamemnon to come and rescue his brother's wife. It is an insult to Achilles that Menelaus and Agamemnon would act as if they are the only two men in the world who love their wives. He reminds Odysseus that he, and any other man who "is a true man and of sound mind, loves his own" (Il. 9.341-42 [Murray, LCL) just as he loves Briseïs, whom Agamemnon had taken from him earlier. It is the highest form of hypocrisy to Achilles for one man (Agamemnon) who has stolen another man's (Achilles') wife to expect that man (Achilles) whose wife he has stolen to help him (Agamemnon) recover the wife (Helen) of his brother (Menelaus) who was stolen by yet another man (Paris)! The very sense of honor that led to the war, now leads Achilles to abstain from fighting.

Fear of failure in battle seems to spur Achilles to twice refer to letting his anger against Agamemnon go due to the necessity of concentrating on the war at hand (18.113; 19.66). In the first instance he speaks of this to his mother, Thetis, and in the last he speaks directly to Agamemnon.

Priam enters into negotiation with Achilles over the burial of Hector. Priam points out to Achilles that the Trojans are penned in the city with no access to the things needed for a proper burial. He asks for a truce of sorts to allow the Trojans to bury Hector, recognizing that they may be faced with additional fighting after the funeral: "For nine days we will wail for him in our halls, and on the tenth we will make his funeral, and the people will feast, and on the eleventh we will heap a mound over him, and on the twelfth we will do battle, if we must (ἀνάγκη) (*Il.* 24.664-67 [Murray, LCL]).

Twice, hunger is the cause of necessity. Odysseus begs Alcinous to let him eat before demanding of him the tale he will tell. He says,

> But as for me, allow me now to eat, despite my grief; for there is nothing more shameless than one's hateful belly, which bids a man perforce (ἀνάγκῃ) take thought of it, be he never so sadly distressed and laden with grief at heart, even as I too am laden with grief at heart, yet constantly does my belly bid me eat and drink, and makes me forget all that I have suffered, and commands that it be filled" (5.215-21 [Murray, LCL]).

The basic needs of the body cannot be ignored; this is necessity of the highest order for human survival. At another time, when Odysseus and his men had come to the island where Helios kept his cattle, the wind rose contrary to them and they were forced to stay put for a while. At length, they ran out of food from the ship, it became necessary to cast about for food on the island (12.330). They had been warned not to touch the cattle of Helios or trouble would come to them (12.267-70). Once Odysseus left the ship and departed to a solitary place to pray, the men fell upon the cattle and slew several of the best ones for 'sacrifices' to the gods. Here, though necessity appears to be an excuse for their behavior, Zeus does not think so. He responds to Helios' complaint about the cattle rustlers with great fury and destroys their ship.

At times, necessity is associated with Fate in Homer's poems. Although, as Wilhelm Gundel notes, Ἀνάγκη *in* Homer and Hesiod does not quite become a controlling power in itself, it is closely associated with the will of a god or the gods.[17] In turn, the will of the gods is often associated with Fate. Penelope's ruse for delaying the suitors by promising to marry after she has woven a proper garment for Laertes, her father-in-law, against the day of his death is uncovered (2.107-10). She had been weaving by day and unweaving by night in hopes that by delaying the completion of the garment, she might survive the ordeal until Odysseus returned. Antinous tells

[17] Wilhelm Gundel, *Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene* (Gieβen: R. Lange, 1914), 31.

Telemachus that she had to finish the garment not willingly but under compulsion (2:110) once the suitors discovered her ruse.[18]

Penelope's weaving and unweaving, physical evidence of *her* will in the matter of marriage is paralleled by the weaving or spinning of fate in Homer. The idea that there were three Fates whose job it was to determine the destiny of each individual was widespread in the Greco-Roman world. Their work was often conceived as spinning or weaving. The three goddesses were Lachesis (Dispenser of Lots), Klotho (The Spinner), and Atropos (She Who Cannot Be Turned).[19] In Homer, the three Fates do not yet appear; it is *Moira* or *Aisa* who spins the fate of humans.[20]

Fate, as something that is spun for each human at birth, suggests that there are events that are predetermined in human life over which humans have no control. When Aeneas is encouraged by Apollo to go out and fight Achilles, Hera noticed a problem and called the gods together for consultation:

> Take thought in your minds, you two, Poseidon and Athena, how these things are to be. Aeneas here has come out armored in ruddy bronze to face the son of Peleus, and it is Phoebus Apollo who has set him on. Come then, let us turn him back immediately; or else then let one of us stand likewise by Achilles' side and give him great might, and let him lack nothing in his heart, so that he may know that they who love him are the best of the immortals, and those are worthless as wind who till now have warded war and combat from the Trojans. We have all come down from Olympus to join in this battle, so that Achilles may suffer no harm among the Trojans for today; but later he will suffer *whatever Fate spun for him with her thread at his birth* when his mother bore him. But if Achilles does not learn this from some voice of the gods, he will take fright when some god

[18] The same account is given by Penelope to Odysseus while he is yet a stranger to her in his own house (19.156) and by the shade of Amphimedon to the shade of Agamemnon in Hades when he recounts how Odysseus slaughtered the suitors (24.146).

[19] William Chase Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1944), 16.

[20] B.C. Dietrich, "The Spinning of Fate in Homer," *Phoenix* 16.2 (1962): 86-101.

> comes against him in battle, for dangerous are the gods when they appear in manifest form (*Il.* 20:115-31 [Murray, LCL] italics added).

This passage suggests that what fate spins for a person cannot be altered, even by a god. Yet, it is not so much that fate cannot be altered by a god but "that which is spun" that cannot be altered, for even the gods are said to spin fates for humans.[21] Once the fate is spun, it cannot be changed.

When Odysseus comes to King Alcinous for help, Alcinous can only promise to take care of Odysseus as far as is within his power. What happens beyond that time is "whatever fate (αἶσα) and the dread spinners (κλῶθές) spun with their thread for him at his birth" (*Od.* 7.197). Fate is connected to necessity when Athena appears to Odysseus just as he returns to Ithaca. She says,

> And now I have come here to weave a plan with you, and to hide all the treasure, which the lordly Phaeacians gave you by my counsel and will, when you set out for home and to tell you all the measure of woe it is your fate (*aisa*) to fulfill in your well-built house. But be strong, for bear it you must (*anankē*), and tell no man of them all nor any woman that you have come back from your wanderings, but in silence endure your many griefs, and submit to the violence of men (13.303-10 [Murray, LCL]).

The sufferings that are fated for Odysseus are those that he must endure; he has no control and no choice. Dietrich believes that Homer has taken the popular belief that spinning has divine properties associated with birth and death and given it a new twist in its association with the fate of humans. This connection between spinning or weaving and fate prepares the way for Plato's "magnificent image of Ἀνάγκη with spindle and distaff, who with the help of Lachesis, Klotho, and Atropos determines the lots of life."

The Homeric hymns also reveal the conflict between will and necessity. In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, Hades takes Persephone from the beautiful meadow "by

[21] James Duffy, "Homer's Conception of Fate," *The Classical Journal* 42.8 (1947): 477-85.

force" (ἀέκουσαν) (19). Demeter implores Helios to help her discover who stole her daughter. She says,

> The maiden I bore, my sweet sprig, with looks to be proud of – I heard her voice loud through the fathomless air as if she was being taken by force, but I did not see it. You, however, look down from the sky with your rays over the whole earth and sea: so tell me truly if perchance you have seen who it is, of gods or mortals, that has taken her away from me "by force against her will" (ἀέκουσαν ἀνάγκῃ) (66-73 [West, LCL]).

Demeter's search for Persephone takes her to Crete to the house of Keleos. She, perhaps to garner sympathy, tells the daughters of Keleos that she has come "not from choice, but by force, against my will (ἀέκουσαν ἀνάγκῃ)" at the hands of some freebooters from whom she had escaped (123-24 [West, LCL]).

Aphrodite offers a similar story to Anchises in the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*. Zeus caused Aphrodite to fall in love with Anchises because she had been bragging about her ability to couple mortals and immortals, though she had remained apart from such activity (53-54). When Aphrodite comes to Anchises on the mountain where he is taking care of his cattle, she tells him a fabulous story of her capture. She was at a dance to Artemis, and Hermes snatched her away (ἥρπαξε), just as Persephone had been snatched away (ἁρπάξας) by Hades (*To Demeter* 19). Hermes reveals to Aphrodite that she is to be the wife of Anchises and bear him children. Hermes then returns to the place of the immortals; she comes to Anchises "forced by necessity" (130). Although it is a lie, the necessity here is designed to instill in Anchises' mind that she comes to him according to the will of the gods. The irony is that she does in fact come at the will of a god, but it is not the god of her tale to Anchises. Anchises' response to her claims indicates that the necessity of which Aphrodite speaks seals the deal for him:

> If you are a mortal, and the mother who bore you was a woman, and your father is the famed Otreus, as you say, and you have come here by the will of the immortal go-between Hermes, and you are to be known as my wife forever, then no god or mortal man is going to hold me back from making love to you right now." (145-50 [West, LCL]).

The nature of the erotic approach of an immortal goddess (even in disguise as a mortal woman) to a mortal man creates an erotic necessity from which the man is not soon able to extract himself.[22]

In summary, Homeric necessity is often associated with the sense of "what has to be" due to some external force, power, or situation. In many cases, the will of a divine being creates necessity for some other divine being or a human. Humans may be a source of necessity for other humans, as well. Necessity is used in a variety of ways in Homer. There is certainly the excuse that necessity offers for some action that a person does not want to undertake.

Hesiod

Hesiod's use of necessity is almost exclusively associated with divine figures imposing their will on someone else. In his *Works and Days,* Hesiod corrects his earlier view in *Theogony* (225) that there was only one Strife. He now recognizes two Strifes, one which "fosters evil war and conflict—cruel one, no mortal loves that one, but it is by necessity (ὑπ' ἀνάγκης) that they honor the oppressive Strife, by the plans of the immortals" (14-16 [Most, LCL]). Here, necessity is associated with the plans of the gods because it is only by their designs that humans will honor the bad Strife. They certainly will not do so willingly. C.J. Rowe comments:

[22] Hugh Parry, "The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite: Erotic 'Ananke'," *Phoenix* 43 (1986): 253-64.

> When Hesiod says that men honor her 'by compulsion' (ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, like Atlas in *Th* 517 with his inescapable burden; or Prometheus in *Th* 615 bound to his rock with adamantine chains) this may be either because he is thinking generally of Eris as one of the evils that inevitably attach to the human condition; or because of the way in which he has begun the sentence: 'no mortal chooses her' (so it must be a matter of compulsion). To say that a person does something ἀθανάτων βουλῆσιν by no means rules out the possibility of saying that he chooses to do it; but to say that he does it ὑπ' ἀνάγκης surely does.[23]

The idea that if humans act out of necessity they cannot also be acting by choice is a theme that will be repeated often in Greco-Roman literature. It will be taken up by philosophers, historians, dramatists, ethicists, and rhetoricians.

Zeus assigned Atlas the fate of holding up the sky due to a series of faults that angered Zeus (*Theog.* 517-20). Hesiod refers to this assignment as a "mighty necessity" (κρατερῆς ἀνάγκης), but he also connects it with the will of Zeus: "for this is the portion which the counselor Zeus assigned him" (520 [Most, LCL]). Apostolos Athanassikis translates "harsh necessity."[24] Atlas does not have a say in the matter; he must obey.

Also, Prometheus is held down by necessity by a great bond, chained to a rocky crag at the edge of the world because of his insolence in helping humans (615). This too is associated with the will of Zeus and is unalterable by Prometheus.

Pindar

In the first Olympian Ode, Tantalus points out the futility of failing to take a great risk, especially since humans must die (θανεῖν δ' οἶσιν ἀνάγκα) (1.82). The risk of which he speaks is the conquest of taking Hippodameia from her father. Thirteen other

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[23] *Essential Hesiod* (ed. C.J. Rowe; London: Bristol Classical Press, 1978 [2002]), 104-05.

[24] *Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Shield*, (trans. by Apostolos N. Athanassakis; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 26.

suitors had been killed trying to win her hand. The necessity of death is the natural condition of mortals: "Pindar's point is that we will all die one day, but let's make the most of life and make a name for ourselves while we can."[25] To leave a legacy of great deeds was the goal of many ancient men of renown.

In his second *Olympian Ode*, Pindar mentions Necessity as the enforcer of the declarations of doom by Zeus regarding punishment in the afterlife (60). Here is Necessity that represents the finality of Zeus's decisions. Because he is Zeus Almighty, what he says is the way it must be. There is no escape from the decree of Zeus.
In the third Olympian Ode, it is the compulsion of a father's wishes that drives a son to make a great discovery (3.28).

Pindar declares of Hieron of Etna: "And in the grip of necessity one of haughty heart had to fawn on him for his friendship" (*Pythian Odes* 1.51 [Farnell]).[26] The incident referred to here is Hieron's defeat of Thrasydaeus of Acragas. After this defeat, "the Acragantines sent an embassy to Hieron and obtained terms of peace."[27]

Both the fourth and the fifth Pythian Odes are addressed to Arcesilas, King of Cyrene after his chariot won a spectacular victory in the races. The *Fourth Pythian Ode* was commissioned by a nobleman, Damophilus, who had been exiled for taking part in a quarrel. At the end of the poem, Pindar includes a plea to Arcesilas to restore

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[25] *Pindar: Selected Odes* (ed. w/trans by Stephen Instone; Warminster: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1996), 109.

[26] Lewis Richard Farnell, *The Works of Pindar: Translated with Literary and Critical Commentaries* (London: MacMillian and Co., Limited, 1930),

[27] R.W.B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes: Essays in Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

Damophilus from exile.[28] Pindar speaks of the excellence of the young nobleman, noting that one of the most difficult things is to see what is good and to be held back from it by compulsion (4.287). The compulsion, or necessity, which keeps Damophilus away from the good that he sees is the exile.

Philosophical Anankē

A full investigation of the use and development of necessity in Greek philosophy would take us far beyond the scope of this chapter. There are several monographs that deal with this question in detail.[29] For the purpose of this chapter, however, some important developments must be considered.

From the earliest Greek philosophers until Boethius wrote *The Consolation of Philosophy* in 524 C.E. , necessity played an important role in philosophical thinking. Initially, the concern was with how the world came into being. Was it something that happened randomly, as in by chance, or was there a design or purpose to the world? The Presocratic philosophers wrestled with this question.

In Plutarch's *Dinner of the Seven Wise Men*, Thales refutes the king of Egypt's answers to the riddles posed. When asked what is the strongest thing, the King replied, "Fortune (τύχη). Thales found this response to be rather uninformed: ". . . for Fortune would not be so fickle about abiding with one if it were the mightiest and strongest thing in existence" (*Sept. sap. conv.* 153C [Babbit, LCL]). Thales gives his own answer to the

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[28] Richmond Lattimore, "Pindar's Fourth Pythian Ode," *Classical Weekly* 42.2 (1948): 19-25, 19.

[29] Heinz Schreckenburg, *Ananke: Untersuchungen Zur Geschichte Des Wortbegrauchs* (München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964; Gundel, *Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene*; Allan Wooley, "Cosmic and Divine Ananke From Its Origin Through Plato," (unpublished dissertation: Princeton University, 1962); Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought*.

riddle: "Necessity (ἀνάγκη); for that alone is insuperable" (153D [Babbit, LCL]). Otto Brendel writes, "It seems to be good archaic terminology, perhaps not without relation to the other, mystical aspects of the idea, that Necessity stand for the Strongest, since domination is ascribed to her as to an old goddess of the universe."[30]

Prior to the birth of philosophy, certain natural or celestial phenomena (floods, eclipses) were often explained by pointing to the anger of some god. It is believed that Thales' prediction of an eclipse in 585 B.C.E. represents a significant shift in the understanding of natural events.[31] Behind the prediction of an eclipse lies a belief in fixed laws that can be used to forecast cyclical events. Thales' identification of Necessity as governing all things "represents in the universe the inviolability of cause and effect and does so as dual essence, as a mythical personage belonging to the oldest theogony or as earliest philosophical concept of the mechanics of natural events."[32]

Paul Tillich, in the opening chapter of his *The Protestant Era,* writes, "Greek philosophy, like Greek tragedy, religion, and mystery cult, is a struggle against fate, an attempt to rise above fate."[33] Fate, for Tillich, contains necessity and chance.[34]

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[30] Otto J. Brendel, *Symbolism of the Sphere: A Contribution to the History of Earlier Greek Philosophy* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), 38.

[31] Nahm, *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, 20-21.

[32] Brendel, *Symbolism of the Sphere*, 36.

[33] Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era* (trans. James Luther Adams; Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 5.

[34] Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, 7.

And, it was necessity and chance (*heimarmene*[35] and *tyche*) that clouded the skies of late antiquity, primarily through human infatuation with astrology. Harking back to Thales' prediction of the eclipse and the subsequent development of astrology, interest in astrology became a concern with repeated events. As sure as the stars wheeled overhead, certain events were thought to be predetermined. In time, predictions of events in one's life due to what star he or she was born under created a sense of a loss of freedom of choice.

The loss of freedom of choice became a critical issue in discussions of necessity. And it continued unabated for several centuries. Boethius was still intensely involved in trying to make sense of how freedom of the will can exist alongside providence (necessity) as late as the 6th century C.E. [36]

Part of the reason why necessity was considered antagonistic to freedom of the will has to do with how it is presented by the earlier philosophers. According to Thales above, necessity is insuperable. Wooley believes that the *anankē* that Parmenides uses in both the *Doxa* and the *Alethia* of his poem is an ultimate force.[37] For Parmenides even Being is fixed in its limits by Necessity:

> [Being] is motionless in the limits of mighty bonds, without beginning, without cease, since Becoming and Destruction have been driven very far away, and true conviction has rejected them. And remaining the same in the same place, it rests by itself and thus remains there fixed; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds

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[35] Gundel, *Beiträge zu Entwickelungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene*, 3 points out that Zeno was the first to write a book in which he practically equates *anankē* and *heimarmene*. The two terms were not identical, but both usually related in some way to the a predetermined course of events or series of causes and effects.

[36] Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy* (trans. by Richard. H. Green; Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002). Of course, the question is still debated today.

[37] Wooley, "Cosmic and Divine Ananke," 26.

> of a Limit, which constrains it round about, because it is decreed by divine law that Being shall not be without boundary.[38]

Martin Henn writes, "The goddess Necessity (Ἀνάγκη) is the cosmic force behind the linkage between Thinking and Being. Parmenides tells us that She is ultimately responsible for binding and rounding the universe into a sphere-like expanse, the depth of whose perfection can only be contemplated in Thought beyond mere sensation."[39] Henn believes Parmenides captures this necessity in four different ways. First, he uses the personified Goddess Ἀνάγκη and the impersonal ἀνάγκη. Second, *Moira* is personified as the Goddess who predestines cosmic events. Third, there are the *daimones* and the *Daimōn*, translated as 'destines' and 'Destiny' respectively. Finally, Henn believes Parmenides uses "the series of impersonal expressions, each sharing the same root signifying 'it is necessary' or one 'must' do something."[40] A.H. Coxon notes that these impersonal expressions refer to the necessity "personified by the goddess herself, who is therefore best qualified to speak of it, and derives from that which determines reality (1.22n; 9, 6n)."[41] So, here, very early in Greek thought, we see the impersonal verb capturing the necessity of a divine figure.

The role of Necessity in the cosmos is threefold: 1) she is the force that holds the cosmos together to make a whole; 2) she dragged the Sky out into the farther regions to

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[38] *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosphers* (trans. Kathleen Freeman; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 44.

[39] Martin J. Henn, *Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretative Essays and Commentary to the Text* (Contributions to Philosophy 88; Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 85.

[40] Henn, *Parmenides*, 86: χρεὼ, χρῆν, χρεὼν, χρὴ.

[41] A.H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides* (edited with new trans. by Richard McKirahan; Las Vegas, NV: Parmenides Publishing, 2009), 285.

create a limit for the stars[42]; and 3) she is the personification of "the primal force in nature that brings Thought to Being."[43] Also, the use of χρῆ and cognates supports the development of Parmenides' logical necessity, "the discovery of which is one of his principal achievements."[44] In fr. 3, Parmenides' doctrine "is the ultimate source of Aristotle's view that scientific demonstration is of necessary truths, the necessity of which derives eventually from that of the primary entities, i.e. from their simplicity and timelessness."[45] Parmenides' ideas were very important for much of what developed later in Greek philosophy related to necessity.[46]

The power of the necessity of Parmenides, as the force or power that establishes the limits of the universe, echoes that of Thales and anticipates that of Empedocles. Empedocles writes of the "oracle of Necessity" that decrees the wanderings of a divine spirit who has committed sin and is subjected to repeated reincarnations.[47] In the following fragment he observes that Grace "loathes intolerable Necessity."[48]

In Empedocles' philosophical system, there are four "periods" of a cycle of combination and dissolution of elements. The two forces that control the degree to which elements are combined or dissolved are Love and Strife. Necessity controls the

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[42] Robert B. English, "Parmenides' Indebtedness to the Pythagoreans," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 43 (1912): 81-94.

[43] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, 285.

[44] Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, 318.

[45] Ibid., 296.

[46] For a recent detailed treatment of Parmenides' contribution to Presocratic philosophy see, John Palmer, *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[47] Fr. 115, Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, 65.

[48] Fr. 116, ibid.

alternation of which force is predominant. When Love is predominant, all the elements are mixed together.[49] Then Love begins to fail, and Strife becomes dominant: the elements begin to separate until a stage is reached in which Strife is completely in control and everything is completely separated. Mahai I. Sapriosu writes, "What the oracle of Ananke decrees is that Strife and Love rule in turn . . . . Moreover, Charis (Grace or Love) 'hates unbearable necessity' ([Fragment] 116), when it is time for her to give way to Strife."[50] Wooley, who recognizes the mythical components in Empedocles' writing, observes that Ἀνάγκη has both a physical and a religious function: "In the physical realm *Ananke* regulates the alternation of power between Love and Hate. And in then religious realm *Ananke* guards the integrity of either Love or Strife: i.e., that each remains true to its single function."[51] This necessity looks very much like design; it 'must be' that Strife and Love alternate their influence on the world. Though Charis hates that she must give way to Strife, there is nothing she can do.

Following Parmenides and Empedocles, there were significant changes in Greek philosophy, especially regarding the role of the external power or force in the creation and maintenance of the cosmos. W.C. Greene notes,

> From the time of Socrates on, the thinkers of Greece are ranged in two main groups. The one conceives of Nature as the product of necessity, without plan or purpose; here stand the Atomists and their successors the Epicureans, and here, too, the worshippers of the goddess Tyche, whose cult becomes of great importance in the Hellenistic and Roman Ages. The other groups includes those who believe that the universe is the product not of blind, mechanical necessity but of a law or destiny which is rational and good, whether it be called the will of

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[49] Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 234.

[50] Mihai I. Spariousu, *God of Many Names: Play, Poetry, and Power in Hellenic Thought from Homer* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 81-82.

[51] Wooley, "Cosmic and Divine Ananke," 58-59.

> Zeus or Providence or Fate: here stand Diogenes of Apollonia, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and after them the Stoics and their successors.[52]

These two groups represent those who believe necessity is external (as in a power with design or intent) and those who hold necessity to be internal (as in nature).

The Externalists

Plato. With Plato we begin to see nuances of necessity. Yet, there still remains the basic grouping that we saw in the early poets; necessity can be brought about by a divine figure, another person, or a situation.

In the myth of Er, necessity plays three separate roles. First, necessity is personified as a goddess who controls the very foundation of the cosmos. Er, a warrior who was slain in battle, was resurrected on the twelfth day, just as he was about to be burned. He told of his journey to the underworld and what fate awaited the dead. One of the interesting features that Er described was a shaft of rainbow-colored light that is called the Spindle of Necessity (616C). This spindle rests on the knees of the goddess Necessity, and as she slowly turns the spindle all the cosmos revolves in the opposite direction at a speed appropriate to its distance from the spindle. Hilda Richardson refers to the spindle as "the axis of the universe."[53] This would seem to place Necessity at the very pinnacle of power and responsible for whatever happens in the universe.[54] Brendel describes Ἀνάγκη here as a "principal cause, a *primum movens* of the whole as divine

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[52] Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought*, 277.

[53] Hilda Richardson, "The Myth of Er (Plato, Republic, 616b), *The Classical Quarterly* (20.3-4 (1926): 113-33, 117.

[54] Wooley, "Cosmic and Divine Ananke From Its Origin Through Plato," 99.

person."[55] The three Fates, Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, daughters of Necessity, attend the entire spectacle with singing. Lachesis sings of the past, Clotho of the present, and Atropos of the future.

The souls were given a choice regarding how they want to be reincarnated. There were many choices for reincarnation: animals, good men, bad men, beautiful men, sick men, and the same for women. A prophet threw out the lots, and each soul was assigned a number in order of which they were to choose their new pattern of life. Choices were made based, for the most part, on the particular previous experience of the one choosing. The character of the new soul was not yet set, "because the choice of a different life inevitably determined a different character" (*Rep.* 618B [Shorey, LCL]).

Second, the new pattern of life is fixed once accepted by the soul; the new owner "shall cleave [to it] of necessity" (*Rep.* 617E [Shorey, LCL]). Each soul is warned to examine carefully the new pattern of life before choosing it. These patterns of life have fated (*heimarmene*) elements within them that may yield nasty surprises to the new owner. The first person to select a life chose to be a tyrant for whom it was fated that he would eat his children (*Rep.* 619C). H.S. Thayer has argued that the main theme of the Myth of Er is moral choice.[56] Those who make the best choice just because it is the best choice are those who live well-ordered lives according to reason. For those persons, the rigidity of the pattern of life following choice is not a problem because they chose well.

Third, as each soul chooses its new life, it necessarily (ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν) develops a new character. The old has passes away, and behold, all things become new.

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[55] Brendel, *Symbolism of the Sphere*, 54.

[56] H.S. Thayer, "The Myth of Er," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5.4 (1988): 369-84, 369.

Although each soul may choose any pattern of life it desired, the soul becomes "new" in some sense as it is fit for the new life. The soul of a man that becomes an eagle in the next life will necessarily be different just because an eagle has different experiences that form the character of its soul.

Ronald R. Johnson argues that the myth supports the main argument of the *Republic*: those who, by means of reason, live justly will have the happiest life now and forever. The myth is a fitting conclusion. In the myth, Plato uses images and concepts, such as necessity, that were found throughout the rest of the work. Johnson thinks the spindle of necessity, like most of the uses of necessity in the entire work, is logical necessity rather than deterministic necessity: "things are the way they are because they *must* be that way in a rational order" (emphasis original).[57] The light that makes up the spindle is the light of reason.

Necessity can be the power or force that works with *logos* (is persuaded by *logos*) in the beginning to create the best universe. Plato creates a question about the nature of necessity (*Tim.* 56 C). In a discussion of the form of the elements, their basic sizes and shapes, Plato says: "And, moreover, as regards the numerical proportions which govern their masses and motions and their other qualities, we must conceive that God realized these everywhere with exactness, in so far as the nature of Necessity submitted voluntarily or under persuasion, and thus ordered all in harmonious proportion" (Tim. 56C [Bury, LCL]). Jowett's translation reads: "And the ratios of their numbers, motions, and other properties, everywhere God, as far as necessity allowed or gave consent, has

[57] Ronald R. Johnson, "Does Plato's 'Myth of Er' Contribute to the Argument of the 'Republic'?" *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 32.1 (1999): 1-13, 8.

exactly perfected, and harmonized in due proportion."[58] In the first translation, it seems that Necessity either chose or was forced to submit to the plan of God, whereas in the second, necessity permitted or gave consent to God. Samuel Sambursky comments,

> The physical world is pictured here as an arena where Reason, the rational principle, struggles against Necessity, symbolizing the opposite of Reason, i.e., the resistance of matter to order and *ratio,* the sum total of all the irrational manifestations of the material world which later to Plotinus appeared as the principle of evil inherent in matter.[59]

A.E. Taylor notes, "There is a suggestion that the 'compliancy' of ἀνάγκη is not absolute. 'When ἀνάγκη submits', you get minute and exact conformity to a recognizable law – this is the point of the δι᾽ ἀκριβείας – but when ἀνάγκη is not sufficiently compliant, you get only imperfect approximation to this ideal."[60] Given this statement by Plato, W.C. Greene has observed that, if asked "to explain why every detail of history has taken place," Plato might say that such a question belongs to history, not philosophy.[61] An *a priori* account of everything is not possible because "such a conception would ignore both that 'Necessity' which even god can only incompletely 'persuade' and that freedom of the human will in which Plato believes."[62]

Plato speaks of two kinds of causes: the divine (θεῖον) and the necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) (*Tim.* 68E). A person should

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[58] http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/timaeus.html. Accessed 8-11-10.

[59] Samuel Sambursky, "Plato, Proclus, and the Limitations of Science," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 3.1 (1965): 1-13, 3.

[60] A.E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's* Timaeus, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928), 382.

[61] Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought,* 298.

[62] Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought,* 298.

> seek after the divine for the sake of gaining a life of blessedness, so far as our nature admits thereof, and to seek the necessary for the sake of the divine, reckoning that without the former it is impossible to discern by themselves alone the divine objects after which we strive, or to apprehend them or in any way partake thereof" (*Tim.* 68E-69A [R.G. Bury, LCL]).

The necessary things here are those that are essential; things that must be accepted as useful, although we may not know what they are good for.[63]

Plato's writings also contain many instances of conditional necessity, in which something is necessary *if* something else is to happen. There are many sources of this conditional necessity. In the *Laches*, Socrates asks Melesias what he would do if he wanted to have his young son train properly for an upcoming contest. His argument is about the superiority of those with knowledge over the sheer numbers of the masses – who should have the right to rule? Would he take the advice of his four friends (the majority) who know little to nothing about the exercises, or would he ask someone who had received training from a master? Melesias opts for the well-trained person, to which Socrates replies: "Yes, for a question must (δεῖ) be decided by knowledge, and not by numbers, if it is to have a right decision" (*Lach.* 184E [Lamb, LCL]). When speaking of the tyrant and what will happen in a state where a tyrant rules, Socrates points out that he will no doubt have those who oppose him (*Rep.* 567B). It is likely that once the tyrant becomes too overbearing, even his closest associates may rise up against him, in which case, Socrates says, "Then the tyrant must (δεῖ) do away with all such if he is to maintain his rule" (*Rep.* 567B [Shorey, LCL]). The actions of the tyrant in removing the best men and keeping the worse is compared with a doctor who removes the worse (diseased) parts of the body and keeps the best. Socrates again reaffirms that these actions are necessity

[63] Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's* Timaeus, 491.

(ἀνάγκη) for the tyrant if we wants to stay in power (*Rep.* 567C). He even blesses the necessity that forces the tyrant to live with unsavory associates.

Much of the *Republic* is filled with hypothetical or conditional necessity because one of the dominant themes of the book is how to establish an ideal state. To that end many things become necessary *if* this is to happen. Socrates speaks to Adeimantus of the necessity of the state providing more goods than it can consume so that it will have surplus for trade (*Rep.* 371A). How the citizens of the state view the gods and religious matters is very important for an ideal state. Socrates raises the question of how to deal with this. One of his main concerns is that tales of horror related to Hades might cause those who would be warriors to fear death. In order to prevent negative tales about Hades being repeated he says that the administrators of state "must (δεῖ) exercise supervision also, in the matter of such tales as these, over those who undertake to supply them and request them not to dispraise in this undiscriminating fashion the life in Hades but rather praise it, since what they now tell us is neither true nor edifying to men who are destined to be warriors" (*Rep.* 386B-C [Shorey, LCL]).

A good man will not volunteer to rule a city because he does not want to appear to be covetous of money or honor (347B). Necessity must be laid upon him in the form of a penalty, and that penalty is being ruled by someone who is worse than the one who refuses to rule (347C). Socrates points out that a good man thought it was disgraceful to seek office rather than waiting for the necessity to arise. There was no joy associated with taking an administrative position, nor was it thought to be a good thing; rather, good men approach the duty as "a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to

better men than themselves or to their like" (347D [Shorey, LCL]).[64] All of these are necessary in relation to the condition of creating an ideal state.

Plato also uses narrative necessity: the necessity that marks transitions in a conversation or argument. Socrates says, "We must (δεῖ) begin our discussion of the matter by making the following distinctions." (*Theat.* 192A [Fowler, LCL]). When discussing the division of coercive art into fighting and hunting, the Stranger says, "And we must (δεῖ) pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance" (*Soph.* 220A [LCL, Fowler]). When Socrates turns to Theodorus to continue the argument he had been having with Theaetetus, after some persuading, Theodorus agrees: "I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must (δεῖ) endure whatever fate (*heimarmene*) you spin for me, and submit to interrogation" (*Theat.* 169C [Fowler, LCL]). This is a delightful play on the power of fate to determine a person's life even down to the smallest detail.

Plato often uses ἀνάγκη and derivatives just as he uses δεῖ and derivatives. *Theat*. 189E, 181E-182A. As Theaetetus and the Stranger discourse about sophistry, the Stranger accuses Theaetetus of labeling "sophistry" anything that appears to him to be "merchandising in knowledge." Theaetetus responds: "I must (Ἀνάγκη) do so, for I have (δεῖ) to follow where the argument leads" (*Soph.* 224E [Fowler, LCL]).

In the *Protagoras*, Protagoras introduces the poetry of Simonides as a source of teaching about virtue (*Prot.* 339A). A discussion of what Simonides meant by his claim follows: "For a man, indeed, to become good truly is hard, in hands and feet and mind

[64] See a similar discussion at 520E.

foursquare, fashioned without reproach" (*Prot.* 339B [Lamb, LCL]). Socrates says that Simonides meant that it is hard to be (in the sense of 'permanently') good, but to become good and then lapse into badness is the condition of all good men. The bad person does not even have the option of becoming good (*Prot.* 345B-C). Socrates quotes another part of the poem: "But I praise and love everyone willingly committing no baseness; for against necessity (ἀνάγκῃ) not even the gods make war" (*Prot.* 345D [Lamb, LCL]).

Evidently there was some misunderstanding as to what Simonides meant; was he saying he praised those who willingly commit no evil? Socrates explains that Simonides had a better education than to make such a claim. No wise man would ever claim that a person willingly does evil. Simonides used the word 'willingly' (ἑκών) of himself: he *willingly* chose to praise and love everyone. Socrates notes that Simonides "considered that a man of sense and honor often constrains (ἐπαναγκάζειν) himself to become a friend and approver of some person, as when a man chances to have an uncongenial mother or father or country or other such connection" (*Prot.* 345E-346A [Lamb, LCL]). Good men do not resort to complaining and castigating those who are not agreeable to them, but they hide the fault find something to praise. Many times, says Socrates, "Simonides was conscious that he had praised and eulogized some tyrant or other such person, not willingly (ἑκών), but under compulsion (ἀναγκαζόμενος) (*Prot.* 346B-C [Lamb, LCL]). Socrates seems to think that the point of Simonides poetry is that he is not the sort of person to expect perfection from anyone; rather, he can accept the normal person as imperfect, yet offer love and praise. Simonides' offers rebuke, not praise, of Pittacus because Pittacus lies "so grievously about the greatest matters with an air of speaking the truth." (*Prot.* 347A [Lamb, LCL]).

Aristotle. With Aristotle we have, not only an interest in the physical component of necessity, but also an interest in how human actions are affected by necessity. Aristotle mentions two kinds of necessity in *The Metaphysics*. There is a necessity associated with violence or force, and a necessity associated with nature or design (*Metaph.* 1027a). Also, throughout the *Posterior Analytics* he uses necessity in relation to the logic of inquiry or scientific investigation. In *Physics* 8.6, he discusses the necessity of movers and movement in the course of causation. But, most importantly for this investigation, Aristotle brings necessity into the realm of human actions and asks how it impinges on human responsibility.

Aristotle believes that the causes of human actions are three: 1) what is up to us; 2) necessity (ἀνάγκη), and 3) chance (τύχη). The actions that are caused by necessity may be caused by a natural necessity (*phusis*) or by a necessity associated with violence or force (βία) (*Rhet.* 1.10.7). The most praiseworthy actions are those that are done voluntarily and by choice. This distinction will become very important in epideictic literature such as encomium and *bios*. We will discuss Aristotle's use of necessity in ethics and rhetoric more fully in the section on the Rhetoric of Necessity.

The Stoics. The problem of necessity related to human actions is nowhere more apparent than in the teachings of the Stoics. The first century C.E. philosopher Seneca remarks,

> I am not under duress, I do not submit against my will, I am not god's slave but his follower, and the more willingly because I know that all things proceed according to a law that is fixed and eternally valid. Fate directs us, and the first hour of our birth determines each man's span. Cause is linked with cause, and a long chain of events governs all matters public and private. Everything must therefore be borne with fortitude, because events do not, as we suppose, happen

> but arrive by appointment. What would make you rejoice and what would make you weep was determined long ago. (*On Providence* 5 [Hadas]).[65]

A short time later he asks, "What is the duty of a good man? To offer himself to Fate. It is a great consolation that our rapid course is one with the universe's. Whatever it is that has ordained the mode of our life and the mode of our death has bound the gods, too, by the same necessity. The course that carries human affairs and divine alike is irrevocable" (ibid).

Marcus Aurelius makes repeated references to yielding to the thread of fate that was spun for each person (*Med.* 3.11, 16; 4.34; 7.57; 10.5).[66] Yielding to what happens according to fate, i.e. what was predetermined long before the birth of any one person, is the best course of action for everyone. Only humans have the ability to yield to fate:

> Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams. Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all" (*Med.* 10.28 [Long]).

These quotations suggest that a view of resignation in the face of a predetermined course of events was prevalent among some of the Stoics in the first and second century C.E. [67]

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[65] *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca: Essays and Letters* (Trans. with intro. by Moses Hadas; New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1968).

[66] *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius* (trans. George Long; The Harvard Classics ed. Charles W. Eliot; New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1937).

[67] Yet, see Dorothea Frede, "Stoic Determinism," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. Brad Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 205, where she argues that "Stoic determinism . . . does not lead to resignation, but to a careful study of our capabilities and limitations." The resignation to which the later Stoics like Marcus Aurelius allude is more in line with a willingness to accept what happens and to work within the bonds of certain limitations, not seeking to change those things that are not up to us.

Moses Hadas observes that both Stoicism and Epicureanism arose as reactions to the loss of the simplicity and safety of the city-state.[68] With the world becoming bigger and bigger and the empire or republic becoming the new political norm, the average person felt lost. Attempts to restore the dignity of the individual took two different paths. The Epicureans chose to relativize the world around them by arguing that it was only material and would soon enough dissolve into nothing. Their idea of the good was to seek happiness and let the world take its course. The Stoics chose an exact opposite approach. For them, the world was well-ordered and designed. The design the world revealed was that of reason (*logos*). Yet, the design was not that of convention, which was merely the preference of a particular group of people at a particular place, but of the *nomos* of nature that all men everywhere obeyed.[69] Whatever role nature provided for a man, excellence was achieved by playing that role to the best of his ability; "he is as worthy a performer if he plays a slave well as if he had played a king well, and neither role affects his inward self."[70] Whatever one's lot in life, the Stoic urged him to accept it without question and be the best at it.

Due to the continuation and development of epideictic literature, in which persons are praised or blamed for actions freely chosen, and the corresponding discussions of ethical theories in the Hellenistic period, the freedom with which a person acts remained an important issue. In the Stoic system, it appeared that humans have no freedom.

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[68] Hadas, *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca*, 20-21

[69] Hadas, *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca*, 22.

[70] Hadas, *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca,* 23.

For the Stoics, Fate and Necessity are important concepts. Fate (*heimarmenē*) is the term they chose for the web of causes that make up all events in the cosmos. Charlotte Stough writes,

> For fate [εἱμαρμένη] is nothing more than the 'ordered inter-weaving of causes,' the divine and rational order of the cosmos by which all events past, present, and future are determined. To insist, as the Stoics did, that all things in the universe are fated is merely to affirm that the cosmos is an intelligible system of interdependent parts in which all events, including human events, are linked causally to other occurrences that precede and follow them and hence could, in principle, be predicted from relevant conditions in Nature, were all those condition known to us. Thus Chrysippus asserts that 'no particular event, not even the smallest, can take place otherwise than in accordance with universal Nature and its *logos*.'[71]

This sounded like determinism to many ancient thinkers. If one must do what is fated (due to their belief in the web of causes), how can one have freedom of will? How to maintain that humans are free to choose and yet that everything has an antecedent cause was a supreme problem for the Stoics. They believed that a wise man should be credited for his goodness, and a bad person should be held accountable for his evil. As Long notes, "But this, in the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, shows the absurdity of the Stoic thesis: neither praise nor blame has any justifiable basis if men cannot act contrary to the nature given them by destiny."[72]

The Stoics credited reason with structuring the entire cosmos so that each event followed from a previous cause and in turn itself became the cause of yet another event. Reason, which for the Stoics, was equivalent with "god," had a master plan for the world.

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[71] Charlotte Stough, "Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility" in *The Stoics* (ed. J.M. Rist; Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 205.

[72] A.A. Long, "Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action" in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A.A. Long; London: The Atholone Press, 1971), 173.

Arnold notes that for the Stoics Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno "all thing take place according to fate; and fate is the linked causes of thing that are, or the system by which the universe is conducted. This 'fate' is only another name for 'necessity'; fates cannot be changed."[73] The association of fate with necessity here is part of the problem of understanding what the Stoics were actually claiming.

Necessity was distinguished from fate by Chrysippus in the third century B.C.E.[74] Necessity relates to the inner nature of a thing rather than to the web of causes that predetermine each event. A popular example was that of rolling a round cylinder down a hill. The external cause (fate) that starting the cylinder rolling was the force that caused it to move; the internal cause (necessity) that facilitated the rolling was the roundness of the cylinder, or its nature. Thus, it was fated that the cylinder would roll because it was pushed, but it was necessary that it roll because it was its nature to roll. The push is what cannot be controlled by the cylinder; not to fight against the push because its nature is to roll is seen as admirable by the Stoics. Yet, it seems that the distinction between fate and necessity was lost in later Stoicism, so that by the time of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, the two terms were nearly merged.[75]

The internal nature of a man was thought to be under his control, whereas the external world was not. This position led the Stoics to regard external things as indifferent. The external world is ruled by Reason, and Reason may not share her reasons for things with humans. The only things that are of concern to anyone are the

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[73] E. Vernon Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (New York: The Humanities Press, 1958), 200.

[74] Marilynn Lawrence, "Hellenistic Astrology," n.p. [cited 10 Oct 2010]. Online: http://www.iep.utm.edu/astr-hel/.

[75] J.M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 125-26.

things that are up to him.[76] One of the most important things that is "up to us" is how to respond to external events. A good Stoic was one who learned "to accept the necessary things willingly."[77]

Both the Stoics and their opponents agreed on several things in relation to praise and blame:

> [F]irst of all, that an agent cannot be blamed for an action unless *that* agent did it, rather than something else, and chose to do it, knowingly, rather than doing it unintentionally or through some misunderstanding. This idea is usually put by saying that one can sensibly praise or blame an action only if the action is 'up to' the agent. Secondly, they agree that an action is not 'up to us' if it was necessary for us to do what we did. Combining these two principles, we find a third point of common agreement: one can sensibly praise or blame an action only if it was not necessary that the agent should perform it.[78]

But, it was precisely the problem that the Stoic position should result in the removal of blame or praise for individuals because all actions were due to necessity associated with Fate.[79]

For the Stoics, an action was necessary primarily because of the nature of the individual.[80] Because person X had responded to various external stimuli in various ways over the period of his life, his character was set. Because his character was set, it was necessary for him to do certain things. A person who has been formed like X could be expected to respond in certain ways. And he could be blamed or praised for his actions precisely because he had made the choices that led to the formation of his character in

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[76] Tad Brennan, *The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 239.

[77] Musonious Rufus fr. 42, quoted in Brennan, *The Stoic Life*, 237.

[78] Brennan, *The Stoic Life*, 243.

[79] Josiah B. Gould, "The Stoic Conception of Fate," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35.1 (1974): 17-32, 21.

[80] A.A. Long, "Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action," 181.

such a way. The Stoics were led to defend human freedom to some degree because they believed, along with many other philosophers and jurists, that humans are responsible for some of their actions.[81]

Yet, as evidenced by the writings of Cicero (*De Fato* 9.19-20), Seneca, Epictetus (*Golden Sayings* 189)[82], Marcus Aurelius (*Med.*12.14)[83], and Alexander of Aphrodisias,[84] in the period preceding the New Testament to just beyond it, the jury was still out on the Stoic question of fate, necessity, and human responsibility.

The Internalists

The thinkers that I am calling "internalists" are those who reject the notion of an external entity that may be a god or any other controlling power that exerts its will. These thinkers instead consider necessity as an internal reality that is related to nature or "the way of things."

The Atomists. The Atomist's view of necessity and fate is based on the atom. Leucippus and Democritus (his student) perceived that the universe was made up of invisible particles that cannot be reduced further in size: *a-toma* 'uncuttables'. Thomas

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[81] Gould, "The Stoic Conception of Fate," 27.

[82] "On all occasions these thoughts should be at hand: 'Lead me, O God, and Thou, O Destiny, Be what it may the goal appointed me, Bravely I'll follow; nay, and if I would not, I'd prove a coward, yet must follow still.' Again: 'Who to Necessity doth bow aright, Is learn'd in wisdom and the things of God.'"

[83] "Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director. If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou resist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if there is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not carry away."

[84] Robert W. Sharples, "Peripatetics on Fate and Providence," in *Greek & Roman Philosophy 100 BC – 200 AD* (vol. 2; ed. Robert W. Sharples & Richard Sorabji; London: University of London, 2007), 595-605.

Cahill notes, "Our world or *kosmos*, they also speculated, is not unique but one of many, all of which came to be by accident and developed by necessity. We do not need to posit the existence of gods to explain the workings of the world."[85] Cahill's statement "came to be by accident and developed by necessity" refers to a saying of Leucippus in a treatise *On Mind*: "Nothing happens in vain (μάτην), but everything from reason (λόγου) and by necessity (ἀνάγκης)."[86] On the surface, this statement could mean that necessity is the mechanism of purpose, since nothing happens 'in vain.' Allan Wooley, however, takes the phrase to mean that "*Anankē* is the causeless law that all atoms always move; and so the whole irrefrangible chain of mechanistic cause and effect, which results from the eternal motion as original cause, also comes under *Anankē*."[87] C.C.W. Taylor explains that Leucippus probably meant that nothing happens *without a reason*, and the reason for what happens is necessity: it had to happen. He continues:

> But the claim that whatever happens happens 'by necessity' is not *just* the claim that whatever happens has to happen, though the former implies the latter. For the concept of necessity is not a purely modal concept requiring elucidation via its connection with other such concepts, such as possibility and impossibility. Rather, necessity is conceived as an irresistible force bringing it about that things have to happen. This is indicated both by the causal force of the preposition *hupo* (render 'by' in the expression 'by necessity'), and also by the fact that Democritus is reported as identifying necessity with impact and motion. Impact and motion, then, take over the determining role traditionally assigned to Necessity, when the latter is conceived (as in Parmenides and Empedocles) as an ineluctable, divine cosmic force (italics original).[88]

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[85] Thomas Cahill, *Sailing the Wine-Dark Sea: Why the Greeks Matter* (New York: Nan A. Talese, 2003), 149.

[86] C.C.W. Taylor, *The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 3. This is apparently the only surviving fragment we have from Leucippus.

[87] Allan Wooley, "Cosmic and Divine Ananke From Its Origin Through Plato," (unpublished dissertation: Princeton University, 1962), 78.

[88] Taylor, *The Atomists*, 190.

The impact of atoms crashing into each other was the source of motion of the atoms; this force replaced for Democritus the divine or cosmic Necessity of earlier thinkers. Cyril Bailey argues that Democritus wanted to eliminate the *tychē* that Empedocles had introduced as a cause, and "even more he desired to be rid once and for all of the mysterious, semi-religious external forces, which previous philosophers and even more markedly his own contemporaries had postulated as the efficient causes of their systems."[89] It is important to remember that the Atomists were not atheistic, but simply irreligious. They believed that "the gods do not – indeed cannot – influence the affairs of men."[90] Traditional religious beliefs that suggested that the gods were involved in the affairs of men were rejected by the Atomists. Their view that the gods existed in "perfect tranquility and detachment in the spaces between the worlds"[91] precluded them from believing that the gods would be involved in the messy affairs of humans.

Necessity had no purpose or design. Things that happen 'of necessity' happen as a result of the law of nature, but that law only suggests that things happen consistently and regularly, not with purpose. Atoms crashing into one another are not obeying an external law of necessity, but the law of their own being.[92] Many of the thinkers who followed Leucippus and Democritus apparently understood their view of necessity to be very close to, if not identical with, fate.[93]

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[89] Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964), 121.

[90] John Godwin, *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura IV* (Wiltshire: Aris and Phillips, 1986), 3.

[91] Godwin, *Lucretius*, 3.

[92] Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, 85.

[93] Taylor has a collection of *testimonia* related to Leucippus' and Democritus' view of necessity and fate in *The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus,* 91-94.

How did necessity impact human actions? One of the ethical fragments of Democritus from Stobeaeus says that it is better to promote virtue "by using encouragement and persuasion of speech than law and necessity" (2.31.59).[94] The person who is taught to do "what he should (τὸ δέον)" by persuasion will tend to be good at all times, whereas the person who is forced into obedience may tend "to err in secret." Democritus held the view that the mind is the defense that necessity has provided against chance. The wise man "can see through chance to necessity, and if he can do so, presumably he can control his affairs or himself to an extent compatible with the control of necessity."[95] Although he recognizes necessity as foundational to the world, Democritus does not want to allow it to control human decisions.

Gregory Vlastos discusses some of the other fragments in which it becomes clear that Democritus has a fairly sophisticated ethical system.[96] He concludes,

> It was the genius of Democritus to define an ethics that meets the conditions so fixed by Leucippean physics. Nature is 'necessity', not 'justice'; neither good nor evil in itself; not intelligent, though intelligible. Yet its intelligibility alone, divested of any moral quality whatsoever, yields sufficient ground for the law of the measure. The good is not given to man; it is not 'chance.' It must be created by man; it is 'art'. Yet art is itself the child of necessity. . . . But it advances nonetheless man's self-sufficiency in nature, and this not only by mechanical invention, but also by the power of the 'teaching that makes nature' to transform chance pleasure into cheerful well-being.[97]

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[94] Taylor, *The Atomists*, 21.

[95] Lowell Edmunds, "Necessity, Chance, and Freedom in the Early Atomists," *Phoenix* 26.4 (1972): 342-57, 354.

[96] Gregory Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in Democritus (Part One)," *The Philosophical Review* 54.6 (1945): 578-92, and "Ethics and Physics in Democritus (Part Two)," *The Philsophical Review* 55.1 (1946): 53-64.

[97] Vlastos, "Ethics and Physics in Democritus (Part Two)," 64.

In this system, what is "good" is discovered by humans in the process of struggling against the hostile forces that surround them. Learning by experience, humans develop arts and skills that allow them to live better lives.

Epicureans. Another school of thought that was based on the Atomists' metaphysic was the Epicurean. In this school, pleasure was the highest human good. Because chance reduces the value of intelligence and might thwart the designs of a good man to make a better world, the best course of action is to retire to the garden and seek pleasure. But this pleasure was not the pleasure of sensuality or of wantonness; rather, Epicurus says, "By pleasure, we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul" (*Life of Epicurus* 131).

As with Aristotle, Epicurus is aware of how necessity and chance impact assessment of human actions. In the "Letter to Menoeceus," Epicurus gives an outline of his ethical theory.[98] In comparison to the masses of ignorant people, a good man holds proper beliefs about the gods and fate:

> Destiny (εἱμαρμένην), which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity (κατ' ἀναγκην), others by chance (τύχης), and others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods, than to bow beneath the yoke of destiny (εἱμαρμένη) which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honor the gods, while the necessity (ἀνάγκη) of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting point of great good and great evil. He

[98] Kathleen Freeman, "Epicurus—A Social Experiement," *Greece and Rome* 7 (1938): 156-68, 157.

> believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance" (Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Epicurus* 133-34[Hicks, LCL]).

Epicurus rejects the notion that destiny is a power above all other powers. Instead he chooses a middle ground that has become popular with many: necessity is responsible for some things, chance for others, and for others, we alone are responsible. In order to escape the hard determinism of Leucippus and Democritus, Epicurus taught that there was a moment of erratic behavior in the atoms, a "swerve," that allowed for freedom of the will. His student, Lucretius, puts it this way:

> [T]here is likewise in the atoms another cause of motions besides collisions and weight, from which comes this innate power in us, since we see that nothing can come into being from nothing. For weight prevents everything from happening by blows as if by external force. But so that the mind itself has not internal necessity in performing all its actions, and is not forced as if conquered to bear and suffer, the tiny swerve of the atoms at no fixed region of space nor fixed time brings it about (*De Rerum Natura* 2.284-93 [Englert]).[99]

Regarding responsibility for actions, Epicurus believes that necessity destroys it, and fate and chance do not represent stable entities from which we can expect the same things repeatedly. His view of necessity also echoes the view of necessity found in Euripides' *Alcestis* (973-75): it cannot be affected by sacrifices or prayers. He writes, ". . . the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties" (*Life of Epicurus* 134 [Hicks. LCL]).

When speaking of desires, he says, "And we must also reflect that of desires some are nature, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary only if

[99] Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* (trans. Walter Englert; Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2003).

we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live" (Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Epicurus* 127 [Hicks, LCL]). Bailey writes,

> The natural and necessary desires are those which spring from the pain of want (τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ' ἔνδειαν) and their satisfaction is productive not only of the pleasure or movement, but of the pleasure of equilibrium: they must then be gratified. The natural but not necessary desire are typically the 'ticklings of the flesh': they cannot arise without certain painful bodily movements and therefore their satisfaction does to some degree produce the pleasure of equilibrium, but much more does it arouse the pleasure of movement: they must therefore be indulged sparingly.[100]

Necessary desires are those that arise from bodily processes that are absolutely required for the continuation of quality life. This is the necessity of expectation due to design. Because the body is designed to need food, the desire to eat is both natural and necessary.

In addition to philosophical necessity, necessity is also very deterministic in religion. The Goddess Necessity or some natural force, law, or power is often personified as a controlling power from which there is no escape.

Necessity, Fate, and Fortune in Religion

The Cult of Tychē

We have met *Tychē* already. Some, like the wise man in Epicurus' teaching, attributed unexpected or unexplained events to the workings of this power. Aristotle believed that *tychē*, with "what is up to us" and necessity, was one of the three causes of human actions (*Rhet.* 1.10.7). The king of Egypt thought *tychē* was the strongest thing of all, but Thales pointed out that if that were so, it would not be so fickle about staying with a person (*Sept. sap. conv.* 153C).

[100] Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, 494.

As a deity, *Tychē* is a nymph in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*.[101] She is basically the same goddess as the Roman Fortuna (Fortune).[102] As the Olympian gods declined, she gained greater prominence. Her prominence was due in part to the Macedonian rise to power that shook the foundations of world order, and "fostered a belief in the random and irrational working of Fate."[103] The darkened heavens that produced an evil fate from which no man could escape created a world of pessimism. As the philosophers wrestled with the degree to which human actions are free, it seems that many humans assumed their actions were not free at all. In fact, the whim of Fortune or grip of Fate seemed to control everything; humans were simply pawns moved about on a board. In time, public religion declined into a worship of Fate or Fortune. Gilbert Murray writes,

> It is worth remembering that the best seed-ground for superstition is a society in which the fortunes of men seem to bear practically no relation to their merits and efforts. A stable and well-governed society does tend, speaking roughly, to ensure that the Virtuous and Industrious Apprentice shall succeed in life, while the Wicked and Idle Apprentice fails. And in such a society people tend to lay stress on the reasonable or visible chains of causation. But in a country suffering from earthquakes or pestilences, in a court governed by the whim of a despot, in a district which is habitually the seat of a war between alien armies, the ordinary virtues of diligence, honesty, and kindliness seed to be of little avail. The only way to escape destruction is to win the favor of the prevailing powers, take the side of the strongest invader, flatter the despot, and placate the Fate or Fortune or angry god that is sending the earthquake or pestilence. The Hellenistic period pretty certainly falls in some degree under all of these categories. And one result is the sudden and enormous spread of the worship of Fortune.[104]

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[101] *The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion,* "Fate," 562.

[102] *The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion,* "Fortune," 221.

[103] *The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth and Religion*, 562.

[104] Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925), 164-65.

There are two sides to the role of *Tychē* as a goddess. On one hand she is the replacement for the rejected Olympians, the new Savior-Goddess who gives gifts to men. On the other, she is a fickle, unsteady "friend" who may not be counted on for more than very fleeting support. According to Walter Burkert, *Tychē* takes on the nature of the Great Goddess who rules over all other divine beings.[105] Humans resent her fickleness. In some of the early Greek novels, she is actually a malevolent power that sets itself up against humans.[106] Overall, she represents both good and bad fate and at times stands for luck, chance, [107] and even necessity.[108]

Ἀνάγκη *in Religion.* Not much is known about Ἀνάγκη as a goddess in a cultic setting. There are, however, three sources that highlight how she was viewed in terms of religion. First, Euripides' *Alcestis* suggests that it was useless to offer prayers or sacrifices to Ἀνάγκη. In response to the lament of Admetus, who has lost his wife due to his own stupidity and selfishness, the chorus proclaims that there is nothing stronger than Necessity and there is no cure for necessity anywhere, not even in the writings of Orpheus. They declare that "of that goddess alone there are no altars, no statue to approach, and to sacrifice she pays no heed" (*Alc*. 973-75 [Kovacs, LCL]). They go on to encourage Admetus to take heart even though he had "been caught in the goddess's ineluctable chains" (984). The chorus perceived Admetus' situation as the result of a

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[105] Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion* (trans. John Raffan; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 186.

[106] John Ferguson, *The Religions of the Roman Empire* (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life; ed. H.H. Scullard; Ithaca, NY: Cornell Universtiy, 1970), 80.

[107] E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1951), 242.

[108] Dillon, "Fate," *ABD* 2.778.

decree of fate but encouraged him to give his wife a proper burial and treat her as one who had achieved immortality. This resignation before the inevitable was the typical view of necessity personified as a goddess. What was "necessary" was not so much the fated death of Alcestis, as the condition of mortality for human; that alone is truly inescapable.

Second, Pausanias says that on the Acrocorinth there was a temple dedicated to Ἀνάγκη and βια "into which it is not customary to enter" (*Description of Greece* 2.4.7 [Jones, et.al., LCL]). This second century C.E. geographer's work highlights an important fact about Ἀνάγκη: she was not to be worshipped. The temple itself, however, suggests two things about Ἀνάγκη. First, she was important enough to warrant a temple. Second, she was very closely identified with Βια (force). This close association is also found in Aristotle's ethical discussions (see below), where Βια and nature (φύσει) are the two sources of human actions that are not the result of the human's own actions due to necessity (*Rhet.* 1.10.7).

The third reference to Necessity's role in religion is found in Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Republic*. In Book 10, Plato recounts how Er, a great warrior, was resurrected after being dead twelve days following a battle. Er tells of the journey he took while dead to the nether world and what he saw. At one point, he encountered a brilliant shaft of light that Plato called "the Spindle of Necessity" (616C), resting on the knees of Necessity. In his discussion of Necessity in the Myth of Er in Book 10, Proclus refers to the writings of Petoseiris which identify this Ἀνάγκη with another Greek goddess *Themis* and claim that the phrase "*Ananke* and *Themis*" was used in the sacred

rites of several mystery religions (*Comm. in remp.* 2.344-45).[109] Proclus specifically mentions the Hellenistic mystery religion and the Persian mysteries of Mithras. In his discussion of this passage from Proclus, Wilhelm Gundel suggests that the Ἀνάγκη of the magical papyri that Proclus has in mind is much reduced from her former position as powerful goddess in control of all and is here only a demon under the control of another god.[110]

Schreckenburg quotes a passage from Iamblichus *De Mysteriis* 8.7, which indicates that Ἀνάγκη is completely identified with *Heimarmene* and that this necessity does not hold everything related to humans in insoluble bonds; the soul may yet escape. This was considered a foundational position of many of the mystery cults.[111]

Mystery Religion. The cyclical worldview had at its base cyclical time. Cyclical time was a result of the close ties of the ancient people with nature and its recurrences.[112] With the belief in cyclic time came the belief that nothing happened by accident or without cause. Mircea Eliade writes, "Empires rose and fell; wars caused innumerable sufferings; immorality, dissoluteness, social injustice, steadily increased—because all this was necessary, that is, was willed by the cosmic rhythm, by the demiurge, by the

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[109] *Procli Diadochi In Platonis Rem Publicam Commentarii* (vol. 2; ed. W. Kroll; Leipzig: Teubner, 1901). See also, P.W. Van Der Horst, "Ananke," *DDD* 1:60.

[110] Wilhelm Gundel, *Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene*, 96.

[111] Schreckenburg, *Ananke: Untersuchungen Zur Geschichte Des Wortbegrauchs*, 158.

[112] Bruce J. Malina, *The Social World of Jesus and the Gospels* (London: Routledge, 1996), 196-201. See also James Muilenberg, "The Biblical View of Time," *HTR* 54.4 (1961): 229.

constellations, or by the will of God."[113] Also, everywhere was the fear of death, primarily because of the teaching that each soul was destined to be reincarnated repeatedly until it became perfected and moved on to a place of eternal rest. Diogenes Laertius tells us that Pythagoras was the first to teach that the soul went through a cycle of necessity, being reintroduced into several different bodies (*Lives* 7.12).

Many ancient people sought release from "the wheel"; reincarnation was not desired.[114] This "wheel" was the cycle of necessity or wheel of necessity.[115] John Baille notes that in "the later or philosophic period in Greco-Roman thought, we find that every proposed refuge from despair, every support offered to the human spirit, consists in some definite way of escape from the wheel of events."[116]

The Orphic mystery religion had as its foundation the Orphic theogonies, in which we find *Anankē* as a primordial Goddess. She was together with *Chronos* at the beginning of time.[117] There is no evidence that she played any role in the Orphic religion *per se*,[118] but the Orphics did recognize the wheel or cycle of necessity, from which they sought release. In relation to Orphic teaching about reincarnation, Miguel de Jáuregui writes, "In effect, reincarnation can function as a process of progressive purification, as in

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[113] Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (trans. Willard R. Trask; New York: Pantheon Books, 1954), 133.

[114] Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922; repr., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 590-91.

[115] David M. Robinson, "The Wheel of Fortune," *Classical Philology* 41.4 (1946): 207-16.

[116] John Baille, *The Belief in Progress* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 51.

[117] W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orphic Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 79.

[118] Wooley notes that many scholars believe the Orphics were the first to personify *Anankē*, "Cosmic and Divine Ananke," 207. Also, Jane Harrison says that "abstractions, [such as] Tyche, Ananke, and the like, were popular with the Orphics," *Prolegomena,* 270.

Platonism and its epigone Origen, but also as a simple punishment, the cycle of which can be escaped only through the purification provided by the *telete*, as the lamellae appear to imply."[119] The Orphic desired nothing more than to escape the weary wheel of reincarnations, which was also known as the "cycle of necessity."[120]

The Orphic hymn *To the Fates* reflects a comparable appreciation of the controlling power of this force, here also called Μοῖρα.[121] The poet writes,

> In life Fate (Μοῖρα) alone watches; the other immortals
> Who dwell on the peaks of snowy Olympos do not,
> Except for Zeus' perfect eye. But Fate (Μοῖρα) and Zeus' mind,
> Know all things for all time.
> I pray to you to come, gently and kindly,
> Atropos, Lachesis, and Klotho, scions of noble stock.
> Airy, invisible, inexorable, and ever indestructible,
> You give all and take all, being to men the same as necessity (ἀνάγκη).[122]

This poem suggests that the author recognized the all-seeing eye of a Fate that sees all, gives all and takes all; it is a Fate that, with Zeus, rules everything. Apostolos Athanassakis says the triple naming of Atropos, Lachesis, and Klotho helps explain *moira,* which meant "a person's allotted portion in life . . . conceived as a piece of yarn (life) [with] a beginning (birth) and an ending (death). . . . Lachesis assigns the lot, Klothos spins the yarn of life, and the irreversible Atropos cuts it."[123] Fate is here

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[119] Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, *Orphism and Christianity in Late Antiquity* (Sozemena 7; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co., 2010), 341-42.

[120] Harold R. Willoughby, *Pagan Regeneration: A Study of Mystery Initiations in the Graeco Roman World* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929), 98-99.

[121] The Orphic Hymns were probably collected sometime in the third century C.E. Apostolos N. Athanassakis, *The Orphic Hymns* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977 viii).

[122] Athanassakis, *The Orphic Hymns*, 79-81.

[123] Ibid., 133.

identified with necessity and shown to be inexorable though the singer does beg her to "come gently and kindly."

The hymn addressed to Night hints at the ceaseless necessary motion of the cosmos. The poet declares: "Ever incomplete, now terrestrial and now again celestial, you circle around in pursuit of sprightly phantoms, you force light into the nether world, and again you flee into Hades. Dreadful Necessity governs all things" (3:8-11). Athanassakis comments:

> And certainly the phrase 'dreadful Necessity governs all' (3.11) must have been (Time) to give birth to Ether, Chaos, and Erebos (Primeval Darkness). She was also the consort of the Demiourgos (Creator) and mother of Heimarmene (Fate). But apropos of Ananke . . . it should be said that it is a concept which is found in the Presocratics, Plato, the tragedians, the Pythagoreans, and even in the cults of Mithras and Hermes Trismegistos, not to mention the Neo-Platonists and the Neopythagoreans" (xii).

Necessity as a goddess is also found in other texts that have religious significance. The Roman poet Horace, in his Ode to Fortuna (*Odes* 1.35), mentions a goddess who precedes Fortuna wherever she goes: "Necessity, grim goddess, with spikes and wedges in her brazen hand; the stout clamp and molten lead are also there" (17-20).[124] Necessity here is a cohort of Fortuna, and she "carries the symbols of Fortuna's power."[125] The imagery associated with Necessity is that of fixation: spikes, wedges, clamps, and molten lead used to connect the clamp to the stone wall.[126] The wedges mentioned here are

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[124] C.E. Bennett, *Horace: The Odes and Epodes* (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 93.

[125] Kenneth Quinn, *Horace: The Odes* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1996), 189.

[126] Lead was associated with *Ananke* in some magical rites from a later period; the curses were written into the lead: Gundel, *Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene*, 96.

similar to those used to fasten Prometheus to the face of the cliff.[127] There the wedge-shaped spikes represented the finality of Prometheus' fate. In *Ode* 24 of Book Three, Necessity works alone, driving her adamantine nails into the roof of an overzealous man's building, a symbol of the inevitability of death that comes to all. Horace may have been influenced by the Etruscan practice of driving a nail into the wall of the temples of certain gods and goddesses to mark the end of one year and the beginning of the next.[128] The nails driven into the roof mark the end of the man's life.

In an Ode to Simplicity (*Odes* 3.1), Horace notes that the vicissitudes of life are managed by Necessity. He begins by pointing out that this man has this advantage, while that man has that advantage, and yet another has a different advantage: "that this man contends with an advantage in character and reputation, that that man has a larger crowd of followers" (11-12). All of this is controlled by Necessity who "with impartial law . . . chooses by lot both high and low, her capacious urn holds every name" (14-15). Necessity here is nothing other than the "will of god" in the Stoic sense; providence (or the *logos* that pervades the entire universe) is fair in handing out life assignments.[129]

Astrological Determinism. Astrological determinism is the belief that the stars and/or their positions in relation to earth determine the destiny of countries, cities, and individuals. The Chaldeans are credited with having worked out the system of correspondences wherein what happens on earth is a reflection of what happens in the heavens. They observed that changes in the heavens corresponded to changes on the

[127] Quinn, *Horace,* 189.

[128] Gordon Williams, *The Third Book of Horace's Odes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 126.

[129] Frank Granger, "The Religion of Horace," *The Classical Review* 24.2 (1910): 46-48.

earth and induced a causal relationship. They studied the heavens to discover what social or political events took place under what sign or constellation so as to determine repeatable coincidences. This study led to predictions about the future of countries, cities, and even individuals. Franz Cumont observes, "There is nothing surprising in the fact that, as they ascribed to the heaven itself the revelation of this marvelous knowledge, they would have seen in astronomy a divine science."[130] Although not as sophisticated as later astrology, the Babylonians did develop the skill to predict some eclipses.

Necessity played a role in the Babylonian astrology. The observation that the revolutions of the heavens were unchanging led the Babylonians to believe in a Necessity that was superior to the celestial divinities.[131] Burnet notes that in the pre-Socratic Greek tradition, Necessity in Empedocles is responsible for the regulation of the celestial bands.[132] The unpredictable events in the skies, such as meteor showers, offered hope that some divinity could intervene in this unchanging destiny; however, the sacrifices, incantations, and offerings given on such a premise were more a concession to established religion than the true belief of the astrologers. Necessity controlled the movements of the heavens and thus the fate of all.

Astrology did not initially make great inroads into Greco-Roman religion. The first group to pick up the divinization of heavenly bodies was the philosophers. According to Burkert, Plato, in his later works, makes the move that establishes

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[130] Franz Cumont, *Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1960), 13.

[131] Cumont, *Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans*, 15-20.

[132] Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 190.

astronomy as the foundation of religion.[133] We have seen how in the Myth of Er, *Anankē* and her daughters, the Fates, controlled the movements of the celestial spheres. Yet, this abstraction had no visible counterpart. In the *Laws* Plato comes to the belief that the exact and consistent movement of the stars must surely point to their intelligence:

> It is no longer possible that any single mortal man will be god-fearing for long if he has not grasped these two principles mentioned, that the soul is the oldest of everything which participates in coming-to-be (and that it is immortal, and that it rules over all bodies), and moreover (secondly) he must grasp, as has now been said many times, the intelligence of being which is in the stars, as mentioned, and in addition also the necessary preliminary mathematical sciences (12.967d-e).[134]

The heavens became a temple filled, not with statues, but with the very gods themselves. Burkert writes, "Never before had gods been presented in such manifest clarity."[135] But, astronomy is not astrology; however, the one led to the other. It was especially the Stoic view of the inter-relatedness of the cosmos that influenced the role of the heavens in religion. It is believed that the Stoics picked up the Babylonian idea of eternal recurrence and developed it. Eternal recurrence means that the planets and other heavenly bodies will come back into the original position where they were at the beginning of the cosmos. A great conflagration would occur at that point and another Great Year would begin, in which all things that happened as the planets, stars, and constellations moved through their positions would happen again with only minor changes. Such a view of the power of the planets and stars gave credence to astrological determinism: the position of the stars and planets control earthly events. By the first century B.C.E., this view was widespread.

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[133] Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 327.

[134] Quoted in Burkert, *Greek Religion,* 327.

[135] Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 329.

Heavenly bodies were associated with the gods of religion and were given their characteristics. In time, it became popular to attempt to discover the future by means of the zodiac and planetary movements. It was thought that the particular star under which a person was born influenced many aspects of that person's life. Cicero mentions one such belief in his *De Fato*: ". . . if someone is born at the rising of the Dogstar, he will not die at sea" (12). Theorists and believers continued to debate whether a star *caused* a particular event or was simply a *sign* of that particular event.

Many ancient people came to believe that the stars controlled everything; therefore, their future was already determined.[136] The strangle-hold of astrological determinism is seen in the various responses to it. Some, like Tiberius, rejected religion altogether because of his belief that everything is ruled by Fate (Suetonius, *Life of Tiberius* 69).[137] Others found solace in the decrees of Fate; what is ordained will happen, no use to worry about it. Still others wanted to be freed from the controlling powers of Fate and Necessity and sought such freedom in the mystery religions. Apuleius' *Metamorpheses* tells the story of how Lucian came to be freed from the power of fate and magic by his initiation into the cult of Isis.

Although *Anankē* did not have her own cult, she was recognized as a divine figure of some import. She was associated with Fortune, and believed to be seated at the very center of the earth controlling the movement of the cosmos. She was also associated with *Bia*, or force, and had a temple as late as the second century C.E. in Corinth. The

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[136] N.C. Croy, "Personal Religion," in *Dictionary of New Testament Background* (eds. Craig A. Evans and Stanley Porter; Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 930.

[137] Everett Ferguson, *Backgrounds of Early Christianity* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993), 226.

mystery religions highlighted the relentless inevitability of death and reincarnation, as astrology did the cyclic motion of the stars and their determining power.

Necessity in Other Greek Literature

When we turn to the tragedians, the orators, the comedians, and the historians, we find necessity used in very familiar ways. Necessity is a power or force (either cosmic or divine) that controls things or creates situations in which someone must act. Most of the time, necessity is something that is beyond the control of the person affected by it. The will of a god or the gods is often the cause of necessity.

In Euripides' *Alcestis*, Alcestis believes "some god" is responsible for the way the events have unfolded (297-98). Having offered herself willingly to die in Admetus' (her husband) place, the necessity of accepting the appointed death becomes real. As she says her final goodbyes to her children she laments the things she will miss, noting that today is the very day when she must die (δεῖ γὰρ θανεῖν μέ) (320). Near the end of the play, the chorus speaks of Necessity (Ἀνάγκης) as the goddess who has no altars, no statue, and for whom sacrifice is useless (973-75). There is nothing stronger than her (965). Justina Gregory has pointed out that here sacrifice need not be seen only in a cultic sense, but may be a reminder to Admetus (and all humans) that mortals cannot offer someone else in their stead.[138] After Heracles retrieves Alcestis from Death and presents her to Admetus again, Admetus stands just as bound by the necessity of death as he did before the substitute was made.[139] As we have seen, beginning with Homer, the Fates spin a

[138] Justina Gregory, "Euripides' *Alcestis*," *Hermes* 107 (1979): 259-70, 269.

[139] Justina Gregory, "Euripides' *Alcestis*, 270. See also, D.L. Drew, "Euripides' *Alcestis*," *The American Journal of Philology* 52.4 (1931): 295-319, 303 n.30.

thread for each person and thereby determine when they must die. The necessity of death forever separates mortals from immortals.[140]

The will of the gods is also the source of necessity (along with the physical strength of Ajax) according to Tecmessa in Sophocles' *Ajax.* She tells Ajax that "there is no greater evil for men than the fate (τύχης) imposed by compulsion (ἀναγκαίας)" (485). She was taken from a free country and made a slave when Ajax conquered her people. The will of the gods accomplished this through the strength of Ajax (489-90). She later asks to be guarded from this ἀναγκαίας τύχης when told that a prophet had declared that Ajax' trip outdoors may have sealed his fate (803).[141] Orestes also uses the same phrase when he instructs the old slave to slip into the palace undercover of false name. The slave is to tell those who ask that Orestes is dead ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τύχης; he fell from his chariot during the Pythian games (48-50). Segal notes that this necessity is related to the commandment that Orestes received from the gods to restore justice by means of lying and deceit.[142]

Necessity as a function of the gods also appears in Herodotus. Rosaria Munson has examined ἀνάγκη in Herodotus and found a transcendent necessity associated with the oracles of certain gods.[143] Of events that have been declared by an oracle Munson writes, "The event is god-willed and inevitable not in an absolute way, but simply

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[140] Charles Segal, "Euripides' 'Alcestis': Female Death and Male Tears," *Classical Antiquity* 11.1 (1992): 142-58, 156.

[141] The trip outdoors was potentially fatal because word had come through the prophet Calchas that divine retribution for Athena would pursue Ajax for only one day, this day.

[142] Charles Paul Segal, "The Electra of Sophocles," *TAPA* 97 (1966): 473-545, 484.

[143] Rosaria Vignolo Munson, "Ananke in Herodotus," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 121 (2001): 32. She also included passages that have χρή, δεῖ, and μέλλω.

because (γάρ) those in power do not listen to the wise who would prevent the immoral behavior upon which divine retribution will necessarily follow."[144] Yet, prophecy often contains a more emphatic form of necessity: "Some statements that a specific historical event *must* happen (with χρή/χρεόν and δεῖ) come from divine prophecies."[145]

In several cases there is a statement after the fact that the person was *bound* to end up badly. These divine declarations are descriptive rather than prescriptive because of the contingency of behavior: *If* a person continues down such-and-such a road, he will end up badly, or stated another way, *because* a person continued down such-and-such a road, he ended up badly. The necessity is related to the actions and choices of the individual. The gods as observers of human life noted and warned certain humans of the inevitability of their actions. Necessity is not something forced by the gods or their oracles; rather, the gods make known to humans the consequences of past, present, or future actions.

In the Aeschylian tragedy *Prometheus Bound*, the main character, the Titan Prometheus, is chained and nailed to a rocky crag in a deserted country because he stole fire from the gods and gave it to humans. Power (Κράτος) and Force (Βία) bring Prometheus to the sheer rock face where the divine blacksmith, Hephaistos, installs the bonds. After their work is completed, Prometheus is left alone to contemplate his situation. He laments his predicament, but points out that he is aware of all that will happen to him. His words offer a glimpse into how necessity (in this case personified as a goddess) and what must happen was understood by Aeschylus.

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[144] Munson, "Ananke in Herodotus," 33.

[145] Munson, "Ananke in Herodotus," 33.

> I have clear and thorough knowledge of all that will come to me. One's fated destiny (τὴν πεπρωμένην) must (χρὴ)[146] be borne in the easiest way, in the knowledge that the strength of Necessity (Ἀνάγκης) is irresistible. But I cannot keep silent, or not keep silent, about what has happened to me; because I gave prizes to mortals I bear this yoke of compulsion (ἀνάγκαις) in my misery; I hunted out and stole in a hollow reed a stream of fire, which has proved to be for humans a teacher of every craft and a great resource. (*Prom.* 103-11 [Sommerstein, LCL])

Aeschylus uses τὴν πεπρωμένην, χρὴ, and ανάγκη to express the idea of inevitability. Kitto notes that Aeschylus has taken over primitive conceptions of divine entities, "in particular the shadowy conception of a Necessity stronger even than the gods."[147] Necessity, though, according to Kitto, need only be a dramatic convenience: if Prometheus is to defeat the aims of Zeus, some power stronger than Zeus is needed. Even though Kitto sees Necessity as only a dramatic convenience, it is nonetheless significant that he is aware that Aeschylus has taken over an idea that is traditional. Orpheus, the mythical singer, had earlier stated that "the decrees of Fate must everywhere be endured."[148]

Homer had to deal with the power of the inevitable in his poems. Green points out that, behind Homer's gods, there stands "a shadowy power, at times just, at times dreadful and oppressive, the power of *Moira*."[149] As we have seen from earlier

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[146] A.J. Podlecki notes that χρὴ "sounds a note of inevitability, of necessity, in some cosmic sense, that will be heard often in the course of the play," *Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound* (Oxford: Aris & Phillips, 2005), 160.

[147] Kitto, H.D.F. *Greek Tragedy*, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1954), 59.

[148] Freeman, *Ancilla to the Presocratics*, 6.

[149] William Chase Greene, "Fate, Good, and Evil in Early Greek Poetry," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 46 (1935): 5.

examples, the belief that it is useless to struggle against necessity was widespread.[150] Agamemnon mentions it by way of excusing his behavior when he points out to Achilles that he (Agamemnon) is not to blame for the strife that developed between them regarding Briseis. He tells Achilles that he is not at fault, "but Zeus and Fate (Μοῖρα) and Erinys, that walks in darkness, since in the place of assembly they cast on my mind fierce blindness on that day when on my own authority I took from Achilles his prize. But what could I do? It is a god that brings all things to their end" (*Il*. 19:86-92 [Murray, LCL]).

Greene notes that the early tragic poets used well-accepted myths in which oracles and divine interventions were the powers that controlled human destiny. He writes, "Moreover the characters or the chorus, often though not necessarily always speaking for the poet, may proclaim their conviction that what is occurring is the result of fate, of necessity, or of chance; that is, of irresistible external forces, with no moral implications."[151]

Later, Prometheus is quick to point out that though it is clear from his punishment that he committed a sin, he did so by choice (266). When the Chorus-Leader expresses hope that Prometheus, once escaped from his cruel punishment, will be as strong as Zeus, Prometheus reveals that he knows something that not even Zeus can escape.

Prometheus

The decisive decree of destiny is not ordained to bring that to pass in that way yet awhile. Only after being racked by countless pains and torments am I at last to escape these bonds. Craft is far weaker than Necessity (Ανάγκης).

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[150] Mark Griffith, *Aeschylus* Prometheus Bound, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 104.

[151] Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* , 90.

Chorus- Leader

Well, who is the steersman of Necessity?

Prometheus

The triple Fates and the unforgetting Furies.

Chorus-Leader

You mean Zeus is less strong than these?

Prometheus

Certainly, he cannot escape destiny (τὴν πεπρωμένην).

Chorus-Leader

And what is Zeus' destiny, if not to reign eternally?

Prometheus

I will not go on to tell you that; do not persist in asking (511-520 [Sommerstein, LCL])

Prometheus believes that even Zeus is subject to what is fated. The "triple Fates" refer to the three daughters of *Anankē* (Necessity): Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos. They "represent *what must be*, eternal, immutable, universal law."[152] The Furies serve to enforce the laws of the Fates, making sure no one violates the natural order.

Later, in his exchange with Hermes, who has come to discover what marriage of Zeus will cost him the throne, Prometheus tells Hermes that none of Zeus' threats "will bend me to make me say at whose hands he is destined to fall from his supreme power" (996). Prometheus recognizes the helplessness of his own situation and resigns to be "willing to suffer what I must (χρὴ) (1067).

Joscasta declares to Polynices a similar resignation before the will of the gods: "Some god is sending the progeny of Oedipus to a terrible ruin. This is how he began: I gave birth unlawfully [contrary to Apollo's will], your father married me for ill, and thus you were begotten. Yet, why should I dwell on this? One must (δεῖ) endure what the gods send" (*Phoen.* 379-82). Oedipus too realizes the necessity of yielding to the will of the gods. He blames his mortality: "Being mortal, I must (δεῖ) bear the necessities

[152] Griffith, *Aeschylus* Prometheus Bound, 180.

(ἀνάγκας) sent by the gods" (1763).[153] Menelaus recognizes that he has few friends from whom he might expect help in delivering Orestes. But, he does have his words, by which he will try to persuade Tyndareus. At the end of his speech he observes: "And I must (δεῖ) save you (I cannot deny it) not in the teeth of superior force but by clever words. I cannot save your life by armed might as you perhaps suppose. It's no easy feat to master by a single spear the woes that are besetting you. I would not be led to adopt such a soft policy <out of> idleness: but as things stand it is necessary (ἀναγκαίως ἔχει) for the wise to take orders from fortune (τύχης)" (*Orest.* 709-16). His meaning seems to be that a person must work with the options that are before him.

Necessity may also be brought about by events that have unfolded a certain way in a certain situation. Electra tells the Chorus: "Dreadful actions were forced on me by dreadful things" (*El.* 221). The dreadful actions that she feels she must take are related to avenging her father's murder. She refuses not to lament her father's death, even though his murderers now rule his house and do not permit it. It is a hard compulsion that forces her to continue to lament his death and to call for her brother, Orestes, to come avenge their father (256). Jenny March notes that the compulsion Electra feels precludes her feeling any guilt for her actions, though she may feel shame for what she is forced to do.[154]

Creon feels the need to yield to the urging of the Chorus to release Antigone from her subterranean dwelling. Teresias, the prophet, has declared that doom awaits him if he

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[153] The old man who comes to Agamemnon's tent early in the morning speaks of this same necessity to Agamemnon: "Atreus did not beget you for a life of all blessings. You must (*dei*) feel pain as well as pleasure: you are a mortal" (*Iph. Aul.* 29-30 [LCL, Kovacs]).

[154] Sophocles *Electra* (trans. & ed. Jenny March; Warminster: Aris & Phillips, Ltd, 2001), 154.

does not bury Polynices and recover Antigone from where she has been buried alive. As he realizes what he has to do, he declares that one "must not fight (δυσμαχητέον) against necessity (ἀνάγκη)" (*Ant.* 1106). Seth Schein points out that verbal adjectives, like δυσμαχητέον, are often used by authors in the fifth century B.C.E. in ways that resemble "ἀνάγκη and related words and the impersonal δεῖ in tending to refer to or suggest some external, objective constraint or force – including 'causal necessity' or 'divine inevitability' – by which something 'is necessary'."[155] Both Teresias and the Chorus suggest that Creon may run into trouble with the gods if he does not act quickly to release Antigone and bury Polynices.

Neoptolemus urges Philoctetes not to be upset by the news that he must (δεῖ) sail to Troy and to the Trojan War (*Phil.* 915). As far as Neoptolemus is concerned, the treachery designed by Odysseus to convince Philoctetes to go the Troy because of the prophetic word of Helenus constitutes "a powerful necessity (ἀνάγκη) (922). Neoptolemus reveals this to Philoctetes toward the end of the play: "There is a man with us who was taken prisoner from Troy, Helenus, the noble prophet, who tells us beyond doubt that this is bound to happen (ὡς δεῖ γενέσθαι); and in addition, that it is fated (ὡς ἔστι' ἀνάγκη) that Troy be entirely taken during the present summer, and if he is found to be telling lies, he gives us permission to kill him" (1337-42).

The Athenians claim necessity in their defense when they use holy water for mundane purposes. Their actions do not constitute a transgression because they were forced to use the holy water:

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[155] Seth L. Schein, "Verbal Adjectives in Sophocles: Necessity and Morality," *Classical Philology* 93 (1998): 293-307, 295.

> The water, moreover, they had disturbed in their sore need (ἐν τῇ ἀνάγκῃ κινῆσαι) which they had not wantonly brought upon themselves; they had been forced to use the water while defending themselves against the Boeotians who had first invaded their land. And anything done under the constraint of war and danger might reasonably meet with some indulgence, even from the god. For altars were a refuge in cases of involuntary (ἀκουσίων) misdeeds, and transgression was a term applied to those who do evil without compulsion (μὴ ἀνάγκῃ) and not to those who are driven by misfortunes to some act of daring (*Thucy.* 4.98.5-6 [Smith, LCL).

This is yet another account where necessity provides an excuse because the actor did not act with intent to do evil. Martin Ostwald observes that Thucydides believed that *anankē* guided humans toward good things. He writes:

> Some ἀνάγκαι constrain (or should constrain) an agent to do the good or morally right thing to do: for example, when Perdiccas' breach with Brasidas is described as τῶν ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων διαναστάς [the necessary misfortunes having risen up] (IV.128.5), the policy he abandoned was one he would have been constrained to follow if his action had been dictated by his real interests, and when the Melians believe that 'kinship and a sense of shame' will compel the Lacadaemonians to come to their aid (V.104), their estimate of what constitutes a moral necessity is right, however unrealistic their estimate of its consequences may be.[156]

In Herodotus' *Histories*, Demartatus does not *want* to go to war "of his own free will," but he tells Xerxes that if it is "necessary" he will rise even to the greatest of challenges (7.104.3). As Munson notes, in Herodotus war is a defensive measure taken only when all else fails. In this sense, war is excusable because of the necessity.[157] Herodotus is not just interested in reporting the facts of history, but to "evaluate actions from an ethical perspective" and "to praise and blame."[158]

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[156] Martin Ostwald, *Anankē in Thucydides* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988), 58.

[157] Munson, Ananke *in Herodotus*, 41.

[158] Munson, Ananke *in Herodotus*, 45.

Polybius reflects a similar concern with praise and blame. He argues that unless the causes of events are given people will not know whether to praise or blame the actors (*Histories* 2.56.14). He points out that some actions rightly deserve punishment while others rightly deserve forgiveness or excuse. But, in every case "the final criterion of good and evil lies not in what is done, but the different reasons and different purposes of the doer"(2.56.16 [Paton, LCL]).

Cassius Dio reveals a similar belief that choice and intentionality are more important than external causes. In the fragments of Book 8 of the *Roman History* he mentions that sometimes forbearance is better than extensive punishment. If a person makes a mistake not from evil motives, forbearance allows both the person who made the mistake and others to see the correct path. He writes, "Everyone would rather obey than be forced, and prefers voluntary to compulsory (*anankē*) observance of the law. That which a man chooses of his own accord he works for as if it were his own affair, but what is imposed upon him he rejects as unbecoming to a freeman" (8.3 [Cary, LCL]). Also, choice should be considered when making judgments about the actions of another:

> Benefits lie rather within the actual choice of men and are not brought about by necessity (ἀνάγκης) or by ignorance, or anger, or deceit, or anything of the sort, but are performed voluntarily by a willing and eager mind. For this reason it is proper to pity, admonish, and instruct those who commit any offence, but to admire, love, and reward those who do right (8.11 [Cary, LCL]).

In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, a discussion about the nature of law evolved into a discussion about compulsion and persuasion in relation to the law. A critical component is persuasion (πείσας); if the subjects of a government are not persuaded to accept its policies or laws, but are forced to accept them, the concept of "law" is negated (1.2.44).

Whatever men "constrain (ἀναγκάζει) other to do 'without persuasion,' whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force" (1.2.45).

Necessity is also related to custom, expectation, or norm. In most of these examples, the person recognizes the value of what is necessary. They engage in the actions that are necessary willingly in order to set things right or to do what is acceptable or expected. In Eurpides' *Alcestis*, Heracles believes the laws of hospitality demand that he try to help Admetus recover Alcestis: "I must (δεῖ) save the woman who has just died and show my gratitude to Admetus by restoring Alcestis once more to this house" (840-42 [Kovacs, LCL]). D.J. Conacher believes that χάρις (or reciprocal favor) is an important theme in this play.[159] The hospitality that Admetus had shown Heracles even while he prepared for his wife's funeral was significant to Heracles, especially once he realized what had happened.[160] Admetus himself acknowledges the need to act properly in relation to his dead wife when he is faced with the specter of a young woman who greatly favors Alcestis: "How shall I put this woman in her bed? I fear a double reproach: from my people, lest someone should cast in my teeth that betraying the memory of her who saved my life, I fall into the bed of another woman; and I must (δεῖ) show all care for my dead wife (she deserves my honor)" (1056-61 [Kovacs, LCL]).

Medea highlights the troubles of being a woman in her speech to the Corinthian women. It is necessary for women to buy a husband and master for their bodies at an exorbitant price (*Med.* 232). In order for a woman, who has had no experience in dealing with a particular man and has no idea of his desires and wishes, to know how to please

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[159] D.J. Concacher, *Euripides* Alcestis, (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, Ltd, 1993), 37.

[160] Michel Lloyd, "Euripides' *Alcestis*," *Greece and Rome* 32.2 (1985): 119-131, 127-28.

her newly acquired husband she must (δεῖ) become a diviner (239). Because there is no one to tell her how to be a good wife, she must read it in the stars, practice augury, or divine animal parts. Whereas a man has the freedom to roam about when he gets bored with things at home, women must fix their gaze on only one man: their husband (239). Laura McClure sees in this speech and others in this play Medea's use of "blame" language as she laments the state of women and attacks the male-dominated hierarchy.[161] This use of necessity highlights an interesting phenomenon with necessity: what is seen as the norm (i.e. a "good thing") by one group (here, the males in the society) can be experienced as overpowering compulsion by those affected by the necessity. We will see this again in other literature.

In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Socrates, Alcibiades, and Pericles discuss the definition of law. Socrates says, "Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought (δεῖ) and what ought not to be done" (1.2.42 [Marchant and Todd, LCL]). As we have seen above, laws that are not accepted by the majority of the people represent "force," not law. But, when agreed to, laws are a source of necessity in a positive sense – what must be done if the *polis* is to survive and function properly.

Political customs may be seen as necessary. Cassius Dio tells us that ancient custom deemed it necessary to appoint a dictator at night (*Roman Histories* 8.26). Livy mentions the same event, referring to an established custom by which "in the silent time of the night" Fabius appointed Lucius Papirius dictator (*Hist*. 9.38). Livy also mentions an appointment at night by Verginius (4.21).

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[161] Laura McClure, "The Worst Husband: Discourses of Praise and Blame in Euripides' Medea," *Classical Philology* 94 (1999): 373-94, 385-88.

Social customs may carry a sense of necessity as well. Ajax tells Tecmessa that the time has come for her to begin to train their son to be like his father. She must (δεῖ) "break him in by his father's harsh rules and make his nature like mine" (*Ajax* 548-49 [Lloyd-Jones, LCL]). Agamemnon tells Iphigenai that he must (δεῖ) make a certain sacrifice at Aulis before he can depart on his journey (*Iph. aul.* 673). She asks, "With what rites must (χρὴ) you determine what the gods require?" (*Iph. Aul.* 674 [Kovacs, LCL]). The innocent question is related to the proclamation of the prophet Calchas, who sent word to Agamemnon while he waited at Aulis that he must sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenai to Artemis (*Iph. Aul.* 85-95). As the nature of the tragedy becomes more apparent, the Chorus declares that they feel pity for the royal house in the way a foreign woman ought (δεῖ) to lament (*Iph. Aul.* 469).

Isocrates spends no small amount of time showing what actions are necessary for the king. The king must be intelligent (*Ad Nic.* 10), must be a lover of people and a lover of his country (15), and must care for the people (15). He should cultivate the qualities of dignity and courtesy (34). The king, as a well-educated man, must show the ability to deliberate and decide (51). In the *Evagoras*, a point of praise for Evagoras is that "he fell in no respect short of the qualities which belong to kings (ὧν προσεῖναι δεῖ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν) (*Evag*. 46 [Van Hook, LCL]).

Isocrates declares that "everyone knows that those who wish to praise a person must (δεῖ) attribute to him a larger number of good qualities than he really possesses." (*Bus.* 4 [Van Hook, LCL]). The conventions of writing an encomium at that time taught what Aristotle calls 'amplification'.[162] Later, Isocrates observes that Polycrates has not

[162] See Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1.9.33-41

only failed to tell the truth about Busiris, but also missed "the entire pattern which must (δεῖ) be employed in eulogy" (*Bus.* 33).

Beyond gods or divine figures and social customs, another person may also be the source of necessity. Odysseus informs Philoctetes, who is begging to get his bow back, that he will not be given the bow, but in fact, must (δεῖ) come along with the bow willingly or he will be dragged by force (*Phil.* 982). That Philoctetes must go has been decided beforehand by Zeus (990). He laments that he had gone to the Trojan war with Agamemnon and Menelaus of his own free will, whereas Odysseus had been kidnapped and compelled (*anankē*) (1025). Earlier, Odysseus had made the same claim regarding being compelled (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) to fight in the war (73).

Oedipus is informed by Theseus that someone wants a brief visit with him. At first, it is unclear to Oedipus who could possibly want to sit in supplication before him, but eventually Theseus reveals enough that Oedipus figures out that it is his son, Polynices, who wants the audience. His disgust with his son prompts him to demand of Theseus: "This man's voice, king, is most hateful to his father; do not constrain (*anankē*) me to grant this concession" (1178 [Lloyd-Jones, LCL]).

Electra is aware that she must (δεῖ) obey those in authority if she wants to continue to live in freedom (*Elect.* 339). She also feels that the actions she has to undertake are forced (ἐξαναγκάζει) on her by the hostility that comes from her sister, Clytemnestra (*Elect*. 616-20). Other persons are responsible for the necessity of her being a slave (*Elect.* 814, 1193) and doing what they think is right (*Elect.* 1037).

Necessity in Herodotus also has a human component. A person may be forced by some despot or tyrant to do certain things against his or her will; that person may be praised for disregarding or resisting his or her personal ἀνάγκη.[163]

Sometimes the necessity is only possible. Odysseus refuses to hide from Polyphemus because it would be disgraceful to do so. He declares: "I shall not do it. Troy would groan loudly if I were to run from a single man when I stood my ground so often, shield in hand, against a throng of Trojans without number. Rather, if I must die (εἰ θανεῖν δεῖ), I will die nobly—or live on and also retain my old reputation (*Cycl.* 198-202 [Kovacs, LCL). He does not state that it is necessary for him to die; rather, the emphasis is on his intended actions regardless of whether death comes now or later.

Creon waxes eloquent about disobedience and insubordination. He is especially upset to have found Antigone going against his commands and points out that the insubordination of a woman is especially terrible. Obedience is the only way: "In this way we have to protect discipline, and we must never allow a woman to vanquish us. If we must (δεῖ) perish, it is better to do so by the hand of a man, and then we cannot be called inferior to women" (*Ant.* 677-80 [Lloyd-Jones, LCL]).

Demosthenes addresses the jurors in *Against Meidias* regarding their role in determining the guilt of Meidias. Since he is aware that Meidias has been going around trying to find other victims who have been assaulted so he can show the jury how common a thing it is and thus gain some sympathy, Demosthenes points them in the opposite direction: "But it seems to me, men of Athens, that it would be reasonable for you to do just the reverse, if the common good should (δεῖ) be your consideration" (37

[163] Munson, Ananke *in Herodotus*, 37.

[MacDowell]).[164] Stated another way, what Demosthenes is saying is, "If you think it is necessary to take thought of the common good, you will do just the opposite of what Meidias will suggest." Demosthenes does not assume the necessity, but by a subtle (or not so subtle) hint, he perhaps suggests to the jurors what they *should* do.

In Euripides' *Medea*, Jason declares to the chorus that Medea will have to (δεῖ) hide herself beneath the earth or soar aloft if she is not going to give satisfaction to the royal house (1296). Unless she has some magical way of escaping or a really good hiding place, she will pay the price for murdering the King's daughter. The irony is that she, perhaps unwittingly, has just such a means of escape. At the end of the play she and the corpses of her children are born away into the heavens by a winged chariot.

In other cases, the necessity does not produce its intended result. Often the imperfect tense of δεῖ is used when something should have been done but was not or when something should have been the case but was not.

Isocrates uses this device often. In a letter written for one of his clients who was being sued by a man named Callimachus, the defendant argues that the plaintiff (Callimachus) thinks that he (the defendant) should have (ἔδει) claimed to have given him more than two hundred drachmas (*Callim.* 15 [Van Hook, LCL]). Callimachus was seeking ten thousand drachmas, but the case had already gone to arbitration, and therefore could not be tried again. The defendant recognized that he could have claimed he had given Callimachus more than two hundred drachma if he had wanted to lie. What Callimachus thought the defendant should have done, was not done. Just a few lines later, the defendant points out that even if there were no witnesses and had been no

[164] Demosthenes, *Against Meidias* (edited and translated w/commentary by Douglas M. MacDowell; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

arbitration and the jury was "under the necessity (ἔδει) of considering the case in light of the probabilities, not even in this even would you have found difficulty in arriving at a just verdict" (*Callim.* 16). The jury might have been forced to do what the defendant suggests, but clearly was not.

In the *Trapeziticus*, there is a dispute over how a sum of money was appropriated by the banker, Pasion. One of the items in question is a memorandum that contained the agreement between the plaintiff and Pasion. The banker claims to be embarrassed over the fact that he is losing money in his business and offers to pay the plaintiff back promptly. They come to a private agreement and a memorandum is drawn up by which Pasion will be forced to pay an additional fifty percent to the plaintiff if he does not fulfill the terms of the private agreement. The memorandum is left with Pyron who is to either burn it, if the private agreement has been fulfilled, or give it to the King, Satyrus, if not. The plaintiff accuses Pasion of falsifying the memorandum which should have (ἔδει) been given to King Satyrus (*Trapez.* 23). After falsifying it, Pasion demanded it be opened and read; the falsified memorandum released Pasion from all debt to the plaintiff. Only the King should have read the document. Later, the plaintiff mentions the document again:

> When we gave to the alien, Pyrion, the agreement by which Pasion, as he claims, is released from my demands, but as I contend, I was to have (ἔδει) received back the gold from him, we bade the alien, in case we arrived at an understanding with each other, to burn the memorandum; otherwise, to give it to Satyrus, and that this was stated both of us agree (25 [Van Hook, LCL]).

In both cases, that which should have happened did not. The unsettled nature of the case is highlighted yet again by the use of ἔδει when the plaintiff points out the nature of their agreement on the memorandum: ""there yet remained matters which Pasion had (ἔδει) to

settle with me in accordance with the memorandum" (26 [Van Hook, LCL]). That the suit is being brought is evidence enough that the obligation that Pasion had to settle was not fulfilled.

Also, in his correction of Polycrates 'pitiful' attempt to write a defense of Busiris, he says his treatment of the same subject will show what elements Polycrates ought (ἔδει) to have used in his composition (10). Clearly, Isocrates thinks that Polycrates did not do what was required.

When addressing Nicocles regarding the need for a king to be educated and to have instructors, Isocrates points out that although the king, more than other men, should (ἔδει) receive correction and reproof, they in fact "live all their lives, from the time when they are placed in authority, without admonition" (*Ad Nic.* 4 [Norlin, LCL]). What they need more than others they do not receive, primarily because most people do not come in contact with the king, and those who do often only want to appease him (ibid.). In the letter written as if from King Nicocles himself to his subject, men are urged to cherish their marriages. The king declares that he did not like to see men take women in marriage and then break the marriage because of some other woman or a boy (*Nic.* 38-39). He has no patience with men "who though honest in all other partnerships, are without conscience in the partnership of marriage, when they ought (ἔδει) to cherish this relationship the more faithfully inasmuch as it is more intimate and more precious than all others" (*Nic.* 40 [Norlin, LCL]). He speaks as if they do not.

Demosthenes uses ἔδει in the same manner. The way Apollodorus pays his men and takes very good care of them while they are on his ships becomes a big issue for Polycles ([*Poly.*] 35. His complaint is that he would not have been sued for such a large

sum of money if Apollodorus had not been so extravagant in his outfitting and with his payments. Polycles complains that Apollodorus "ought (ἔδει) to have done the same thing as the other trierarches" ([*Poly.*] 36 [Murray, LCL]). Although, Polycles feels that Apollodorus should have been a less-extravagant fleet manager, Apollodorus clearly was not.

In the suit brought by Callicles, the defendant argues that the wall his father built did not impede a natural watercourse. He argues that the road that ran between his property and the property of Callicles was in fact the waterway. He reprimands Callicles for not proving that there was a watercourse that had been dammed: "And, by heaven, you ought (ἔδει) to have satisfied all men that there was a watercourse, that you might have shown, not by your mere statement, as is the case now, but on a basis of fact, that my father was guilty of wrongdoing" (*Call.* 6). To prove his case, it was necessary for Callicles to prove the existence of the watercourse; this he failed to do.

Conclusion

What may we say about necessity in the Greco-Roman world at this point? Several things have become clear. Both δεῖ and ἀνάγκη are used in various ways to reveal necessity. Although, the words are not identical, they can be used interchangeably (e.g. *Gorg*. 459 c-e; *Soph.* 224e; *Phil.* 1337-42). Either word may be used in relation to the different sources of necessity: an external power or deity, a situation, expectation or custom, or another person.

Also, many of the examples of necessity in this chapter are logical necessity;[165] however, some of them are conditional and some are absolute. Those related to the nature of a thing are absolute: it cannot be otherwise (e.g. for a human to live, he must eat [*Od*. 5.215-21; Zeus' conclusion that the gods must be subordinated to the rule of Fate and Necessity – Lucian, *Jupp.conf.* 4; the necessity of death for humans – Pindar, *Ol.* 1.82). Other examples of necessity are conditional. This necessity relies on the occurrence of some state, condition, or event to bring it about. A person may desire to follow a certain career. In order to do so, it will be necessary for them to get specific kinds of training. This is the heart of Socrates' questions to Gorgias related to teaching rhetoric (*Gorg.* 459 c-e). It is also the point made by Socrates when he discusses the making of high and low notes in relation to knowledge of harmony (*Phaedr.* 268e).

Furthermore, necessity has multiple sources and is experienced in various ways. First, necessity is conceived of as a goddess, divine figure, or ultimate force. The Orphic theogony lists Ἀνάγκη as the primordial goddess who mated with Chronos at the beginning of the world. Pausanias mentions a temple on the Acrocorinth that was dedicated to Ἀνάγκη and Βία. Although Ἀνάγκη had no cult, the presence of a temple indicates the pervasiveness of her lore. The chorus in Euripides' *Alcestis* refers to her as the goddess who has no altar, no statue, and who ignores sacrifices and gifts (973-75). Plato's "Myth of Er" also conceives of Necessity as a goddess whose actions are fundamental to the operation of the world (*Rep.* 616c). As a divine figure, Necessity is experienced as a force over which humans have no control or to which there is no appeal.

[165] This would exempt the Goddess Necessity or necessity thought of as an external power or force, whether personified or not.

In Pindar, she is the consort of Fortuna, and her imagery is that of fixation: spikes, wedges, and clamps. There is an air of finality to her actions and decisions.

This same sense of finality is attached to the necessity of the philosophers. In their discussions, necessity is a power that is attached to the mechanics of nature. Their awareness of the consistency of cause and effect led some of them to associate necessity with repeated events, such as the regular patterns of the stars that appeared overhead. This force was often personified in the feminine until the Atomists rejected any association with divinity and moved closer to a view of necessity as natural law. Epicurus lamented that the necessity of the natural philosophers is somewhat like a yoke and is deaf to any complaints or prayers. He recognized that necessity does away with responsibility; when a person is forced (has no choice) to do something, he cannot be blamed or praised (Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Epicurus*, 133-34). Aristotle held a similar view of responsibility (*Rhet.* 1.10.7), as did Polybius (*Hist.* 2.56.16), and Cassius Dio (*Rom. Hist.* 8.11).

Second, necessity arises as a result of the enforcement of the will of a divine figure or a human. The will of a god (or the gods) can be experienced as necessity, as in the case of the delay of Odysseus by Calypso (*Od.* 4.557; 5.13-15, 151-58). Also, the *Hymn to Demeter* reveals the force of a god's will (66-73*).* Herodotus reveals the connection between prophetic utterances and necessity. In Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, the main character refers to the power of necessity in relation to the will of Zeus (103-11). This enforcement of a divine will may either be embraced as "right" or it may be lamented as "compulsion," in which case, it functions as an excuse for the behavior that is forced. Human will may also be a source of necessity. The singer, Phemius, is

forced by the suitors of Penelope to sing in Odysseus' house (*Ody.* 1.154). Hector raises the possibility of the will of the Achaean warriors creating a necessity for Andromache to become a slave (*Il.* 6.456-58). Phemius chose to use necessity as his excuse when he pled for his life before Odysseus (*Od.* 22.354-58).

Third, situations may create necessity for humans. The Trojan warriors fight out of necessity when the Greeks are getting the upper hand (*Il.* 6.85). Hunger creates a necessity for Odysseus to eat although he is terribly upset (*Od.* 5.215-21). A contrary wind creates a situation in which Odysseus' men find it necessary to look for food (*Od.* 12.330). In most of these examples, the person who is forced to act is not praised because he or she does not *choose* the action.

In addition to the sources of necessity, there are two primary ways in which necessity is experienced by humans: as expectation or as compulsion. If the person agrees that what is necessary is good and right, then necessity is experienced positively as expectation. A person may be praised for doing what is good and right (as in Isocrates' remarks about what is necessary for a king – *Ad. nic.* 10-51). If the person resists the thing that is necessary (i.e. they feel forced to do what they do not want to do), then they experience necessity as a negative compulsion. In most cases, whether on the lips of the person under duress or from the mouth of a narrator or other person relating the story, the negative compulsion is used as an excuse or defense for actions that were not chosen. The Athenians who used the holy water for mundane purposes fall into this category (Thucydides, *Hist.* 4.98.5-6). Thucydides is careful to exonerate the Athenians because they had not acted intentionally with malice, but were forced by circumstances to use the water. The notions of willingness and force even apply to the quality of law as well.

Xenophon reports that good laws are those that are accepted by the people (who have been persuaded by reason of their goodness). Bad laws are those that people are forced to accept. In fact, he notes that when a person forces another to do something without that person being persuaded of the truth or rightness of the action, the proper term for such a situation is "force" not "law" (*Mem.* 1.2.45). Both of these ways of experiencing necessity will be important as we proceed with our investigation.

In the next chapter we will take a close look at how necessity functions in the rhetoric of antiquity, especially the rhetoric of praise and blame. As we have seen in this chapter, necessity is often viewed as something over which humans have no control; it is experienced as a malevolent force acting contrary to the wishes of humans. Although it was used by some of the philosophers to account for the laws of nature, when applied to human behavior and responsibility, necessity is often seen to take away responsibility and thus the opportunity for praise or blame. This same view of necessity in relation to praise and blame is picked up by the rhetorical theorists and others who taught rhetoric.

CHAPTER THREE

The Rhetoric of Necessity

The previous chapter demonstrated a wide range of uses for necessity in the literature, philosophy, and religion of the Greco-Roman world. Because of our interest in the rhetoric of necessity in a *bios* of Jesus, it is important to investigate the uses of necessity in rhetorical handbooks and the progymnasmata. This investigation will allow us to see more clearly how necessity functions in various kinds of narrative, but especially those that are useful in writing a biography.

The Beginning of Rhetoric

Rhetoric can trace its roots all the way back to Homer, but it took an interesting turn in Athens in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.E.[1] It was in Athens that ordinary citizens became involved in the process of decision-making. The way in which these ordinary citizens participated in the democracy gave rise to concern on the part of some thinkers of the day. Plato was very concerned that the Sophists were not troubled with the truth of a question; rather, they sought only, in his estimation, to appease the audience – to sway them by emotional appeals and witty strategies. Anyone was allowed to speak on an issue. Demosthenes records the regular cry of the herald to open debate: τίς ἀγορεύειν

[1] Michael Gagarin, "Background and Origins: Oratory and Rhetoric Before the Sophists," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (ed. Ian Worthington; West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 27-36.

βούλεται; (*Cor.* 170).[2] This, too, caused Plato concern because he believed those not trained in philosophy could not know the truth and should not speak.

Plato did not argue against rhetoric *per se*, but against what he considered the improper use of it by the Sophists. Plato's *Gorgias* is an attack upon the unscrupulous use of rhetoric related to the death of Socrates.[3] By the time of Socrates "the art of composing highly probable arguments was often sublimated into the art of hoodwinking the audience in any manner possible."[4] Fancy turns-of-phrase, witty sayings, and pleasing words held audiences spellbound even in the absence of facts or truth. The sort of rhetoric attacked by Plato in the *Gorgias* "is, with its fine language and fallacious arguments, no guide to truth, but is well fitted to delude the credulous and ignorant."[5] This statement reflects the ever-present critique of rhetoric by philosophers and comedians in antiquity.[6] Cicero mentions the dispute between the rhetoricians and philosophers:

> For as I said before, the older masters down to Socrates used to combine with their theory of rhetoric the whole of the study and the science of everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics; it was subsequently, as I have explained, that the two groups of students were separated from one another, by Socrates and then similarly by all the Socratic schools, and the philosophers looked down on eloquence and the orators on wisdom.[7]

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[2] Demosthenes *On The Crown* (ed. Harvey Yunis; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[3] Cicero *De Oratore* 3.31.122

[4] Richard A. Kataula and James J. Murphy, "The Sophists and Rhetorical Consciousness" in *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1994), 21.

[5] W. Rhys Roberts, *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism* (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963), 4.

[6] Andrea Wilson Nightingale, "The Folly of Praise: Plato's Critique of Encomiastic Discourse in the Lysis and Symposium," *The Classic Quarterly* N.S. 43:1 (1993): 112-30,

[7] Cicero *De Oratore* 3.19.72.

Much has been written about the "war" that took place in Athens between Plato's school and the Sophists.[8] The basic question was: who should rule Athens, the people, or the elite? Plato's response was that the elite should rule; the Sophists, like Isocrates and Gorgias, argued that anyone can "learn how collaboratively to govern a city (*polis*) and nobility of birth and high economic status are irrelevant."[9] It was to this end that the Sophists taught rhetoric in Athens.

The conflict may be traced back to Protagoras' break with the Presocratic philosophers. He introduced the idea that man is the measure of all things, whereas the Presocratics had been busy with the idea of Being or first principle (ἀρχή) and had largely overlooked the role of humans in the world. His teaching had three components: 1) the correct use of words; 2) agnosticism toward the gods; and 3) that knowledge is relative to the knower (or the 'man is the measure of all things' doctrine).[10] This last doctrine is the one that proved most problematic for Plato and other philosophers. Plato spent no small amount of time discussing the perceived relativism of Protagoras, especially in his *Protagoras* and *Theaetetus.*[11] Kathleen Freeman notes that the "man doctrine" "is generally taken to mean that each individual's perceptions are immediately true for him at any given moment, and that there is no means of deciding which of several opinions about the same thing is the true one; there is no such thing as 'truer', though

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[8] John Poulakos, *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece* (Columbia, SC: Columbia University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Barrett, Harold. *The Sophists: Rhetoric, Democracy, and Plato's Idea of Sophistry.* (Novata: Chandler & Sharp, 1987).

[9] Bruce McComiskey, *Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002),

[10] Carol Poster, "Protagoras," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.,* n.p., [cited 12 Aug. 2010]. Online: http://www.iep.utm.edu/protagor/.

[11] Oded Balaban, *Plato and Protagoras: Truth and Relativism in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999).

there is such a thing as 'better'."[12] This gave rise to the idea that probability, rather than absolute truth, should be the measure by which all human actions and endeavors are gauged. McComiskey writes,

> In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle argues that all human actions, the subjects of rhetorical deliberation and judgment, are based on probability rather than truth (1.2.14). Politics, for example, requires collaborative inquiry into the relative just or unjust nature of human actions according to socially written laws with their attending relative provisions for punishment. Politics and law have their foundations in socially relative customs (*nomoi*) based on communal truths-as-probabilities rather than universal truth; thus the conduct of political and judicial institutions requires an art that derives its power from probability (that is, rhetoric) and not from universal truth (that is, philosophy).[13]

That some things are better is the idea behind the democratic impulse supported by later Sophists. By arguing and discussing, using rhetorical flourishes and good argumentation, a majority of the people could be convinced of what is "better," and thus a way forward paved. Laurent Pernot notes that the Sophists were probably interested in moving beyond the staleness of what they were being told was univocal "truth."[14]

The charge of relativism against Protagoras has recently been challenged. Takis Poulakos argues that Protagoras' man doctrine "expresses not so much a doctrine of absolute relativism as a principle of self-determination." He continues,

> When looked at not as a philosophical treatise but as a rhetorical summons, the 'man-measure' proclamation announces the advent of a new epoch in which it will be human beings—not the gods, not the tyrants—who will decide the fate of

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[12] Kathleen Freeman, *Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 348.

[13] McComiskey, *Gorgias and the Art of Rhetoric*, 33.

[14] Laurent Pernot, *Rhetoric in Antiquity* (trans. W.E. Higgins; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 14.

> the polis, who will collectively determine its course of action, and who will take credit or assume responsibility for the outcome.[15]

Yet, this opens up the possibility of many ideas about what is "better;" ideas that differ in regard to just about every aspect of human life.

In time, Plato does come around somewhat. His *Phaedrus*, a dialogue in which he "sees a place for rhetorical training as an accompaniment to the man who has acquired knowledge so that he might frame his ideas carefully to insure comprehension and persuasion in his listener," demonstrates the wide acceptance that rhetoric received in Athens in the 4th century B.C.E.[16] Plato believes that that rhetoric is another tool in the hands of the philosopher; yet, philosophy is still the dominant method by which truth can be perceived:

> In *Phaedrus* Plato comes to recognize this fact of the interdependence of rhetoric and philosophy. Unmistakably, Plato will not have this relation forget its obligations to philosophy. The change marked in his thinking does not change the fact that this is still his major concern. That is to say, if philosophy is mute without rhetoric, it is still the case that, and here akin to the arguments from the *Gorgias*, rhetoric without philosophy is a real danger to justice.[17]

Rhetoric in the service of philosophy and rhetoric as a method for arguing any case well continued to have adherents through the Roman period.

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[15] Takis Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates' Rhetorical Education* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 48. Poulakos references Cythia Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[16] Katula and Murphy, "The Sophists and Rhetorical Consciousness," 25.

[17] Eric Ramsey, "A Hybrid Technē of the Soul? Thoughts on the Relation between Philosophy and Rhetoric in *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*," *Rhetoric Review* 17.2 (1999): 257.

Rhetorical Education

By the beginning of the Christian era, rhetorical schools were common throughout the ancient world. As Greek language and culture spread, these rhetorical schools "furnished local inhabitants with an entry into the new civic life and access to the law courts."[18] There were two types of written material that were used in the rhetorical schools: the rhetorical handbooks and the progymnasmata, or preliminary exercises. The handbooks represented some of the earliest attempts to codify rhetorical strategies. They served more as theoretical pieces than as collections of examples and were reserved for the final stages of education.[19] Important rhetorical handbooks include Aristotle's *Rhetorica* (fourth century B.C.E.), Anaximenes of Lampsacus[20] *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (fourth century B.C.E.), the anonymous[21] *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (first century B.C.E.), Cicero's *De Inventione* (first century B.C.E.), and the Quintillian's *Institutio Oratoria* (first century C.E.).

The progymnasmata, a series of graduated exercises, *did* offer the collection of examples for young orators and writers to emulate. These exercises "were assigned by Greek grammarians to students after they had learned to read and write as preparation for

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[18] George A. Kennedy, "Historical Survey of Rhetoric" in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. – A.D. 400* (ed. Stanley Porter; Brill: New York, 1997), 18.

[19] Teresa Morgan, "Rhetoric and Education," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (ed. Ian Worthignton; Chicester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 303-19, 309-10; H.I. Marrou, *A Historoy of Education in Antiquity* (trans. George Lamb; Madison, WI: The University of Waterloo, 1982), 201.

[20] The work, although included among Aristotle's works, is now attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus. P. Chiron, "The *Rhetoric to Alexander*," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (ed. Ian Worthignton; Chicester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 90-106, 90; George Kennedy, "The Genres of Rhetoric," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. – A.D. 400* (ed. Stanley Porter; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 43-50, 43.

[21] Aune notes that some scholars believe it was written by Cornificius. David Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 416.

declamation and were continued in rhetorical schools as written exercises even after declamation had begun."[22] The progymnasmata probably arose sometime in the late fourth or early fifth century B.C.E.; the term first appears in a rhetorical handbook, *Rhetoric for Alexander*, near the end of the fourth century B.C.E. Christy Desmet writes,

> In the classical period, the progymnasmata provided young speakers with prompts for invention, arranged in order of increasing difficulty from narration to argumentation; each exercise built on knowledge from previous ones, but added something new. The progymnasmata also provided civic, or ethical, training to young orators. Theon suggests, perhaps optimistically, that the exercises will promote not only facility in speaking, but also 'honest morals' through exposure to the sayings of wise men. Because they are oriented toward the past, the progymnasmata tended to be culturally conservative rather than progressive. Yet the exercises also encouraged the practice of refutation and suggested, in the manner of the Sophists, that equal arguments can be made on both sides of any issue. Finally, the progymnasmata served to train boys in both oratory and written prose composition.[23]

The progymnasmata included instructions on various exercises including fable, chreia, narrative, maxim, refutation, confirmation and refutation, topic or common-place, encomium, invective, comparison, characterization and personification, ecphrasis or description, proposition, and law. In each case, the purpose of the exercise was given, along with suggestions on how to structure it. Narrative, personification, thesis, encomium, comparison, and refutation are especially important for my thesis since each has an element of necessity in it. The progymnasmata translated by George Kennedy come from Aelius Theon (first century C.E.), Hermogenes (second century C.E.), Aphthonius (fourth century C.E.), and Nicolaus (late fifth century C.E.).

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[22] George Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Atlanta: SBL, 2003), x.

[23] Christy Desmet, "Progymnasmata," in *Classical Rhetorics and Rhetoricians: Critical Studies and Sources* (ed. Michelle Ballif and Michael G. Moran; Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005), 297.

The Rhetoric of Necessity

Ancient rhetoric consists of three branches, each of which deals with a particular area of human life. Aristotle lists forensic (δικανικόν), deliberative (συμβουλευτικόν), and epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικόν) (*Rhet.* 1335b3) as three genres of rhetoric. Later theorists broadly accepted Aristotle's classification, but with the caveat that the boundaries between them are often blurred. George Kennedy notes that Quintilian especially questioned whether there are only three genres. Quintilian's solution was to recognize that "any one speech may involve deliberative, judicial [forensic], and epideictic elements."[24]

Forensic rhetoric deals with accusation and defense, usually having to do with civil or criminal charges (*Ad. Her.* 1.1.2). Deliberative rhetoric has to do with questions regarding future action, usually in a political setting. And, finally, epideictic rhetoric is the rhetoric of praise and blame. Epideictic is concerned with the goodness or badness of the individual and may be associated with virtue and deeds or achievements.

In the case of speeches and written rhetoric, there are particular methods for gathering information, putting it together, and delivering it. There are typically five things a speaker or writer needs to do to prepare and deliver a speech. Pseudo-Cicero lists Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory and Delivery (*Ad. Her.* 1.2.3). A typical juridical speech consists of five elements: 1) introduction (*exordium*); 2) statement of facts (*narratio*); 3) proof (*probatio*); 4) refutation (*refutation*) 5) and conclusion

[24] Kennedy, "The Genres of Rhetoric," 45.

(*peroratio*).[25] The five things the speaker needs to do to prepare and deliver a speech are then used for each of the elements of the speech. Invention, which is nothing other than "the devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing" (*Ad. Her.* 1.2.3) is used to create an introduction, statement of facts, proof, refutation, and conclusion. Then the speaker does the same with arrangement – how best to arrange the material that has been gathered in the invention at each stage of the speech, and so on. The process may be used for a speech that is primarily judicial, deliberative, or epideictic, or for a speech that has components of more than one of the genres.[26]

Each component of each branch has certain starting places (τόποι) from which arguments can be made. For example, if a person wanted to refute a narrative, in addition to the topoi of the unclear, the implausible, the inappropriate, the deficient, the redundant, the unfamiliar, the inconsistent, the disordered, the inexpedient, the unlike, and the false, (*Theon* 76; Kennedy, 27), Theon recommends using the topos of the impossible (*Theon* 93.7-8; Kennedy, 40). Each, several, or a few of these topoi can be used to refute the narrative; those that are selected are the ones that seem most likely to the speaker to persuade his audience. Theon gives an example of the impossible, showing how, by starting with the idea that the narrative is impossible, a person can work up a refutation by saying it was impossible because it was unnatural or because such things did not

[25] David Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Chrisitan Literature and Rhetoric* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 187. Aristotle had argued earlier that a speech required only two parts: the statement of the subject (πρόθεσις) and proof (πίστις) (*Rhet.* 1414a1-3). He did allow that at most a speech may have four parts, adding the introduction (προοίμιον) and the conclusion (ἐπίλογος) (1414b4).

[26] Michael de Brauw, "The Parts of the Speech," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (ed. Ian Worthignton; West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 187-202.

happen at that time. The same applies to epideictic rhetoric, which is used to praise or blame a specific person, city, country, or thing.

No branch of rhetoric, however, is locked into using only specific elements. Each branch uses what it needs from all the rhetorical conventions available. There are no hard and fast rules laid down which have to be followed slavishly.

Theon, in his instructions on writing a thesis, notes, "We shall handle each thesis with whatever topics are possible; for as we indicated repeatedly, it is not possible to treat every problem from every starting point" (*Theon* 121.23-25; Kennedy, 56). Pseudo-Cicero gives a similar understanding of the use of topics and starting points in his discussion of epideictic:

> From this arrangement it is now no doubt clear how we are to treat the categories of praise and censure – with the added provision that we need not use all three for praise or for censure, because often not all of them even apply, and often, too, when they do, the application is so slight that it is unnecessary to refer to them. We shall therefore need to choose those categories which seem to provide the greatest force (*Ad. Her.* 3.7.15 [Caplan, LCL]).

The "three" that he refers to are the three classes of goods that are related to a person: 1) external circumstances; 2) goods of body (physical advantages); and 3) goods of mind (qualities of character) (3.6.10). Each of these three has its own supply of general topoi, or starting places, from which evidence can be mustered. For example, the class of goods called "external circumstances" has the following topoi: "descent, education, wealth, kinds of power, titles to fame, citizenship, friendships, and the like, and their contraries" (*Ad. Her.* 3.6.10 [Kaplan, LCL]). Each one of these offer an idea or a place from which one can begin to gather information or arguments that show the person to be good and virtuous or bad and vicious.

The practice of one kind of rhetoric does not preclude the use of one or both of the others in the same speech or presentation. Theodore Burgess notes that the various divisions of the progymnasmata "had its value for oratory in general, but some forms were recognized as more helpful to the judicial, others to the deliberative, and still others to the epideictic."[27] The exercises that were thought especially useful for epideictic include encomium, invective, common topics, syncrisis, ethopoeia, and thesis. Heinrich Lausberg notes that epideictic rhetoric can stand alone or be part of a speech that is primarily judicial or demonstrative.[28]

Judicial and deliberative cases often include sections of praise or blame (*Ad. Her.* 3.7.15). Quintilian notes that the Romans had discovered a practical use for epideictic:

> Funeral laudations are frequently attached to some public office and are often entrusted to magistrates by order of the Senate; to praise or discredit a witness is important in court; it is a permitted practice to let defendants have people to praise their character; and finally, the published speeches against Cicero's fellow candidates, against Lucius Piso, and against Clodius and Curio, contain invective, and yet were spoken as formal voting statement in the Senate (*Inst.* 3.7.2-3 [Russell, LCL]).

If a defendant is allowed to have someone praise his character (in the service of proving he is not a bad person or is not capable of committing such crime), that person would need to understand epideictic rhetoric. The particular speech of praise would be epideictic, but the overall rhetorical proceeding would be judicial. In one of the declamations ascribed to Quintilian, a young soldier in the army of Marius is repeatedly

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[27] Theodore C. Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," (Ph.D. diss.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), 108 n.1.

[28] Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric* (trans. Matthew T. Blass, Annemiek Jansen, and David E. Orton; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 105.

praised as part of his defense (Declamation 3).[29] Proofs and arguments from the sphere of defense may be included in epideictic presentations (*Inst.*. 3.7.6). Aristotle observes that praise and deliberations are interrelated: what you would praise is what you should suggest, and what you suggest is what you should praise (*Rhet.* 1.9.36). Ancient rhetoric was not a rigid system of rules, but a fluid interchange of forms. D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson note that "the writer's sophistication and sensitivity to the particular circumstances (καιρός) is of far greater importance in the successful execution of the commission that the application of rules and formulas."[30]

Necessity in Rhetoric

In the following pages we will take a close look at how necessity is used in rhetorical writings. Since the goal of the project is to shed light on Luke's use of necessity in his *bios* of Jesus, we will use the progymnasmata of Aelius Theon[31] who is roughly a contemporary of Luke as our guide. There is no need to claim that Luke knew of Theon or studied with him; suffice it to say that Theon's work represents the kind of rhetorical training that someone educated as Luke was would have received.[32]

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[29] Lewis A. Sussman, *The Major Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian: A Translation* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).

[30] D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), xix.

[31] George Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Writings from the Greco-Roman World; Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), xii. The critical text followed here is that of Michel Patillon, *Aelius Theon: Progymnasmata* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002). References to Butts are to James R. Butts, "The 'Progymnasmata' of Theon: A New Text With Translation and Commentary," (PhD diss.; Claremont Graduate School, 1987).

[32] Mikeal Parsons, *Luke: Storyteller, Interpreter, Evangelist* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2007), 19.

The preliminary exercises that Theon deals with are the component parts from which history, epic, poetry, biography, and drama were created. These exercises can be used in any one of the three branches of rhetoric. These are topics, or starting-places, from which the speaker or writer can get ideas for each exercise. As mentioned above, it is not necessary to use all of the topics in a single speech or composition.

Theon begins by saying he is going to "give an account of what is necessary (ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν) to know before undertaking the treatment of hypotheses in order to be properly trained." (*Theon* 59.13-15; Kennedy, 3).[33] This amounts to necessity of expectation and is inherently conditional: *if* you are going to speak or write properly on a variety of issues or causes, then you need to know these things.

As his examples, Theon uses works from authors that precede him by several hundred years. He recommends that his teachers collect examples from "ancient prose works" (*Theon* 66.1; Kennedy, 9) and give them to their students to be memorized. Kennedy notes that these "ancient" works are the "Attic writings by philosophers, historian, and orators of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C."[34] According to H.I. Marrou, the four pillars of education in antiquity were Homer, Euripides, Menander, and Demosthenes.[35] In the progymnasmata of Libanius (fourth century C.E.), characters from Homer are the subject of encomia.[36] Throughout his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle uses

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[33] Translations of Theon are taken from Kennedy, unless otherwise noted.

[34] George Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, 9, n.28.

[35]H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (trans. George Lamb; Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 164.

[36] Craig A. Gibson, *Libanius's* Progymnasmata: *Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Writings from the Greco-Roman World; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008), 197-237.

examples from Homer and the dramatists. Libanius also writes an exemplary encomium of Demosthenes.[37] In historical writing, Thucydides holds pride of place. The progymnasmatist, Aphthonius, provides a model exercise of encomium with Thucydides as its subject.[38] Thus, we see that the works of older authors remain before the eyes of later students.

One of the examples of narration of the mythical sort that Theon suggests to his teachers is the Myth of Er, found in the tenth book of Plato's *Republic* (Theon 66.20-21; Kennedy, 9). It may be safe to assume that Theon used the works that he recommended to others, thus from this last example we know that Theon's students would probably have been familiar with the Necessity from the Myth of Er.

Another of the examples of mythical narration comes from Plato's *Republic* 359d-60d. This is the story of Gyges and the ring of invisibility. Interestingly, the account of the ring provides support for Plato's point that men who are allowed to do whatever they want will be corrupted, no matter how good they appear to be. The story is "great proof, one might argue, that no one is just of his own will (ἑκων), but only from constraint (ἀναγκαζόμενος), in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do wrong, does wrong" (*Rep.* 360c [Shorey, LCL]).

One of the examples given for the practice of theses is a speech ascribed to Lysias which discusses whether the gifts given to a woman at marriage necessarily belong to her in the case of divorce or death (Theon 69.9; Kennedy, 12). In other cases, ancient writers

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[37] Craig A. Gibson, *Libanius's* Progymnasmata: *Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, 237-45.

[38] Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, 108-10.

provide examples of ideals that are praised among all people. In Pericles' "Funeral Oration" (Thucydides *Hist.* 2.43), the soldiers who died are praised for giving their life for the common good. Theon urges his teachers to let the young practice these same kinds of rhetoric found already in the ancients so they may later read the ancient sources themselves and "have the ancients as correctors" (Theon 72.15-16, Kennedy, 15). The exercises that include necessity as part of the invention are: narrative, topos, prosopopoeia, encomium/invective, syncrisis, and thesis.

Narrative. A narrative (διήγημά) is "language descriptive of things that have happened or as though they had happened" (Theon 78:16-17; Kennedy, 28). Theon does not appear to recognize a difference between διήγημά (narrative) and διήγησις (narration); Butts notes that they are interchangeable terms for Theon.[39] Other rhetoricians compared a διήγημά to a piece of poetry (the Shield of Achilles) and the διήγησις to the entire poetical work (the *Iliad*) (Hermogenes 4; Kennedy, 75).
In his discussion of narrative, Theon says there are six elements of a narrative: person, act, place, time, manner, and reason or cause. He distinguishes between a narrative and a historical account; the latter goes into greater detail and covers a wider range of subjects, whereas the former should be limited to issues concerned with the chief point that has been raised (Theon 83:25-30; Kennedy, 32).

[39] Butts, "The Progymnasmata of Theon," 361.

In Theon's judgment, when considering the element "person" in a narrative, the person's fortune (τύχη)[40] is important, as is his or her motive[41] or choice (προαίρεσις). Although Fortune was thought to be fickle by many, the goods that she gave could appear to be great. The emphasis on choice is extremely important in judicial and epideictic proceedings and will be discussed in greater detail below. Theon lists several properties of an action; one couplet is that it is either necessary (ἀναγκαῖον) or not necessary (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον) (Theon 78:29-20; Kennedy, 28). Because Theon later mentions that a action may be done either willingly or unwillingly and necessity is one component of "unwillingly," it seems that necessity is here used in the sense of "required" or "not required." It would not make sense for Theon to list necessity first as an indicator of compulsion or freedom and then do the same thing with it in association with willing or unwilling.

Aristotle had argued earlier that the division of a speech held by some in his day suggested that only forensic rhetoric had need of a narrative (*Rhet.* 3.13.3). He found this absurd, and goes on to discuss the role of narrative in the epideictic style (*Rhet.* 3.16.1-5), as does Nicolaus the Sophist (Kennedy, 138). In Aristotle's estimation, a recounting of the facts in an epideictic speech can show that a man is courageous, or wise, or temperate, or just; therefore, the facts may be narrated over the course of the speech or

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[40] Laurent Pernot, *Histoire et Technique,* (Vol. 1 of La Rhétorique de L'Éloge dans Le Monde Gréco-Romain; Paris: Institue d'Études Augustiniennes, 1993), 174-75. Pernot notes "the sphere of the goods of fortune is susceptible to a grand extension." This is because *tychē* was associated only with *external* goods in many of the theorists, but some extended its influence to cover parts of all three of the classes of goods: external goods, goods related to the body, and goods of the mind or character. Here again, this 'fortune' has become 'good fortune', as is evident in the primary sources where εὐτύχια or εὐτυχης is used.

[41] Butts translates προαίρεσις 'motive' here, 'choice' at 111:18 (Butts, 474), and 'motive' at 113:13 (Butts, 497), while Kennedy uses 'morality' here, 'moral choice' at 111:18 (Kennedy, 51), and 'choice' at 113:13 (Kennedy, 53).

document, instead of all at once (*Rhet.* 1416b2). In reference to those who had argued that a narrative must be short, Aristotle says the length depends on what you are trying to accomplish. A speaker "must say all that will make the facts clear, or create the belief that they have happened or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish to make them" (*Rhet.* 1416b4-5). The length of narrative in epideictic should be relative to the popularity of the subject. If not many people know what the subject did, a longer narrative (or more short narratives) will be needed.

The author of *Rhetoric for Alexander* lists several topoi available for arguing for or against an action. The actions must be just, lawful, expedient, honorable, pleasant, and easily practicable, or if the course of action a person is urging is disagreeable, he must show that they are feasible and necessary (ἀναγκαῖα) (*Rhet. Alex.*1421b25). The one who dissuades uses the opposite arguments, which includes the argument that the proposed action is unnecessary (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον) (1421b30). As he describes each topos in more detail, he says the necessary actions are "those the performance of which does not rest with ourselves but which are as they are in consequence, as it were, of divine or human compulsion" (1422a20 [Freese, LCL). It would seem that one method of arguing for an action is to claim that the action under question is something that cannot be avoided, either due to some other human or to a god or gods; however, this move is only used if the audience is put off by the initial call for action.

Quintilian seems to oppose this notion of necessity of action in a deliberative context (*Inst.* 3.8.22-25). He does not find a place for necessity as one of the main heads for advice. Though there is a necessity to suffer *if* you do not yield to the force that is pressuring you, you have no necessity to yield. He assumes the definition of necessity is:

"that into which men are driven for fear of something worse" (*Inst. Orat.*3.8.23 [Russell, LCL]). He says this points to the issue being "expediency." His defense is based on the claim that there really is no room to debate about what is necessary – it simply must be done (*Inst. Orat.*3.8.25). He recommends replacing "necessary" with "possible." The contrast is between what is expedient and what is honorable. Some preferred honor over expediency, others, who were more practical, preferred expediency.

Cicero brings yet another definition of necessity into the deliberative mix. He says the most important considerations for deliberative are what is possible or not, and what is necessary or not. Using the definition of necessity as "something that is an indispensable condition of our security or freedom" (*Part. or.* 25.83 [Rackham, LCL]), he notes that necessary things should "take precedence in public policy of all the remaining considerations" (ibid.). He goes on to observe that even things that may not appear to be necessary but are very important may just as well be necessary (*Part. or.* 25.84).

Not only may an act be either necessary or unnecessary, the manner in which it is performed involves necessity. An act may be performed either unwillingly (ἀκουσίως) or willingly (ἑκουσίως) (Theon 79:12-13; Kennedy, 29). Actions done unwillingly may be due to ignorance (ἄγνοιαν), chance (τύχην), or necessity (ἀνάγκην). These three elements of an action are important in ethical writings from the period.

A narrative in a defensive speech is the part of the speech that gives the statement of the facts, what actually happened or is alleged to have happened. According to Cicero, there are three questions that arise relative to any case: its reality, its identity, or its quality (*Part. or.* 9.33). Each has a particular method associated with it: reality >

inference; identity > definition, and quality > ratiocination (reasoning). Inference is related to "probability and the essential characteristics of things" (10.34 [Sutton and Rackham, LCL]). Probabilities are derived from the several components that make up a narrative: person, place, time, actions, etc. It is probable that younger people will act in predictable ways (10.34). The place where the action happened brings its own inferences; it is probable that a stone dropped in a mountainous region will roll downhill. Similarly, it is probable that an action is either intentional or unintentional; Cicero lists necessity as one of the subheadings under the unintentional. (*Part. or.* 11.38). Also, he points out that, when considering the quality of an action, the speaker must know that "the deed was rightly done for the sake of avoiding or avenging pain or in the name of piety or modesty or religious scruple or patriotism, or finally because of necessity or ignorance or accident" (12.42 [Sutton and Rackham, LCL]).

Many, including Quintilian, believed the narrative should be persuasive (*Inst.* 4.2.31). In fact, the elements of the narrative mentioned (above) by Theon suggest the narrative should be persuasive. The sixth element is reason or cause, by which, Theon observes, the narrative will be more credible (Theon 84.22; Kennedy, 33). Cicero also notes that the narrative (*narration*) and the proof (*confirmation*) work together to "procure belief in what is said" (*Part. or.* 8.27).

Theon gives an example of a 'straightforward" narrative from Thucydides: "A force of Thebans a little over three hundred in number made an armed entry during the first watch of the night into Plataea in Boeotia, a town in alliance with Athenians, and so on" (Theon 87.25; Kennedy, 36). This simple narrative may be elaborated a bit, expressed as a question, an enquiry, a command, a wish, or even an oath (Theon 88-89;

Kennedy, 36-37). This short example of a narrative as an exercise matches what we find in the exercises of Libanius, where no narrative is longer than a short paragraph, but can be as short as two sentences.[42] But, according to Theon, it is also acceptable to weave narratives together to form a longer story such as a history or biography (Theon 86.1: Kennedy, 34).

As part of the narration about the events that had unfolded up to the point of the speech asking for help, the speaker in Isocrates' *Plataicus* asks the Athenians to consider two things. First, are the Thebans being just in their infliction of penalties on the Thebans? Second, does it seem "consistent with the dignity of the city of the Plataeans, without their consent but under compulsion, to accept such dependence under the Thebans?" (*Plat.* 8 [Van Hook, LCL]).

Plutarch narrates the situation that led to Theseus breaking the yoke of the Minoan tribute. The time of the third tribute had come. Because of something that had happened many years earlier, it was necessary (ἔδει) for the fathers who had young sons to present them for a lottery (*Thes.* 17.1) from which seven (along with seven maidens) would be chosen for King Minos. The citizens of Athens were upset with King Aegeus because he had no legitimate son to put in the drawing when the time came. The young men and women were put into a labyrinth in which all were killed by the Minotaur. Theseus volunteered to go, killed the Minotaur, and won their freedom from the lottery. Also, in order to show the greatness of Lycurgus, Plutarch tells how when Polydectes (his older brother) died, it was necessary (ἔδει) in the minds of most people that Lycurgus become king (*Lyc.* 3.1). It was discovered that Polydectes' wife was with child, and

[42] Craig A. Gibson, *Libanius's* Progymnasmata: *Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, 9-41.

when she had a baby boy, Lycurgus gave the kingship to him. This narrative, along with the one above, is used to show the greatness of an action of a subject being praised.

Topos.[43] In his discussion of topos, Theon mentions moral choice (προαιρέσεως), which is a significant component of all things ethical.[44] A topos is "language amplifying something that is acknowledged to be either a fault or a brave deed" (Theon 106:5; Kennedy, 42). One of the primary considerations when constructing a topos is the moral choice of the person. What were they thinking when they committed such a crime, or such a good deed? In his treatise on the same subject, Aphthonius addresses the "intention" of the person who committed a deed like tyranny. Because tyrants clearly act after much consideration, he asks how "is it just to dismiss something fully intended before the actions" (Kennedy, 107). The point of the topos is to highlight the quality of the deed. The deed is shown to be either really good or horribly bad, and a person who would *choose* to do such a thing is comparably treated.

Theon says the topos may be constructed like a judicial speech, with the several parts (Theon 107.20, Kennedy, 44). After the introduction and the narration, one should take up the proofs. After addressing intent, another avenue of attack (or praise) is the thing with which the crime is concerned; here, necessity has a role. If the topos happens to be directed against a thief, a powerful argument is that the thief is taking money,

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[43] This is the preliminary exercise. Elsewhere, τόπος refers to the starting places from which arguments in support of or against an issue can be obtained. See James R. McConnell, "The Topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts," (PhD dissertation; Baylor University, 2009) and Johan Thom , "The Mind is its Own Place: Defining the Topos," in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (eds. J.T. Fitzgerald, T.H. Olbricht, and L.M. White; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 555-73.

[44] Josef Martin, *Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode* (München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1974), 203 points out that προαιρέσεως is only used in encomia written about people since plants and other inanimate objects cannot "choose."

something that is one of the most necessary things (ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἐστίν) for humans (Theon 107.25, Kennedy, 44). The argument then goes on to show why money is necessary for everyone.

The exercises in Libanius include topoi about a murderer, a traitor, a physician-poisoner, against a tyrant, and for a tyrannicide. These are quite lengthy exercises running to several paragraphs with several headings: a brief introduction, argument from the opposite, exposition of the act, from comparison, from antecedent acts, way of thinking, rejection of pity, and exhortation.[45]

Prosopopoeia. The exercise called prosopopoeia is "the introduction of a person to whom words are attributed that are suitable to the speaker and have an indisputable application to the subject discussed . . ." (Theon 115.10; Kennedy, 47). What would a man say to his wife when leaving on a journey? How would a general address his soldiers when preparing them for battle? Here, as we saw above with Cicero's instructions related to the reality of a cause (what we infer from essential character), probability is important. The character must speak in a way that is appropriate for his age, the occasion, the place, and his social status (Theon 115.20-25, Kennedy, 47). If the expectations for a character are missed, the effect will be lost. For example, a younger man is expected to speak with simply and modestly, whereas an older man will speak from knowledge and experience. Similarly, a speech before a group of women will sound differently that one given to a group of soldiers. In other words, each speaker must speak as he ought.

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[45] Craig A. Gibson, *Libanius's* Progymnasmata: *Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, 141-93.

A prosopopoeia may be used to console someone else. In this case, support can be given for the cause by showing that what happened was necessary (ἀναγκαῖον), common to everyone, and unintentional (ἀκούσιον) (Theon 117.5, Kennedy, 49). Here, again, necessity is associated with the unintentional.

Necessity is again linked to the unintentional when the prosopopoeia is used to ask forgiveness. The first proof offered is that "the action was unintentional, either through ignorance or chance or necessity" (Theon 117.25; Kennedy, 49). In Sophocles' *Electra,* the main character has an extended dialogue with the chorus of Argive women in an attempt to explain her actions of continual lament for her long-departed father, Agamemnon. The Argive women think she grieves too much. She argues that if she is doing something wrong, they must pardon her: "since a hard compulsion forced me to do this, you must bear with me (σύγγνωτε)" (*El.* 256-57).

In the 4th century C.E. progymnasmata of Libanius, there are twenty-seven examples of prosopopoeia in his progymnasmata. The first example is entitled, "What Words Would Medea Say When She Is about to Murder Her Children?" Toward the end of the speech, Medea says, "You have come, O children, under the sword, you have come. Your father forced this upon you through me; for if he had been a good man, none of this would have been necessary (ἔδει)."[46] While not specifically stating that she is asking for forgiveness, Medea removes the blame from herself and places it on Jason. It is his actions in marrying the princess that cause Medea to hate him to the point of destroying her children because they are also his. Perhaps more in line with prosopopoeia in relation to forgiveness is example three from Libanius: "What Words

[46] Gibson, *Libanius's* Progymnasmata, 361.

Would Achilles Say Over the Dead Patroclus?" Achilles mourns his friend, and then says, "But since it was necessary (ἐχρῆν) to suffer this—as I wish it had not been—I will not also leave you behind dead, but will defend you as best I can."[47]

Encomium/Invective. The encomium is "language revealing the greatness of virtuous actions and other good qualities belonging to a particular person" (Theon 110; Kennedy, 50). This is in distinction to a topos (discussed above), which is about a *type* of person (e.g. a thief) rather than a particular person (e.g. Achilles). Theon dispenses with the various labels for praising the gods (hymn), praising a person (encomium), or praising the dead (*epitaphios*) because, in each case, the method is the same. Theon's use of "encomium" covers the broad class of rhetoric called epideictic.[48]

Here again, we encounter the three classes of goods related to humans: 1) external goods; 2) goods of the body; and 3) goods of the mind. D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson observe the connection of these three classes of goods with ethics:

> We find, however, naturally enough, that the bases of praise are fundamental notions of ethics which derive from the early sophists and philosophers: the division of 'goods' into those of mind, body, and circumstances; the notions that dominance of others by the mind is of special significance; and the classification of good qualities of character and actions under the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance.[49]

This connection with ethics was also noted by Cicero's son at the end of his father's instructions for preparing a discourse of praise or blame: "You have given me brief instruction not merely as to how to praise another but also as to how to endeavor to be able to be deservedly praised myself" (*Part. or.* 23.83).

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[47] Gibson, *Libanius's* Progymnasmata*,* 365.

[48] Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," 119-121.

[49] Russell and Wilson, *Menander Rhetor,* 1981.

We have already encountered the elements of the various classes of goods in our discussion of narrative. External goods include good birth, education, friendship, reputation, official position, wealth, good children, and a good death (Theon 110.1-5; Kennedy, 50). Theon does not include a person's fortune (τύχη) in this list; others did. The *Ad Herennium* describes external circumstances as those that "can happen by chance or by fortune, favorable or adverse" (*Ad Her.* 3.6.10 [Caplan, LCL]). Quintilian also mentions that the blessings of Fortune are sometimes important: "Fortune (*Fortuna*) too sometimes confers dignity, as with kings and princes (for they have a richer soil to display their virtue), but sometimes also lets the slightness of a man's resources enhance the glory of his good deeds" (*Inst.* 3.7.13 [Russell, LCL]).

Theon agrees with Aristotle who rejected the gifts of fortune as a source of praise. In *Rhet.* 1367b32, Aristotle connects praise with acting according to moral purpose (προαίρεσιν). He believes that a man who can be shown to have done the same thing several times will be thought to have acted according to moral purpose. This is why it is important to "assume that accidents and strokes of good fortune are due to moral purpose; for if a number of similar examples can be adduced, they will be thought to be signs of virtue and moral purpose" (*Rhet.* 1367b32 [Freese, LCL]). The fact that the person does the same thing several times leads one away from the belief that it happens by accident or fortune. Instead, as Meredith Cope has said, the repetition leads one to believe that the character of the person has been formed in this way.[50]

Isocrates, in his praise of Evagoras, says that Evagoras was "proud, not of the successes that were due to Fortune (διὰ τύχην), but of those that came about through his

[50] Meredith Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Vol. 1; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877)., 179.

own efforts" (*Evag.* 45 [Van Hook, LCL]). Likewise, Aristotle notes that "the statement that 'one ought not to pride oneself on good which are due to fortune (διὰ τύχην), but on those which are due to oneself alone,' when expressed in this way has the force of a suggestion; but expressed thus, 'he was proud, not of good which were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone,' it becomes praise" (*Rhet.* 1368a36) [Freese, LCL]. Iamblichus records that Pythagoras taught that all success that comes by chance (τύχην), as well as despotism, injustice, and human greediness are worth nothing (*De Vita Pyth.* 218).

Gifts that come from fortune are not a source of praise for many authors of rhetorical works. Even those who include fortune among the list of external goods qualify it. In the *Ad Herennium*, how the person used the advantages or disadvantages from external or physical goods must be explained (*Ad Her.* 3.7.13). Also, Quintilian further clarifies his statements about Fortune: "All external goods, and all things that come to men by chance, are praised not because a man has them, but because he has made honorable use of them" (*Inst.* 3.7.13 [Russell, LCL]). Even though some rhetoricians are willing to include gifts of fortune in external goods, it is really the way the person used them that helped to determine his character. Students were cautioned to keep external goods in the background because, unless they were going to be explained, congratulation is more appropriate for many external goods than praise (*Rhet. Alex.* 1440b20).

Plutarch offers Theseus as an example of a man with a good birth who clearly believed his actions were what proved his noble birth (*Thes.* 4-6). His father, Aegeus, had been tricked into having intercourse with Theseus' mother, Aethra. Aegeus had left a

pair of sandals and a sword under a large rock with instructions for Aethra that if the child she bore was a son who became man enough to lift the rock and take the objects, he should be sent to Aegeus in Athens at once. Theseus became that man, but when urged by his mother to go to Athens by sea because the land route was filled with robbers and brigands, he refused to take the ship. He chose the land-route so that he might, as his cousin Heracles before him had done, destroy those vile creatures that robbed innocent passers-by. Plutarch records,

> Accordingly, he thought it a dreadful and unendurable thing that his famous cousin should go out against the wicked everywhere and purge land and sea of them, while he himself ran away from the struggles which lay in his path, disgracing his reputed father by journeying like a fugitive over the sea, and bringing to his real father as proofs of his birth only sandals and a sword unstained with blood, instead of at once offering noble deeds and achievements as the manifest mark of his noble birth (*Thes.* 7.2 [Perrin, LCL]).

The noble birth by itself was not enough for Theseus; he sought deeds and achievements that would prove that his noble birth was praiseworthy.

At least one modern author has misunderstood the use of external goods in an encomium. Jerome Neyrey, in an important article on the Fourth Gospel, discusses several encomiastic elements that he believes show two very different attitudes toward Jesus.[51] He observes "two antithetical encomia about Jesus, one representative of how outsiders view Jesus (=vituperation, because it seeks to vilify him) and another characteristic of insiders (=encomium, because it claims maximum honor for Jesus on the same encomiastic points)."[52] He uses the topics of 'geography,' 'generation,'

[51] Jerome Neyrey, "Encomium versus Vituperation: Contrasting Portraits of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 126.3 (2007): 529-52.

[52] Neyrey, "Encomium versus Vituperation," 539.

‘education,’ ‘deeds of the soul,’ and ‘death’ to show how the author of the Fourth Gospel creates these two encomia.

Neyrey assumes that the author of the Fourth Gospel follows the virtue method for arranging an encomium. However, the virtue method calls for more demonstration of virtue than Neyrey gleans from the Fourth Gospel. It is appropriate to arrange the account of external goods not “simply and in any random order but in each case showing that the subject used the advantage prudently and as he ought, not mindlessly—for goods that result from chance rather than moral choice are the least source of praise” (Theon 111). Theon gives examples related to the proper use of advantages. He then goes on to point out that the student must do the same thing with actions: arrange “each one under one of the virtues, then describing the deeds (that exemplify the virtue): for example, saying first that he was temperate and then adding immediately what he did temperately; and similarly with the other virtues” (Theon 112; Kennedy, 52).

Neyrey does not take this second step in his article. He does a good job of showing how traditional encomiastic topics were used by the author of the Fourth Gospel, but not how these then translate into praise of Jesus. While these external goods are important, *how* Jesus used them is far more important.

In addition to the external goods, a student could draw topics from the physical goods or goods of the body. These include health, strength, beauty, and acuteness of sense (Butts – “quick sensibility”) (Theon 110.5; Kennedy, 50). Goods of the mind are associated with the actions that come from them. In addition to the cardinal virtues of courage, prudence, justice, and temperance, Theon adds “pious, generous, magnanimous,

and the like," no doubt in keeping with Aristotle's list of ethical virtues (Theon 110.10, Kennedy, 50).[53]

Theon creates a list of actions that can be used as topics for praise. Actions that are especially praiseworthy include "those done for others rather than ourselves; and done for the sake of the honorable, not the expedient or the pleasant; and in which the toil is that of the doer but the benefit is common; and through with the populace experiences benefits" (Theon 110.15; Kennedy, 51). Aristotle has a similar, perhaps even longer, list.[54] Aristotle's list includes 1) things done for honor, rather than money (1366b16); 2) not done for his own sake, but for his country or others (ibid.); 3) a good reputation after death (1367a19); 4) to take vengeance on one's enemies (1367a24); 5) goes beyond what is expected (1367b31), and 6) has done a good thing repeatedly (1367b32).

In his praise of Athens in the *Panegyricus,* Isocrates chooses several items to show that Athens has the right to rule the Greeks. Athens first held the hegemony of the Greeks (*Paneg.* 22); she is the oldest, greatest, and most renowned city in the world (23). The Athenians did not conquer their homeland, as many had done; rather, they sprang from the very soil itself (25). Demeter gave the most necessary thing to humans at Athens: grain (28). He asks does it not make sense that the people most deserving of the special rites of the mystery religion at Athens be given to a people who "are admitted by all men to have been the first to exist, to be endowed with the greatest capacity for the arts, and to be the most devoted to the worship of the gods?" (33 [Norlin, LCL]). These

[53] Aristotle's list of ethical virtues is found at *Rhet.* 1.9.5.

[54] Remember, these lists were not meant to be exhaustive. The large number of variables related to one life would provide numerous topics from which to draw. What worked well in one area in relation to one person might not work so well before a different audience.

things, and the many others that Isocrates draws upon, are those elements that he believes best highlights the greatness of Athens.

Lucian's life of Demonax recounts that Demonax "wanted nothing for himself, but helped his friends in a reasonable way" (*Dem.* 8). Lucian is more interested in the witty sayings of Demonax than in specific accomplishments that show his virtues. But, this has to do with Lucian's purpose and interest in presenting the life of Demonax; he chose the things about Demonax that he wanted to emphasize. He ends the life by noting that Demonax lived to be almost one hundred years old and everyone respected him and showed him honor (*Dem.* 63). He received great honor at his funeral and was carried to his final resting place by the philsophers (*Dem.* 67).

Once the list for the subject has been compiled, Theon offers advice on how to arrange the encomium. He writes,

> Immediately after the prooemion we shall speak of good birth and other external and bodily goods, not arranging the account simply and in any random order but in each case showing that the subject used the advantage prudently and as he ought (ὡς ἔδεῖ)—for goods that result from chance (ἐκ τύχη) rather than moral choice (κατὰ προαίρεσιν) are the least source of praise (Theon 111.10-15, Kennedy, 51).

Two things are worth noting. First, it is important for Theon that any external or physical advantage not be listed directly as a point of praise; rather, the advantage must be connected to actions or occurrences that show how the subject used the advantage properly or "as he ought." This is not simply because Theon seems to prefer the virtue method over the chronological method; even those who approach the encomium from a chronological point of view still stress the need both to show how the person used the advantage and to associate actions with virtue. For example, Quintilian, whose overall arrangement of the encomium is chronological by period (before the subject was born,

during his lifetime, and after his death) says there are two ways to handle goods of the mind: 1) follow successive stages of his life, or 2) set his actions under the appropriate virtue (*Inst.* 3.7.10). As mentioned above, in his discussion of how to arrange the external circumstance, he notes the need to show that the subject made honorable use of the advantage (3.7.13).

Making honorable use of some advantage is fairly traditional among rhetoricians. Isocrates highlights the point in his defense of himself: "For, when a man has superior talents whether for speech or for action, one cannot fairly charge it to anything but fortune (τύχην), but when a man makes good and temperate use of the power which nature has given him, as in my own case, all the world ought in justice to commend his character" (*Antid.* 36). He also provides another example of this practice in his correction of Polycrates' attempt to write an encomium of Busiris. After discussing Polycrates' shortcomings, Isocrates turns to the noble lineage of Busiris:

> Of the noble lineage of Busiris who would not find it easy to speak? His father was Poseidon, his mother Libya the daughter of Epaphus the son of Zeus, and she, they say, was the first woman to rule as queen and to give her own name to her country. Although fortune had given him such ancestors, these alone did not satisfy his pride, but he thought he must also leave behind an everlasting monument to his own valor (*Bus.* 10 [Van Hook, LCL]).

External goods are not praiseworthy in and of themselves.

Also, the phrase ὡς ἔδεῖ connects Theon's statement with statements made by Aristotle about how a person should act. This idea of "ought" suggests some kind of expectation or requirement that should be met. We have already seen that the three classes of goods used in epideictic rhetoric are derived from ethics. It will be helpful to take a brief survey of how necessity is used in ethics, with Aristotle as our guide.

A critical consideration for Aristotle is how to assign praise and blame. Since ethics is about living a good life according to virtue (the mean between two extremes), it is important to know when a person is being virtuous. It is also important to know to what degree a person is responsible for their actions. Both voluntariness and choice are limits to a person's responsibility, and necessity impinges upon both.

Praise and blame are assigned to actions that are voluntary (ἑκουσίος), while excuse, and sometimes pity, are given to involuntary (ἀκουσίοις) (*Eth. nic.* 3.1.1-2).[55] C.C.W. Taylor says Aristotle uses ἑκων and ἀκων for agents, and ἑκουσίον and ακουσίον for actions of agents.[56] Involuntary actions are those done under force (βίαια) and through ignorance. Voluntary actions are those in which the doer knows full well what it is that he is doing and in which no outside force causes him to act. Aristotle is aware that it is difficult always to know when an action has been done under force or in ignorance.[57]

Aristotle believes that the good life should be one that is the result of actions that are willingly chosen by the person. He writes, "For if living finely depends on things that come by fortune or by nature, it would be beyond the hopes of many men, for then its attainment is not to be secured by effort, and does not rest with men themselves and is not a matter of their own conduct" (*Eth. eud.* 1215a10 [Rackham, LCL]). A little later, he adds necessity (ἀνάγκη) to the list of things that produce actions that are not

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[55] Gailann Rickert, ΕΚΩΝ *and* ΑΚΩΝ *in Early Greek Thought* (American Classical Studies 20; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1989) discusses the circumstantial uses of these two words through Aristotle.

[56] C.C.W. Taylor, *Aristotle* Nicomachean Ethics: Books II-IV (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2006), 125.

[57] See the excellent discussion of this issue in Sarah Broadie, *Ethics With Aristotle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 124-78.

praiseworthy. Again, the discussion is directly related to the preference for things done by the man himself. He has been discussing causes and how they impinge on actions (*Eth. eud.* 1222b15-1223a9). Some things may not be "up to" the man, but "of things which it depends on him to do or not to do he is himself the cause, and what he is the cause of depends on himself." He continues:

> And since goodness and badness and the actions that spring from them are in some cases praiseworthy and in other cases blameworthy (for praise and blame are not given to things that we possess from necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) or fortune (τύχης) or nature (φύσεως) but to things of which we ourselves are the cause, since for things of which another person is the cause, that person has the blame and the praise), it is clear that both goodness and badness have to do with things where a man is himself the cause and origins of his actions (1223a9-10 [Rackham, LCL]).

Things of which we ourselves are the cause stand in distinction to those things that come about by necessity, fortune, or nature.

The late second century C.E. historian, Cassius Dio retains this view of assigning praise and blame. He writes:

> Benefits lie rather within the actual choice (προαιρέσει) of men and are not brought about by necessity, or by ignorance, or anger, or deceit, or anything of the sort, but are performed voluntarily (ἑκουσίας) by a willing and eager mind. For this reason it is proper to pity, admonish, and instruct those who commit any offense, but to admire, love, and reward those who do right (*Hist.* 8.11 [Cary and Foster, LCL]).

Again, the willingness even to defer blame for actions that are done under necessity or through ignorance is clear. Both gods and men grant pardon for acts done involuntarily (*Hist.* 8.17).

Aristotle defines what he means by actions done under force (βια) and how this relates to voluntary and involuntary. He equates force and necessity against the voluntary (*Eth. eud*. 1224a10). Against its nature, a stone travels upward by force and under

necessity. When he turns to the causes of human action in the *Rhetoric*, he says, "Now, all human actions are either the result of man's efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance (τύχην), others to necessity (ἀνάγκης). Of those due to necessity, some are to be attributed to compulsion (βία), others to nature (φύσει), so that the things which men do not do of themselves are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion" (*Rhet.* 1368b7-1369a8 [Freese, LCL]). The things that humans do "not of themselves" are things for which they will receive neither praise nor blame.

The second point in Theon's statement about external advantages is related to Aristotle's point about determining responsibility. How can it be determined that a person has done something "of themselves"? These are the types of things for which one can receive praise or blame. For Aristotle, the answer has to do with the person's moral choice[58] (προαίρεσιν) (*Eth. nic.* 3.3.19-20). Theon clearly prefers actions for which a moral choice can be shown over those that come from circumstances beyond the control of the individual, in this case ἐκ τύχης. Deliberate choice is the mark of a man worthy of praise (*Rhet.* 1367b32). Choice of good or evil, not mere opinion about them, is what determines character (*Eth. nic.* 3.2.11).[59] Richard Sorabji notes that Aristotle believed that deliberate choice is the result of deliberation and desire and leads to deliberate action.[60] It is this deliberate choosing of an action that produces praise if the action is

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[58] Others translate προαίρεσιν 'decision.' See Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe, *Aristotle* Nicomachaen Ethics: *Translation, Introduction, and Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); *Aristotle:* Nicomachean Ethics (trans. Terence Irwin; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999), 129.

[59] J.O. Urmson, *Aristotle's Ethics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1988), 49-53.

[60] Richard Sorabji, *Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980). 228.

virtuous, but blame if it is vicious. The nature of the act is less important than the nature of the choice.[61] A praiseworthy act is one that is voluntarily chosen and results in virtuous action.

In his speech before the Thousand, Pythagoras instructs the fathers to administer their family matters according to moral choice (*De Vita Pyth* 47). He is concerned that they should intentionally pay attention to their family affairs and not treat them nonchalantly. He further encourages the fathers to try to be loved by their offspring, not because of mere nature (διὰ τὴν φύσιν) or biological ties, but because of choice. The children are not responsible for the biological relationship, but they choose to love a good father.[62]

Likewise, Isocrates believes that a man who chooses to be virtuous is much better than one who happens to be so by nature. The naturally-moral person may yield to persuasion. He writes:

> Now men who are moral by nature (φύσει) deserve our praise and admiration, but still more do those deserve it who are such in obedience to reason; for those who are temperate by chance (τύχῃ) and not by principle may perchance be persuaded to change, but those who, besides being so inclined by nature, have formed the conviction that virtue is the greatest good in the world, will, it is evident, stand firm in this position all their lives (*Nic.* 47 [Norlin, LCL]).

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[61] Dennis Klimchuk, "Aristotle on Necessity and Voluntariness," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 19.1 (2002):1-19.

[62] John Dillon and Jackson Hershbell, *Iamblichus* On the Pythagorean Way of Life: *Text, Translations, and Notes* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991), 71. Dillon and Hershbell apparently prefer a reading of προαίρεσιν that is closer to 'character.' But this misses the connection with 'voluntary' that is essential to the choice of the children. I follow the translation of Thomas Taylor, *Iamblichus: Life of Pythogras* (London: J.M. Watkins, 1818), 22: "That they should likewise endeavor to be beloved by their offspring, not through nature, of which they were not the causes, but through deliberate choice: for this is voluntary beneficence."

Again, the de-emphasis on an excellence that arrives by a means that is beyond the control of the subject is clear.[63]

Theon's phrase ὡς ἔδει in relation to how a person should use external or physical goods has a parallel Aristotle's ethics as well. Each virtue represents a middle position between two extremes. Aristotle provides various labels for the conditions that result from being on either side of the mean. "Quick-tempered" is the label for someone who feels "the emotion of anger sooner than he ought (δεῖ)" (*Eth. eud.* 1221b15 [Rackham, LCL]). This ought suggests a norm. The norm seems to be how a good person (presumably one who has developed a good character over time) would feel the emotion. In regard to either pleasure or pain, someone may feel the emotions either excessively absolutely or in relation to some standard, "for instance [they] are felt more than ordinary men feel them; whereas the good man feels in the proper way (ὡς δεῖ) (*Eth. eud.* 1222a15 [Rackham, LCL]). This is the necessity of expectation or requirement, a type of necessity that is at the heart of ethics. In general, the necessity of expectation, custom, norm, or requirement applies to many areas of life in the ancient word.

Plutarch takes both Theseus and Romulus to task for not maintaining the position of king. Theseus became too democratic, whereas Romulus became more of a tyrant. To be a king requires preserving the kingship: "For the ruler must (δεῖ) preserve first of all the realm itself, and this is preserved not less by refraining from what is unbecoming than by cleaving to what is becoming" (*Comp. Thes. Rom.* 2.1-2 [Perrin, LCL]). The expectation is that a king will act like a king and govern as a king should govern.

[63] See also *Paneg.* 91 and 132 where the same idea is present.

When Lycurgus got mad because the polemarchs (military commanders) failed to send him his victuals at home, he failed to perform the necessary sacrifice, and he was fined (*Lyc.* 12.3). There was an expectation that Lycurgus (and everyone else) would offer the proper and required sacrifice.

Lycurgus put together specific regimens for the education and training of young men. This included stealing their food (and not getting caught),[64] as well as singing and answering tough questions before the *eiren*. If the boy failed to perform adequately or to answer correctly, he was punished. But, the punishment had to be fair or ὡς δεῖ, and so the punishment was given before the elders and magistrates so they could judge how the punishment compared to requirement or expectation (*Lyc.* 33.3).

In the preliminary exercises of encomium and syncrisis, necessity, ignorance, and fortune are limiting factors for praiseworthy deeds. These terms are often found together in discussions about human action, and, along with "nature" which also appears with necessity and fortune, belong to the category of things over which humans have no control. It is precisely those things over which humans *have* control that are the best gauges of virtue or goodness. Praise is not given for things that are necessary; however, necessity often plays an important role in assessing character, primarily in relation to how a person matches up with the ideals of virtue. There is a real tension between the necessity of expectation that describes the life a virtuous person should live and the claim that a person acted out of necessity.

[64] Plutarch includes an account of one of them who was so determined not to get caught that he allowed the fox that he had stolen and hidden under his coat to tear out his insides "rather than have his theft detected" (*Lyc.* 23.1 [LCL, Perrin]).

Evidence from Greco-Roman literature supports this. Plutarch's biographies, of all biographies, are perhaps the most concerned with moral issues. Plutarch approaches his *Lives* by writing a *bios* of a famous Greek followed by a *bios* of a famous Roman. In many cases, he follows the two lives with a *syncrisis*. The goal of the lives is to put before his readers good examples to emulate. As Tim Duff has noted, "Plutarch claims, throughout his *Parallel Lives*, to reveal his subjects' character and thereby improve his readers' character."[65] By observing the lives of great men, his readers can see how to live a virtuous life. Plutarch does not only wish to create desire in his readers; he wants them to be changed by the experience. The payoff is great: "The reader's character, then, is molded as he observes and investigates the character of the great men of the past. By doing this, he gains προαίρεσις, gains the ability to make correct moral choices."[66]

A word should be said here about the connection between *bioi* (ancient biographies) and epideictic literature. The encomium is very important for this connection. Burgess writes, "No single term represents the aim and scope of epideictic literature so completely as the word ἐγκώμιον."[67] The close relationship between encomium, which has as its goal to praise the good deeds and actions of a specific person, and *bios*, which has as its goal to present the life of a great figure in history, is noted in their structure and content.[68] Michael Martin has recently shown that that encomiastic

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[65] Tim Duff, *Plutarch's* Lives*: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 1.

[66] Duff, *Plutarch's* Lives, 39.

[67] Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," 113.

[68] Arnaldo Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (exp. ed.; Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), 49-50.

topic lists were essential as guides for the composition of ancient biographies.[69] His summary is worth quoting in its entirety:

> In sum, the lists can potentially provide a great deal of insight into biographical composition. Indeed . . . close conformity to the lists is evident in the *bios* genre with regard to (a) the number and order of topics covered in the narrative as a whole, (b) the number and order of topics covered in syncrises within the narrative, and (c) the manner in which individual topics are handled. Such conformity shows that the cultural conceptions of personhood attested in the lists quite naturally influenced biographical composition. More importantly, it shows that the *lists themselves*, given that they were prescriptive for written composition, influenced biographical composition.[70]

Craig Gibson agrees: "The exercise in encomium would have helped students think systematically about the lives of praiseworthy historical characters, a skill useful in writing biography and history."[71] Jerome Neyrey writes, "Other genres of literature, such as bioi, funeral orations, and similar forms of epideictic rhetoric frequently organize their materials according to the formal topics of the encomium."[72] Biography is included with other epideictic literature here because both deal with the same topics, are organized in a similar manner,[73] and both are interested in, to some degree, praise and blame.

Plutarch is aware that praiseworthy subjects should be shown *choosing* their actions rather than being forced into them by necessity. He portrays Theseus as someone

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[69] Michael Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists: A Compositional Template for Luke and Other *Bioi*?" *New Testament Studies* 54 (2008): 18-41.

[70] Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists," 24.

[71] Craig A. Gibson, "Learning Greek History in the Ancient Classroom," *Classical Philology* 99 (2004): 103-29, 113.

[72] Jerome Neyrey, "Encomium versus Vituperation: Contrasting Portraits of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 126 (2007): 529-552, 550.

[73] Bernard Schouler, *La Tradition Hellenique Chez Libanios,* (vol 1; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964), 111.

who intentionally went out of his way to find difficult tasks to complete in order to show his greatness. We have already seen his bravery in volunteering to be enlisted in the Minoan lottery while others were forced (*Thes.* 17.2.1-4). On this expedition, he killed the Minotaur, a fierce creature that had previously made short work of all who opposed it. You will remember that Theseus chose to go by land to Athens instead of sail there by sea so that he would have opportunity to encounter and rid the world of robbers, thieves, monsters, and madmen. Along his route he encountered and killed Periphetes the Club-bearer (*Thes.* 8.1), Sinis the Pine-Bender (*Thes.* 8.2), the Crommyonian sow (*Thes.* 9.1), Sciron of Megara (*Thes.* 10.1), Cercyon, and Damastes (*Thes.* 11.1). Plutarch tells us that the Crommyonian sow was not easy to find and kill, but Theseus went out of his way to find it and kill it "so that he might not be thought to perform all his exploits under compulsion (πρός ἀνάγκην)" (*Thes.* 9.1 [Perrin, LCL]). Plutarch revisits this point when he makes the comparison between Theseus and Romulus at the end of the two lives.

The parallel life of Romulus offers the opposite view: a man who only does great deeds out of necessity. The very founding of Rome is associated with an act of necessity. Plutarch relates that, after the death of Amulius, the brothers were not willing to live in Alba, unless they were the rulers. But, neither did they want to rule Alba with their grandfather still alive. They claimed that they wanted to found a city where (as legend had it) they had been nourished by wild animals. Plutarch observes that the real reason may have been necessity (ἀναγκαῖον) due to the amount of rabble they had gathered; they could not both keep the rabble and live in Alba (*Rom.* 9.2). They either had to disperse their band of followers or move somewhere where they could all be together.

This account is followed by the first reference to the rape of the Sabine women, which Plutarch says "was not a deed of wanton daring, but one of necessity (δι' ἀνάγκην), owing to the lack of marriages by consent" (*Rom.* 9.2 [Perrin, LCL]). Later, perhaps ironically, Plutarch has Romulus make his defense that the rape was just his way of trying to unite and blend the two peoples "in the strongest bonds (ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις)" (*Rom.* 14.6). The syncrisis of these two men, discussed below, shows how Plutarch believed necessity to play an important role in their characters.[74]

Other parallel lives show similar uses of necessity. Cicero left his home and joined Pompey. He had "without any reason an under no compulsion . . . made himself an enemy of Caesar, and had come thither to share in their great danger" (Cic. 38.1). This is reminiscent of Theseus' action when he voluntarily joined the lottery of youths. Plutarch is aware that necessity is a detriment to praise when actions are perceived to be forced, not chosen. The clarification that a person did something without being compelled or influenced by necessity is important for distinguishing good actions from bad ones. By pointing out that actions are done from necessity and not choice, Plutarch echoes what we have seen above with those authors who insist on praising their subjects for things that were "up to them" and not "due to fortune." Praise is given when a person *willingly chooses* to do a great deed. In fact, because necessity and fate/fortune appear together so often, the mention of one term brings to mind the other. Both, along with nature and ignorance often make up the list of things that are not up to us or are beyond our control, i.e. not of our choosing.

[74] David H.J. Larmour, "Plutarch's Compositional Methods in the Theseus and Romulus," *T.A.P.A.* 118 (1988): 361-75, 366.

Necessity as excuse is also important. On one occasion Plutarch derided Caesar for celebrating his attack on the sons of Pompey. That war should not have been celebrated, for it was not right "for Caesar to celebrate a triumph for the calamities of his country, priding himself upon actions which had no defense before gods or men except that they had been done under necessity." (*Caes*. 56.4.8-10 [Perrin, LCL]). The celebration was not one of victory over foreign powers; the celebrants and the vanquished were both Roman. While Caesar seized the chance to celebrate, Plutarch can only offer a defense of his military actions: political necessity. Camillus, on observing the plunder of Veii by his army, prayed to the gods: "O greatest Jupiter, and ye gods who see and judge men's good and evil deeds, ye surely know that it is not unjustly, but of necessity and in self-defense that we Romans have visited its iniquity upon this city of hostile and lawless men" (*Cam.* 5.6 [Perrin, LCL]). The Hellenes were scared and wanted to run away, but Themistocles contrived with Sicinnus to deliver a message to Xerxes related to the Hellenes. Xerxes then had his ships move to completely surround the Hellenes. Once they realized they were surrounded, "with a courage born of necessity the Hellenes set out to confront the dangers" (*Them*. 12.7 [Perrin, LCL]). Plutarch records the speech of Aristides to Themistocles when he arrives at Themistocles' tent to tell him of the surrounding host. One statement echoes Plutarch's narrative above: "for the sea round about and behind us is already filled with hostile ships, so that even our unwilling ones must now of necessity be brave men and fight" (*Arist*. 8.6 [Perrin, LCL]).

Political necessity (πολιτικῆς ἀνάγκης) was one of two follies by which a man could sully his career, but for which Plutarch thought he ought to be given a break. He compares his attempt to write a life of Lucullus with a painter painting a portrait (*Cim.*

2.4). Painters should not overemphasize a small defect in their subject, nor should they leave it out completely. Similarly, as a biographer, Plutarch observes how nearly impossible it is "to represent a man's life as stainless and pure" (*Cim.* 2.4 [Perrin, LCL]). If a man becomes blemished though political necessity or passion, these things should be regarded "as shortcomings in some particular excellence than as the vile products of positive baseness." He continues, "We must not all too zealously delineate them in our history, and superfluously too, but treat them as though we were tenderly defending human nature for producing no character which is absolutely good and indisputably set towards virtue" (*Cim.* 2.5 [Perrin, LCL]). Duff believes Plutarch's kindly sentiments toward Lucullus may have been related to the latter's early defense of Plutarch's hometown.[75] Considering, however, his comments about Caesar, perhaps the role of political necessity is greater than Duff has considered. On two other occasions, necessity is a component of events related to Lucullus. Political necessity causes him to bribe a woman to help him win a province (*Luc.* 6.2), and he was forced by necessity to accept the terms of the Fimbrians, who were about to abandon him to fight alone (35.4).

Necessity may relate in various ways to other characters besides the subject of the epideictic piece. Iamblichus recounts the story of Dionysius and Phintias (an Epicurean) in which Phintias is told that he must die (δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθνῄσκειν) (*De Vita Pyth.* 235). Under the laws of Numa, if a condemned man encountered one of the virgins who guarded the sacred fire, his life was spared. The virgin, however, must (δεῖ) take an oath that the meeting was accidental (*Num.* 10.3).

[75] Duff, *Plutarch's* Lives, 59.

Necessity is also used in the sense of expectation or requirement. The few times when a subject of an encomium or *bios* is spoken of as doing something of necessity, it is related to a norm or expectation. When the king of Egypt, who had promised him a command post, failed to carry through with his promise, Agesilaus was unsure of what he must (δεῖ) do (*Ages.* 2.30). Apollonius of Tyana declares to the king that he must (δεῖ) go and offer his accustomed sacrifice to the sun while the king attends to his own affairs (*Vit. Apoll.* 2.38). In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Socrates' attitude concerning religion is said to be in concert with the answer given by the priestess at Delphi when she answered the question, "What is my duty (πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖν) concerning sacrifice?" (*Mem.* 1.3.1). Chaerecrates questions Socrates concerning his brother's conduct, which is "just the opposite of what it should (δεῖ) be" (*Mem*. 2.3.5). Socrates questions a man who had just been made general about why both shepherds and generals do what is necessary for them to do (*Mem.* 3.1.2). When discussing those who are born with great advantages, Socrates noted that they can become utterly evil if they are unable to discern their duty (ἃ δεῖ πράττειν), but if they are taught their duty, they can become very useful to the state (*Mem.* 4.1.4).

Subjects of encomia or *bioi* are not praised for doing things out of compulsive necessity. In fact, necessity is a significant deterrent to praise. We do not find the subject of encomia saying that it is necessary for them to do certain things. Nor do we find the narrator recounting actions that they have done that were due to necessity. What we have seen is that in epideictic literature, necessity serves to highlight that the action was not intended or planned, but was something forced upon the actor by a divine being, another person, or a situation.

Syncrisis. The syncrisis is a comparison of two good things in order to show which one is better, or of two bad things to show which one is worse, or in both cases they may be equal (Theon 112:20; Kennedy, 53). The comparison is made only when it is not clear which is better (or worse). The comparison follows the same structure as an encomium or invective, and, in fact, is either a double encomium or a double invective. Much that was discussed under encomium applies here. Basically a double encomium presents the lives of two persons, following the outline of external goods, physical goods, and goods of the mind. Since actions and accomplishments are how a person's goodness is judged, the kinds of actions each undertook are very important. When the comparison is being made, the student should give "preference to things done by choice (προαιρέσεως) rather than by necessity or chance" (Theon 113.10; Kennedy, 53). Here, again, choice supersedes things that are beyond the control of the subject.

At the end of several of his parallel lives Plutarch offers a syncrisis of the two men. It is not always clear whom he picked as the one with a slight edge in terms of greatness. In one case, however, the language from Theon's exercise helps us see a clear winner. In his comparison of Theseus and Romulus, Plutarch notes, "Theseus, of his own choice (ἐκ προαιρέσεως), when no one compelled him (ἀναγκαζοντος), but when it was possible for him to reign without fear at Troezen as heir to no inglorious realm, of his own accord reached out after great achievements" (*Comp. Thes. Rom.* 1.1 [Perrin, LCL]). When times were good and when he could have relaxed at home, Theseus went out in search of things that would show his greatness.

By comparison, Romulus lacked the drive to seek out greatness. Unlike Theseus, "Romulus, to escape present servitude and impending punishment, became simply

'courageous out of fear,' as Plato phrases it, and through the dread of extreme penalties proceeded to perform great exploits under compulsion (δι' ἀνάγκην)" (*Comp. Thes. Rom.* 1.1). Romulus did great things, but his achievements were not due to his own choice; rather, he waited until he was forced to act. Plutarch sees this as a weakness.[76] In the end, it is Theseus who has an advantage of greatness over Romulus.

Thesis. A thesis is "a verbal inquiry admitting controversy without specifying any persons or circumstances; for example, whether one should marry, whether one should have children, whether the gods exist" (Theon 120.10, Kennedy, 55). In the second century B.C.E. Hermagoras had formulated the distinction between a definite question and an indefinite one.[77] The thesis is the indefinite question. It differs from the topos in that the thesis deals with things that have not been settled, whereas the topos deals with things that have been agreed to be either good or bad. An encomium and a prosopopoeia are examples of definite questions because they deal with specific persons and circumstances.

The thesis may be either theoretical or practical. The theoretical is related to some area of knowledge of the world; the practical refers to some particular action. The common headings, or topics, for a practical thesis "are supported by argument from what is necessary and what is noble and what is beneficial and what it pleasant, and refuted from the opposites" (Theon 121.20; Kennedy, 56). As an example for a practical thesis, Theon uses the question whether a wise man will engage in politics. If the student is

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[76] David H.J. Larmour, "Plutarch's Compositional Methods in the Theseus and Romulus," 366-67.

[77] M.L. Clarke, "The *Thesis* in the Roman Rhetorical Schools of the Republic," *The Classical Quarterly* NS 1 (1951): 159-66, 159.

arguing that the wise man *should* engage in politics, he could include the argument that "it is necessary for the city to have someone giving thought for its future, and especially a good person; for without this a city could not survive" (Theon 124.1; Kennedy, 58). As an example of a theoretical thesis, Theon asks whether the world receives providence from the gods. The argument in favor would include support from necessity: providence must exist, for without it there would be no belief in the gods because faith in the gods comes from belief in their providence.

The Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric

Epideictic rhetoric includes many different types of writing and speaking that have as their primary goal praise of some person or thing. In Pindar's *Odes*, some of the earliest examples of praise literature, poems are dedicated to the winners of various contests at the games. Pindar wrote *Odes* for winners at all four of the great Pan-Hellenic festivals: Nemean, Isthmian, Olympic, and Pythian. Olympian *Ode Six* is dedicated to Hagesias of Syracuse who was the winner in the mule race in 472 and 468 B.C.E. Pindar writes,

> Let us set up golden columns to support the strong-walled porch of our abode and construct, as it were, a splendid palace; for when a work is begun, it is necessary to make its front shine from afar. If someone should be an Olympic victor, and steward of the prophetic altar of Zeus at Pisa, and fellow-founder of famous Syracuse, what hymn of praise could he escape, a man such as that, if he finds his townsmen ungrudging in the midst of delightful songs? (1-5)

Over time, the rhetoric of praise and blame, as it came to be called, could be found in defensive speeches, deliberative speeches, funeral speeches, festive gatherings, as well as in biographies of great men.

But, what was the purpose of epideictic rhetoric? Was it merely to show off the skills of the speaker or writer? Or, was it really intended to capture the essence of the subject praised or blamed? This section will provide a brief investigation of three functions of epideictic rhetoric: entertainment, normative, and subversive.

Entertainment. For many years, classical epideictic rhetoric was thought to simply be "show" or "entertainment" rhetoric; rhetoric designed to show off the skill of the rhetor. And, in some cases, that was true. The comment of Gorgias at the end of the *Encomium of Helen* says that he had written "a speech which would be a praise of Helen and a diversion to myself" (*Hel.* 21). This statement was fodder for many an argument for the near-worthlessness of epideictic rhetoric. It may have been a statement like that one that prompted Socrates to refer to rhetoric as "an art that we do not quite approve of, since we call it a flattering one" (*Gorg.* 502 D). Theon suggests it may be possible to write an encomium of honey (112:16). Hermogones mentions praising animals and even plants (Kennedy, 83), as does Aphthonius (Kennedy, 108). Such ideas gave fuel to those who proclaimed the worthlessness of epideictic.

Many commentators on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the last century saw epideictic as simply 'show.' Christine Oravec lists Rhys Roberts, Lane Cooper, E.M. Cope, and Theodore C. Burgess as scholars who understood epideictic as merely 'display' language.[78]

[78] Christine Oravec, "'Observation' in Aristotle's Theory of Epideictic," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 9.3 (1976), 162. I would question her call on Burgess, who seems to be aware that an encomium was concerned with moral purpose and character, and not merely designed to praise an unworthy subject: Theodore C. Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," *Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902): 124-25.

Bernard K. Duffy observes, "In all, Aristotle's discussion casts aside the importance of reality and truth in favor of appearance and persuasion."[79]

The view that epideictic is about displaying the skills of the orator and not much else still has adherents. Christopher Carey writes,

> Epideictic oratory does not seek to win a political or courtroom debate and there is no formal decision that marks out success or failure. It does, however, like the other forms of oratory, seek to persuade. It may be entertaining—an anecdote has Prodicus assert that if his audience was flagging at one of his less costly lectures he would throw in a gem from his fifty drachma session to keep them attentive (Arist. *Rhet.* 1415b)—but its goal is not solely to entertain. It is intended to demonstrate ability. In a society that values public speaking it enhances the status of the speaker.[80]

In Carey's estimation, epideictic is a display of the orator's skill. Takis Poulakos agrees with respect to the encomium: ". . . the encomium has been generally regarded as a Sophistic pretext for self-display, a form that invited trivial topics and meaningless exercises intended to show off an orator's linguistic dexterity and argumentative wit."[81] Some of this criticism goes back to the belief that rhetoric, especially as practiced by the Sophists, was simply a tool for argument, regardless of the validity of any one position. Protagoras believed and taught that every story has two equally plausible sides. He "required his pupils to debate both sides of an issue, one side in the morning and the other in the afternoon, to drive home his point they could, with equal rationality, argue both for

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[79] Bernard K. Duffy, "The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 16 (1983): 79-93, 80-81.

[80] Christopher Carey, "Epideictic Oratory," in *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric* (ed. Ian Worthington; West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 236-52, 239/.

[81] Takis Poulakos, "Towards a Cultural Understanding of Classical Epideictic Oratory," *Pre/Text* 9 (1988): 147-166, 157.

and against a proposition."[82] Given such skills and the competitive nature of the Greeks, it is hardly surprising that some students of rhetoric used their skills to entertain.

To argue, however, that the audience of epideictic rhetoric was not moved by the content of the speech would be to miss a point humorously made by Autobulus in Plutarch's "Encomium of Hunting." An early dialogue in the piece has Autobulus conversing with Soclarus about the encomium to hunting that he had heard read out loud the day before. He fears that young men will be so excited by the praise for hunting that they will leave all other pursuits to take to the woods and fields. Autobulus confesses that he was so moved by the discourse that he even feels the urge to go a-hunting (*Soll. an.* 959B-C).[83]

Normative. Another function of epideictic is the reinforcement of traditional values that are upheld by a particular group. Whether a philosophical school or a national celebration, epideictic can be used to display important beliefs and ideas in a way that solidifies their 'rightness' in the minds of the audience.

Oravec challenges those who have claimed that Aristotle viewed epideictic as 'mere show'. Her investigation of the use of *theoria* ('observation') in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* reveals that it "is a complex concept whose meanings imply judgment and comprehension as well as the perception of theatrical display."[84] Audiences were not merely entertained by the skill of the rhetor; rather, they interacted with the content and method of the epideictic presentation and made some judgment about the content. She

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[82] Katula and Murphy, "The Sophists and Rhetorical Consciousness," 29.

[83] Hubert Martin, Jr., "Plutarch's De Solloertia Animalium 959B-C: The Discussion of the Encomium of Hunting," *The American Journal of Philology* 100 (1979): 99-106.

[84] Christine Oravec, "Observation' in Aristotle's Theory of Epideictic," 163.

writes, "Therefore, the function of 'observation' is not only to appreciate the speaker's verbal skill, but to evaluate the credibility of the tale – its verisimilitude – in light of the proven facts of the hero's life and the generally accepted values of virtue and nobility."[85]

Duffy examines two works of Plato, *Phaedrus* and *Menexenus*, in order to discover the role of epideictic in Plato's thought. He argues that Plato used epideictic to reinforce the values that he believed were necessary for the operation of the state. Since the builders of society determine what effects should be sought, as in *Republic*, they should utilize epideictic to instill these values in the lives of the citizens. Duffy writes, "From a Platonic perspective the purpose of epideictic oratory is to represent, however imperfectly, timeless values distilled from past experience. The accurate reporting of specific details is overshadowed by the higher truths which the epideictic speaker expresses."[86] Duffy believes Plato uses epideictic in *Phaedrus* and *Menexenus* to convey philosophical truth. Walter Beale's assessment of epideictic as 'rhetorical performative discourse' agrees that epideictic functions "to bolster faith or pride in the ideals of the 'present system,' or assessing 'where we are now' as a community."[87]

Takis Poulakos shows that beyond the praise given to the king, Isocrates' *Evagoras* is also an example of reinforcement of aristocratic ideals.[88] He argues that the aristocratic ideals were at the heart of Pindar's *Odes* where the young men who are

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[85] Christine Oravec, "Observation' in Aristotle's Theory of Epideictic," 168-69.

[86] Bernard K. Duffy, "The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric," 85-86. See also, Michael F. Carter, "The Ritual Function of Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case of Socrates' Funeral Oration," *Rhetorica* 9 (1991): 209-32.

[87] Walter H. Beale, "Rhetorical Performative Discourse: A New Theory of Epideictic," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11 (1978): 221-46, 223.

[88] Takis Poulakos, "Towards a Cultural Understanding," 147-166.

praised are all of aristocratic descent. This sort of praise reminded the lower class people of their place: "Beyond their function to glorify victors, [praise speeches] served an ideological mission: to impose on the community a hierarchical view of social relations."[89]

But, in the hands of a master rhetorician with a complaint against the dominant system, epideictic can become a tool for critique. Poulakos believes Isocrates, in his *Evagoras,* sets aside the normal method of praising a subject for his virtuous character in favor of showing that what led to Evagoras' success as a leader was his willingness to learn. The type of praise that Evagoras receives is related to the educational ideals of the Sophists: diligence, reflection and care, and careful preparation.[90] In contrast to the aristocratic system of government supported by Plato and Aristotle, Isocrates believes in social mobility. He uses the encomium to praise the ideals that would allow anyone to take a place in government. Although the encomium traditionally supports the dominant ideals of a culture, it can also be used as a tool for subversion.

Subversive. People are seldom of one opinion. Competing ideas are a component of human life. Epideictic rhetoric was used in the service of the 'minority' view in an attempt to gain dominance over the majority view or at least to get a hearing. Scott Consigny has argued that Gorgias' use of epideictic was useful for undermining those who believed their discourse was privileged.[91] Gorgias challenged the state-sponsored

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[89] Takis Poulakos, "Towards a Cultural Understanding," 155.

[90] Takis Poulakos, "Towards a Cultural Understanding," 159.

[91] Scott Consigny, "Gorgias's Use of the Epideictic," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25.3 (1992): 281-97; 289.

funeral orators who believed their praise of the status quo was 'the truth.' This critical stance is surveyed by Dale Sullivan in his article on rhetorical criticism.

Sullivan argues that criticism of those who do not accept *your* orthodoxy is in effect praise. It is praise because it highlights what you consider the dominant orthodoxy. Your criticism attempts to paint their views as somehow 'against' the 'commonly-held' views that you support. His idea of criticism relies on a view that there are competing orthodoxies in any culture, which represent "the belief systems and perspectives of subgroups or subcultures within a society."[92] McComiskey also notes the important role of perception in the establishment of orthodoxies: "Epideictic oratory, in other words, represents, always in politicized language, *perceived* values, and rhetors of any cultural group have the potential, realized or not, to represent social values as they perceive them, whatever the *status quo*."[93] Although epideictic does praise what are accepted values *for a particular audience*, it can also be used by those who make up a different audience to promote *their* ideals. As McComiskey has noted in epideictic "the possibility of promoting subversive values always exists."[94]

This is because the ideals that humans praise are often those of their own making. Groups differ widely in their perceptions of beauty, the good, virtue, and the like. Takis Poulakos writes, "Exposing actual social and economic relations as human valuation, epideictic oratory discloses the capacity that participants of a society have to become

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[92] Dale L. Sullivan, "The Epideictic Character of Rhetorical Criticism," *Rhetoric Review* 11 (1993): 339-49.

[93] Bruce McComiskey, *Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), 91.

[94] Bruce McComiskey, *Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), 92.

social agents by articulating their own versions of the social order."[95] As soon as a group coalesces around a set of ideals, it will begin to praise them as the 'norm.'
A good epideictic rhetor will praise those things in which his audience places the highest value.

Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard surveys various views of epideictic and concludes that "epideictic audiences are given a view of reality with which they already agree."[96] Using the work of Oravec and others, she argues that epideictic is not only normative, but is also a catalyst for change. By offering a vision of 'what can be', the encomiast presents the audience with an alternative future. Sheard draws upon the claim of Protagoras that he could make the weaker argument stronger and the stronger weaker. The weaker (but better) argument is expanded (amplified) in the face of a more well-entrenched orthodoxy that does not appear, to the speaker, to be as good.[97] She concludes that epideictic is "a rhetorical gesture that moves its audience toward a process of critical reflection that goes beyond evaluation toward envisioning and *actualizing* alternative realities, possible worlds."[98] Epideictic is a means of wrestling with alternative value systems.

There is little doubt that many rhetoricians, public speakers, lawyers, and politicians were proud of their speaking ability. In a world in which many people are uneducated, a quick wit and good command of phrases that induce emotion can propel

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[95] Takis Poulakos, "Towards a Cultural Understanding," 161.

[96] Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard, "The Public Value of Epideictic Rhetoric," *College English* 58.7 (1996): 765-94, 776.

[97] Sheard, "The Public Value of Epideictic Rhetoric," 783.

[98] Sheard, "The Public Value of Epideictic Rhetoric," 787.

one into the limelight. Epideictic rhetoric, with its expectation of amplification, is easily manipulated for this purpose. Instead, however, of simply being an attempt to show off the skill of the orator, epideictic rhetoric also serves the additional functions of praising the norm and subverting the norm by praising an alternate norm. These considerations will serve us well in our investigation of Luke's *bios* of Jesus, which is certainly in the epideictic genre.

Conclusion

As rhetoric developed in the ancient world it became part of the educational system. The rhetorical handbooks and progymnasmata were used at different stages of education to train young men to write and to speak. Several of the exercises in the progymnasmata of Theon include necessity. Of particular importance for this project is the attitude toward necessity that is apparent in the exercises that involve an assessment of human character via actions: encomium/invective and syncrisis.

Theon and the other rhetorical theorists do not praise a person for his fortune (τύχη) or his nature (φύσις) or because he has done some great thing out of necessity (ἀνάγκη). If his fortune or nature has given him some advantage, the way he uses the advantage must be shown. To show that a person acts out of necessity when the subject is his actions and achievements is to reflect badly on his character. Often fortune, nature, and necessity are the trinity of things beyond human control, which equates to things that are not willingly chosen. Praise is given to those who consider their plan of action and then intentionally proceed with what they have determined to do. Happening upon or stumbling blindly upon a treasure is not praiseworthy; studying treasure maps, preparing for the voyage, locating the 'x', and recovering the treasure is praiseworthy. Fighting and

defeating a monster when it corners you along a deserted byway is not praiseworthy; seeking it out and defeating it is. Suddenly gaining courage to fight an enemy from which you were about to flee until you realized that you were surrounded is not praiseworthy; boldly attacking an enemy without fear is.

Sometimes fortune and necessity are coupled with ignorance in cases where excuse or defense is important. In most cases, necessity is used in an epideictic speech or written composition to provide a defense or an excuse for some behavior or action that is viewed by the audience or the author as unacceptable. In many cases, the subject complains that she or he did not *want* to do the deed but felt forced by circumstances, a divine being, or some other person.

There is one final use of necessity in epideictic that is important: the necessity of expectation or requirement. Ethics provides guidelines for how a person should live. Culture provides expectations for political offices and other roles in society, how things should be. This type of necessity is often conditional: if you want to be a good king, then you must do x, y, and z. The three classes of goods (external, body, and mind) drawn from ethics and used in epideictic are expectations. Good people do these things. If you want to be a good person, then you must do these things. The expectations, however, may vary from culture to culture or place to place, or sometimes even within subgroups within cultures. These differences of ideals are what allow epideictic to be used to support the norm or to challenge the norm by supporting an alternative norm.

Now that we have established the types of necessity that were common in the ancient world, and we have seen how necessity could be used in ancient rhetoric, we are in a position to look at how necessity was used in the writings of Hellenistic Judaism and

Early Christianity. We will be interested to see if these sources differ from the Greco-Roman world in their uses of necessity. Chapters Four and Five build on the conclusions from Chapters Two and Three. We are now in a position to see how necessity functions rhetorically in these works.

CHAPTER FOUR

Necessity in Hellenistic Judaism

To this point, we have investigated the various contributions to the presupposition pool of Luke's audience from the Greco-Roman philosophical and literary world, as well as the teachers of rhetoric. The connection between the two influences can be clearly seen in Theon's use of examples from the Greek literary output of the several centuries preceding his own work. Thus, we can safely assume that the uses of necessity in early Greek authors remain before the eyes of readers in the first century C.E.

We should be careful, however, to point out that the Greco-Roman world was not the only source of influence for the Lukan audience. Hellenization had an impact on the Jewish world as well. The translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek brought Greek literary and rhetorical ideas into contact with Jewish theology. The Septuagint was the Bible for the average first-century believer, Jew or Gentile. Also, the works of Hellenistic Jewish authors betray the influence of Greek thought on Jewish ideas. In this chapter, we will examine some uses of necessity in the Greek Old Testament,[1] the Old, Philo, and Josephus.

[1] W.J. Bennett, Jr. concludes, rightly I think, that "the use of δεῖ in the LXX is not dependent upon any particular Hebrew or Aramaic construction but depends rather upon the translator's understanding of the meaning and context of the particular verse in question." "The Son of Man Must . . .," *NovT 17*.2 (1975): 113-129, 119. See also E.Tiedtke and H.G. Link *NIDNTT* 2:664; Joachim Jeremias, *New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus* (trans. John Bowden; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 277; and Erich Fascher , "Theologishce Beobachtungen zu δεῖ," in *Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann* (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmnann, 1954), 228.

Lev. 4:2; 5:17

In the Greek version of the Old Testament, necessity is often a requirement or expectation. In the Manual of Sacrifice (Lev. 1-7), two verses make reference to the commandments of the Lord "ὧν οὐ δεῖ ποιεῖν" (Lev. 4:2; 5:17). Leviticus 4 offers prescriptions for a person who sins unintentionally (ἀκουσίως) concerning one of the commandments "which is it is necessary (δεῖ) not to do" (4:2). Instructions are given in the case of the high priest (4:3-12), the whole congregation (4:13-21), a ruler (4:22-26) and anyone else (4:27-35). It is allowed that the entire congregation may act in ignorance (ἀγνοήσῃ) and thus commit an unintentional sin (4:13). Specific violations are not given, presumably because the treatment is the same for any sin. Interestingly, only the high priest is exempted from acting unintentionally; each of the other three groups are described as acting without intent (ἀκουσίως) (4:13, 22, and 27). Also, in Lev. 5:17 further prescriptions are given for the person who does "one of all of the commandments of the Lord, which it is necessary (δεῖ) not to do" unintentionally. Here again, the focus is not on the sin, but on the remedy.

The argument that arises in reference to "unintentional" in these passages is related to a tradition of interpretation that claims there is no forgiveness for sins that are committed intentionally.[2] The Septuagint, however, makes very clear the connection between the necessity not to do certain things and the unintentional nature by which they are done. The use of ἀκουσίως brings to mind the many examples in the preceding chapters (see above) where a person is forgiven for, or at least can expect forgiveness for,

[2] Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., "Leviticus," in *New Interpreters Bible* 1:1033-34, 1039.

something done unintentionally. In this case, the cause of the unintentional action is ignorance (ἀγνοήσῃ). Several rhetors list ignorance as one of the causes of unintentional actions (Quintilian *Inst.* 7.4.15; Theon 79:12-14 [narrative], 117:26-28 [*prosopopoeia*]; Cicero *Part. or.* 12.42).

There is a necessity to act in a certain way: to avoid doing certain things that the law of God has prescribed. This necessity is not that of excuse, else there would be no reward or praise for the person who followed the law. Here, necessity is a requirement: for a person to be in the covenant community, he or she must not do certain things (cf. Xenophon *Mem.* 1.2.42). James Watts has pointed out that "the law and the cult that it prescribes are vital to Israel's survival."[3] In other words, to be an Israelite means to follow the prescriptions of the Torah, and the Torah prohibits some things. If, however, one of the forbidden things is done without intent, the law provides a means of forgiveness, which is just what we expect from the association with ἀκουσίως.

It is interesting how necessity and intention are blended in these passages. The necessity relates to the commandments of God, but the specific declaration that they were done unintentionally predisposes the reader to assume lack of blame and forgiveness. The lack of intention sets up the expectation that forgiveness will be offered; the bulk of the passages spell out how that forgiveness is to be achieved.[4]

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[3] James W. Watts, *Ritual and Rhetoric in Leviticus: From Scripture to Sacrifice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 95.

[4] W.H. Bellinger, Jr, *Leviticus, Numbers* (NIBC 3; Peabody, MA; Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 2001), 36-43.

Ruth 4:5

Necessity as a requirement also plays a role in the story of Ruth and Boaz. When Boaz has determined that Naomi and Ruth want him to perform the act of kinsman-redeemer, he meets at the gate of Bethlehem to settle the matter with a person who is yet nearer kin to Naomi than he. Initially, when the man is offered the right to purchase the land of Naomi's deceased husband, he accepts the offer. Then Boaz offers the further revelation that, if he buys the field of Naomi, it is necessary (δεῖ) for him to acquire Ruth also and raise up a son for the deceased man so that his name will not perish in Israel (4:5).[5] The next-of-kin declines the offer because it will upset his own inheritance (v.6).

The story of Ruth the Moabitess brings up a question of social obligation related to the duties of an ἀγκιστεύς– the kinsman-redeemer. There is some sort of order of which Boaz is aware that precludes him from acting as kinsman-redeemer until the person who has a prior right has refused or acted on his right.

Why must the nearer-kinsman take Ruth and raise up a child in the dead man's stead in addition to acquiring the property from Naomi? Although no other passage of Israel's legal code addresses this situation, Eryl Davies believes that Boaz has it right when he informs the other kinsman of this duty.[6] Davies argues that the duty of the kinsman-redeemer was not merely to buy the property or to acquire the widow, but to

[5] The Hebrew text at this point raises a question over just who is doing the "acquiring." The *ketiv* (as the text is written) suggests a first person singular ending, thus "I shall acquire" meaning Boaz rather than the nearer-kinsman. The *qere* (a marginal note reflecting how the text should be read), however, suggests a second person singular ending, thus "you shall acquire" meaning the nearer kinsman. The LXX settles the dispute in favor of the *qere*. Cf. Robert D. Holmstedt, *Ruth: A Handbook on the Hebrew* Text (Waco, Tx: Baylor University Press, 2010), 191; Tamara Cohn Eskenazi and Tikva Frymer-Kensky, *Ruth* (JPSBC; Philadephia: The Jewish Publication Society, 2011), 76.

[6] Eryl W. Davies, "Ruth IV.5 and the Duties of the GŌ'ĒL," *VT* 33 (1983): 231-34.

maintain the estate of the deceased "by allowing the firstborn son of the levirate union to inherit the estate of the deceased brother."[7] The elders at the gate do not object to Boaz' additional stipulations; therefore, it was presumably part of the legal code involving kinsmen-redeemers. The δεῖ phrase captures the essence of the social convention that placed great emphasis on the cohesion of the family and clan.[8] The necessity is the requirement that the kinsman-redeemer raise up a son for the fallen brother.[9] This necessity is related to the covenant requirements that are also at the heart of our first example from Leviticus. The covenant requirement in this case, however, according to Daniel Block, is not in the letter of the law, but in the spirit: "Neither man was legally bound by Deut 25:5-10, but this does not eliminate a moral obligation."[10] The function of necessity here is to convince the nearer-kinsman of his responsibility, something he was clearly reluctant to embrace.[11]

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[7] Davies, "Ruth IV.5 and the Duties of the GŌ'ĒL," 233.

[8] Murray D. Gow, "RUTH QUOQUE – A COQUETTE? (RUTH 4:5)," *Tyndale Bulletin* 41.2 (1990): 302-311, 310.

[9] See Kathleen A. Robertson Farmer, "The Book of Ruth," in *New Interpreters Bible* 2:936-37. The discussion there assumes that Boaz is saying: "Just so you know, if you buy the property, I plan to marry Ruth and raise up a child to Elimelech. This might eventually cause problems for your ownership of the property." See also D.R.G. Beattie, "Kethib and Qere in Ruth 4:5," *VT* 21.4 (1971): 490-94, who argues that Boaz had already married Ruth the night before.

[10] Daniel I. Block, Judges, *Ruth* (NAC 6; Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishing Group, 1999), 715. For a reading that follows the ketiv "I will acquire" see John R. Wilch, *Ruth* (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 2006), 330-335.

[11] See Dvora E. Weisberg, "The Widow of Our Discontent: Levirate Marriage in the Bible and Ancient Israel," *JSOT* 28.4 (2004): 403-29, who argues that the levirate marriage often brought a sense of anxiety to the male involved in the exchange (419).

2 Kings 4:13-14

Necessity also plays a role in the encounter between Elisha and the Shunamite woman. The encounter between the Shunammite woman and Elisha sets up a necessary reciprocation on the part of the prophet (2 Kings 4). The rich woman convinces her husband to build a small room for Elisha to use when he visits that region. After some time of staying in this special room, Elisha sends his servant to ask the woman what should be done (τί δεῖ ποιῆσαι) for her since she has gone to all the trouble of preparing a nice place for them to stay (v. 13). He offers to speak to the king, or perhaps to the general, on her behalf. She kindly refuses. Clearly, Elisha, at least according to the LXX, feels an obligation to repay the woman for her kindness. After her refusal, he asks Gehazi, "what must be done (τί δεῖ ποιῆσαι) for her" (v.14). Gehazi points out that the woman has no son, and her husband is getting older. Through the words of Elisha's prophecy the Shunammite woman bears a son.[12]

Clearly, Elisha feels some sort of obligation that is owed the Shunammite woman. When she refuses to tell him how he can fulfill his obligation to her, he turns to Gehazi, his servant, to find out how can this need be met. The obligation that Elisha feels is in some sense related to the hospitality shown to him by the Shunammite woman. Her favor in providing for him and giving him his own place to stay while travelling is a significant

[12] Some interpreters believe there was more to Elisha's gift than a word from God. S. Brent Plate and Edna M. Rodriguiez Mangual, "The Gift That Stops Giving: Helene Cixous's "Gift" and the Shunammite Woman," *BibInt* 7.2 (1999): 113-132, note that "while the text perhaps does not supply enough clues to blatantly call this a rape, it certainly begins to point in that direction" (128). See also Gershon Hepner, "Three's a Crowd in Shunem: Elisha's Misconduct with the Shuamite Reflects a Polemic against Prophetism," *ZAW* 122.3 (2010): 387-400, and Mary Shields, "Subverting a Man of God, Elevating a Woman: Role and Power Reversals in 2 Kings 4," *JSOT* 58 (1993): 59-69. A common concern among these interpreters is that the woman did not ask for a son. The Septuagint, however, solves this problem by showing that the man of God declares the necessity of her having a son.

gesture, and such a thing should not be overlooked.[13] That Elisha feels strongly about his responsibility is evidenced by the twice-repeated question: τὶ δεῖ ποιησαι (what must be done – vv. 13-14). According to Louis Feldman, the midrashic tradition was aware of this need for Elisha to reciprocate the woman's favor.[14]

The woman does not seem to feel the obligation and objects to Elisha's insistence. She certainly did not ask for a son; however, the son will be her only means of support once her "aged" husband has gone.[15] After the woman took her family and went to the land of the Philistines for seven years to escape the famine in Israel, she came back to Israel and went to the king to reclaim her property (2 Kings 8:1-6). The "aged" husband is absent from this later story, so presumably he is dead. The woman comes with her son before the king to reclaim her property. While we cannot say for sure that having a son increased her chances of reclamation or put the law more strongly in her favor, there is some evidence that this is the case.[16]

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[13] T.R. Hobbs, "Hospitality in the First Testament and the 'Teleological Fallacy'," *JSOT* 95 (2001): 3-30, 24-25.

[14] Louis Feldman, "Josephus' Portrait of Elisha," *NovT* 36.1 (1994): 1-28, 22.

[15] The story that immediately precedes this one in 2 Kings 4 (the widow's cruse of oil) involves a woman who has to rely on her sons following the death of her husband. Cf. Marvin a. Sweeney, *I & II Kings: A Commentary* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 290: " The death of her husband without a male heir leaves the woman in difficulty as the husband's property – and even the woman—might be claimed by one of his male relatives."

[16] Richard H. Hiers, "Transfer of Property by Inheritance and Bequest in Biblical Law and Tradition," *Journal of Law and Religion* 10.1 (1993): 121-155, 136.

Thus, necessity in this case functions to explain why a "great woman" who does not ask for a son gets a son nonetheless.[17] Just as Heracles felt the necessity to offer his assistance to his friend Admetus as a way of showing his gratitude for hospitality (Euripides *Alc*. 840-42), so Elijah insists that something should be done for a woman who had shown hospitality to him and his servant.

Esther 1:15

Somewhat like the story of the Shunammite woman and Elisha is the story of Queen Vashti and King Ahasuerus. On the seventh day of an impromptu wine party at which the wine flowed deeply and freely (1:8), the king requests Vashti, his queen, to display her beauty for his friends. When Vashti refuses to come before the assembled noblemen to display her beauty for the king, he becomes very angry and asks the lawyers to give their opinion on such a thing. They report to him what the law requires: κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ὡς δεῖ ποιῆσαι (Esther 1:15).[18] The king is compelled by the law of the Persians to respond to this affront.[19] Since Persian law dictated that the queen must be

[17] Hobbs' reading of this text suggests that the necessity may be related to Elisha's need to recover his honor after being bested by the woman who has offered him hospitality (25). Paul House, *1, 2 Kings* (NAC 8; Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1995), 256-69 believes that the Elisha miracle tradition proves Elisha to be a worthy successor to Elijah. The miracles of Elisha are shown to mirror those of Elijah, in each case proving "that he is indeed a worthy successor to Elijah and that God will not leave Israel without a prophetic voice to guide them." At the point of the telling of our story, Elisha has not yet raised someone from the dead (1 Kings 17:17-24). It is necessary for Elisha to raise someone from the dead if he is going to maintain his identity with Elijah. The son of the Shunnamite woman sets the stage for the resurrection miracle.

[18] According to the MT, Ahasuerus asks the chamberlains what, according to the law, must be done to Vashti (NRSV). Linda Day argues that Memucan (apparently the king's lead advisor) "does not answer the question from a legal standpoint" but instead seems to make up an answer on the spot. Linda M. Day, *Esther* (AOTC; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2005), 36. Cf. D.J. Clines, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther (NCBC; Eerdmans, 1984), 281.

[19] The inviolability of Persian law is addressed briefly in Ben Zion Katz, "Irrevocability of Persian Law in the Scroll of Esther," *JBQ* 31.2 (2003): 94-96.

deposed for her affront to the king, the king had no choice in the matter.[20] In this case, necessity functions to excuse the king from charges that his decision was personal or because he was drunk (1:10).[21] It was, however, the custom or requirement of the law that is the source of the necessity, not a general requirement that the king do something about this affront.

Proverbs 22:14

The notion of what is best for a person even though he or she may not want to do it is found in Proverbs 22:14a. The proverb states: "There are evil ways before a man and he does not love to turn from them; but it is necessary to turn from crooked and evil [ways]." Here again the conditional nature of necessity is visible. The assumption behind this command is "if a person wants to be a good person, then he or she must turn from crooked and evil ways." The contrast between wanting (loving) to turn from the evil ways and being forced to do so by the necessity of requirement highlights one of the problems with things done out of necessity: is it praiseworthy when a person does the right thing out of necessity, even if it is the necessity of requirement? The person really does not have a choice *if* he or she *wants* (read "has been convinced") to be a good person. Necessity here shows that a person may not always enjoy doing what must be done, but it must be done, nonetheless. As with the previous discussion on thesis and with

[20] Many commentaries on this passage (in the MT) suggest that there was no Persian law that guided the response to Vashti's "insolence." See, e.g., Michael V. Fox, *Character and Ideology in the Book of Esther (2nd ed.; Eerdmans, 2001),* 21. Others point out the unalterable nature of Persian law that is critical in this story: Kenneth Craig, *Reading Esther: a Case for the Literary Carnivalesque* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 56.

[21] Evidently, this event became an opportunity for the men of the kingdom to reaffirm the importance of women honoring their husbands (1:16-20).

Aristotle's instructions regarding deliberative speaking, necessity serves as a strong persuasive for the person who may not be inclined to choose the best way.

Ezekiel 13

Ezekiel 13 reveals that Yahweh was upset with certain women in Israel who were prophesying falsely. It seems that the result of their prophecy was a potential reversal of fortune for some of their audience: death for those who should (ἔδει) not die, and life for those who should (ἔδει) not live (v.19). The *NRSV* has: "You have profaned me among my people for handfuls of barley and for pieces of bread, putting to death person who should not die and keeping alive persons who should not live, by your lies to my people, who listen to lies." The *Jerusalem Publication Society* version reads: "You have profaned My name among My people in return for handfuls of barley and morsels of bread; you have announced the death of person who will not die and the survival of person who will not live—lying to My people, who listen to your lies." It was evidently clear to Yahweh who was worthy of death and who was not, yet these female false prophets confused the issue so that the results were the opposite.

Nancy Bowen discusses this passage in relation to the role women prophets in the ancient Near East took at childbirth.[22] She looks at the religious roles of women in antiquity, especially those that may be called "magic" or "divination." One of the roles of a female prophet in antiquity was to serve as a healthcare consultant. A woman who took on this role may provide advice during pregnancy and at childbirth. Bowen says that one of the things the "consultant" would do is to provide an answer to the question of

[22] Nancy R. Bowen, "The Daughters of Your People: Female Prophets in Ezekiel 13:17-23," *JBL* 118.3 (1999): 417-33.

survival: will I live?[23] According to the word of the Lord, these women were giving the wrong answers.

It is the contention of William Brownlee that these women "possess magic spells by means of which they cause some to die and permit others to live."[24] This is precisely the problem that is addressed by the two uses of the imperfect of δεῖ: Yahweh, and not these women, has the right to decide who dies and who lives. Yet, the imperfect also indicates that the spells, incantation, or whatever means these women were using were actually working. Some who should not die were dying, and others who should not live were being kept alive.

Ezekiel 13:17-23 forms a topos against the false female prophets. The purpose of a topos is to amplify something that is already acknowledged to be a bad (or good) thing, in this case, false prophets. One of the considerations of a topos is the intention of the person(s) involved. This is borne out in our passage twice. The women are accused of making cushions and veils "so as to pervert souls" (τοῦ διαστρέφειν −13:18). They are also doing their evil work "for the sake of" some barley and "on account of" a few pieces of bread (in both places ἕνεκεν - v.19). By means of magic, they are compared to predators who "hunt" for souls.

Another consideration in a topos is the thing that is done, in this case, bringing death to certain people and life to others by means of sorcery or divination. Theon provides the example of a person who stole money, one of the most necessary things (ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἐστίν) for humans (Theon 107.25, Kennedy, 44). The Lord accuses

[23] Bowen, "The Daughters of Your People," 427.

[24] William Brownlee, "Exorcising the Souls from Ezekiel 13:17-23," *JBL* 69.4 (1950): 367-373, 371.

the women of doing something that violates an even more basic necessity: life. They kill those who *should* not die (οὐκ ἔδει ἀποθανεῖν), and let those live who *should* not live (οὐκ ἔδει ζῆσαι) (v. 19). Those who do so pervert the very order of God's will, who is seen as the one whose will determines life and death.[25] Daniel Block thinks those who live are the women and their clients and those who die are "my people."[26] Necessity functions in this pericope to help highlight the evil deeds of the female false prophets.

Job and Isaiah

In Job and Isaiah, δεῖ is related to speech. Eliphaz, one of Job's interlocutors, asks Job sarcastically if a wise man would answer as he had done, ἐλέγχων ἐν ῥήμασιν, οἷς οὐ δεῖ, ἐν λόγοις, οἷς οὐδεν ὄφελος; (Job 15:3). This question is the middle of three rhetorical questions asked by Eliphaz of Job. These three rhetorical questions are the first set of two groups of rhetorical questions asked in Job 15. The second set of questions appears in 15:7-9. The question assumes that Job's previous argument (chs. 12-14) is not valid. The rhetorical question that contains necessity functions to highlight the (perceived) weakness of Job's argument.

It is the words of Job that are under attack. Eliphaz sees Job's previous argument as containing no truth, and in fact, he considered it made of words that were not necessary. These unnecessary words are linked with "words that are of no benefit"

[25] Walther Eichrodt, *Ezekiel: A Commentary* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970), 172.

[26] Daniel I. Block, *The Book of Ezekiel* (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 417.

(15:3b). But, Job's words are an argument that calls attention to a righteous sufferer who descends from a high position to become a laughingstock (12:4).[27]

Job seems to admit as much later when he acknowledges that he spoke a word ὃ οὐκ ἔδει (19:4). The imperfect tense shows that even though it was not necessary, he spoke it anyway.[28] He lays the blame on his "friends" for driving him crazy with their attacks (v.5). These two references could refer to an ill-conceived argument or words that were not rhetorically sound. Certainly Job's frustration with his audience has gotten to him. He is aware that perhaps he has spoken things that were too strong or perhaps said more than he meant. Maybe he did not use the customary words that a person in his situation "should" use, according to his companions.[29]

In Isaiah 50, the speaker says the Lord has given him "a tongue of instruction so that [he] may know the time when it is necessary (δεῖ) to speak a word" (v.4 [NETS]). This verse is located within the third Servant's Song in Deutero-Isaiah (50:4-11). Here the word is not what is "proper" or "right"; rather, it is the time or season. Not every time is the right time to say something. The Servant is projected as one who has a "ministry of the word." [30] The requirement for speaking the word that the Lord has given is a norm for prophets.

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[27] Mocking or laughing at someone in antiquity was the ultimate disgrace; see John E. Hartley, *The Book of Job* (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 207.

[28] This view is shared by Homer Heater, Jr. *A Septuagintal Translation Technique in the Book of Job* (Washington: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1982), 67.

[29] In Daniel 3:19 the sense of ἔδει is that of "customary but exceeded anyway" in the story of the furnace that was heated seven times hotter "than it was necessary for it to be heated" (NETS).

[30] Eugene Robert Ekblad, Jr. *Isaiah's Servant Poems According to the Septuagint: An Exegetical and Theological Study* (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 136.

This figure suffers some of the same ill treatment given to Jesus: his back is opened to scourges and his cheeks to blows, and he did not turn his face away from spitting (v.6). Fredrick Holmgren has drawn a parallel between this figure and Jesus in the New Testament.[31] The word that the speaker speaks is not just any word, but a word spoken when it is necessary. The notion of "right time" (καίρος) is important here.[32] The connection with the beatings and spitting (v. 6) suggest that this word was not easily received. Here, necessity functions to highlight that this speaker is led by the Lord regarding the timing of his words, thus perhaps making his message more socially and religiously relevant.[33] Joseph Blenkinsopp connects this passage with 1 Kings 22:14 where Micaiah says that he can only prophecy what Yahweh tells him.[34] This Servant speaks the words that are required, but the result is only physical abuse.

Daniel

Finally, in Daniel, δεῖ takes up a sense close to fate or predestination. Daniel is given the interpretation to Nebuchadnezzar's dream after he and his friends had prayed and asked for help. When Daniel is brought before Nebuchadnezzar, he informs Nebuchadnezzar that the interpretation of the dream was from the God of heaven who had revealed to Nebuchadnezzar "ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν ἡμερῶν" (2:28).

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[31] Fredrick C. Holmgren, "The Servant: Responding to Violence (Isaiah 50:4-9)," *CTM*.5 (2004): 352-58.

[32] Paul S. Minear, "Time and the Kingdom," *JR* 24.2 (1944): 77-88. See also James Barr, *Biblical Words for Time* (Naperville, Il: Allenson, 1962).

[33] Note the parallel here with Luke 12:12: the disciples are told the Holy Spirit will teach them what is necessary to say at the right hour. Many interpreters have seen a connection between this Servant's Song and the teaching ministry of Jesus and the apostles (R. Reed Lessing, *Isaiah 40-55* (St. Louis: Conconrdia Publishing House, 2011), 512, 520.

[34] Joseph Blenkinsopp, *Isaiah 40-55* (AYB 19a; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 321.

These "things that must come to pass at the end of days" are mentioned twice more as Daniel reiterates to the king that he has had a vision of the end of time (v.29).[35]

Chapter Two of Daniel is taken up completely with the story of Nebuchadnezzar's dream and Daniel's interpretation. The verses under consideration make up Daniel's reply to Nebuchadnezzar's question: "Are you able to disclose to me the vision that I have seen and its sense?" (v. 27). Daniel uses necessity three times in order to demonstrate the certainty of the events that he is about to recount. By repeating the necessity three times, he emphasizes the point in keeping with the use of *mesodiplosis* (repeating the same phrase in the middle of successive sentences).[36] His God is also demonstrated to be the source of his wisdom. Twice the Lord in heaven who reveals mysteries is connected with the necessity of what is about to happen.[37] This use of necessity probably influences Luke 21:9, where the same phrase is used by Jesus of the coming events related to the destruction of the temple.

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[35] Herodotus recounts the story of the Persian who sat beside Thersander at the banquet of Attaginus. The Persian is reported to have told Thersander that he was aware that the Persian army would soon be defeated. When Thersander pointed out that the Persian should tell his superiors, the man responded: "what God has ordained (ὅ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐκ τοῦ θεου) no man can by any means prevent" (9:16). Also, Philostratus in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 5:12 uses the phrase: "But Apollonius submitted himself to the decrees of the Fates, and only foretold that things must come to pass ("ὡς ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι") and his foreknowledge was gained not by wizardry, but from what the gods revealed to him."

[36] Gideon O. Burton, "mesodiplosis" n.p. [cited 2/26/2012]. Online: http://rhetoric.byu.edu/.

[37] Gregory K. Beale, "The Influence of Daniel Upon the Structure and Theology of John's Apocalypse," *JETS* 27.4 (1984): 413-23.

Necessity in 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees[38]

During the period of the Seleucid rule over Palestine, the Jews were subjected to many horrors. Some of these stories are retold in the Maccabean literature. This literature provides a good cross-section of necessity in Hellenistic Judaism because necessity is an external force, an excuse, and a requirement. Interestingly, it is often the same force that is experienced differently by different characters. What is an excusable external force for one becomes, or is, an internal requirement or expectation for another. 1 Maccabees (circa 80 B.C.E.) gives the list of atrocities committed by Antiochus against the Jews. They were required to stop their sacrifices, to profane the Sabbaths, to build altars to idols in the temple precincts, to sacrifice swine and common animals, to stop circumcision, and many other things, or face death (1: 41-50). Many of the Jews capitulated to this pressure.

One of the leaders of the Jews, Mattathias witnessed a Jewish man offering a pagan sacrifice on the altar of an idol at Modein. He was filled with rage and killed the man and the king's agent who was forcing (ἀναγκάζοντα) the Jews to sacrifice (2:25). It is interesting here that, although necessity can be used as an excuse for behavior that is deemed reprehensible, evidently Mattathias did not see this as an acceptable reason to pervert the law. Evidently, in his mind, resistance and death should be preferable to bowing to pressure.

Out of this incredible circumstance, two incidents stand out in both 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees. An aged lawyer and priest, Eleazar, is tortured to death, and a mother

[38] David de Silva, *Introducing the Apocrypha* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 270 places the date of 2 Maccabees around 124 B.C.E. He also fixes the date of 4 Maccabees in the first half of the first century C.E (356).

and her seven sons are also killed in the most horrible ways because they refuse to eat pork. These two accounts offer some interesting perspectives on necessity in Hellenistic Judaism. The humiliation of the Jews included compelling them to walk in a procession in honor of Dionysius while wearing ivy wreaths and to participate in the sacrifices to that god (2 Macc. 6:7-9).[39] Those who did not choose (μὴ προαιρουμένους) to adopt Greek customs were to be killed (v. 9). It is incredible that Antiochus and his henchmen could expect anyone to *willingly* adopt a Greek way of life in the face of such radical pressure and coercion. At this point it seems that Antiochus and his regime are completely unaware of the laws of necessity and responsibility.

Eleazar is forced to open his mouth to eat the flesh of swine (6:18). The author wants his audience to know that Eleazar does not do this of his own accord. What he does do of his own accord (αὐθαιρέτως) is to go up to the rack, spitting out the swine flesh that was forced into his mouth (6:19). This kind of defiance of the aggressor is held up to be an ideal.

The author inserts that everyone who has "the courage to refuse things that it is not right to taste" should (ἔδει) do what Eleazar has done (6:20 [NETS]). Daniel Schwarz says that Eleazar "constitutes an example of proper behavior."[40] F.M. Abel points out that a "duty" of Eleazar was both to reject the meat *and* to go willingly forward to the torture.[41] The action of the tyrant is reprehensive because forced, but the actions of the aged lawyer are required to be imitated by anyone with courage to resist. The

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[39] Jan Willem Van Henten, *The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviors of the Jewish People* (SJSJsup 57; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 91.

[40] Daniel R. Schwarz, *2 Maccabees* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 288

[41] F.M. Abel, *Les Livres des Maccabées* (Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie, 1949), 367.

imperfect tense of δεῖ used here suggests that there were many who gave in to the pressure of Antiochus and ate the pork; they did not do as Eleazar had done.

This lament in 2 Maccabees can be compared to the statement by the author of 4 Maccabees, who urges his readers to be like Eleazar: "Such should (δεῖ) be those whose office is to serve the law, shielding it with their own blood and noble sweat in sufferings even unto death (7:8). In both cases the authors hold up an expectation or requirement for their audience; in one case it is upheld, in the other it is not.

In his speech before his tormentors, Eleazar informs his audience that his acceptance of a horrible death rather than the impurity of the pork will serve as an example to the young who are watching or who may hear about his deed. They will see "a noble example of how to die a good death willingly and nobly for the revered and holy laws" (6:28 NETS). Eleazar dies a noble and courageous death in defense of the law of God.

The same story is recounted in 4 Macc. 5-7. According to David de Silva, "*4 Maccabees* functions primarily as what ancient rhetoricians would have called epideictic rhetoric."[42] A purpose of this type of literature was to establish certain values a foundational to a society, often by means of praising a person in whom the values were exhibited. Epideictic literature may combine many types of rhetoric, and in this case, deliberative is mixed with encomium.

In this account, Antiochus offers a brief deliberative speech before the torture commences in an attempt to convince Eleazar that to eat the pork is the right thing to do. His argument includes two of the elements that Aristotle listed in his *Rhetoric for*

[42] David de Silva, *4 Maccabees* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 46. See also, H.-J. Klauck, *4 Makkabierbuch* ([JSHRZ 3.6; Giitersloh: Mohn, 1989), 659.

Alexander under deliberative speeches: honor and pleasantness. He tries to get Eleazar to respect his old age and eat the pork (v.7). He also points out that the meat of the pig is good to eat (v. 8-9). Antiochus restates both points in a more sinister way in vv. 11-12: "Will you not awaken from your foolish philosophy, dispel your futile reasonings, adopt a mind appropriate to your years, philosophize according to the truth of what is *beneficial*, and have compassion on your old age by *honoring* my humane advice?" (NRSV – italics mine).

Also, in keeping with Aristotle's advice, Antiochus brings necessity into the argument. Aristotle had suggested that if the point being made was disagreeable, the person offering the speech should show the necessity of the action (*Rhet. Alex.*1421b25). Antiochus points out, unlike the Antiochus of 2 Maccabees, that Eleazar will be forgiven for any act committed due to necessity: "For bear in mind that, if indeed there is some power overseeing this religion of yours, it will excuse you for any transgression committed under duress (δι' ἀνάγκην)" (5:13 NETS). In this deliberative speech, Antiochus attempts to get Eleazar to violate his faith by means of honor, pleasantness, and necessity. The use of necessity here highlights how a defensive topic may be brought into a deliberative speech. The normal use of necessity as excuse is here brought in as a point of persuasion.[43]

Eleazar asks for and receives permission to respond. In his defense, he deals with the issues raised by Antiochus. Right away, he picks up the point of necessity and flings it back. Second century rhetorician Hermogenes refers to this move as *biaion* (*On*

[43] David de Silva, *4 Maccabees: Introduction and Commentary on the Greek Text in Codex Sinaiticus* (SCS; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 128-32.

Invention 3.3; Kennedy, 83).[44] He points out that those like him who have been persuaded to adopt the way of life that accords with God's law recognize no greater necessity (ἀνάγκην) than obedience to the law of God (5:16). As regarding the beneficial nature of pork, Eleazar points out that the Creator has given the types of food that are suitable for the soul (5:26). In this exchange necessity moves from an external force that creates pressure on a person to do something unwillingly to an internal force that causes a person to desire to do something willingly. Eleazar points out to Antiochus that it would be tyrannical for him to compel (ἀναγκάζειν) Eleazar to eat the very food that he would then laugh at him for eating (5:27). Eleazar is having none of Antiochus' pressure. In his defense, Eleazar picks up the necessity of excuse that was used by Antiochus as a component of persuasion and replaces it with the necessity of requirement for the Jewish people.[45]

Following the persecution and death of Eleazar, seven young men and their mother are tortured to death by Antiochus. They, too, were being compelled (ἀναγκάζεσθαι) to eat swine's flesh, and, they, too, were refusing to eat (2 Macc. 7:1). In a chapter that is filled with resurrection language (7:9, 11, 14, 23, 29), the young men one by one fall prey to the devices of Antiochus. Finally, their mother is also killed by the tyrant when she refuses to eat pork (7:41).

Again, the story is repeated in 4 Macc. 8. And, again, necessity plays a more important role in 4 Maccabees than in 2 Maccabees. Antiochus warns the young men that if they are disobedient to him they will compel (ἀναγκάσετέ) him to destroy them (8:9).

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[44] George Kennedy, *Invention and Method: Two Rhetorical Treatises from the Hermongenic Corpus* (Writings from the Greco-Roman World; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005).

[45] de Silva, *4 Maccabees*, 132.

He sets the instruments of torture out before the young men in an attempt to persuade them to eat out of fear (8:12). He informs them, as he had informed Eleazar, that "the justice which you revere will be merciful to you if you transgress the law under duress (δι' ἀνάγκην) (v. 14 NETS). This is the second time the Antiochus of 4 Maccabees has shown awareness of the relationship between necessity and responsibility. As we have seen before, necessity can be an excuse for persons accused of some error or sin. Here, necessity is an external force that causes someone to act against their better judgment. Antiochus uses the same approach that he had taken earlier with Eleazar: the necessity of excuse becomes a persuasive element.

As part of the response to Antiochus, the author of 4 Maccabees offers a *prosopopoeia* that may be entitled, "What Would A Jewish Young Man Say If He Had Wanted to Persuade His Brothers to Eat the Defiling Food?" Unlike the speech of Eleazar, in which necessity is thrown back into the face of the accuser, here this hypothetical young man (who is called "fainthearted" and "unmanly" by the author - 8:16) uses necessity twice as a means of excusing their actions if they should choose to eat the meat (8:16-26).

The argument of this *prosopopoeia* is deliberative but has forensic undertones. The young man attempts to convince his brothers that they should fear the tortures (8:19) and take pity on their own youth and the age of their mother (8:20). He also marshals necessity as a means of gaining forgiveness for their behavior. He points out that "divine justice will make allowance for us if we fear the king under duress (ἀνάγκη)" (8:22 NETS). He also picks up on the earlier arguments of Antiochus by claiming that the Greek way of life is "most pleasant" and "delightful" (8:23). He urges his brother not to

challenge necessity (ἀνάγκη) because the law would not "readily condemn us to death for fearing the instruments of torture" (8:24-25). In this case, the young Jewish man would be making a very similar deliberative argument to that used by Antiochus: necessity is a persuasive element.

Though the author is quick to point out that the young men did not react to Antiochus in this manner (8:27), this hypothetical use of necessity highlights again how differently necessity may be used in the same conversation. Eleazar points out that there is no greater necessity than to be obedient to the law of God. Antiochus and the hypothetical speaker of the prosopopoeia argue that God is aware of the excuse that is associated with compulsion and is willing to grant it in this case.

The Letter of Jeremiah (circa. 100 B.C.E.)[46]

The *Letter of Jeremiah* is designed to alert the Israelites to the potential of falling back into idolatry once they are in exile. Jeremiah warns the soon-to-be captives what awaits them when they get to Babylon:

> Now then, you will see in Babylon silver and gold and wooden gods being carried upon shoulders causing fear to the nations. Beware, therefore, lest you too, having been made like the allophyles, become like them and reverence for them seizes you when you see a crowd before and behind them doing obeisance to them, but say in thought, "It is necessary (δεῖ) to bow down to you, O Master" (vv. 3-5 NETS).

This letter functions as a *thesis* urging the children of Israel not to think of the man-made gods of Babylon as gods at all. It is a piece of deliberative rhetoric designed to convince the persons who were headed for Babylon to worship only Yahweh and not the so-called

[46] David de Silva, *Introducing the Apocrypha* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 216 says the latest date for the Hebrew original was about 306 B.C.E.

gods of Babylon.[47] His goal is clearly to convince the prospective captives that the gods of Babylon are not gods at all. He uses several rhetorical strategies to accomplish this goal.

The author uses the historical report of Israel's past sins as his prooemium (vv. 1-2) (Theon 121.2 [Kennedy, 56]). According to Theon, a practical thesis (those having reference to some action) can be supported by various arguments (Theon 121.20-35 [Kennedy, 56]). The author of this letter chooses reverence, necessity, and the beneficial. Carey A. Moore suggests that the necessity of worshipping only Yahweh (v.5) as the theme of the letter.[48] The author points to reverence in v.6: "For my angel is with you, and he himself is seeking out your souls" (NETS). The author then uses a rhetorical strategy called *ekphrasis*, (i.e., a vivid, detailed description) to rebut the opposition's claim that the idols are gods. His descriptions include making fun of the idols because they are unable to do anything that a god would be expected to do.[49] This thesis also has a component of consolation in it; the author uses repetition of a direct statement: "do not fear them" five times in the letter (vv. 14, 22, 28, 64, and 68). As part of the rebuttal, he asks four rhetorical questions (*erotema*) that include necessity (vv. 39, 44, 51, 56).[50]

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[47] Evangelia G. Dafni, "ΟΙ ΟΥΚ ΟΝΤΕΣ ΘΕΟΙ In Der Septuaginta des Jermiahbuches und in der Epistel Jeremias," in *The Biblical Canons* (J.M. Auwers & H.J. De Jonge, eds.; Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 234-45.

[48] Carey A. Moore, *Daniel, Esther, and Jeremiah: The Additions* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1977), 336.

[49] J.C. Dancy, *The Shorter Books of the Apocrypha* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 199 thinks of the entire letter as a satire that does not rely on a logical structure.

[50] Benjamin G. Wright III, "The Epistle of Jeremiah: Translation or Composition," in *Deuterocanonical Additions of the Old Testament Books* (Géza G. Xeravits, József Zsengellér, eds.; Berlin: Walther de Gruyter, 2010), 126-41. 131-32. Weigand Naumann, *Untersuchungen über den apokryphen Jeremiasbrief* (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913), mentions the striking rhetorical recurrence of the verbal adjective and notes its home in Attic Greek, but does not draw any interpretative significance from it (34).

These questions are variations on a theme: why should we call these idols gods? Each of these questions is designed to drive home the point that, in the face of his evidence to the contrary, no one should consider these impotent idols to be gods. These statements as a group support the thematic δεῖ in v.5. At last, he sums up the argument with a statement that points to the beneficence of not worshipping the idols: "Better, therefore, is a righteous person who does not have idols, for he will be far from reproach" (v. 72 NETS). This piece of rhetoric is a deliberative argument in which necessity is used to convince an audience of the necessity of worshipping only Yahweh.

Necessity in Philo

On Abraham

Philo's encomium of Abraham shows clear awareness of the conventions of praising a person. These conventions have been discussed above in reference to the rhetoricians and progymnasmatists. The topos that Philo chooses for his praise of Abraham is "what was done alone, first, or with few others" as mentioned in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1368a) and Theon (110; Kennedy, 51). Things that Abraham does alone, first, or with few others and which Philo finds praiseworthy include: 1) leaving his homeland (*Abr.* 66); 2) offering his only son Isaac (*Abr.* 183); 3) offering the favored son of his old age (*Abr.* 197); and 4) yielding his superiority to Lot's weakness (*Abr.* 216).

Throughout his encomium of Abraham, Philo uses necessity several times; however, in keeping with the conventions of writing an encomium, he does not present Abraham as doing any of his excellent deeds having been forced by necessity. In fact, when Philo uses necessity in relation to some deed of Abraham, in all but one instance, it

is to distance Abraham from some lesser person (or persons) with whom he is comparing him, or to provide an excuse for what may be an unseemly moment in Abraham's life.

We will look at four occasions in this document in which necessity is used. First, Philo offers a rebuttal of the arguments of those who criticized Abraham for offering Isaac (*Abr.* 178). Abraham's detractors use a comparison (*syncrisis*) to show that Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac was not a great deed for several reasons. They point out that many others have done the same thing (179), and not just common men, but men of great renowned (180) have voluntarily slain their children to secure a greater benefit for their nation. They also point out that barbaric nations have long practiced child-sacrifice as a holy ritual (181). Even the Indians have those who put themselves to death and whose wives jump onto the funeral pyre with them (182-83).

Philo's response is a reformulation of the comparison. Those who offer their children out of custom or habit do no great thing because they have been habituated to the process and thus are unaffected (185). Also, those who sacrifice children in order to alleviate dangers do it because a) they have been constrained, or b) for glory and fame. Those who offer out of fear are not acting willingly but by compulsion, and thus no praise is to be given: "for praise is recorded for voluntary (ἑκουσίοις) good deeds, while for those which are involuntary (ἀβούληται) other things are responsible, favorable occasions, chances (τύχαις), or force (ἀνάγκαις) brought to bear by men" (*Abr.* 186 [Colson, LCL]). Jerome Moreau notes that those cases in which compulsion is present deprives the will of its exercise and thus removes the possibility of praise.[51]

[51] Jerome Moreau, "Abraham dans l'exégèse de Philon d'Alexandrie," (PhD diss.; Université Lumière, 2010), n.p. [cited 2 Feb 2012]. Online: http://theses.univ-lyon2.fr/documents/lyon2/2010/moreau_j#p=46&a=top

Philo then looks to see if Abraham was motivated by any of these factors. Philo finds Abraham to be free of the motivations that had affected others who offered their child. The countries in which Abraham was raised had no such custom of child-sacrifice so he was not accustomed to it (188). There could have been no external compulsion because no one else knew of the oracle that he was given, nor was there a calamity in the land "for which it would have been necessary (ἔδει) for the favored child to become the offered remedy" (*Abr.* 189 [Colson, LCL]). Desire for praise would have been absent because there was no one in the desert to praise him when he did the act.

Philo then switches to proofs for the greatness of Abraham's deed (191). He presents four proofs that Abraham's action in offering Isaac is a great deed. First, Abraham strove more than any other man to obey God in all things. Second, he was about to be the first to offer a child sacrifice in a land in which it was not customary. Third, Isaac was not just his son, but the son of his old age, and thus especially dear to Abraham: those who give an only son deserve the highest praise. And, fourth, unlike others who abandon their child at an altar and flee from the scene, Abraham was the priest of his own altar; he was directly involved with the awful deed (198). Samuel Sandmel says that Philo presents the sacrifice of Isaac as Abraham's "greatest act of piety."[52]

This "rebuttal by *syncrisis*" uses necessity twice. First, Philo shows that those who act out of necessity are not praised, in keeping with the train of thought we find in Theon's treatment of *syncrisis* (Theon 113.10; Kennedy 53) and in the ethical tradition.

[52] Samuel Sandmel, "Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature," *HUCA* 26 (1955): 151-332, 227.

In the second, Philo allows for, but immediately eliminates, the possibility that Abraham may have encountered a situation that would have made it necessary to offer Isaac. He is using an argument from impossibility: it would have been impossible for Abraham to have offered Isaac as a sacrifice to avert some disaster because there was no disaster to avert. Though others offer their children due to custom, out of fear, due to trouble, or for glory and fame, Abraham does none of these things; instead, he offers his son in obedience to God, an extremely important virtue in Jewish life. Louis Feldman writes, "Philo (*Parem* 35, *Spec*. 4.147) says that the queen of the virtues, the fairest of them all, is piety."[53]

The second use of necessity occurs is the account of Abraham's dealings with Lot. As an example of Abraham's virtuous actions toward other humans, Philo spends no small amount of time showing that Abraham practiced deference in relation to Lot. Abraham grew exceedingly rich, far richer than was expected of an immigrant. When Philo points out that Abraham had done something beyond expectations he is using another topos related to an encomium (Theon 110). Although he was wealthy and powerful, he treated his less-successful nephew with great tenderness (*Abr.* 213).

Philo shows how gentle Abraham was (209-11), and then describes Lot as an irascible fellow (212). As Lot's herdsmen become more and more aggressive, Abraham's men are eventually forced out of necessity (ἀπηνάγκασαν) to defend themselves (*Abr.* 213).

[53] Louis H. Feldman, *Philo's Portrayal of Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism* (Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity Series 15; ed. Gregory E. Sterling; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 256.

There can be little doubt that Philo is using necessity here to soften the blow of Genesis 13:7 where the quarrel between Abraham's men and Lot's men is recorded. Philo here uses necessity to explain why Abraham's men were fighting with Lot's. By setting up Lot's men and Lot as hard-to-get-along-with types, the reader is prepared for the conflict. The humility of Abraham is reflected in his men: they only fought when forced.

A third important use of necessity is found in the story of Sarah giving her handmaiden to Abraham in an attempt to create an heir for God's promises. Philo finds the importance of Sarah to be a boon for his *encomium* of Abraham (245-47). He creates a *prosopopoeia* that may be entitled: "What would Sarah say when she came to Abraham to give him her handmaiden?" The *prosopopoeia* is used to provide an excuse (to Philo's audience) for Abraham's action in having intercourse with his wife's servant.

Philo presents Sarah as being very aware that her barrenness was creating a problem for Abraham. She comes to him and speaks wisely about her condition and her solution to the problem. She tells Abraham that she knows that he will take her handmaiden, ". . . not in unreasoning lust but in fulfillment of nature's inevitable (ἀναγκαῖον) law" (*Abr.* 250 [Colson, LCL]). There is a law, a purpose, related to the coming together of men and women which has not been realized in this union. Sarah had already pointed this out in her opening comments: "Long have we lived together in mutual goodwill. But the purpose for which we ourselves came together and for which nature formed the union of man and wife, the birth of children, has not been fulfilled, nor is there any future hope of it, through me at least who am now past the age" (*Abr.* 248 [Colson, LCL]). The situation of her barrenness creates the necessity that causes

Abraham to sleep with her servant. We must remember that Sarah's speech is part of Philo's praise of Abraham, so the necessity here is designed to alleviate (somewhat) the awkwardness of Abraham sleeping with a woman other than his wife, in other words to excuse Abraham's behavior.

The final story in which necessity plays an important role is the account of the death of Sarah. Philo says that Abraham mourned only a little time because wisdom had shown him further mourning was not proper (*Abr.* 258). Wisdom had also taught Abraham that, just as a reasonable person does not mind repaying a debt that was legally and honestly made, he must (δεῖν) not fret over the death of Sarah, "but accept the inevitable (ἀναγκαίοις) with equanimity" (*Abr.* 259 [Colson, LCL]). Philo, at this point, is praising Abraham for doing what was required (i.e. necessary): practicing the virtue of mourning, neither too extravagant nor too subdued. Philo's encomium follows Aristotle's directions related to praise and counsels:

> Praise and counsels have a common aspect; for what you might suggest in counseling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase. Accordingly, when we know what we ought to do (ἅ δεῖ πράττειν) and the qualities we ought to possess (ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ), we ought to make a change in the phrase and turn it, employing this knowledge as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that "one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are due to fortune, but on those which are due to oneself alone," when expressed in this way, has the force of a suggestion; but expressed thus, "he was proud, not of goods which were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone," it becomes praise. Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you would suggest; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise (*Rhet.* 1.9.35-36 [Freese, LCL]).

Here, Philo has shown Abraham doing what is required, i.e. what he has been taught by wisdom.

On Joseph

Throughout his life of Joseph, Philo utilizes necessity in a variety of ways.

In the beginning of his praise, Philo highlights the training that Joseph had received that prepared him to be a great political leader. Education is one of the topics from which one may draw praise in an encomium (Theon 110; *Ad. her.* 3.6.10). Philo demonstrates that Joseph was trained as a shepherd, an occupation that is most congenial to the development of great leaders of people.

He marshals two pieces of evidence that support the importance of this claim. First, the poets were in the habit of calling ancient kings shepherds of the people (*Ios.* 2). Bringing in favorable opinions of famous persons (like poets) is considered by Theon to be support for the greatness of person under review (Theon 110). Second, Philo compares hunting as preparation for generalship with shepherding as preparation for political office. In the comparison, he says that just as "practice in hunting is most-necessary (ἀναγκαιότατον)" for future military leaders, shepherding is the most-suitable thing for a political leader (*Ios.* 3 [Colson, LCL]). By comparing hunting with shepherding in this way, Philo essentially highlights the necessity of shepherding for one who would be a leader of people.

In this brief section of the life of Joseph, Philo makes the argument that shepherding is "like" being a political leader. He proves his point by offering evidence from famous persons and by means of a comparison with something that is assumed to be true: the necessity of training in hunting for a military leader. Joseph's training as a shepherd is thus shown to be a good thing.

The necessity of various kinds of training for the role of political leader is further supported by Philo. Potiphar gave Joseph control of his entire household after observing

his excellent disposition (*Ios.* 37). Philo points out that it was not merely Potiphar who made Joseph administrator, but nature, which did so as part of Joseph's destiny:

> For it was necessary that one who was destined to be a statesman should be previously practiced and trained in the management of a single household; for a household is a city on a small and contracted scale, and the management of a household is a contacted kind of polity; so that a city may be called a large house, and the government of a city a widely spread economy (*Ios.* 38 [Yonge]).

In a prosopopoeia in which Joseph speaks to Potiphar's wife about her advances toward him, Joseph tells her that she should not think that he has come into Potiphar's house with any intention of avoiding the duties that a servant must (δεῖ) render to his master (*Ios.* 45).[54] This point is made again in the allegorical interpretation of the story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife with necessity being the inner passions that have to be overcome by one who would rule well (*Ios.* 71-72). These passions are a powerful force that can disrupt a harmonious life.[55]

Further, in his interpretation of the first part of the Joseph narrative (*Ios.* 1-27), Philo allegorizes the coat of many colors that Jacob had made for Joseph. The life of a statesman is compared to that of a ship's pilot and a physician, both of whom use multiple resources in the administration of their duties. Philo writes: "And so too the politician must needs (ἀναγκαῖον) be a man of many sides and many forms" (*Ios.* 34, [LCL, Colson]). Here again Philo emphasizes the necessity of various kinds of training for an administrator.

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[54] See also Josephus *A.J.* 2.43 for a very similar use of δεῖ in the Joseph-Potiphar account.

[55] See also his comments on the power of the senses and the confusion they force upon (ἀναγκάζει) the soul (*Ios.*142). The earthly realm, as compared to the heavenly realm, is constantly compelled (ἀναγκαζόμενα) to dream by false opinions which keep it off balance and unaware of reality (*Ios.* 147).

In the account of the return of the ten brothers to their father, Jacob, after they had left Simeon with Joseph in Egypt, Philo uses necessity several times in conversations that he places in the mouths of the brothers and their father. Twice, necessity is used to explain or convince of a detail that may be difficult to accept. Joseph's brothers tell Jacob that they have a sad story, but it must (δεῖ) be told (*Ios.* 183). They also recount to Jacob that Joseph's demands are very grievous to them, but they must submit to them out of necessity (πειστέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης) (*Ios.* 186). After hearing them out, Jacob responds: "But if the necessity (ἀνάγκης) which presses upon us is more powerful than my wishes, we must yield (εἰκτέον): for perhaps, perhaps I say, nature may be devising something better which she does not choose as yet to reveal to our minds" (*Ios.* 192 [Yonge]). Philo also mentions the necessities of life (ἀναγκαίων) as those things that were running short (190). These *prosopopoeia* use the rhetorical device *exergasia* (repetition of the same idea with different words, in this case words related to necessity: δεῖ, πειστέον [verbal adjective indicating necessity], ἀνάγκης, and ἀναγκαίων) to instill the significance of the necessity under which these men felt themselves to be operating.

Near the end of the encomium, Philo mentions three things that Joseph enjoyed: great beauty, wisdom, and eloquence of speech (*Ios.* 268-69). The beauty was exemplified by his encounter with Potiphar's wife. His wisdom was demonstrated by the way he handled the affairs which were his responsibility. The eloquence of speech was manifest in both his interpretation of dreams and "by the persuasion which followed his words; in consequence of which his subjects all obeyed him cheerfully and voluntarily (ἑκὼν), rather than from any compulsion (ἀνάγκῃ)" (*Ios.* 269 [Yonge]).[56] Here is the

[56] See Xenophon's comments about persuasion and force in *Mem*. 1.2.44-45.

clear distinction between doing what is necessary because it is accepted as "right" and doing what is necessary when one is not convinced that it is right. The former represents the "good" kind of necessity, the necessity related to "as he ought." The latter represents the "bad" kind of necessity: the necessity that one complains against and resists though compelled.

On Moses

Philo's *Life of Moses* is the first Jewish biography of Moses.[57] The first book deals mainly with Moses' birth and education and the things that he accomplished in his role as "king," whereas the second book deals with the things Moses did as a priest and lawgiver (*Mos.* 1.334). Moses is not only a philosopher and a king, but he is lawgiver, priest, and prophet (2.2).

Manuel Alexandre notes that Philo's biography of Moses falls clearly within the class of epideictic literature.[58] Alexandre goes on to show how well Philo's treatise on Moses is constructed rhetorically. It contains an *exordium* (1.1-4), a *narratio* (1.5-333), a *transitio* (1.334-2.7), a *confirmatio* (2.8-287), and a *peroratio* (2.288-291). The occurrences of necessity are, not surprisingly, found in the *narratio* and the *confirmatio*, the two larger sections where most of the argumentation is done.

Philo's use of necessity in this biography is mainly associated with requirement and excuse/defense. Both types of necessity are found in the *narratio* and the

[57] Louis Feldman, *Philo's Portrayal of Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 19.

[58] Manuel Alexandre, *Rhetorical Argumentation in Philo of Alexandria* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999), 110.

confirmatio. There are more instances of necessity as requirement than necessity as excuse.

Philo uses necessity in the sense of requirement or expectation several times. When Moses and Aaron approach Pharaoh to request permission to go out into the desert to perform their ancestral sacrifices, they tell Pharaoh that the sacrifices must (δεῖν) be performed in the desert (*Mos.* 1:87). The emphasis that necessity receives here is noted by the location of δεῖν at the beginning of the sentence. The reason they give is related to the uniqueness of the Israelite sacrificial system. The action is necessary because the Israelites do not worship as other nations do; their rights and ceremonies are peculiar to themselves.

Interestingly, Pharaoh throws the necessity back at Moses and Aaron, as if he understood them to be saying that he must be obedient to the god of the Hebrews. He asks, "Who is he whom I must (χρή) obey?" (1.88 [LCL, Colson]). As we saw earlier, this is an example of what is called *biaion* in the Hermogenic corpus: "It occurs when we can turn around the argument and catch the opponent with the very things he has boldly asserted" (*Invention and Method* 138).[59]

When they do begin their assault on the Promised Land, the Gadites and the Reubenites wish to stay on the east side of the Jordan River. They promise Moses that they will take their place at the front of the attack and fight for the other tribes until they have secured a place for everyone else on the west side. Moses relents and promises them the land they desire. Philo observes that these people went to the fight more readily and cheerfully than others because a man who has been given a gift beforehand "is more

[59] George Kennedy, *Invention and Method: Two Rhetorical Treatises from the Hermongenic Corpus* (Writings from the Greco-Roman World; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2005).

eager in the cause in which he is engaged, since he thinks that he is repaying a necessary debt, and not giving a free gift" (*Mos.* 1.333 [Yonge]). Clearly the person responding under such conditions feels the pressure of the commitment that he has made. The "debt" is required because the Gadites and the Reubenites made a promise to Moses in order to receive the land they wanted.

There are several things that were necessary for Moses. In his opening remarks about Moses' skill as king, lawgiver, and priest, Philo notes that it was necessary for Moses also to obtain the gift of prophecy (*Mos.* 2.6). This gift is necessary because there are many things that are obscure and unclear even to one so great as Moses; prophecy provides insight into these things and "finds its way to what the mind fails to reach" (ibid [Colson, LCL]).

When Philo turns from discussing the attributes of Moses in relation to his kingship, he moves on to discuss Moses' role as priest. He points out that the "chief and most essential (ἀναγκαιότατον) quality required (δεῖ) by a priest is piety . . ." (*Mos.* 2.66 [Colson, LCL]). It is the opinion of Alexandre that Philo demonstrates that Moses "was not only naturally gifted for this task but that he also in practice became a model of piety, which is the 'supreme and most essential quality'."[60] Significantly, Philo does not merely praise Moses for having natural gifts that supported his piety, but for making the kind of use of them that allowed his piety to be exemplary (*Mos.* 2.66). Thereby Philo praises Moses for possessing something that was necessary. It is in this case, as we have seen, that the person who achieves the ideal or expectation for an office or action may be praised for doing, achieving, or possessing what is required.

[60] Alexandre, *Rhetorical Argumentation in Philo of Alexandria*, 113.

The necessity that Moses experiences as coming from God in relation to his own life is also borne out in his role as lawgiver. Philo notes that in his role as lawgiver, Moses has to "command what should (δεῖ) be done and forbid what should (δεῖ) not be done" (2.187). These things are the basis of virtue for the Israelites.

Philo refers to several things related to the tabernacle as "necessary." Some of the items in the tabernacle that were anointed by Moses were "necessary" (*Mos.* 146). Philo seems to take the idea of correspondence ("as in heaven, so on earth") to a new level when he twice notes the necessity of Moses using earthly materials in the furniture of the tabernacle and the garments of the priests (*Mos.* 2.88, 134). As Moses stood before God on the mountain and received instructions regarding Israel's worship, he "saw with the soul's eyes the immaterial forms of the material objects about to be made and these forms had to be (ἔδει) reproduced in copies perceived by the senses, taken from the original draught, so to speak, and from patterns conceived in the mind" (*Mos.* 2.74 [Colson, LCL]).

The calf that was sacrificed at the dedication of the tabernacle was offered for the remission of sins. The passage is worth quoting in its entirety: "The calf he purposed to offer to gain remission of sins, showing by this figure that sin is congenital to every created being, even the best, just because they are created, and this sin requires (ἀναγκαῖον) prayers and sacrifices to propitiate the Deity, lest His wrath be roused and visited upon them" (2.147 [Colson, LCL]). For Philo, the offering of the calf indicates the necessity of having sacrifices and prayers to appease God's wrath related to sin.

Several of the characters in Philo's *bios* of Moses use necessity as an excuse or in their defense. Among these is Moses' family when they are forced to abandon him at the

river (*Mos.* 1.10). The family kept the child at home and fed and nursed him for three months in spite of Pharaoh's command to dispose of him. According to Philo, the child was discovered and someone passed the information along to those who were in charge of destroying the male children (1.10). The narrative indicates that they exposed the child at the river unwillingly, as is indicated by their tears, lamenting, and groaning. In keeping with prescriptions for writing a narrative (like those found in *Theon* 79), Philo provides the reason why the family exposed the child unwillingly: ". . . the necessity (ἀνάγκης) which had fallen upon them . . ." (1.10). Luis Feldman writes, "Philo thus expresses apologetically that Moses' parents really had no other choice."[61] This is necessity of excuse used in a narrative.

The choice of the impious to do evil intentionally (ἑκουσίω) when they had no compulsion (ἀνάγκη) is rewarded with the most unusual types of punishment (*Mos.* 2.53).[62] Philo goes to great lengths to point out that the laws that God gave to Moses are not just a specific set of laws but are "all aiming at the harmony of the universe, and corresponding to the law of eternal nature" (*Mos.* 2.52 [Yonge]). His indication of those who do evil intentionally is the opposite of the forgiveness that might be expected for a person who commits some offense out of necessity (see below).

Philo, in his discussion of Moses' greatness as a prophet, mentions the incident regarding the Israelites who could not participate in the rites of the Passover because a

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[61] Louis Feldman, "Philo's View of Moses' Birth and Upbringing," *CBQ* 64 (2002): 258-81, 265.

[62] See also *Spec.* 1.101 for Philo's comments about allowing harlots to marry priests: "For it would be mere folly that some men should be excluded from the priesthood by reason of the scars which exist on their bodies from ancient wounds, which are the emblem of misfortune indeed, but not of wickedness,; but that those persons who, not at all out of necessity but from their own deliberate choice, have made a market of their beauty, when at last they slowly repent, should at once after leaving their lovers becomes united to priests, and should come from brothels and be admitted into the sacred precincts" [Yonge].

family member had recently died. He describes the events of Passover in which the normal order of the people bringing their sacrifices to the priests is suspended and every person acts as priest for his own family (*Mos.* 2.224). While most of the people were celebrating the redemption from Egypt with the Passover rites, others were mourning both the loss of a loved one and the absence of the joy associated with the rites of the Passover. Because the necessity of mourning was upon them, they were not allowed to participate in the sacred rites. After the Passover celebration had ended, these people came to Moses and complained to him that the necessity (ἀναγκαιόν) of mourning their loved ones had prevented them from participating in the festival (2.227). Moses realizes "that the excuse which they alleged for not having previously offered their sacrifice was founded in necessity (ἀναγκαίαν), and that they were entitled to merciful consideration" (2.228 [Yonge]).

In the prosopopoeia that addresses the issue "What Would God Say When Moses Comes to Him Asking about the Passover," God also recognizes the necessity (ἀναγκαία) of mourning for a loved one (*Mos.* 2.230). At the same time, the necessity (δεῖ) of keeping the sacred precincts pure against both intentional (ἑκουσίου) and unintentional (μὴ κατὰ γνώμην) pollution is reinforced (231).

Necessity operates on several levels in this story. First, in relation to the narrative, there is the necessity that explains why the manner of the action was unwilling. Some of the people miss the festival of Passover unwillingly and Philo has them explain that it was due to the necessity of dealing with their dead loved ones. Second, Moses recognizes their explanation as a valid excuse grounded in necessity. Third, the

prosopopoeia in which God speaks preserves both the necessity of the excuse and the necessity of keeping the tabernacle pure.

Remarkably, in this exchange, a required thing (mourning for loved ones) was used as an excuse by those who for whom it was required. In cases where the requirement does not interfere with a sacred rite or some other important thing, mourning is simply what *should* be done, although not in the sense of being praiseworthy. This case, however, demonstrates that there are times when a requirement can become an excuse.

In *Mos.* 2.251, Moses addresses the panicked children of Israel at the Sea of Reeds. He lists terror (δέος), fear (φόβος), and risk (κίνδυνος) as representing the circumstances in which the Israelites find themselves. The sea is before them, and Pharaoh's army is behind them; where shall they go? Moses encourages the people that they shall soon see the salvation of the Lord (*Mos.* 252).

Interestingly, the terror is necessary (ἀναγκαῖον). No doubt Moses means that the terror is the appropriate response to the circumstances; it is how a normal, sane person would react to such threats. Elsewhere, Moses asserts that in order for a person to be virtuous, "it is necessary (ἀνάγκαῖον) first of all to encounter danger" (*Mos.* 2.183). Aristotle's ethical considerations come into play here. The proper response is a virtue, a middle way between two extremes or, to feel an emotion "in the proper way (ὡς δεῖ)" as a good man feels it (Aristotle, *Eth. eud.* 1222a15 [Rackham, LCL]). The ethical component of this passage in Philo is highlighted by Rudolf Schmitt who asks if it an

example of a "catalogue of circumstances" somewhat like those in Paul.[63] Schmitt argues that Philo lists the difficulties as a means of encouragement. The point of comparison between Philo and Paul is the help that comes from God. In Paul it is Christ who offers help with difficulties and hardships; in Philo it is God. The hardships are set out as examples of things that are conquered in order to encourage the readers to emulate those who had to undergo them.[64]

Necessity may also be an external force that compels a person to do something against his or her will. In his retelling of the Israelite enslavement to the Egyptians, Philo points out the atrocities committed against the Hebrews (*Mos.* 1.37-38). The Egyptian taskmasters would not even allow the Hebrews time to stop and bury their dead or weep over them. Thus, the natural inclination of a person to bury his dead loved one and to weep over their passing were suppressed "with the intolerable weight of a necessity beyond their powers" (*Mos.* 1.39 [Yonge]). The threat of death by the Egyptian taskmasters became the necessity by which the natural desire to mourn the dead was overcome. Mourning the dead is also considered a necessity (*Mos.* 2.230). Necessity is a component of a narrative that explains why (unwilling due to necessity) the Hebrews did not bury their dead during this period.

Philosophical Necessity in Philo

Philo shows awareness of various views on necessity as an external power that determines human actions on the earth. In his discussion of the superiority of man over

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[63] Rudolf Schmitt, "Ist Philo, Vita Moysis (Mos) II 251 Ein Peristasenkatatlog?" *NovT* 29.2 (1987): 177-182.

[64] Schmitt, "Ist Philo, Vita Moysis (Mos) II 251 Ein Peristasenkatalog?" 182.

other animals, he contrasts humans, who are free to choose, with animals that live according to the necessity of their nature:

> Let us now see where man has been made superior to other animals. We find that the special prerogative he has received is mind, habituated to apprehend the natures both of all material objects and of things in general. For as sight holds the leading place in the body, and the quality of light holds the leading place in the universe, so too in us the dominant element is the mind. For mind is the sight of the soul, illuminated by rays peculiar to itself, whereby the vast and profound darkness, poured upon it by ignorance of things, is dispersed. This branch of the soul was not formed of the same elements, out of which the other branches were brought to completion, but it was allotted something better and purer, the substance in fact out of which divine natures were wrought. And therefore it is reasonably held that the mind alone in all that makes us what we are is indestructible. For it is mind alone which the Father who begat it judged worthy of freedom, and loosening the fetters of necessity (ἀνάγκης), suffered it to range as it listed, and of that freewill which is His most peculiar possession and most worthy of His majesty gave it such portion as it was capable of receiving. For the other living creatures in whose souls the mind, the element set apart for liberty, has no place, have been committed under yoke and bridle to the service of men, as slaves to a master. But man, possessed of a spontaneous and self-determined will, whose activities for the most part rest on deliberate choice, is with reason blamed for what he does wrong with intent, praised when he acts rightly of his own will. In the others, the plants and animals, no praise is due if they bear well, nor blame if they fare ill: for their movements and changes in either direction come to then from no deliberate choice or volition of their own. But the soul of man alone has received from God the faculty of voluntary movement, and in this way especially is made like to Him, and thus being liberated, as far as might be, from that hard and ruthless mistress, necessity (ἀνάγκη), may justly be charged with guilt, in that it does not honor its Liberator. And therefore it will rightly pay the inexorable penalty which is meted to ungrateful freedmen" (*Deus* 46-48 [Colson, LCL]).

In this passage, Philo refers to necessity as "that hard and ruthless mistress" (48 [Colson, LCL]) from which humans have been liberated by being given a mind that is, as much as it can be, like God's – free to choose. That Philo would lament necessity in such a way reflects the feeling of hopelessness that many in the ancient world felt in relation to ἀνάγκη, and brings to mind others who have referred to Necessity in such a way (*Odes* 1.17; 3.14-15; *Alc.* 973-75). In Philo's view, release from necessity creates the possibility

of praise and blame: "But man, possessed of a spontaneous and self-determined will, whose activities for the most part rest on deliberate choice (προαιρετικαῖς), is with reason blamed for what he does wrong with intent (ἑκὼν), praised when he acts rightly of his own will" (47). Roberto Radice notes:

> This philosophically significant passage shows how Philo, above all when he starts from the exegesis of the Bible, rather than from a particular philosophical argument, overcame ethical intellectualism, creating a hierarchy of living creatures not only on the basis of their level of intelligence, but on their degree of freedom in relation to the necessity of the physical world.[65]

Plants and animals are not praised or blamed specifically because they have no deliberate choice (ἀπροαιρέτους) or will of their own (ἀκουσίους) (48).[66] Philo seems to be promoting a doctrine of absolute free will where human responsibility is based on the ability to choose. David Winston, however, in his assessment of this passage and others in Philo related to determinism and free will, concludes that Philo is deterministic, "inasmuch as [his view] seems to be tied to the notion of an all-penetrating divine Logos that reaches into each person's mind, thus converting it into an extension of the divine mind, albeit a very fragmentary one."[67]

Philo does leave room for humans to be affected by necessity. He demonstrates this by his use of "for the most part" and "as far as might be" in the passages quoted

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[65] Roberto Radice, "Philo and Stoic Ethics," in *Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy* (Studies in Philo of Alexandria 5; ed. Francesca Alesse; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 164.

[66] See also *Conf.* 176-79 where Philo suggests that the souls that "revolve about the air and heaven" cannot be "convicted of those deliberate acts of wickedness which proceed upon consideration" (Yonge). Humans, on the other hand, are "often most justly condemned as being guilty of deliberate and studied crime."

[67] David Winston, "Freedom and Determinism in Philo of Alexandria," in *The Ancestral Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism* (ed. Gregory E. Sterling; Brown University, 2001), 149.

above. Philo preserves this possibility, in part, because he describes several of his subjects as acting under the constraints of necessity (see above).

Philo recognizes that fate and necessity are important powers that play a definite role in human life, but they are not the "causes of all things that exist or take place" (*Her.* 300-01). There is a still-more-ancient power than these two that is the cause of all things. This power (God) he compares to a charioteer or a pilot of a ship (*Her.* 301).

Necessity and fate are again the focus of his thought when he discusses the migration of Abraham. Philo takes the Chaldeans to task for misunderstanding the role of the stars in the lives of humans. They considered the revolutions of the stars overhead to be responsible for things that happened on earth, calling this Fate. Instead of allowing the stars to be informative guides for times and seasons, the Chaldeans "erected fate and necessity into gods" and, by that, caused many to believe that there was no other primary cause of good and evil in the world (*Migr.* 179). As we have already seen, he strongly opposes any view that takes away freedom of choice from humans. He points out that Moses taught a different view of originating causes. In a statement that sounds very Parmenidean, he writes:

> Nay, he teaches that the complete whole around us is held together by invisible powers, which the Creator has made to reach from the ends of the earth to heaven's furthest bounds, taking forethought that what was well bound should not be loosened: for the power of the Universe are chains that cannot be broken" (*Mig. Abr.* 181 [Colson, LCL]).

The belief in the controlling power of fate and necessity goes back many centuries to the philosophical discussions held by the Greeks. The Atomists held a view of fate and necessity that raised both to a position of prominence somewhat like that of the Chaldeans. In the Atomists view, however, fate and necessity were not gods but natural

forces that control everything. Radice argues that for Philo the created world is the world of necessity, but God himself is freewill.[68]

Philo is also concerned that some people believe the stars are responsible for human behavior. He is aware that (in his time) people do not know the nature of the stars. He asks several questions that he evidently believes are unanswerable, as far as he is concerned: "Are they living and intelligent, or devoid of intelligence and conscious life? Are their motions determined by choice or simply by necessity?" (*On Dreams* 1.22 [Colson, LCL]).[69] The distinction between the voluntary and necessity is made clear again in his discussion of the "city of God." The place where God dwells is a place free from war and strife. The Spirit speaks to Philo and tells him that "God is a being of free-will; the world of things is Fatality (ἀνάγκη)" (*On Dreams* 2.253). Joel Stevens Allen says that, in this context, the world of mortality and change is the world of necessity.[70]

Peter Frick shows how Philo repeatedly distances himself from the view of the Chaldeans because it completely destroys freedom of the will and responsibility:

> In essence, if human actions – whether good or evil – are ineluctably governed by the stars, then the idea of moral responsibility collapses at once. Indeed for Philo the whole idea of justice is called into question if a judge 'hands over to punishment those who sin against their will, who have committed their acts involuntarily, having no control over their conduct' (1:80).[71]

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[68] Radice, "Philo and Stoic Ethics," 164.

[69] Interestingly, Philo is quite certain that no one will ever know the truth about the heavens: " the day will never come when any mortal shall be competent to arrive at a clear solution of any of these problems" (*On Dreams* 1.24).

[70] Joel Stevens Allen, *The Despoliation of Egypt in pre-rabbinic, rabbinic, and patristic traditions* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 111-12.

[71] Peter Frick, *Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 136. Frick quotes from Abraham Terian, *Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981).

Philo's rejection of the absolute control of human activity by the stars is related to his view of human responsibility. He believes that virtue is associated with choice and stands against compulsion (*Prob.* 60-61). In this work, Philo argues at length that a good man is free, in the sense that he cannot be compelled to do anything: "But, the wise man only desires such things as proceed from virtue, in which it is impossible for him to be disappointed. And again, if he is under compulsion (ἀναγκάζεται), then it is plain that he does something against his will (ἄκων)." He goes on to say that "the actions which proceed from virtue, the creature man performs, not through compulsion but voluntarily (ἑκων) . . ." (*Prob.* 61 [Yonge]). The virtuous man "does nothing against his will (ἄκων), and nothing under compulsion (ἀναγκάζεται)" (ibid).

Philo offers several examples of heroes who prove his point. He mentions Calanus and the hero Heracles. Calanus was an Indian-born philosopher who resisted Alexander the Great's attempt to get him to join the Greek general in order to show the Greeks the strength of some foreign philosophy. When he refused, Alexander threatened to force (ἀναγκάσειν) him to join his group (*Prob.* 95). Calanus points out that he would be worthless to the Greeks as an example of virtue if he could be forced to do something against his will (ibid.). Philo provides a copy of a letter than Calanus sent to Alexander, in which he pointed out that "there is no king nor ruler who will ever succeed in compelling us to do what we do not choose (προαιρούμεθα) to do" (*Prob.* 96). Heracles was the mythic hero of Greek descent who could not be forced to do anything he did not wish to do.

In the course of his argument, Philo recognizes that someone might object to his use of heroes to prove the point that every good man is free. He concedes and switches

to those who are not of immortal descent: Anaxagoras and Zeno. Philo even claims that the lives of the men who were not heroes more clearly demonstrates his thesis since they "exceed in no slight degree the nobleness of those heroes, because the one class have a glory handed down to them by their ancestors without any actions of their own (ἀκούσιον), while the fame of the others is founded on deeds of virtue deliberately (ἑκουσίοις) performed" (*Prob.* 109). This rhetorical move is related to our discussion of encomium/invective above: *the choice* to engage in an action, undergo suffering or conflict, or put oneself in harm's way is praiseworthy. As D.A. Carson notes, for Philo free will is "the ground of human responsibility."[72]

Josephus

The rhetorical capabilities of Josephus have been widely discussed. Denis Saddington, after studying four of the speeches of Josephus in *The Jewish War*, has concluded that "it is apparent that Josephus could deploy the full range of rhetorical technique as sophisticatedly as the Greek and Latin writers of his time."[73] In his autobiography, Josephus spends most of his rhetorical energy demonstrating his activities in and around Galilee in the period before the destruction of the Jerusalem temple in 70 CE.[74] Most of his self-portrait paints the picture of a man who goes to great lengths to

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[72] D.A. Carson, "Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo," *NovT* 23.2 (1981): 148-64, 158. For a fuller discussion of freewill and necessity/fate in Philo see: Lincoln E. Galloway, *Freedom in the Gospel: Paul's Exemplum in 1 Cor 9 in Conversation with the Discourse of Epictetus and Philo* (Contributions to Biblical Exegesis & Theology 38; Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 103-48; Francesca Calabi, *God's Acting, Man's Acting: Tradition and Philosophy in Philo of Alexandria* (Boston: Brill, 2008).

[73] Dennis Saddington, "A Note on the Rhetoric of Four Speeches in Josephus," *JJS* 58 (2007): 228-235, 235.

[74] For a discussion of the *Vita* as an encomium see Jerome Neyrey, "Josephus's *Vita* and the Encomium: A Native Model of Personality," *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 25.2 (1994): 177-206. Neyrey quotes Polybius (*Hist*. 10.2.5-7) in reference to the role of Fortune in the life of a person,

avoid bloodshed as a means of settling conflicts or punishing a wrongdoer and who does what is required of him.

Josephus presents the Jewish war with the Romans as something that was necessary. He offers several examples of the behavior of local non-Jewish groups whereby the Jews were harshly mistreated, presumably for no reason (*Vita* 24-27).[75] In many of these cases, thousands of Jews were slaughtered. Josephus, after noting that he has given a full account of these incidents in his work on the Jewish wars, goes on to say: "I recalled them here because I wanted to establish with readers that war against the Romans was not the choice (προαίρεσιν) of the Judeans, but more of a necessity (ἀνάγκη) " (*Vita* 27 [Mason]).[76]

In a *prosopopoeia* in which God speaks briefly in a dream to Josephus, this necessity is reaffirmed by a divine voice that speaks with Josephus on the night that he makes plans to leave Asochis for his ancestral home. The voice encourages him to take heart for he will meet with many successes. His role in the coming war with Rome is also highlighted: he must (δεῖ) fight with the Romans (209-10). This is clearly a *prosopopoeia* in which God consols Josephus by pointing out that his actions are necessary. Robert Gnuse, in his comments on Josephus' autobiography as an apology for

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concluding that the quote from Polybius proves that gifts of Fortune determine "one's status in the world as a person beloved and favored by the gods" (198). In the section quoted by Neyrey, Polybius actually tries to *correct* that view. He says the other writers are *not aware* that they have missed the point of encomium because men who act by calculation with sound judgment and mental ability should be praised while those who receive Fortune's gifts only congratulated.

[75] Stuart S. Miller, "Josephus on the Cities of Galilee: Factions, Rivalries, and Alliances in the First Jewish Revolt," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 50.4 (2001): 453-67. See also Shayne J.D. Cohen, *Josephus in Galilee and Rome: His Vita and Development as a Historian* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979).

[76] The translation used here is that of Steve Mason, *Flavius Josephus: Life of Josephus*, n.p. [cited 4 Feb 2012]. Online: http://pace.mcmaster.ca/york/york/showText?text=vita.

his people, notes that the dream narrative is a means by which Josephus sought "to justify his revolutionary actions to a later audience."[77]

Josephus reiterates the necessity of the war with Rome in his rant against Justus, the historian who miserably failed, according to Josephus, to depict accurately the accounts of the Jews wars with the Romans He points out to Justus that Justus had had the opportunity to throw down his weapons "and to demonstrate to the king and to the Romans that it was not of choice (ἑκόντες), but as forced by necessity (ἀναγκασθέντες), that you fell into the war against them" (351 [Whitson]).

Since much of the narrative his *bios* of himself is taken up with a discussion of Josephus' role in the war between the Jews and the Romans, it is perhaps significant that he shows himself to be the kind of person who does what he must. Josephus presents himself as a merciful and chaste ruler. He notes that he did not molest even one woman, refused gifts, and even refused the tithes that were his by right (80). Even though he conquered some cities and towns more than once and had some of his greatest enemies at his mercy, he never punished the towns or his enemies unjustly (81-82). According to Josephus, this goes to show that God pays attention to "those that do as they ought to do (τά δεὸντα)" (83 [Thackeray, LCL]). Josephus presentation of the war as necessary, his own necessary role in the war, and himself as being a person who does what is necessary suggests that at least one purpose of his autobiography was to show that by taking a leading role in the war he was just doing what needed to be done.

Josephus also mentions an event that puts an interesting spin on necessity. In recounting some of his adventures with the Galileans, he recalls how two men came to

[77] Robert Gnuse, "*Vita Apolegetica:* The Lives of Josephus and Paul In Apologetic Historiography," *JSP* 13.2 (2002): 151-69, 164.

help in the battle and the Galilean Jews wanted to force (ἀναγκαζόντων) them to be circumcised (*Vita* 113). Josephus refused to allow this; instead, he told the Jews that it is necessary (δεῖν) for each person to worship God according to their own choice (προαίρεσιν) and not due to force (ibid.). This necessity of choice is an interesting use of necessity. Here is good evidence for necessity used for "the norm." Instead of forcing their religious views on the visitors, Josephus points to a standard of behavior that can help these Galilean Jews maintain peaceable relations with their friends.

We will briefly examine a few cases of necessity in Josephus' *The Antiquities of the Jews*. Since historical writing makes use of narrative, we should not be surprised to find many of the examples of necessity in this section are located in narratives about particular events. Josephus also makes use of prosopopoeia in his narratives, and several of these contain necessity.

Josephus recounts the story of Laban's deception of Jacob concerning his favorite of Laban's two daughters: Rachel (*Ant.* 1:297-302).[78] When Laban substitutes Leah for Rachel on the wedding night, Jacob is furious and demands to know why Laban has treated him in this manner. Laban asks Jacob to forgive him for the necessity (ἀνάγκης) that forced him to do this. He assures Jacob that there was no ill-intent on his part, but the matter was out of his hands (1:302). Though Josephus does not specify it, the necessity of which Laban speaks is found in the local customs that prohibited a younger daughter from being married before an older one (Gen. 29:26).[79] This cultural

[78] For some comments on how Jacob was deceived see, J.A. Diamond, "The Deception of Jacob: A New Perspective on an Ancient Solution to the Problem," *VT* 34.2 (1984): 211-13.

[79] Roland DeVaux, *Ancient Israel: It's Life and Institutions* (trans. John McHugh; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997) states that this practice was not universal (29).

requirement is experienced by Laban as an external power for which he would ask understanding from Jacob. Laban, according to Josephus, asks for συγγνώμην (forbearance or lenient judgment), indicating that he recognized that his action was viewed as wrong by Jacob.[80]

In this narrative, necessity is used to explain the manner of Laban's actions. Laban does what tradition demands he must do, then he uses the necessity as an excuse when confronted by Jacob. This story demonstrates that the same necessity may serve different functions for the same character in a story.

In a narrative that is filled with as much intrigue as that of the Laban/Jacob story, Josephus recounts the account of the Rape of Dinah.[81] Dinah went into the village of the Shechemites to check out the latest fashions of the indigenous people, and, while there, was raped by Shechem, the son of the king of that country. Shechem then petitioned his father, Hamor, to ask Jacob to give Dinah to him in marriage (*Ant.* 1.337). Jacob asked for time to deliberate with his sons about τί δεῖ ποιεῖν ("what must we do" or "what must be done" 1.339). The resonance of this phrase with Aristotle's ethical ideal suggests that Josephus envisions Jacob conferring with his sons about the right course of action. All of Jacob's sons, except the full brothers of Dinah, Simeon and Levi, had no response; however, Dinah's full brothers decided upon a deed of daring that resulted in the death of the men of the city and the recovery of their sister (*Ant.* 1.340).

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[80] A very similar use of both ἀνάγκη and συγγνώμη occurs in Sophcles' *Electra* 256-57. There Electra points out that a necessity forces her to grieve for her lost father and the deplorable conditions of her family. She asks the Argive women to bear with her due to this pressure.

[81] For a discussion of the way Josephus has altered the biblical account, see Louis H. Feldman, "Philo, Pseudo-Philo, Josephus, and Theodotus on the Rape of Dinah," *JQR* 94.2 (2004): 253-77, esp.262-71.

Josephus uses necessity here in a deliberative sense to set up the reason why Simeon and Levi took such strong action. By placing the decision of Simeon and Levi in close proximity to the deliberative τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, Josephus makes it appear that their revenge was what was necessary.[82]

In the account of Joseph's encounter with Potiphar's wife, Josephus presents Joseph much as the heroes of 4 Maccabees are presented: able to overcome passion with reason (*Ant.* 2.40). When Potiphar's wife tries repeatedly to seduce him, Joseph stands resolute against her on the grounds that such a deed would involve great disrespect for the man who had bought him and entrusted his affairs to him. Joseph is depicted as attempting to persuade Potiphar's wife that she should overcome her passion. His argument includes the rejection of the necessity (δεῖ) of his obedience to the wife of his owner (2.43). Joseph points out that, in this case, there are abundant reasons why his refusal to be obedient to her would be met with leniency.

In his exhortation, Joseph anticipates and refutes an argument that could have arisen in the mind of a reader related to Joseph's status as slave and the demands of his owner's wife: a slave should do as he is instructed. As far as Joseph is concerned, the area of forced sex is outside the bounds of necessity, even for a slave.

The narrative about Joseph meeting his brothers in Egypt when they come to buy corn contains a double use of necessity. The brothers go to Egypt to buy corn and, while there, meet their brother Joseph whom they had sold into slavery. They do not recognize him, and Joseph uses his cover to test their character and to learn of the fate of his father and his younger brother Benjamin.

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[82] For more about the motives for revenge see Danna Nolan Fewell and David M. Gunn, "Tipping the Balance: Sternberg's Reader and the Rape of Dinah," *JBL* 110.2 (1991): 193-211, esp. 206.

A series of events leads to the brothers being charged as spies, and Joseph demands that they leave one brother, Simeon, behind as a guarantee of their honesty and go bring the youngest brother, Benjamin, back to Joseph in order to prove their story regarding their family and father (*Ant.* 2.98-105).[83] After the nine brothers return to their father and tell him what happened in Egypt, Jacob is very upset. He initially refuses to yield to the demands of Joseph; however, the corn is shortly used up, and they are again in distress. With pressure mounting, Josephus refers to "the necessity (ἀνάγκης) that forces" (*Ant*. 2:114) Jacob, against his wishes, to send Benjamin with the nine brothers.

The necessity has two sources: the famine and Joseph's demand that the brothers cannot return to him without Benjamin. The situation (famine) is experienced as something external to the Hebrews that causes (βιαζομένης) them to go back to Egypt to buy more grain and to have another encounter with Joseph. The translation of Whiston fails to capture this idea: "Yet when the corn they had brought failed them, and when the famine still afflicted them, and necessity forced them, Jacob did [not] still resolve to send Benjamin with his brethren, although there was no returning into Egypt unless they came with what they had promised" (*Ant*. 2:114-15).[84] In Thackeray's translation, Josephus simply states: "But when the corn which they had brought failed them and the famine was tightening its grip, under pressure of necessity Jacob decided to send Benjamin away with his brethren; for it was impossible for them to return to Egypt if they left without fulfilling their promises." (2:114-15 [Thackeray, LCL]). The famine creates the

[83] Cf. Gen. 42:18-20.

[84] *The Works of Josephus: Complete and Unabridged* (trans. William Whiston; rev. ed.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1987). Whiston argues for the addition of the negative particle, which he says the coherence of the passage demands (60, n. "d").

necessity that the brothers return to Egypt, but Joseph's demands create the necessity that they do so with the youngest brother, Benjamin. Josephus' use of necessity here helps explain why a man who has already "lost" two sons (Joseph and Simeon) would agree to risk the loss of a third one. The degree of lamenting and weeping (it lasted an entire day) that took place when the sons were about to depart indicates how difficult this decision was for Jacob (*Ant*. 2.118-19).[85]

Josephus' version of the account in Gen. 44 where Benjamin is found to have Joseph's silver cup in his grain bag includes a long speech by Judah in which he attempts to convince Joseph to allow him to serve Benjamin's punishment (*Ant.* 2.140-58).[86] The speech of Judah contains several persuasive tactics. In an echo of Joseph's own speech to Potiphar's wife (*Ant*. 2.43), the weaker person (Judah) calls upon the empowered person (Joseph) to overcome the passion that is about to cause trouble for the weaker person (2.141). He compares Joseph's giving them grain (which sustained their lives) to his now giving them pardon (which will sustain their lives) (2.143-44). With great irony he suggests that God is giving Joseph the opportunity to "forgive the injuries that are done to thyself . . ." (145). Again, he compares the rightness of giving food to the "more glorious thing of saving those who deserve to be punished" (2.146 [Whiston]). Judah calls upon Joseph to consider "his" father while considering their father and forgive them for the sake of "their" father's old age (2.147-52).

Toward the end of his speech, there is an echo of the earlier conundrum that Jacob and the nine brothers were in (2.114-15): the necessity brought about by the impossibility

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[85] Louis H. Feldman, "Josephus' Portrait of Jacob," *JQR* 79.2 (1988): 101-51, esp. 143.

[86] Whiston believes this oration belongs to an exercise completed earlier by Josephus and inserted here (62, n. f).

of them returning to Joseph without Benjamin now becomes the necessity brought about by the impossibility of them returning to Jacob without Benjamin. Judah insists that the remaining brothers cannot return to their father without Benjamin, but "must (δεῖ) stay here to share his fate" (2:154 [LCL, Thackeray]). Judah experiences the gravity of the situation as necessity: to stay with Benjamin and suffer the same fate is required of the brothers.

Necessity is used here as a component of a defensive speech in which Judah seeks for mercy for Benjamin and the ten brothers. Joseph had earlier dismissed the ten brothers, saying they were free to go; only Benjamin, the guilty one, would be kept in prison. His dismissal involved two elements: 1) it was not right to let Benjamin go free for the sake of his brothers who had done no wrong; and 2) it was not right to punish all for the crime of one (*Ant.* 2.138). Judah's use of necessity is a direct refutation of Joseph's dismissal: if Benjamin is kept, all of us must stay.

In other narratives in Josephus necessity functions as an excuse for the Israelites' complaints against Moses when they were wandering in the wilderness (*Ant*. 3.1-2; 22-23). Moses prays to God on their behalf, asking for help and for forgiveness for the things they had done out of necessity (ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης), and especially since that is the nature of humans: to be persnickety and complaining (3:23). Necessity is a requirement laid down by the Midianite women who come to seduce the young Israelite men. In this story, the women lay down a condition or requirement for the young men: it is necessary (ἀνάγκη), if you want to live to live with us, for you to worship our gods (4:137). The maidens reiterate to the young men that it is necessary (δεῖν) for them to change their ways of worship to match those in whose country they resided or to seek a

place where they could worship as they wish (4:138). The Gibeonites use necessity as their excuse when their plot is discovered. After Joshua and the people accept their covenant, Joshua discovers that these people live very nearby and are, in fact, Canaanites. When he calls them on the lie, they cite necessity as their defense, as Josephus reports: "but they alleged, on their own behalf, that they had no other way to save themselves but that, and were therefore forced (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) to have recourse to it" (*Ant*. 5.57 [Whitson]).

Necessity also functions as excuse or defense in the actions of the men of Israel in relation to the Benjamites. Following the disastrous civil war that developed after the affair of the Levite's concubine was spread abroad, the other tribes had risen up against the Benjamites and had slaughtered all of them except six hundred men (Judges 21) as punishment for the atrocities committed against the Levite's concubine. But, the slaughter yielded another problem: where would the remaining Benjamites get wives? The other tribes had sworn not to give their daughters as wives to the Benjamite men. This created a predicament.

The solution, according to the Septuagint, was the capture of four hundred virgins from the city of Jabesh Gilead (Judges 21:12-14) who were then given to the men of Benjamin as wives. The remaining two hundred wives were to be "stolen" from the festivals that were held at Shiloh (Judges 21:15-24). Josephus' story parallels this account, but he adds some additional details.[87] According to Josephus the men of Israel

[87] See also the parallel story in Plutarch, *Rom.* 9.2; 14.6 regarding Romulus and the rape of the Sabine women. Louis Feldman, "Josephus' Portrayal (Antiquities 5.136-174) of the Benjaminite Affair of the Concubine and Its Repercussions (Judges 19-21)," *The Jewish Quarterly* NS 90.3/4 (2000): 255-9, has commented on the similarities and differences of the two accounts. Feldman does not notice it, but both accounts include a reference to necessity as excuse.

took counsel to discover by what means they may overcome their oaths not to give their daughters to the Benjamites as wives (*Ant*. 5:168). Part of the discussion centered on the nature of the oath. Some advised the group that they should disregard the oath because it had not been taken after careful consideration, but as a result of passion. It was also pointed out that to save an entire tribe was certainly not something against God, and, further, that going back on their word was only a terrible offense when done with malicious intent, not "when they were prompted by necessity (ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης)" (*Ant*. 5:169 [LCL, Thackeray]).[88] Necessity blunts the force of the convention; going back on one's word is a grave offense, except in those cases where a greater harm would be done by adhering to an ill-advised oath. The situation forces the men of the other tribes to find a way to nullify their previous oaths.

A most interesting account is that of Michal hiding helping David to escape and then covering her deed by placing a goat liver in the bed to deceive the men who come to take David. The account is given in 1 Samuel 19. Josephus embellishes the story with his own flavoring again. When Saul's men discover that Michal has deceived them and Saul by her contrivance, Saul is informed and confronts Michal about the deception. Josephus calls her creative response "a plausible defense" (6:219). She defended her actions by claiming that David had threatened to kill her, and that she had helped him out of fear. She pointed out that she ought to be forgiven because her actions were not of her own free choice (μὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν) but were due to necessity (κατ' ἀνάγκην)

[88] Feldman, "Josephus' Portrayal (Antiquities 5.136-174) of the Benjamite Affair of the Concubine and Its Repercussions (Judges 19-21)," observes that the by showing that the Israelite men disdain (ὀλιγωρεῖν) their earlier oath, Josephus connects them with the overall attitude of lawlessness that prevailed in Israel at the time (259-60). On this reading, the Israelite men would be actually doing what the prosopopoeia in 4 Macc. 8 only raised the possibility of doing: using necessity as an excuse to disregard the law of God.

(6:219). Saul bought her story and forgave her. In reality, her story is a lie, but the plausibility of such a scenario is clear to anyone who is familiar with necessity and shows how easily a Hellenistic writer like Josephus could supply a *prosopopoeia* in this literary environment.

Philosophical Necessity in Josephus

Beginning in *Ant.* 16.395, Josephus raises the question as to the motivation of Herod regarding the slaughter of his children and relatives. He questions whether Herod's sons gave an occasion for their own murder, whether Herod was just so obstinate that his mind was unmovable, or perhaps Fortune, Necessity, and Fate played a role (*Ant*. 16.395-97). Josephus defines this power as the belief "that human actions are thereby determined beforehand by an inevitable necessity (ἀνάγκη), and we call her Fate (εἱμαρμένην), because there is nothing which is not done by her" (Ant. 16.397 [Whiston]). Gustav Stahlin refers to these three concepts as the closely-related terms for the fate which even challenges the power of God.[89] George Foot Moore says that εἱμαρμένην was identified with ἀνάγκη in terms of cause and effect.[90] Moore only finds in Josephus a belief that what is "necessary" or what "must be" is "the will of God

[89] Gustav Stahlin, "Das Schicksal im Neuen Testament und bei Josephus," in *Josephus Studien: Untersuchungen zu Josephus, dem antiken Judentum und dem Neuen Testament* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 319-343, 337.

[90] George Foot Moore, "Fate and Freewill in the Jewish Philosophies According to Josephus," *HTR* 22.4 (1929): 371-389, 376.

revealed by the prophets."[91] In *Ant*. 8:418, necessity is connected with prophetic events, by which God shows τί δεῖ φυλαξασθαι (what must be avoided).[92]

In *Bell*. 2.162-64, Josephus compares the Pharisees and Sadducees view of fate (ἑιμαρμένην).[93] He offers a similar statement in *Ant*. 13.172-73. Luther Martin has observed that Josephus recognizes and uses the Hellenistic notion of ἑιμαρμένην as a "determined governance of human affairs." [94] Martin goes on to point out that Josephus distances himself from this view with his belief that "freedom from this determinism, and thus human responsibility, is possible only in obedience to the will of God."[95] An example of this belief in Josephus is *Bell*. 3.391, where Josephus lists fate and the will of God together as the cause of an event.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that necessity in the Septuagint is most often the necessity of requirement. Interestingly, the first two uses of necessity (Lev. 4:2; 5:17) are related to forgiveness of sins that are committed unintentionally. Although the Law required that the commandments not be violated, unintentional violation was met with forgiveness via the sacrificial system. Other situations in which necessity is a requirement include the Boaz/nearer-kinsman exchange (Ruth 4:5), the double request by

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[91] Moore, "Fate and Freewill in the Jewish Philosophies According to Josephus," 388.

[92] See also *Bell*. 3.401ff, 6.312

[93] In his lengthy and helpful assessment of this term in Josephus, Jonathan Klawans, "Josephus on Fate, Free Will, and Ancient Jewish Types of Compatibilism," *Numen* 56 (2009): 44-90, "eschew[s] the term "fate" in favor of "determinism," "predeterminism," and "predestination" (48).

[94] Luther H. Martin, "Josephus' Use of Heimarmene in the Jewish Antiquities XIII.171-73," *Numen* 28.2 (1981): 127-37, 133.

[95] Ibid., 134.

Elisha regarding what should be done for the Shunammite woman (2 Kings 4:13-14), King Ahaseurus and the rebellion of Vashit (Est 1:15). Other Hellenistic Jewish documents also show awareness of necessity as requirement: Philo *Ios*. 3 and Josephus *Vit*. 83.

These texts also yielded evidence of several rhetorical features that included necessity used in ways indicated by the progymnasmata and rhetorical handbooks. Ezekiel 13:17-23 used necessity in a topos that amplifies the nature of the evil deeds of the female prophets who were deciding the basic necessity of human existence: life and death. Among the several examples of prosopopoeia were 1) the hypothetical speech of the young Jewish man in 4 Maccabees 8:16-26 who sought to convince his brothers to yield to Antiochus even as he used necessity as an excuse; and 2) Sarah's speech to Abraham concerning his reproductive encounter with her handmaiden in which necessity is used as an apology for Abraham's behavior.

The *Letter of Jeremiah* is a thesis that uses necessity to exhort the Jews who are about to go into Babylonian captivity to worship only Yahweh and to recognize that the man-made idols of the Babylonians do not deserve to be called "gods." Philo spells out the role of necessity related to actions in his comparison of Abraham's excellent deed of offering Isaac with other pagans who had offered their children to a god (*Abr.* 185-86). Philo also uses narrative necessity in relation to the manner of an action when he points out that Moses' parents had unwillingly yielded to the necessity of Pharaoh's orders by placing the young child in the river (*Mos*. 1:10).

Necessity used as an excuse in a forensic sense is found in Philo (*Mos.* 2.224-31) and Josephus (*Vita* 27, *Ant*. 1.302, *Ant*. 3.23, and *Ant*. 6.219). Necessity as an external force or pressure (compulsion) occurs in *Mos*. 1.37-38 and *Ant*. 2.114.

There were several examples of the necessity that serves a deliberative cause to help convince a reluctant audience (Prov 22:14; Is 50:4; *Abr*. 259). Also, we saw that in the philosophical writings of Philo and Josephus, necessity and choice are very closely related, with choice being given the superior position in terms of qualifying what is good relative to human actions. Necessity is always associated with the unwilling or unintentional actions of persons. In addition to these exercises, we also saw at least three rhetorical devices that emphasized necessity: Daniel 2:28-29 (*mesodiplosis*-repeating the same phrase in the middle of successive sentences), 4 Maccabees 5 (*biaioin* – a species of refutation in which an opponent's bold assertion is turned back on him), and Philo *Ios*. 186-192 (*exergasia* – repetition of the same idea with different words).

These examples demonstrate two important things. First, necessity as compulsion is always experienced negatively by the person who is being compelled. A person who is compelled to do something (usually unwillingly) is not praised for his or her actions, but in fact may have a defense or an excuse from the necessity. Josephus recognizes the validity of Michel's defense before Saul that she did not act willingly but was forced by David to help him escape (*Ant*. 6.219). Even a requirement may, in certain cases, become an excuse. The children of Israel who missed the Passover celebration because they had to bury their dead had a legitimate excuse before God (*Mos*. 2.227-28). Laban sought forgiveness (or at least sympathetic understanding) from Jacob because of a necessity that forced him to marry the older daughter first (*Ant.* 1:297-302).

Second, necessity as a requirement is usually considered neutral or is viewed positively. Sometimes a requirement is just a matter of fact (the necessary items in the tabernacle – *Mos*. 146). A requirement may also be part of a norm or custom that is considered "right" by most people (the need for Elisha's act of reciprocity – 2 Kings 4; Job's awareness of proper speech – Job 15:3, 19:4). A person who acknowledges a prerequisite is not yielding to compulsion; rather, he is embracing a requirement that leads to the attainment of some goal, one that is usually sought willingly. We now turn to necessity in the New Testament writings.

CHAPTER FIVE

Necessity in the New Testament

Necessity in Paul

The writings of Paul represent the earliest literature in the New Testament. As such, and given the high degree of interaction with Gentile Christians, they represent the types of literary works with which Luke's authorial audience may have been familiar.

Mostly, Pauline necessity is the necessity of requirement that functions in various ways in his letters. A few examples will suffice. In Rom 1:27, Paul refers to the "return" that those men who commit shameless acts with other men get: τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἥν ἔδει. Romans 12:3 is a warning not to think more highly of oneself than one ought. Twice in Colossians Paul refers to speaking as is necessary or as one ought. In 4:4, he asks the Colossians to pray for him that he can speak clearly about the mystery of Christ, as he should (ὡς δεῖ).[1] In 4:6, gracious speech leads to the knowledge of how one should (ὡς δεῖ) answer those with whom the believers interact. 2 Thess reminds the Thessalonians that they should (δεῖ) imitate Paul's work ethic (3:7). 1 Timothy 3 provides a list of fifteen things that are required (δεῖ) for a bishop (v.2, 7).[2] In Titus 1, the list includes thirteen requirements (δεῖ) for a bishop (v.7).

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[1] Even here, the compulsive divine plan shows up: Douglas J. Moo, *The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 326; James D.G. Dunn, *The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 265: For Dunn, δεῖ represents "a predestined destiny and unavoidable compulsion."

[2] I. Howard Marshall, *The Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999), 477 suggests the meaning of δεῖ may be "what is fitting, in this case for church officials."

There are, however, a few instances where the question of compulsion arises. The most interesting of these are 1 Cor 9:16; 2 Cor 9:7; and Philemon 14. In each of these examples, a person is under great pressure to do something; so much so that the issue of "willingly" comes up in the discussion.

1 Cor 9:16 is a troubled passage. Most of chapter nine is seen as a digression by which Paul either defends his rights[3] or establishes that he has certain rights as an apostle.[4] Most scholars have argued that it is not properly an *apologia.*[5] The gist of the chapter is that Paul establishes that he has certain rights (especially for financial support), but he gives them up in order to win more converts. In the course of his argument, Paul notes that he has never made use of any of the rights that he has and that his present discourse is not designed to convince others to yield on this matter (9:15). He declares, "No one will deprive me of my ground for boasting" (v.15). He then goes on to point out that preaching the gospel, in contrast to giving up his rights, does not allow him to boast because he preaches under a necessity (ἀνάγκη), and a woe awaits him if he does not preach (v. 16).

Scholars are divided over how seriously to take Paul's declaration that he does not preach the Gospel willingly, but under compulsion. Abraham Malherbe recognizes the "tortured mixture of philosophical and commercial language" that Paul uses here, but wrestles through it to conclude that Paul preaches the gospel willingly. He writes,

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[3] Joost Smit Sibinga, "The Composition of 1 Cor 9 and It's Context," *NovT* 40.2 (1998): 136-63, 136-37.

[4] David E. Garland, *1 Corinthians* (BECNT; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 402.

[5] For an argument that it is a defense see Gordon Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987), 392-441.

"Although necessity is laid upon him to preach the gospel, he does so willingly and has a reward. Were he to preach unwillingly, he would nevertheless have to preach, for he has been entrusted with an οἰκονομία."[6] He goes on to point out that the manner of Paul's work "is without compulsion; his free offer of the gospel is the practice of someone who is himself free."[7] Malherbe's study compares Paul with Stoic and Cynic philosophy.

David Garland accepts that Paul preaches under necessity and not of choice. He notes that "Paul did not decide on his own to enlist in the apostolic ministry."[8] Paul does not act from choice, but that is because he recognizes himself as the slave of Christ. The necessity that Paul experiences is "a compulsion that is laid upon him from outside by God."[9]

In his investigation of this passage, Lincoln Galloway argues that Paul plays on what Galloway thinks is an ambiguity in the term ἀνάγκη. He writes, "[Paul] understands the prophetic tradition that portrays the prophet as responding to ἀνάγκη in terms of necessity, rather than compulsion. He also knows the philosophic tradition that a person is only compelled if the required action goes against the person's will."[10] Galloway concludes that Paul is not preaching against his will, i.e. he is not compelled.

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[6] Abraham J. Malherbe, "Determinism and Free Will in Paul: The Argument of 1 Corinthians 8 and 9," in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress,1995), 231-55, 251.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Garland, *1 Corinthians,* 423.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Lincoln E. Galloway, *Freedom in the Gospel: Paul's Exemplum in 1 Cor 9 in Conversation with the Discourses of Epictetus and Philo* (CBET 38; Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 183-84.

What Galloway misses, and tries to explain away, is the use of ἑκὼν and ἄκων. The only other places where Paul uses either of these words is Rom 8:20 (ἑκὼν) and Philemon 14 (ἑκουσίον).[11] In his letter to the Romans, Paul discusses the future glory that awaits. He points out that creation (κτίσις) was subjected to futility or worthlessness, "not of its own choice (ἑκοῦσα), but by the will of the one who subjected it in hope." As Charles Talbert has pointed out, "As a result of human sin, the material world is subject to futility—that is, to decay, and to pain."[12] It is important to note that the creation is not willingly involved in this transaction; it had no choice, and that is usually associated with compulsion.

Paul clearly indicates that his ground for boasting is that he has not made use of what was clearly his right: to receive funds from the churches (9:15). He would rather die than give up his right to boast in this manner. Since Paul understood the rhetoric of his day, he would know that he could boast because he is doing what he ought (preaching the gospel for free), but not in relation to what he is compelled to do. That he understands himself to be compelled to preach the gospel is made clear when he points out that actions done willingly (ἑκὼν) have a reward, but those done unwillingly (ἄκων) have only a stewardship (9:17).[13] Paul uses necessity here to highlight that his calling should be understood in terms of compulsion, which gives him no right to boast, but his decision to refrain from taking financial support from the churches is in fact praiseworthy. This is his boast and a worthy one.

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[11] On Philemon 14, see below.

[12] Charles Talbert, *Romans* (Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2002), 214.

[13] See Gordon Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 418 who writes, "God had ordained such a destiny for him from birth and had revealed it to him in the event of the Damascus Road (Gal 1:15-16)."

In 2 Cor 9, Paul addresses a special love-offering in which the Corinthians have promised to participate. He informs them that he thought it best to send some of the brothers on ahead to make *sure* the offering is ready so his boasting about their participation will not be in vain (9:1-5). A reader of any sophistication can sense the pressure in these verses.[14] It seems that Paul, too, is aware of the pressure that he has placed on them, so much so that he clarifies for them, as he will do with Philemon in another letter. In 2 Cor 9:7, Paul informs the Corinthians that each person should give "as he has decided (προῄρηται) in his heart, not reluctantly or out of necessity (ἀνάγκης); for God loves a happy giver." This is the necessity of external compulsion, and it what Paul wants to avoid. The connection with προαίρεσις (the term that is associated with an individual's choice) is very strong and makes it clear that Paul does not want the Corinthians to feel pressured to give. There is no praise for things done due to a compulsive necessity.

Wanting subjects to act willingly and not out of necessity is fairly common in the ancient world. In his rhetorical investigation of 2 Corinthians, J. David Hester labels the section 9:2-24 "Argument from abundance and return 'with many thanksgivings *to God*' as patron" (italics original).[15] Many good patrons were shown to be people who wanted subjects who were willing, rather than those who felt their allegiance was forced. In his letter to Demonicus, Isocrates points Demonicus to Demonicus' own father as an

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[14] David E. Garland, *2 Corinthians* (NAC 29; Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1999), 403, comments on Paul's warning that if the Corinthians renege they will be labeled "pledge-dodgers" and may have their name posted on a wall in the Athenian Agora.

[15] J. David Hester, "Re-Reading 2 Corinthians," in *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts* (ESEC; ed. Anders Eriksson, Thomas H. Olbricht, Walter Übelacker; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002), 276-295, 280.

example of ethical principles. Hipponicus was a man of balanced life. He "prized more those who were devoted to him than those who were his kin by blood; for he considered that in the matter of companionship nature is a much better guide than convention, character than kinship, and freedom of choice (προαίρεσιν) than compulsion (ἀνάγκης) (10 [Freese, LCL]). Also, as we saw in Philo, Joseph's wisdom was demonstrated by the way he handled the affairs which were his responsibility. The eloquence of speech was manifest in both his interpretation of dreams and "by the persuasion which followed his words; in consequence of which his subjects all obeyed him cheerfully and voluntarily (ἑκὼν), rather than from any compulsion (ἀνάγκῃ)" (*Ios.* 269 [Yonge]).[16]

Regarding the pressure that can create shame, Demosthenes, in a speech delivered to the Assembly urging the Athenians to act regarding the activities of Philip of Macedon, counts on shame being treated as necessity: "What are you waiting for? Until you are compelled (δί' ἀνάγκη), I presume. But what are we to think of what is happening now? For my own part I think that for a free people there can be no greater compulsion (ἀνάγκην) than shame for their position" (*1 Philip.* 10 [Vince, LCL]). [17] Plutarch remarks that compulsion or menace may not be required in dealing with a nation, "but when they see with their own eyes a conspicuous and shining example of virtue in the life of their ruler, they will of their own accord (ἑκουσίως) walk in wisdom's ways. . ." (*Num.* 20.8 [LCL, Perrin]). Paul follows in this same tradition by curtailing the pressure that may have been taken as compulsion in the early verse of chapter nine: God operates through choice, not by compulsion.

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[16] See Xenophon's comments about persuasion and force in *Mem.* 1.2.44-45.

[17] This line of argument is repeated nearly verbatim in *Chers.* 50-51 and *4 Philip.* 27.

In Philemon, Paul addresses a fellow-worker whose slave has been with Paul for some time, long enough for the situation to grow uncomfortable. The slave, Onesimus, has become quite useful to Paul, and Paul hates to send him back. Paul feels that he has the right to command Philemon to do his "duty," but he wants to come at the problem from a position of love. Paul is sending Onesimus back to Philemon with the clear understanding that he wanted to keep him. It was, however, the realization that Philemon had not consented to Onesimus' being with Paul that drove Paul to his decision. Since Philemon had not consented to Onesimus being with Paul (rather, Onesimus was there because he had run away),[18] the usefulness that Onesimus was to Paul was not a gift freely given by Philemon; it was forced. The necessity comes from the fact that Onesimus' location was out of Philemon's hands; it was something over which he had no control, and, perhaps more importantly, Philemon had not willingly agreed to let Onesimus stay with Paul. Paul recognized the use of Onesimus as a "good deed" from Philemon, but a good deed that was from necessity, not from choice. Paul knew this would not work for honor for Philemon.

The question of what was being asked of Philemon has often been raised. At the heart of this question is what is meant by τὸ ἀγαθόν σου – "your good deed." F.F. Bruce sees the good deed as Philemon sending Onesimus back to Paul to continue his useful service.[19] James Dunn's investigation of the issue leads to the conclusion that it is

[18] Perhaps he had not run away at all. Perhaps Philemon had sent him to Paul on a specific errand, and Onesimus had gotten busy helping Paul and had overstayed his leave. As Bruce points out: "In view of our ignorance of so many details, the possibilities are numerous" (F.F. Bruce, *The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians*, (NICNT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984), 197).

[19] F.F. Bruce, *The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians,* 214-16.

"unclear."[20] Murray Harris believes Paul wants Philemon to accept Onesimus back into his household just as he would welcome Paul himself.[21] Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, after spending several pages commenting on v. 14, seem to miss the point entirely. They argue that Paul wants "to exclude . . . the assumption that brute force, the way it is usually understood, can ever be the cause, the motor, or the instrument of a good decision and action."[22] The thing that was constraining Philemon to let Onesimus stay with Paul was circumstances, not brute force; Onesimus was miles away with Paul and thus out of Philemon's immediate reach. There was little Philemon could do except wait or make a costly journey to bring his slave home.

What is at the heart of this letter is Paul's recognition that Philemon has to willingly relinquish Onesimus to him for things to be right.[23] As it is, Onesimus, by being with Paul and out of reach of Philemon, represents a "necessary" gift, and one that has no honor or praise attached to it. Paul tells Philemon that he wanted to do nothing without Philemon's consent (γνώμης), so the gift of Onesimus would be one voluntarily (κατὰ ἑκούσιον) given, and not of necessity (κατά ἀνάγκην) (v. 14). This is a very similar situation to what we saw in 2 Cor 9:7 where Paul had pressured the Corinthians by his "advance warning" system only to relieve the pressure by pointing out their right

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[20] James D. G. Dunn, *The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996), 332.

[21] Murray J. Harris, *Colossians & Philemon* (EGGNT; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 265.

[22] Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, *The Letter to Philemon* (ECC; Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000), 388.

[23] Chris Frilingos, "For My Child, Onesimus: Paul and Domestic Power in Philemon," *JBL 119* (2000): 91-104, notes that "Paul shames Philemon in his own house" even while offering him a way out of the honor challenge (103).

to give as they choose. The decision regarding Philemon "should be viewed (by the household) as an honorable act of free will."[24]

Necessity in Mark, Matthew, and John

Necessity and Biography

The New Testament gospels are examples of a genre in the ancient Greco-Roman world called *bios.* This conclusion has become more widely accepted following the work Richard Burridge.[25] A *bios* is a medium length prose work that portrays "the character of one subject through a mixture of similar literary units and topics."[26] Burridge's work built on the earlier work of Charles Talbert[27] and Philip Shuler.[28] By comparing the gospels with other ancient *bioi*, Burridge has shown that the four canonical gospels have a "family resemblance" to other ancient *bioi*.[29]

The response to Burridge's work has been the general acceptance of the claim that the gospels are *bioi*; however, just what that means for reading the individual gospels has not yet been realized. In the second edition of his work, Burridge discusses the different reactions and suggestions to his book, most of which centers on the implications of the

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[24] Frilingos, "For My Child, Onesimus," 104.

[25] Richard Burridge, *What are the Gospels? A Comparison with Graeco-Roman Biography* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005).

[26] Richard Burridge, "The Gospels and Acts," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 220 B.C. – A.D. 400* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 508.

[27] Charles Talbert, *What Is a Gospel? The Genre of the Canonical Gospels* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977).

[28] Philip L. Shuler, *A Genre for the Gospels: The Biographical Character of Matthew* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982).

[29] Burridge, *What Are The Gospels?* 250.

Christocentric nature of the gospels implied by the genre.[30] Taking seriously just how an ancient biography was composed and how the elements of *bios* might help us read one of the gospels has not been done. This is true in spite of Burridge's warning that "proper identification of the genre of a work is necessary before we can undertake a rhetorical critical analysis."[31] Burridge seems to imply that the establishment of genre should yield proper critical analysis.

One of the components of Shuler's thesis was that Matthew should be considered an encomiastic biography. Though Shuler was not able to prove the existence of the narrow genre "encomiastic biography," his general concern with encomium as a basis for ancient biography has proven interesting. Shuler investigated the encomiastic topic lists of several of theorists of the period within a century either side of the New Testament. His summary is worth quoting in its entirety:

> Turning again to the description of that laudatory biography evidenced by the works of Polybius, Cicero, Cornelius Nepos, Plutarch, and Lucian, it may be concluded that its aims were closely associated, if not identical with, the intents and purposes of epideictic oratory as described by the rhetoricians. As a genre, it most certainly had at its axis the techniques of amplification and comparison, in addition to those rules of praise codified in the formal encomium. It may be said, therefore, that the genre was concerned with a portrait of the individual, the presentation of the *bios* pattern from birth to death (according to the designs of the author), and that the particular contents of that pattern usually included praiseworthy actions, deeds, accomplishments, sayings, and so forth, in toto or in part.[32]

The conclusions of Shuler were largely ignored because he had tied the connection with encomium to the search for a particular sub-genre: encomiastic biography.

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[30] Burridge, *What are the Gospels?*, 252-307.

[31] Richard Burridge, "The Gospels and Acts,"507.

[32] Shuler, *A Genre for the Gospels*, 56-57.

Michael Martin has recently revisited Shuler's thesis in light of the work of Burridge and the focus of the Progymanstic School at Baylor University.[33] Martin has modified part of Shuler's original thesis related to encomium and biography and has detailed how the lists in the progymnasmata have helped to shape the form of biographies. He argues that the progymnastic topic lists "not only account for the full range of the life portrayed in each of the several *bioi*, Luke included, but that they do so more fully than Burridge's six-topic list."[34]

As noted above, the designation of the gospels as *bioi* has had little impact on gospels' scholarship. There are many examples from Matthean studies alone. Dale Allison works out his structure of Matthew before he even turns to the question of genre.[35] Some earlier works that accept the biographical status of Matthew without that acceptance having an impact on structure or outline include those of Donald Hagner[36] and Craig Blomberg.[37]

Consider, also, several commentaries on Matthew that have appeared since Burridge's work. Howard Clarke gives a nod to bios but then ignores it in his outline and

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[33] Michael W. Martin, "Progymnastic topic lists: a compositional template for Luke and other bioi?" *NTS* 54.1 (2008): 18-41. The Progymnastic School at Baylor University refers to the emphasis in the graduate New Testament department on the use of the rhetoric in the progymnasmata for New Testament research. There have been a spate of published and ongoing dissertations that deal with the rhetoric of the progymnasmata.

[34] Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists," 25.

[35] Dale Allison, *Studies in Matthew: Interpretation Past and Present* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 135-42.

[36] Donald A. Hagner, *Matthew 1-13* (WBC 33a; Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1993).

[37] Craig Blomberg, *Matthew* (NAC 22; Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1992).

structure.[38] Russell Pregeant is aware of the discussion about bios as a genre for the gospels, but he appears unconvinced.[39] Warren Carter seems to prefer the genre of bios for the gospel of Matthew, but it has little impact on his interpretation.[40] Robert Fortna seems oblivious that a discussion about the genre of Matthew has even occurred.[41] Michael Mullins joins those who accept that Matthew is a *bios*, but he shows no ill-effects of such acceptance.[42]

The following analysis will attempt to take seriously the structure, order, and topoi that are used in ancient biographies. The structure and order will be that given in the progymnasmata of Theon and others. The topoi will also be those provided by the Progymnastic topic lists provided primarily in Theon, but with an eye also to the lists of Hermogenes, Apthonius, Nicholas, and John of Sardis. Martin's research indicates that, while there were many common features of encomia among the theorists, no two authors agreed on how to write a biographical composition.[43]

We need also to consider at this point what role necessity plays in *bios*. There are two points at which necessity impacts a biography written according to the encomiastic outline. First, there are three classes of goods from which praise may be drawn and

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[38] Howard Clarke, *The Gospel of Matthew and Its Readers* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003).

[39] Russell Pregeant, *Matthew* (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2004).

[40] Warren Carter, *Matthew: Storyteller, Interpreter, Evangelist* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004).

[41] Robert T. Fortna, *The Gospel of Matthew: The Scholars Bible* (Santa Rosa, CA: Polebridge Press, 2005).

[42] Michael Mullins, *The Gospel of Matthew* (Dublin: Blackrock Press, 2007).

[43] Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists," 22.

which are used repeatedly in biographical writing: external goods, goods of body, and goods of mind (Theon 109; Kennedy, 50). Not every available topoi had to be used in any of the rhetorical exercises; students were taught to use the topos or topoi that would be most likely to help them achieve their goal (Theon 121 [Kennedy, 56]; *Ad. her.* 3.7.15).

Externals are those things that come to a person outside of his will or intent, things that are out of his control, e.g. birth, family, and origin. According to Theon and others, the person writing the treatise of praise must show that the person being praised used any external good "prudently (φρονίμως) and as he ought (ὡς ἔδει), not mindlessly (ἀνοήτως), for goods that result from chance (ἐκ τύχης) rather than moral choice (κατὰ προαίρεσιν) are the least source of praise" (Theon 111; Kennedy, 51).[44] Pseudo-Cicero points out the importance of explaining how the subject used his advantages or disadvantages, including physical and external goods (*Ad. her.* 3.7.13). Aristotle notes that a person ought not be proud of what he has by chance, but of those things that are due to his own efforts (*Rhet*. 1.9.36). The point here is that those who have certain gifts or advantages have a responsibility to use them in the correct manner.

This "correct manner" is defined via expectations for that class of person. External goods are not acquired by men, they just happen. For example, a person born into a wealthy family has done nothing praiseworthy. If, however, that person becomes a great philanthropist, she will be seen to have used the advantage "as she ought." In Quintilian's Ninth Declamation, "The Case of the Ransomed Gladiator," a rich young man was ransomed by a poor young man, who took the rich young man's place in the

[44] See also Quintilian *Inst*. 3.7.14.

gladiatorial contest. The rich young man sued his own father for disowning him because he honored his word to take care of the poor young man's family. At one point in the speech, the rich young man offers a *prosopopoeia* about his condition:

> How indeed I wish this case would allow me to boast in the following way: I am a young man born of noble ancestry. Since I believed that the only advantage of such notable good fortune could be to do good works and to open, as it were, a safe harbor of generosity against the varied misfortunes of men, I earnestly desired some sort of public glory for my kindness: I restored a man on the verge of death to his normal life and native land, whether he was shipwrecked, lost his possessions in a fire, or was cleaned out by robbers. I am squaring my accounts with you, my fellow countrymen, who lost one of your citizens because of me. This is the more fitting outlay for me than fancy clothes or silverware. Where can money be better spent than where praise is gained and where the interest on our virtue is compounded?" (Quintilian, *Declamation Nine* 120).[45]

This rich young man recognizes his responsibility to do good works because of the good fortune of his noble ancestry. It is a requirement for anyone who wishes to use the external goods of a person in their biography to demonstrate how that person made good use of them.

Second, in a *syncrisis* actions are compared side by side. Theon instructs his students to give "preference to things done by choice (προαιρέσεως) rather than by necessity (ἀνάγκη) or chance" (Theon 113 [Kennedy, 53]). Although not mentioned directly in encomium, we know that this same preference applies to encomium because Hermogenes tells us that syncrisis "proceeds by use of encomiastic topics" (*Herm*. 19 [Kennedy, 83]). Also important are the multitude of references to encomiastic practice and ethics that were discussed in Chapter Three. The point here is that person should not be praised for that he did out of necessity; rather, prominence should be given to those actions that are the result of choice (προαιρέσεως).

[45] Lewis A. Sussman, *The Major Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian: A Translation* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).

Perhaps a word should be said about the point of intersection between these two uses of necessity. Both are concerned with choice. The first, the "as he ought" (Theon 111) is concerned with choice against fortune or chance (ἐκ τύχης) or necessity (ἀνάγκη). The person so gifted or blessed with a great external advantage must choose to use it wisely. The second adds a concern with necessity related to action and deeds performed. A person who is forced or compelled to do something is not worthy of praise. Only those who choose to do great deeds are praised. So, how do we distinguish between the necessity of requirement and the necessity of compulsion?

The difference lies in the perception of the necessity. When necessity is a requirement, it is generally agreed to be a good thing, or at least neutral. For example, the requirements (δεῖ) of kingship that Isocrates presents to Nicocles are not viewed as something the king is forced to do against his will, but something he accepts at the condition of being king (*Ad. nic.* 4, 6, 10, 15, 36, 51). These are the important or essential elements of kingship. Similarly, in his thrashing of Polycrates for failing to write a good encomium of Busiris, Isocrates points out what elements were necessary (ἔδει) for Polycrates to use in writing either a eulogy or a defense (*Bus.* 10). The imperfect tense suggests that these were things Polycrates should have done but did not. Demosthenes points out that the people of Sparta are required (ἀνάγκη) to obey the laws of Sparta and not those of another city (*Lept.* 106). An interesting example comes from Demosthenes speech against Polycles. Polycles rails at Apollodorus for having his own sailing equipment and for paying his sailors very well and allowing them certain luxuries. He claims that this has taught the sailors bad ways, pointing out that Apollodorus "ought to have (ἔδει) done the same as the other trierarchs" (*Poly.* 35-36). Apollodorus has not

done what was expected of him by Polycles; he subverted the norm of "how sailors should be treated." Boaz informs the nearer-kinsman of a particular requirement that must (δεῖ) be met before he can claim the property of Naomi (Ruth 4:5).

On the other hand, a person who is forced or compelled to do something does not see it as a good thing. Aristotle lists necessity among the causes of actions that a person does not on his own initiative (*Rhet*. 1.10.7). Quintilian notes that actions done by necessity and chance are examples of things done unintentionally (*Inst*. 3.6.26). Josephus wants his readers to know that the war with the Romans was not something the Jews chose to do; rather, it was a war brought on by necessity (*Vita* 27). The Cyclops tells Odysseus that the earth provides grass for his sheep of necessity, whether it wants to or not (*Cycl*. 332). Medea believes that women in Corinth have no freedom to leave their husbands: "But we must (ἀνάγκη) fix our gaze on one person only" (*Med*. 247). Menelaus tells Tyndareus: "The intelligent consider all actions done from compulsion (ἀνάγκη) as slavish" (*Orest*. 488). Philo points out that "the actions which proceed from virtue, the creature man performs, not through compulsion but voluntarily (ἑκων) . . ." (*Prob.* 61 [Yonge]).

It becomes clear, then that necessity may be experienced as a good thing or as an unacceptable force, situation, or power that causes someone to do what they do not want to do. As we turn to the New Testament biographies for evidence of necessity, it will be interesting to see how these two uses interact.

Necessity in Mark

Although Mark does not begin his narrative with a demonstration of the greatness of Jesus by means of events surrounding his birth, he does begin with a programmatic

statement that Jesus is the Messiah, Son of God, and this designation is related to a divine oracle (1:1). Many scholars have noted the importance of the prologue of Mark (1:1-15) for the rest of Mark's narrative.[46] Some, however, do not see much value in Mark's opening statements. George Kennedy, whose work on classical rhetoric and the New Testament has been immensely influential, downplays any rhetorical significance in the opening verses of Mark. He writes,

> If the words 'the Son of God' appearing in his first verse are genuine (the Greek text is in doubt), he simply asserts who Jesus is. In verses 2-3 he cites the prophecy of the coming of John, but otherwise in his opening chapters ignores the need Matthew felt for evidence from Scripture. His picture of John the Baptist is that of a prophet who asserts his vision, take it or leave it. In 1:11 God authoritatively proclaims who Jesus is. The temptation by Satan is given as a fact but not utilized to prove anything.[47]

If, however, we take the encomiastic topoi into consideration, the opening verses of Mark establish an important claim that the rest of the Gospel supports. Contrary to Kennedy, Mark's prologue does serve an important rhetorical function. In fact, by the end of the first chapter, Mark has established several things.

Mark uses several encomiastic topoi in his opening chapter. At least seven of the topoi available to a person who wished to write a life of another person are used in the first chapter of Mark. Mark begins with praise from names. Jesus is called "Christ" and "Son of God" (1:1) by the author. An unclean spirit identifies him as "the Holy One of God" (1:24). Divine testimony occurs at least five times. Jesus sees the heavens ripped open (1:10), the Spirit descending (1:10), and a voice from heaven declares to Jesus: "you are my Son, the Beloved; with you I am well pleased" (1:11). Spirits recognize Jesus in

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[46] Robert A. Guelich, "The Beginning of the Gospel': Mark 1:1-15," *BR* 27 (1982): 5-15; Frank J. Matera, "The Prologue as the Interpretive Key to Mark's Gospel," *JSNT* 34 (1988): 3-20.

[47] Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism*, 105.

both 1:24 and 1:34. An oracle announces the coming of the forerunner (1:2). Mark makes use of comparison as well. Jesus is compared with John (1:7-8, 14) and the scribes (1:22). In both cases, Jesus is shown to be superior.

In addition to praise from names, divine testimony, and comparison, Mark also demonstrates Jesus' reputation. There was astonishment at his authority in Capernaum (1:22), and again after he cast out an unclean spirit (1:27-28). People from all over the region of Galilee flocked to him to hear him and to be healed (1:45). One of the most important moves that Mark makes is to begin immediately to show the greatness of Jesus' deeds. There are several things in this first chapter that Jesus does for others more than for himself. He healed Peter's mother-in-law (1:30-31). In the summary statement of 1:32-34, Mark records that Jesus healed many people. He cast out many demons (1:39) and healed a leper (1:40-44). The incident with the leper also reveals the compassion (goods of mind) that Jesus has for those who are afflicted (1:41). Additional encomiastic topics could be gathered from Mark's first chapter, but these already clearly demonstrate that Mark is aware of and uses the rhetoric of praise in his bios of Jesus.[48]

Many scholars have seen a two-part structure to Mark's gospel: 1:1-8:26 and 8:27-16:8.[49] Peter's confession of Jesus as the Messiah in 8:29 has been called a "watershed" because from that point in the gospel the focus shifts from Jesus public

[48] This significant amount (seven) of encomiastic topics found in the first chapter alone fits well with what we already know of the non-stop drama of this chapter marked by eleven (11) instances of καὶ εὐθυς – "and immediately." This is the "bounding lion" as described by Richard Burridge, *Four Gospels, One Jesus?* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 36-37.

[49] Stephen Smith, "A Divine Tragedy: Some Observations on the Dramatic Structure of Mark's Gospel," *NovT* 37.3 (1995): 209-31. For a recent review of the status of the question of Mark's structure see Kevin W. Larsen, "The Structure of Mark's Gospel: Current Proposals," *CBR* 3.1 (2004): 140-60.

ministry to a preparation of his disciples for what lies ahead.[50] Jesus begins to head toward Jerusalem and his passion.

In the chapters prior to the pivotal scene of recognition and confession, Mark has demonstrated the greatness of Jesus as Son of God by narrating several miraculous events that Jesus did for others more than for himself. In the feeding of the five thousand (6:33-44), Mark shows Jesus to be a compassionate Son of God who provides for the needs of his followers. Jesus also calms the waters of the lake for his disciples who were trying to obey his order to go ahead of him to Bethsaida (6:47-52). Mark provides a summary statement that Jesus healed many (6:53-56). In 7:24-30, Jesus delivers the child of a Greek woman from a demon. A deaf mute is healed (7:31-37), and then Jesus feeds four thousand of his followers (8:1-10). In the pericope immediately preceding Peter's confession, Jesus heals a blind man near Bethsaida (8:22-26).

In addition to narrating the great deeds of power that Jesus does for others, in relation to several of these deeds, Mark shows the humility of Jesus as he goes beyond what is expected of the Messiah. In three of these events, as in the great confession scene itself, Jesus very clearly tries to avoid popularity. In the face of immense popularity and the potential for great fame, Jesus intentionally downplays his power and charisma. There can be little doubt that in popular expectation the Messiah would not keep such a low profile. When he heals the child of the Greek woman, Mark recounts that he did not want people to know where he was (7:24). After healing the deaf mute, Jesus commands those present not to tell anyone what had happened (7:36). The blind man who is healed is also told to go home, not to even enter the village (8:26). After Peter's confession that Jesus

[50] R.T. France, *The Gospel of Mark* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 11.

is the Messiah, Jesus tells his followers not to tell anyone (8:30). Thus, perhaps the Messianic Secret is an encomiastic topos used by Mark to further his praise of this subversive Son of God.[51] David Watson suggests that in Mark Jesus "does not dispense with honor; rather, he turns it on its head."[52] As we will see in the other biographies of Jesus as well, there are two sets of expectations regarding the life of Jesus of Nazareth, Son of God.

Just after the confession by Peter, Jesus encounters Moses, Elijah, and his Father on a mountain (9:2-10). Probably few of Mark's readers would have missed the connection with the Jewish oracles: Law (Moses) and the Prophets (Elijah) that speak of Jesus. For those who may have missed it, Mark immediately provides a brief discussion in which the scriptural prediction of the coming of Elijah is connected with oracular utterances concerning the suffering of the Son of Man (9:12-13).[53] Also, even in the moment of greatest revelation (the mountaintop witness), Jesus insists that his closest disciples keep his identity secret (9:9). At this point, Jesus assumes they truly know who he is.

It is precisely in the midst of these witnesses that Mark first uses necessity. Following the stories of the many great deeds that Jesus does for others, once his

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[51] For a discussion of the Messianic Secret in Mark see, William Wrede, *The Messianic Secret* (trans. J.C.G. Greig; Cambridge: J. Clarke, 1971); Heikki Räisänen, The 'Messianic Secret' in Mark (trans. Christopher Tuckett; London: T & T Clark, 1990). A good summary of the history of scholarship is C.M. Tuckett, "Messianic Secret," *ABD* 4:797-800. See also, Sylvie de Vulpillières, *Nature et Fonction des Injonctions au Silence dans L'Évangile de Marc* (Paris: J. Gabalda & Co, 2010) who concludes that the nine silence sayings serve Markan Christology by means of progressive revelations, with the disciples being entrusted to announce the great truth after the resurrection (315).

[52] David F. Watson, *Honor Among Christians: The Cultural Key to the Messianic Secret* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 140.

[53] On the role of Elijah see, Johannes Majoros-Danowski, *Elija im Markusevangelium: Ein Buch im Kontext des Judentums* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008).

disciples have declared him to be the Messiah, he tells them that it is necessary (δεῖ) for him to go to Jerusalem, suffer, die, and be resurrected (8:31). Also, in the discussion following the transfiguration, the necessity of Elijah's coming is connected with the restoration of all things, but that restoration looks a lot like suffering and death (9:11-13). This is not paradox; it is revelation.

The narrative necessity of Jesus' programmatic statement functions to establish Jesus' death and resurrection as an integral component of the restoration of all things. The repeated demonstrations of deeds done for others would suggest that the disciples should understand the reason for this prediction to be a deed done for others as well. This will be made clear in 10:45, when Jesus, after a third prediction of his passion (9:31; 10:34), tells his disciples that he has come "to give his life as a ransom *for many*." At that point, the events in Jerusalem are explicitly connected with the previous healings and deliverances. S. Mowinckel observed, in his investigation of the messianic expectations in ancient Israel, that the Servant of Yahweh "has come forward as 'deliverer' for the sake of the others."[54] The suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus are connected with restoration of all things via the coming of Elijah, which is itself necessary, and both are related to the prophetic utterances (oracles) of the Scriptures. Mark uses all of these topoi to build his case for the greatness of Jesus.

Mark does not provide a birth narrative that builds up expectations as Matthew does. He begins with the statement that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and then practices what may be called oracular demonstration or *ekphrasis*: he makes it vividly clear by setting many examples before his readers in rapid succession.

[54] S. Mowinckel, *He That Cometh* (trans. G.W. Anderson; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959), 210.

Following the first prediction of his passion and the discussion following the transfiguration, Mark has additional uses of necessity. The next three occurrences of necessity in Mark are in the apocalyptic material in chapter thirteen.[55] The only two uses of necessity that are unique to Mark are in this chapter. In Mark 13:7, Jesus declares that there are certain things that must (δεῖ) happen before the end comes. As Jesus speaks, Marks own readers could associate the previous necessity that Jesus had declared (8:31) and which had been fulfilled with this one that may have been taking place as they read. Since Jesus' predictions about the necessity of his passion and resurrection had come true, they could feel confident that "the end is not yet." Preaching the gospel to all nations is also necessary (δεῖ) before the events of great day of trouble arrives (13:10). Finally, Jesus points out that the main clue to the arrival of that day is when the βδέλυγμα τῆς ἐρημώσεως is seen standing where it must (δεῖ) not be (13:14).[56] Taken together, these three statements of necessity build an important framework for the answer to the disciples' question in 13:4: "what is the sign when these things are about to be complete?"[57]

The entire section (13:5-37) has the feel of a prosopopoeia entitled "What Would Jesus Say When the Disciples Ask Him About the Destruction of the Temple?" A prosopopoeia could be used to exhort, to consol, or to seek forgiveness (Theon 116-117;

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[55] On apocalyptic themes in Mark 13 see Egon Brandenburger, *Markus 13 und die Apokalyptik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1984.

[56] For a discussion of the cryptic Greek phrase see W.A. Such, *The Abomination of Desolation in the Gospel of Mark: Its Historical Reference in Mark 13:14 and its Impact in the Gospel* (Lanham, MD: University Press of American, 1999).

[57] Such notes the connection of the sign with the abomination in v.14 (27-30). Camille Focant, *L'évangile selon Marc* (Commentaire biblique: Nouvea Testament 2; Paris: Cerf, 2004), 489-90, sees the first two uses of necessity as pointing out the need for the disciples to join in the evangelization of the world without having received an answer to their question about "when."

Kennedy, 48-49). One of the means of consoling via prosopopoeia was to show the necessity of what has happened (or what will happen) (Theon 117.7). Whether or not the entire discourse is designed to consol, certainly the first part (vv.5-11) serves that function. Jesus tells his disciples not to worry (μὴ θροεῖσθε) because it is necessary (δεῖ) for wars and rumors of wars to happen before the "end" (v. 7). He also associates not worrying beforehand (μὴ προμεριμνᾶτε) about what they will say when they are handed over with the necessity (δεῖ) of preaching the gospel to all nations (vv.10-11). Although the end of the apocalyptic discourse turns to an exhortation about conditions at the "end," at least the first part seeks to console the disciples about worrying too much.[58]

The final use of necessity in Mark is at 14:31, located in the section where Peter refutes Jesus' statement that all of his disciples will fall away (14:27-31). Mark provides additional encomiastic topics in chapter fourteen. He offers an example of a remarkable deed that is associated with Jesus' death (Hermogenes 16; Kennedy, 82: "manner of death"; Cicero *De. part*. 23.82). A woman comes and anoints Jesus body for burial prior to his death (14:3-9). Jesus, in turn, eulogizes the woman before her death by pointing out that "wherever the good news is preached in the whole world, what she did will be spoken also in her memory" (v.9).

Mark also provides another example of a connection of the life of Jesus with an oracle when Jesus, at the Last Supper, tells his disciples: "The Son of Man goes just as it has been written about him . . ." (v.21). Perhaps most significantly, Jesus preemptively makes yet another reference to his death as a deed that is done for others: "This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many" (v.24). Even the falling away of

[58] Perhaps the thrust of this prosopopoeia carries over to his notices about his death: don't worry, resurrection is necessary too.

the disciples is connected with an oracle or divine testimony; "it is written" that once the shepherd is struck, the sheep will scatter (v.27).

Peter twice refutes Jesus' statement that the disciples will desert him. At first he simply compares himself with the other disciples: even if they flee, I will not (v.29). Jesus responds by making the prediction very personal: you, Peter, will deny me three times before the cock crows in the morning (v.30). Peter again refutes Jesus' claim, this time ratcheting up the rhetoric. This time Peter speaks ἐκπερισσῶς – with great emphasis.[59] He points out that even if it is necessary (δεῃ) for him to die with Jesus, he will not deny him. Necessity here functions for Peter as Aristotle suggested it might be when trying to convince someone of something that is difficult to grasp (*Rhet. Alex.*1421b25).

Necessity in Matthew

The Gospel of Matthew contains a section that deals with Jesus' birth and upbringing (Matt 1-2), a large section that focuses on his deeds, actions, and teaching (Matt 3-25), and a section that deals with his death (Matt 26-28). The section on birth and upbringing corresponds to the encomiastic topos of "birth" mentioned under the external goods in several of the theorists. According to George Kennedy, the opening seventeen verses form a proem that grabs the audience's attention by showing that Jesus is a descendant of Abraham and David.[60] The visit of the angel and the news that Mary's

[59] Camille, *L'évangile selon Marc,* 533, notes that this adverb demonstrates the escalation of language here by Peter. For the first time, he and the others seem willing to die with Jesus.

[60] George Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1984), 102.

pregnancy is "through the Holy Spirit" (1:18-25) indicate that Jesus is the Son of God and amount to an unusual occurrence at his birth.

Matthew also provides praise from names (Theon 111; Kennedy, 51): the angel tells Joseph the child will be named Jesus "because he will save his people from their sins" (Matt 1:21). Matthew informs the audience that this naming was a fulfillment of a prophecy (*Ad. her.* 3.7.11) which then yields additional praise from a name: Emmanuel means "God with us" (1:23). Additional examples of praise from a name come from the visit of the Magi who ask where is the one who was born "King of the Jews" (2:2). Also, when Herod hears of the wise men's search for the child, he asks the chief priests and teachers where the Messiah was to be born (2:4). So, in just a few short verses Matthew has managed to show his audience that his subject is no ordinary person; he is a direct descendant of Abraham and David, whose birth is brought about by the Holy Spirit, and whose name means "savior" and "God with us." Additionally, he is both King of the Jews and Messiah! And, if that is not enough, the location of the Messiah's birth had been foretold in an oracle in the Jewish Scriptures (2:6), and that oracle declares that person to be the ruler and shepherd of God's people.

Other unusual events surrounding the birth of Jesus include the star that appeared to the Magi to guide them to the place where the young child was (2:9). The child was given gifts of gold, frankincense, and myrrh by the wise men. Also, the steps of Jesus' earthly father were guided by the Lord through other visits from the angel in dreams regarding the safekeeping of the child (2:9, 19, 22). The first of these three dreams and the final one are shown to be related to oracles about the child. The first dream further supports the notion that Jesus is the son of God because Joseph taking Jesus to Egypt

fulfilled the oracle that God had called his son out of Egypt (2:14-15). Even the final guidance of the angel to take the child back to Nazareth is shown to be fulfillment of an oracle about the child: he will be called a Nazarene (2:23).[61]

By providing all of this evidence to support his view of the greatness of Jesus, Matthew has set up a very powerful expectation with his audience. It has already become clear to his audience that Jesus has one great external advantage: his divine birth. That Jesus *had* a divine birth was of little consequence to a first century reader; that Jesus *made good use of* his divine birth carried tremendous weight.

The next large section in Matthew (chs. 3-25) involves Jesus' deeds, actions, and teachings, many of which show that Jesus did make good use of his divine birth. Throughout this section of the *bios*, Matthew uses many encomiastic topoi as he continues his praise of Jesus. There is more divine testimony (3:3, 16-17). Many of the theorists preferred that the deeds that are used to show a subject's greatness be deeds that he did for others, first, alone, with great difficulty, and things that exceeded expectations (Theon 110; Kennedy, 50-51; *Orat.* 3.7.16).

Matthew has many examples of these. The list of things done for others includes the summary statement at 4:23-25, which indicates that Jesus healed all their diseases. Other summary statements that include references to large numbers of healings are found at 14:34-35 and 15:29-31. As Lidija Novakovic has noted, twice, the healing ministry of the Son of David is associated with a witness from the Jewish Scriptures (8:16-17 and

[61] For a discussion of the importance of dreams and angelic visits see Jim McConnell, "The Topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts," (PhD dissertation; Baylor University, 2009).

12:15-21).[62] Of the use of servant passages from Isaiah in these two healing summaries, Novakovic writes, "Matthew achieves the goal of demonstrating that the servant is not a sick person who voluntarily suffers on behalf of others, but a mighty healer who takes away the illnesses of the people and releases them from their suffering."[63] The Son of God empowered with the Holy Spirit does not use his power to his own advantage, but gives of himself to improve the lot of others. Also, on two separate occasions, Jesus fed very large groups of people: 5,000 (14:15-21) and 4,000 (15:32-39).

Matthew also provides many examples of things that Jesus was the first to do (Theon 110.23). Here a comment about the role of the audience is important. Several of the theorists include at least a brief comment about the importance of the audience when offering praise of an individual. In rhetoric, a key to argumentation was to know the lines of reasoning used in a specific community.[64] The audience to which one speaks an encomium or writes a biography influences the nature of the work. Quintilian writes, "For much depends on the character of the audience and the generally prevailing opinion, if people are to believe that characteristic of which they especially approve are present in the person to be praised, and those which they hate in the person to be denounced" (*Inst*. 3.7.23 [LCL, Russell]). In various locations, different virtues are received in different ways. "Literary learning will earn less honor at Sparta than at Athens, endurance and

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[62] Lidija Novakovic, *Messiah, the Healer of the Sick* (WUNT 2.170; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 118-23.

[63] Novakovic, *Messiah, the Healer of the Sick*, 188.

[64] L. Gregory Bloomquist, "The Role of the Audience in the Determination of Argumentation: The Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the Apostles," in *Rhetorical Argumentation in Biblical Texts* (edited by Anders Eriksson, Thomas H. Albricht, and Walter Übelacker; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002), 158.

courage more. Among some peoples, it is honorable to live by plunder, in others to respect the laws. Frugality might seem repulsive to the Sybarites, luxury the worst crime in the eyes of the Romans of old" (*Inst*. 3.7.24). What is most important is that the topoi employed in the *bios* of Jesus are things that are impressive or significant to the audience.[65]

Several impressive incidents in which Jesus did what no one else could do come to mind. He calmed a raging sea in the presence of his bewildered disciples (8:27). He also walked on the water, both impressing and terrifying his disciples (14:22-34). In a deed that is both stirring and indicative of his pious nature, he has Peter draw a coin from a fish's mouth in order not to cause offense to those who wanted him to pay the temple tax (17:18-21). On his second day in Jerusalem during his final week, Jesus cursed a fig tree and it immediately withered (21:18-21).

In addition to these encomiastic elements, several other topoi are used. Matthew finds praise for Jesus in actions that he did that were contrary to or beyond expectations (Theon 110.24-25; Kennedy, 51): the secrecy of his Messiahship (16:20, 17:9) and secrecy of his healing power (12:15-21; 13:53-57). Matthew uses syncrisis to elevate Jesus above other teachers (7:28-29), John the Baptist, whom Jesus himself praises highly (11:7-15), David (12:3), the priests in the temple (12:4), and the scribes and Pharisees throughout the gospel but especially in chapter 23 where he pronounces many woes on the Pharisees. The goods of mind are on display also: his gentleness and humility (11:28), and wisdom (21:23-27; 22:15-22; 22:23-33; and 22:41-45). His reputation is a

[65] For the role of the audience in rhetorical presentations see Kathy Maxwell, *Hearing Between the Lines: The Audience as Fellow-Worker in Luke-Acts and Its Literary Milieu* (New York: T & T Clark, 2010).

point of praise as well: on his approach to Jerusalem the people lay their garments in the road and cry "Hosanna" (21:1-11); in the temple the children dance and cry "Hosanna" (21:14).[66]

The manner of death and events after the death are important encomiastic considerations for Theon, Hermogenes, and Cicero. Matthew provides ample evidence of the greatness of Jesus by means of events surrounding his death. When Jesus died, darkness covered the land for three hours (27:45). The curtain in the temple was torn in two from top to bottom (27:51). Many tombs were broken open and the saints who had been buried there were resurrected and were seen by many in Jerusalem (27:52-53).

Most of the uses of necessity in Matthew occur in the section that deals with Jesus' pursuits, deeds, and teaching. In the outline of Matthew made famous by W.D. Davies and Dale Allison, necessity appears in all three of the last narrative sections as well as both of the discourse sections.[67] All of Matthew's uses of necessity are the necessity of requirement.

The first use of necessity in Matthew is found in the first passion prediction. After the revelation that Jesus is the Messiah and a stern warning from him to keep the knowledge quiet (16:20), Matthew informs his readers that "Jesus began to show his disciples that it is necessary (δεῖ) for him to go to Jerusalem, and suffer much from the elders and chief priests and scribes and be killed and be raised again on the third day"

[66] This list of encomiastic topoi used by Matthew in his *bios* of Jesus is intended only to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Much more needs to be said about the rhetorical strategies of all of the gospels as *bioi*.

[67] The outline is reproduced in Allison, *Studies in Matthew*, 141-42. A very similar outline is found in Burridge, *What are the Gospels*?, 191.

(16:21). Here, δεῖ is in the emphatic position of the clause. Matthew clearly wants to drive home the significance of this necessity.

Most interpreters have busied themselves with trying to determine the cause of the necessity attached to δεῖ. John Nolland claims that it is the purposes of God or a connection with apocalyptic.[68] Craig Bloomberg writes, "Jesus does not explain the divine necessity behind the word 'must' here, but he will account for it in 20:28."[69] For D.A. Carson, the necessity is Jesus' "willing submission to his Father's will."[70]

Some of these commentators fail to consider the function of necessity, even when it is closely associated with major structural components within their organization of the Gospel. For example, Blomberg has three major sections in his outline of Matthew: 1) Introduction to Jesus' Ministry (1:1-4:16); 2) the Development of Jesus' Ministry (4:17-16:20); and 3) The Climax of Jesus' Ministry (16:21-28:20).[71] Given the prominence of 16:21 in this schema, we might have expected a bit more comment than what is quoted above.

Others give the passage more consideration. James Efird comments on this passage: "From a literary standpoint it is obvious that this passage forms a major watershed in the development of the story."[72] He goes on to point out how Matthew develops the emphasis on the necessity of conflict in Jerusalem, death, and resurrections.

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[68] John Nolland, *The Gospel of Matthew* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005), 686.

[69] Craig Blomberg, *Matthew* (NAC 22; Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1992), 259.

[70] D.A. Carson, "Matthew," (EBC 8; Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), 376.

[71] Blomberg, *Matthew*, 49.

[72] James M. Efird, "Matthew 16:21-27," *Int* 35.3 (1981): 284-289, 284.

In Warren Carter's reading, Matt 16:21-28 is one of "six scenes (kernels) that are central to the gospel's plot."[73] This scene opens the fourth narrative block (16:21-20:34). This block further develops the identity of Jesus. Hagner labels the section 16:21-17:27 "The Turning Point: The Announcement of the Cross," and notes that the focus shifts from Jesus' healing and teaching ministry to what will happen in Jerusalem.[74] Of the necessity here, Hagner only notes that it is "the compulsion of God's will that lies behind the four infinitives, which are together syntactically governed by δεῖ."[75] Ben Witherington surprisingly actually follows Burridge's outline of Matthew as biography.[76] Witherington, however, simply follows the well-worn "divine necessity" path when explaining the function of δεῖ in this passage.[77]

This use of necessity is narrative; the narrator is telling his audience that Jesus began from that point to show to his followers that the necessity of his conflict in Jerusalem would lead to his death, but ultimately to his resurrection. In the context of Matthew, this bit of information is extremely important for at least two reasons. First, it is obviously hard to grasp, coming as it does on the heels of Peter's confession that Jesus is the Christ and then Jesus' instructions to keep it quiet. Probably no one wanted more than these men to shout from the mountaintops that Jesus is the Christ. Peter's reaction

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[73] Warren Carter, *Matthew: Storyteller, Interpreter, Evangelist* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 140.

[74] Donald Hagner, *Matthew 14-28* (WBC 33B; Dallas, TX: Word Publishers, 1995), 476-77.

[75] Hagner, *Matthew 14-28*, 479.

[76] Ben Witherington III, *Matthew* (Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys 2006), 14.

[77] Witherington, *Matthew*, 319. See also Pierre Bonnard, *L'Évangile Selon Saint Matthieu* (Commentaire Du Nouveau Testament 1; Genève: Labor et Fides, 1982), 247, who points out the connection between certain Old Testament texts and the plan of God.

here (16:22) and near the end of the gospel when Jesus predicts the scattering of the sheep (26:35) suggest that even those who "get it" are still capable of completely missing it. Jesus' words to Peter in 16:23 highlights the problem: there are two sets of expectations at work in reference to Jesus (the expectations of God and the expectations of men). Clearly, the expectations of men do not include the death of the Messiah, Son of God.

Second, there is the connection with ancient Scripture that bears out the suffering of the Servant (Is. 53). In the verse that sounds an echo with 16:21, Jesus mentions that the Scriptures themselves contain a necessity related to his suffering (26:54).

As a component of a *bios*, this use of necessity functions to show that the suffering, death, and resurrection of the Messiah are not due to mere chance, but fulfill the expectations created by the first two chapters of Matthew regarding the divine birth of Jesus: he is to save his people from their sins (1:21). At this pivotal point in his story about Jesus, Matthew inserts necessity to help the audience and the characters understand the significance of what was about to unfold. Daniel Patte has observed that Jesus perceives the good in going to Jerusalem to die and be resurrected.[78] As they neared Jerusalem and the final days of Jesus' life, he pointed out that the he "came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many" (20:28 RSV). Being born the Son of God who will save his people from their sins creates a powerful expectation. Matthew shows Jesus using the advantage of his good birth "ὡς δεῖ."

[78] Daniel Patte, *The Gospel According to Matthew: A Structural Commentary on Matthew's Faith* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 234.

The second use of necessity supports this first use in an important way. On the surface it indicates that even an event that is considered "necessary" may not turn out as first expected. In 17:10, Jesus' disciples ask why the scribes say that Elijah must (δεῖ) first come. This passage contains a connection between scripture (oracle) and necessity as well. As Nolland has observed, "The necessity involved is the need for scriptural prediction to be fulfilled."[79] It is not so much the need as it is the evidence that the Scripture about Elijah has been fulfilled.

The scribes have said that Elijah must come first, and Jesus affirms the correctness of their claim, even as he corrects their interpretation of what it means (17:11-13). The Scriptures (Mal 3) had predicted that Elijah would come before the great Day of the Lord. Jesus does not dispute the claim of the scribes; however, he does explain that "Elijah" is John the Baptist. By showing his disciples that the "must" related to Elijah has been fulfilled in John (in a way that was not expected), he demonstrates that his own "must" spoken just a few verses earlier will be fulfilled, but perhaps not as expected. Here again, we see evidence of the expectations of two worlds.

The uses of necessity in 18:7, 33; 23:23; 24:6, and 25:27 each establish some particular thing as a requirement for something else. In 18:7, it is offenses that must come, although a woe is pronounced on the one through whom the offense comes. In the parable of the two debtors (18:33), the evil servant is asked rhetorically: "Was it not necessary for you to have mercy on your fellow servant, even as I had mercy on you?" To have forgiveness is a requirement for one who has received forgiveness. The use of necessity here again raises the stakes for those who want to be in the kingdom of God:

[79] Nolland, *The Gospel of Matthew*, 707-08.

forgiveness is part of the deal. In the series of woes pronounced on the Scribes and Pharisees (Matt 23:13-39), Jesus upbraids them for tithing mint, dill, and cumin, but neglecting the real issues: justice, mercy, and faith (v.23). He points out that the real necessity is to practice the latter without overlooking the former. This is the language of blame (invective) used to refute the actions of the Pharisees. The Scribes and Pharisees are blamed because they overlook the true requirements of the kingdom of God. In a passage in which necessity has an apocalyptic ring, Jesus declares that wars and rumors of wars are things that must happen before the end comes (Matt 24:6) The use of δεῖ γενέσθαι is certainly reminiscent of Daniel and other texts related to prophecies or revelations by God or the gods (see above on Daniel 2:28 et.al.). In the final example, in the parable of the talents, the last wicked slave fails to invest the gift of the master (Matt 25:14-30). The master accosts him because, although he had the knowledge of what kind of person his master was, he failed to do what was necessary with the money (v.27). Investment with the bankers was a far better solution than hiding it in the ground. This last use of necessity highlights the importance of the proper use of a gift, and, for readers of Matthew who were familiar with the encomiastic topoi, may suggest the importance of Jesus' use of his own gift (and thus a reflection of their own). The repetition of necessity also serves to build up the notion of requirement in Matthew's gospel. This is especially important in relation to the final two uses of necessity.

Matthew also uses necessity toward the end of his *bios* of Jesus where he turns his attention toward the death of Jesus. The first of these involve an argument between Jesus and Peter. The argument moves from a general statement about desertion to a much

more specific claim about what Peter will do. Both of these highlight the conflict in expectations between God and humans.

Twice in the section of the *bios* dealing with Jesus' death and the events surrounding it, Matthew includes accounts that involve necessity. In Matt 26:35, Peter declares to Jesus: "Even though I must (δέῃ) die with you, I will not deny you." This statement is the final response in a verbal exchange between Peter and Jesus in which Peter has twice refuted the claims of Jesus as to what will happen once he is captured. The pericope extends from 26:31-35. Jesus first points out that all of his disciples will be scandalized because of him, and he quotes Zech 13 as proof (26:31-32). Peter then picks up the idea of being scandalized and flings it back at Jesus: "if all will be scandalized in you, I will not be scandalized" (v. 33). Jesus responds with yet another, more specific declaration of what Peter will do that very night (v.34). Again, Peter picks up Jesus' charge and refutes it, but this time he heightens it with "even if I must die with you" (v. 35). The necessity here serves to amplify Peter's position against the prophecies of Jesus. The reader will remember that Peter had reacted in a similar fashion when Jesus first announced his impending suffering, death, and resurrection (16:22). Jesus had accused Peter of being a σκάνδαλον to him because he did not comprehend the things of God (16:23). That which is predicted about Elijah in Mal 3 has in fact come true.

The second use of necessity in the passion narrative is in Matt 26:54. This is the story of the arrest of Jesus in the garden (Matt 26:47-56). After Jesus is arrested one of his servants pulls out his sword and cuts off an ear of the high priest's slave (v. 50). Jesus' response is a command to his servant to put up his sword (v.52). The command is then followed by two rhetorical questions: 1) do you not think I can ask for help from my

Father?; and 2) but if I did get help from my Father how would the Scriptures be fulfilled, "which say it must (δεῖ) happen in this way?" (v. 54). Given the earlier reaction of Peter to Jesus' statement about the scattering of the sheep, this passage seems to be a cryptic reminder that things were going just as Jesus had declared according to the Scriptures. The addition of necessity to the earlier simple statement "for it is written" (v. 31) here ratchets up the seriousness of the events that are unfolding. These are not just random events; rather, this is what the Scriptures predicted would happen. In relation to *bios*, the manner of Jesus' death is demonstrated to be "of necessity" in keeping with the word of God. The "as he ought" is connected with what is spoken about him in the Scriptures and the expectations that are built up about him from divine testimony and comments in the first two chapters of Matthew.

Many commentators have claimed a "divine necessity" for the various uses of δεῖ in Matthew. This divine necessity is often associated with the Scriptures and the will or plan of God. By taking seriously the encomiastic topoi and structure of a *bios* as presented by theorists like Theon, we can see that Matthew uses necessity in his rhetorical strategy to demonstrate that Jesus does what is expected of the Son of God. This expectation often clashes with the human expectation of the same individual. In this context, divine necessity is the expectation that God has for Jesus.

Necessity in John

All but one instance of necessity in John occurs in the first half, the Public Ministry of Jesus (chs. 1-12). The remaining instance is found near the end of the section that deals with Jesus' last week in Jerusalem (chs. 13-20). These two sections have also

been called The Book of Signs (1-12) and the Book of Glory (13-20).[80] Most scholars have also recognized the unique nature of the first eighteen verses and consider them as a self-contained unit called the Prologue.[81]

John's *bios* of Jesus contains many encomiastic elements. The Prologue begins with a comparison (*syncrisis*) of Jesus and John the Baptist in which John the Baptist is the one who has come to bear witness of the divine light that is coming into the world (1:1-8). John the Baptist declares that Jesus is greater that he (1:15). The prologue also mentions two very important things that Jesus did for others: 1) he gave them the right to become children of God (1:12-13); and 2) he revealed God to them (1:18). Furthermore, there is a reference to Jesus reputation: "we have seen his glory" (1:14). Alicia Meyers also includes a discussion of the topoi of origins and upbringing.[82] Thus, the prologue sets the expectations for the Johannine Jesus very high indeed.[83] Charles Talbert has argued that the Jewish wisdom myth associated with a descending-ascending redeemer is the best way to make sense of the prologue of John.[84] The descending/ascending redeemer myth suggests that the Jesus of the Gospel of John is a divine figure and thus expectations for him will be greatly heightened.

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[80] Gail R. O'Day, "The Gospel of John," *NIB* 9:507.

[81] Leon Morris, *The Gospel According to John* (NICNT; Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1971), notes that these verses are much more than just a preface; they reveal everything the gospel is about (71 n.1).

[82] Alicia D. Meyers, *Characterizing Jesus: A Rhetorical Analysis on the Fourth Gospel's us of Scripture in its Presentation of Jesus* (LNTS 458; London: T & T Clark, 2012), 61-71. Also, see her work for a good discussion of other topoi in John.

[83] Peter M. Phillips, *The Prologue of the Fourth Gospel* (LNTS 294; London: T & T Clark, 2006) points out how John's prologue invites readers to join the community of believers and receive eternal life (227-28).

[84] Charles H. Talbert, *Reading John: A Literary and Theological Commentary on the Fourth Gospel and the Johannine Epistles* (rev. ed.; Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2005), 275-93.

Beyond the Prologue, the author of the Fourth Gospel uses at least nine topoi in his *bios* of Jesus. These include praise from name, testimony of the famous, divine testimony, deed done for others, deeds done beyond expectations, reputation, comparison, goods of mind, and manner of death. Each of these help to demonstrate how the fourth evangelist viewed Jesus.

In relation to praise from a name, John the Baptist, whom we know from the prologue as the "man sent from God" (1:6), announces to his audience that Jesus is the "Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world" (1:29). John also restates this title the next day (1:35-36). Also, Andrew, Simon Peter's brother, declares to Peter: "we have found the Messiah (which is translated Anointed)" (1:41). In Jesus' brief encounter with Nathaniel, Nathaniel provides three honorific titles: Rabbi, Son of God, and King of Israel (1:49).

John also uses the testimony of the famous to extol the greatness of Jesus. After Jesus calls him to be a follower, Philip goes and finds Nathaniel and tells him that the one "about whom Moses in the law and also the prophets wrote" has been found (1:44). The singular greatness of Moses in the Jewish tradition assures that his witness will greatly increase the likelihood that Jesus is accepted as the authentic Messiah. The witness of Moses to the life of Jesus is brought up again by Jesus himself in a conversation with "the Jews": "Do not think that I will accuse you before the Father; your accuser is Moses, on whom you have set your hope. If you believed Moses, you would believe me, for he wrote about me. But if you do not believe what he wrote, how will you believe what I say?" (5:45-47).

In addition to the testimony of the famous, John includes examples of divine testimony or divine witness. Jesus tells Nathaniel that he will "see heaven opened and the angels of God ascending and descending on the Son of Man" (1:51). The scriptures bear witness to Jesus, as noted by the author, proclaiming him as the king who comes riding on a donkey's colt (12:14-15). When Jesus encounters the Greeks and his soul becomes troubled, a voice from heaven proclaims that the Father's name has been glorified, and will be glorified again (12:28). The significance of the voice comes from the fact that Jesus had just prayed, as he agonized over his impending death: "Father, glorify your name" (12:27). The voice comes as a clear response to his prayer and is understood to be the Father answering his Son. This witness also immediately precedes the third of four predictions about the type of death he was to die: being "lifted up" from the earth (12:32-33).[85]

J. Louis Martyn has commented on the degree to which Jesus fulfilled the expectations of the Messiah: "What can be said is that in the Johannine synagogue there were many who knew well some form of the hope for the Prophet-Messiah like Moses who would perform signs."[86] And, perform signs he did. Seven signs are scattered throughout the first twelve chapters of John. Each of these signs fall into the topos "deed done for others" that we have seen already in Mark and Matthew. At a wedding feast in Cana, Jesus turns about one hundred twenty gallons of water into a really good quality

[85] The others include 3:14, 8:28, and 18:31-32. Alicia Myers, *Characterizing Jesus*, discusses the first of these in detail (86-93).

[86] J. Louis Martyn, *History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel* (3rd ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 109.

wine (2:1-11).[87] Also at Cana, after he had returned from Samaria, he heals the son of a royal official who lived in Capernaum (4:46-53). At the pool of Bethesda, Jesus heals a man who had been lame for thirty-eight years (5:1-14). Jesus feeds five thousand (6:1-13), and walks on water (6:16-21). A great deed done for someone else that also doubles as a deed that Jesus is the first to do is the healing of the man born blind (9:1-6). The witness of the man who had been healed was that no one had ever opened the eyes of a person who had been born blind (9:32). The last sign/deed that Jesus performs is the raising of Lazarus from the dead (11:1-44).

These "signs" are not merely rhetorical candy; they serve a very important purpose in the gospel. As Willis Hedley Salier has noted, "Each σημεῖον narrative presents Jesus as the giver of life."[88] He goes on to point out the implicit comparisons between Jesus and other "life givers," namely the Roman emperor.

Not just the signs/deeds are important to fulfill the expectation created by the lofty prologue; the discourses of Jesus are also important clues. Barnabas Lindars has pointed out how the discourses in chapters 3-10 "are concerned with Jesus' qualifications for his function as the agent of God's final act of redemption, and give an idea of the way in which he performs it."[89] The signs and the discourses of the first "book" in John serve as encomiastic topoi which help to demonstrate the greatness of Jesus, Word, and Son of God.

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[87] C. Marving Pate, *The Writings of John* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 63.

[88] Willis Hedly Salier, *The Rhetorial Impact of the Sēmeia in the Gospel of John* (WUNT 2nd series 186; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 175.

[89] Barnabas Lindars, Ruth B. Edwards, and John M. Court, *The Johannine Literature* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 89-91.

The author of the Fourth Gospel also demonstrates that Jesus is the Son of God by pointing to things that he did that were beyond expectation or counter to expectation. These include Jesus announcing that his resurrection is the only "sign" of authority that he will provide to those who question his right to restore proper worship to the temple (2:18-22). His encounter with the woman in Samaria is noted both by the woman herself *and* by the author as being against the norm: "The Samaritan woman said to him, "How is it that you, a Jew, ask a drink of me, a woman of Samaria? (Jews do not share things in common with Samaritans)" (4:9). During his secretive visit to the temple during the Feast of Tabernacles, Jesus taught in the temple. The Jews were amazed at his teaching and asked, "How does this man have such learning, when he has never been taught?" (7:14-15). Clearly the Jews were not expecting this lowly Nazarene to possess such wisdom. James L. Resseguie lists several more of these overturned expectations in his discussion of point of view in John.[90]

In addition to these topoi, John also provides several accounts where Jesus' reputation has preceded him, has become clear to some person in the narrative, or has been enhanced by some action. Many believe in him due to the signs (2:23). Nicodemus declares him to be a "teacher come from God" (3:2). The Samaritans believe in him and declare him to be the Savior of the world (4:42). The crowds proclaim him prophet and Messiah (6:14, 7:31, 7:40-41). The temple guards reported to their superiors that they had never heard anyone speak like Jesus (7:46). On his entry into Jerusalem, the crowds cry "hosanna" as he rides into the city (12:12-13).

[90] James L. Resseguie, *The Strange Gospel: Narrative Design & Point of View in John* (BIS 36; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 119-20.

Comparison is also an important tool in the Fourth Gospel's portrait of Jesus. Jesus is compared to Moses (3:14, 6:30-59, 7:14-21). In each case he is shown to be superior to Moses. He is also compared favorably with John the Baptist (3:27-30, 4;1, 5:31-36). Besides Moses and John, Jesus fares well in a comparison with the father of the Jewish nation, Abraham (8:31-58).

John demonstrates the goods of mind by showing the compassion of Jesus as he wept over Lazarus (11:34). Also, his humility is demonstrated when he washes the disciples feet at the last supper. To the very end, Jesus refuses to become arrogant or haughty with his special position as Son of God.

Furthermore, there are several events in John's bios that confirm the greatness of Jesus in relation to his death. Jesus receives a very special anointing with costly perfume just prior to his death (12:1-7). Four separate accounts show that his death is in accordance with the oracles of God (18:9, 19:24, 19:28, 19:36). Perhaps the single most important event surrounding Jesus death in terms of a *bios* is the resurrection (20:1-18). The list of biographies written about persons who have been resurrected is short indeed! Also, after the resurrection, Thomas, the skeptical one, declares that Jesus is "my Lord and my God" (20:28).[91]

There are two things worth note here. First, Jesus does many things that bear witness to the lofty claim of the Prologue. As a divine Son of God, there is an expectation that he will do amazing things. In this respect, he does not disappoint. Referring to a person as "Son of God" in the Hellenistic Jewish and Greco-Roman world

[91] This is only a cursory reading of the topoi that John has used in his *bios* of Jesus. No doubt there are many more, and a well-organized study of John's rhetorical strategy, taking seriously the genre of *bios,* has yet to be done.

would automatically bring up images of the great men in the past who were known to be sons of gods (Moses, the exalted angel, Heracles, Apollonius of Tyana, certain rulers [e.g. Caesar]).[92] Second, although he is the divine Son of God and acts in accordance with expectations for such, his actions are often subversive, overturning the expectations that certain people held for the Messiah. The messianic expectations of the first century were not monolithic, but there were certainly expectations.[93] The text of John assumes an audience that will understand the various honorific titles given to Jesus in light of what he is perceived to be able to do. The text has its own expectations that are in part derived from the cultural milieu and in part derived from the author's familiarity with the history of Jesus.

The first use of necessity in John relates to the importance of a good birth (3:7). Just as John has from the beginning shown the greatness of Jesus because of his being the Word that has come from God, so now Jesus points out the need (δεῖ) for Nicodemus to participate in that good birth that has been made available to all people (1:13) if he wants to see the kingdom of God.[94] No doubt it was more difficult for Nicodemus to grasp this notion of being "born from above" than John's readers because Nicodemus did not have the advantage of knowing the Prologue. Resseguie has noted the increasing

[92] Jarl Fossum, "Son of God," *ABD* 6:128-37.

[93] N.T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God* (Christian Origins and the Question of God 1; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 307.

[94] C.H.Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 305.

consternation on the part of Nicodemus during this exchange.[95] No doubt Nicodemus recognizes the heightened value of a birth "from above."[96]

Nicodemus clearly understands the "requirement" portion of Jesus' words because he had begun the conversation with a very similar statement. In 3:2, Nicodemus points out that he knows that Jesus is a teacher-come-from-God because no man can do the kinds of signs that Jesus does "unless" (ἐαν μη) God is with him.[97] God's being with a person is a requirement for the signs to be produced. Jesus responds in a very similar manner, picking up the "unless" and tossing it back at Nicodemus: "unless (ἐαν μη) one is born from above, he is not able to see the kingdom of God" (3:3). In his further explanation following Nicodemus' question (3:4), Jesus begins with ἐαν μη in reference to the birth of water and Spirit (3:5) and finishes by modulating his original ἐαν μη of 3:3 to δεῖ (3:7). Interestingly, the δεῖ and ἐαν μη seem to be equivalent because Jesus says, "Do not marvel that I said to you, "You must be born from above" (3:7). Here, Jesus seems to equate ἐαν μη and δεῖ. This narrative necessity used clearly as requirement but also as a means of helping Nicodemus understand what is really necessary: new birth. Nicodemus does not question the requirement, but he does question the process.

In John 3:14-15, which Talbert calls "theological reflections of the Evangelist," the first of four references to Jesus' exaltation via the cross appears.[98] One event in

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[95] Resseguie, *The Strange Gospel*, 12-13.

[96] Bruce J. Malina and Richard L. Rohrbaugh, *Social Science Commentary on the Gospel of John* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), note that "birth was the all-important factor in determining a person's honor rating" (81).

[97] John uses this conditional marker a total of sixteen times (3:2, 3, 5, 27; 4:48; 5:19; 6:44, 53, 65; 7:51; 12:24; 13:8; 15:4 [twice], 6; and 20:25).

[98] Talbert, *Reading John*, 104.

which something is lifted up in order to bring healing (the brazen serpent in the wilderness – Num 21:4-9) is compared with another (Jesus being lifted up on the cross). The exaltation of Jesus is clearly superior because, whereas the brazen serpent brought temporary healing, the death of Jesus will bring eternal life. But, it is precisely this death that the audience needs to understand.[99]

The identification of Jesus' death with the healing properties of the brazen serpent surely brought to mind the requirement of looking at the snake in order to be healed. That the snake was given healing power by God suggests that Jesus' healing power is even greater. Thus the necessity of being lifted up, as many commentators have noted, plays a dual role here: lifted up on the cross and, because of the result of his death (a great deed done for others), an increase of Jesus' honor and glory.[100] Although a sacrificial death is not what many in the audience would expect of a Son of God, John has already allowed one character to point Jesus out as "the lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world" (1:29, 36). By subverting the expectations of the audience, John establishes a new status quo in which suffering is the way to exaltation.

The next use of necessity in John's gospel also involves a comparison (3:30). It also involves the use of ἐαν μη. Here the comparison again favors Jesus as noted by the person with whom he is compared: John the Baptist. Just as the Johannine audience may have been surprised by the early suggestions of Jesus' death, John's disciples are

[99] The gospel authors seem to assume that the "fact" of Jesus' origins, life, and death were not accepted (clearly, judging from the crucifixion) and thus had to be demonstrated. The gospels attempted to demonstrate this because the witness of the Jewish authorities against Jesus as the Son of God was still quite strong when they wrote. There would have been no need to demonstrate the greatness of Jesus' life as Son of God if the gospels had been written at a much later date when Jesus was accepted as the Son of God. The fact that they are demonstrating suggests there was a group that needed the demonstration.

[100] See Myers, *Characterizing Jesus*, 86-93.

surprised by their leader yielding to "the one who was with you across Jordan" (3:26). John himself declares that a person cannot receive anything unless (ἐαν μη) it comes from heaven. Thinking back to the beginning of the chapter, perhaps John is declaring the necessity of receiving goods or approval from heaven before being able to do great works. Leon Morris has observed that John's purpose here "is to show the reason for Jesus' greater success."[101]

Ultimately, John declares that Jesus must (δεῖ) increase while he decreases. Malina and Rohrbaugh have made some interesting comments on this transition:

> John defends Jesus and testifies to the divine origin of his mission. Later calendar makers placed the birth of John the Baptist at June 24 (three days after the summer solstice), on the day light noticeably begins to decrease, and the birth of Jesus at December 25 (three days after the winter solstice), the day light noticeably begins to increase. The notion is also suggested by the fact that the Greek verbs here for "to increase" and "to decrease" are those used for the waxing and waning of light from celestial bodies.[102]

The necessity here seems to be that of a *prosopopoeia* designed to consol. The disciples of John the Baptist are upset because the ministry of Jesus seems to be gaining ground, and they come to John for clarification. After he reminds them that he had already told them that he is not the Messiah (3:28; cf. 1:19-34), he informs them that upon recognizing the success of Jesus, he is filled with joy (3:29). John's word to his disciples is that Jesus' increase in required; not fate, not luck, not manipulation, but is part of the way things have to go for the kingdom to be established.

Here a word should be said about those who speak of the divine plan of God in terms of determinism. Recently, Emmanuel O. Tukasi has written about John's use of

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[101] Leon Morris, *The Gospel of John*, 240.

[102] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Gospel of John*, 92. See also Herman Ridderbos, *The Gospel of John: A Theological Commentary* (trans. John Vriend; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 148.

necessity (including δεῖ) in a way that makes John very deterministic.[103] Others have offered similar readings that either are or come close to sounding deterministic.[104] Our investigation of necessity has revealed that there are basically two categories of necessity: requirement and compulsion. As noted above, for those who accept the necessity of requirement, it is a good thing, but for those understand necessity as compulsion, it is not a good thing. It is a mistake to read the necessity of requirement in John, especially those passages related to Jesus, in terms of compulsion or determinism because no author in the ancient world would have written a *bios* in which a person was praised for acting out of necessity that is compulsory.

The additional uses of necessity in John support this. There are five other passages in which necessity is used of Jesus in John's gospel (4:4; 9:4; 10:16; 12:34; and 20:0). In each, something is necessary for Jesus to do: go through Samaria (4:4); to work the works of the one who sent him (9:4); to bring in other sheep who are not of "this" fold (10:16); to be lifted up (12:34), and rise from the dead (20:9). Jesus does not go through Samaria as a robotic figure pre-programmed on at some point to act out lines of code installed on his hard drive. Neither does he mechanistically work the works of the one who sent him. He never shows the slightest inclination that he acts unintentionally or unwillingly, terms that repeatedly show up in connection with those who are being compelled. Jesus sees and embraces the necessity of his actions, so, for him, they are requirement, not compulsion.

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[103] Emmanuel O. Tukasi, *Determinism and Petitionary Prayer in John and the Dead Sea Scrolls: An Idealogical Reading of John and the Rule of the Community (1QS)* (LSTS 66; London: T & T Clark, 2008).

[104] Ridderbos, *The Gospel of John*, 137, 147, 333; Morris, *The Gospel of John*, 256: He says the necessity in 4:4 "points to a compelling divine necessity."; J.H. Bernard, *The Gospel According to St. John*, (ICC vol. 2; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1976), 326, refers to "the divine predestination of events."

Necessity in Hebrews[105]

The Letter to the Hebrews contains eight uses of necessity (2:1; 7:12, 27; 8:3; 9:16, 23, 26; 11:6). The author alternates between δεῖ and ἀνάγκη with no discernible difference in meaning. All of the uses of necessity in Hebrews are requirement or expectation.

Most scholars recognize a tripartite structure in this letter.[106] There is usually a section that encompasses 1:5-4:13 that deals with superiority of the Son. Also, there is a large section that takes in 4:14-10:18 that is concerned in some way with the priesthood of Christ. Recently, Michael Martin and Jason Whitlark have revisited the structure of Hebrews in light of the progymastic teaching on syncrisis.[107] It is their contention that five epideictic syncrises in Hebrews are the key to the outline of the project: 1) 1:1-14; 2:5-18; 2) 3:1-6; 3) 5:1-10; 4) 7:1-10:18; and 5) 12:18-24.[108]

The first use of necessity is sandwiched between the two syncrises that show the superiority of Jesus over angels/messengers. In 2:1, the readers are told that it is necessary (δεῖ) to pay careful attention to the things that they have heard so that they do not drift away from those earlier foundational teachings. What is it that creates the necessity? It is the exaltation of the Son above the messengers. Whatever the earlier word from an angel, all has now been superseded by the Word of the Son (1:1-14).

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[105] Fred B. Craddock, "The Letter to the Hebrews" *NIB* 12:8 gives a frame of 60-95 C.E. for the dating of Hebrews. David Allen, *Hebrews* (NAC 35; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2010), 74-78 places the date at 67-68 C.E.

[106] David Allen, *Hebrews*, 87-94.

[107] Michael Martin and Jashon Whitlark, "The Encomiastic Topics of Syncrisis as the Key to the Structure and Argument of Hebrews," *NTS* 57 (2011): 415-439.

[108] Martin and Whitlark, "The Encomiastic Topics of Syncris," 423.

The section 2:1-4 marks "the only hortatory paragraph in the first two chapters."[109] This section, which occurs between the first two epideictic syncrises that highlight the superiority of Jesus over the angels, has the markings of a thesis supported by necessity. Another way to read 2:1 is: "Therefore, to pay close attention to what we have heard is all the more necessary for us, lest we drift away." A thesis addresses whether we should do something; here, the author argues that we should pay close attention to what has been heard. We do not have to enquire as to why it is all the more necessary, the author provides clear evidence by means of a comparison regarding the words of God: if the word of angels was binding to the point of punishment, how can we escape if we ignore the salvation that was offered by Jesus, confirmed by his disciples, and demonstrated by God via signs? (2:2-4)

Here, a clear condition is assumed: *if* you want to avoid drifting away from foundational truths, *then* you must pay close attention to what you have heard. Paul Ellingworth makes the threat more powerful: they must pay attention "because if they do not do so, they will be lost."[110] While this may go beyond the evidence, there is certainly a strong warning here.[111] There is an expectation that the readers will pay attention to those foundational doctrines that will save them.

The next six uses of necessity in the letter occur in the fourth syncrisis outlined by Martin and Whitlark in which the Levitical priesthood is compared with the Melchizedekian priesthood (7:1-10:18). Martin and Whitlark label this section:

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[109] Allen, *Hebrews*, 189.

[110] Paul Ellingworth, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (NIGCT; Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993), 135.

[111] David L. Allen, *Hebrews*, 191.

"Pursuits—Deeds: Syncrisis of the Priestly Deeds of Each Covenant." By claiming that this section relates to deeds, they have raised the question of the necessity of the deeds. As Theon noted in his discussion of syncrisis, preference should be given to deeds done by choice rather than by necessity or chance (Theon 113 [Kennedy, 53]). Also, as we have seen repeatedly, actions that are compelled are not praiseworthy. Also, because Jesus was appointed High Priest (5:5), we should consider that the priesthood of Jesus is one of the external goods (official position) mentioned by Theon (110).

The author points out that a change in priesthood, of necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης), calls for a change in the law (7:12). This use of necessity does not affect the superior status of Jesus in any way. Ellingworth correctly points out that ἀνάγκη "denotes logical or at least theological necessity."[112] Allen's view is that the formation of a new priesthood does away with the requirement that one must come from the tribe of Levi in order to be a priest, thus effectively ending the Levitical priesthood.[113]

Since the new priest has come (on the announcement of Psalm 110), the law has to change to reflect the new foundation. Clearly, the author has in mind to show that a change in x yields a change in y. In his mind the two, priesthood and law, are so intimately bound together that each reflects the reality of the other. Since Psalm 110 predicted a new priesthood, believers should realize that the old Mosaic system has ended. It is a fundamental change: a change in priesthood necessitates a change in law (and not *only* a modification of the law to account for a new lineage).

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[112] Ellingworth, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, 374.

[113] Allen, *Hebrews,* 421.

Also, the author is at pains to show that Jesus did not have the same requirements as the Levitical priests. Whereas the Levitical priests were required to offer a sacrifice for their own sins and then a sacrifice for the sins of the people, it was not necessary (οὐκ ἔχει ἀνάγκην) for Jesus to do so because his one sacrifice of himself sufficed forever (7:27-28).[114] The oath from Psalm 110 declares the Son who lives forever to be the high priest. It is not necessary for him to follow the prescriptions of the Mosaic law and offer sacrifices daily because his priesthood had brought an end to that law.

The connection between the two priesthoods may be closer than chapter seven has made it sound. Yes, there is a change in the priesthood, and yes, Jesus is the appointment of God's oath in Psalm 110 as a perfect, eternal high priest; however, he is *still* a high priest, and there are certain expectations associated with high priests. One of those expectations is that the high priest will offer gifts and sacrifices in the place where God chooses (Lev. 1-7). Because he is a high priest, it is necessary (ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον) for him to have something to offer when he enters the heavenly tabernacle (Heb 8:3). Here again the conditional is assumed: if you are to be a high priest, then you must offer gifts and sacrifices to God. In 5:3, the author points out that the Mosaic high priest is obligated (ὀφείλει) to offer sacrifices for himself and the people. Chrysostom remarks: "He was a Priest. But there is no Priest without a sacrifice. It is necessary then that He also should have a sacrifice."[115]

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[114] See the discussion in Allen, *Hebrews*, 430-31 about which sacrifices commentators have thought were no longer necessary.

[115] *Homilies on Hebrews* 14.2 (*NPNF*[1] 14:433)

In chapter nine, the discussion turns to the new will that replaces the old Mosaic covenant. There has been considerable wrangling about διαθήκη in 9:15-16.[116] The issue turns on the translation: is it "covenant" or "will"? Also at issue is the question of necessity, especially since 9:16 seems to say that it is necessary (ἀνάγκη) to prove the death of the person who made the covenant/will. The death precedes the will being executed or the covenant being established. As the old covenant was not established without the blood of bulls and goats (v.18), the new covenant also requires blood for its inauguration. The issue seems to be that the death of Christ is the means by which the new covenant is inaugurated.

Yet, the way in which Christ's death serves to establish the new covenant is not as straightforward as it seems. Scott Hahn has challenged the long-standing belief that the death of Jesus answered the death of animals in the old covenant. Hahn puts great emphasis on the necessity of the death (a first-covenant stipulation that occurs when the covenant is violated) being borne by *someone*, even if that someone is a designated representative.[117] Once the covenant that God made with Israel is broken, death is the only means of keeping the terms of the covenant. As long as the covenant makers are alive (those who have broken the covenant), there is no "force" to the covenant (v.17). Under the old covenant, their death was symbolized by the death of animals. Hence, for Hahn, the author of Hebrews is saying that the death of the violator of the covenant (the

[116] There have been several lengthy discussions about this issue: Fredrick Gardiner, "On διαθήκης in Heb. ix. 16, 17," *Journal of the Exegetical Society* 5 (1885): 8-19; James Swetnam, "Suggested Interpretations of Hebrews 9:15-18," *CBQ* 27.4 (1965): 373-90; Scott R. Murray, "The Concept of diathēkē in the Letter to the Hebrews," *CTQ* 66.1 (2002):41-60.

[117] Scott F. Hahn, "A Broken Covenant and the Curse of Death: A Study of Hebrews 9:15-22," *CBQ* 66 (2004): 416-36, 432-33.

covenant-maker who broke the covenant) must be borne if the covenant is to have any force at all. So, the necessity is not to prove that someone has died and that their will is now in effect, but that the death itself must be affected for the covenant to remain viable. Hahn summarizes:

> The author does not argue for a strained comparison between a covenant and a testament but restates a cultic, religious, and theological paradigm articulated elsewhere in Hebrews: the first covenant entailed the curse of death for those who broke it (2:2; 10:28), and Christ takes that curse upon himself on their behalf (2:9, 14; 9:15, 28), thus freeing those under the first covenant from the curse of death (2:5; 10:14) and providing for them a new and better covenant (9:28; 10:15-17; 12:22-24).[118]

On this reading, necessity in this passage relates to the requirement of the covenant that death be enforced when a violation occurs. If that death is not demonstrated, the covenant has no force. The death of the substitute paves the way for the inauguration of the new covenant by releasing the parties from obligation under the old covenant.

The necessity in 9:23 is related to the requirement that blood is the only agent that can be used in consecration or inauguration rites. In the comparison, the author points out that it was necessary (ἀνάγκη) that the earthly copies of the heavenly originals be cleansed with the blood of animals, but the heavenly originals required a better sacrifice. Since the earthly sacrificial system was only a type of the heavenly, if the earthly system and furnishings required sacrifices for their consecration and inauguration, then the heavenly must require the same, only of a higher quality.

Unlike the earthly priests who go in daily to offer sacrifice for the sins of people and themselves, the Great High Priest is not required to do so. Because his sacrifice is once forever, his one sacrifice continues effective into the coming age. Christ did not

[118] Hahn, "A Broken Covenant and the Curse of Death," 435.

enter the heavenly court in order to offer himself again and again as the earthly priests do. If this were so, it would have been necessary (ἔδει) for him to suffer his death many times (v.26). The imperfect tense of δεῖ clues us in to the fact that this is not the case. The sense is basically: "he would have had to suffer again and again since the foundation of the world (but he did not)."[119]

The final use of necessity in Hebrews is related to an argument from the impossible. In 11:5, the author states that in order for a person to be pleasing to God, "whoever would approach him must (δεῖ) believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him." This is necessary because "without faith it is impossible to please God" (ibid). This line of argument is similar to that encountered in Josephus' account of Joseph and his brothers. The brothers were under tremendous pressure when they began to run out of corn after their first visit to Egypt because it was not possible for them to return without Benjamin and Jacob did not want to let Benjamin go to Egypt (*Ant*. 2:114-15). It was necessary for them to take Benjamin because of Joseph's demands.

Conclusion

The writings of the New Testament reflect the diversity of uses of necessity that we have seen in other Hellenistic Jewish documents as well as the writings from the Greco-Roman world. Necessity is used in the sense of requirement, and it is also used as compulsion for excuse or defense.

First, the New Testament documents use necessity as requirement. Paul's letters have many examples of the necessity of requirement (Col 4:4, 6; 1 Tim 3, Titus 1).

[119] See Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 483 for a brief discussion of the unreal situation created by the negative statement in v.25.

Because they are biographies, Mark, Matthew, and John avoid using necessity as compulsion when speaking of the actions of Jesus. When necessity is used of the actions of Jesus, it is used in the sense of requirement: Mark (8:31), Matthew (16:21; 26:54), John (3:7, 14, 9:4). Jesus is compared with other archetypical figures in Hebrews. The necessity of his having something to offer upon his entrance into the heavenly Holy Place is a condition of being the High Priest (8:3).

Second, necessity can also be used as compulsion in the New Testament. Paul is the best example of this. Paul understands his calling in terms of compulsion (1 Cor 9:16). He also wants the Corinthians to give willingly, not out of coercion (2 Cor 9:7). In order for Philemon to receive honor in the matter of Onesimus, he cannot be forced to act against his wishes (Phlm 14).

We have also seen different rhetorical devices used by these authors. Among the several examples of prosopopoeia were Jesus' speech of consolation to his disciples in Mark 13:5-37 where necessity is used to comfort them regarding the end of time and the speech of John the Baptist to his disciples in which he consoles them by telling them that it is necessary for Jesus to increase while his own ministry decreases (3:25-30). Mark uses necessity in his narrative at 8:31 and 9:11-13 to show that Jesus' actions in going to his passion in Jerusalem were a required part of the restoration of all things. The Fourth evangelist's comparison of Jesus' manner of death with the brazen serpent that Moses placed on a pole involves a necessity that points to the incredible healing effect of Jesus' death (John 3:14-15).

The way necessity is used by New Testament authors indicates again that choice, willingness, and intentionality are important considerations when determining how

necessity is used. Those who feel pressured to act against their will do not see necessity as something they want to embrace. Paul has to modify his appeal to the Corinthians because it could have created a situation in which they were no longer giving willingly. Those who align themselves with some goal or purpose often freely accept the requirements of the process. John the Baptist recognized his place in the work of God, and intentionally deferred to the growth of Jesus' ministry. The person who acknowledges the necessity of requirement may be praised for doing things "as he ought" because he is not bowing before compulsion, but willingly engaging the requirement.

CHAPTER SIX

Necessity in Luke's *Bios* of Jesus

Introduction

In the last two chapters we saw that Hellenistic Jewish and early Christian authors use necessity in ways that reflect the instructions given in Theon and the other progymnasmatists and theorists. In this chapter, we will look closely at necessity in Luke's *bios* of Jesus, taking what we have learned about necessity into consideration. The previous chapters have laid an important foundation for the kinds of necessity we can expect in Luke. Having sampled many significant authors who make up Luke's background and contemporaries, we can project how a first-century auditor may have understood Luke's uses of necessity.

This chapter will argue that Luke speaks of the necessity of Jesus' actions in association with "requirement" rather than in association with "compulsion." As we have seen, these are the two overarching categories of necessity. Necessity of requirement or expectation is the necessity that identifies what is proper or right in relation to some purpose or goal, and it is understood to be good. The person who engages this necessity does so willingly. This willingness is captured by the conditionality: you are not compelled to do anything, but *if* you plan to do/be x, then it is necessary to do y. Those who *want* to do/be x, then accept the y as the guidelines by which they must operate.

The necessity of compulsion, on the other hand, is something that the subject does not enter into willingly. Compulsive necessity takes away the opportunity to praise *or*

blame because the impetus for the action does not come from the choice or desire of the person who acts. It is a standard of ancient Mediterranean thought that a person who acts unwillingly or unintentionally, often seen in concert with ignorance (they did not know what they were doing), chance (they were digging a post hole and stumbled across a buried treasure), or necessity (they were forced to do what they did), is not praised or blamed for his actions. Luke clearly wants to praise Jesus; therefore his use of necessity must be in keeping with his literary goal.

The traditional outline of Luke's narrative is as follows:

A. Prologue: 1:1-4
B. Birth and Childhood: 1:5-2:52
C. Preparation for Ministry: 3:1-4:13[1]
D. Ministry in Galilee: 4:14-9:50
E. On the Way to Jerusalem: 9:51-19:44
F. Passion: 19:45-24:53[2]

Each of these sections, except the prologue, contains some of the encomiastic topoi that are used in *bioi*. The traditional outline meshes fairly well with one option of presenting a person's life according to the ancient theorists. After the opening section that deals with Jesus' birth, preparation for ministry, and the amazing things that happened during this period (1:5-4:13), Luke has a unit that is heavily weighted toward Jesus' miraculous deeds (4:14-9:50). The next section includes a few miracles, but contains much more of Jesus' teaching (9:51-19:44). The final section deals with his death and events that occur

[1] Fearghus O'Fearghail, *The Introduction to Luke-Acts: A Study of the Role of 1:1-4:4 in the Composition of Luke's Two-Volume Work* (Rome: Pontifico Istituto Biblico, 1991), 35-36 makes the whole of 1:5-4:44 a syncrisis of John and Jesus, which he says follows the encomiastic model.

[2] Darrell Bock, "Gospel of Luke" in *Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels* (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1992), 495-510, 500. Michael Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists," 36 outlines Luke as follows: Prooemion (1:1-4); Origins (1:26-38; 3:23-38); marvelous occurrences at birth (2:1-39; 3:21-22), nurture and training (2:41-52; 4:1-3), pursuits and deeds (4:14-22:46), manner of death (22:47-23:46), and events after death (23:47-24:53).

after his death (19:45-24:53). This outline follows the outline of many of the biographers of antiquity as well as the theorists who wrote about how to praise an individual.[3]

An analysis of Luke's use of δεῖ yields the following results. There are eighteen occurrences in the *bios* (2:49; 4:43; 9:22; 11:42; 12:12; 13:14, 16; 13:33; 15:32; 17:25; 18:1; 19:5; 21:9; 22:7; 22:37; 24:7; 24:26; and 24:44). Of the eighteen, thirteen are spoken by Jesus (2:49; 4:43; 9:22; 11:42; 12:12; 13:16: 13:33; 17:25; 19:5; 21:9; 22:37; 24:26; and 24:44). Other speakers include a Jewish ruler (13:14), the prodigal's father (15:32), Luke (18:1 and 22:7), and two angels at the tomb (24:7). Three instances involve the use of a rhetorical question: 2:49, 13:16, and 24:26. There is one occurrence in the Birth and Childhood section (2:49), two in the Galilean ministry (4:43 and 9:22), nine in the Journey to Jerusalem segment (11:42; 12:12: 13:14,16; 13:33; 15:32; 17:25; 18:1, and 19:5), and six in the Passion narrative (21:9; 22:7; 22:37; 24:7; 24:26; and 24:44).

Twice δεῖ is found in a passage that also involves a quotation from the Old Testament (13:33 [Psalm 118:26] and 22:37 [Isaiah 53:12]). The audience is a person or persons who may be considered Jesus' followers eleven times (4:43; 9:22; 12:12; 17:25; 18:1; 21:9; 22:7; 22:37; 24:7; 24:26; and 24:44). Jesus is the subject or referent ten times (2:49; 4:43; 9:22; 13:33; 17:25; 19:5; 22:37, 24:7; 24:26; and 24:44). Also, thirteen of the eighteen instances of δεῖ in Luke belong to Luke's special material (2:49; 11:42; 13:14, 16; 13:33; 15:32; 17:25; 18:1; 19:5; 22:37; 24:7; 24:26; and 24:44). Luke shares only 4:43, 9:22; 12:12, 21:9, and 22:7 with Mark and Matthew. In three of these cases (4:43; 12:12, and 22:7) Luke has added δεῖ to the material.

[3] See Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists," 22; Burridge, *What are the Gospels*?, 200-202.

Luke 1:5-2:52

After the prologue, Luke launches into a *syncrisis* (comparison) of the birth and childhood of John the Baptist and Jesus.[4] Luke Timothy Johnson notes that Luke's infancy narrative has a very "complex internal structure, in which stories concerning John are matched with those about Jesus, in each case showing Jesus' superiority."[5]

In the course of this comparison, Luke uses the topoi of good birth and divine testimony of both John and Jesus. John's ancestors come from the house of Levi (1:5-6), whereas Jesus' ancestors are from the tribe of Judah (1:17, 2:4). These two tribes historically represent the priestly office and Israelite kingship. As Bock has noted, "John is great as a prophet before the Lord; Jesus is great as the promised Davidic ruler."[6] The divine testimony related to John involves the appearance of Gabriel to Zechariah (1:13-20). The angel gives Zechariah the good news of the impending birth of a son who will be an agent of God's restoration of Israel.[7] The divine testimony in relation to Jesus includes *two* angelic visitations: one to Mary (1:26-38) and one to shepherds (2:8-14). The appearance to Mary, who is "among the most powerless people in her society" shows

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[4] Raymond Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah* (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 250-53; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX* (AB 28; New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1979), 313-21; Craig A. Evans, *Luke* (NIBC 3; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1990), 22-23; Robert C. Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation* (vol. 1; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 15-20.

[5] Luke Timothy Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke* (Sacra Pagina 3; Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1991), 34.

[6] Darrell L. Bock, *Luke 1:1-9:50* (ECNT; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1994), 68.

[7] Joel Green, *The Gospel of Luke* (NICNT; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 76-78. See also Maria Ytterbrink, *The Third Gospel for the First Time: Luke within the Context of Ancient Biography* (Lund: Lund University, 2004), 42, who points to the allusion to Samuel in the reference to the Nazirite vow. She observes that this echo would have caused Luke's readers to think of Samuel. It was Samuel who was the transitional figure from prophet/priest to king in ancient Israel.

how God's will may at times appear rather strange to humans.[8] Johnson writes, "That she should have found 'favor with God' and be 'highly gifted' shows Luke's understanding of God's activity as surprising and often paradoxical, almost always reversing human expectations."[9] The appearance to the shepherds is highly suggestive of kingship, as we saw in Philo's *Life of Joseph* and Matt 2:6 where the ruler born in Bethlehem is called the shepherd of God's people.[10] Jesus, born in the city of the shepherd-king David, is called σωτὴρ (savior – 2:11). John Nolland comments that the words of the angels here would have brought to the mind of Hellenistic readers "an echo of the language in which Augustus had been honored."[11]

Luke uses unexpected events to highlight the nature of these two children (Cicero, *Part. or.* 21:73). In relation to John the Baptist, this event comes when Zechariah is finally able to speak again after the naming episode (1:59-66). The naming of John is the first of many accounts in Luke where an expectation is introduced and overturned. The friends and relatives who have gathered are surprised that the child is not going to be named after his father but will be given a name that is not associated with his family (1:59-61). Their expectations are overturned by direct order of the angel who had commanded Zechariah to name the child John. When Zechariah chooses the same name that Elizabeth had announced, they are filled with awe and wonder what John will

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[8] Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke*, 39.

[9] Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke*, 39. See also, Loretta Dornisch, "A Woman Reads the Gospel of Luke: Introduction and Luke 1: The Infancy Narratives," *BR* 42 (1997): 7-22, 16.

[10] For the view that the shepherds represent God's revelation to people of low estate see I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke* (NICGTC; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1978), 108. In this sense, the announcement to the shepherds may be another example of the unexpectedness of God's will.

[11] John Nolland, *Luke 1-9:20* (WBC 35a; Dallas, TX: Word Books, 1989), 107.

become (1:66). Their amazement creates another set of expectations that John will be someone spectacular.[12]

The words of the shepherds to those who were present after Jesus is born cause amazement (2:18). Jesus' parents are amazed at what is spoken of him in the temple when he is taken to be dedicated (2:33). When Jesus is twelve, he visits the temple in Jerusalem, and his conversation with the teachers there amaze those who hear him (2:47). Even his parents are astonished at what they see when they finally find him (2:48). In each of these cases, the persons who are amazed are not expecting things to be as they turn out.

In addition to these topoi, Luke adds the judgment of the famous (Theon 110): Simeon and Anna. Simeon identifies the young child as the Messiah, salvation, and light (2:26-32). Anna associates Jesus with the redemption of Israel (2:36-38). In addition to Simeon and Anna, twice in this section Luke mentions that Jesus had the favor of God (2:40, 52).

The names that are given to Jesus or associated with him in this section provide additional praise and heighten the expectations about him (Theon 111). He is called Jesus, which means "Yahweh saves." Marshall notes that "although Luke does not expressly draw attention to [the meaning of the name], it is hard to believe that he was not aware of it."[13] This child who is to be named Jesus will be great (μέγας), Son of the Most High, and will inherit the throne of David (1:32). His reign over the house of Jacob

[12] Fitzmyer, *The Gospel According to Luke I-IX*, 65.

[13] Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 67.

will never end (v. 33). He is designated "holy" and again called the Son of God (1:35). Elizabeth refers to Jesus as her "Lord" (1:43).

The dedication of Jesus in the temple contains the use of the Jewish oracles in a way that demonstrates his parents do what is expected of them (Cicero, *Part. or*. 21.73). They took him to the temple to dedicate him as was required by the law (Ex. 13). They also went in order to offer the sacrifice for purification (Lev 12).

There is one final but quite significant event in Luke's presentation of the childhood of Jesus: his visit to the Temple at twelve years of age (2:41-52). This incident is also the first in which Luke uses necessity. Here, Luke uses the topos "actions done beyond expectations" to highlight a significant moment in the life of Jesus.[14] Green, after noting that Jesus' parents raised him in a very pious environment, writes, "But Luke introduces a surprising countermeasure as well. Jesus is being raised in a pious environment, but his commitment to God's purpose transcends that piety and that environment."[15]

The story is quite familiar: Jesus goes with his parents to Jerusalem for the Passover, but he stays behind, unbeknown to his parents, and visits with the teachers in the temple. People who observe his interaction with the teachers are amazed at his intelligence. Whatever the norms of expectation were for twelve-year olds, the onlookers find Jesus to have surpassed them all.

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[14] Cf. Nils Krückemeier, "Der zwölfjährige Jesus im Tempel (Lk 2.40-52) und die biografische Literatur der hellenistischen Antike," *NTS* 50 (2004): 307-19 for a comparison of this passage with similar accounts of precocious young men at or near a temple (Nicholas of Damascus *Life of Augustus*; Philostratus *Life of Apollonius*; and Iamblichus *Life of Pythagoras*). Krückemeier points out that Luke goes beyond these other biographers by showing that Jesus increases not only in wisdom but also, as Messiah of Israel, in the strength of God (318).

[15] Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 155.

When his parents discover him on the third day, they are "utterly astonished."[16] Clearly, they did not expect him to stay behind and engage the religious authorities in the temple. His mother's question makes this very apparent: "why have you treated us in this manner; see, your father and I, being terribly worried, were seeking you" (2:48).[17] Jesus' answer reflects his own shock and surprise: "why were you seeking me? Did you not know that it is necessary (δεῖ) for me to be about my Father's business?" (2:49). His parents do not, perhaps due to their shock, understand what he says to them (v.50). In the end, however, Jesus goes home with his parents and is subject to them.

The necessity in this story has been variously understood. Green believes Jesus has been compelled to go to the temple to teach: "Jesus is in the temple, the locus of God's presence, but he is there under divine compulsion engaged in teaching. The point is that he must align himself with God's purpose, even if this appears to compromise his relationship with his parents."[18] Tannehill writes, "Jesus already senses a divine purpose for his life which places him under obligation."[19] Robert Stein relates the necessity here to "a strong sense of divine causality."[20] Culpepper notes that "Jesus was responding to the divine imperative that he fulfill God's purposes for his life."[21] Brown associates the

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[16] Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke*, 60. See also Martin M. Culy, Mikeal C. Parsons, and Joshua J. Stigall, *Luke: A Handbook on the Greek Text* (Waco, Tx: Baylor University Press, 2010), 92. Their translation is "stunned." The idea seems to be that Jesus has done something that his parents would never have expected.

[17] Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[18] Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 157.

[19] Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, 54.

[20] Robert H. Stein, *Luke* (NAC 24; Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1992), 123.

[21] R. Alan Culpepper, "Luke" in *New Interpreter's Bible* 9:77.

"must" statements with "the role the Father has given him to play."[22] For Marshall, necessity in Luke is "a sense of divine compulsion, often seen in obedience to a scriptural command or prophecy, or the conformity of events to God's will."[23]

Yet, as we have seen in previous chapters, compulsion is a very negative experience, even if (or maybe especially if) the source is a divine being (Homer *Il*. 19:86-92; Sophocles *Iph. aul.* 673). Biographers do not show their subjects acting out of compulsive necessity unless it is to excuse an action (Philo *Abr*. 250) or to show a weakness in his character when compared to another great man (Plutarch *Comp. Thes. Rom.* 1.1).

Is Luke here excusing Jesus' behavior? Is this compulsion only having exchanged the God of the Old Testament for Ἀνάγκη? Our review of necessity in the Septuagint found that it is most often used as requirement, with little evidence of compulsion or inevitability. On the other hand, the exchange between Mary and Jesus highlights a very important observation about Luke's narrative: there are two sets of expectations at work, and they often collide or interfere with each other. Many commentators have noted that Jesus' parents should have known where to find him. At least two reasons are given. First, it has been pointed out that Joseph and Mary did not redeem Jesus when they took him to the temple, therefore he truly belonged to God.[24] Second, all of the prophecies and marvelous events that surrounded his birth indicate that he will be something great, therefore his parents should have looked for him in the

[22] Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah*, 491.

[23] Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 129.

[24] Charles Talbert, *Reading Luke: A Literary and Theological Commentary on the Third Gospel* (rev. ed.; Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2004), 38.

temple.[25] The story of Jesus at the temple, however, suggests that his parents did *not* expect his actions.

Luke uses many different topoi to build up significant expectations about Jesus in his opening chapters. Charles Talbert refers to the entire section (1:5-4:15) as an example of a genre called "the prepublic career of a great person." He continues, "The genre functioned as a foreshadowing of the character of the public career of the biographical subject."[26] The nature of Jesus' birth and unique role as Messiah/Son of God provides him with a very substantial advantage. As we saw in our discussion of the Synoptic gospels, advantages are not praised simply because a person has them; rather, the advantage must be put to good use. The expectations of his earthly parents and his heavenly Parent collide in this story. Although his earthly parents do not expect him to be in the temple, Luke shows Jesus acting in a manner that demonstrates correct usage of his great advantage: a Son of God should be in God's house doing "God" things. Since he is the Son of God, he should act as a Son of God should act.

This passage, however, also has clear defensive overtones. However gently it may have been done, Mary is clearly rebuking her son for what she perceives is unacceptable behavior.[27] Jesus' response to her is in the form of two rhetorical questions. His questions also reflect some defensiveness: "why were you seeking me? Did you not know?"

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[25] René Laurentin, *Jésus au temple: Mystère de Páques et foi de Marie en Luc 2,48-50* (Paris: Gabalda, 1966), 38.

[26] Talbert, *Reading Luke*, 17.

[27] Bock, *Luke 1:1-9:50*, 268: "This is the language of complaint."

Paul Elbert's research into Luke's questions is helpful here.[28] Elbert suggests that Luke uses what he calls "dual-element questions" to foreground and background information. The first element looks forward to the following narrative, while the second element looks backward to the preceding information. The foregrounding and backgrounding of narrative information in Luke's questions at this point connects the second question with the information contained in the preceding verses (1:5-2:41). The first question is related to the material that will follow. When Jesus questions his parent's knowledge of his activities, Luke asks the reader to remember the great prophecies and the significant events that indicate the coming greatness of Jesus. When Jesus asks why they were seeking him, his words anticipate others in the narrative (as well as readers) who will come seeking him.[29]

The necessity is involved with what Jesus expects them to have known. Presented as a statement, these words would be: "You were searching for me because you did not know that it is necessary for me to be about my Father's business."[30] Jesus thus associates his activity of staying behind with "being about my Father's business." Jesus' rhetorical questions are the beginning of Luke's overall presentation of Jesus as one who uses his advantages "as he ought" (Theon 111). This is also the first of several times when Jesus will use necessity to explain his actions when they do not meet the

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[28] Paul Elbert, "An Observation on Luke's Composition and Narrative Style of Questions," *CBQ* 66 (2003): 98-109, 106.

[29] Not only the questions in 2:49, but the entire pericope is considered a transitional text between the actual childhood of Jesus and his adult ministry: Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "Luke 2:41-52," *Int* 36 (1982): 399-403.

[30] David Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature & Rhetoric,* 422 writes: "While rhetorical questions have the form of question, they are often equivalent to emphatic declarations."

expectations of other characters.[31] As we have seen, sometimes the necessity of requirement can become the necessity of excuse (cf. Sophcles' *Electra* 256-57; Josephus *Ant*. 1:302), usually only when one party does not understand the requirement of the other. It is in this sense that Jesus' questions may seem defensive.

This understanding of the pericope is quite a distance from the review of this section given by Claire Rothschild. She writes,

> Here use of the expression δεῖ aims at bolstering the historical plausibility of this very transparent application of the literary topos of the precocious adolescence of an important individual: Jesus uses oracular language at a young age. By expressing Jesus' presence in the Temple among the teachers in fulfillment language, the historical 'truth' of this patently contrived section of narrative is heightened.[32]

Given the norms for writing a *bios*, Luke would not need to use δεῖ to strengthen acceptance of an opening narrative about the precociousness of a young man: it would have been expected and accepted.

Luke 3:1-4:13 – Preparation for Ministry

In this section, Luke uses additional topoi in his characterization of Jesus. Divine testimonies are applied to John and Jesus. As John begins his ministry, Luke associates John's ministry with Isaiah's oracle concerning one who would go before the Lord to prepare his way (Lk 3:4-6; Is 40:3-5). In the Isaiah passage, God forecasts a change from punishment to restoration and blessing. John is the agent of God who begins this process.

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[31] Jean-Marie Guillaume, *Luc Interprète des Anciennes Traditions sur La Résurrection de Jésus* (Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie, 1979), 43 sees the first use of δεῖ and the last use as bookends that highlight the continuation of Jesus' alignment with the divine plan throughout his entire life.

[32] Claire Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History* (WUNT 2-175; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 196.

Luke notes for the first time the expectations of the people regarding the Messiah. In this case, the people are wondering if John is the Messiah.

For Jesus, the baptism event has additional confirmations of what the early parts of the story declared: Jesus is the Messiah (anointed) and Son of God. John declares Jesus to be the Messiah (3:16-17), and the voice from heaven declares him to be the Son of God (3:21-22) as he is filled with the Spirit.

There is another reference to Jesus' origins by the Voice and the genealogy (3:23-38). Martin has argued that the genealogy and the announcement of Jesus' sonship "functions as the Gospel's second treatment of the topic of origins, showing that God can be regarded as both a father and ancestor of Jesus."[33]

The encounter with Satan in the wilderness (testing Jesus' courage) reveals additional expectations for a Son of God (4:1-13). Jesus' answers also reveal that not all expectations for a Son of God are met. Each of the temptations reveals that Satan is aware of the potential that Jesus has as Son of God. Mark McVann has investigated the temptation scene in light of rituals of status transformation. He writes,

> At the baptism, Jesus is invested with the status of a prophet, a man of God. Yet as a novice prophet, he must demonstrate that he has learned well his lessons of what a prophet is. Jesus, no longer John, is now the prophet of God in Israel. During the ritual confrontation, moreover, Jesus demonstrates that he is worthy to bear the titles of God's Son and prophet; that its, he is totally loyal to God's affairs and able to function worthily.[34]

Jesus does not use his great advantages for personal gain or in any way to show off his power (cf. Philo *Abr*. 209-13; Lucian *Dem*. 8). His answers in the form of

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[33] Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists," 37.

[34] Mark McVann, "Rituals of Status Transformation in Luke-Acts," in *The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1991), 346.

quotations from the Old Testament show that he sees himself in continuity with the covenant. Jesus recognizes and aligns himself with the expectations of a Son of God.

Luke 4:14-9:50

Luke begins this section by noting that Jesus returned to Galilee still empowered by the Spirit, news spread about him, and as he taught in the synagogues everyone praised him (4:14-15). This section of Luke's *bios* demonstrates that Jesus used his advantage of being the uniquely begotten Son of God properly, or "as he ought," primarily by a significant amount of deeds done for others.

There is also additional witness to Jesus' greatness by divine testimony. The oracle of Isaiah depicts him as the anointed one who will do great things (4:17-20). Demons recognize him and even call him by name (4:33-34, 41; 8:28). Moses, Elijah and The Voice also bear witness to his uniqueness (9:28-36).

At least two of the traditional virtues are on display. Luke demonstrates Jesus' wisdom in the Sermon on the Plain (6:20-49), the lesson of the forgiven woman at Simon's house (7:36-50), and the parable of the sower (8:4-15). He also reveals his courage in the account of the angry crowd in Nazareth (4:16-30). This last story is especially interesting because at first the crowd accepts him gladly (4:22), but when he points out that he expects them to reject him, they turn on him (4:28-29). He escapes without harm by walking right through their midst (4:30).

Several of the theorists observed that the kinds of actions that are most suited to any audience are those that the subject did for others more than for himself (Aristotle, *Rhet*. 1367a.18-20; Theon 110.16; Quintilian, *Inst*. 3.7.16). Luke offers at least nineteen examples of deeds that Jesus did for others:

Unclean spirit cast out	Capernaum (4:31-35)
Simon's mother-in-law healed	Capernaum (4:38-39)
Many healed	Capernaum (4:40)
Great catch of fish	by the lake (5:1-11)
Leper healed	Some town (5:12-13)
Many healed	Some town (5:15)
Paralytic healed and forgiven	Some town (5:20-25)
Withered hand healed	A synagogue (6: 6-11)
Many healed	Some town (6:17-19)
Centurion's servant healed	Capernaum (7:2-10)
Widow's son raised	Nain (7:11-15)
A woman's sins forgiven	Nain (7:44-48)
Sea calmed	Lake (8:22-25)
Demoniac of Gedara	Gedara (8:26-39)
Jarius' daughter healed	Some town (8:40-43, 49-55)
Hemorrhaging woman healed	Some town (8:43-48)
Healed many	Bethsaida (9:11)
Fed five thousand	Bethsaida (9:12-17)
Epileptic boy healed	Near Bethsaida (9:37-42)

These actions include healing the sick, casting out demons, forgiving sins, and power over nature. In each case, what Jesus does is clearly for the benefit of others. By multiplying his examples, Luke shows that Jesus is acting according to moral purpose or with intentionality. Aristotle believed that if a person could be shown to have done some great thing repeatedly, it is evidence that the action was not due to chance but was by the subjects own design (*Rhet*. 1367b32)

Even though he has such great power, Jesus does not try to make a name for himself. In fact, he commands the leper not to tell anyone what had been done (5:14). Also, after Peter's confession that Jesus is the Christ, Jesus commands his disciples to tell no one (9:21). This "secrecy" is an example of Jesus' humility even though he has great power and gifts (Theon 111.19-21).

Luke again offers comparisons. When the Pharisees accost him and his disciples for gathering grain on the Sabbath, Jesus compares his actions with those of David who

ate the sacred bread when he and his men were hungry (6:1-5; 1 Sam 21:1-6). Jesus uses the comparison to show that he is Lord of the Sabbath (v. 5). Luke also compares Jesus with John the Baptist again (7:24-35); this is also done in Jesus' own words.

Necessity appears twice in this section, both of which are examples of necessity used to correct erroneous expectations and to show that Jesus acts as the Son of God should act. The people in the area around Capernaum had seen many amazing things in a very short period (4:31-41). He has already astounded them with his authoritative teaching (v.32), expelled a demon (vv. 33-35), healed Simon's mother-in-law (4:38-39), and healed many and cast out demons (vv. 40-41).

It is at this point in Luke's gospel where expectations come to the foreground. Until his first sermon in Nazareth, Jesus is largely unknown. The initial reaction to his preaching is that everyone "spoke well of him and were amazed at the gracious words that came from his mouth" (4:22 NRSV). Their amazement is moderated somewhat by their recognition that he is Joseph's son (v.22).[35]

Recent studies in cultural anthropology related to ancient Palestine provide some important insights to what Luke's narrative audience may have expected from Jesus.[36]

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[35] Wolfgang Wiefel, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (THNT 3; Berlin: Evangelische Verlangsanstalt, 1988), 106.

[36] Kenneth Bailey, *Poet & Peasant and Through Peasant Eyes* (combined ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983); *The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation* (Jerome Neyrey ed.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1991); Bruce Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (rev. ed.; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993); Bruce J. Malina, *The Social World of Jesus and the Gospels* (London: Routledge, 1996); K.C. Hanson and Douglas E. Oakman, *Palestine in the Time of Jesus: Social Structures and Social Conflicts* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998); David de Silva, *Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture* (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000); *The Social Setting of Jesus and the Gospels* (Wolfgang Stegemann, Bruce J. Malina, and Gerd Theissen, eds.; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002); Bruce J. Malina and Richcard L. Rohrbaugh, *Social Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels* (2nd ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003).

Bruce Malina and Jerome Neyrey have investigated the cultural codes of honor and shame in the Mediterranean world.[37] These two values are pivotal for understanding expectations in the world in which Luke writes. Several of these points connect with what we have found in the rhetoricians regarding praise and blame. First, things that are honorable are "what people consider valuable and worthy."[38] The group that gets to define what is valuable and worthy is the most immediate group to which a person belongs. Malina and Neyrey write that "if we consider Jesus or the Twelve or Paul from the perspective of the social lines of power, gender, and precedence operative in their world, we see that *all acted outside of their inherited social roles and rank* (italics original)." They continue, "Such activity would be clearly dishonorable and shameful if assessed from an elite point of view. But, for group members this activity was worthy of moral affirmation; it was honorable. Honor, then depends on the vantage point of the actors and perceivers."[39] Several of the rhetorical theorists point out the value of the audience in establishing what is thought to be good and noble (Aristotle, *Rhet*. 1367a26; Quintilain, *Inst*. 3.7.23-25).

Second, there are two types of honor: ascribed and acquired. Ascribed honor comes to a person "passively through birth, family connections, or endowment by notable persons of power."[40] Ascribed honor is very close to what the theorists call "external goods," which include good birth, education, wealth, friends, etc. (Theon 110.1-5). On

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[37] Bruce Malina and Jerome Neyrey, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts: Pivotal Values of the Mediterranean World," in *The Social World of Luke-Acts*, 25-65.

[38] Malina and Neyrey, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts," 26.

[39] Malina and Neyrey, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts," 27.

[40] Malina and Neyrey, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts," 27-28.

the other hand, acquired honor is "the socially recognized claim to worth that a person obtains by achievements, such as benefactions (Luke 7:4-5) or prowess (Luke 7:16-17)."[41] Later, Malina and Neyrey add Jesus' miracles to the list of ways in which he acquires honor (51). Acquired honor closely parallels the interest of the theorists on the actions and achievements of the subject (Quintilian, *Inst*. 3.7.15-16).

So, the question about Jesus being Joseph's son is really a challenge to his ascribed honor of being the anointed one of God, as he had read in the Isaiah scroll.[42] This is the second such challenge that Jesus has received; the first is the challenge by Satan, in which Satan is shamed and defeated (4:1-13). Throughout the remainder of Luke, the ascribed honor that Jesus receives in the opening chapters will repeatedly be challenged.

The crowds in Capernaum have seen Jesus demonstrate his ascribed honor and also gain more acquired honor. Understandably, they would not want Jesus to leave them, so they go out to find him and prevent him from going away (v. 42). François Bovon points out that the crowd is not aggressive; rather "they feel abandoned and so begin anxiously looking for their shepherd; they wish to detain him so that he might protect them forever."[43] Jesus, however, corrects their misconception: "it is necessary (δεῖ) for me to preach the kingdom of God to the other cities also, because I was sent for this purpose" (4:43). A similar event unfolds when Heracles is urged by the people at the house of Admetus to stay with them (Euripides *Alc*. 1151). Heracles, however, could not

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[41] Malina and Neyrey, "Honor and Shame in Luke-Acts," 28.

[42] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels,* 243.

[43] François Bovon, *A Commentary on the Gospel of Luke 1:1-9:50* (trans. Christine M. Thomas; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002), 164.

delay his mission to gather horses for King Eurystheus any longer; he informed the people of the necessity (δεῖ) that he hurry on to fulfill his task (*Alc*. 1152).

This account has an interesting parallel with the first use of necessity when the twelve-year old Jesus is in the temple (2:41-52). In the temple account, it is Jesus' parents who are seeking (ἐζητοῦμεν) him because they did not expect him to stay behind in the temple. Here, the crowds come seeking (ἐπεζήτουν) him because they did not expect him to leave them behind. In the temple account, it is necessary for him to stay behind, but in this account it is necessary for him to leave. But, as the opening oracle of Isaiah had proclaimed, Jesus is anointed to preach good news to the poor and to demonstrate God's power of renewal and restoration to those who need it (4:18-19). The people at Capernaum have to recognize that Jesus has not come to set up a kingdom in any one location, but to share the power of God will *all* who are oppressed.

The second use of necessity in the Galilean Ministry unit comes in 9:22. After Peter's confession, Jesus does two things: he tells his disciples to keep quiet their knowledge that he is the Messiah, and he informs them of the necessity (δεῖ) of his suffering, rejection, death, and resurrection (9:21-22). The two statements are connected in the Greek: he warns them to keep silent and points out the necessity.[44] Walter Grundmann associates the necessity here with the Messiah's task of overcoming death.[45] Johnson points out the parallels between this scene and the Emmaus road scene at the end of Luke (24:19-26): both accounts contain "the report of popular opinion, the view of the

[44] Martin Culy, Mikeal Parsons, and Josh Stigall, *Luke: A Handbook on the Greek Text*, 309. The aorist participle εἰπων (v.22) functions as attendant circumstance.

[45] Walter Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (THNT 3; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1963), 189-90.

disciples, and the clarification by Jesus concerning the need to suffer."[46] In both of these accounts, Jesus corrects the misconceptions of his followers about his role as Messiah.

The correction of misconceptions in this passage is supported by the material that immediately follows. In 9:23-27, Jesus highlights the conditions for those who want to be his disciples: they must deny themselves and take up their crosses daily (v.23). Several commentators have pointed out the connection between this definition of discipleship and Jesus' own call to suffer and die.[47] Granting this connection, it is significant that his directions are in the form a condition: *if* anyone *wants* to follow me, then he must . . . . Discipleship, like Sonship, is not forced; rather, it is something entered into by will (θέλει – v.23). The conditional nature of discipleship reflects Jesus' own choice to be the Messiah who suffers, dies, and rises again.

The conditional nature of the call also mitigates against those who drink too heavily at the well of inevitability. Bock notes that "the presence of δεῖ shows that Jesus is presenting a commission statement. There is an inevitability to these events."[48] Culpepper makes the will of God here sound very similar to the will of the gods that we saw in Homer and other early Greek literary works: "The first point that Jesus underscores regarding his role as the Son of Man is its necessity. God's redemptive will demands it."[49] The language of "demand" and "inevitability" suggest a form of necessity

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[46] Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke*, 154.

[47] Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, 1:222; Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34* (WBC 35B; Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1992), 475.

[48] Bock, *Luke 1:1-9:50*, 847.

[49] Culpepper, "Luke," 201.

that is not present in Luke's *bios* of Jesus. The rules of the genre demand that Luke not show Jesus acting out of necessity in a compulsory manner.

So far, we have seen that each time Jesus declares something to be necessary, the subsequent material shows him doing it. In 2:49, the second half of the rhetorical question Jesus asked his mother reaches back to the material from the early part of the *bios* as a reminder of what Jesus' life is all about. The subsequent chapters (4-9) show him being about his Father's business. The first half of the question anticipates those who are seeking (ζητέω) Jesus later in the story (4:42 – ἐπιζητέω). When the crowds come to him outside Capernaum, he tells them he must go preach the good news in other cities also (4:43). The subsequent chapters show him doing this: he goes to many other villages and towns, including Nain, Bethsaida, Gedara, and several places around the lake. Now, given this latest insight into what kind of Messiah Jesus will be (he will suffer, be rejected, be killed, and then be raised), Luke's audience can expect trouble.[50]

Luke 9:51-19:44

With the shift to the journey motif, there is also a clear shift to teaching over healing and miracle. The topoi that Luke uses in this section highlights this shift.

Luke demonstrates Jesus' virtue of wisdom by many teaching episodes. As Jesus proceeds toward Jerusalem, he teaches. Johnson writes, "The great bulk of material in this section is made up of sayings."[51] The moments of teaching and instruction are many. Jesus provides instructions to his disciples regarding how they should act as they go out

[50] Ytterbrink, *The Third Gospel for the First Time*, 169-70.

[51] Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke*, 164.

as emissaries for the Kingdom (10:1-24). To the lawyer who wanted to test him, Jesus offers the parable of the Good Samaritan (10:25-37). An extended discussion on prayer is found at 11:1-13. He attacks his opponents with surprising force in 11:37-54, at the home of a Pharisee who had invited him for dinner. The Pharisees are highlighted again in 12:1-12, which is then followed by the parable of the rich man (12:13-34). His disciples are instructed how to stay alert and ready (12:35-48). A call to repentance is given in 13:1-21, which includes the parable of the fig tree. Once again he speaks at the house of a Pharisee, warning them in a parable about wanting the best seats and places of honor (14:7-11). This warning is followed by the parable of the great dinner (14:15-24). Chapter fifteen contains three parables about lost things (15:3-32). Riches are the topic of discussion in chapter sixteen. Jesus teaches his disciples about the necessity of prayer in chapter 18:1-8. The parable of the pounds (19:11-27) follows Jesus' visit to Zacchaeus' house (19:1-10). Overall there are at least eight parables in this section, compared with only three in the Galilean ministry section (5:36-39; 6:39-42; and 8:4-15).

Luke also uses comparison in this unit. Jesus is compared with Jonah, and he is shown to be superior to Jonah (11:30, 32). Jesus is also compared favorably with Solomon (11:31). In both cases, Luke has Jesus himself say that he is greater (πλεῖον) than both of these famous Israelite figures. Malina and Rohrbaugh have observed that these two comparisons are part of deviance labeling and Jesus' response to being labeled a deviant.[52] The deviant label comes from early in chapter eleven where Jesus is accused of casting out a demon by Satan, the adversary of God. Jesus' comparison of himself

[52] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 274.

with Jonah and Solomon heap derision on the heads of his adversaries by cause someone greater than these two famous figures is present and they have missed it.

In addition to demonstration of the virtue of wisdom, and the comparisons, one of which compares Jesus with Israel's wise man, Solomon, Luke also continues to show Jesus doing deeds for others, although not nearly as many as in the Galilean ministry. In this section, Jesus heals a mute (11:14), a bent woman (13:10-17), a man with dropsy (14:1-6), ten lepers (17:11-19), and a blind man near Jericho (18:35-43). The healing of the mute sparks a great controversy about the methods by which Jesus heals, as noted above. The case of the bent woman also ignites the indignation of the ruler of that synagogue.

Necessity appears in this section nine times (11:42; 12:12; 13:14, 16; 13:33; 15:32; 17:25; 18:1, and 19:5). Only three of these are things that are directly related to Jesus' actions (13:33, 17:25, and 19:5). The first two of these three have to do with Jesus' impending death in Jerusalem. The final necessity linked to the actions of Jesus is his visit to Zacchaeus' house.

Luke 11:42

Although the references to Jesus' own actions are very significant, the other six uses of necessity are important in their own right. The first is part of a "woe" declared to the Pharisees regarding their tithing habits (11:42). They would meticulously tithe even down to the ingredients of seasoning, but overlook the purpose of tithing – to help the poor and needy, as well as the Levite who ministered in the temple. Jesus uses necessity here as part of an invective against their actions.

The entire section 11:39-52 is an invective against the Pharisees. There is a repeated theme: you seek all the glory for yourselves and offer none of what you should to those who are truly in need. An invective is the language of blame (Theon 109-111). An invective is created using the opposite of the topoi available in an encomium. For example, actions that are praiseworthy are those "in which the toil is that of the doer but the benefit is common; and through which the populace experiences benefits and which are done for benefactors, and even more for those who are dead" (Theon 110; Kennedy, 51). This invective takes the opposite of "actions done for others rather than ourselves" (ibid.). Jesus accuses the Pharisees of thinking only of themselves in their cultic rituals and ignoring those who need their alms, mercy, justice, and other means of support.

This pericope features ἔδει – the imperfect of δεῖ, which, as we have seen, suggests that the action that is considered "necessary" has not been done (Isocrates, *Callim*. 15; *Trapez*. 23; Demosthenes, *Poly*. 36; Ez 13:19; 2 Macc 6:20). Nolland observes that the imperfect here "is probably the apodosis of a present condition-contrary-to-fact clause ("[if you were to do the will of God], it would be necessary to . . .").[53] Jesus is saying: "you should (but did not) pay attention to justice and the love of God, as well as tithe according to the Law. Because the Pharisees think themselves to be the unique children of God, they of all people should be shining examples of justice and mercy.

[53] Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:24*, 665-666.

Luke 12:12

In chapter twelve, Jesus, anticipating the trouble his disciples will encounter, teaches them to avoid the Pharisees' hypocrisy and not to fear the days of uncertainty. When they are brought before rulers in the synagogues, they should not worry about what to say (12:11). Fear of speaking before a very learned audience would be natural for an uneducated person. Creating a defense (ἀπολογέομαι) would certainly be something that would create anxiety (μεριμνάω) for Jesus' disciples.

This pericope (12:1-12) has the markings of a *prosopopoeia* designed to consol. Jesus repeatedly tells his disciples not to fear (v. 4, 7) and not to be anxious (v. 11). Jesus also points out the Holy Spirit's assistance with what must (δεῖ) be said (v. 12). Rothschild sees this passage as guaranteeing "the reliability of all upcoming speeches before authorities in the narrative." She continues, "What the historical figures in the narrative of Luke-Acts will be said to declare in the presence of authorities was spoken out of necessity and is thus as reliable as fate itself."[54]

There is an intertextual connection with Isaiah 50:4 where the Servant is told he will be given a tongue of instruction so he will know the right time when it is necessary (δεῖ) to speak. There is also an emphasis on "timing" in this passage: ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ὥρᾳ. As servants of the Lord, the disciples should take heart; God will assist them in their defense.

[54] Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History*, 197.

Luke 13:14, 16

The story of the straightened woman (13:10-17) is a classic healing story that involves a challenge by an opponent of Jesus and Jesus' response. It is the final appearance of Jesus in a Jewish synagogue.[55] Malina and Rohrbaugh say it is "another in Luke's list of notices that the acquired honor of Jesus is growing."[56] Parsons has shown how the story illustrates Luke's awareness of and subversion of the physiognomic convention of labeling a person's character by her physique.[57] From the standpoint of biography, Luke continues to display Jesus using his great advantage by providing power to heal others.

In the exchange between the ruler of the synagogue and Jesus, we see clearly the importance of expectations. The ruler of the synagogue expects healings to be performed on any day but the Sabbath. Nolland notes the theme of "contrasts or reversals" that runs from 13:10-14:35, especially the healings on the Sabbath.[58] Jesus clearly expects any day to be a good day for healing.

What, according to those who would have agreed with the synagogue ruler, was so wrong with Jesus healing a woman on the Sabbath? Charles Erdman says that the act of mercy that Jesus offered this woman "was not only allowable but necessary."[59] Green argues that the synagogue ruler assumes "the legitimacy of his interpretation" based on

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[55] William Hendriksen, *Luke* (NTC; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1978), 699.

[56] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels,* 282.

[57] Mikeal Parsons, *Body and Character in Luke and Acts: The Subversion of Physiognomy in Early Christianity* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 83-95.

[58] Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 722.

[59] Charles Erdman, *The Gospel of Luke* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1922), 133.

the significance of Sabbath observance in the Second Temple period.[60] Green points to the ruler's use of δεῖ as his assumption that the will of God is more important than citing specific texts. For the synagogue ruler, the issue was about ἐργάζεσθαι (doing work) on the Sabbath (v.14). How was healing considered "work?"

The synagogue ruler refers to the six days when a person can come and be healed (θεραπεύεσθε). He is not opposed to healing taking place in the synagogue on any other day except the Sabbath. Luke 8:43 suggests there were "others" who engaged in various kinds of healing practices. Donald Hagner has recently surveyed much of the literature on the Sabbath controversies.[61] He points out the difficulty of determining exactly what counted as "work" amidst "the sheer amount and bewildering nature of the Sabbath halakah as developed in the Second Temple period and in post-70 Judaism."[62] There were definitely rules that had been created to protect the sanctity of the holy day, but there were also exceptions to those rules, especially regarding life and death matters. Hagner concludes that the Sabbath controversies are largely concerned with the *person* of Jesus, who understood the Sabbath as "a day created by God for the experiencing of health, wholeness, and joy, a day which by its very nature therefore points toward and anticipates the salvation from sin and suffering that he now brings into the world."[63] The Lukan Jesus has come to set the captives free, and this work must be done seven days a

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[60] Green, *The Gospel of Luke,* 523.

[61] Donald Hagner, "Jesus and the Synoptic Sabbath Controversies," *BBR* 19.2 (2009): 215-48. Cf, Daryl D. Schmidt, "The Sabbath Day: To Heal or Not to Heal," *Dialogue* 27.4 (1994): 124-47; Gerard F. Hasel, "Sabbath," *ABD* 5:849-56.

[62] Hagner, "Jesus and the Synoptic Sabbath Controversies," 234.

[63] Hagner, "Jesus and the Synoptic Sabbath Controveries," 247.

week. G.B. Caird writes, "So far from being the wrong day, the Sabbath was actually the best day for such works of mercy."[64]

Luke uses the rhetorical device *biaion* in this exchange. The synagogue ruler objects to Jesus' miracle on the grounds that work must (δεῖ) be done on any day of the week except the Sabbath (v. 14). Jesus refutes his claim by tossing the necessity back in his face.[65] Jesus compares how the synagogue ruler treats his animals with his attitude about this woman: you untie an animal and lead it to water, but you don't want to see her loosed from her infirmity! Jesus asks the ruler two rhetorical questions that function as very emphatic statements: 1) each of *you* unties his ox or donkey on the Sabbath and leads it out to drink; 2) but this woman who is a daughter of Abraham should have been loosed (implied – 'by *you'*) but was not (imperfect of δεῖ). Jesus' words shame those who feel their sting. By this response the challenge of his actions, Jesus gains more honor.

The importance of context is highlighted by this healing story. The preceding story is of the barren fig tree (13:6-9). In that story, an echo of Isaiah 5, a man who had planted a fig tree in his vineyard comes to look for fruit on it for three years after it should have been bearing fruit. We do not know how long the fig tree had been in the ground, but it had reached the point three years earlier where fruit was expected. The tree should have been bearing fruit, but it was not.

The healing of the bent woman suggests an important parallel: she had been bent for eighteen years, and no one had given her any relief. We do not know if the woman

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[64] G.B. Caird, *Saint Luke* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd, 1963), 171.

[65] Heidi Torgersen, "The Healing of the Bent Woman: A Narrative Interpretation of Luke 13:10-17," *CurTM* 32 (2005): 176-86, 185

had been coming to the synagogue for eighteen years on the Sabbath in her bent condition (although the text does not rule this out). Presumably, since she is in the synagogue on this Sabbath, she had been there before on other Sabbaths. For some (possibly extended) period of time, this bent woman has come to the place of worship and no one can cure her. This reflects the absence of the fruit in the previous story. Unlike the vineyard in Isaiah 5:1-7, where three times we are told the owner was "expecting" fruit (5:2; 5:4; 5:7), this one has a gardener who is willing to work with the plant one more year to see if it can produce. The lack of healing offered to this woman suggests that the presence of God was not operating among his people either directly or through an agent, such as a prophet, to heal.[66] Jesus' presence among them to heal suggests that they were being given one more opportunity to bear fruit.

This connection is strengthened by the use of the imperfect ἔδει, which, as we have seen, often indicates a situation where what should have been done was not (see above on Luke 11:42 – you should have [ἔδει] practiced justice and the love of God – but did not). Jesus makes the connection very explicit: you loose your animals, and you should have (but did not) loose this woman. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza writes, "The reference point is not that one was allowed to save an animal in danger on the Sabbath but that it was necessary to water ox and ass on the Sabbath."[67] By performing the healing, Jesus does what they have had ample opportunity to do, but have not (to provide

[66] Charles W. Hedrick, "An Unfinished Story about a Fig Tree in a Vineyard," *PRSt* 26 (1999): 169-92, 190 draws a parallel between the two accounts, but sees the story of the Bent Woman as offering hope that the "one more year" of the Fig Tree story may actually work out. Though she has suffered eighteen years, she eventually is healed and can bear fruit.

[67] Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1983), 125.

relief to this daughter of Abraham), thus showing that his focus is not on a rigid set of rules but on the needs of others.

Luke 13:33

The section involving the Lament over Jerusalem is the first pericope in the Journey section in which necessity involves Jesus directly. The previous three uses of necessity in this section involved the Pharisees or rulers of the Jewish people in some way. Here, Jesus receives a warning from some Pharisees that Herod wants to kill him. Jesus refuses to be scared (cf. Plutarch *Thes*. 7.2: Theseus thought it "a dreadful and unendurable thing that his famous cousin [Heracles] should go out against the wicked everywhere and purge land and sea of them, while he himself ran away from the struggles which lay in his path, disgracing his reputed father"). Because Jerusalem is the place where prophets are killed, Jesus must (δεῖ) be on his way, heading to his death.[68]

Here Jesus identifies himself with the prophets of Israel who have been rejected by the people, especially those in Jerusalem (13:34-35). His courage is displayed here in his refusal to fear his impending death. This Prophet-Who-Is-The-Son-Of-God faces the impossibility of escaping death in Jerusalem because of the hardness of the hearts of the rulers of the Jews. In the face of sure persecution and death, Jesus chooses to stay the course; he will keep on doing what he has been doing: driving out demons and healing

[68] In Euripides' *Cyclops* 201, Silenus urges Odysseus, the hero of Homer's *Odyssey*, to hide from the Cyclops. Odysseus replies that he will not flee from the Cyclops: "Rather, if I must (δεῖ) die, I will die nobly—or live on and also retain my old reputation."

people (13:32).[69] Jesus remains faithful to his purpose of having the interests of others at the foreground of his mission.

Luke 14:18, 23

Luke 14 finds Jesus in the home of another Pharisee on the Sabbath, eating a meal and being watched carefully (14:1). Jesus, after questioning the Pharisees about the rightness or wrongness of healing on the Sabbath, heals a man who is present with a sickness. Jesus makes another comparison between the animal world and human world in reference to the right to heal on the Sabbath, but this time no one has a reply. Perhaps they had learned their lesson from the healing of the bent woman.

During their time at the table, Jesus spoke to those seated about how to act when invited to a banquet (14:7-14) and how a guest list may be radically changed to include outcasts (14:15-24). Jesus tells the parable of the Great Banquet in response to the exclamation of one of the dinner guests: "Blessed is whoever eats bread in the kingdom of God!" Many were invited by the man who gave the feast, but all who were invited made excuses and did not come (Luke gives record of only three). The first person asks to be excused (παρητημένον) because he has bought a field and must (ἔχω ἀνάγκην) go out (ἐξελθὼν) to see it (14:18). The second has bought five yoke of oxen and has to go prove them, and the third has just been married and cannot come. These excuses are quiet flimsy. Malina and Rohrbaugh note that they are "indirect but traditional Middle

[69] Santiago Guijarro, "The Politics of Exorcism," in *The Social Setting of Jesus and the Gospels* (Wolfgang Tegemann, Bruce J. Malina, and Gerd Theissen, eds.; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 159-74, 166, argues that Jesus' exorcisms are, in part, responsible for Herod's (an many others') anger because the exorcisms "threatened the stability of the social order." The restorative work of Jesus highlights the coming kingdom of God and thus threatens to upset the stable order of society.

Eastern way[s] of signaling disapproval of the dinner arrangements."[70] There can be little doubt that this disapproval is Luke's way of marking the no-longer-hidden contempt that many of the ruling elite have for Jesus' ideas about the kingdom of God and his own role as Messiah. The opposition to Jesus to this point in Luke shows how completely he has been rejected as Israel's Messiah. Again, two sets of expectations collide.

The man who has made the banquet will not be undone. In an ironic twist, he turns the necessity of absence into a necessity of attendance. After he gets word of all of the refusals, he sends his servant out (ἔξελθε) to bring in (εἰσάγαγε) the poor, maimed, blind, and lame (vv. 20-21). The servant reports that this has been done, but there is still room (v. 22). But the householder wants no empty seats lest one of those who were invited may change his mind. He sends out (ἔξελθε) the servant again, but this time, not to invite, but to pressure (compel – ἀνάγκασον) the outcasts to come in (εἰσελθεῖν) (v. 23). Whereas those invited used necessity to excuse themselves, the householder uses the same kind of necessity to make sure his house is full.[71]

This use of ἀναγκάζω further supports the contention that the Lukan δεῖ is not compulsive. Luke clearly knows the difference between necessity as compulsion and necessity as requirement. He marks the former in this passage with the language of excuse (παρητημένον) not once but three times (vv. 18 [twice] and 19). Ironically, whereas the first guests claim they are compelled to stay away, the final guests, afraid of

[70] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 286.

[71] Malina and Rohrbaugh note that for the "outcasts" who lived outside the city walls, "considerable coercion would have been necessary to induce these people to enter the precincts of the elite after business hours, when the city gates were normally closed," (286-87). See also, Richard Rohrbaugh, "The Pre-Industrial City in Luke-Acts," in *The Social World of Luke-Acts*, 125-49, 144-45.

being out of place, have to be compelled to enter. Jesus again subverts the expectations of the high and mighty and gives place to the poor and lowly.[72]

Luke 15:32

The story of the Prodigal Son (or of the Two Sons) ends with the father telling the eldest son: "it was necessary (ἔδει) to celebrate and rejoice for this brother of yours was dead and has come to life, was lost and has been found" (15:32). What is unclear is for whom it was necessary. Many modern translations and commentaries add "we" in this passage, insinuating that the father means the inclusive group.[73] Some interpreters see in this passage a reference to the divine necessity of celebrating the recovery of the lost.[74]

If, however, we go with what appears to be a Lukan pattern in this regard, the imperfect will signal that what was necessary (here "to celebrate" and "to rejoice") has not been done. In this case, the eldest son is the referent. Kenneth Bailey has noted that some early Arabic versions render the text "you" at this point, in reference to the eldest son.[75] Walter Liefeld notes, regarding the lack of a personal subject in the Greek here: "This allows the implication that the elder brother should have joined in the celebration."[76] This is another example of an expectation being unfulfilled. The father,

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[72] Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, 184-85; Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 562 writes that the host "by extending hospitality to such persons . . . has stepped completely outside the patronal ethics of the Mediterranean world . . . ."

[73] The modern versions that insert "we" include NIV, NRSV, NKJV, NAB. Commentaries include Nolland, *Luke 9:21-18:34*, 780; Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 613, Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 586 n.255; Hendriksen, *Luke*, 757.

[74] Talbert, *Reading Luke*, 180.

[75] Kenneth Bailey, *Poet and Peasant*, 201.

[76] Walter L. Liefeld, "Luke" in *Expositors Bible Commentary* 8:995.

in essence, says to his son: you should have (but did not, or at least, have not yet) joined the celebration and rejoicing because your brother who was dead has come to life; he was lost and has been found.

The father is pointing out to his eldest son how the recovery of his "lost" brother was occasion for celebrating and rejoicing. There is a strong expectation that he will join the family and village in celebrating this recovery. The eldest son, however, has no such inclination. His take on the situation is one of resentment and anger.[77]

The role of choice related to expectations in Luke is again clear in this story. The elder son becomes angry and οὐκ ἤθελεν ("was not willing" or "did not want") to go into the house. Although his father points out to him the requirement of celebration, at the end of the day it was his *choice* whether he would accept the celebration as a good thing and participate.

Navigating necessity can be quite confusing for some interpreters. Greg Forbes tries to cover all the bases: "Nevertheless, the father does not retreat from his *choice* to celebrate. In fact, ἔδει stresses his *constraint* to do so. It is not clear whether we should understand ὑμας or σε with ἔδει. However, although the tone is different, the end result is the same. The father is not only justifying the feast, but *exhorting* his son to join it (my italics)."[78] One who is constrained to do something does not choose to do it. The father acts willingly out of the joy of having his son return.

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[77] For the view that Luke overturns the convention of overlooking or ignoring the elder brother and instead leaves the narrative open to possible peaceful solution see, Mikeal Parsons, "The Prodigal's Elder Brother: The History and Ethics of Reading Luke 15:25-32," *PRSt* 23 (1996): 147-74.

[78] Greg Forbes, "Repentance and Conflict in the Parable of the Lost Son (Luke 15:11-31)," *JETS* 42 (1999): 211-29, 224.

Luke 17:25

The conflict between the narrative audience's expectation (and perhaps some of Luke's readers) and the activity of Jesus continues in chapter seventeen. Somewhere between Galilee and Samaria, Jesus encounters ten lepers who need mercy (17:11-19). He heals them, but only a foreigner (ἀλλογενὴς) returns to give thanks (v. 18). Jesus continues to be rejected by his own people, but outsiders take advantage of the situation and embrace him.

As a question arises from the Pharisees about the kingdom of God, Jesus points out to them that the kingdom is right in their midst (ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ἐστιν) (17:10-21). Then Jesus turns to his disciples and gives them a warning about his coming rejection. There will be a future time of glory for the Son of Man, "but first it is necessary (δεῖ) for him to suffer much and to be rejected as not being genuine by this generation" (17:25). All of the evidence to the contrary - his teaching, his miracles, his widely extolled concern for others - tradition will override his excellence. To make his point more clear, Luke sets up two comparisons by which the nonchalant nature of the rejection will be shown: as it was in the days of Noah (17:26-27), and as it was in the days of Lot (17:28-29). In both of these cases people continued their normal, daily activities as if nothing else was happening.[79] There could have been no clearer form of disdain than to ignore the warnings.

Again, many commentators relate the δεῖ here to a divine plan which must be slavishly followed by Jesus.[80] Culpepper writes, "The divine imperative ('he must' [*dei*])

[79] Wiefel, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas*, 311.

[80] Josef Ernst, *Das Evanelium nach Lukas*, (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1977), 489.

underscores the fact that the passion also is part of the outworking of God's redemptive will."[81] Tannehill associates the necessity here with "the divine purpose which Jesus must fulfill in his preaching and suffering."[82] John Squires thinks the passion predictions, the angels, and the ancient prophets who reveal the necessity of Jesus' suffering are closely related to "the way Fate is communicated through oracles in Hellenistic histories."[83] To soften the blow somewhat, he quotes David Tiede, who writes that "when Luke uses impersonal verbs and passive constructions, it is not to counsel resignation to *arbitrary* fates and forces. Rather, it is to confront the reader with the determined purpose of God (my emphasis)."[84]

Luke, however, is not interested in showing that Jesus "counsels resignation" even to "the determined purpose of God" instead of an arbitrary fate or force; in terms of encomium and biography, one is as bad as the other. He is very interested to show that Jesus acts in ways that bring honor to himself and his Father, and that part of the responsibility of being born the Son of God is to face down trouble when it comes from those who do not understand his mission. It is precisely because God does *not* override the will of humans that Jesus will face suffering. There can be little doubt that Jesus recognizes his mission in a way that we may never understand, and it is likely that he could sense the same trouble that Luke's readers have been privy to throughout the narrative. It is a requirement of his Sonship, which he clearly embraces, to hold the line

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[81] Culpepper, "Luke," 9:331.

[82] Tannehill, *The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts*, 54.

[83] John T. Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts*, 169-70.

[84] Squires, *The Plan of God in Luke-Acts,* 170; David L. Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 75.

to the last moment. He has already seen enough to know that he is being rejected, even as he points out the necessity of his mission to his disciples.[85]

Luke 18:1

The opening line of the parable regarding prayer when there is a concern about losing motivation suggests that this is a brief *thesis* on the need for prayer following the last line of the previous chapter (17:37). The end of the previous chapter sounds a note of gloom and raises the specter of a sudden and perhaps violent event on the horizon. The parable of the Persistent Widow (18:2-5) highlights the necessity (δεῖν) of continual prayer instead of a slow waning of enthusiasm in the face of opposition and trouble. The parable sets up a comparison between God and a judge who did not want to be bothered. The continual crying of the woman bothered the judge so he relented so as to relieve himself from this pest; however, God will not keep putting his children off. Unlike this human judge, he will listen patiently to their complaints and avenge them quickly.

Luke 19:5

The short story of Jesus' encounter with Zacchaeus highlights again that Jesus' work is for others and even includes those who are extremely marginalized (19:1-10). Zacchaeus, like others in Luke's story, was seeking (ἐζήτει) to see Jesus. Since the original dual question at 2:49 where Luke hinted that many people will be seeking Jesus, Jesus has been sought by the crowd on more than one occasion (4:42; 6:19) and Herod (9:9) and now by Zacchaeus.

[85] Green, *The Gospel of Luke,* 634 writes, "Though divine necessity is stressed, Jesus also make clear that his repudiation will come because his fundamental orientation to the purpose of God stands in tension with the commitments of 'this generation.'"

Zacchaeus is described by Luke as being a ἀρχιτελώνης (chief tax collector) and also πλούσιος (rich) (19:2). He is also called "short of stature" (v.3). Zacchaeus is a short, rich, chief tax collector who wants to see Jesus. He is also someone with whom Jesus is not expected to have anything to do, much less actually go into his house (v.7).[86] So why does Jesus stop beneath the sycamore tree in which Zacchaeus is and tell him to come down in a hurry "because it is necessary (δεῖ) for me to stay at your house today" (v.5)?

Commentators have offered different answers. Johnson suggests that the necessity is related to this being an important turning point in the Luke's story.[87] Liefeld points to the divine necessity that creates a sense of urgency: Jesus "had to stay with him."[88] Marshall writes, "Behind Jesus' summons lies a necessity imposed on him by God (δεῖ); the implication is that a divine plan is being worked out."[89] Stein also connects the necessity here with something that is divinely ordained; in fact, "Jesus' individual actions all fit into the divine plan, even his bringing salvation to Zacchaeus' home."[90] Green concludes that "the nature of [Jesus'] mission renders it imperative that he share Zacchaeus' hospitality."[91] These interpretations are tinged with the inevitable:

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[86] Parsons, *Body and Character in Luke and Acts*, 97-108.

[87] Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke*, 285.

[88] Liefeld, "Luke," in *EBC* 8:1007.

[89] Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke*, 697.

[90] Stein, *Luke*, 467.

[91] Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 670.

Jesus is acting according to a script. John O'Hanlon makes this quiet explicit: "The whole life and mission of Jesus is under the compulsion of the divine necessity."[92]

But, surely we are not to think of Jesus as marching into Jericho, coming to a certain tree, at which time some internal force compels him to stop and look up at a man lodged among the branches and invite himself to that man's house. Perhaps Jesus' teachings in 9:3 and 10:1-12 are important here. Jesus tells Zacchaeus that he must remain (μεῖναι) at his house. When he sent out missionaries, he told them to seek a place where a man of peace resided and remain (μένετε) with him (10:7). Did Jesus see something in Zacchaeus that let him know that he would be welcomed and cared for? If Zacchaeus has been doing all that he says in 19:8, surely he will take care of a travelling prophet. Zacchaeus, then, may be a "man of peace" who has already started to embody the message that John preached (Luke 3:7-14).

Zacchaeus is the first chief tax collector with whom Jesus has interacted and he is rich. The rich have not fared well in Jesus' teachings.[93] Most of his instructions to them or about them have been warnings about the polluting qualities of riches. The audience does not at all expect what is coming, and perhaps neither do they expect Jesus to stay at Zacchaeus' house. There is a great reversal when Zacchaeus stands and announces his normal attitude toward his riches.[94] Jesus' visit to Zacchaeus' house offered Zacchaeus

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[92] John O'Hanlon, "The Story of Zacchaeus and the Lukan Ethic," *JSNT* 12 (1981): 2-26, 15.

[93] Parsons, *Body and Character in Luke and Acts*, 105.

[94] I side with those scholars who translate the present actives in v.8 as present actives. See F. Scott Spencer, *The Gospel of Luke and Acts of the Apostles*, 188; Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels,* 303. Green, *The Gospel of Luke*, 671-73 discusses some of the recent scholarship on this issue. Also see Claire Rothschild, *Luke-Acts and the Rhetoric of History*, 294 who argues that phrases beginning with "today" are means of reflecting "the reliability of the event recorded" instead of being markers of time.

the opportunity to show the crowd just how wrong they had been in their assumptions about him. Parsons has pointed out the significant the negative characterizations of Zacchaeus based on his occupation and stature. Thus the expectations of the crowd about Zacchaeus are overturned just as the expectations are about Jesus visiting Zacchaeus. Zacchaeus, the man of peace, is a son of Abraham.

Jesus is acting in keeping with his calling. Again, because expectations run high in the opposite directions, Jesus explains his actions in terms of necessity. The Son of God has come to mix and mingle even with those who may seem undesirable. It has become increasingly clear that the "as he ought" in relation to how Jesus uses the advantage of his divine birth is less in keeping with human expectations for their Messiah than with God's expectations for his Son. Jesus' activities continue to be oriented toward or for others.

Luke 19:45-24:53

We have now come to the final section of Luke's bios of Jesus in which Luke deals with the events leading up to Jesus' death and resurrection. Many Lukan scholars note Luke 19:45, when Jesus finally enters the temple in Jerusalem, as the beginning of the Passion Narrative. There are others, however, who begin the Passion at 22:1.[95]

Luke brings Jesus back to the place where he first spoke of the necessity of being about his Father's business (2:49/19:45). Luke immediately informs his audience that the chief priests, scribes, and leaders of the people were now actively trying to kill (ἀπολέσαι) him (19:47). The only other time Luke has used this word of Jesus is 13:33

[95] For example, Stein, *Luke*, 34.

where Jesus connects the impossibility of a prophet being killed outside Jerusalem with the necessity of his journey to that same city. Luke's readers can sense that there is significant trouble ahead.

Luke continues to use various topoi to display the greatness of Jesus.[96] Jesus continues to act without self-interest, except perhaps in his confrontation with the leaders in which they are put to shame. In these exchanges (Luke 20), Jesus bests his opponents repeatedly and gains more acquired honor.[97]

There are at least six references to deeds done for others in the Passion narrative. First, at the Passover meal, Jesus equates his action of breaking the bread with his body τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διδόμενον (22:19). He does the same thing with the cup after the meal: the cup represents the new covenant in his blood τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυννόμενον ("that which is poured out for you all") (22:20). The participle ἐκχυννόμενον harks back to 11:50 where Jesus tells the Pharisees and lawyers that they are responsible for the blood of all the prophets that has been "poured out" since the foundation of the world.

Since the bread and the cup represent something done for others (the breaking of Jesus' body and the shedding of his blood "for you"), the context of these events, the Passover meal, will allow readers to associate Jesus' claims with God's action in redeeming Israel from Egyptian bondage. Both the necessity of the Passover lamb's death (22:7) and the necessity of Jesus' being numbered with the transgressors, bearing the sins

[96] In addition to those listed below, see Martin, "Progymnastic Topic Lists," 38.

[97] Malina and Rohrbaugh, *Social Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels*, 307-310.

of many, and being handed over for their sins (22:37)[98] are critically important in this respect.

Second, Jesus tells Peter that Satan, the tester and adversary, has received permission to sift him as wheat is sifted (22:31). Jesus then tells Peter: "but I have prayed περὶ σοῦ . . ." (v.32). This prayer of Jesus shows Jesus doing the very thing that he told his disciples was necessary for them to do (18:1).

Third, in the garden, when Judas led the leaders of the Jews to Jesus in order to arrest him, a very brief skirmish broke out. Those who were with Jesus, once they saw what was about to happen, asked if one of the two swords should be drawn and brandished (22:49). Before Jesus could answer, a sword whistled through the air and narrowly avoided halving the high priest's slave, but instead sliced off his right ear. Jesus then rebuked his warriors, "No more of this!" (22:51 – RSV).

This final miracle that Jesus performs directly for a character in Luke's story often goes unheralded. Ernst highlights its significance: it corresponds to a feature of Lukan style by showing that Jesus practices love of friend and enemy even in the midst of his darkest trial.[99] Jesus' love for and actions on behalf of others is what Luke has been at great pains to show. As Theon notes: "Virtues shine brightest in misfortunes" (Theon 112.1-2).

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[98] Luke uses *synecdoche* to highlight all of Is. 53:12, if not the entire Servant's Song (52:13-53:12). It is beyond the scope of this project to deal with Luke's atonement theology, but it is worth noting that the emphasis on deeds done for others may help to sharpen our thinking about the statements of Jesus in 22:19, 20 regarding what it done "for you." See Talbert, *Reading Luke*, 236; John Oswalt, "Isaiah 52:13-53:12: Servant of All," *CTJ* 40 (2005): 85-94; F. Scott Spencer, *The Gospel of Luke and Acts of the Apostles,* 200; Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke,* 803-807.

[99] Ernst, *Das Evangelium Nach Lukas*, 610.

Fourth, during Jesus' crucifixion the rulers who were standing nearby watching the events unfold, sneered at him, "He saved others; let him save himself, if he is the anointed of God, the chosen!" (23:35). These "others" Jesus saved include the man with the withered hand (6:6-11), the sinful woman (7:36-50), the demoniac from Gadara (8:26-39), the woman with the issue of blood (8:43-48), the daughter of Jairus (8:50), tens lepers (17:19), and the blind beggar (18:42). Luke allows the sneering rulers to remind his audience of that the focus of Jesus' ministry has been "others."

Fifth, when he is crucified Jesus prays from the cross, "Father forgive them for they do not know what they are doing" (23:34).[100] What is it that they do not know? Certainly not that they want to kill him; this they know all too well. What they do not know is who he is. The authorial audience of Luke is privileged with this information, but the narrative audience does not know. For many in the narrative audience, the signs and miracles do not convince them that *Jesus is the Messiah/Son of God.* In their minds, they are killing an imposter.

How is responsibility determined for someone who, out of ignorance, did something that was necessary? In order to answer this question, we must understand that in the Greco-Roman world, necessity and ignorance were often listed as excuses for actions. Aristotle and others taught that a person should not be blamed for actions that were done out of ignorance or due to chance/fate or necessity. The Roman Quintilian allowed excuse as a defense for an action:

> This may be either (1) ignorance (as when a man brands as a slave a runaway who is afterwards adjudged to be a free man, and then denies that he knew he was

[100] For a recent discussion of the textual problem and an interesting solution, see Jason Whitlark and Mikeal Parsons, "The 'seven' last words: a numerical motivation for the insertion of Luke 23:34a," *NTS* 52 (2006): 188-204.

> free); or (2) necessity (as when a soldier overstays his leave and says he was delayed by floods or by illness). Fortune too is often made the scapegoat, and we sometimes say that we did wrong but we meant well" (*Inst.* 7.4.15).

Likewise, Cicero taught that a person might admit to the charges but ask for pardon based on ignorance, accident, or necessity (*Ad. Her.* 1.14.24).

The Jews also shared this way of thinking, as is seen in 2 Macc 11:31. In a letter from King Antiochus to the Jews, Antiochus tells the Jews that they will be left alone to live their lives according to their ancestral customs. He further indicates that "none of them shall be molested in any way for errors made through ignorance" (NETS). This view seems to echo the words of Lev 5:17-19, where the teaching of forgiveness related to committing sin in ignorance. Jesus' cry from the cross would have had the effect of offering himself as their sacrifice as prescribed by the law in Lev. 5:18. Jesus asks that they be forgiven, yet the law required a sacrifice which they did not offer. See also Lev 4 for a discussion of unintentional sin committed by various members of Israelite society. This passage in Luke shows the greatness of Jesus' heart: even in the hour of his greatest embarrassment and humiliation, he prays for forgiveness for the very people who have clamored for his death.

In the midst of his trial scenes and the crucifixion, Luke uses the testimony of the famous (Pilate) and the lesser (a criminal and a centurion) to declare Jesus' innocence. Four times Pilate insists that Jesus has done nothing wrong (23:4, 14, 20, 22). One of the criminals who were crucified with Jesus observed his innocence (23:41). Also, the Roman centurion, who no doubt had witnessed many deaths, declared Jesus' innocent/righteous (23:47).

The sixth example of deeds done for others is found in Luke 24:47. As part of his final comments to his disciples, Jesus informs them of the necessity of preaching in his name repentance and forgiveness of sins *beginning from Jerusalem*. The very city where he was rejected, mistreated, mocked, scourged, beaten, and crucified is the city where the Good News is preached first. In Lucian's biography of Demonax he points out how Demonax easily forgave others: "though he assailed sins, he forgave sinners, thinking that one should pattern after doctors, who heal sicknesses but feel no anger at the sick. He considered that it is human to err, divine or all but divine to set right what has gone amiss" (*Dem*. 7 [Harmon, LCL]).

In addition to the deeds done for others, Luke also lists several signs and portents that occur at Jesus' death as well as additional divine testimony. When Jesus dies, Luke records that there was darkness ἐφ' ὅλην τὴν γῆν (upon the whole earth) due to the failure of sunlight (23:44-45a).[101] If this event was an eclipse, it would have suggested the anger of a god. As Talbert notes, in antiquity, "events with cosmic significance were attested by cosmic signs."[102] About the same time the curtain in the temple was torn in two. The significance of this event has been debated, but the connection with the temple along with Jesus' previous statements about the temple suggest judgment of some type. Wiefel warns against trying to draw the connection too strongly with either the free

[101] Possibly an eclipse, see Colin J. Humphrey's and W.G. Waddington, "The Jewish Calendar, A Lunar Eclipse, and the Date of Christ's Crucifixion," *Tyndale Bulletin* 43 (1992): 331-51. Others have argued that an eclipse is impossible during a full moon, e.g. Stein, *Luke*, 595.

[102] Talbert, *Reading Luke*, 253.

access to the holy-of-holies approach or with the beginning of the destruction of the temple.[103] For Luke what is important is that it happens coordinately with Jesus' death.

Perhaps the greatest sign associated with the death of Jesus is his resurrection (24:1-8). From the standpoint of biography, this sign would have significant meaning in regard to the trial of Jesus. Since his death was not by natural causes or disease (he was a relatively young man in his thirties), the resurrection suggests that God vindicated him after he was killed.

This sign is also accompanied by divine testimony. The empty tomb is not left unexplained. The two "men" meet the women at the tomb and remind them that what Jesus had said about the necessity of his suffering, death, and resurrection (24:5b-7).

Luke's *bios* of Jesus does not end with death or just a resurrected life. The final event in Jesus' earthly existence is Jesus being taken up (ἀναφερέτο) into heaven (24:51). This divine testimony bears great witness to the fact that Jesus was truly the Son of God and gives further proof that he has "entered into his glory."

Necessity in the Passion Narrative

This final section of Luke's bios include six uses of necessity, four of which are directly related to Jesus' death and resurrection.

Luke 21:9

Jesus answers a question from his disciples about the destruction of the Jerusalem temple (21:7). He informs them that even though they hear rumors of wars and

[103] Wiefel, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas*, 400.

commotions, they should not be terrified: δεῖ γὰρ ταῦτα γενέσθαι πρῶτον, ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐθέως τό τέλος (21:9).

In keeping with the historical impulse of Lukan scholarship, Nolland notes, "The specific reason provided for not being terrified is the divine necessity that is in control of this apparently chaotic and out of control unfolding of events."[104] Stein echoes this sentiment: "Luke's readers could take heart at such a time, for God's sovereign rule requires this."[105]

This is the "eschatological" δεῖ that has been overlooked in the discussions of eschatological necessity mentioned in the introduction.[106] There is no doubt an echo of Daniel 2:28-29 here. Yet, Jesus refocuses the necessity back to "first things." His answer functions like a brief *prosopopoeia* used to comfort (Theon 117). He uses the necessity to calm their fears about the rumors of wars and commotions; they are not immediate signs of the τέλος.

Luke 22:7, 37

Luke has to explain to his Gentile readers that the Feast of Unleavened Bread is also called Passover (πάσχη) (22:1). Then he has to inform them that the Day of Unleavened Bread is the day on which the paschal lamb must (δεῖ) be slain (22:7). In 22:37, Jesus tells his audience that a particular part of the Scripture must (δεῖ) find completion (τελεσθῆναι) in him because the things that concern him have an end (τέλος). The part of Scripture that he refers to is Isaiah 53:12d: "and he was counted

[104] John Nolland, *Luke 18:35-24:53* (WBC 35C; Dallas, Tx: Word, 1993), 992.

[105] Stein, *Luke*, 514.

[106] Neither Grundmann nor Conzelmann mention it.

(ἐλογίσθη) among the lawless." This verb occurs three times in the Servant's Song: 1) "But his form was without honor, failing beyond all men, a man being in calamity and knowing how to bear sickness; because his face is turned away, he was dishonored and not esteemed (ἐλογίσθη) (53:5 – NETS); 2) "This one bears our sins and suffers pain for us, and we accounted (ἐλογισάμεθα) him to be in trouble and calamity and ill-treatment (53:4 – NETS); and 3) "Therefore he shall inherit many, and he shall divide the spoils of the strong, because his soul was given over to death, and he was reckoned (ἐλογίσθη) among the lawless, and he bore the sins of many, and because of their sins he was given over (παρεδόθη) (53:12 – NETS). This final verb related to 'giving over' is used of Jesus' betrayal in Luke 9:44; 18:32; 20:20; 22:4, 6; 22:21, 22, 48; and 24:7, 20. Luke's language in this part of the Last Supper narrative echoes the language of Isaiah 53.[107]

There can be little doubt that Luke closely identifies Jesus with the Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53. This is the only place in Luke's bios where a necessity saying is directly related to a *specific* Scripture in the Septuagint. Recently Ulrike Mittmann-Richert has investigated the role of Isaiah 53 in Luke's atonement theology.[108] Concerning Luke 22:37, she notes that "none of the other New Testament authors let Jesus so forcefully point out the importance of his death."[109] Her comments are related to

[107] The literature on the relationship between Isaiah' Suffering Servant and Jesus is immense and I can do no more than point toward some recent scholarship. Of course an important study is that of Morna Hooker, *Jesus and the Servant* (London: SPCK, 1959), who argues that there is no correlation between the use of Isaiah 53 in Luke and Luke's view of atonement. See also, William H. Bellinger, Jr. and William R. Farmer, eds., *Jesus and the Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 and Christian Origins* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998); Eugene Robert Ekbald, Jr., *Isaiah's Servant Poems According to the Septuagint: An Exegetical and Theological Study* (Leuven: Peeters, 1999); Jeremy Schipper, *Disability and Isaiah's Suffering Servant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[108] Ulrike Mittmann-Richert, *Der Sühnetod des Gottesknechts* (WUNT 220; Göttingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010).

[109] Mittmann-Richert, *Der Sühnetod des Gottesknechts*, 136.

Jesus' statements at the Last Supper that his body is broken and his blood is shed "for you" (22:19-20). She sees the intertextual echoes in the Servants Songs in Isaiah all throughout the Passion narrative of Luke.[110] But, it is especially Isaiah 53 where the "scriptural basis" for the δεῖ of Jesus' passion is to be found.[111]

Isaiah 53 paints a picture of a person who has been weakened, injured, or deformed in some way by the actions of others. This one is certainly not expected to account for much. In the poem itself, he never speaks and remains anonymous.[112] He is mistreated and, in general, looked down on, but it is clear that his suffering is because of the actions of others and it is for them that he suffers. Wolfgang Roth comments on his anonymity: "He is *the* prophet of Yahweh, unknown by name, but known by his function: to stand between man and God in service and suffering."[113]

Even the preceding context of Luke 22 points to the importance of service for honor. In answer to their dispute over who would be the greatest, Jesus points them away from such vain thoughts (22:24-27). Twice in the narrative, Jesus points out the greatness of the lesser (7:18 – John the Baptist; 9:46-48 True Greatness). The second reference brings up an interesting observation: twice in Luke's *bios*, after Jesus mentions his coming trial and/or death, the disciples fall into an argument over who will be the greatest (9:43-48; 22:22-27). This highlights the struggle even of those closest to Jesus to

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[110] Mittmann-Richert, *Der Sühnetod des Gottesknechts*, 178-79. Mittmann-Richert provides a very helpful tabular summary of the intertextuality and parallels.

[111] Mittmann-Richert, *Der Sühnetod des Gottesknechts*, 238-49, esp, 241.

[112] This anonymity, in conjunction with the "secrecy motif" serves Luke's presentation of Jesus as one who did not seek his own glory. The anonymity of the Servant no doubt played a role in Luke's choice to use that passage.

[113] See Wolfgang M.W. Roth, "Anonymity of the Suffering Servant," *JBL* 83 (1964): 171-79, 179.

grasp the true power of service in a world dominated by honor-grabs and power plays. As G.B. Caird notes, "The only greatness which is acknowledged in the kingdom is humble service, and this greatness Jesus has displayed throughout his ministry and will display to the end."[114]

Luke 24:7, 26, 44 and 46

In the final chapter of his biography of Jesus, Luke revisits the notion of necessity four times. The resurrected Jesus is revealed slowly to his disciples in the narrative. First, the women are told that he is alive (24:5). Then, he appears to the two on the Emmaus road but is not known until the last moment (24:13-31). In the final appearance, Jesus meets with a group of his disciples in Jerusalem where he gives them more explanations and final instructions (24:36-52). In each case, the audience (the women at the tomb, the two disciples on the road to Emmaus, and those gathered in Jerusalem) is reminded, specifically, of what Jesus had said about the necessity of, not just his suffering, but his resurrection, and ultimately what is expected of them. Twice the reminder is accompanied by a question (24; 7, 26). The final use of necessity (24:46) points beyond the present moment and into the future of the lives of the disciples.

The women who come to the tomb early to anoint Jesus' body are surprised by two men in dazzling white clothing. The men speak to the women just as Jesus had spoken to his mother in the temple when he was twelve (2:48-49). In both instances, those who sought (ἐζητεῖτε – 2:49) or are seeking (ζητεῖτε – 24:5) Jesus are questioned about their actions. In both cases, the persons seeking Jesus are treated as if they should have known where he would be (or not be). In both cases, the people seeking Jesus are

[114] Caird, *Saint Luke*, 238.

expected to remember either things that were spoken about Jesus or something Jesus had said. When the angels tell the women to "remember" what Jesus had said earlier, they are in effect saying the same thing as Jesus did at 2:49 when he asked, "Did you not know?" The question>reminder here serves the same function as the dual question in 2:49: you should have paid attention to the things that were said about me.

The women are then reminded of what Jesus had said regarding the necessity (δεῖ) of his rejection, crucifixion, and resurrection (24:7). This is not an exact quote of anything that Jesus had said earlier, but it captures the movement of the end of the story.

The two disciples on the Emmaus road get an unexpected visitor. Their testimony (ironically to Jesus himself – 24:19) that Jesus was "a man – (actually) a prophet! – powerful in word and deed before God and all the people," supports the earlier part of the biography where Jesus is shown repeatedly to act with great power in both deeds and words.[115]

Their expectations are very clear: "we were hoping 'he is the one who is about to liberate Israel'" (24:21). Jesus' response is to rebuke them for failing to believe what the prophets have said: "O fools and slow in heart to believe all that the prophets spoke!" (24:25). The rebuke precedes a rhetorical question: "was it not necessary (ἔδει) for the Christ to suffering these thing and to enter his glory?" (v.26). Jesus' words have a bite: "You should have believed the prophets, specifically about what kind of Messiah I would be." Hermogenes describes a figure called πεῦσιν (interrogation). This figure

> involves a supposition that cannot be denied, for it concerns either things naturally agreed upon—for example, "Is it not now day?" – or things previously shown in the speech; for example, "You were discovered stealing a cloak at the

[115] Translation is taken from Culy, Parsons, Stigall, *Luke*, 740.

> house after having dug a hole in the wall. Are you not a thief?" What has been previously shown in the speech is equal in effect to things naturally agreed upon.[116]

By now the Lukan audience will agree with Jesus: what more could Jesus have done to convince his disciples that he would not remain dead? Repeatedly, Luke's narrative reveals that the Servant will be vindicated by God; however, since the disciples are so dull-witted Jesus now takes the time to explain *again* what he has every right to expect them to already know. [117]

When Jesus appears in the midst of his disciples in Jerusalem as they ponder what they have just heard regarding his resurrection appearances, it takes some time before he is able to convince them that it is really him (24:36-43). He first greets them, but they only become frightened (24:36-37). He then asks why they are frightened and full of doubt: echoing what has happened to the women and the two on the Emmaus road. Here again there is an expectation that they *should have known he would rise and reappear.* The rhetorical questions "Why are you troubled? Why do doubts arise in your hearts?" in conjunction with the following information have the effect of saying: "You should not be troubled, nor should doubts arise in your hearts."

In 24:44, Jesus reminds his disciples again of the connection between his life, death, and resurrection and the Scriptures. The entire Old Testament seems to be in view: τῷ νόμῳ Μωϋσέως καὶ τοῖς προφήταις καὶ ψαλμοῖς. All that God had ever asked Israel to do is bound up and accomplished in the life of Jesus.

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[116] George Kennedy, *Invention and Method,* 221.

[117] This pericope marks an interesting parallel with the people of God in the Old Testament who have to be reminded again and again of God's words to them.

Since Jesus is now clearly self-identified as the Messiah (24:26), we see him clarifying for *his* disciples what had become clear to him earlier: *if* you are going to be the servant of God, *then* it becomes necessary to follow the guidelines for being a servant. It has been clear from early in the Lukan narrative that Jesus understands who he is. Luke is not now presenting nor has he ever presented Jesus as bending beneath an incredible load of inevitability or compulsion. This is the "Life of Jesus" that Luke is presenting, not the story of God's mechanistic destiny to which a child born in Bethlehem found himself hitched. We have not seen the slightest hint that Luke's Jesus feels pressured to perform his acts of piety. He has learned of his Father's will through prayer and study of his Scriptures. He accepted the role of Servant and now asks his followers to do the same. By accepting this role, he also accepted that certain things will happen: misunderstanding, rejection, persecution, suffering, and even death. This is the norm, the new norm, the subversive, "unexpected" norm.

There seems to be a missing δεῖ in Luke 24:46: καὶ εἶπεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι Οὕτως γέγραπται παθεῖν τὸν χριστὸν καὶ ἀναστᾶναι ἐκ νεκρῶν τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. In Luke 9:22, 17:25, and 24:26 predictions of the suffering of Christ are accompanied by either δεῖ or ἔδει. Reuben Swanson offers manuscript evidence that most often reads "οὕτως ἔδει" just after "οὕτως γέγραπται."[118] Some have argued that the expression "Οὕτως γέγραπται" is a synonym for "δεῖ" and that both are identified with the "divine plan."[119]

[118] Reuben Swanson, *New Testament Greek Manuscripts: Variant Readings Arranged in Horizontal Lines Against Codex Vaticanus* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 418. See also, Marshall, The *Gospel of Luke*, 905.

[119] Ernst, *Das Evangelium Nach Lukas*, 670.

Kathy Maxwell offers perhaps the best reason for the absence of δεῖ at this point. Maxwell has identified several rhetorical strategies used by Luke by which he ensures audience participation with his narrative.[120] One of Luke's strategies is to "[omit] a needed piece of information from a speech but [provide] the information in the surrounding narrative, either before or after the speech occurs."[121] As noted above, twice in the earlier part of his narrative, Luke associated necessity and suffering. Even in the cotext of this passage, he has Jesus point to the necessity of suffering (24:26). By deleting the δεῖ in 24:46, Luke forces his audience to *remember* the association of suffering with Jesus' lifestyle and thus with their own. But since the speech in v.46 continues in v.47, the disciples are also urged to discover their own programmatic δεῖ: to preach repentance and forgiveness of sins in Jesus' name beginning in Jerusalem. They are encouraged to take heart because in the case of Jesus, suffering has been followed by resurrection. In terms of the continuation of the story of Jesus, this is a critical (even if implied) necessity.[122]

The movement of the logic in 24:44-47 is important to note: This is what I said earlier: "Everything *written* about me must be fulfilled" > here is what is *written* > it is necessary for 1) Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead on the third day, *and* 2) repentance and forgiveness to be preached in his name beginning from Jerusalem. This rhetorical move is an example of what Pseudo-Cicero called *transitio* (transition). A *transitio* is a figure of style that "briefly recalls what has been said, and likewise briefly

[120] Kathy Maxwell, *Hearing Between the Lines: The Audience in Luke-Acts and its Literary Milieu* (LNTS 425; London: T & T Clark, 2010), esp. 120-175.

[121] Maxwell, *Hearing Between the Lines*, 158.

[122] See Acts 3:18 for another possible example of a missing (δεῖ).

sets forth what is to follow next" (*Ad. her*. 4.26.36 [LCL, Caplan]). Luke uses the rhetoric of reminder in his final chapter to recall the course of Jesus' life and then to point forward to the expectations for the lives of Jesus' followers.

Connection with Acts

This project has concentrated on Luke's *bios* instead of reading Luke-Acts as a single work. There are, however, some things that can be said about necessity in Luke that are related to Acts.[123]

In Acts, the first use of δεῖ (1:16) echoes the last direct use in Luke (24:44): both involve the necessity of Scripture being fulfilled.[124] There is no other use of δεῖ in Acts that is associated with fulfillment of the Scriptures. Peter's first speech to the disciples in Acts involves finding a replacement for Judas. Peter sees something in Psalm 68:25 (LXX) and Psalm 108:8 (LXX) that related to what happened with Judas. The Scriptures, which spoke about Judas' condition, had (ἔδει) to be fulfilled, and now that they had, it has become necessary (δεῖ) to choose a replacement (1:21).

Only twice in Acts is necessity associated with something related to Jesus. In Acts 3:21, in Peter's third speech, he tells those assembled at Solomon's porch, that "the heavens must (δεῖ) receive Jesus" until a later time which God has set. It seems fairly straightforward that Peter's statement about Jesus' location is in response to the issue

[123] David P. Moessner, "The 'Script' of Scripture in Acts," in *History, Literature, and Society in the Book of Acts (*ed. Ben Witherington; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221 writes of Luke methodology: "In particular, Luke uses the phrase, 'the plan/counsel/will of God' similarly to the way Hellenistic historians speak of a divine principle of order or fate (for example τύχη, εἱμαρμενη, γνώμη, ἀνάγκη) through which they ascertain a larger 'rationale' or movement in history and order their material accordingly."

[124] Robert C. Hannehill, *The Acts of the Apostles* (vol. 2 in The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 20.

raised in 3:15, where he tells them that God had raised Jesus from the dead. The notice of resurrection (which evidently created no small stir among the audience, cf. 4:2) would have raised questions like: "where is he?" "why is he not here?"[125]

The second use of necessity related to Jesus is in Acts 17:3 where Luke records that Paul was arguing from the Scriptures with the Thessalonian Jews in their synagogue and "explaining and proving that it was necessary (ἔδει) for the Christ to suffer and to rise from the dead, and saying, 'This Jesus, whom I proclaim to you, is the Christ'." Thus we see Paul doing what Jesus had done after his resurrection: teaching from the Scriptures the necessity of Christ's passion and resurrection.

In Acts 4:8-12, Peter gives an answer to the Jewish rulers in response to their question about what power or name was used in the healing of the lame man at the Temple (3:1-10). Mikeal Parsons notes that Peter, by using the term εὐεργεσίᾳ (good deed), brings up the benefaction system of the ancient Greco-Roman world.[126] The disciples of Jesus are carrying on his tradition of deeds done for others.

Peter, just as his Lord had done, deflects any possibility of gaining glory for himself from this miracle. He quickly points out that restoration (healing – σωτηρία) comes only through the name of the rejected, crucified, risen, ascended One that healing comes: "for neither is there another name under heaven given to men by which we must be healed (σωθῆναι) (v. 12). All other programs were over, all other methods worthless; only by the name of Jesus is healing possible.

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[125] John B. Polhill, *Acts* (NAC 26; Nashville: Broadman, 1992), 134.

[126] Mikeal Parsons, *Acts* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 63.

After being released from prison following their arrest, the disciples echo the words of Jesus when he responded to his mother in the temple. The high priest accused them of filling Jerusalem with teaching about Jesus, which was about to bring the blood of Jesus on their heads (5:28). Peter's responded: "We ought (δεῖ) to obey God rather than man" (v. 29). Polhill writes, "Peter had no choice."[127] Many have seen in Peter's response a likeness of Socrates' answer to the Athenians.[128] A nearer resemblance is Jesus' words in 2:49: "did you not know that I must be about my Father's business?" Just as Jesus was in the temple, doing what he was not supposed (or at least 'expected') to do, so his disciples are in the temple doing what they should not be doing, but insist is a requirement of their calling anyway.

In the rest of Acts, there are several additional uses of necessity in which we can see (all too briefly) comparisons between the disciples and Jesus. Necessity becomes associated with Paul's calling, even to the point of mentioning how much Paul must (δεῖ) suffer (παθεῖν) (9:6; 9:16). Ironically, a bit later, Paul in one of his defensive statements before Agrippa, referred to his own earlier belief of the necessity of his actions *against* the name of Jesus of Nazareth (26:9). Just as Jesus had declared the necessity of his continued journey so he could arrive in Jerusalem, so Paul declares the necessity (δεῖ) to visit Rome (19:21). Both Jesus (23:11) and an angel (27:24) reiterate the necessity of his visit to Rome. Paul mentions the necessity of supporting weaker brothers (deeds for others) in his speech before the Ephesian elders (20:35). Thus, we can see that in some ways the disciples of Jesus mirror the attitudes that he projected in Luke's first volume.

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[127] Polhill, *Acts*, 169.

[128] Joseph Fitzmyer, *The Acts of the Apostles* (AB 31; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 336.

Conclusion

What may we now say about the rhetorical function of necessity in Luke's bios of Jesus? Several things are apparent. First, Luke uses many different topoi in his narrative presentation of the life of Jesus. He compares Jesus to other famous Israelites (Moses, David, Solomon, and Jonah) in each case showing the superiority of Jesus. The miraculous nature of his birth, coupled with the lineage into which he is born, gives Jesus a great external advantage: an excellent and unique birth. As we have seen, however, no subject of a biography is praised for merely having a good birth; he must make good use of the advantage. I have argued that throughout his bios, Luke does just that: he shows in many ways (using various topoi) how Jesus, Son of God, filled with the Spirit, performed deeds, taught lessons to, and cared deeply for others.

Luke also uses unexpected events and praise from names to highlight the goodness of Jesus. The names that he is given work together with his good birth to create very high expectations for the young child. Luke's audience is given more and more evidence as the story progresses that Jesus is not going to be a political, military Messiah; he has come to give himself for others. Throughout the biography, divine witnesses (the Voice from heaven, angels, demons, and even Satan) highlight that he is the Son of God. The oracles of the Jews (LXX) are brought in to support the various claims made about him. Perhaps most significantly of all, the intersection of necessity and a direct quotation from the Septuagint (Luke 22:37) spotlights Jesus' role as Suffering Servant. This is the ultimate gift for others.

Luke also displays the virtues of Jesus, not in any chronological fashion, but scattered throughout his narrative. In general, we can say that Jesus' wisdom is displayed

in his parables and teaching moments. His justice is demonstrated by his repeated actions on the behalf of others. His courage is also displayed in Capernaum (ch. 4), on the way to Jerusalem when told that Herod is seeking him (ch. 13), and throughout the Passion narrative. Luke clearly uses many of the typical topoi used by biographers in his account of Jesus' life.

Second, Luke is aware of the difference between compulsive necessity and the necessity of requirement. When Luke speaks of compulsion he uses ἀνάγκη, as he does in the parable of the Great Banquet or Feast (Luke 14). This parable also couples ἀνάγκη with "excuse" language (παρητημένον). Contrary to those who see Luke's use of necessity in relation to Jesus as deterministic or inevitable, Luke is clearly aware of "choice" on the part of Jesus and his followers. Following Aristotle's' advice about how to show intention, Luke repeatedly has Jesus doing things for others, even going to Jerusalem where he knows great hostilities await him. Repeated success at some deed shows intention and will, according to Aristotle. The call to discipleship in Luke 9 is clearly by will: "If anyone *desires* to come after me" (9:23). The parable of the Two Brothers also demonstrates that necessity is limited by human choice. The older brother does not do what his father thinks was necessary, because he does not want to (15:28).

The repeated use of the imperfect tense of δεῖ also highlights the component of will. Although not true in every case, often ἔδει is used when something that should have been done was not. Certainly Luke 11:42 (Jesus tells the Pharisees what they ought to have [but did not] do in relation to tithe and justice and mercy), 13:16 (where Jesus uses the imperfect after the ruler of the synagogue had used the present to show what should have been done for the bent woman [but again, was not]), as well as Luke 15:32 (the

prodigal's father to the older brother about what he should have [but did not] do) emphasize the ability of a person to rebuff the ideal for his life.

Third, in Luke's use of necessity in his bios of Jesus is programmatic for Jesus' (and his disciples') life. He moves from insisting that he must be about his Father's business (2:49) to resisting the crowd that had come to prevent him from leaving them because the Servant of God must go preach in other cities too (4:43). Along the way, especially the way to Jerusalem, necessity is used to remind others how they should live (11:42; 13:16: 15:32; 18:1). Necessity is used to demonstrate the requirement that followers of God should associate with and bring the Good News to the marginalized as well (19:5). The suffering, rejection, death, and resurrection are emphasized repeatedly, no doubt in part because of the difficulty of the disciples to grasp the significance of living a life "for others." Richard L. Stein has observed: "Great literature unsettles (that is the measure of its greatness); it challenges the reader's preconceptions, including values conditioned by society and tradition. Once again, the task of literature is to render unfamiliar the familiar, including ethical assumptions and social structures."[129]

At the end of the narrative, the necessity of Jesus' death functions as a reminder to the still dull-witted and fearful disciples (24:7, 26, 44). The final use of necessity is implied and maps out the mission of the disciples: preach repentance and forgiveness of sins in the name of Jesus beginning at Jerusalem. From beginning to end, necessity informs Luke's readers that the Father's business is that of forgiveness and redemption for others.

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[129] Richard L. Stein, "Historical Fiction and the Implied Reader: Scott and Iser," *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 14 (1981): 213-231, 217.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

It is time to bring the various, but interrelated, strands of this thesis together.

First, Lukan scholarship has presented a very deterministic view of necessity in relation to the actions of Jesus in the Third Gospel. Out of the struggles to determine what part of the New Testament story is actually historical and has not been created by the post-Easter church came an interest in causation of events in ancient narratives. With Hans Conzelmann came a turn toward *heilsgeschichte* or the history of salvation.[1] Conzelmann showed how Luke reformulated the early Christian narrative in response to the delay of the parousia. Salvation history, as it is now called in the English-speaking world, consists of the redemptive acts of God seen over the course of human history. Conzelmann was concerned to show how Luke's use of δεῖ supported his ordering of the narrative: the actions of Jesus were God's will of necessity.[2] Salvation history is closely associated with the idea of the "plan of God" – God has a plan the outcome of which is guaranteed by his will; it is inevitable.[3]

In the context of salvation history, many scholars have associated Old Testament prophecy and fulfillment with the divine destiny.[4] According to this view, the Old

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[1] Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke* (trans. Geoffrey Buswell, New York: Harper & Row, 1960).

[2] Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke*, 153.

[3] For an excellent and thorough discussion of the history of interpretation of this problem see François Bovon, L*uke the Theologian* (2nd rev. ed.; Waco, Tx: Baylor University Press, 2006), 1-85.

[4] David L. Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980).

Testament projects certain events into the future, and the fulfillment of these events is assured by the will of God.

Beginning with Grundmann's observations about ἀνάγκη and δεῖ, scholars have sought the source of Luke's necessity.[5] Did he follow the Old Testament understanding of necessity as controlled by the omnipotent Creator God?[6] Or was he influenced by the Greco-Roman notions of fate, compulsion, and inevitability?[7] The basic concern of these scholars has been what *God* is doing in the world to bring about salvation, not what *Jesus* did and how he did it. All of the actions of Jesus (and his followers) are controlled by the far-reaching will of God: "Claimed by the divine will, they are shaped and determined by it down to the smallest details of their lives."[8]

We have repeatedly seen instances where modern scholars retain this view of necessity when commenting on the Gospel of Luke. The language of necessity, as used by many Lukan scholars, sounds very deterministic. Jesus is presented as a non-questioning automaton who has been caught in the river of God's will and is "guided" to a certain destiny because "thus spoke Yahweh." While it is nearly certain that few, if any of these scholars, intend their use of necessity to be overly deterministic, the language that they use (compulsion, inevitable, determined) would have brought a very different image of necessity to the minds of Luke's first audience. A first-century reader or auditor hearing such a description of Luke's work would have assumed that the Third Gospel is

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[5] Grundmann, δεῖ, δεὸν εστι *TDNT* 2:21-25; ἀνάγκη *TDNT* 1:344-47.

[6] Erich Fascher , "Theologishce Beobachtungen zu δεῖ," in *Neutestamentliche Studien für Rudolf Bultmann* (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmnann, 1954), 228-54 and "Theologische Beobachtungen zu δεῖ im Alten Testament," *ZNW* 45 (1954): 244-52.

[7] Siegfried Schulz, "Gottes Vorschung bei Lukas," *ZNW* 54 (1963): 104-16.

[8] Grundmann, δεῖ, δεὸν εστι *TDNT* 2:23.

not a biography of Jesus at all, but one more piece of historical writing in which characters are, as David Tiede remarks of the women at the empty tomb of Jesus, "caught in a web not of their own weaving."[9] This smacks of determinism that removes all opportunity for praise or blame. The scholars that we reviewed in the introduction also stand in this same tradition of using an overly-deterministic δεῖ.

Second, our review of necessity in the ancient world indicates that deterministic or compulsive necessity is most often used in the service of excuse or defense (issues in which a person wishes to *exempt* her will from consideration) and is not found in documents that seek to praise an individual for his good life. In Chapter Two, we encountered many examples where a god decrees or causes something to happen, and it is clearly not embraced by the person to whom it came. In Chapters Two, Three, and Four, we have also seen many examples of the will of the gods, as well as necessity of other kinds, used as excuse. One of the major problems with the Necessity of the natural philosophers was noted by Epicurus: it took away responsibility. The Stoics struggled mightily to get people to accept that their system of Fate and Necessity did not destroy human freedom. From Homer to Cassius Dio, humans reacted very negatively or very resignedly to the controlling power of Necessity (whether as goddess or abstract power of some kind).

Third, the turn to biography as the genre of Luke has led us to consider Luke as having written a document that is concerned with the intentions, will, and choice of his subject. The guidelines for epideictic literature preclude the use of compulsive necessity in a document of praise. There is little doubt that Luke's first volume is a biography.

[9] Tiede, *Prophecy and History in Luke-Acts*, 105.

Ancient biography was written according to the guidelines for praise and blame as found in epideictic theory and works. As contemporary examples from Philo, Josephus, and Plutarch have shown, compulsive necessity is not used of any action for which a biographer wishes to laud an individual. Plutarch makes this very clear in his comparison of Theseus and Romulus. Philo also makes it clear in his comparison of Abraham and others who have offered their children to the gods. Isocrates, Philo, and Josephus use necessity as requirement when discussing their subjects. Isocrates praises Evagoras for not falling short of the qualities of a king. Philo praises Joseph for receiving the required education for a leader through his early occupation as a shepherd. In his autobiography, Josephus presents himself as the kind of military leader who does what is required.

Following the recent turn to biography as the genre of the Gospels, however, there has not yet been a full consideration of the impacts of reading the Gospels *as* biography. A recent example might suffice.

A contemporary scholarly work related to Luke is Peter J. Scaer's, *The Lukan Passion and the Praiseworthy Death*. Scaer does an excellent job of showing Luke's rhetorical skills and how Luke arranged his account of Jesus' life according to the conventions of encomiastic biography.[10] His project includes a discussion of the praiseworthy deaths of Socrates, the Maccabean martyrs, and some of Plutarch's subjects in his *Lives*. Yet, Scaer calls Luke's work an apology for the shame of the crucifixion: "As part of his apologetic thrust Luke intended to demonstrate that Jesus' death was, in

[10] Peter J. Scaer, *The Lukan Passion and the Praiseworthy Death* (NTM 10; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2005), 45.

fact, honorable and praiseworthy."[11] Scaer seems to think Luke's work is an encomiastic apology.

These two genres do not mix, as Isocrates noted in his critique of Gorgias' *Helen*. Isocrates writes:

> Nevertheless, even [Gorgias] committed a slight inadvertence—for although he asserts that he has written an encomium of Helen, it turns out that he has actually spoken a defense of her conduct! But the composition in defense does not draw upon the same topics as the encomium, no indeed does it deal with actions of the same kind, but quite the contrary; for a plea in defense is appropriate only when the defendant is charged with a crime, whereas we praise those who excel in some good quality" (*Helen* 14-15 [Van Hook, LCL]).

Gorgias seeks to relieve Helen of the universal condemnation that he thinks she has received. He refers to praise and blame in the opening line of his speech, and calls what he has done an encomium in the last line. Between those two lines, however, he refers to his work as "a defense" (5, 8, 15).[12] Gorgias argues that Helen's actions were caused by "Fate and the will of the gods and the decrees of Necessity, or because she was seized by force, or won over by persuasion," in any case, it is not her fault (5). This is certainly the language of defense or apology. In such a work, the goal is not to praise a person, but to relieve blame caused by some charge.

Scaer argues that Socrates' death was due to necessity from the gods. He quotes Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo*: "It is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until God sends some necessity (ἀνάγκη) upon him, such as has now come upon me" (62C).[13] Scaer shows no awareness of the well-defined tradition in ancient Greco-Roman

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[11] Scaer, *The Lukan Passion and the Praiseworthy Death*, 3.

[12] Gorgias, "Encomium on Helen" in Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 131-33.

[13] Scaer, *The Lukan Passion and Praiseworthy Death*, 73.

writings that necessity used in defense is usually compulsive and thus not praiseworthy. While his work deserves to be applauded for at least recognizing that a willing death is the only praiseworthy death,[14] his association of "divine necessity" with Grundmann and Fitzmyer needs to be explicated more carefully because of the assumptions it carries. Chapter Five showed that other New Testament authors did not speak of Jesus' activities in terms of compulsion; although they were clearly aware that necessity language could be used in the service of excuse or defense.

Frank Stagg's observations about compulsion in the life of Jesus, although they seem to have been largely ignored, are worth noting at this point.[15] Stagg argues that Jesus' death was not an inevitable part of a preconceived plan. He writes, "The death of Jesus was not a fate fixed for him by the Father. No individual was required to reject, betray, or murder Jesus. His own could have received him had they been willing. Judas did not have to betray him."[16] People in the narrative acted on their own: "There was no external coercion that determined the action of any who conspired to put Jesus to death."[17] Stagg rightly notes that compulsion removes responsibility and thus the opportunity for praise or blame: "Were the crucifixion of Jesus due to some divine coercion or determination, the Judas, Caiaphas, Pilate, and all the others would be exonerated and Jesus would be robbed of his glory."[18] In reference to the passages in

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[14] Scaer, *The Lukan Passion and Praiseworthy Death*, 96.

[15] Frank Stagg, *New Testament Theology* (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1962).

[16] Stagg, *New Testament Theology*, 129-30.

[17] Stagg, *New Testament Theology*, 130.

[18] Stagg, *New Testament Theology*, 130.

Acts that seem deterministic, Stagg writes, "Guilt would be excluded were their actions determined from above."[19]

This project makes two important contributions to Lukan studies. First, it shows that taking the genre of ancient biography seriously for the Gospels has serious consequences. If we are going to consider Luke a biography, we should read it in light of biographic controls. Luke followed the encomiastic model, as did many other ancient biographers. The methods, goals, and purposes of biography should guide our reading of Luke.

I have argued that of the ideas about necessity that were "in the air" in the first century C.E., Luke represented Jesus acting according to the necessity of requirement, not compulsion. Because of the control of the biographical genre (seen through the lens of encomium and epideictic rhetoric), Luke's audience would have been most likely to understand Jesus' actions as those freely chosen and intentional rather than compelled or inevitable due to an overarching and minutely controlling "divine plan."

Second, this project offers a reading of Luke (and to some slight degree the other gospels) as a biography, keeping the genre front and center as it asks how Luke uses necessity in his bios of Jesus. The picture of Jesus that emerges is of the picture of a man who understood his calling and mission as Messiah/Son of God. As such, his words and deeds reflected his mission. He yielded himself to the will of God and was rejected and killed for his troubles. His divine birth provided him with understanding and power that he used for the benefit of others. Luke repeatedly shows Jesus using that great advantage "as he ought," seeking the good of others, no matter what was their perceived status in

[19] Stagg, *New Testament Theology*, 131.

society. Even when tempted to use his power for selfish gain, Jesus steadfastly refused and kept to his mission.[20]

That Jesus would carry the mission of Messiahship and Suffering Servant through to its *telos* was not certain. We need only remember the first "son of God" who, for selfish reasons, lost his privilege and standing before God. The use of the imperfect of δεῖ in several places in the narrative where it clearly indicates that what was necessary did not happen is another important clue. The biographical nature of Luke's work calls us to engage in praise for one who willingly endured rejection and a horrible death for the sake of others. This *bios* calls us to recognize "the greatness of virtuous actions and other good qualities belonging to a particular person" (Theon 110; Kennedy, 50).

[20] In no way am I denying that the biblical story is one of God's salvation for humanity. The important consideration in this work is that Jesus *chose* to participate in that salvation. Being born the Son of God did not ensure that he would stay the course. Old Testament prophecies had been ignored before. The divine will of God had been shouted from the mountaintops, all to no avail. He could have said, "no."

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