ABSTRACT

Speech-in-Character, Diatribe, and Romans 3:1-9:
Who's Speaking When and Why It Matters

Justin King, Ph.D.

Mentor: Bruce W. Longenecker, Ph.D.

This project aims to resolve questions concerning Paul's imaginary dialogue with an interlocutor in Romans 3:1-9 and to demonstrate how understanding the dialogue's script matters in the letter's larger argument. Advancing on the diverse diatribal evidence often referenced by scholars, I introduce the related but more consistent and methodologically sound primary literature on speech-in-character (*prosopopoiia*). I identify as central to speech-in-character the crafting and attributing of speech to an imaginary speaker that is "appropriate" to the characterization of that speaker. In diatribal dialogue and speech-in-character, however, attributed speech can be unmarked, making it difficult to determine whether the primary speaker or an interlocutor is responsible for speaking given lines in a discourse. This is true for every exchange in Rom 3:1-9. Speech-in-character's convention of appropriateness to characterization permits a development in how to approach such dialogues. Because characterization usually precedes attributed speech, characterization can serve as a plumb line by which to measure whether a line belongs to a certain speaker. The premise is, if a line

appropriately corresponds to the characterization of an imagined speaker, then it is possible for that line to be attributed to that imagined speaker. I demonstrate that this method proves useful on texts containing speech-in-character and on diatribal dialogues. I also argue that this method resolves the problem of who speaks which lines in the script of Rom 3:1-9. When Paul's characterization of the interlocutor (Rom 2) serves as the measure for determining who speaks each line in 3:1-9, an "appropriate" arrangement develops. I conclude that, contrary to traditional (and some rescriptive) readings, speech-in-character's convention of appropriateness to characterization strongly advocates for a reading in which Paul, in the role of diatribal teacher, consistently raises leading questions for his interlocutor to answer. This has significant theological import for Paul's view of divine impartiality and anthropological equality, especially as these issues come to a head in Rom 9-11. Consequently, this project makes contributions to scholarship on the rhetorical figure of speech-in-character, diatribal dialogue, and Pauline studies.

Speech-in-Character, Diatribe, and Romans 3:1-9:
Who's Speaking When and Why it Matters

by

Justin King, B.A., M.A.

A Dissertation

Approved by the Department of Religion

_____
W. H. Bellinger, Jr., Ph.D., Chairperson

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of

Doctor of Philosophy

Approved by the Dissertation Committee

_____
Bruce W. Longenecker, Ph.D., Chairperson

_____
Beverly R. Gaventa, Ph.D.

_____
Phillip J. Donnelly, Ph.D.

Accepted by the Graduate School

May 2016

_____
J. Larry Lyon, Ph.D., Dean

Page bearing signatures is kept on file in the Graduate School.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The apostle Paul's description of the Church as a body, in which all members work together to strengthen the whole, applies appropriately in the case of this dissertation. Every page of this project bears the influence of countless teachers, colleagues, friends, and family members to whom I owe the deepest level of gratitude. I hope these brief words can somehow resemble my ineffable appreciation.

I discovered my intrigue with the academic study of early Christian literature during my undergraduate years at Oklahoma Baptist University. Though many professors at OBU like Dr. Carolyn Cole challenged and encouraged me, three biblical studies professors prepared and set me on this course that I am currently traveling. Dr. Bobby Kelly imparted to me his love and aptitude for the Greek language. Dr. C. Mack Roark was no less influential in linguistic matters, introducing me to the broader scope of Hellenistic Greek literature. Finally, Dr. Justin Hardin shared with me his passion for Paul's life and letters. Dr. Hardin's fascination with Paul was contagious, and, though it manifests at times as a blessing and at times as a curse, I completely caught it. To these professors who were so influential in my early academic career, I am forever in debt.

My M.A. degree at the University of Chicago represented a period of significant transformation and development. There, too, three professors deserve mention. Under the tutelage of Dr. Margaret M. Mitchell, Dr. Hans Josef-Klauck, and Dr. Jeffrey Stackert my historical-critical abilities grew exponentially. Without the influence of these scholars, this project would have been impossible. Dr. Mitchell deserves a special note of thanks,

as a conversation we shared concerning what it means to “distrust Paul” in the interest of historical inquiry was particularly formative. To these scholars as well, I am forever in debt.

The New Testament faculty at Baylor, however, has stored up a veritable treasure trove in heaven for their sacrifices and contributions to my education. Dr. Bruce W. Longenecker, Dr. Beverly R. Gaventa, Dr. Mikeal Parsons, Dr. Lidija Novakovic, and Dr. Kelly Iverson each rank among the best the academy and humanity have to offer, and I have profited greatly from each of them, both regarding their academic rigor and their gracious interactions with students and one another. The influence of Dr. Parsons’s rhetoric seminar that I took my first semester at Baylor is surely visible throughout this project. Similarly, Dr. Gaventa’s arrival at Baylor has been a blessing, and her expertise on Paul and Romans has been particularly influential in motivating me to formulate my own views about this significant letter. Last but by no means least, Dr. Longenecker, my mentor, has steered me from numerous pitfalls, and any that remain are likely due to my occasional but rare decisions to argue against the grain. This project grew out of a seminar Dr. Longenecker taught on Paul, and from the very beginning, his expertise, encouragement, and patience have often been the glue that held this project together. Again, without the guidance of Baylor’s New Testament faculty in these ways and others, this project would have been impossible, and I will be forever grateful. My dissertation committee and readers deserve an additional thank you: Dr. Longenecker, Dr. Gaventa, Dr. Phillip J. Donnelly, Dr. Parsons, and Dr. Novakovic.

Countless colleagues, friends, and family members have contributed to this project directly and indirectly as well. My colleagues, especially Scott Ryan, John

Duncan, Lindsey Trozzo, and Dr. Mike Whitenton, have made helpful insights and often excelled at keeping me distracted. Beginning at OBU, my friends Jerry and Diane Newsom have been a constant source of encouragement, good coffee, and better conversation. My family, of course, has made sacrifices of inestimable worth to assist in this project's completion. My mom, Missy King, and parents-in-law, Debbie and Carey Skinner, deserve nothing but my highest appreciation. My brother and best friend, Jerrod King, has perhaps been my biggest source of inspiration and drive to complete this project. My wife, Hannah, and our dogs, Darcy and Cooper, have provided constant reminders of normalcy often forgotten in the course of a Ph.D. program. Hannah's care, support, love, and willingness to allow me to devote so much time and mental energy to this project have amassed a debt I will never be able to repay. To all mentioned and so many more, this project is as much yours as it is mine, and I am forever thankful.

DEDICATION

Το Παῦλος
δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ
κλητὸς ἀπόστολος

To Hannah
a personification of patience and grace

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Who's speaking when and why does it matter? This question is applicable to numerous texts in what is probably the most influential Christian document ever composed—Paul's letter to the Romans. For instance, what is the identity of the infamously agonized "I" who speaks in Rom 7:7b-24, 25b? The "Christian" anachronism aside, is the speaker in Rom 7:7-24, 25b the Christian Paul, the non-Christian Paul, an imaginary Christian speaker, or perhaps an imaginary non-Christian speaker? Consider also Paul's attribution of speech to the δικαιοσύνη based on πίστις in 10:6-8. What does it mean for δικαιοσύνη to be characterized by πίστις? More to the point, what does it mean for δικαιοσύνη based on πίστις to speak, and how does it advance the argument of Romans?

The question of who speaks when and why it matters is equally applicable to Paul's no less enigmatic consideration of Jewish advantage over non-Jews in Rom 3:1-9. The text reads:

> (3:1) Therefore, what advantage comes from being Jewish, or what benefit accrues from circumcision? (3:2) There is much [advantage] in every way! To begin, they were entrusted with the oracles of God. (3:3) To what end? If some lacked πίστις, their lack of πίστις will not nullify God's πίστις, will it? (3:4) Absolutely not! Instead, let God be true but every human a liar, as it is written, "So that you might be justified in your words, and you will overcome when you are judged." (3:5a) But if our unrighteousness proves God's righteousness, what shall we say? God is not unjust when he brings wrath, is he? (3:5b) I speak in a human way. (3:6) Absolutely not! Otherwise, how will God judge the world? (3:7) But if God's truthfulness is increased for his glory by my lie, why am I still being judged as a sinner? (3:8a) Why not, (3:8b) as we are slandered and as some claim that we say, (3:8c) "Let us do evil so that good might

> come?" (3:8d) Their judgment is justly deserved. (3:9a) What then? Are we advantaged or disadvantaged? (3:9b) By no means! (3:9c) For we have charged both Jews and Greeks all to be under Sin, (3:10) as it is written…

Does Paul raise a series of rhetorical questions in 3:1-9 that he himself answers, or does the passage represent imaginary discourse between Paul and a hypothetical interlocutor? Assuming 3:1-9 represents fictitious dialogue, how is the reader to understand the back-and-forth exchanges within the discourse? Paul provides no overt indicators (such as a verb of speech) marking the transitions between speakers. Does the interlocutor pose questions for Paul to answer, or is it the other way around? Might the dialogue partners instead alternate between asking and answering questions? How would a reader even determine which speaker is responsible for which lines? Besides, what difference does it make who speaks which lines? Does it matter whether Paul asks the questions in 3:1 or answers them in 3:2, for example? Do certain arrangements of the script create tension between 3:1-9 and other material in Romans or Paul's theologizing elsewhere? If so, what do those tensions indicate about Paul's thought? Conversely, might alternative arrangements allow 3:1-9 to fit more harmoniously in the holistic argument of the letter and Paul's thought? Specifically, does Paul, the apostle to the gentiles, think God inevitably privileges Jews over non-Jews (cf. 3:2, 9; 9-11)? These are difficult questions to be sure, and this project engages and proposes solutions for these important but complex questions concerning Rom 3:1-9. Indeed, who is speaking when in Rom 3:1-9 and why does it matter?

Staging the Project

I have divided this project into three parts: Part One, "Speech-in-Character," Part Two, "Diatribe," and Part Three, "Romans 3:1-9." Because relevant literature on any one

of these topics often fails to bridge the gaps between the other two, and the few works that do are either incomplete or unpersuasive (see below), each Part contains an introduction and relevant history of research. As such, a thoroughgoing history of research is unnecessary at this point, but a brief survey here introduces the topic(s) at hand and begins to create space for my contributions.

Rudolf Bultmann's 1910 dissertation, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*,[1] established within Pauline studies the dialogical nature of Paul's letters and their relationship to the Greco-Roman diatribe. In Bultmann's view, Paul's preaching and epistolary style approximates the Cynic-Stoic street preachers who employ diatribe in their propagandistic and polemical messages for the masses. Bultmann's paradigm held sway over Pauline scholarship for seventy years. With the publication of Stanley K. Stowers's dissertation in 1981, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans*,[2] however, the tide turned on Bultmann's prominence. Stowers redirected New Testament scholarship's understanding of the diatribe, most significantly in terms of its scholastic setting and the conventions for using it in argumentation. It is in the wake of Stowers's dissertation that scholars began to recognize the immense relevance diatribe's rhetorical conventions might have for explaining the dialogical structure of Rom 3:1-9.

Before Stowers, scholars read Rom 3:1-9 in one of two ways; either they ignored or denied that dialogue was present,[3] or they read the passage as though an imaginary

---

[1] Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoisch Diatribe* (reprint; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen, 1910).

[2] Stanley Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 57; Chico: Scholars Press, 1981).

[3] For example, though published two years after Stowers's dissertation, David R. Hall, "Romans 3:1-8 Reconsidered," *NTS* 29.2 (1983): 183-97.

interlocutor raised objections to Paul's message for the apostle to answer.[4] According to this arrangement of the script, with only minor nuances the interlocutor poses questions in Rom 3:1, 3, 5, and 7-8c, and Paul responds in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d. This reading is unsurprisingly represented by Bultmann.[5] I identify this as the "traditional" reading.

Beginning with Stowers, however, scholars begin to recognize that the general conventions for diatribe allow one to revise, or "rescript," the arrangement of the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9. In these readings, scholars appeal to diatribal conventions in order to attribute to Paul's voice various lines traditionally voiced by the interlocutor, and vice versa.[6] Such revisions not only produce new readings of Rom 3:1-9 but of Paul's overall argument in Romans as well. I identify these as "rescriptive" readings, since they rearrange the script[7] of the dialogue between Paul and his interlocutor.

---

[4] Almost all Romans commentaries neglect the dialogue of Rom 3:1-9 or read it traditionally. To my knowledge, the only exceptions are Ben Witherington III with Darlene Hyatt, Leander E. Keck, and Brendan Byrne. Witherington, Hyatt, and Keck uncritically follow Stowers, and Byrne charts a slightly different course. Ben Witherington III with Darlene Hyatt, *Paul's Letter to the Romans: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 93-4; Leander E. Keck, *Romans* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 2005), 89-96; Brendan Byrne, *Romans* (SP 6; Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1996), 106-15.

[5] This is the case, though he barely addresses 3:1-9. Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 67, 94. On the sparse treatment of 3:1-9, see Paul J. Achtemeier, "Romans 3:1-8: Structure and Argument," *ATR* sup 11 (1990): 79.

[6] Most relevant to my study, Stanley K. Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue with a Fellow Jew in Romans 3:1-9," *CBQ* 46 (1984): 707-22; idem., *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); idem., "Apostrophe, Προσωποποιια, and Paul's Rhetorical Education," in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (eds. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; NovTSup 105; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 351-69; Neil Elliott, *The Rhetoric of Romans Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul's Dialogue with Judaism* (JSNTS 45; Sheffield Academic Press, 1990; reprint; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007); idem., *The Arrogance of Nations: Reading Romans in the Shadow of Empire* (Paul in Critical Contexts; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008); Douglas A. Campbell, *The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009).

[7] By "script," I mean to evoke the concept of a dramatic script, such as for a play or movie, in which the various lines of a discourse are attributed to one character or another. For an ancient reference, as depicted by Plato, many of Socrates' dialogues are representative of this style. As already noted, the dilemma with the script of the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9, and thus the catalyst and justification for this project, is that Paul does not—overtly—indicate which lines of the discourse belong to each speaker.

At the time of his dissertation, Stowers apparently failed to recognize the ramifications his reassessment of diatribe might have for the script of Rom 3:1-9, as he seems to maintain the traditional reading. Soon thereafter, however, Stowers returns to Rom 3:1-9 in an attempt to solve four problems he associates with traditional readings of the pericope: (1) the difficulty in accounting for its place in the letter, (2) the view that it lacks unity and coherence, (3) the inability to make sense of its dialogical nature, and (4) the production of readings in which Paul speaks in a plethora of voices.[8] Relying on introductory formulas and the observation that diatribal teachers typically ask questions and guide discussions, Stowers attempts to resolve these problems by revising the script of 3:1-9 for the first time. In Stowers's reconfiguration, the interlocutor speaks in 3:1, 4, 6, 9a, and Paul speaks in 3:2, 3, 5, 7-8, 9b. Stowers, therefore, maintains the frame of the traditional reading, but he inverts the middle exchanges so that Paul poses the questions in 3:3 and 5 for the interlocutor to answer. Stowers also attributes to Paul the questions and response in 3:7-8. Ten years later, Stowers maintains this script and argument, (basically) reprinting it in *A Rereading of Romans* (1994), his third attempt at the pericope.[9]

Stowers's rescriptive agenda for Rom 3:1-9 does not fall flat, but neither does it persuade everyone. On the one hand, Neil Elliott revises the script of 3:1-9 even more exhaustively than Stowers. Elliott accepts Stowers's internal adjustments, but he identifies inconsistencies in Stowers's arrangement of 3:1-2 and 7-9. Elliott does not engage the primary diatribal literature as Stowers. Rather, Elliott follows Stowers's presentation of diatribe and uses it against him. Contra Stowers, Elliott argues that 3:1

[8] Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue," 707-22.

[9] Idem., *Rereading*, 159-75.

and 9a should be read as recapitulative leading questions in Paul's voice, which the interlocutor answers in 3:2 and 9b. Thus, Elliott completely inverts the traditional script, so that Paul takes on the role of Socratic questioner in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c and 9a, and the interlocutor responds in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d and 9b. [10] Elliott also maintains this script in his later work, *The Arrogance of Nations* (2008),[11] and Douglas A. Campbell follows him completely.[12]

On the other hand, not all (not even most) works on Romans and diatribe since Stowers's publications result in rescriptive readings of 3:1-9. For example, Changwon Song continues to endorse the traditional reading.[13] Song's argument for the traditional script, however, fails to convince. Relying solely on Epictetus' *Discourses* as evidence for diatribe, Song focuses mainly on the use of μὴ γένοιτο by Epictetus and Paul. Unfortunately, Song's only argument is that, in *Discourses*, μὴ γένοιτο "as a statement of rejection… [is] usually attributed to the Teacher."[14] But Song immediately cites numerous exceptions to the rule *and* allows that Stowers's reading "may be possible also."[15] Thomas H. Tobin similarly supports the traditional script of Rom 3:1-9, but he too fails to provide substantive arguments for his dialogical arrangement. Like Song, Tobin only demonstrates engagement with Epictetus. Further, Tobin offers no argument for *why* he reads 3:1-9 in the traditional sense. Rather, Tobin simply asserts the traditional

[10] Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 132-41.

[11] Elliott, *Arrogance,* 105-7, 205n74.

[12] Campbell, *Deliverance*, 572-4, 1088n117.

[13] Changwon Song, *Reading Romans as a Diatribe* (Studies in Biblical Literature 59; New York: Peter Land, 2004), 94-95.

[14] Ibid., 94-95, 112n5.

[15] Ibid.

reading without evidentiary support; Tobin assumes, "Once Paul has made his argument… he then deals with objections that might be raised against his position."[16]

Generally speaking, therefore, three arrangements of the dialogue in 3:1-9 exist: (1) traditional readings; (2) Stowers's rescription; and (3) Elliott's rescription. To view the various options at a glance, refer to the translation above and Table 1.1.

Table 1.1. Points of transition between speakers in arrangements of the script of Rom 3:1-9 in secondary scholarship.

Line in Script	Traditional	Stowers	Elliott
3:1	Interlocutor	Interlocutor	Paul
3:2	Paul	Paul	Interlocutor
3:3	Interlocutor		Paul
3:4	Paul	Interlocutor	Interlocutor
3:5a	Interlocutor	Paul	Paul
(3:5b)	Paul; authorial aside		
3:6	Paul	Interlocutor	Interlocutor
3:7	Interlocutor	Paul	Paul
3:8a			
(3:8b)	Paul; authorial aside		
3:8c	Interlocutor		
3:8d	Paul		Interlocutor
3:9a	Interlocutor	Interlocutor	Paul
3:9b	Paul	Paul	Interlocutor

I aim to show that one of the primary problems plaguing treatments of Rom 3:1-9 is one and the same for *both* traditional and rescriptive readings. This underlying and overarching problem is the reliance on and acceptance of assumptions in lieu of argumentation supported with valid evidence. The reality is, despite the amount of ink spilled trying to explicate Rom 3:1-9's dialogue, little argumentation actually exists on

[16] Thomas H. Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric in its Contexts: The Argument of Romans* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2004), 118-22, see also 120n44. Similarly, Stanley E. Porter, *The Letter to the Romans: A Linguistic and Literary Commentary* (NTM 37; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2015), 84-87.

either side of the spectrum. As we will see, this holds true in multiple ways not only for the scholars previously mentioned but also for the works of Abraham J. Malherbe,[17] Rafael Rodríguez,[18] James D. G. Dunn,[19] N. T. Wright,[20] Douglas J. Moo,[21] Robert Jewett,[22] John M. G. Barclay,[23] and Stanley E. Porter,[24] amongst others.

Though this argumentative and methodological neglect represents an unfortunate state of affairs in biblical scholarship, it is simultaneously something of a paradoxically fortunate opportunity. Neither reading begins with a privileged foot forward; traditional and rescriptive readings are on equal—albeit unsupported—footings. This means there is no room to show initial partiality to one reading over another simply based on some scholar's argument on its behalf. Consequently, what will be required is not a simple weighing of the merits and demerits of relevant views (though this is important), but a reassessment of method and a thoroughgoing application of it to Rom 3:1-9. In this way, to the degree possible, argument and evidence shall precede and validate conclusions

---

[17] Abraham Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο in the Diatribe and in Paul," *HTR* 73 (1980): 231-40.

[18] Rafael Rodríguez, *If You Call Yourself a Jew: Reappraising Paul's Letter to the Romans* (Eugene: Cascade, 2014).

[19] James D. G. Dunn, *Romans 1-8* (WBC 38a; Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 128-44; idem., *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 117-19.

[20] N. T. Wright, "Romans 2:17-3:9: A Hidden Clue to the Meaning of Romans?," *Journal for the Study of Paul and His Letters* 2.1 (2012): 1-25; idem., *The Letter to the Romans* (*NIB* 10; Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 452-55; idem., "The Law in Romans 2," in *Paul and the Mosaic Law* (ed. James D. G. Dunn; WUNT 89; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996), 131-50; idem., *Paul and the Faithfulness of God: Book II* (Christian Origins and the Question of God 4; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 836-39.

[21] Douglas J. Moo, *The Epistle to the Romans* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 177-97.

[22] Robert Jewett, *Romans: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 238-52.

[23] John M. G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 471-74, see also 483n.89.

[24] Stanley E. Porter, *The Letter to the Romans: A Linguistic and Literary Commentary* (New Testament Monographs 37; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2015).

rather than be assumed to fit within a set of presupposed views. Such a need is brought into even sharper relief by the fact that so many scholars draw from a common pool of diatribal tradition but inevitably come to different conclusions concerning the shape and meaning of Rom 3:1-9. If our understanding of the passage is to gain clarity in its own right and concerning its function holistically in Romans, then evidence, argument, and greater methodological constraint are required.

Methodology

This naturally brings us to the question of method. The methodology I propose primarily draws on tools within the historical-critical arsenal, especially those of a rhetorical nature. For over a century, scholars have recognized the validity of reading Romans in light of diatribe, either as a formal diatribe or as a text evincing diatribal elements. As Stowers emphasizes, one of the most salient features of diatribe is its dialogical aspect,[25] and it is this feature that is so important for Rom 3:1-9. I continue in this tradition, with one sizable caveat. As I will show, the primary sources for diatribe display a remarkable degree of diversity. In my view, this degree of variation largely accounts for why so many scholars appeal to the corpus of primary diatribal literature as evidence for understanding Rom 3:1-9 but nevertheless produce divergent interpretations. Stated plainly, due to its inherent instability, relying solely on diatribal literature as evidence for explicating Rom 3:1-9's dialogue is unable to produce a consistent or conclusive reading. Additional, less diverse, evidence is necessary if one hopes to improve our understanding of Paul's staged discourse in Rom 3:1-9.

[25] Stowers, *Diatribe*.

Fortunately, such a body of evidence stands at the ready, namely, the literature related to the rhetorical practice of attributing speech to speakers other than oneself, "speech-in-character."[26] Because in diatribe every instance of dialogue requires attributing speech to an imaginary speaker, every occurrence of diatribal dialogue necessarily engages in speech-in-character.[27] What is more, numerous primary sources share and teach speech-in-character's core conventions of attributing speech to an imaginary speaker that is appropriate to that speaker's character. Thus, speech-in-character is both directly relevant to diatribe and represents a significantly more consistent body of evidence from which to draw conclusions about Rom 3:1-9 (or any other ancient, dialogical text).

The premise is that if—as with Rom 3:1-9—a dialogical text does not identify imaginary speakers by name, verbs of speech, introductory formulas, or other overt means, then speech-in-character's complementary conventions of characterization and appropriateness to that characterization can help identify which lines in a discourse belong to which speaker. For example, if an imaginary speaker is characterized as uneducated, speech that thoughtfully engages Aristotle's *Ars Rhetorica* or Cicero's *De Oratore* would probably not be appropriately read or heard in that imaginary speaker's voice. On the contrary, if the interlocutor is characterized as well educated, such speech could be altogether appropriate and can serve as an aid to identify the speaker by

---

[26] I am aware of the varying terms for the practice in the *Progymnasmata* and broader rhetorical tradition, which distinguish between προσωποποιία, ἠθοποιία, and εἰδολοποιία. See Part One for my decision to translate the various technical terms as "speech-in-character." See George A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 47-49, 84-85, 115-17, 164-66, 213-17; *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 4.55, 65; Quintillian, *Institutio Oratoria* 9.2.

[27] Note that, though diatribe and speech-in-character are necessarily linked, they are not identical. In staging a diatribal dialogue, the speaker or writer necessarily engages in speech-in-character when inventing and/or attributing words to an interlocutor. Thus, speech-in-character is only one part of the diatribal dialogue.

retrospectively identifying a matching characterization. In this way, the conventions for speech-in-character bring new light to diatribal dialogues that otherwise ambiguously transition between speakers. Parts One and Two contribute to developing this approach, and Part Three illustrates how this method is particularly appropriate and helpful for understanding the script of the imaginary dialogue in Rom 3:1-9.

Significance

Romans 3:1-9 is perhaps simultaneously the most obviously dialogical and most vexing pericope in the entirety of Romans. Because of the difficulty in determining who speaks which lines in the dialogue, and because certain arrangements of the script confuse rather than clarify Paul's logic, the passage has been touted as "one of the most difficult, perhaps, in the epistle"[28] and as "obscure and feeble," to the extent that the whole epistle would make better sense if the pericope was omitted.[29] More recently and more optimistically, however, Rom 3:1-9 has been proclaimed as a key to understanding the whole of Romans.[30] Given such vastly differing perceptions, Rom 3:1-9 is certainly a text deserving of fresh inspection.

It is surprising, therefore, that current scholarship lacks an extensive treatment of Rom 3:1-9 that compiles and analyzes the diversity of approaches to and revisions of the staged dialogue in the passage and its function in the epistle. My dissertation, first of all, fills this lacuna by creating a readily accessible and critical compendium of the diverse evidence and arguments offered by New Testament scholars.

---

[28] Frédéric Louis Godet, *Commentary on Romans* (translated by A. Cusin; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1969), 131.

[29] C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (Moffatt New Testament Commentary; London: Hodder and Stroughton Limited, 1932), 46.

[30] N. T. Wright, "Romans 2:17-3:9."

More importantly, though the traditional reading can be identified as the majority view at this time, the increase in rescriptive readers illustrates that a general consensus does not exist. Again, this is in large part due to the nature of the evidence and arguments (or lack thereof) employed to support either view. My dissertation secondly provides what is perhaps the first, and at least the most thoroughgoing, methodologically focused *argument* concerning the arrangement of the dialogue in 3:1-9 and its import. What makes this possible is the realization that the conventions for speech-in-character are inherently relevant to the dialogical portions of diatribal literature, including Paul's letter to the Romans. As I discuss below, though a few scholars make this observation, none allow it to make its full or appropriate contribution to Rom 3:1-9. By allowing the conventions for speech-in-character to exert their due influence, I therefore draw on both speech-in-character and diatribal evidence in order to provide the evidentiary stability that diatribe alone is unable to offer.

Third, as I show in Part Two, little progress has been made in our understanding of diatribe since Stowers's work(s). There has been no thorough reassessment of the primary sources or their application to Rom 3. Instead, scholars seem content to rely heavily on Stowers's analyses (to the degree diatribe is concerned, I do too). Though my dissertation does not reassess the primary diatribal literature, it does address the problem of over-reliance on Stowers by rebalancing the focus of the conversation from diverse diatribal sources to the much more stable primary literature on speech-in-character. I engage the relevant primary sources for speech-in-character extensively and exhaustively, both as individual texts and in conjunction with one another. This allows me to identify the core conventions of the rhetorical figure that all or most sources share *and* the

elements uniquely attested by each individual source. These core conventions constitute what one would expect to find in almost any concrete example of attributed speech in antiquity. Conversely, the uniquely attested features in each source amount to elements that an author like Paul might employ in the composition of a speech-in-character but that are not central or necessary to the proper implementation of the rhetorical figure. My dissertation, therefore, makes a contribution in the area of speech-in-character, but, because of the close relationship between speech-in-character and diatribal dialogue, it also makes significant advances in diatribal studies.

Fourth, and finally, my dissertation seeks to answer the perennially problematic questions of the meaning and function of Rom 3:1-9, both on its own terms and in the scheme of Romans. I will accomplish this in three ways: (1) by defining whose voice is responsible for each line of the dialogue's script, providing the evidence for and adhering more closely to the rhetorical conventions than previous scholarship has achieved; (2) by demonstrating how a correct differentiation of the speakers significantly influences our understanding of the pericope; and (3) by properly situating the passage into the larger argumentative context of Romans. Though this investigation touches on countless points in Pauline studies, it has immense bearing for questions of Paul's rhetorical acumen, his endorsement of divine impartiality, and his understanding of the relationship between Jews and non-Jews in God's eschatological and salvific economy.

An Outline: A Preview to the Project

The dissertation progresses from the broadest sphere (historical and rhetorical backgrounds), through various scholars' approaches to Paul and Rom 3:1-9, and finally down to the narrowest sphere in which I engage Rom 3:1-9 and its epistolary context.

The dissertation is divided into three parts. Part One concerns speech-in-character. Chapter Two investigates the way two rhetorical handbooks address the practice of attributing speech to other characters. These rhetorical handbooks are the pseudonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. Chapter Three similarly surveys the presentation of speech-in-character in the earliest two collections of *Progymnasmata*, those of Theon and [Pseudo-]Hermogenes. Chapter Four categorizes the findings from Chapters Two and Three in order to create a composite picture of the rhetorical figure in antiquity. Finally, Chapter Five looks at examples of Paul's use of speech-in-character throughout his literary corpus.

Part Two takes up the issue of diatribe. Chapter Six reviews the approaches to diatribe in secondary literature. Chapter Seven analyzes concrete examples of diatribal dialogue in light of the conventions for *both* diatribe and speech-in-character. Thus, Chapter Seven (and Chapter Five) sets the methodological course for the investigation of Rom 3:1-9 to follow.

Part Three applies the findings from Parts One and Two to the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9 and considers its fit and function in the letter as a whole. Chapter Eight provides a history of research that reviews and begins to analyze traditional readings of Rom 3:1-9, and Chapter Nine is the corresponding history of research on rescriptive readings of the dialogue. Chapter Ten investigates the beginning of Romans and Paul's apostrophic characterization of his interlocutor in Rom 2. Chapter Eleven addresses the dialogue in 3:1-9 and situates the pericope in the broader argumentative scope of Romans as a whole.

Chapter Twelve pulls together conclusions from the project as a whole and brings the project to a close. I turn now in Part One to investigate the fascinating rhetorical

figure of speech-in-character, the appropriate attribution of speech to a speaker other than one's self.

PART ONE

Speech-in-Character

In the following four chapters, I will examine the rhetorical practice of speech-in-character. I follow James R. Butts's use of the term "speech-in-character," because it conveys most accurately the core elements of the concept, namely, writing or giving a *speech* that coheres with the *character* of another speaker.[1] In the course of my

[1] This solves the terminological problem in which various ancient authorities utilize diverse terms to discuss a single exercise. James R. Butts, "The Progymnasmata of Theon: A New Text with Translation and Commentary" (Ph.D. diss, The Claremont Graduate School, 1987), 459-60. Stowers similarly follows Butts's translation of "speech-in-character." Stowers, *Rereading*, 16-17, 333n.40; idem., "Romans 7:7-25 as a Speech-in-Character (προσωποποιία)," in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (edited by Troels Engberg-Pederson; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 180n.1.

The issue regarding what to call this rhetorical technique is both technical and translational. It is technical in the sense that one must first decide whether or not προσωποποιία and ἐθοποιία (amongst others) constitute different or identical exercises. The analyses below strongly indicate that it is reasonable to think about προσωποποιία and ἐθοποιία as essentially describing a single technique, namely, the attribution of speech to another character. To begin, the first-century writers Quintilian and Theon use the single term προσωποποιία to express the whole concept of attributing speech to a diversity of character types. Moreover, even among the writers who differentiate between the terms, the differentiation only has to do with the type of character in whose mouth words are placed and not with an entirely different technique altogether.

The issue is also translational, as one must decide what modern-language translation(s) of the technical terms best expresses the practice described by each term. Since the working understanding is that both προσωποποιία and ἐθοποιία ultimately pertain to the composition of speech in the voice of another character, what translation best expresses the concept? The range of translations is broad: (1) Donald A. Russell opts for "impersonation." Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* (ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell; LCL 127; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 9.2.29. (2) Harry Caplan and George Kennedy employ "personification" for προσωποποιία. [Cicero], *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (trans. Harry Caplan; LCL 403; reprint; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 4.66; Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, xiii, 47. (3) George Kenendy, Ray Nadeau, and Charles Baldwin translate ἐθοποιία as "characterization." Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, xiii, 84, 115; Ray Nadeau, "The Progymnasmata of Aphthonius in Translation," *SM* 19 (1952), 278-79; Charles Sears Baldwin, "The Elementary Exercises (ΠΡΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ) of Hermogenes," in *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 34-35. Finally, (4) Stanley Bonner and Butts translate "speech-in-character," though Bonner nevertheless defines it in terms of impersonation. Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the elder Cato to the younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 253; Butts, "Theon," 459-60. To problematize several of these translations, the translation of the concept as "impersonation" potentially suggests the kind of mimicry and sarcasm Quintilian specifically wishes to avoid (*Inst.* 1.8.3), "personification" fails to apply to the attribution of speech to human persons who, by definition, do not need to be "personified," and all of the translations with the exception of "speech-in-character" fail to communicate the core element of *speaking* in another character's voice. Thus, though it might be somewhat cumbersome, translating the

examination, the detailed intricacies of speech-in-character will find fuller form than the limited definition provided above suggests, both with respect to its core elements and its unique variations in presentation by its advocates. Therefore, the primary goals of Part One, "Speech-in-Character," are twofold: (1) to identify from the primary literature the elements that are central to the practice of speech-in-character, and (2) to highlight any differences or developments in the various treatments of speech-in-character.

The methodological assumption uniting this twofold goal is that the core or central elements of speech-in-character provide the surest foothold when analyzing the apostle Paul's application of this exercise, whereas the differences advanced by various ancient proponents represent unessential but potential elements Paul may or may not follow in any given occurrence of speech-in-character in his letters. This of course contains the caveat that the form of speech-in-character at which I ultimately arrive must be a presentation of speech-in-character that could have been relevant to Paul. So, the primary sources I examine in the following chapters must not only discuss the practice of speech-in-character, but they must also pre-date or be in close chronological proximity to Paul. For this reason, I exclude exhaustive engagement with the fourth-century *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius and the fifth-century *Progymnasmata* of Nicolaus, though I will highlight their differences in the footnotes.

Secondary scholarship on speech-in-character has tended to take one of three basic forms: (1) general and brief treatments of speech-in-character, usually as one monolithic concept in Greco-Roman rhetoric which ignores or downplays the differences

---

concept of προσωποποιία and ἐθοποιία as "speech-in-character" is by far the best, as it adequately expresses the central element of speech that occurs in the technique.

between various authors, (2) dictionary or encyclopedia style articles that isolate various elements of speech-in-character, and (3) discussions of tightly focused aspects within the broader practice of speech-in-character and pertinent to a given scholar's arguments about the New Testament (or any other document).[2] It seems unnecessary to review each scholar's summation of speech-in-character, as there is significant overlap. Rather, I will address points of contention with various scholars as they arise in the following chapters.

The approach to speech-in-character presented here differs from these general trends in several important ways. First, instead of picking and choosing which portions of theoretical texts to discuss, I attempt to engage texts exhaustively. Second, my treatment will not be isolated to a single type of writing, but it will be triangulated between the

---

[2] For treatments of speech-in-character, see Stanley K. Stowers, "Romans 7:7-25," 180-88; idem., *Rereading*, 16-21; Charles Sears Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1924, reprinted 1959), 71-73; Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 227; George A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 205-6; idem., *Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors* (A History of Rhetoric 3; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 64; Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study* (Trans. Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, and David E. Orton; eds. David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson; Leiden: Brill, 1998), §820-829, 840, 1131-1132, 1137.3; Christine Heusch, "Die Ethopoiie in der griechischen und lateinischen Antike: von der rhetorischen Progymnasma-Theorie zur literarischen Form," in 'ΗΘΟΠΟΙΙΑ*: La représentation de caracteres entre fiction scolaire et réalité vivante a l'époque imperial et tardive* (edited by Eugenio Amato and Jacques Schamp; Cardo 3; Salerno: Helios, 2005), 11-33; Ronald F. Hock, "The Rhetoric of Romance," in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period: 330 B.C. – A. D. 400* (ed. Stanley E. Porter; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 445-65; David E. Aune, *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 383; R. Dean Anderson Jr., *Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms Connected to Methods of Argumentation, Figures and Tropes, From Anaxamenes to Quintilian* (Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 24; Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 106-7; Donald Lemen Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1957), 199-201; Laurent Pernot, *Rhetoric in Antiquity* (trans. W. E. Higgins; Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 148; Witherington and Hyatt, *Romans*, 179-80; Charles H. Talbert, *Romans* (Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary; Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 2002), 186-87; Campbell, *Deliverance,* 532-33; Alicia D. Myers, *Characterizing Jesus: A Rhetorical Analysis on the Fourth Gospel's Use of Scripture in its Presentation of Jesus* (LNTS 458; London: T & T Clark, 2012), 51-55; Michel Patillon and Giancarlo Bolognesi, eds., *Aelius Theon: Progymnasmata* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002), xxxiv-xxxviii; Matthew W. Bates, *The Hermeneutics of the Apostolic Proclamation: The Center of Paul's Method of Scriptural Interpretation* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2012), 194-99. For a treatment of speech-in-character based largely on [Hermogenes] and Aphthonius, see Craig A. Gibson, "*Prosopopoeia* in the New Testament: Where should we look and what should we expect to find?" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Philadelphia, PA, November, 2005), used with permission. For a tightly focused treatment of certain aspects of speech-in-character, see Stowers, "Apostrophe," 351-69.

treatments of speech-in-character in the so-called handbooks, in the earliest two *Progymnasmata*, and with concrete examples in the New Testament. Third, my engagement with these texts will indicate which elements are the most salient features of speech-in-character and which elements represent subsidiary or potentially optional aspects. Fourth, as an aide to future work on speech-in-character and early Christian writings (as well as any text through the second century C.E.), I aim to put as much of the methodologically pertinent evidence as possible in one central location.

The following discussion of speech-in-character begins with an investigation of two rhetorical handbooks, *ad Herennium* and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. I begin with *ad Herennium* because it is the earliest extant and complete treatment of speech-in-character among all types of sources. Thereafter, I prioritize generic similarity (Quintilian). Corroborating comments on speech-in-character from other ancient rhetoricians will be included in the footnotes as appropriate. After seeking to understand each text on its own, I will compare and contrast their presentations of speech-in-character (Chapter Two). I then turn to the works of the progymnasmatic genre, Theon and [Hermogenes], similarly reading each text closely before comparing and contrasting their treatments of speech-in-character (Chapter Three). Again, I will begin with the earlier treatment (Theon) before addressing the later example (Hermogenes). Afterwards, I briefly bring together my findings from Chapters Two and Three in order to finalize my presentation of the central as well as secondary elements of speech-in-character (Chapter Four). Finally, I will use my findings to analyze select practical examples of speech-in-character in the New Testament, simultaneously documenting the apostle Paul's awareness of and aptitude for this literary and rhetorical technique (Chapter Five).

CHAPTER TWO

Speech-in-Character in the Rhetorical Handbooks

In this chapter, I explore the treatments of speech-in-character offered in two rhetorical handbooks, the pseudonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*. Among the ancient rhetoricians at work during the relevant time frame, Cicero and Pseudo-Demetrius also comment on the practice of speech-in-character, albeit very briefly and with respect to isolated and minute elements; whenever appropriate, I offer in the footnotes corroborating evidence from their respective treatments of the technique. After providing a close reading of each handbook, I compare the two treatments, highlighting their similarities and analyzing their differences. I will demonstrate that, although there are differences, *ad Herennium* and Quintilian are remarkably similar in their presentations of speech-in-character.

Pseudo-Cicero: Rhetorica ad Herennium[1]

Introduction

Though other Latin treatments of rhetoric preceded the composition of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the latter rhetorical handbook represents the oldest extant treatment of rhetoric in Latin, much less preserved in its entirety.[2] Though *ad Herennium* was

[1] For *Rhetorica ad Herennium*'s treatment of speech-in-character, I employ Harry Caplan's Latin Loeb text and translation. [Cicero], *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (trans. Harry Caplan; LCL 403; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, reprinted 2004), 366-69, 395-401. References to *Ad Herennium* will follow the formula of [book number.section number]. I will not indicate the alternative Roman numeral section numbers in my analysis.

[2] Caplan, ed., *ad Herennium*, vii; Kennedy, *New History*, 121.

attributed to Cicero from before Jerome's career through the late fifteenth century, the general scholarly consensus is that Ciceronian authorship is erroneous.[3] Instead, it is best to attribute *ad Herennium* to an unknown author.[4] Concerning *ad Herennium*'s date of composition, internal evidence establishes a *terminus post quem* in 86 B.C.E. and a *terminus ante quem* c. 80 B.C.E.[5] Thus, we find in *ad Herennium* an anonymous treatment of rhetorical theory from the early first century B.C.E. *Ad Herennium* addresses the practice of attributing speech to other characters under two headings—*sermocinatio* and *conformatio*.

Analysis: Sermocinatio

As one step in the task of embellishment (*expolitio*; 4.54), *ad Herennium*'s treatment of speech-in-character preempts its longer treatment with a shorter discussion of *sermocinatio*, which it defines as follows:

> Sermocinatio est… in qua constituetur alicuius personae oratio adcommodata ad dignitatem.
>
> [*Sermocinatio*]… consists in putting in the mouth of some person [*personae*] language [*oratio*] in keeping [*adcommodata*] with his character [*dignitatem*]. (4.55 [Caplan, LCL])[6]

---

[3] Cicero never mentions *ad Herennium*, many elements in *ad Herennium* are at odds with Cicero's *De Inventione*, and Quintilian does not seem to be acquainted with a work by Cicero of this type. Caplan, *ad Herennium*, vii-ix; Kennedy, *New History*, 121-22.

[4] Caplan, *ad Herennium*, ix, xiv. See also his argument problematizing the identification of Cornificius as the author. Ibid., ix-xiv. Cf. Kennedy, *New History*, 121.

[5] Establishing the *terminus post quem*, the most recent historical references in *ad Herennium* are the death of Sulpicius (88 B.C.E.) and Marius' seventh consulship (86 B.C.E.); for the rough *terminus ante quem*, the political interests shown in the treatise and the lack of conditions produced under Sulla suggest a date *circa* 80 B.C.E. *Ad Herennium*, 1.25; 4.68; cf. 4.47. Caplan, *ad Herennium*, vii, xxvi; Kennedy, *New History*, 122.

[6] Throughout the translations, I have chosen to provide the technical terms for speech-in-character in their original languages, which I have placed in brackets. I have also placed in brackets select original language terms in order to demonstrate most clearly the diction with which each author explains speech-in-character.

Ad Herennium then provides a concrete example of *sermocinatio*, in which each aspect of the definition is represented. In this example, a wise person (i.e., "some person") is characterized as one who prioritizes the welfare of the community over his or her own self and, when in danger, is willing to suffer if it protects the best interests of the state (i.e., "character"). Such a wise person would say, "Not for self alone was I born, but also, and much more, for the fatherland. Above all, let me spend my life, which I owe to fate, for the salvation of my country" (i.e., language attributed in keeping with one's character) (4.55 [Caplan, LCL]). In this way, *ad Herennium* both defines and demonstrates *sermocinatio* as one way rhetorically to embellish an idea.

As suggested in its shorter discussion (4.55), after addressing some additional figures, *ad Herennium* promptly returns to its treatment of *sermocinatio* (4.65). Again, *ad Herennium* begins by defining *sermocinatio* in a way that wholly coheres with the previous definition:

> Sermocinatio est cum alicui personae sermo adtribuitur et is exponitur cum ratione dignitatis.
>
> [*Sermocinatio*] consists in assigning [*adtribuitur*] to some person [*personae*] language [*sermo*] which as set forth conforms [*ratione*] with his (or her) character [*dignitatis*]. (4.65 [Caplan, LCL])

As before, *ad Herennium* follows this definition with an example. In this narratival example, three "persons" to whom language is assigned appear in conversation with one another: an armed enemy soldier, a wife, and a husband. When the enemy soldier breaks into the house and threatens the husband, despite the wife's cries for mercy and pleas for her husband to submit, the husband proudly criticizes the enemy. After repeating his threats, and as the husband "began to say something or other, worthy, I am sure, of his

manliness" (4.65 [Caplan, LCL]), however, the enemy killed him.[7] Thus, as the husband's forthcoming words were to be "worthy… of his manliness," *ad Herennium* establishes the requirement for attributed speech to be in accord with one's character both in its definitions and in the example itself. *Ad Herennium* repeats this requirement a third time, concluding the example with the authorial commentary that

> Puto in hoc exemplo datos esse uni cuique sermones ad dignitatem adcommodatos; id quod oportet in hoc genere conservare.
>
> I think that in this example the language [*sermones*] assigned to each person was appropriate [*adcommodatos*] to his (or her) character [*dignitatem*]—a precaution necessary to maintain in Dialogue [*genere*]. (4.65 [Caplan, LCL])

Once more, the definition coheres with the example on all accounts.

Following this narratival example, *ad Herennium* notes one final aspect of *sermocinatio*. Namely, *sermocinatio* does not have to depict an *actual* dialogue; rather, there are also hypothetical dialogues (*sermocinationes consequentes*; 4.65). In *sermocinationes consequentes*, the scripted dialogue does not actually occur, but it is imaginary or hypothetical. In this hypothetical class of *sermocinatio*, the dialogue is set forth as what some person(s) might hypothetically say given a set of circumstances, such as "what do we think those people will say if you have passed this judgment" (4.65 [Caplan, LCL])? Additionally, though the previous exemplary depictions of *sermocinatio* employed specific persons (for example, the "wise man" in 4.55), the example *ad Herennium* provides for *sermocinationes consequentes* suggests that speakers may be unspecified as well (4.65). Accordingly, the person(s) to whom speech is attributed can be general and unidentified, such as "those people" or "every one" (4.65).

[7] Though the actual words attributed to each of the speakers are important, they are not nearly as important as what *ad Herennium* has to say about the way in which the words parallel each character's traits.

Altogether absent in *ad Herennium*'s treatment, however, are any formal requirements or suggestions for the proper structure or composition of *sermocinatio*. Structural cues, however, may be implicit, as two of the three examples adhere to a similar sequence. The examples of the wise man and of the enemy soldier, the wife, and the husband both adhere to a similar structure; each example (1) begins with an identification of the speaker, (2) moves into a characterization of that speaker, and (3) concludes with the attributed speech. The example of unspecified persons in *sermocinationes consequentes*, however, is unfinished, as it omits the characterization and the actual words attributed to the speaker(s). If *ad Herennium* completed the example, presumably it would follow a similar pattern as the others.

Thus, in *ad Herennium*'s treatment of *sermocinatio*, several conventions for how to use or compose a *sermocinatio* arise:

(1) the speaker or author shapes and assigns speech;

(2) the words can be attributed to:

    a. a specific person or group of people,

    b. a specific type of person, or

    c. an unspecified person;

(3) the attributed speech can be real or imaginary;

(4) the language must agree with the character of the person in whose mouth it is scripted; and

(5) there is an implicit pattern of identification of the speaker → characterization of the speaker → *sermocinatio* / attributed speech.

Analysis: Conformatio

Following its treatment of *sermocinatio*, *ad Herennium* engages speech-in-character from a second perspective, namely, *conformatio*. Following the same pattern of definition and example, *ad Herennium* defines *conformatio* as follows:

> Conformatio est cum aliqua quae non adest persona confingitur quasi adsit, aut cum res muta aut informis fit eloquens, et forma ei et oratio adtribuitur ad dignitatem adcommodata aut actio quaedam.
>
> [*Conformatio*] consists in representing an absent person [*non adest persona*] as present [*adsit*], or in making a mute thing or one lacking form articulate, and attributing to it a definite form [*forma*] and a language [*oratio*] or a certain behavior [*actio*] appropriate [*adcommodata*] to its character [*dignitatem*]. (4.66 [Caplan, LCL])

At the end of the section, *ad Herennium* further notes that

> Haec conformatio licet in plures res, in mutas atque inanimas transferatur.
>
> [*Conformatio*] may be applied to a variety of things, mute and inanimate. (4.66 [Caplan, LCL])

Two examples depict the use of *conformatio*. First, to a mute and inanimate city, *ad Herennium* attributes speech that agrees with the character of that city. Namely, the invincible city[8] (i.e., a "mute and inanimate" thing), characterized by numerous trophies, unconditional triumphs, opulence, and a longstanding inability to be conquered (i.e., "character"), is cast as petitioning its tumultuous citizens, "Do you now suffer to be trod upon and trampled underfoot by worthless weaklings?" (i.e., words attributed in keeping with its character; 4.66 [Caplan, LCL]). Second, *ad Herennium* scripts the dead Lucius Brutus as returning to life, appearing, and chastising the people (4.66). Here, Lucius Brutus (i.e., "an absent person"), who defeated kings, created liberty, and put his own life at risk to free the fatherland (i.e., "character"), rebukes those who do the exact opposite

[8] Rome, of course.

by bringing in tyrants, failing to preserve liberty, and abandoning freedom (i.e., "language appropriate to his character;" 4.66). In both examples, the language assigned is appropriate to the entity in whose mouth that language is scripted. Unfortunately, *ad Herennium* neither provides an example of *conformatio* applied to a thing "lacking form" (that is, an abstract idea) such as Wisdom, Fate, or Love,[9] or applying a behavior (*actio*) in lieu of speech.[10]

Again, *ad Herennium* offers no explicit advice for how to structure a *conformatio*, but the examples follow the pattern of the first two *sermocinatio* examples. Both examples of *conformatio* (1) identify a subject, (2) characterize that subject, and (3) conclude by attributing speech to that subject.

Thus, *ad Herennium* offers four conceptual conventions for the implementation of *conformatio*. Namely, *conformatio*:

(1) attributes language (or behavior) to a person or thing;

(2) the subject to which one attributes speech can be:

a. an absent person by imagining them as present,

b. the dead,

c. a mute and inanimate thing, or

d. an abstract idea;

---

[9] Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* offers Vergil's creation of Rumor, Prodicus' creation of Pleasure and Virtue, and Ennius' creation of Death and Life, and the *Progymnasmata* of [Hermogenes] and Apthonius offer Menander's creation of the character Elenchos (refutation) as examples of speech-in-character applied to abstract ideas or things. Quintilian, *Inst.*, 9.2.36; Hermogenes, *Prog.*, 20.10; Aphthonius, *Prog.*, 34.15.

[10] Since *conformatio* can apply behavior to a character, it may seem odd to use the term *speech*-in-character. Because, in the larger picture of this project, I am only interested in attributions of *speech* to imagined speakers, the technical term "speech-in-character" remains quite useful and none the worse for wear.

(3) requires the attributed language or behavior to be appropriate to the character of that person or thing; and

(4) follows an implicit pattern of identification of the speaker → characterization of the speaker → *conformatio* / attributed speech.

Synthesis: Speech-in-Character

From the above analyses, though *sermocinatio* and *conformatio* overlap to a considerable degree in *ad Herennium*'s presentation of speech-in-character, three differences emerge. First, both *sermocinatio* and *conformatio* involve the attribution of language, but only *conformatio* allows the attribution of behavior. Second, as both *sermocinatio* and *conformatio* can attribute speech to a person, *conformatio* further stipulates that this person, though absent, is imagined as if he or she were present. Third, only *conformatio* envisions attributing speech or behavior to non-person, inanimate, mute, or abstract things. Said otherwise, every element of *sermocinatio* can appear in *conformatio*, but *conformatio* can include elements that lie outside the scope of *sermocinatio*. As such, the elements of *sermocinatio* comprise one tool that can be employed in the broader and more complex practice of *conformatio*. This observation corroborates with the general trend for treatments of rhetorical theory to progress from simpler to more complex skills;[11] *ad Herennium* addresses *sermocinatio* first because it amounts to one piece that speakers and writers can use to assemble the more complex *conformatio* puzzle.

Being able to see past the similarities and to recognize the differences between *sermocinatio* and *conformatio* allows one to see the distinction between these two terms

[11] As Theon writes, "Easier exercises come before more difficult exercises [πρότερα γὰρ τὰ ῥᾶστα τῶν δυσχερεστέρων]." *Prog*. 65.10-11.

more clearly. That is, technically speaking, one may use *sermocinatio* by itself or *conformatio* by itself, but one can never use both simultaneously, even though elements from *sermocinatio* can contribute to *conformatio*. For instance, attributing speech to persons who are present in a narrative qualifies as *sermocinatio* but not *conformatio*, since the latter requires persons to whom speech is attributed to be absent. Additionally, speech attributed to an inanimate object is by definition *conformatio* but not *sermocinatio*, since *sermocinatio* does not involve the attribution of speech to inanimate objects. So, despite their potential similarities, because *sermocinatio* involves attributing speech to persons who are present (conversing with one another in a narrative, perhaps) while *conformatio* attributes speech to persons who are specifically absent, it is never possible for an assigned speech to be both *sermocinatio* and *conformatio* in *ad Herennium*'s terms. Nevertheless, note that *sermocinatio* and *conformatio* in fact do the exact same thing in *ad Herennium*'s treatment (i.e., attribute speech to another character); the sole distinction *ad Herennium* makes regards the identity of the subject(s) in whose mouth words are scripted (i.e., a person, an inanimate object, or an abstract idea).

Structurally speaking, though *ad Herennium* does not explicitly require any formal structural patterns, four of its five examples adhere to a general tripartite pattern of (1) identification, (2) characterization, and (3) attribution of speech. The sole exception is the unfinished example of *sermocinationes consequentes*.

One final note about the presentation of speech-in-character is appropriate. When discussing the proper use of the voice, *ad Herennium* writes:

> Si qua inciderint in narrationem dicta, rogata, responsa, si quae admirationes de quibus nos narrabimus, diligenter animum advertemus ut omnium personarum sensus atque animos voce exprimamus.

> If in the Statement of Facts there occur any declarations, demands, replies, or exclamations of astonishment concerning the facts we are narrating, we shall give careful attention to expressing with the voice the feelings and thoughts of each personage. (3.14 [Caplan, LCL])

Though *ad Herennium* does not identify these occurrences specifically as *sermocinatio* or *conformatio*, these concepts seem to be in mind. That is, the supposed interjections do not physically come from the mouth of an audience member. Rather, when introducing "outside" interjections into the main speech, *ad Herennium* specifically requires the main speaker to tend carefully and accurately to the character of each person presumably speaking, and he or she achieves this through appropriate inflections of the voice. Thus, *ad Herennium* not only assumes that speeches-in-character will be evident to the reader or speaker, but voice inflection provides one additional means by which to inform the audience that there has been a change in speakers.

To synthesize the treatment of *sermocinatio* and *conformatio* as speech-in-character, *ad Herennium* espouses the following conventions:[12]

(1) a speaker or author attributes speech to another subject;

(2) the subject to which one applies speech can be a person, an inanimate thing, or an abstract concept,

    a. if the subject is a person,

        i. it can either be a specific person, a specific type of person, or an unspecified person,

        ii. the person can be someone living or dead,

[12] Given that *ad Herennium* does not envision the simultaneous use of *sermocinatio* and *conformatio*, how is a synthesis of these two mutually exclusive practices justified? First, the basic element of each practice is identical, namely, the attribution of appropriate speech to an imagined speaker. Second, Quintilian will note how certain writers have divided various aspects within speech-in-character into limited categories much like *ad Herennium* has done (*Inst*. 9.2.31). Third, it is clear from Quintilian (*Inst.* 9.2.32) and [Hermogenes] (*Prog.* 20.7-18) that the broader picture of speech-in-character can include both of the aspects of what *ad Herennium* respectively calls *sermocinatio* and *conformatio*.

iii. if absent, the person is envisioned as present;

b. if the subject is mute and inanimate or abstract, it is depicted as possessing the ability to speak or act;

(3) the attributed speech must match the character of the subject to which it is applied;

(4) there is an implicit pattern which progresses from identification of the speaker → characterization of the speaker → attributed speech; and

(5) during performance, a speaker should inflect the voice only moderately to capture the thoughts and feelings of an imaginary speaker.

Though *ad Herennium* employs different terms than we will find in other writers who address speech-in-character,[13] it will become obvious from the following discussions that all of these treatments have the same concept in mind. Indeed, Quintilian explicitly makes this point by identifying *sermocinatio* as προσωποποιία (*Inst.* 9.2.31).

Quintilian: Institutio Oratoria[14]

Introduction

Having been appointed by Vespasian in 71 C.E., Quintilian taught rhetoric in his state-sponsored office until he retired *circa* 91-92 C.E. Soon thereafter, Quintilian began working on his rhetorical treatise *Institutio Oratoria*, which he completed in 95 or 96

[13] On the one hand, this is due in large part to the fact that *ad Herennium* is composed in Latin, while most of the other texts are composed in Greek. On the other hand, at least one important Latin writer, Quintilian, is familiar with and prioritizes the Greek terminology (*Inst.*, 9.2.29, 31, etc).

[14] For the Latin text of Quintilian's treatment of speech-in-character, I use Donald A. Russell's Latin Loeb edition and translation. Quintilian, *The Orator's Education* (*Institutio Oratoria*)*: Books 9-10* (ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell; LCL 127; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 51-55.

C.E.[15] In *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian aimed to account for the lifelong education of the orator, beginning with childhood, moving through adulthood, and idealistically arriving at a full, mature, and perfect orator.[16] As such, with the transition to Quintilian, this investigation jumps forward between one hundred seventy-five and one hundred eighty years to examine a treatment of rhetorical speech-in-character at the end of the first century C.E.

Analysis: Fictiones Personarum / Προσωποποιία

As part of his treatment of figures of thought (*Inst.* 9.2), Quintilian addresses speech-in-character as one such rhetorical technique that "[forms] a departure from simple ways of making a statement" and "[varies] and [animates] a speech to a remarkable degree" (9.2.1, 29 [Russell, LCL]). Though Quintilian does not supply a formal definition of speech-in-character, he does discuss the terminological difficulties involved in the technique, various functions of the technique, and a litany of conventions for how to use the figure successfully.

From the very beginning of Quintilian's discussion, the terminological problems (introduced in the previous discussion of *ad Herennium*) involved in discussing speech-in-character come to the fore.[17] First, Quintilian provides both Latin and Greek technical terms for the rhetorical technique under consideration—*fictiones personarum* and προσωποποιίαι (9.2.29)—neither of which are employed by *ad Herennium*, which uses

[15] Kennedy, *New History*, 177-80; Russell, ed., *The Orator's Education (Institutio Oratoria): Books 1-2* (ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell; LCL 124; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1-3.

[16] Kennedy, *New History*, 181-82.

[17] For a list of the various terms used for speech-in-character by ancient rhetoricians, see my discussion above and/or Heusch, "Die Ethopoiie," 13-14.

sermocinatio and *conformatio*.[18] Second, Quintilian, though writing in Latin, favors the Greek term προσωποποιία and uses it instead of the Latin term throughout the rest of the passage (9.2.29, 31, 37). Third, Quintilian is aware that some writers use different terms to discuss similar concepts. Specifically, Quintilian notes that some writers limit the scope of προσωποποιία to instances in which the speaker or writer invents both the person (*corpora*) speaking and the reported speech (*verba*; 9.2.31). Such writers then define cases in which the characters involved in conversation are real persons as διαλόγους or *sermocinationem*; in this type, because the character is a real person, the speaker or writer must only create the imagined speech (9.2.31). Thus, some writers not only use various terms to discuss a given figure, but in doing so they make terminological distinctions within the practice of speech-in-character based on which elements a speaker or author must invent in the process of composing an imagined conversation.

Quintilian himself, however, does not follow this tradition of dividing the various aspects of speech-in-character; rather, he opts to "follow the now established usage in calling them both by the same name," προσωποποιία (9.2.32 [Russell, LCL]). Thus, for Quintilian, whether the speaker or writer simply invents the imagined speech or more elaborately creates both the speech and the character speaking, the same term applies.[19]

---

[18] For instances in which Quintilian records the Greek προσωποποιία(ι), Russell switches without explanation between the use of the English transliteration, prosopopoiia (9.2.29), and the Latin loan word, *prosopopoeia* (9.2.31, 37; 1.8.3). For consistency, I have adjusted each occurrence of προσωποποιία to "prosopopoiia" throughout the translations.

[19] Quintilian, however, throws something of a wrench in his terminological simplicity, as a few sections later he introduces what he calls ἠθοποιία (9.2.58). Quintilian writes, *imitatio morum alienorum, quae* ἠθοποιία *vel, ut alli malunt*, μίμησις *dicitur, iam inter leniores adfectus numerari potest: est enim posita fere in eludendo. Sed versatur et in factis et in dictis*… That is, Quintilian identifies the representation (*imitatio*) of the character (*morum*) of another person through attributed speech (*dictis*) or actions (*factis*) as ἠθοποιία or μίμησις. The hair Quintilian must split in order to maintain a distinction between these two terms is incredibly thin, as the only differences between Quintilian's presentation of προσωποποιία and ἠθοποιία seem to be that ἠθοποιία addresses gentler "emotions" (9.2.58 [Russell, LCL]) and can include the attribution of behavior. Otherwise, attributing words that represent the character of

What is more, Quintilian believes that the practice of calling both techniques by a single term has become largely established by the end of the first century C.E. (9.2.32).

Concerning the functions of προσωποποιία, in addition to creating variety and liveliness in a speech (9.2.29),[20] Quintilian suggests that this figure is particularly useful for three purposes (9.2.30). Quintilian writes:

> His et adversariorum cogitationes velut secum loquentium protrahimus (qui tamen ita demum a fide non abhorrent si ea locutos finxerimus quae cogitasse eos non sit absurdum), et nostros cum aliis sermones et aliorum inter se credibiliter introducimus, et suadendo, obiurgando, querendo, laudando, miserando personas idoneas damus.
>
> We use them (1) to display the inner thoughts of our opponents as though they were talking to themselves (but they are credible only if we imagine them saying what it is not absurd for them to have thought [*cogitasse eos non sit absurdum*]!), (2) to introduce conversations [*sermones*] between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, in a credible manner [*credibiliter*], and (3) to provide appropriate characters [*personas*] for words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or pity. (9.2.30 [Russell, LCL])

Thus, first, προσωποποιία is an effective way to disclose the thoughts or views of one's opponent(s) by imagining an opponent talking to him or herself. In order for this feature of προσωποποιία to be effective, however, the speaker or writer must script words for the opponent that are credible for the imagined opponent to have spoken or thought. Said otherwise, the words assigned to the opponent must accurately match the character of the

---

another speaker coheres seamlessly with and adds nothing to Quintilian's treatment of speech-in-character (9.2.30-37). Though Lausberg fails to see the nigh contradiction in Quintilian's treatment, see his discussion in Lausberg, *Handbook*, §824.

[20] See also *Inst*. 6.1-5, where Quintilian uses prosopopoiiai as a way to enliven and diversify a speech in order not to be off-putting due to a straightforward repetition of facts. Similarly, in their treatments of style, [Demetrius] and Cicero note the usefulness of προσωποποιία to color a speech. [Demetrius] writes that προσωποποιία is a "figure of thought producing forcefulness" (σχῆμα διανοίας πρὸς δεινότητα). For, the speech "is made to appear much more lively (πολὺ γὰρ ἐνεργέστερα) and forceful (δεινότερα) by the characterizations (προσώπων); rather, it actually becomes a drama (δράματα)." [Demestrius], *On Style*, 265-266. Cicero writes that "impersonation of people (*personarum ficta*)" is "an extremely brilliant method of amplification" (*De or.* 3.205 [Rackam, LCL]). Similarly, Cicero writes in *de Inventione* that a speaker can produce variety by changing one's method of presentation; "At times you can sum up in your own person... but at other times you can bring on the stage (*inducere*) some person or thing (*personaram aut rem aliquam*) and let this actor sum up the whole argument" (1.99 [Hubbell, LCL]).

opponent in whose mouth they are placed. Second, προσωποποιία can introduce conversations into a rhetorical context, either between oneself and others, or simply between other characters.[21] In order to be persuasive, these conversations must also be credible, such that the imagined characters could reasonably have said the words scripted in their respective voices. Third, προσωποποιία can serve to "provide appropriate characters for words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or pity" (9.2.30 [Russell, LCL]). Essentially, through προσωποποιία, a speaker or writer may introduce characters possessing specific character traits in order to reveal and comment on some element pertinent to a given rhetorical situation. In this way, a speaker or writer selects

[21] First, Stowers seems to read Quintilian's comment that προσωποποιία can "introduce (*introducimus*) conversations" as a reference to something of a formal "introduction" or "introductory passage" preceding a subsequent conversation, such as may occur in an apostrophe (especially in Rom 2:1-5, 17-29). Stowers, *Rereading*, 100-2, 144-49; idem., "Apostrophe," 358; cf. R. Dean Anderson Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* (rev.; Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 18; Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 201-3, cf. 203n34. Stowers is followed by Bates, *Hermeneutics*, 196-97, 196n52-58. This, however, is not the only way to read Quintilian. Quintilian does not mean that προσωποποιία provides the formal introduction of an imaginary speaker for an upcoming prosopopoetic speech; rather, Quintilian intends that the *use* of προσωποποιία submits into, includes, brings in, puts forth, appropriates, delivers or otherwise introduces a conversation into a specific rhetorical context. That is, what Quintilian suggests when he writes that προσωποποιία can "introduce conversations" has nothing to do with apostrophe or the composing of a formal introductory passage, but with the presentation of the actual prosopopoetic conversation for one's audience, however it may be comprised. Such a reading of Quintilian is defensible from the fact that Quintilian nowhere else in the pericopae on speech-in-character discusses a formal introduction to a prosopopoetic speech (much less an introduction *as* προσωποποιία), and, furthermore, from the fact that Quintilian's sole obsession with προσωποποιία is the attribution of words to an imaginary speaker in one form or another. Second, Stowers later writes that the introduction of *conversations* "obviously involves addressing [a] person who is imagined to be present and is, therefore, akin to apostrophe," in which the actual speaker "participates by addressing an imagined person." Stowers, "Apostrophe," 361. Again, Stowers misses the mark. On the one hand, apostrophe only involves the actual speaker turning to speak to an imagined person but not engaging in any back-and-forth conversation. On the other hand, because speech-in-character attributes speech to *another speaker*, the only portions of an imaginary conversation that qualify as speech-in-character are the lines spoken in the voice of one's imaginary dialogue partner. Thus, for Quintilian (and all of the writers I will examine), προσωποποιία or speech-in-character technically has to do with the attribution and presentation of *speech* in the voice of another person and not with the preceding introduction of the speech, though prosopopoetic speeches usually do have some type of introduction. So, while I agree with Stowers that apostrophe can work alongside speech-in-character to "introduce" and begin to characterize an imagined speaker (as in Rom 2), by definition apostrophe is distinct from προσωποποιία. In fact, Stowers himself begins to equivocate at times, noting that apostrophe "makes present an imaginary person," but speech-in-character "has an imaginary person speaking with someone." Stowers even submits, "Little is at stake in deciding if apostrophe to imaginary persons might be called προσωποποιία." Ibid.

particularly relevant characters in order to advance the plot or argument in a specifically measured way.[22]

To begin discussing the conventions for composing a speech-in-character, Quintilian notes that attributed speech must be "appropriate" to the imagined speaker's character in order to be most effective.[23] Illustrating this need for appropriate words, Quintilian writes elsewhere that because they each have a different character, "Caesar, Cicero, and Cato will all have to be assigned different ways of giving the same advice (*namque idem illud aliter Caesar, aliter Cicero, aliter Cato suadere debebit*)" (*Inst*. 3.8.49 [Russell, LCL]). Indeed, to ensure that one attributes words that are appropriate to a given character, the speaker or writer must not only consider the character of the imagined speaker, but also his or her "fortune, position, and career," as well as the subject about which the speech is being made (3.8.50-51 [Russell, LCL]).

Additionally, though the character in whose mouth a speaker or writer scripts speech is often a human, Quintilian mentions several other viable candidates.[24] For instance, one may assign words to the gods, the dead,[25] or inanimate cities or nations (9.2.31). Quintilian notes, however, the delicacy required to employ these subjects effectively, since doing so "transcend[s] the bounds of nature" (9.2.32 [Russell, LCL]). To model acceptable attributions of speech to mute and inanimate characters, Quintilian

---

[22] In Book 3.8.54, Quintilian provides an example of Cicero setting up characters for particular rhetorical functions. Namely, "Cicero in the *Pro Caelio* makes Appius Caecus and Clodius, her brother, address Clodia, the one to rebuke her vices, the other to encourage them" ([Russell, LCL]).

[23] See also *Inst* 6.1.25-27 and 11.1.39-41 on the effectiveness of appropriate speeches-in-character in appealing to one's emotions.

[24] See also *Inst*. 11.1.41.

[25] See also Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.28, where he allows that one may "raise the dead from the grave (*defunctos excitare*)" (Russell, LCL).

includes two examples from Cicero's first oration against Catiline.[26] The first example imagines if Cicero's "country, which is dearer to [him] than [his] life, if all Italy, if the whole commonwealth, were to say to [him], 'Marcus Tullius, what are you doing?'" (9.2.32 [Russell, LCL]; Cicero, *Cat.* 1.27). Quintilian's second example scripts the country pleading with Catiline and "somehow, without uttering a word, [crying], 'For some years past, no crime has been committed except by your doing'" (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.32 [Russell, LCL]; Cicero, *Cat.* 1.17-18). By imagining the speech as hypothetical ("if") and highlighting the collective ("all", "whole") quality of the country in order to align it with speaking individuals, and by noting how the mute country paradoxically cries "without uttering a word" (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.32 [Russell, LCL]), respectively, Quintilian soothes the unnaturalness inherent in assigning words to a character that cannot naturally speak.

Beyond inanimate and mute objects, however, it is also possible to personify and imagine abstract concepts in dialogue. Thus, "Vergil invented Rumour, Prodicus (according to Xenophon's report) (invented) Pleasure and Virtue, and Ennius (invented) Death and Life" (9.2.36 [Russell, LCL]). The orator can even imagine an unspecified speaker (*incerta persona*), introduced with phrases such as, "at this point someone says," or "someone may say" (9.2.36 [Russell, LCL]).[27] Finally, Quintilian allows that speech

---

[26] Cicero, *In Catilinam* (trans. C. MacDonald; LCL 324; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

[27] On this point, Stowers is correct that the general "introductory phrases tell the reader that someone is about to speak, but they do not identify who this speaker is. The reader must infer an identity from the words of the imaginary speaker themselves in light of clues from the preceding discourse." Stowers, "Apostrophe," 356. To Stowers, I simply add one clarification, namely, the preceding discourse usually in fact provides enough context to allow an audience to infer sufficiently the character type or the identity of the imagined speaker. Though it is not a perfect parallel because there is not an indication that any new speaker has entered the scene, even if general and unspecific, see my following discussion of Quintilian's example from Vergil's *Aeneid* 2.29 and the pertinent footnotes.

can occur in προσωποποιία without any indication of the speaker, such as Vergil models in the *Aeneid*, "Here camped the Dolopes, fierce Achilles here" (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.37 [Russell, LCL]; Vergil, *Aen.* 2.29). Quintilian writes,

> Est et iactus sine persona sermo:
> 'hic Dolopum manus, hic saevus tendebat Achilles.'
>
> One can even have speech without any person:
> "Here camped the Dolopes, fierce Achilles here." (9.2.37 [Russell, LCL])

In this case, Quintilian writes that subtraction (*detractionem*)[28] is combined with προσωποποιία by omitting the speaker's identity (9.2.37). This example, however, is highly problematic on two accounts. First, though Quintilian suggests that Vergil provides no indication of *who* is speaking, what is actually missing is any overt indication that any *other* character is necessarily speaking at all, as Vergil includes no verb of speech to signal the introduction of speech-in-character. Second, allowing that this example is speech-in-character based on Quintilian's identification of it as such, in its original context, Vergil in fact identifies the supposed speakers through Aeneas' recollection of what "*we*" (*nos*; *Aen*. 2.25) *Trojans* did when they went to explore the presumably abandoned Greek camps. That is, though these words are not placed in the mouth of specific persons, the imagined speakers must be the unspecified Trojans who are characteristically overjoyed at the thought that the Greeks have sailed home (*Aen.* 2.25-28). Consequently, though Quintilian claims that speech-in-character can occur without any identification of the speaker, his example fails to demonstrate the rule. Instead, the example suggests that speech-in-character includes an identifcation of the

[28] For Quintilian, "subtraction" (*detractionem*) is a category of figures that intentionally omits certain elements in the interest of brevity, novelty, or rhetorical force, such as what should be evident from the context (συνεκδοχῇ), conjunctions (asyndeton), or verbs (ἐπεζευγμένον; *Inst*. 9.3.58-64).

speaker (i.e., unspecified Trojoans), but it may omit a clear indication that another speaker is in fact speaking at a particular time.[29] As a result, though one may maintain despite Quintilian's failed example that speech-in-character can occur without any identification of the speaker's identity because that is what Quintilian specifically states, one should be twice as cautious when applying this category to concrete examples of speech-in-character. Indeed, in such cases, one must look at the broader context for whatever clues are present as a way, first, to recognize the mere presence of speech-in-character and, second, to attempt to identify the supposed speaker.

Furthermore, προσωποποιία does not have to represent an "actual" speech, but it can suggest imaginary or hypothetical speech (*ficta oratio*) as well (9.2.36).[30] In such fictive speeches, the writer or speaker imagines what a speaker would hypothetically say in a given situation, such as "someone may say" (9.2.36 [Russell, LCL]).

Similarly, προσωποποιία is not limited to use in speeches, but it is also applicable to written documents (9.2.34) and narratives (*speciem narrandi*; 9.2.37). To demonstrate the use of speech-in-character in a written document, Quintilian relates the account of Asinius; when an opponent put forth a will leaving his possessions to his benefactor, Asinius critiques the opponent's character by imitating it in a will imaginatively

[29] Without recognizing the problematic example, scholars routinely take Quintilian simply at his word. See, for instance, Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 227; Stowers, "Romans 7:7-25," 187; idem., "Apostrophe," 256-57; idem., *Rereading*, 20; Campbell, *Deliverance*, 533; Lausberg, *Handbook*, §824.1. The closest exception to this rule is R. Dean Anderson Jr., who recognizes that, though Quintilian allows that a "speech may be inserted without indication of the person," in this example from Virgil "there is little room for misunderstanding that προσωποποιία is being used," and in both rhetorical and philosophical texts with speech-in-character "a formal introduction and identification of the speaker is inevitably present." *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 202-3. See also Anderson, *Glossary*, 106. Anderson does not, however, actually demonstrate how this works with respect to Quintilian's example, nor does he recognize that the example nevertheless excludes any specific indication that a different speaker has even come on the scene. Indeed, this latter failure will prove quite significant in analyzing the various arguments for speech-in-character in Rom 3 (Part Three).

[30] See also *Inst*. 4.1.28, where Quintilian writes that, in an epilogue, one can "put imaginary speeches into the mouths of [one's] characters (*fictam orationem induere personis*)" (Russell, LCL).

composed in the voice of the opponent that excludes his mother from any inheritance (9.2.34-35). As a narratival example, Quintilian quotes Livy's *History of Rome*, who casts envoys sent by Romulus to Rome's neighboring states in order to procur marriage rights declaring, "Cities, like other things, sprang from humble beginnings; then, if helped by their own valour and by the gods, they made great wealth and a great name for themselves" (Quintilian, *Inst*. 9.2.37 [Russell, LCL]; Livy, *Hist.* 1.9.3).

Structurally speaking, however, Quintilian gives no formal requirements concerning the arrangement of speech-in-character. Nevertheless, by investigating the fuller context of the sources from which Quintilian draws his examples, a consistent pattern becomes apparent. For instance, in *in Catilinam* 1, Cicero first identifies the upcoming speaker as "your country" (*te patria*), then characterizes the country as an authoritative and powerful judge who hates and dreads Catiline and is fully convinced that Catiline was seeking to destroy her, and finally attributes words to the country that indict Catiline (1.17-18). In *Cat.* 1.27, Cicero again introduces this country (*patriae*) which he has previously characterized as altogether opposed to Catiline and imaginatively scripts the country asking Cicero whether he plans to sit idly by or do something to impede Catiline. Similarly, in Quintilian's (misrepresented) example from Vergil's *Aeneid* 2.1-29, Aeneas imagines the experience of the Trojans (i.e., "speakers"), who, overjoyed by the thought that the Greeks had apparently sailed home (i.e., "character"), went out to explore the Greeks' abandoned camps and marvelled the notion that Achilles had once camped there (i.e., "credible speech"). In the case of Asinius, Quintilian explains that an opponent (i.e., "speaker") put forth a will that would leave his estate to his benefactor (i.e., "character;" *Inst.* 9.2.35). Then, in an invented will, Asinius

parodies the opponent's character by carrying it out to its logical extremes, suggesting that the opponent would abandon his own mother (i.e., "credible words;" 9.2.34). Finally, in *History of Rome* 1.9.1-3, Livy depicts how in Rome's early years she lacked a sufficient population of women to populate the city. So, in need of women (i.e., "characterization"), the senate and Romulus sent envoys (i.e., "speakers") to neighboring states to petition for the right of intermarriage (i.e, "credible words"). Consequently, every example Quintilian lifts from his sources evinces three elements in its original context: (1) an identification of the speaker, (2) a characterization of the speaker, and (3) a prosopopoetic speech that is credble given the characterization of the speaker.

Finally, in book 1 of *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian addresses the proper use of one's voice. In doing so, Quintilian briefly advises how one should perform a speech-in-character so as to be most rhetorically effective. Quintilian writes:

> Nec prosopopoeias, ut quibusdam placet, ad comicum morem pronuntiari velim, esse tamen flexum quendam quo distinguantur ab iis in quibus poeta persona sua utetur.
>
> Nor do I think that prosopopoiiai, as some advise, should be pronounced in the manner of the comic stage, though there should be some inflection of the voice to distinguish them from passages in which the poet speaks in his own person. (1.8.3 [Russell, LCL])

Here, Quintilian directs the reader to nuance one's voice when speaking in the voice of another character, as this signals for one's auditors the presence of different speakers. In his treatment of προσωποποιία (*Inst*. 9.2.29-37), however, Quintilian never indicates any stipulations regarding how to demarcate or identify the speakers when composing speech-in-character. Nevertheless, Quintilian supposes that such shifts in speakers will be

apparent enough,[31] so that the only advice he is able to offer students is to "let [them] understand" (*intellegat*) (1.8.2 [Russell, LCL]).[32]

In summary, Quintilian teaches the concept of speech-in-character according to the following conventions:

(1) a speaker or writer invents and assigns words to a character;

(2) the character to whom words are attributed can be real or invented, including:

    a. specified or unspecified humans,

    b. gods,

    c. the dead,

    d. inanimate and mute objects,

    e. abstract concepts, and

    f. unidentified speakers;

(3) the assigned speech can represent actual or hypothetical conversations;

(4) the assigned words must be credible and not absurd for that character to have thought or spoke, agreeing with the character, fortune, position, and career of the imagined speaker, as well as the subject of the speech;

(5) speech-in-character may be effectively employed in speeches, narratives, and written documents;

(6) an implicit pattern includes identification of the speaker → characterization of the speaker → attributed prosopopoetic speech;

---

[31] Similarly, Stowers writes, "My point is that people with some education in Paul's world were trained to 'read' for—meaning to listen for—speech according to character, and they composed their writings accordingly… [Quintilian] thus assumes that the reader understood when to modulate his voice according to the 'person speaking,' whether or not there was a formal introduction." Stowers, "Apostrophe," 354.

[32] To "let him understand," Russell inferentially adds, "his text."

(7) speech-in-character may or may not explicitly indicate when and where another speaker enters the conversation;

(8) when reading a speech-in-character for an audience, one should inflect his or her voice in order to signal a change of speaker; and

(9) speech-in-character serves particular functions:

   a. to disclose an opponent's thoughts,

   b. to introduce conversations, either

      i. between oneself and others, or

      ii. between others with themselves, and

   c. to provide specific characters for various rhetorical purposes.

Summary: Ad Herennium *and Quintilian on Speech-in-Character*

In this chapter I have analyzed and explained the presentation of speech-in-character in *ad Herennium* and Quintilian, respectively. In doing so, though a relatively harmonious understanding of speech-in-character has emerged (see below), a few differences between the two must be noted. First, *ad Herennium* and Quintilian represent two distinct ways of classifying speech-in-character. As discussed above, Quintilian uses the term προσωποποιία to cover the whole range of speech-in-character.[33] Quintilian is aware, however, that some writers make categorical distinctions contingent on whether a speaker or writer must invent the words *and* the person of the speaker (προσωποποιία), or simply the words (*sermocinatio*). Interestingly, *ad Herennium* models just such a practice, as it divides speech-in-character into the categories of *sermocinatio*, which only invents the words, and *conformatio*, which invents both the words and the character of the

[33] Cf. the footnote on Quintilian's terminological hair splitting, and *Inst.* 9.2.58.

speaker. Second and third, *ad Herennium* does not comment specifically on the function(s) of speech-in-character or on its use in narrative or written documents, whereas Quintilian does. Fourth, only Quintilian seems to allow that speech-in-character may be present even when it is not clearly marked.

Nevertheless, *ad Herennium* and Quintilian assemble a relatively united front with respect to the core elements in the practice of speech-in-character. The following conventions are present in both texts:

(1) a speaker or writer crafts speech and attributes it to an imaginary speaker;

(2) the character to whom speech is attributed can be:

a. a person, a type of person, or a group of people,

b. a dead person,

c. an unspecified person,

d. an inanimate object, or

e. an abstract concept;

(3) the attributed speech can be real or hypothetical;

(4) the attributed speech must align with the character of the supposed speaker;

(5) one should inflect the voice when performing a speech-in-character; and

(6) the examples used to depict speech-in-character follow a common pattern:

a. identification of a speaker,

b. characterization of the speaker, and

c. the delivery of an appropriate speech-in-character.

Having addressed the presentation of speech-in-character in the rhetorical handbooks, I set them aside momentarily. Though I return to the handbooks in my final

assessment of speech-in-character, I turn now to another type of source that discusses the attribution of speech to other characters, the *Progymnasmata*.

CHAPTER THREE

Speech-in-Character in the *Progymnasmata*

In this chapter on *Progymnasmata*, I will examine the treatments of speech-in-character by Theon and [Hermogenes]. Though the differences in Aphthonius and Nicolaus will be discussed in the footnotes, I exclude them from comprehensive engagements due to their fourth- and fifth-century compositions, respectively.[1] I will follow the same pattern as I did in Chapter Two on the handbooks, first offering a close reading of each text in its own right, and then placing the two texts in conversation with one another in order to assess their similarities and differences.

Theon: Προγυμνάσματα[2]

Introduction

Identifying the historical Theon—and thereby dating the *Progymnasmata* attributed to him—is tricky. The tenth-century *Suda* records an entry on Aelius Theon of Alexandria, who composed a work on progymnasmata (Θ 206). Is this Aelius Theon the

[1] I have placed the Greek texts and my translations of Theon, Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus in Appendix A.

[2] For the Greek text of Theon's treatment of speech-in-character, I follow Michel Patillon and Gioncarlo Bolognesi, eds., *Aelieus Theon: Progymnasmata* (Budé; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002), 70-73. See also Leonardus Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2; Leipzig: Teubner, 1854), 115-18; and Butts, *Theon*, 444-64. All Greek translations are my own. For additional translations of Theon, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 47-49; Butts, *Theon*, 444-64.

Scholars have traditionally cited references to Theon's *Progymnasmata* by noting the page and line numbers in Spengel's edition. Patillon's text, however, disrupts the line divisions of Spengel's text without providing an alternative reference system. Consequently, Spengel's reference system remains the most accessible, but Patillon's text does not fit the mold. For these reasons, in Appendix A I have readjusted the line divisions of Patillon's text to cohere with Spengel's divisions; the bracketed numbers refer to the text's page and line numbers in Spengel, and [P #] indicates the page number in Patillon.

author of the *Progymnasmata* attributed to Theon, and, if so, when did he live? Despite attempts to attribute this *Progymnasmata* to another "Theon" in the fifth century C.E.,[3] the scholarly consensus is that Aelius Theon of Alexandria indeed composed this *Progymnasmata* in the first century C.E.[4] First, because Theon references Theodorus of Gadara and Dionysius of Halicarnassus and thus establishes a *terminus post quem*, he could not have written this *Progymnasmata* before the end of the first century B.C.E.

---

[3] Malcom Heath, "Theon and the History of the Progymnasmata," *GRBS* 43 (2002/3), 129, 141-58. On the face of things, Heath puts forth a seemingly strong case. When one digs a little deeper, however, it becomes clear that Heath's presentation is not altogether fair to the complete body of evidence. Rather, Heath selects and chooses only the elements that best support his case. To be sure, part of Heath's selectivity is due to the fact that he cannot analyze *all* of Theon's *Progymnasmata* in a single essay. But it is precisely in some of the sections where Heath does not spend much time that questions arise and problematize his methodology and argument. For example, with respect to speech-in-character, there are remarkable similarities between Quintilian and Theon that Heath does not discuss. First, both Quintilian and Theon refer to the whole scope of speech-in-character as προσωποποιία (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.32; Theon, *Prog.* 115.12). If, as Heath argues, Theon had known and used the text of [Hermogenes], which, like *ad Herennium*, distinguishes between types of speech-in-character based on the subject in whose voice speech is scripted, and if Theon was more characteristic of the later Progymnasmatic writers who also distinguish between types of speech-in-character, should one not expect Theon also to distinguish between the types of speech-in-character? On this score, however, Theon disappoints. Indeed, Theon's sole point of connection is with Quintilian in the first century C.E. What is more, Quintilian even remarks that such a presentation of speech-in-character had become the general consensus in the first century (9.2.32). Thus, Theon's classification of speech-in-character is right at home in the first century C.E. but would be altogether out of place among the fourth- and fifth-century Progymnasmatists. Second, it is only Quintilian and Theon that expand so broadly with respect to the aspects of a given speaker's character and the rhetorical context that one must keep in mind when composing appropriate words for that imagined speaker. None of the later Progymnasmatic writers go into such explicit detail as Quintilian and Theon, who specify that one must keep in mind the character, the fortune, the social status, and the vocation of the speaker, as well as the subject about which a speech is being composed (Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.8.50-51; Theon, *Prog*. 115.22-116.22). As it stands, due to Theon's similarities to Quintilian and differences from the later Progymnasmatic writers on the topic of speech-in-character, there are strong reasons to locate Theon in the first century C.E.

[4] G. Reichel, *Questiones Progymnasmaticae* (Ph.D. diss., Leipzig, 1909), 30, 115-27; Willy Stegemann, "Theon (5)," *PW* 5A (1934), 2037-54, especially 2037-39; Butts, *Theon*, 1-5; Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O'Neil, *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric: Volume 1: The Progymnasmata* (Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations Series 27; Graeco-Roman Religion Series 9; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 63-64; Patillon and Bolognesi, *Aelieus Theon*, viii-xvi; Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 72-77; Stowers, "Romans 7:7-25," 180; Hock, "The Rhetoric of Romance," 454. George Kennedy originally assumed a first-century C.E. date for Theon, but he has since broadened his view to allow anytime between "the Augustan period and the flowering of the Second Sophistic in the second century after Christ." George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 616; idem., *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Roman World 10; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 1. Nevertheless, Kennedy affirms, "It is the consensus of scholarly opinion that [this Progymnasmata] is, in any event, the earliest surviving work on exercises in composition." Ibid.

Second, Theon's similarities with Quintilian on the classification of prosopopoiia permit Theon a place squarely in the middle of the general consensus of the mid- to late-first century CE, which later progymnasmatic writers uniformly do not follow. Third, Theon's placement of the *chreia* exercise first in his list of progymnasmata,[5] a feature unique among the *Progymnasmata*, parallels Suetonius' first-century list (*On Grammarians and Rhetors* 25.4).[6] Fourth, the cognomen "Aelius" fits well into the Alexandrian context surrounding the first century, as it could have come to Theon or one of his ancestors from the Roman prefect of Egypt, Aelius Gallus (26-24 B.C.E.), or from Hadrian (Publius Aelius Hadrianus Augustus) when he visited Alexandria in 130 C.E.[7] *If* the cognomen stems from Hadrian, two options allow Theon's *Progymnasmata* to remain a methodologically sound source for the study of Paul: (1) it is entirely possible that Theon could have composed this *Progymnasmata* some time before receiving the cognomen, which was only later connected to the *Progymnasmata* in the *Suda*'s sources, or (2) though written a few decades later, the contents depict and genuinely fit within the first-century rhetorical millieu, as documented by Quintilian and Suetonius.[8] For these reasons, I follow the consensus to date Theon early rather than late.

---

[5] Butts has persuasively argued for the original order of Theon's *Progymnasmata*, the first exercise being *chreia*. Butts, *Theon,* 8-22.

[6] Patillon and Bolognesi, *Aelius Theon*, xii-xvi.

[7] Patillon and Bolognesi prefer to argue that the cognomen was given to one of Theon's ancestors in the first century B.C.E. and passed down to Theon. Ibid., xvi. Interestingly, though Heath knows Patillon and Bolognesi, he altogether ignores the former option. Heath, *Theon*, 142. For a scholar referencing Patillon and dating Theon to the first half of the second century C.E., see Heusch, "Die Ethopoiie," 14, 14n22.

[8] Patiollon and Bolognesi, *Aelius Theon*, xvi.

Analysis: Προσωποποιία

Theon treats προσωποποιία sixth in his collection of elementary exercises (προγυμνάσματα) in Greek rhetoric and composition.[9] To begin the discussion, Theon defines προσωποποιία as

> Προσωποποιΐα ἐστὶ προσώπου παρεισαγωγὴ διατιθεμένου λόγους οἰκείους ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀναμφισβητήτως.
>
> Prosopopoiia [προσωποποιία] is the introduction of a person [προσώπου] who non-controversially [ἀναμφισβητήτως] sets forth words that are appropriate [οἰκείους] both to the person himself and to the subjects [πράγμασιν][10] being set forth. (115.12-14; P 70)

In order to supplement his definition, Theon provides several examples of contexts for which a student would be expected to invent speech.[11] Theon divides his examples into two types, those with unspecified speakers and those with specified speakers (ὡρισμένων... προσώπων; 16-17). For examples of προσωποποιία with an unspecified speaker, Theon suggests as contexts "what words a husband would say to his wife when he is about to depart" (14-15), or "what a general would say to his soldiers when encountering dangers" (15-16). In both examples, the speaker represents a type of person rather than a specific husband or general, respectively. For προσωποποιίαι that imagine specific speakers, however, Theon puts forth as exemplary contexts "what words Cyrus

---

[9] See Butts, *Theon*, 8-22.

[10] Here, πράγμασιν may be more exhaustive than the specific translation "subjects" suggests. For Theon, πράγμασιν certainly includes the subject to be discussed, but it could also apply to the circumstantial or contextual details set forth in which a speech is to take place. Thus, the translation of πράγμασιν more generally as "things," "holisitc circumstances," or something similar. On this note, see also Butts, *Theon*, 460n.3.

[11] In the strictest sense, Theon does not provide any examples of προσωποποιία, since he never actually records the words that would be attributed to a supposed speaker. The first progymnasmatic writer to include an actual speech-in-character is Aphthonius, concerning "What words Niobe would say while her children lie dead." *Prog*. 35.15-36.20.

would say while marching against the Massagetae" (17-18), or "what Datis would say while conversing with the king after the battle of Marathon" (18-19). In these latter examples, the imagined speakers are the clearly defined personages of Cyrus and Datis, respectively. Thus, when engaging in προσωποποιία, one may attribute suitable words either to unspecified or specified persons.[12]

Another word, however, is necessary about Theon's specific example of Datis; namely, the example of Datis' words with king Darius after Marathon seems thoroughly hypothetical, as no record of such a speech seems to have existed in antiquity.[13] At minimum, no such speech remains extant in any of the primary sources Theon might have known.[14] As such, it appears that Theon employs this example in order to guide his students to compose an imaginative speech based on what they already know about Datis,

---

[12] Gibson reads Theon's (and Nicolaus') treatment of speech-in-character quite uniquely. Gibson argues, Theon and Nicolaus "seem to regard prosopopoiia as a tool for an author or speaker's self-presentation, rather than as a means of attributing speech to character's other than one's self. So Theon suggests that the exercise is useful in speeches in which we exhort, console, demand, dissuade, or seek forgiveness... and that it has a practical application in letter writing." Gibson, "Prosopopoeia," 9-10. Gibson's reading, however, is untenable. First, Theon himself defines speech-in-character as the "introduction" or "entrance" (παρεισαγωγή) of a person to whom appropriate words are attributed. Obviously, if Theon intended to present his own person through prosopopoiia, there would be no need to introduce another speaker. Second, Theon's specific examples prove that he has a different speaker in mind than himself; Cyrus speaks, Datis speaks, and Herodotus—a Greek—attributes speech to non-Greeks. Third, though Theon writes that prosopopoiia is useful when "we" are trying to achieve certain rhetorical purposes (to exhort, dissuade, console, and so forth), this in no way demands that there are contradictions in Theon's treatment. Rather, one should read Theon's discussion on the functions of speech-in-character in light of his own definition and use of speech-in-character. Thus, when reading Theon in light of Theon, Theon must mean that a speaker or author attributes words to an additional speaker for a given rhetorical purpose. As a result, though the speaker or author invariably controls the imagined speaker and his or her speech for a particular rhetorical goal in the speech or narrative as a whole, there is nevertheless speech attributed to another speaker that coheres with the character of the imagined speaker. *In fact*, this understanding of the usefulness of speech-in-character in Theon is precisely one aspect of what Gibson identifies as the broader result of progymnasmatic education in speech-in-character, and with which I agree entirely, that "students take away from it a skill to be applied elsewhere." Gibson, "Prosopopoeia," 9.

[13] Ctesias even holds that Datis died during the battle of Marathon. Ctesias, *History of Persia* 13.22, 25.

[14] The following is a non-exhaustive but demonstrative list. Ctesias, *History of Persia* 13.22, 25; Herodotus, *The Persian Wars*, 6.111-120; Cornelius Nepos, *Militiades* 5.4; Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, 10.27.1-3; 11.2.2; Plutarch, *Aristides* 5.1.1; Demosthenes, *Against Neaera* 94; Plato, *Laws* 3.698.c.

his defeat in the battle of Marathon, and King Darius, even though there is no record of such a speech *actually* occuring in antiquity. From this, it is clear that Theon does not limit προσωποποιία to attributions of words actually spoken, but he also allows the exercise to portray imaginary or hypothetical speech.

Of primary importance to Theon in the creation of προσωποποιία, however, is the requirement that the attributed speech be suitable to the rhetorical species of the speech and its rhetorical situation. With resepct to rhetorical species, Theon contends

> Ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῆς γυμνασίας πίπτει καὶ τὸ τῶν παρηγορικῶν λόγων εἶδος, καὶ τὸ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐπιστολικῶν.
>
> Under this genus [γένος] of exercises [γυμνασίας] fall the species [εἶδος] of consolation [παρηγορικῶν], exhortation [προτρεπτικῶν], and epistolary [ἐπιστολικῶν] speeches. (115.20-22; P 70)

Thus, within the genus (γένος) of prosopopoetic exercises, Theon notes that there are three distinct species (εἶδος) of speeches: consolatory (παρηγορικῶν), exhortatory (προτρεπτικῶν), and epistolary (ἐπιστολικῶν; 20-22).[15] To assist and ensure that his students compose speeches within the parameters of a given species and rhetorical context, Theon directs his students to understand and hold in proper balance the

[15] Because Paul's literature falls under the epistolary genre, one might wonder whether Paul's implementation of speech-in-character falls within Theon's proposed category of "epistolary" speech-in-character. The answer is no, and the distinction is as follows. Paul's authentic letters attribute speech-in-character to other imagined speakers (see Chapter Five). In epistolary speech-in-character, the whole letter is itself a speech-in-character. That is, an epistolary speech-in-character is a letter written in the name of someone who did not in fact write it; epistolary speech-in-character applies to the practice of pseudepigraphy. Thus, if any of the letters in the New Testament are deemed deutero-Pauline or otherwise pseudonymous, *these* examples might fall under the category of epistolary speech-in-character. Non-Christian examples of epistolary speech-in-character include but are by no means limited to the letters of Alciphron, Aelian, and Philostratus. Harry O. Maier, *Picturing Paul in Empire: Imperial Image, Text and Persuasion in Colossians, Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 31-35; Patricia A. Rosenmeyer, *Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 193-233, 255-338, esp. 259-62; and Carol Poster, "A Conversation Halved: Epistolary Theory in Greco-Roman Antiquity," in *Letter Writing Manuals and Instruction from Antiquity to the Present* (Carol Poster and Linda C. Mitchell, eds.; Historical and Bibliographic Studies; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 28, 43 n.14.

personalities (το... πρόσωπον) of the speaker and the addressee (τὸ [πρόσωπον] πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος), the speaker's age (ἡλικίαν), the occasion (καιρόν) of the speech, the place (τόπον) in which the speech takes place, the social status (τύχην) of the speaker, and the subject matter (ὕλην) about which someone is going to to make a speech (22-27). Indeed, Theon continues,

> Ἔπειτα δὲ ἤδη πειρᾶσθαι λόγους ἁρμόττοντας εἰπεῖν.
>
> Only after making these considerations should one attempt to speak suitable [ἁρμόττοντος] words. (115.27-28; P 70)

For, a single speech is not appropriate to any and every context. Rather, different speeches are appropriate for different speakers, contexts, and subjects; suitable speech is contingent on a particular speakers age, gender, social status, vocation, character, and race, as well as on the place in, the occasion on, the audience to, and the subject about which a particular speech is delivered (115.28-116.22). Said otherwise, in order for προσωποποιία to be effective, it must exhaustively account for the world in which the speech hypothetically takes place.[16]

But Theon does not expect his students to work through the vast diversity of persons and subjects entirely on their own (22-24). Rather, to help students navigate through the complexity of persons and subjects, Theon outlines a number of appropriate starting places (ἀφορμάς) for given subjects. For example, if the goal is to exhort (προτρέποντες; 27-28) or request something (117.4-5), the student should script the speaker saying certain kinds of things, such as that what is being exhorted or requested is "easy, good, and fitting; that it is beneficial, just, reverent, pleasant" (116.28-32), and so forth (116.32-117.4). If the intention is the opposite of exhortation, however—that is, to

[16] Similarly, see Aristotle, *Ars Rhetorica* 3.7.1-7.

dissuade (ἀποτρέποντες)—then the speaker should say precisely the opposite (117.5-6). Similarly, Theon suggests different stock starting places for consolation (παρηγορῶμεν) (6-24) or to request forgiveness (24-28). In every case, however, "One must argue from whichever common-places are admissible, for all common-places are not suitable for all prosopopoiiai which are under the same species" (28-30).

Finally, though he leaves this thought undeveloped, Theon notes that προσωποποιία is especially helpful for depictions of character types (ἠθῶν) and emotions (παθῶν; 117.30-32).

Structurally, Theon gives no advice with respect to the formal arrangement of προσωποποιία. What is more, Theon's "examples" leave much to be desired in terms of creating some kind of consistent pattern. First, *none* of Theon's "examples" of προσωποποιία present the supposed speech. Second, Theon's example of προσωποποιία using Datis as a specific speaker is a completely hypothetical scenario, so there is no concrete example to examine in his source text(s).[17] Third, the only example Theon provides for which an extant narrative exists in the primary literature is that of Cyrus marching against the Massagetae, narrated in Herodotus' *Persian Wars* 1.201-16. Unfortunately it is painfully unclear for which context in the narrative Theon intends for his students to compose a speech. Does Theon envision his students composing an imaginary speech concerning what Cyrus would have said to the Queen of the Massagetae, Tomyris, when attempting to form a marriage alliance before any battle began, for which Herodotus only includes indirect speech (1.205)? For Cyrus's words to his councilors when deliberating how to respond to Queen Tomyris's requests, to which

[17] Theon seems to rely on Herodotus' *Persian Wars* 1.201-16 and 6.111-20 for his two examples of προσωποποιία with specific speakers.

Herodotus simply alludes (1.206)? For Cyrus's reported rejection of Queen Tomyris's appeals, which Herodotus again places in indirect speech (1.208)? Or, does Theon expect his students to compose what Cyrus said concerning his dream about Darius, even though that bears little more relationship to the battle with the Massagetae than as a retrospective foreshadowing (1.209-210)? Or does Theon have in mind the whole narrative, with all of its various possibilities for speech? All that is to say, precisely what context Theon has in mind with respect to Cyrus's march against the Massagetae is quite unclear. For any of the options mentioned above, however, three elements would invariably be present in light of the narrative as a whole: (1) an identification of Cyrus as the speaker (1.201, 205, 206, etc.), (2) a characterization of Cyrus and the Massagetae (1.201-205), and (3) the attributed prosopopoetic speech. What is additionally clear from Theon's examples is that every context for which Theon imagines invented speech assumes a clear indication that someone other than the writer gives voice to the scripted words, whether that is a specific individual (i.e., Datis) or an unspecified person (i.e., a husband).

Therefore, when outlining the various elements of Theon's presentation of προσωποποιία, the following conventions take shape:

(1) προσωποποιία involves crafting and attributing speech to a person;

(2) the person for whom speech is scripted may be a specific person or a general type of person;

(3) the attributed speech may be actual or imaginary;

(4) the attributed speech must be appropriate for:

a. the imagined speaker's character, age, race, social status, gender, and vocation,

b. the addressee's character,

c. the occasion and place a speech is delivered,

d. the subject engaged in the speech;

(5) the example of Cyrus allows for a pattern of identification of speaker → characterization of that speaker → attributed speech-in-character;

(6) there is a clear indication that someone else is speaking;

(7) one may use stock starting places appropriate for given subjects;

(8) the three primary types of speeches composed under προσωποποιία are:

a. consolation,

b. exhortation,

c. epistolary;

(9) προσωποποιία can emphasize the character or the emotion of the speaker.

[Hermogenes]: Προγυμνάσματα[18]

Introduction

The progymnasmatic treatise attributed to the second-century rhetorician Hermogenes has also been attributed to Libanius, and Priscian's translation even attributes it to either author.[19] When the diverse authorial attributions are coupled with the fact that the compiler of the Hermogenic corpus included in it the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius rather than the one attributed to Hermogenes, it seems quite clear that

[18] For the Greek text of Hermogenes' Προγυμνάσματα, I rely on Hugo Rabe, ed., *Hermogenis Opera* (Rhetores Graeci VI; Leipzig: Teubner, 1913), 20-22. All Greek translations are my own. For an additional translation, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 84-85. References to Hermogenes will indicate the page and line number(s) of a given text in Rabe's edition. [S #] refers to the respective page number in Spengel's edition.

[19] Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 73; Heath, "Theon," 150.

Hermogenes's authentic authorship is doubtful.[20] What is more, scholars date the treatise quite broadly, ranging from the second to the fourth century C.E. The sole historical marker serving as the general *terminus post quem* is the text's reference to Aelius Aristides, who lived during the second century from 117-181 C.E. Thus, the treatise could have been composed at any point after Aristides's rise to popularity, but scholars generally agree that it was composed before the *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius and Nicolaus.[21] Given the post-Pauline date of this *Progymnasmata*, its inclusion serves three goals: (1) to illustrate that certain diverse features of speech-in-character witnessed in the first century B.C.E. persist into later rhetorical theory; (2) to provide a measure by which to compare Theon, and (3) to demonstrate the ways in which the two later *Progymnasmata* of Aphthonius and Nicolaus address speech-in-character in distinction from the first-century C.E. treatments of Quintilian and Theon.

Analysis: ἠθοποιία, προσωποποιία, εἰδωλοποιία

Hermogenes's treatment of speech-in-character comes ninth in its arrangement of progymnasmata, and it begins by distinguishing and defining the three types of speeches-in-character. First, Hermogenes defines ἠθοποιία as follows:

> Ἠθοποιία ἐστὶ μίμησις ἤθους ὑποκειμένου προσώπου.
>
> Ethopoiia [ἠθοποιία] is an imitation [μίμησις] of the character [ἤθους] of an imagined [ὑποκειμένου] person [προσώπου]. (20.7-8; S 15)

[20] Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 73; Heath, "Theon," 158-59. For an overview of the arguments and the maintenance of Hermogenic authorship, see Hock and O'Neil, *Progymnasmata*, 158-60. Recognizing that Hermogenic authorship is doubtful, from here on I nevertheless refer to the author of this treatise as "Hermogenes" for the sake of simplicity.

[21] Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 73; Hock and O'Neil, 159; Heath, "Theon," 159.

Furthermore, the immediately following example concerning which words Andromache would say to Hector clarifies that such "imitation" has to do specifically with attributions of speech, since the dependent variable in the example is limited to Andromache's *words* (λόγους; 8-9).[22] In fact, Hermogenes affirms this reading in his explanation of the differences between ἠθοποιία and προσωποποιία when he writes,

> ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ δήλη· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὄντος προσώπου λόγους πλάττομεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐκ ὂν πρόσωπον πλάττομεν.
>
> The difference is clear: for, there (ethopoiia), we invent [πλάττομεν] speeches for a person that exists [ὄντος προσώπου], but here (prosopopoiia), we invent a person that does not exist [οὐκ ὂν πρόσωπον]. (20.12-14; S 15)

Thus, for Hermogenes, ἠθοποιία is an imitation of the character of an imagined speaker by assigning speech that accurately models the character of that imagined speaker. Second, Hermogenes characterizes προσωποποιία as

> προσωποποιία δέ, ὅταν πράγματι περιτιθῶμεν πρόσωπον.
>
> Prosopopoiia [προσωποποιία], however, is when we apply a personality [πρόσωπον] to a thing [πράγματι]. (20.9-10; S 15)

Additionally, as quoted above, in προσωποποιία "we invent a person that does not exist (οὐκ ὂν πρόσωπον)" (14). Again, Hermogenes's examples indicate that speech is involved in προσωποποιία, as Elenchos speaks in Menander (frag. 545), and the Sea specifically "makes speeches" (ποιεῖται τοὺς λόγους) in Aristides (Hermogenes, *Prog.* 20.10-12).[23] Consequently, προσωποποιία involves both inventing a "person" and crafting speech for that "person." Finally, third, Hermogenes defines εἰδωλοποιία as follows:

---

[22] Similarly, Stowers writes, "In all of these writers, ἦθος means using *words* to portray a person's character." Stowers, "Rom 7:7-25," 181, emphasis mine.

[23] Aristides's speech of the Sea to the Athenians seems to be no longer extant. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 84n.43.

> εἰδωλοποιίαν δέ φασιν ἐκεῖνο, ὅταν τοῖς τεθνεῶσι λόγους περιάπτωμεν.
>
> And, they say it is eidolopoiia [εἰδωλοποιίαν] whenever we attribute speeches to the dead. (20.14-16; S 15)

Thus, εἰδωλοποιία is when a writer scripts speech for a dead person, as Aristides assigns speech to dead people in his speech *Against Plato on Behalf of the Four* (*In Defense of Oratory* 319-343; Hermogenes, *Prog.* 20.14-18). If we boil down each of these three types of speech-in-character, however, a lowest common denominator emerges; for Hermogenes, speech-in-character involves crafting and assigning speech to a supposed speaker, the only difference being the character to which those speeches are attributed.

So, to whom may a writer attribute speech when engaging in speech-in-character? The examples discussed above provide some answers. First, one may attribute speech to known humans, such as Andromache (8). Second, one may attribute speech to personified abstract ideas, such as Elenchos in Menander (10), or to inanimate objects, like the Sea in Aristides (11-12). Third, one may even assign speeches to the dead, as Hermogenes indicates with Aristides' attributions of speech to dead people in his *Against Plato on Behalf of the Four* (*In Defence of Oratory* 319-343; Hermogenes, *Prog.* 16-18). Finally, Hermogenes writes that one may script speech for definite (ὡρισμένων) persons, like Achilles (19, 21-23), or indefinite (ἀορίστων) persons, such as "what type of words *someone* would say to his family when he is about to depart" (19-21).

In addition to distinguishing between speeches-in-character based on the identity of the supposed speaker, however, Hermogenes also divides speech-in-character into the categories of "single" and "double" (20.24-21.2). Technically, Hermogenes is speaking about ἠθοποιία (20.24), but there is no reason to suppose that these categories would not similarly extend to προσωποποιία and εἰδωλοποιία, since an invented personage or a dead

person must inevitably speak alone or to others. In any case, by "single," Hermogenes means that the supposed speaker does not address other characters but delivers a speech by him or herself, such as a monologue (21.1-4). For example, what a general would say when he returns from victory is a "single" speech-in-character (2-4). A "double" speech-in-character, however, occurs when the supposed speaker addresses other characters on the scene, such as what that general would specifically say to his army after a victory (1, 4-5).

Additionally, a speech-in-character may be ethical (ἠθικαί), pathetical (παθητικαί), or mixed (μικταί; 10-11). Said otherwise, speeches-in-character emphasize either the character of a speaker ("ethical"), the emotion of a speaker ("pathetical"), or a mixture of both ("mixed;" 11-18).

Regardless of any categorical distinction, however, when someone assigns words to an imaginary speaker, the writer must attribute appropriate words to the imagined speaker and context. Hermogenes writes,

> Πανταχοῦ δὲ σώσεις τὸ οἰκεῖον πρέπον τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις τε καὶ καιροῖς.
>
> Throughout, you will preserve what is appropriately fitting [τὸ οἰκεῖον πρέπον] for the imagined [ὑποκειμένοις] persons [προσώποις] and occasions [καιροῖς]. (21.6-7; S 15)

This even includes using figures and making precise diction choices[24] that represent the character of the imagined speaker appropriately (22.4-5). For, Hermogenes informs,

[24] Aphthonius and Nicolaus offer additional stylistic concerns in their *Progymnasmata*. Aphthonius writes, "You will elaborate the ethopoiia in a style that is clear, concise, brilliant, unconstrained, and freed from any inversion or figure." *Prog.* 35.11-13. Similarly, Nicolaus writes, "The reported speech should be composed with rather short and natural phrases, but not with long periods, for to be concerned with one's way of speaking is foreign to emotion, and it is characteristic for those who lament to bring forth concisely and briefly one thing after another." *Prog.* 66.9-15.

people who are young or rejoicing speak differently than people who are old or grieving, respectively (21.7-9).

Finally, in the composition of a speech-in-character, Hermogenes suggests that the elaboration (ἐργασία) should advance through a temporal progression.

> Ἡ δὲ ἐργασία κατὰ τοὺς τρεῖς χρόνους πρόεισι· καὶ ἄρξῃ γε ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων, ὅτι χαλεπά· εἶτα ἀναδραμῇ πρὸς τὰ πρότερα, ὅτι πολλῆς εὐδαιμονίας μετέχοντα· εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰ μέλλοντα μετάβηθι, ὅτι πολλῷ δεινότερα τὰ καταληψόμενα.
>
> The elaboration [ἐργασία] advances according to the three times [χρόνους]; begin with the present [τῶν παρόντων], because it is difficult; then run back to the past [τὰ πρότερα], because it shares in much happiness; then, jump forward to the future [τὰ μέλλοντα], because the things that are going to happen are much worse.[25] (21.19-22.3; S 16)

To structure an extended speech-in-character effectively, therefore, Hermogenes suggests that the temporal progression should begin by discussing the circumstances of the present (τῶν παρόντων), then turn back to consider the way things were in the past (τὰ πρότερα), and finally conclude by jumping forward to imagine what will happen in the future (τὰ μέλλοντα; 21.19-22.3).

With the exception of the temporal arrangement of the attributed speech, however, Hermogenes provides no other formal requirements concerning the structure of a speech-in-character as a whole. Though Hermogenes does not provide any complete examples of speech-in-character,[26] in their original contexts, his concrete examples betray a pattern. For instance, the first example Hermogenes employs considers what Andromache would say about Hector (20.8-9; 21.14). On the one hand, the context seems quite vague in

[25] The note that things in the future are "much worse" is in relation to a specific context. Depending on the context for any given speech-in-character, the events of any temporal period will be nuanced accordingly.

[26] Like Theon, Hermogenes does not record any attributed speeches. Rather, Hermogenes's "examples" uniformly put forth hypothetical contexts for which his students might compose speeches.

Hermogenes's text, as Andromache doubtlessly could say many things about Hector in many different contexts. Nicolaus the Sophist will also use this example in his *Progymnasmata*, though he will specify that the context for Andromache's supposed speech was "when Hector fell" (πεσόντος Ἕκτορος; *Prog.* 64.12). On the other hand, when Nicolaus's use of Andromache as an example is combined with the fact that Homer indeed records a speech from Andromache to the dead Hector when she learned of his death, it becomes more likely that Hermogenes had the same context in mind.[27] As such, when one examines the Homeric context from which Hermogenes draws the example, a simple structure is visible. Homer first identifies the forthcoming speaker as the wife of Hector (*Il*. 22.437), then characterizes Andromache in the midst of her despair (22.437-476), and concludes with speech-in-character which imitates Andromache's severe grief over the loss of Hector (477-514). Such is also the case with Hermogenes's other Homeric example of speech-in-character, "What words Achilles would say about Patroclus" when he died (*Prog.* 21.15-18). Again, Homer first identifies a potential speaker, Achilles (*Il*. 18.2), then characterizes that speaker's grief (22-35), and concludes by composing speech-in-character that matches Achilles' intense distress over the loss of Patroclus and his plans for battle (78-93, 97-126). Finally, the same pattern emerges in Hermogenes's example from Aristides's *In Defence of Oratory*, in which Aristides introduces Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles as potential speakers (2.319), characterizes these men as injustly accused by Plato (2.319-20), and finally "resurrects"

[27] Regardless of whether Andromache's speech to Hector when she learned of his death is the exact context Hermogenes had in mind, this particular speech does nevertheless represent one example of "what words Andromache would say about Hector." Thus, whether this example fits Hermogenes's truncated exemplary context intentionally or accidentally remains impossible to verify, but, in either case, it nevertheless fits.

and attributes speech to them in an imaginary defence against Plato (2.321ff). In these ways, Hermogenes's examples reveal a pattern of (1) identification, (2) characterization, and (3) attribution of speech-in-character.

Condensing Hermogenes's treatment of ἠθοποιία, προσωποποιία, and εἰδωλοποιία as speech-in-character into a brief outline, therefore, produces the following results:

(1) a writer crafts speech and attributes it to an imagined speaker;

(2) the subject to whom speech is attributed may be

    a. a known person or type of person,

    b. an unspecified person,

    c. abstract concepts,

    d. inanimate objects, or

    e. the dead;

(3) the attributed speech must be appropriate

    a. to the characters involved in conversation, and

    b. to the contexts;

(4) the attributed speech should map chronologically from the present, back to the past, and then forward to the future;

(5) a character may speak "singly" by oneself or "doubly" to others;

(6) a speech-in-character may emphasize character, emotion, or both; and

(7) the implied structure follows a pattern of identification of the speaker → characterization of the speaker → attributing speech appropriate to the character of that speaker.

Summary: Theon and [Hermogenes] on Speech-in-Character

In this chapter, I have presented the approaches to speech-in-character offered in the *Progymnasmata* of Theon and Hermogenes, respectively. When juxtaposed, the elements common to Theon and Hermogenes include:

(1) crafting and attributing speech to an imagined speaker;

(2) the imagined speaker may be a specific person or a general type of person;

(3) the attributed speech must be appropriate to

   a. the character of the imagined speaker, and

   b. the occasion of the speech;

(4) the attributed speech may be actual or imagined;

(5) speech-in-character can emphasize either

   a. the character of the speaker (ethical), or

   b. the emotion of the speaker (pathetical); and

(6) the implied structure follows a pattern of identification of the speaker → characterization of the speaker → the attribution of speech-in-character.

Despite these similarities, there are also several interesting differences. To begin, Theon's attention to the context for which assigned words must be appropriate is significantly more robust than that of Hermogenes, as Theon aims for his students to hold assigned speech in balance with elements of character, audience, age, occasion, place, social status, and the subject of the speech, while Hermogenes only specifies attention to character and occasion. Additionally, Theon highlights the functions and subjects speech-in-character might address—consolation, exhortation, and epistolary—and he provides

detailed notes concerning what kinds of things to say in each kind of speech.[28] Hermogenes, however, advances no further in this respect than to allow that speeches may emphasize character, emotion, or both, which, with the exception of the mixed category, is present in Theon as well.[29]

Though the text attributed to Hermogenes is the shortest of the four extant *Progymnasmata*, it similarly includes material not present in Theon and makes up for its brevity with novelty. For, Hermogenes's text introduces into the progymnasmatic corpus several features that differ markedly from Theon's treatment, on the one hand, and that preempt by at least one century the later progymnasmatic writings of Aphthonius and Nicolaus, on the other hand. For example, based on the textual evidence, Theon for all intents and purposes seems to be unaware of the option to divide speech-in-character into the categories of ἠθοποιία, προσωποποιία, and εἰδωλοποιία with respect to the identity of the imagined speaker. Indeed, without noting the possibility that others might reserve the term προσωποποιία to attributions of speech to inanimate or abstract characters, Theon uses προσωποποιία solely to speak of assigning speech to humans, which Hermogenes accounts for under ἠθοποιία.[30] What is more, if somewhat lackluster, Hermogenes adds

---

[28] Nicolaus also considers the rhetorical functions to which one might place speech-in-character, but he casts the discussion in terms of the three species of rhetoric, encomium, judicial, and deliberative, with an added nod towards the exercise's applicability in writing letters. *Prog.* 66:16-67:9.

[29] Regarding the function of speech-in-character in ethical, pathetical, or mixed categories, Nicolaus writes, "Someone either focuses on general principles (i.e., character) or on what has happened from a given circumstance (i.e., emotion), for in this way character differs from emotion." Said otherwise, ethical speeches highlight what character traits belong to certain character types (such as, to a coward), but pathetical speeches emphasize what certain characters might do in a specific, usually highly charged, context. *Prog.* 64.5-13.

[30] Aphthonius similarly divides speech-in-character into the three categories of ἠθοποιία, προσωποποιία, and εἰδωλοποιία based on the identity of the imagined speaker. Aphthonius, *Prog.* 34.2-18. Nicolaus only mentions two categories, ἠθοποιία and προσωποποιία. For Nicolaus, ἠθοποιία begins with defined persons and only creates speech, but προσωποποιία requires the invention of the person and the applied words. *Prog.* 64:1-3; 64:20-65:10.

the categories of "single" and "double" speeches-in-character. And, more constructively, Hermogenes is the first to give any explicit advice concerning the general arrangement of the attributed speech according to present, past, and future times.[31]

Thus, as Chapter Two compared and contrasted the portrayals of speech-in-character in *ad Herennium* and Quintilian, Chapter Three has demonstrated the similarities and differences between the *Progymnasmata* of Theon and Hermogenes, respectively. It is time, therefore, to conclude this consideration of the theoretical aspects of speech-in-character as it both would and could have been relevant to the apostle Paul. Thus, I turn now to Chapter Four, in which I first gather together the core elements pertinent to speech-in-character and common to all of the writers currently under investigation and, second, isolate the features unique to each writer to which Paul might have had access in his first-century context.

---

[31] Aphthonius also advises dividing speech-in-character in accordance with the three times. Aphthonius, *Prog.* 35.13-14. Nicolaus similarly advises dividing speeches-in-character into the three times, but he arranges the times slightly differently; one should begin in the present, move back to the past, return to the present, and finally contemplate what might happen in the future. Nicolaus, *Prog.* 65.11-66.8.

Because Gibson emphasizes Hermogenes and Aphthonius, he includes this division into the three times as one of the central characteristics of progymnasmatic speech-in-character. What is more, by examining the "themes" of speech-in-character, Gibson writes that one common component of speech-in-character is that "the speech is most often imagined as taking place after the death of a loved one, or when a stereotyped character is confronted with a situation antithetical to a component of that stereotype." Because of these underlying structures and themes, Gibson is unable to find any instances of formal speech-in-character in the New Testament. "Prosopopoiia," 3-4. Contrary to Gibson, because I date Theon early and lessen the influence of Aphthonius and Nicolaus on methodological grounds, the temporal division of speech-in-character is an element unique to Hermogenes and therefore only a subsidiary or optional element in my analysis. Additionally, Theon's engagement with the function of speech-in-character to exhort, dissuade, console, and so forth broadens the potential "themes" of speech-in-character exponentially wider than Gibson's limited treatment. As a result, when it is recognized that *ad Herennium*, Quintilian, and Theon neglect to require such temporal divisions, and when the potential or likely "themes" of speeches-in-character are reconsidered in light of Theon's broader agenda, the New Testament is opened up to prosopopoetic analysis that would not be possible in Gibson's model, as I show in Chapters Five and Eleven.

CHAPTER FOUR

Speech-in-Character: A Synthesis

Methodologically speaking, for the synthesis of speech-in-character offered in this chapter to have been potentially relevant for Paul, its elements must have been in practice before or near the time of his epistolary endeavors. To ensure methodological soundness, in this examination I have prioritized one text from the first century B.C.E. (*ad Herennium*), two texts from the first century C.E. (Quintilian and Theon), and one text from the second (or perhaps early third) century C.E. (Hermogenes). Though any writer of any time period could theoretically employ rhetorical tools that never existed or are no longer extant in the historical evidence, this chapter firmly establishes the elements of speech-in-character that were doubtlessly in use during the first century C.E.

I will first outline the elements of speech-in-character that are common to all of the writers examined in Chapters Two and Three. Because of the prevalence of these core concepts of speech-in-character, one should expect most if not all of these elements to be present in any appropriation of the exercise, including the writings of Paul and other early Christians. Then, I will outline the unique features represented by each of the respective treatments of speech-in-character. Though these unique elements do not enjoy comprehensive endorsement, their presence in *ad Herennium*, *Institutio Oratoria*, or the two earliest *Progymnasmata* demonstrate that they were at least "in the air" and representative of potential stylistic options available in the first and second centuries C.E. Thus, although these unique elements may not be central to the practice of speech-in-

character, their existence in the first and second centuries C.E. demands the possibility that Paul, his coworkers, his scribes, and other early Christian writers very well may have known and used them. The presence or absence of these unique elements will depend, first, on precisely what the author under consideration "knows" with respect to the breadth and depth of the practice of speech-in-character, and, second, on the artistic license of that writer.

Core Conventions of Speech-in-Character

Though each treatment of speech-in-character certainly has its distinctive qualities, the quartet analyzed in Chapters Two and Three also shares a remarkable number of similarities. To be sure, the list of comprehensive similarities will be limited by the lowest common denominator for any given aspect. Nevertheless, the core concepts of speech-in-character shared by *ad Herennium*, Quintilian, Theon, and Hermogenes unite to construct a coherent and functional rhetorical tool. The four qualities each of these writers manifest include:

(1) a writer or speaker crafts and assigns speech to an imaginary speaker;

(2) the assigned speech must appropriately model the character of the speaker;

(3) the assigned speech may be actual (i.e., "someone says") or hypothetical (i.e., "what would someone say," or "someone may say"); and

(4) there is an implicit tendency to include three elements according to the following progression: an identification of a supposed speaker → a characterization of that speaker → an attribution of appropriate speech-in-character.

The consistent depiction of these core elements, therefore, portrays speech-in-character in its simplest form as the crafting and applying to some character actual or imaginary speech that agrees with the character of the imagined speaker.[1] Furthermore, this designation of speech should identify the imaginary speaker, present the character of that speaker, and then attribute words appropriate for that speaker.

If Theon is removed momentarily, the three remaining treatments of speech-in-character reflect additional similarities. That is, *ad Herennium*, Quintilian, and Hermogenes include that

(5) in addition to scripting speech for specified humans, the speaker may be:

a. an unspecified person (i.e., "someone"),

b. a dead person (i.e., "Lucius Brutus returning from the grave"),

c. a personified inanimate object (i.e., "the Sea"),

d. a personified abstract idea (i.e., "Wisdom").

Though not exhaustive, the presence of these similarities across three writers demonstrates that one should be in no way surprised to find them in concrete examples of speech-in-character.[2] In fact, Quintilian's justification for his use of the single term προσωποποιία instead of dividing speech-in-character into three categories serves as something of an accidental apology for Theon's omission of potential imaginary speakers

[1] Aristotle speaks remarkably similarly, arguing that style and subject matter must be "analogous," or agree appropriately. *Ars Rhetorica* 3.7.1-7.

[2] Similarly, in the first century B.C.E., Cicero allows that (1) "even dumb (*muta*) objects must speak" (*Part. Or*. 55 [Rackham, LCL]); (2) that speech may be attributed to humans, inanimate things (i.e., "a place, a city, or a monument"), or abstract ideas (i.e., "a law"; *de Inventione* 1.99-100 [Hubbell, LCL]); and (3) that "orators and philosophers have license to cause dumb (*muta*) things to talk, to call on the dead to rise from the world below, to tell of something which could not possibly happen" (*Topica* 45 [Hubbell, LCL]).

that are not human persons. Quintilian writes, "For we cannot of course imagine a speech except as the speech of a person" (*Inst*. 9.2.32 [Russell, LCL]).

Unique Features of Speech-in-Character

In addition to similarities, every writer evinces features of speech-in-character that are unique. Though these elements do not represent the core concepts of speech-in-character, their presence in the primary literature proves their potential relevance in the first- and second-century context. This means the writers who composed speeches-in-character during that time could have known and used none, some, or all of the variously nuanced approaches to speech-in-character. Thus, these unique nuances represent potential or optional elements that some writers may or may not have drawn on to style their speeches-in-character.

To begin, in distinction from the *Progymnasmata*, *ad Herennium* and Quintilian both comment on the need to inflect one's voice suitably when speaking in the voice of another presumed speaker (*Rhet. Her.* 3,14; Quintilian, *Inst*. 1.8.3). To be sure, this difference is due at least in part to the various authors' intended goal; *ad Herennium* and Quintilian emphasize oratory, whereas the *Progymnasmata* emphasize composition. Both composition and oratory relate to Paul and his letters, however, for compositional emphases would be necessary in letter writing, and oratorical emphases would be important in delivering the letters.[3]

[3] Discovering an autograph with something like Phoebe's marginalia concerning how and where to inflect her voice would truly be a boon of a discovery for understanding Paul's dialogical sections in Rom 3, 7, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, such information is lost in the sands of time, and there is no methodologically sound way to recover the vocal inflections as preformed by Phoebe in the earliest readings of the letter. As I argue below, we can, however, allow the core conventions for speech-in-character to be a guide. In any case, Quintilian assumes that readers will be able to identify speech-in-character and inflect the voice(s) accordingly.

Quintilian provides a number of other unique elements. First, speech-in-character serves a number of general functions, and it will be important to consider whether concrete examples of speech-in-character fit into one of these categories (*Inst.* 9.2.30):

(1) to create variety and liveliness in a speech;

(2) to display the inner thoughts of opponents;

(3) to introduce conversations; and

(4) to provide appropriate characters for specific rhetorical situations.

Second, Quintilian allows that one may attribute words to the gods (9.2.31), and, third, that the medium through which a speech-in-character is presented may be speech, narrative, or a written document (9.2.34, 37). Finally, Quintilian is the only writer who seems to allow that speech-in-character may be present even when it is not overtly indicated that the spoken words are in fact spoken in the voice of another character, and this will prove quite significant when seeking to explain the abrupt transitions in Rom 3:1-9.

Despite his omission of allowing for several standard potential speakers, Theon's treatment of speech-in-character offers several unique elements as well. For instance, Theon remarks that speech-in-character can be most effective in (1) consolation speeches, (2) exhortation speeches, or (3) epistolary documents (*Prog.* 115.20-22; 116.27-117.4). What is more, Theon's exhaustive attention to characterization and the rhetorical context is unsurpassed, as he considers elements of the speaker's character, race, age, social status, gender, vocation, of the audience's character, of the occasion and place of the speech, and of the subject of the speech (115.22-116.22). Finally, Theon's "starting places" offer a rudimentary but novel "how to" approach to speech-in-character (116.22-

117.30). It will be important to consider whether any of these elements improve our reading of concrete speeches-in-character in Chapters Five, Seven, and Eleven.

Finally, though Theon and Hermogenes join together to report that speech-in-character can emphasize the character or the emotion of the speaker (or both, for Hermogenes; Theon, *Prog.* 117.30-32; Hermogenes, *Prog.* 21.10-18), Hermogenes offers the only explicit advice with respect to how to structure attributed speech. Specifically, Hermogenes suggests that the most effective attributed speech will begin in the present time, fall back to the past, and then jump forward to the future (*Prog.* 21.19-22.3). Though other Pauline speeches-in-character (like Rom 7:7b-12, 13b-24, 25b) might resemble this structure, most occurrences are quite brief and do not. I move now to Chapter Five in order to examine and analyze several examples of speech-in-character in Paul's authentic letters.

CHAPTER FIVE

Examples of Speech-in-Character in Paul

The three preceding chapters examined the four primary voices discussing the conventions for the rhetorical figure of speech-in-character through the second century C.E., *ad Herennium*, Quintilian, Theon, and Hermogenes. In these examinations, each text first received analysis in its own right, then in conjunction with its generic counterpart, and finally in comparison to all of the texts under discussion. In this way, the central elements espoused by all or most of the texts rose to the fore. These core features were five in number: (1) the writer or speaker crafts speech and assigns it to an imaginary speaker; (2) the attributed speech must be appropriate to the characterization of the speaker; (3) the speech may be portrayed as actual or hypothetical speech; (4) three elements tend to accompany speech-in-character, namely, an identification of the speaker or an indication that someone else is speaking, a characterization of the speaker, and the attributed speech-in-character; and (5) speech may be assigned to specific humans, unspecified humans, abstract ideas, inanimate objects, or the dead. When examining concrete examples of speech-in-character, one should expect all or most of these features to be present.[1]

The comparative analyses, however, also served to illustrate the unique or less-attested elements represented in each text. For instance, Quintilian suggests three common functions for speech-in-character that prove to be important in the discussions

[1] By "concrete examples," I mean the use of speech-in-character in practice, or the use of speech-in-character that is not confined to the treatments of the figure in the handbooks and *Progymnasmata*.

below, as well as indicating that speech-in-character can be assigned to the gods, or that the figure can even be present without the identification of any speaker at all. Theon also offers a list of standard functions for speech-in-character. Theon's breadth of attributes to keep in mind with respect to the characterization of the speaker and the situation in which the speech occurs, however, is second to none, as is his corpus of suggested starting places that provide cues for how to begin and proceed through a speech-in-character in order to achieve the intended result. Finally, Hermogenes was the only text that suggested anything of a standardized way to structure speech-in-character chronologically; one should start in the present, fall back into the past, and then proceed to consider what might happen in the future. Though these unique elements are less attested than the central or core features, they are nevertheless attested in the relevant literature, and it is at least possible that any writer could have been aware of them and appealed to them in his or her writings. As such, these unique elements function in this analysis as secondary or optional elements for speech-in-character that a writer, such as Paul, may or may not have been aware of and may or may not have employed in order to style a particular example of speech-in-character in a measured way. In the following discussions, it will become clear that Paul indeed implemented several of these features in his uses of speech-in-character.

The works on rhetorical theory analyzed in the preceding chapters, however, cannot be assumed to be a complete representation of the practice of speech-in-character. To be sure, these treatments must be the sure-footed starting point from which to begin studying the rhetorical practice of attributing speech to imaginary speakers, but they cannot constitute one's whole understanding of the exercise. All four of the treatments

examined above are elementary in nature and intended as aides to educate beginners in the proper use of rhetoric in general and, for the purposes of this project, of speech-in-character in particular. For instance, *ad Herennium* is an educational text that provides an introduction to the theory of rhetoric; it is not a document for master rhetoricians.[2] Similarly, Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* is a text aimed at developing an individual beginning with youth throughout the course of his or her rhetorical education into a mature rhetor.[3] The two treatments of *Progymnasmata*, Theon and Hermogenes (as well as Aphthonius and Nicolaus), also aim at the elementary, or "preliminary," education of students in rhetoric and composition.[4]

In more advanced rhetorical texts, therefore, it would be of little surprise to find appropriations of speech-in-character that deviate from or alter the theoretical conventions for the exercise. In fact, it was expected that skilled rhetoricians would amend and conform rhetorical theory to fit the needs of their practical rhetorical situations. On this score, Gibson writes,

> It is clear, then, that although prosopopoiia begins as an *exercise* with certain formal characteristics and no real rhetorical context, students take away from it a *skill* to be applied elsewhere… In the hands of accomplished writers, both ancient and modern, simpler compositional forms either become identifiable component parts of more advanced forms, or are abandoned as forms, leaving behind only particular skills… The original exercise is intended to teach the student how to

---

[2] For instance, *ad Herennium* is addressed to an unidentifiable Gaius Herennius, who wishes to learn rhetoric, and who is advised that "theory without continuous practice in speaking is of little avail; from this you may understand that the precepts of theory here offered ought to be applied in practice" (*ad Herennium* 1.1 [Caplan, LCL]). Whether Gaius Herennius or students in general actually represent the audience of *ad Herennium*, the introductory and instructional motivations remain the same.

[3] On this point, in the prooemium to Book 1, Quintilian expresses his hopes that *Institutio Oratoria* "will be useful for the education of [Marcus Vitorius' (to whom Quintilian dedicates *Inst*.)] son Geta." *Inst*. 1.6. Moreover, Quintilian's treatment begins with the very birth of the child and his elementary education. *Inst*. 1.1.1.

[4] For instance, Theon's *Progymnasmata* is a work "addressed to teachers, not to students," as a way to help teachers best educate youth in the preliminary stages of composition and rhetoric. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 2.

> convey ethos and pathos through attributed speech, and that's all.[5]

This leads Gibson to conclude,

> I would like to suggest that it may be better to view prosopopoiia, *not* as a stable building block of discourse learned in school and plopped into texts, but rather as one ethopoetic technique among many that accomplished writers used in order to advance their rhetorical goals.[6]

Consequently, though one must pay close attention to the general rules represented by *ad Herennium*, Quintilian, Theon, and Hermogenes, it is equally necessary to notice alterations and emendations of those most elementary patterns in practical implementations of speech-in-character, as they may be quite indicative of the author's intended goal in a particular rhetorical context. Indeed, such sensitivity will prove quite fruitful when engaging certain examples of speech-in-character in Paul's letters.

The primary goals of this chapter, then, are four in number. First, the task of this chapter will be to demonstrate that Paul utilized the skill of speech-in-character in his letters. Such a demonstration will, of course, help to ground the discussion of Rom 3:1-9 in light of diatribe and speech-in-character in Part Three.

Second, as the previous three chapters examined the theoretical aspects of speech-in-character and several of the concrete examples of the exercise offered or referenced by them as models, this chapter will expand on the examination of concrete examples by incorporating Paul's authentic letters into the discussion.[7] In this way, the examination of speech-in-character presented here is triangulated by theory, actual rhetorical texts, and Paul's letters.

---

[5] Gibson, "Prosopopoeia," 9, emphasis original.

[6] Ibid., 10.

[7] With one exception, I reserve discussion of Romans until Part Three.

Third, as argued above, it is not sufficient simply to recognize the presence of speech-in-character in a given text. Rather, attention must be given to the degree to and ways in which an author amends the basic conventions. Each discussion below not only documents that Paul has employed speech-in-character, but they also analyze Paul's appropriation of the figure to suit the particular rhetorical context being addressed in that letter or pericope.

Fourth, I will synthesize Paul's examples of speech-in-character. In doing so, I will develop a preliminary snapshot of his use and/or awareness of the central and secondary features of the exercise.

Note, however, that the goal of this chapter is *not* to answer each and every exegetical oddity that arises in the texts under examination. Such engagement lies outside the scope of this project. Instead, only those points of exegesis that significantly influence the shape of the speech-in-character under examination—for instance, concerning the identity of the speaker, the extent of the attributed speech, or the rhetorical context in which the speech occurs—will be engaged directly. Other issues of exegetical quandary, no matter how interesting or perplexing, must be temporarily omitted.

Finally, a preliminary note seems necessary with respect to what might be perceived as a notable difference between the theoretical treatments of speech-in-character and the examples that follow—size. It is true that surviving examples of speech-in-character from Aphthonius (*Prog*. 35.15-36.20) and Libanius,[8] amongst others, are much longer than any of the Pauline texts discussed in this chapter. Indeed, with the exception of Rom 7 (not discussed at length in this project), the Pauline texts tend to

[8] *Libanius's Progymnasmata: Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Craig A. Gibson, trans. and ed.; Writings from the Greco-Roman World 27; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008), 355-425.

script between one and three lines of speech in the voice of the imagined speaker(s). Based on Hermogenes's prescription for speech-in-character to progress through the three times, however, Gibson suggests "a minimum requirement of three sentences."[9]

But does the size of the attributed speech really matter? Ultimately, I do not think the length of the attributed speech is a significant concern for determining whether the rhetorical figure of speech-in-character is in play. First, none of the ancient theorists offer any specific length requirements. Even Hermogenes's (or Aphthonius's or Nicolaus's) suggested chronological progression, on which Gibson grounds his "minimalist" approach, fails to stipulate how long to dwell on each time period. Plus, such a progression can hardly be taken as thoroughly characteristic of speech-in-character, as none of the three earlier theorists show any awareness of it. What is more, rather than composing speeches-in-character in periodic style, the later progymnasmatists Aphthonius (*Prog*. 35.11-13) and Nicolaus (*Prog*. 66.9-15) even comment on the conciseness and brevity with which each line of a speech-in-character should be composed.

Second, the quote from Gibson above already demonstrates the expectation for practical implementations of speech-in-character to be adapted and take on new forms when placed in real (rather than fabricated for scholastic purposes) rhetorical contexts. In such practical implementation, there is no reason a given writer or speaker could not or would not attribute fewer words in some instances than in others, and vice versa. Said otherwise, the prosopopoetic skill might very well be put to use in any length of attributed speech.

[9] Gibson, "Prosopopoeia," 7.

Third, it is demonstrable that the tools required to compose many of the following Pauline examples most closely align with the skills taught for speech-in-character rather than transferring from some other exercise. For instance, one might consider verbal *chreia* to be quite applicable, especially given the *chreia*'s general brevity. *Chreiai*, however, are always attributed to people, whether specific (i.e., Diogenes) or unspecific (a Laconian). There are no suggestions among the rhetorical theoreticians that *chreiai* can be attributed to inanimate objects or abstract ideas, nor do any actual examples exist.[10] On the other hand, as highlighted in Chapters Two through Four, such attributions of speech are altogether par for the speech-in-character course. Thus, if Paul attributes speech to an abstract concept (δικαιοσύνη, for instance) or an inanimate thing (γραφή, or a body part), it is more reasonable to identify the necessary skills as transferring from speech-in-character rather than from *chreia*.

Because of how consistently Paul's writings cohere with the conventions for speech-in-character (see below), it seems almost certain that speech-in-character is the operative figure behind these texts and that Paul was directly or indirectly familiar with the conventions for the skill as a whole. Therefore, unless Paul provides some clear reason to look elsewhere, it seems that the best starting place is to consider Paul's attributions of speech to imaginary speakers as implementations of speech-in-character, even though they are usually shorter than model examples of the exercise. As such, I offer for consideration the following examples of Pauline speech-in-character.[11]

---

[10] Theon's comment that one can attribute *chreiai* to "something analogous to a person" seems to account for the attribution of *chreiai* to unspecified *persons* as opposed to specified persons. Theon, *Prog*. 96.18-22. Hock and O'Neil, *Chreia*, 109 n.2.

[11] See additional examples in Appendix B.

Examples of Speech-in-Character in Paul

1 Thessalonians 5:3

The first example of speech-in-character in the Pauline corpus is present in the earliest extant piece of Christian literature, 1 Thessalonians. After introducing the eschatological topic of "the times and the seasons," Paul reminds the Thessalonian Christians, "*you yourselves* know accurately that the day of the Lord is coming as a thief in the night" (1 Thess 5:1-2). In order to depict the sudden and unexpected nature with which the day of the Lord will arrive for those who are not prepared, Paul writes in 5:3:

> ὅταν λέγωσιν· εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια, τότε αἰφνίδιος αὐτοίς ἐφίσταται ὄλεθρος ὥσπερ ἡ ὠδὶν τῇ ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσῃ, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐκφύγωσιν.
>
> Whenever *they say*, "Peace and security," then sudden destruction comes upon them like birth pangs in a pregnant woman, and they will not escape.

Paul then returns his focus to the Thessalonian congregation and explains how they differ from those depicted in 5:3; namely, the Thessalonian Christians (ὑμεῖς) "are not in darkness" but are "children of light and of the day" (5:4-5), they should be "alert and sober" (5:6-8), and they should be clothed with "the breastplate of faith and love and the helmet, the hope of salvation" (5:8). Additionally, "God has not appointed [the Thessalonian congregation] for wrath but for the acceptance of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ" (5:9-10). For these reasons, in contrast to those depicted in 5:3, the Thessalonian congregation should be prepared for the day of the Lord at all times, so that it will not surprise them like a thief in the night (5:4).[12] Paul concludes by exhorting the congregation to encourage and build up one another (5:11).

---

[12] For καταλάβῃ as "surprise," see BDAG, καταλαμβάνω 3a-b; Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 294.

The shift in speakers is clearly marked. Paul speaks in his own voice to the Thessalonians as "you" in 1 Thess 5:1-2. In 5:3a, however, the third person plural λέγωσιν introduces a new speaker (i.e., "they") followed by attributed speech (5:3b), and scholars regularly note that the scripted speech is not spoken in Paul's own voice.[13] The τότε of the temporal construction, ὅταν λέγωσιν... τότε, signifies the return to Paul's voice, at which time he suggests that "sudden destruction comes upon *them*... and *they* will not escape" (5:3c). Refocusing his attention on the Thessalonian congregation, Paul again refers to the Thessalonians as "you" (5:4-5, 11) and "we" (5:5-6, 8-10) in distinction from the "they" of 5:3.

But who are "they" who proclaim "peace and security" with the result that inescapable destruction will be heaped upon them (5:3)? Paul does not provide a formal identification, but he does suggest several characteristics. In fact, the strong contrastives ὑμεῖς δέ (5:4) and ἡμεῖς δέ (5:8) situate the Thessalonian congregation (along with Paul) in opposition to the speakers of 5:3.[14] Therefore, the speakers of 5:3 are characterized as existing in darkness and surprised by the day of the Lord (5:4), as children of night and darkness (5:5), as asleep and drunk (5:6-7), and as unclothed with the "breastplate of faith and love and the helmet, the hope of salvation" (5:8). That is, as mirror opposites of the

[13] For example, see Jeffrey A. D. Weima, "'Peace and Security' (1 Thess 5:3): Prophetic Warning or Political Propaganda?" *NTS* 58.3 (2012), 331, who writes, "All translations place the brief phrase… in quotation marks because it is clear from the introductory formula… that the apostle here is not creating but citing these words." Below I will problematize Weima's view that Paul "is not creating but citing these words," but Weima clearly indicates the sweeping consensus that another speaker enters the scene at 1 Thess 5:3.

[14] Gordon D. Fee argues similarly that 1 Thess 5:3 functions as a contrast to the Thessalonian Christians, writing, 1 Thess 5:3 "allows Paul yet another opportunity to contrast the believers in Thessalonica with those in their city who are causing their present grief." *The First and Second Letters to the Thessalonians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 190.

Thessalonian Christians who should always be prepared, the non-Christian speakers of 5:3 are thoroughly unprepared for the day of the Lord.[15]

This characterization, however, does little to help identify the unspecified speakers of 5:3 with much precision. Without identifying this as speech-in-character, scholars tend to focus on the attributed speech of 5:3 as a means to identify the unspecified speakers. For example, Abraham J. Malherbe writes, "Paul does not have to identify these people, for his readers know of whom he is writing… The content of their teaching helps to identify them."[16] For Malherbe, the phrase εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια "is Paul's own ironic formulation to describe the teaching of false teachers" in Thessalonica, and it is a reworking of the false prophets' cries of "peace, peace," in the Hebrew Bible.[17] In order to combat an attitude among some Thessalonians who were "not sufficiently tak[ing] into consideration the eschatological dimension of their existence," Paul replaced the second occurrence of εἰρήνη with the Epicurean term ἀσφάλεια, which emphasizes the Epicurean fixation "on life with friends in the here and now."[18] Thus, Malherbe would identify those who proclaim "peace and security" as Thessalonian false teachers who promoted a worldview that diminished or omitted eschatological existence.

Scholars such as Peter Oakes and Jeffrey A. D. Weima, however, interpret the speech of 5:3 in light of the *Pax Romana* and the values of peace (*pax*) and security

---

[15] Other scholars identifying the speakers in 5:3 as non-believers in contrast to the Thessalonian Christians include Ben Witherington III, *1 and 2 Thessalonians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 148; Beverly Roberts Gaventa, *First and Second Thessalonians* (Interpretation; Louisville: John Knox, 1989), 70-71; Abraham Smith, *The First Letter to the Thessalonians* (NIB 11; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 726.

[16] Malherbe, *Thessalonians*, 291.

[17] Ibid., 291-304.

[18] Ibid., 304-5.

(*securitas*). Oakes argues that the phrase εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια "seems to evoke a slogan of a current 'Golden Age,'" since the terms represent "a very powerful evocation of the central ideology of the new age brought in by Augustus."[19] Similarly, Weima contends the phrase recalls "a popular theme or slogan of the imperial Roman propaganda machine."[20] These readings, therefore, identify the speakers of 5:3 as those advocating hope in the political εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια that the Roman Empire has proclaimedly achieved in ignorance of the eschatological age yet to come.

Both readings, however, evince problems. On the one hand, Malherbe dismisses the Greco-Roman imperial evidence too quickly and fails to recognize that those proclaiming the Roman values of εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια in the *present* correlate (as a type of false teacher) extremely well with his depiction of false teachers who neglect the eschatological dimension of existence. On the other hand, the allusions in 1 Thess 5:3 to Jer 6:14, 24 (cf. Ezek 13:10, 15) seem quite pronounced, but Oakes and Weima largely ignore them in their respective emphases on the Greco-Roman evidence. Moreover, Joel R. White has recently demonstrated that there is no clinching evidence that εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια / *pax et securitas* circulated as a "slogan" for imperial propaganda from Augustus' reign through Paul's life.[21] Thus, White concludes that, though either approach reasonably accounts for the presence of εἰρήνη, neither sufficiently explains Paul's use of

[19] Peter Oakes, "Re-mapping the Universe: Paul and the Emperor in 1 Thessalonians and Philippians," *JSNT* 27.3 (2005), 317.

[20] Weima, "Peace and Security," 332. Similarly, Smith, *The First Letter*, 675-78, 726.

[21] Joel R. White, "'Peace and Security' (1 Thessalonians 5:3): Is it Really a Roman Slogan?" *NTS* 59.3 (2013): 382-95. If White is correct, then Weima's view that Paul "is not creating but citing these words" must be readjusted to allow for Paul's creativity in summarizing these speakers' message with the phrase εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια. Cf. Weima, "Peace and Security," 331.

ἀσφάλεια.[22] But White's argument is problematic as well; he seems to equate the lack of concrete evidence for a slogan with the conclusion that Paul could not still refer to the Roman concept of ἀσφάλεια / *securitas*, which Oakes, Weima, *and* White all document as a central Roman value, even if it is less pronounced than that of εἰρήνη / *pax*.[23]

If one combines the strengths of each approach, however, an interesting explanation for the identity of the speakers in 1 Thess 5:3 emerges.[24] First, the allusions to Jer 6 (cf. Ezek 13:10, 15) seem quite pronounced, as it contains the context of false prophets / teachers, their cries of "peace" when there actually is no peace (Jer 6:14), and the metaphor of birth pangs (6:24), each of which is present in 1 Thess 5:3. Second, the plethora of evidence indentifying εἰρήνη / *pax* and ἀσφάλεια / *securitas* as central (though not exclusive) Roman values best explains the combination of these words in 1 Thess 5:3, even if it does not represent a fixed slogan.[25] It seems, therefore, Paul has recast the context of Jer 6 for his Thessalonian audience. The first way Paul adjusts Jer 6 is by replacing Jeremiah's "εἰρήνη εἰρήνη" with "εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια." Because no evidence confirms that εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια existed as a formal slogan from Augustus' reign through Paul's life, it is best to view the phrase as Paul's composition that would be characteristic of the speakers of 1 Thess 5:3.[26] Since εἰρήνη and ἀσφάλεια comprise two

---

[22] White, "Peace and Security," 395.

[23] Oakes, "Re-mapping the Universe," 317-18; Weima, "Peace and Security," 333-55; White, "Peace and Security," 384-92.

[24] Without so much detail, Fee also seems to follow a similar approach. *Thessalonians*, 188-89.

[25] Oakes, "Re-mapping the Universe," 317-18; Weima, "Peace and Security," 333-55; White, "Peace and Security," 384-92.

[26] Consequently, contra Weima, Paul does have a creative role in composing the speech of 1 Thess 5:3. Cf. Weima, "Peace and Security," 331. Furthermore, I agree with Malherbe's view that "Paul does not have to identify these people, for his readers know of whom he is writing… The content of their teaching helps to identify them." *Thessalonians*, 291. Necessarily, in order for the Thessalonian congregation to

of Rome's core values, these speakers are best identified as those promoting the present reality of Roman peace and security. Thus, as Jeremiah's false prophets were claiming peace in its absence, so also those proclaiming the Roman values of εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια were advocating the present reality of Roman peace and security in ignorance of the eschatological peace that was yet to come.[27] Similarly, as the Israelites were not to hope in the false prophets' claims of peace, neither were the Thessalonians to place hope in the peace and security advocated by Rome.

The second way Paul amends Jeremiah is by shifting the focus of the birth pangs. Whereas Jeremiah depicts Israel as experiencing birth pangs (6:24), Paul realigns the metaphor as a way to express the suddenness and unexpectedness with which the day of the Lord would appear to those unprepared. In this reading, Paul's agenda is not to critique the Roman Empire directly (though it does implicitly) but to provide a depiction of the suddenness with which the day of the Lord would come and a contrast of the preparedness Paul exhorts for the Thessalonian Christians, as evidenced in 5:4-10.[28]

How, then, does 1 Thess 5:3 cohere with the conventions for speech-in-character? It coheres quite well indeed, as all of the central elements of speech-in-character are present: (1) Paul crafts speech and places it in the mouth of another speaker (i.e., "they;"

---

identify these speakers correctly, the speech Paul scripts in their voice must resemble their characterization and the kind of things they actually could have said.

[27] Similarly, Weima contends, "For the apostle, peace and security belong only to those who instead trust in God, who 'did not destine us for wrath but for the obtaining of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ' (5.9)." Ibid., 359.

[28] Oakes similarly writes, "In 5.3, Paul is emphasizing the unexpectedness of the Day of the Lord. He is not specifically attacking the Roman Empire. However, he seems deliberately to be denying the central assertion of Roman imperial ideology. He asserts that the Empire cannot guarantee 'peace and safety'. Its claim to do so will be disproved by the arrival of Christ… This is Christianity against Rome. However, it is neither Christianity seeking Rome's overthrow nor Christianity arguing against participation in the imperial cult. It is Christian hope being asserted to be superior to Roman hope." "Re-mapping the Universe," 318.

5:3a-b). (2) The assigned speech is appropriate to the character of the imagined speakers. Paul characterizes the speakers of 5:3 as non-Christians who are unprepared for the day of the Lord (5:4-8); those who place hope in present Roman peace and security in ignorance of the eschatological peace and salvation in which Christians hope fit the charcterization quite nicely. (3) The assigned speech is actual speech. (4) A new speaker is introduced (i.e., "they;" 5:3a), characterized (5:4-8), and attributed an appropriate speech-in-character (5:3b). The small difference between Paul's composition of this speech-in-character and the core conventions is that the reader or hearer must derive the characterization of the speakers from Paul's comparison of them to the Thessalonian Christians. (5) The convention shared by *ad Herennium*, Quintilian, and Hermogenes that the speaker(s) may be unspecified accounts for the unspecified identity of the speakers in 1 Thess 5:3.

With respect to the more narrowly attested elements of speech-in-character, a few additional points of connection appear between 1 Thess 5:3 and the works of the rhetorical theorists. First, 1 Thess 5:3 coheres with two of Quintilian's proposed functions of speech-in-character (*Inst.* 9.2.30). I argued above that Paul introduces speech-in-character in 5:3 in order to highlight the sudden and unexpected coming of the day of the Lord and to provide a contrast to the preparedness Paul prescribed for the Thessalonian Christians. Thus, by employing speech-in-character, Paul provides appropriate characters for a specific rhetorical situation in his exhortation to the Thessalonians. Additionally, as Paul situated himself and the Thessalonians as mirror opposites of the speakers of 5:3, the implementation of speech-in-character displays the inner thoughts of their opponents. Finally, 1 Thess 5:3 also fits within Theon's use of speech-in-character as a means of

exhortation (*Prog*. 115.20-22; 116.27-117.4); the unpreparedness for the day of the Lord by the speakers of 1 Thess 5:3, their hope in Roman "peace and security," and their impending destruction serve as an example of what the Thessalonians patently should not imitate.[29] Instead, the Thessalonians must be prepared at all times for the day of the Lord and place their hope in the salvation that comes through Christ.

Consequently, Paul's earliest extant letter—the earliest extant piece of Christian literature—employs the practice of speech-in-character in a manner that is wholly within the parameters set forth in the primary treatments of the exercise. Furthermore, Paul's implied characterization of the speakers in 1 Thess 5:3 suggests that Paul's rhetorical sensibility (to one degree or another) exceeds that expected by the elementary treatments. Paul's implicit and comparative (*synkristic*) characterization of the speakers *vis-à-vis* the Thessalonian Christians satisfies speech-in-character's requirement of characterization, yet it does so in a way that evinces fluidity, complexity, and freedom of expression, since the primary treatments of rhetorical theory only model direct characterization.

Galatians 3:8

After posing a rhetorical question to the Galatians concerning whether they received the Spirit ἐξ ἔργων νόμου or ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως (3:5), Paul begins to defend or prove the obvious answer to that rhetorical question—the Galatians received the Spirit ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως. Probably due to the use of Abraham and Gen 17 by others in Galatia, Paul's proof begins with Abraham, for whom πίστις, according to Gen 15:6, culminated in δικαιοσύνη (Gal 3:6). Based on Abraham's πίστις-grounded δικαιοσύνη, Paul argues

[29] In Theon's words, then, the introduction of 1 Thess 5:3 is a means of dissuasion, or ἀποτρέποντες. *Prog*. 117.4.

that Abraham's heirs are therefore characterized by πίστις (Gal 3:7) and not by ἔργα νόμου (3:10-22). In fact, scripture itself already knew this to be the case; law was only applicable to Jews, but Abraham's heirs would come from, and in him blessing would extend to, *all* nations (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη; 3:8).[30] Paul writes,

> προϊδοῦσα δὲ ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῖ τὰ ἔθνη ὁ θεός, προευηγγελίσατο τῷ Ἀβραὰμ ὅτι ἐνευλογηθήσονται ἐν σοὶ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη.
>
> But scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the gentiles ἐκ πίστεως, proclaimed the gospel in advance to Abraham, "In you, all the nations will be blessed."

The take away for Paul is that those characterized as ἐκ πίστεως are blessed with Abraham (3:9) because of their participation in Abraham's seed, Jesus (3:14-16), and their reception of the Spirit (cf. 3:2-5). Those characterized as ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, however, experience nothing but curse (3:10-14). Blessing and πίστις are intrinsically intertwined.

The shift out of Paul's voice is plainly marked; it is scripture (ἡ γραφή) in the nominative case that proclaims the gospel in advance to Abraham (3:8).[31] That scripture's speech constitutes direct discourse is established by the second-person pronoun, σοί, as indirect discourse would require a third-person pronoun, αὐτῷ. To create scripture's speech as recorded in Gal 3:8, Paul combines elements from LXX Gen 12:3 and 18:18.[32]

---

[30] On the complexity of translating ἔθνη in Galatians, see the discussion in footnote 34.

[31] Scholars have recognized Paul's personification of scripture, but none, to my knowledge, have analyzed it in light of the conventions of speech-in-character. See, for instance, Richard N. Longenecker, *Galatians* (WBC 41; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990), 115; J. Louis Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 300; Martinus C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 194. Bates identifies Gal 3:8 as "a lightweight example of… prosopopoeia," but he does not comment any further on this issue. Bates, *Hermeneutics*, 121n38.

[32] Gen 12:3 LXX reads, "In you (ἐν σοί), all the tribes (φυλαί) of the earth will be blessed." Gen 18:18 LXX reads, "In him (ἐν αὐτῷ), all the nations (ἔθνη) of the earth will be blessed." It is possible that, due to scribal harmonization tendencies or diction choices, the LXX versions of Gen 12:3 and/or 18:18 that Paul was familiar with contained the reading as he recorded it. Diminishing the likelihood of this possibility, however, is the absence of any supporting textual witnesses, as well as the fact that 12:3's use of φυλαί and 18:18's use of ἔθνη translate two different Hebrew words in the MT, משפחת and גויי, respectively.

That is, Paul chose the use of σοί from 12:3 over the use of αὐτῷ in 18:18, and he replaced 12:3's φυλαί with 18:18's ἔθνη. By crafting scripture's speech in this way, Paul not only brings scripture's declaration into conformity with the way he speaks about gentiles (as τὰ ἔθνη) elsewhere in Galatians,[33] but he also clarifies without remainder the relevance of the scriptural citation for the present rhetorical context, namely, what was spoken to Abraham had direct relevance not only to Jews but to πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, *all* the nations, as well.[34]

Paul characterizes ἡ γραφή as possessing the foresight that God planned to justify the gentiles ἐκ πίστεως (Gal 3:8). Because, according to Paul's argument, Abraham's children are οἱ ἐκ πίστεως (3:7), scripture is able to include gentiles as Abraham's children and to proclaim in advance the logical declaration that gentiles too will be blessed in Abraham (3:8), which occurs by participation in Abraham's seed, Christ (3:14-16). For these reasons, the speech Paul attributes to ἡ γραφή is wholly appropriate with

---

Combined with Paul's interest in τὰ ἔθνη in Galatians, which constitutes an obvious reason for Paul to substitute 12:3's φυλαί with 18:18's ἔθνη, the chance that Paul's LXX *Vorlage* witnessed the reading as Paul recorded it seems unlikely.

[33] Bates, *Hermeneutics*, 121 n.39; Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature* (SNTSMS 74; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 236-38.

[34] R. Longenecker argues that Paul draws a distinction between the two uses of τὰ ἔθνη in Gal 3:8. Longenecker writes, "The expression τὰ ἔθνη here means 'the Gentiles' whose righteousness is under question, with πάντα τὰ ἔθνη [τῆς γῆς] to be read more inclusively as 'all the nations [of the earth],'" thereby allowing for the inclusion of Jews, and not simply gentiles, within the scope of τὰ ἔθνη in Gal 3:8b. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 115. The view represented by Longenecker that Paul envisions the blessing of 3:8b to include gentiles and Jews is probable given the discussion about law that follows and, especially, given its seamless agreement with Paul's theology of equality among all people, regardless of race, before God. The emphasis in 3:8, however, must surely weigh on the gentiles. As Longenecker notes, it is the Galatian gentiles "whose righteousness is under question," and it is precisely gentiles that Paul finds "at the very heart of the Abrahamic covenant." This emphasis is strengthened when one considers the way Paul uses the term, ἔθνη, up to this point in Galatians; every instance distinguishes the gentiles as separate from Jews (1:16; 2:2, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15). It is only in 3:8 and 14 that ambiguity appears. Thus, given Paul's usage of the term as a reference strictly to gentiles before 3:8, the substitution from Gen 12:3's φυλαί to 18:18's ἔθνη is surely intended to emphasize the fact that *gentiles* too are included in Abraham's heirs and God's people solely on the basis of πίστις.

the characterization Paul assigns to it, thereby satisfying speech-in-character's convention of appropriateness.

In fact, Gal 3:8 satisfies all five of the primary conventions for speech-in-character. (1) Paul shapes and attributes speech to another speaker. (2) The assigned speech is appropriate to the character of the imagined speaker. (3) The assigned speech is actual speech that is recorded within scripture itself. (4) All three accompanying elements are present; Paul first identifies a new speaker, characterizes the newly introduced speaker, and assigns appropriate speech-in-character. Finally, (5) Paul's attribution of speech to an inanimate object, ἡ γραφή, is sufficiently supported in the discussions of the rhetorical figure in the primary literature.

In consideration of the secondary elements of speech-in-character, Gal 3:8 most closely aligns with Quintilian's view that speech-in-character can provide appropriate characters for specific rhetorical situations. The specific rhetorical context of Gal 3:6-9 involves a discussion of Abraham, his heirs, blessing, and πίστις as a way to address the rhetorical questions posed in 3:1-5. Scripture, therefore, which preserves the very stories about Abraham Paul is referencing, constitutes perhaps the most appropriate character imaginable, as (Paul's presentation of) ἡ γραφή represents the ultimate authority on all things Abraham.

Galatians 4:6

To stay with Galatians, in his continued explanation of Abraham's heirs and who belongs to God's family, Paul writes, "All of you are children of God διὰ τῆς πίστεως in Christ Jesus, for as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ" (3:26-27). The Galatians can be God's children because participation "in Christ" universally

"obliterates" ethnic, social, and gender boundaries (3:28).[35] Furthermore, because Christ is Abraham's seed (3:16), participation in Christ also renders one an heir of Abraham (3:29).

Prior to participation in Christ, however, humanity was enslaved (4:3), but God "sent his Son" (4:4) on a redemptive mission so that humanity "might receive adoption" (4:5). Having already demonstrated that the Galatians received this adoption through participation in Christ (3:26-29), Paul writes in 4:6:

> Ὅτι δέ ἐστε υἱοί, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱου αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν κρᾶζον· αββα ὁ πατήρ.
>
> Because you are children, God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, "Abba, Father."[36]

In sum, God has made the Galatians "no longer slaves but children" (4:7).[37]

In Gal 4:6, Paul indicates to his audience a shift out of his voice with the accusative neuter participle κρᾶζον, which can only refer to the neuter πνεῦμα, the Spirit.[38] As such, it is the Spirit that cries, "Abba, Father," and Paul returns to his own

---

[35] Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "Is Pauline Theology Just a 'Guy Thing'?" in *Our Mother St. Paul* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007), 68.

[36] Note that the logic of Gal 4:6 is not one of dependency in which adoption is a prerequisite for the sending of the Spirit. To paraphrase, the logic is more to the effect that "you are God's children *because* God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts" or, "because you are God's children, *you know that* God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts." Martyn argues similarly, "For Paul there is no chronological order between adoption into God's family and receipt of the Spirit." Martyn, *Galatians*, 391n.11. So also Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 209-10; de Boer, *Galatians*, 265; Ben Witherington III, *Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 290; James D. G. Dunn, *The Epistle to the Galatians* (BNTC; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993), 219; Richard B. Hays, *The Letter to the Galatians: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections* (NIB 11; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 285.

[37] J. Louis Martyn similarly emphasizes God's role. *Galatians*, 392.

[38] Bruce W. Longenecker, *The Triumph of Abraham's God: The Transformation of Identity in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998), 61; Betz, *Galatians*, 210; de Boer, *Galatians*, 266.

voice in 4:7 as he again addresses the Galatians (εἶ).[39] Paul characterizes the Spirit as the Spirit that one receives ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως (3:2, 5) and διὰ τῆς πίστεως (3:14), as the Spirit τοῦ υἱου αὐτοῦ ("of [God's] Son"),[40] and as sent by God (4:6). In the attributed speech, "αββα" is the Greek transliteration of the Aramaic אבא, and "ὁ πατήρ" is its Greek translation.[41] Bruce W. Longenecker argues that the use of "Father" in prayer to God echoes tradition about Jesus' own use of the term in prayer,[42] and scholars often note that the retention of the bilingual terms probably stems from its early use among bilingual communities.[43] Consequently, Paul is likely citing a common formula among at least some early Christian churches.

In this sense, what is interesting is not how Paul shapes the attributed speech but its appropriateness in light of his characterization of the Spirit. Namely, Paul characterizes the Spirit as received through πίστις (3:2, 5, 14), as sent by God (4:6), and as the Spirit of God's Son (4:6). In every way, therefore, Paul characterizes the Spirit in connection with the Son. First, adoption in God's family is mediated διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (3:26). Similarly, the sending of the Spirit who is recieved διὰ πίστεως (3:14) is coterminous with and affirms one's adoption (4:6; cf. Rom 8:15-16). Second, the sending of the Spirit (ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα; 4:6) is grammatically parallel

---

[39] Rom 8:15 portrays Christians who have received the "Spirit of adoption" as uttering this cry.

[40] So also de Boer, *Galatians*, 266.

[41] Betz, *Galatians*, 210-11.

[42] Longenecker, *Triumph*, 61-62. So also Dunn, *Galatians*, 221-22; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 174-75; F. F. Bruce, *Commentary on Galatians* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 199.

[43] Betz, *Galatians*, 211; Witherington, *Grace*, 291; de Boer, *Galatians*, 266; Longenecker, *Triumph*, 62; Sigve Tonstad, "The Revisionary Potential of 'Abba! Father!' in the Letters of Paul," *Andrews University Seminary Studies* 45.1 (2007), 8-12; Dunn, *Galatians*, 221;

with the sending of the Son (ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ; 4:4).[44] Third, and most significant, Paul characterizes the Spirit specifically as the Spirit τοῦ υἱου αὐτοῦ (4:6). Having been characterized in connection to the Son at every turn, the Spirit's cry, "Abba, Father," is completely appropriate, as it is the Son who would most reasonably appeal to God as "Father."[45]

Though Paul may very well be citing a traditional prayer formula, his use of the phrase otherwise adheres to the theoretical conventions for speech-in-character. To begin, (1) Paul scripts the attributed speech into the mouth of an imaginary speaker, the Spirit. Additionally, (2) the assigned speech appropriately models the characterization of the Spirit as intimately connected to the Son. (3) The assigned speech is actual speech. Moreover, (4) all three structural elements are present; Paul identifies (3:2, 5, 14; 4:6), characterizes (3:2, 5, 14; 4:4, 6), and attributes appropriate speech-in-character to the Spirit (4:6). Finally, (5) Paul has not placed the speech into the mouth of a person, per se, but into the mouth of a personified abstract concept, the divine Spirit. By attributing speech to an abstract concept, the Spirit, Paul demonstrates a fuller awareness of speech-in-character such that it is not limited to human speakers, but that it may also be scripted in the voice of non-human entities.

If one objects theologically to the view of the Spirit as a personified abstract concept, then Quintilian's treatment of speech-in-character explains Paul's attribution of speech to the Spirit just as well, since Quintilian allows that one may attribute speech to

---

[44] Longenecker, *Triumph*, 60-61.

[45] Dunn writes, "[The experiences]… attributable to the divine Spirit could now be recognized by the fact that this was the Spirit of the Son, the Spirit whose character was attested by the character of Jesus… That is to say, the character of Jesus' sonship provided the parameters for the experiences which could be attributed to the Spirit." *Galatians*, 220.

the gods (*Inst.* 9.2.31). Quintilian's description of the functions of speech-in-character (9.2.30) may also be helpful. It is not difficult to suppose that the Spirit's outburst, "Abba, Father," could have created variety and especially liveliness in Paul's epistolary discourse. Also, the introduction of the Spirit's cry fills a specific rhetorical need, since it functions as a proof of the Galatians' adoption into God's family. Therefore, there is nothing particularly surprising between the general conventions of speech-in-character and Paul's use of the exercise in Gal 4:6.

1 Corinthians 1:12; 3:4

Moving to 1 Corinthians, immediately after the epistolary prescript (1:1-3) and thanksgiving (1:4-9), Paul begins to exhort the Corinthian Christians to be in unity with one another (1:10). Paul wants the Corinthians to "say the same thing" (τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε), to be free from "divisions" (σχίσματα), and to be "restored in the same mind and the same opinion" (κατηρτισμένοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνῶμῃ). Paul offers such exhortation because a group of "Chloe's people" reported to him that there were "contentions" (ἔριδες) among the Corinthians (1:11). Paul then explains what these divisions and contentions look like on the ground in Corinth (1:12); Paul writes:

> λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἕκαστος ὑμῶν λέγει· ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, ἐγὼ δὲ Ἀπολλῶ, ἐγὼ δὲ Κηφᾶ, ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ.
>
> What I am referring to is that each of you is saying, "I am of Paul," "I am of Apollos," or "I am of Cephas." I, however, am of Christ.

Margaret M. Mitchell also recognizes Paul's implementation of speech-in-character in 1 Cor 1:12; she writes, "I understand 1:12 as the rhetorical figure προσωποποιΐα," citing Quintilian (*Inst.* 9.2.30, 37), *Ad Herennium* (4.53, 66), and

Demetrius (*Eloc*. 5.265-66).[46] To be sure, the shift out of Paul's voice and into the voice of other speakers is clear, as Paul specifically writes, "Each of you is saying" (1:12). Thus, the speakers of 1:12b are various members of the Corinthian congregation to whom Paul is writing and addressing in the second person plural (ὑμῶν). Paul characterizes these speakers as experiencing "divisions" (σχίσματα; 1:10), "contentions" (ἔριδες; 1:11), and in need of restoration (κατηρτισμένοι; 1:10).

With respect to the attributed speech, two issues arise. First, does the final phrase, "I am of Christ," refer to a fourth group among the Corinthians, or is it Paul's prescriptive remedy for the Corinthians' divisions? The question is significant because it determines whether the phrase should be read in the Corinthians' voice or as the return to Paul's.[47] The parallel structure of all four phrases leads many scholars to continue reading the fourth phrase in the Corinthians' voice on the assumption that Paul would not have used the same grammatical structure if he were interjecting.[48] Other scholars like Mitchell, however, argue that the phrase does not represent a fourth party but Paul's commentary, since: (1) Paul does not name the "Christ group" when he names the others elsewhere

---

[46] Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1992), 86. Mitchell is followed by David E. Garland, *1 Corinthians* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 48. Craig S. Keener also recognizes 1:12 as *sermocinatio*. *1-2 Corinthians* (NCBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 24-25.

[47] Thus, 1 Cor 1:12 constitutes an instance in which the conventions for speech-in-character can be employed as a way to determine the boundaries of the attributed speech.

[48] The grammatical pattern is: (1) pronoun, (2) conjunction, (3) actual or implied εἰμι, and (4) proper noun in the genitive case. For examples of scholars who make this argument, see C. K. Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 44-45; Leon Morris, *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians* (TNTC 7; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 40. Cf. Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 33-34; Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 129-33; Charles H. Talbert, *Reading Corinthians: A Literary and Theological Commentary* (Reading the New Testament; rev.; Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 2002), 16.

(3:4, 22); (2) he uses the phrase "you are of Christ" (ὑμεῖς δὲ Χριστοῦ; 3:23) as a corrective to the three parties listed in 3:22; and (3) the challenge of 1:13 ("Has Christ been divided?") makes little sense if some of the Corinthians claimed to be "of Christ."[49] Furthermore, the line of exegesis which reads the fourth phrase as Paul's commentary extends back in early Christian literature at least to Chrysostom (*hom. In 1 Cor* 3.2 [*PG* 61.24]).[50] For Mitchell, then, the attributed speech makes best sense if it is analyzed in light of its larger epistolary context.

In addition to Mitchell's arguments, one can add that the phrase, "I am of Christ," does not appropriately fit Paul's characterization of the Corinthian speakers. For Paul, to be in Christ is to be unified and free from divisions (1 Cor 3:22-23; 12:13-14; Gal 3:26-29).[51] The Corinthians, however, are patently not unified in terms of Paul's characterization of them (1:10-11). Assuming Paul's adherence to the convention for speech-in-character to be appropriate to the characterization, the fourth phrase's out-of-character quality serves as an additional signifier that the Corinthians are no longer speaking.[52] Thus, despite the grammatical parallelism between the four phrases and the absence of any overt switch back into Paul's voice (for example, a verb of speech or

---

[49] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 82n.101. Other scholars who argue that the fourth phrase does *not* refer to a Christ group include Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 48-49; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 25; J. Paul Sampley, *The First Letter to the Corinthians: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections* (NIB 10; Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 801, 804

[50] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 82n.101.

[51] Similarly, Sampley writes, "Divisiveness among those who are in Christ is simply unthinkable for Paul." *The First Letter*, 807.

[52] Therefore, contra Gordon D. Fee, it is not the case that there is "no signal that there is a break with the fourth member." Rather, the signal is only recognized when one understands the common convention of appropriateness for speech-in-character and considers the speech in view of its larger epistolary context. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 58-59, 58n.54.

strong adversative), I too understand the fourth phrase to be spoken in Paul's voice and not representative of a fourth party.[53]

The second issue that arises concerns whether Paul quotes actual "slogans" employed by the various Corinthian parties or invents the phrases himself. Larry L. Welborn has argued that the phrases represent "a common formula of political self-identification in antiquity," which suggests that Paul was quoting slogans used by the Corinthians.[54] Again, Mitchell's argument is to be preferred. Mitchell demonstrates that no examples of ancient political slogans cohere with the structure of the phrases in 1 Cor 1:12.[55] Instead, Mitchell identifies the proper names in the genitive case as "genitives of possession or belonging" or "relationship," such that the Corinthian parties are owned or possessed as children or slaves by the noun in the genitive.[56] This reading and the

---

[53] Scholars have often commented that if the phrase, "But I am of Christ," is to be heard in Paul's voice, there is "no link between 1:12 and 1:13. Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 33; Stephen M. Pogoloff, *Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians* (SBLDS 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 179n25. Such a view is hardly necessary; both the phrase, "but I am of Christ," (1:12) and the question, "Has Christ been divided?" (1:13) can serve as a joint response to the factionalism expressed in the first three phrases of 1:12. That is, Paul belongs to Christ and not to any human leaders (1:12). For Paul, those in Christ constitute a unified whole (12:12-31). The Corinthians, however, are not acting like a unified whole; rather, they are lining up with particular leaders (1:12). The question, "Has Christ been divided," therefore, assumes that existence in Christ means to be unified and responds to the factionalism expressed in the first three phrases of 1:12.

[54] L. L. Welborn, "On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Ancient Politics," *JBL* 106 (1987), 90-93. The quote comes from Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 83. Also arguing for political resonances in 1 Cor 1:12 is Pheme Perkins, *First Corinthians* (Paideia; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 50-52, 54-55.

[55] Ibid., 84. Thiselton follows Mitchell. Thiselton, *The First*, 122.

[56] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliaion*, 85. For genitives of possession or belonging, see Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), §1301. For genitives of relationship, see BDF §162.7. Anthony C. Thiselton misreads Mitchell. Thiselton writes, "Mitchell insists that this is not a genitive of possession," and "Mitchell convincingly argues that the genitives cannot plausibly be construed as genitives of possession." Rather, "Mitchell proposes a *genitive of relationship*." Thiselton, *The First*, 121-22, emphasis original. Quite the contrary, Mitchell argues, "The proper names in the genitive case… [are] a 'genitive of possession or belonging,' defined as follows, 'With persons the genitive may denote the *relations* of child to parent, wife to husband, and of inferior to superior.'" Mitchell then notes that BDF §162.7 identifies 1 Cor 1:12 and 3:4 as a "genitive of relationship." Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 85, italics mine. In this discussion based on Smyth and BDF, Mitchell does not discuss

probability that Paul has crafted these phrases are then confirmed by his further development and interpretation of these themes for the Corinthian congregation in 1 Cor 3:1-4; 6:19-20; and 7:23.[57]

In 1 Cor 3:4, Paul again attributes speech-in-character to the Corinthians. After characterizing the Corinthians as not "spiritual" (πνευματικοῖς; 3:1), but as "fleshly" (σαρκίνοις, σαρκικοί; 3:1, 3), as "infants" (νηπίοις; 3:1), as "walking humanly" (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε; 3:3), and as engaged in "zeal and contention" (ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις; 3:3), Paul attributes to them two of the same phrases from 1:12, writing (3:4):

> ὅταν γὰρ λέγῃ τις· ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, ἕτερος δέ· ἐγὼ Ἀπολλῶ, οὐκ ἄνθρωποί ἐστε;
>
> For, whenever someone says, "I am of Paul," and another [says], "I am of Apollos," are you not acting according to human standards?

Though Paul does not specifically identify the speakers in 3:4, it is clear that they are the same Corinthian groups from 1:10-12. Here, Paul's premise is that, by adhering to specific parties, the Corinthians are acting like "humans" (ἄνθρωποί; 3:4), which he has previously combined with being childish and not spiritual (3:1-3).[58] Thus, from Paul's point of view, the phrases he attributes to the Corinthian speakers perfectly match his characterization of them.

Therefore, in both 1 Cor 1:12 and 3:4, Paul again appropriates the practice of speech-in-character completely in keeping with the established conventions. (1) Paul crafts speech and scripts it in the Corinthians' voices. (2) The attributed speech

---

different functions of the genitive as Thiselton imagines; rather, they are different classifications (names) used by different grammars to explain a single function of proper names in the genitive case to express relationship.

[57] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 85.

[58] Ibid., 96-97.

appropriately models the way in which Paul has characterized the divided Corinthians. (3) The speech is imagined as actual. (4) All three primary elements are present; Paul identifies the speakers as "you" Corinthians, characterizes the speakers, and attributes to them appropriate speech-in-character. Of the secondary or potential elements of speech-in-character, 1 Cor 1:12 and 3:4 most clearly parallel one of Quintilian's proposed functions for speech-in-character, namely, to display the inner thoughts of one's opponents (*Inst.* 9.2.30), since Paul provides the views of those against whom he subsequently argues.[59]

1 Corinthians 12:3

In 1 Cor 12:1, Paul turns to the topic of spiritual people (and/or gifts), περὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν.[60] In the course of arguing that the Spirit works through all Christians, Paul utilizes speech-in-character in 12:3.[61] Paul writes:

> διὸ γνωρίζω ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ λαλῶν λέγει· Ἀνάθεμα Ἰησοῦς, καὶ οὐδεῖς δύναται εἰπεῖν· Κύριος Ἰησοῦς, εἰ μὴ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ.
>
> Therefore, I am making known to you that no one speaking by the Spirit of God says, "Jesus is accursed," and no one is able to say, "Jesus is Lord," except by the Holy Spirit.

---

[59] So also Mitchell. Ibid., 86.

[60] That πνευματικῶν may be read as neuter, "things" or "gifts," is supported by: (1) the neuter τὰ πνευματικά in 14:1, (2) the interchange of πνευματικῶν with χαρισμάτων in 12:4, which occurs in the neuter in 9:11 and 15:46, and (3) the discussion of charismatic gifts that runs from 12:4-14:40. Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 204. If the masculine, "people," is to be preferred, which 1 Cor 12:2-3 perhaps suggests, it is nevertheless the case that the arena in which the conversation about "spiritual people" occurs is that of the work of the Spirit and the distribution of spiritual gifts (12:4-11). The discussion of people in 12:2-3 is Paul's demonstration that *all* Christians are spiritual because of participation with the Spirit (12:3), even if there are a variety of charismatic gifts (12:4). Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 267.

[61] Also noting Paul's emphasis that the Spirit works in all Christians are Sampley, *1 Corinthians*, 941; Perkins, *First Corinthians*, 147; and Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 567, who correctly writes, "[Paul] is not providing criteria for discerning authentic inspiration… The confession is a validating sign that one is a Christian inspired by the Spirit, not a touchstone to gauge authentic prophetic speech."

Because it is impossible for someone speaking by the Spirit to confess, "Jesus is accursed" or "Jesus is a curse," and because it is only by the Spirit that one can confess, "Jesus is Lord," it is the Spirit-enabled confession, "Jesus is Lord," that confirms for Paul the Spirit is at work in a person.[62]

The transitions from Paul's voice into that of another speaker are clearly marked by οὐδεὶς... λέγει and οὐδεῖς δύναται εἰπεῖν. Paul does not specifically identify the speaker beyond the general recognition, "no one." Again, however, the characterization helps to identify the speaker a bit more fully. The characterization of the imaginary speaker is someone ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ and ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ (12:3). Because Paul

---

[62] Bruce W. Winter treats the phrase ἀνάθεμα Ἰησοῦς quite differently. Rather than seeing Jesus as the object of the curse, Winter argues that Jesus was "seen as a God who could be invoked to deliver a curse against particular persons in Corinth" and that some Corinthian Christians were cursing other members of the community in continuity with their previous pagan practices. Winter supports his thesis on a number of premises: (1) several ancient curse tablets were discovered in Corinth; (2) these curses invoke the name of a deity to distribute a curse on one's adversary; (3) three curses omit the verb of cursing; (4) evidence demonstrates that later Christians in Corinth and elsewhere invoke God in curses; (5) because Jesus conquered the underworld, it would have been easy for a former pagan to substitute Jesus for the gods traditionally invoked in curses; and (6) such a reading makes sense in light of the disunity of the Corinthian church, in that certain members were vying for priority and power over others. Bruce W. Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 164-83.

Winter's reading requires the nominative Ἰησοῦς to be the subject of an implied verb and the neuter ἀνάθεμα to be an accusative direct object, whereas the traditional reading understands the neuter ἀνάθεμα as a predicate nominative modifying Ἰησοῦς. Speaking strictly with respect to grammar, Winter's reading raises no concerns. Other issues, however, problematize Winter's view. First, it is hardly clear that Paul's intention in 12:3a is to motivate the Corinthian Christians to stop cursing others. Elsewhere in 1 Corinthians, Paul speaks quite bluntly about practices he thinks the Corinthians should cease (for example, 4:14-21; 5:1-2, 6-11; 6:1-11). In 12:3a, however, Paul simply declares that Christians categorically do not make a particular claim. Second, if 1 Cor 12:3a involves invoking Jesus' name to grant a curse, then Paul contradicts and condemns his own practice, as Paul himself (presumably relying on God's power) issues anathemas on his opponents, even in 1 Corinthians (16:22; Gal 1:8-9), which Winter notes. Thus, the problem for Paul is not *that* a curse is made or *the power by which* it is made, but the *entity* that receives the curse—Jesus. Third, contrary to Winter's argument, a traditional reading of 12:3 can make fine sense of the διό in relation to the whole of 12:1-3; the progression hinges on the concept of knowledge. Paul does not want the Corinthians to be ignorant about spiritual people (12:1). The Corinthians know that they all had "spiritual" experiences in their previous religious systems (12:2). Therefore, Paul is now making known to them that all Christians are spiritual (12:3) and are vital components in the life of the community (12:4-31). Furthermore, and fourth, such a reading fits seamlessly within the context of a contentious Corinthian assembly in which some members are judging the spiritual gifts and qualities of others, holding some in high esteem but downgrading others. Paul's point, then, is that every Christian participates in the Spirit and is spiritual; none can be excluded or exalted; all are equal, important, and integral members of the Christian community.

considers being in the Spirit to be a universal reality for Christians (1 Cor 3:16; 6:11, 19; 12:4, 7-13; Gal 3:2-5; 4:6; Rom 5:5; 7:6; 8:4-6, 9-16), the imaginary speaker must be a Christian.[63]

How, though, do Paul's attributed speech-confessions measure up in light of such a pneumatic, Christian characterization? In the first instance, "Jesus is accursed," Paul charts a course quite different than any of his previous examples and from anything discussed in the primary treatments of the figure. The theoretical treatments stress over and over that speech-in-character must be appropriate to the characterization of the speaker, and all of the previous Pauline examples meet this criterion. In 1 Cor 12:3a, however, the imaginary speech poignantly fails to cohere with the characterization of the speaker—how could a Christian confess that Jesus is anathema? The attributed speech is altogether inappropriate for the characterization. But Paul has not lost track of his rhetorical sensibilities. Paul knows full well that the attributed speech would be absurd for a Christian to proclaim, as evidenced by Paul's argument that *no* Christian (οὐδεὶς ἐν πνεύματι θεοῦ) could ever make such a declaration (12:3a). By negating what would be absurd for a Christian to proclaim, therefore, Paul actually confirms the convention that effective speech-in-character must cohere with the characterization of the speaker. Though the speech-in-character appears misguided at first glance, the overall effect tightly conforms to the conventions and displays Paul's ability to utilize speech-in-character at (at least) some level beyond that of the general treatments in the primary sources for the exercise.

[63] Such evidence severely undercuts the view that the phrase, "Jesus is accursed," is a non-Christian, Jewish proclamation, since the characterization precludes the possibility altogether. Cf. Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 571.

The second attribution of speech-in-character, "Jesus is Lord," is more to the point. In Romans, Paul defines the confession, "Jesus is Lord," as indicative of Christian existence (10:9). The same is true in 1 Cor 12:3; it is only the Christian, characterized as ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, who is able to make such a profession. Thus, the attributed speech is altogether appropriate for Paul's characterization of the Christian speaker.

In these very brief attributions of speech-in-character, then, Paul adheres to the conventions for speech-in-character quite well, with one interesting alteration. (1) Paul crafts and attributes speeches to an imaginary speaker. (2) Though the second attributed speech appropriately coheres with Paul's characterization of the supposed speaker in form and content, the first example displays a (slightly) heightened level of rhetorical awareness. Paul could have simply said, "Those without the Spirit say (or might say), 'Jesus is accursed,'" or he could have ommitted 12:3a altogether. Instead, Paul sets up an absurdity and negates it, so that the construction differs from anything found in the theoretical treatments but nevertheless coheres with and confirms the convention of appropriateness set forth in them. (3) The first attributed speech is impossible and therefore hypothetical, as is the second speech since it is construed as what someone would or would not be able to say. (4) All three typical structural elements are present; Paul indicates that another person is speaking, he characterizes the speaker, and he assigns speech to the imaginary speaker. Finally, (5) though exegesis allows one to identify the speaker with more precision than Paul concretely indicates, Paul's use of an unspecified speaker agrees seamlessly with the common allowance for speech to be placed in the mouth of unidentified speakers.

Of the less attested features of speech-in-character, Quintilian's proposal that speech-in-character is well suited for introducing characters for a specific rhetorical context best fits 1 Cor 12:3 (*Inst.* 9.2.30). Namely, Paul introduces these speeches-in-character in order to address the conflict in the Corinthian church regarding which members have better or more spiritual experiences.[64] Paul's solution to this problem is to demonstrate that the Spirit is at work in *all* Christians (12:3) and that every member of the community serves a roll, even if the Spirit works in different ways in each member (12:4-11).[65] It is, therefore, through the use of speech-in-character that Paul once again works to reconcile and unify the Corinthian church. Quintilian's view that speech-in-character can also serve to create vividness also fits 1 Cor 12:3, as many scholars understand the phrase, "Jesus is accursed," to be something of a hypothetical shock treatment situated as an antithesis to the positive confession, "Jesus is Lord."[66]

1 Corinthians 12:15-16, 21

In 1 Cor 12:15-16 and 21, Paul again demonstrates knowledge of the aspect of speech-in-character allowing one to assign speech to mute and inanimate objects.[67] Following his explanation that the same Spirit, Lord, and God work within all Christians to distribute gifts for them to use for the community (12:4-11), Paul illustrates how the differently but inevitably gifted Christians constitute a cohesive whole by way of an

---

[64] For the situation in Corinth, see Sampley, *1 Corinthians*, 943.

[65] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 267-68.

[66] Fee, *The First Epistle*, 579-81; Sampley, *1 Corinthians*, 941; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 204; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 100.

[67] Mitchell also recognizes the use of speech-in-character, which she calls personification, in 12:15-16, 21. Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 159. So also Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 87.

analogy to the body. Just as a physical body is a single entity with multiple parts that fill diverse roles (12:12, 17-20), so also individual Christians have been baptized "into one body" (εἰς ἕν σῶμα) and fill different roles (12:4-11, 13, 27-31). Said otherwise, the body of believers, though it is comprised of many different individuals, should be a unified whole (12:14).[68] In order to depict the absurdity of a divided body, Paul then places speech in the "mouths" of various body parts.[69] Paul writes:

> (12:15) ἐὰν εἴπῃ ὁ πούς· ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ χείρ, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; (16) καὶ ἐὰν εἴπῃ τὸ οὖς· ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ ὀφθαλμός, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;
>
> (21) οὐ δύναται δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰπεῖν τῇ χειρί· χρείαν σου οὐκ ἔχω, ἢ πάλιν ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῖς ποσίν· χρείαν ὑμῶν οὐκ ἔχω.
>
> (15) If the foot says, "Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body," it does not for this reason cease to belong to the body. (16) And if the ear says, "Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body," it does not for this reason cease to belong to the body.
>
> (21) The eye cannot say to the hand, "I do not have any need for you," nor can the head say to the feet, "I do not have any need for you."

In each instance, Paul clearly notes the identity of the imaginary speaker; the foot speaks first (12:15), then the ear (12:16), the eye (12:21a), and finally the head (12:21b). In keeping with the concept of a unified body, the characterization of these four speakers is one and the same. Each body part is simultaneously an individual part and a member of the body, so that even though there are many parts, there is one unified body (12:12). Inversely, the body does not exist in and of itself; rather, the body is constituted of many parts (12:14). Thus, the body is both greater than the sum of its parts and in need of each

---

[68] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 268-69.

[69] Keener also notes Paul's use of speech-in-character; "Paul employs the rhetorical device *prosopopoiia* to generate speaking body parts (as if each has its own mouth!) in 12:15-16 (where they devalue themselves) and 12:21 (where they devalue others)." Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 103. Beyond this, Keener goes into no further detail. Fee recognizes 12:15-16, 21 as "personification," 610, 612.

and every part (12:17, 19). Moreover, God has carefully arranged each and every member just as he desired (12:18). The body and the individual parts, then, are simultaneously, and paradoxically, inseparable and distinct.

An analysis of the attributed speeches-in-character, however, immediately raises concerns. Based on every treatment of rhetorical theory discussed above, attributed speech must agree with or be appropriate to the characterization of the imaginary speaker. Here, however, Paul for the second time (see 12:3a) charts a different course, as he scripts each of the attributed speeches markedly *out* of character. How can the various body parts, characterized as inherently unified in one body, claim that the body is divided or that some members are more valuable than others (12:15-16, 21)? Such claims would be absurd[70] in light of such characterization. Paul, however, specifically plays on this absurdity as a comparison to the conflicting Corinthian congregation. Paul knows that the interconnected parts of a unified body should never suggest that some parts do not belong or that some parts are more important than others (12:14, 17-20, 22-26). Nevertheless, this seems to be precisely what is happening among the Corinthian Christians as it pertains to spiritual gifts.[71] Thus, mapping the character of the divided Corinthians onto the individual body parts, Paul poses speeches in the body parts' voices entirely out of character for a unified body in order to depict vividly and combat the Corinthian's divisive attitude. Even if some body part should actually suggest that it or another part does not belong to the body (12:15-16)[72]—i.e., even if some Corinthian Christian should

[70] So also, Perkins, *1 Corinthians*, 149; Fee, *The First Epistle*, 610.

[71] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 211-16; Barrett, *First Epistle*, 287-97; Morris, *First Epistle*, 174-80; Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 267-70.

[72] For Smyth, the construction ἐάν + subjunctive in the protasis with the present indicative in the apodosis is a present general condition. "The *if* clause has the force of *if ever* (*whenever*), the conclusion

think that she or another member of the congregation did not belong because of his or her gifts—even then such a claim would never result in that member ceasing to be a member of the unified community.[73] Paul, however, negates the incongruous declarations that some members have no need of others by indicating that such a claim would be entirely ludicrous (οὐ δύναται; 12:21). Consequently, Paul has not created inappropriate speeches-in-character due to a lack of rhetorical acumen. Rather, in order to meet the needs of the specific rhetorical context (i.e., Corinthian disunity), Paul tailors the general conventions for appropriate speech-in-character and uses out-of-character speech as a way to illustrate the absurdity of the Corinthians' actions and to work towards reconciling the community.[74]

When measured against the basic conventions, the speeches-in-character in 1 Cor 12:15-16, 21 reflect nicely the essence or spirit of the rhetorical figure, even though Paul has flipped the convention for appropriateness completely on its head in order to suit his

---

expresses a repeated or habitual action or a general truth." *Greek Grammar*, §2297, 2335-2337. For Wallace, the construction would either be a third or fifth class condition; as a third class condition, the sense of the protasis would be merely hypothetical, whereas the sense of a fifth class condition would be a present general condition in which the condition itself "gives no indication about the likelihood of its fulfillment." Daniel B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 689, 689n.9, 696-97.

Thiselton misrepresents the condition. Thiselton identifies the first protasis simply as ἐὰν εἴπῃ ὁ πούς and the second as ἐὰν εἴπῃ τὸ οὖς. Thiselton then identifies as the first apodosis the imaginatively spoken phrase, ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ χείρ, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, and the second as ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ ὀφθαλμός, οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. Thiselton, *The First Epistle*, 1002-3. Thiselton's identifications are inaccurate and make little sense, as there is no "then" statement as he has structured the conditions. The two phrases Thiselton identifies as an apodosis (12:15b, 16b) are direct speech and are inseparable from the statements that introduce them (each of which he correctly identifies as (part of) a protasis; 12:15a, 16a). Each protasis, therefore, includes the introductory statement (12:15a, 16a) and the content of the attributed speech (12:15b, 16b). Paul's commentary (12:15c, 16c) constitutes the apodosis to each condition; the phrase, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο ("not for this reason;" 12:15c, 16c), marks the outcome that results from the hypothetical protasis and therefore represents the "then" statement of the condition.

[73] Garland agrees, writing, "No matter what ears and feet might say if they could talk, they are integrally part of the body." Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 594.

[74] Though he does not discuss 12:15-16, 21 in terms of speech-in-character, Garland understands the gist of the passage, writing, "It is obvious in a body that no part is autonomous, but Paul uses the body analogy to turn self-centered vanity upside-down." Ibid., 595.

rhetorical need. (1) Paul crafts and assigns speeches to imaginary speakers. (2) Though the attributed speeches specifically do *not* match the characterization of the speaking body parts, Paul completely recognizes the absurdity of these contradictory speeches and uses them as an analog for the divided Corinthian community. In doing so, Paul negates the absurd speeches and thereby demonstrates his maintenance of the convention for appropriateness. (3) The use of ἐάν in 12:15-16 and the utter impossibility (οὐ δύναται) of the claim in 12:21 indicate that these speeches are hypothetical or purely imaginative. (4) The three primary contents are present; Paul introduces the speaking body parts, characterizes them, and attributes speech to them. Last, (5) Paul draws on the convention that it is acceptable to attribute speech to inanimate objects.

From the discussion above, it is easy to see that 1 Cor 12:15-16 and 21 fit Quintilian's allowance that speech-in-character can be quite useful for introducing characters for a specific rhetorical context (*Inst*. 9.2.30), as Paul uses these speakers in such a way that only makes sense in light of the ensuing Corinthian dispute about spiritual gifts and status within the community. An additional connection to Quintilian's treatment is the manner in which Paul attributes speech to inanimate objects. Quintilian writes, "When we transcend the bounds of nature, however, the figure can be made less harsh like this: 'If (*si*) my country… were to say to me…'" (*Inst*. 9.2.32 [LCL, Russell]). One way, therefore, Quintilian makes an "unnatural" speech-in-character sound less harsh is to pose it as a hypothetical scenario, "if." Paul also poses his attribution of speech to inanimate body parts (i.e., unnatural speakers) as hypothetical in 12:15-16 through the ἐάν + subjunctive construction, presumably making it a less harsh and more natural attribution of hypothetical speech. Furthermore, Theon's view that speech-in-

character is effective for exhortation / dissuasion is particularly relevant (*Prog.* 115.20-22; 116.27-117.4). In 1 Cor 12:15-16, 21, Paul's goal is to reveal to the Corinthians the absurdity of their quarreling over spiritual gifts and to change their attitude and behavior. That is, Paul is exhorting the Corinthians towards a particular course of action, namely, not to act like the contradictory and absurd body parts (which they are currently doing) but to embrace fully the useful and God-designed unified-diversity among the Corinthian Christians.

2 Corinthians 12:9

2 Corinthians 12:9 contains another example of speech-in-character. In 12:1, Paul continues the theme of boasting that runs through 2 Cor 10-12 (see also 1:12, 14; 5:12; 7:4, 14; 8:24; 9:2-3). After discussing a vision "someone" experienced (12:2-4), Paul writes that he will only boast of his weakness (12:5; cf. 11:30), even though he could boast otherwise (12:6). In fact, Paul writes that he received in his flesh a "thorn" (σκόλοψ), a tormenting messenger of Satan, so that he would not be exalted (ὑπεραίρωμαι) by his possible boasts (12:7). Paul petitioned the Lord three times to remove the thorn (12:8). The Lord responded, but not quite as Paul hoped. Paul records the Lord's response in 12:9:

> καὶ εἴρηκέν μοι· ἀρκεῖ σοι ἡ χάρις μου, ἡ γὰρ δύναμις ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ τελεῖται. Ἥδιστα οὖν μᾶλλον καυχήσομαι ἐν ταῖς ἀσθενείαις μου, ἵνα ἐπισκηνώσῃ ἐπ᾽ἐμὲ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ Χριστοῦ.
>
> And he said to me, "My grace is sufficient for you, for power is perfected in weakness." Therefore, I will boast all the more gladly in my weaknesses, so that the power of Christ might dwell in me.

With the third person singular verb, εἴρηκέν, Paul indicates that another character, the Lord, has entered the scene, and Paul attributes to him direct speech (12:8-9).[75] Assessing the appropriateness of the attributed speech, however, is more difficult because of the complicated composition history of 2 Corinthians. Scholars continue to debate whether 2 Corinthians is a unified letter or a composite of multiple letters that an editor compiled.[76] The issue is significant, because decisions about the (dis)unity of 2 Corinthians establish specific boundaries within which one should expect to find the characterization of an imaginary speaker. The potential partition of interest in this study is that which separates 2 Cor 10-13 from 1-9. If one considers 2 Cor 10-13 to represent a letter separate from 1-9, then he or she must limit the examination of the imagined

[75] Without recognizing that this is speech-in-character, Thrall also notes, "Christ's response is cited in direct speech." Thrall continues, "This suggests, at least, that it was communicated in some revelatory experience characterized by audition. Hence, though this was not part of the experience described in vv. 2-4, there would be a degree of similarity between the one and the other. In addition, the prayer-report thus turns into the report of a dialogue, underlined by the personal pronouns, and this emphasizes the depth of the personal relationship with Christ which Paul felt himself to enjoy." *2 Corinthians*, 820-21. Recognizing 2 Cor 12:9 as an example of speech-in-character, however, problematizes many of Thrall's conclusions. First, that Christ's communication to Paul is "cited in direct speech" does not inevitably support the view that this particular communication was actually auditory. Given the convention for writers to invent and/or shape speech attributed to imaginary speakers, it is altogether possible that Paul received some response from the Lord through an alternative means of revelation and subsequently cast that response as direct speech through the use of speech-in-character. Thus, Thrall's argument is too simplistic on this point. Second, in light of the first critique, it is unclear whether the prayer communication would have shared a significant "degree of similarity" with the vision of 12:2-4 or not. In fact, Paul makes no effort to suggest that the two experiences were similar; the account in 12:2-4 is specifically a "vision and apocalypse of the Lord," but Paul gives no such qualification to the Lord's response in 12:9. Third, it is quite unclear how the pronouns in and of themselves "[*emphasize*] the depth of the personal relationship with Christ which Paul felt himself to enjoy" (emphasis mine). It seems that Paul is simply stating the facts as he sees them—Christ somehow communicated with him, which necessitates the use of pronouns. Moreover, the content of the Lord's communication does not seem in any way narrowly relevant only to Paul personally; rather, the communication could be relevant to any Christian, which Paul seems to suggest in 13:3-5.

[76] For the arguments in either direction, see Thrall, *2 Corinthians*, 5-20, 595; Martin, *Second Epistle*, 298-99; Barrett, *Second Epistle*, 243-44; Hans Dieter Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 3-36; Roetzel, *2 Corinthians* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 2007), 24-35; Margaret M. Mitchell, "Paul's Letters to Corinth: The Interpretive Intertwining of Literary and Historical Reconstruction," in *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth, Interdisciplinary Approaches* (eds. Daniel Showalter and Steven J. Friesen; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 307-38; Günther Bornkamm, *Die Vorgeschichte des sogenannten Zweiten Korintherbriefes* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1961), 162-94; Talbert, *Reading Corinthians*, 6-9.

speaker's characterization to those chapters. If one accepts the unity of 2 Corinthians, however, the search for the characterization can involve the whole letter.

I do not intend to take on or solve the debate concerning 2 Corinthians' compositional history at this time.[77] Rather, both views will receive attention, one of which produces somewhat better results than the other. Confining the search for Paul's characterization of Jesus / Christ / the Lord to 2 Cor 10-13, the reader learns the following details leading up to the attributed speech-in-character: (1) Christ is gentle and kind (10:1); (2) Paul belongs to Christ (10:7); (3) the Lord gave Paul authority for building up and not for tearing down (10:8); (4) there is a gospel about Christ (10:14); (5) the Lord "approves" people (10:18); and (6) the Lord Jesus is God's Son (11:31). Despite this handful of information about the Lord, none of the examples are particularly helpful in terms of grounding or explaining the words Paul attributes to Jesus in 12:9. In the preceding two chapters, there is no mention of the Lord's (or God's) χάρις or the effects of χάρις, nor is there any description of the Lord in terms of antitheses (such as power and weakness). The antithesis between weakness and power does return in 13:3-4 in reference to Jesus' crucifixion in *weakness*, his resurrection by God's *power*, and Christian participation in Christ. To be sure, in light of 13:3-4, one could retrospectively understand Jesus' words in 12:9 to mean something like "God's perfect power is exercised in instances of weakness," whereby Jesus' words would be quite appropriate to

[77] In order to assess Paul's use of speech-in-character in 2 Cor 12:9 completely and most accurately, such a task would be required. Given the numerous examples discussed in this chapter, it is already evident that Paul was aware of and used the rhetorical figure of speech-in-character. It has also been demonstrated that Paul was skilled enough to tailor the conventions of speech-in-character for his rhetorical context and nevertheless maintain its essence. Thus, if final conclusions regarding all the details of 2 Cor 12:9's speech-in-character are slightly out of reach, the plethora of other examples more than sufficiently achieves the goals set forth in this chapter.

his characterization as one in whose weakness God's power was effective (13:4).[78] The location of 13:3-4 in relation to 12:9 (i.e., following at some distance), however, makes it quite difficult to grasp how the discussion in 13:3-4 could serve as a technical characterization and prepare readers to understand the speech-in-character in 12:9, especially on a first reading. Instead, it seems more likely that Paul expects his readers to accept his speech-in-character at face value or in light of previous communications or experiences and without any specific characterization, and that Paul only later expands on or explains the relationship between weakness and power in 13:3-4.

If, however, one accepts the unity of 2 Corinthians, an earlier verse in the letter proves particularly interesting. In 2 Cor 8:9, Paul writes, "For, with respect to the grace (χάριν) of our Lord Jesus Christ (τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ), you know that, although he was rich, he became poor for your sake, so that you might become wealthy by his poverty." Here, Paul does not only comment about the nature of the Lord's grace, but he does so specifically by way of an antithesis between wealth and poverty. That is, what the Corinthians supposedly know about the Lord's grace is that it is self-sacrificial and salvific; though Jesus was rich, he became poor in the incarnation,[79] so that the Corinthians might become rich by receiving salvation (cf. Phil 2:6-11).[80] Thus, in a unified 2 Corinthians, the reader has been primed by 8:9 to understand the Lord's χάρις in a specific, salvific way, and he or she has been introduced to a Jesus who understood and experienced antithetical realities. Thusly primed, the attributed speech in 12:9 could

[78] One problem with such a reading, however, is that Paul identifies the power of 12:9a not as God's power, *per se*, but as the power of Christ in 12:9b.

[79] Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 533-45; Barrett, *Second Epistle*, 223; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 263; Betz, *2 Corinthians*, 62.

[80] Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 534; Betz, *2 Corinthians*, 61, 63.

be altogether appropriate; though Paul was experiencing a tormenting thorn in this life, the Lord's salvific grace and the hope instilled by it was all Paul needed, because the Lord's power was at work in the midst of Paul's weakness.

Despite what decision one makes regarding the (dis)unity of 2 Corinthians, 12:9 meets most of the conventions for speech-in-character, with a sufficient characterization being the only potential deficiency. (1) Paul attributes speech to an imaginary speaker. (2) In a unified 2 Corinthians, the reader has been prepared for the statement of 12:9 by the characterization of 8:9. In a partition letter, however, the characterization is either less helpful or assumed to be part of the Corinthians' prior knowledge. (3) The attributed speech is portrayed as having actually occurred. (4) The common elements of an identification of the speaker and an attribution of speech-in-character are both present. The quality of characterization, however, is contingent on one's view of 2 Corinthians' composition history.[81]

Concerning the uniquely attested elements of speech-in-character, in the context of Paul's argument for boasting in weakness, the Lord's response represents the introduction of speech-in-character for a particular rhetorical context, as it functions to support Paul's defense of weakness (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.30). Furthermore, Theon suggests that speech-in-character is useful for consolation (τὸ τῶν παρηγορικῶν λόγων εἶδος; *Prog*. 115.20-21), and this use appears quite pertinent to the current situation as well. Paul has been given a tormenting thorn (12:7) and has asked the Lord for relief

[81] To be sure, Paul's interactions with the Corinthians while he was physically present in Corinth could have (probably?) involved discussing material that could be relevant to establishing a particular characterization of Jesus that would inform our understanding of the speech-in-character in 2 Cor 12:9. Unfortunately, there is no verifiable way to confirm or deny what this material was or whether this was in fact the case. As such, the rhetorical context must be confined to the limits of the text, our only solid evidence.

(12:8). Though the Lord does not remove the thorn as Paul requested, he does indicate to Paul a remedy, namely, salvific grace and the power that works in weakness (12:9). Thus, the Lord consoles Paul in his present torment by reminding him of the hope he has in the Lord's eschatological activity. Theon also suggests "appropriate starting places" (ἀφορμὰς οἰκείας) for the use of speech-in-character in consolation (*Prog*. 116.27). The Lord's response to Paul's prayer (2 Cor 12:9) does not suggest any element of necessity or intentionality,[82] nor is there any comment that a greater evil or torment exists (cf. Theon, *Prog*. 117.6-13). But the Lord's response does strike at the import of Theon's claim that "one should say that it was beneficial and that nothing advantageous comes from grief over what has already happened" (*Prog*. 117.15-16). That is, though Paul is presently experiencing a tormenting thorn, the Lord's response redirects Paul's concern to the future eschatological act of the gracious Lord and away from his present grief. As it stands, therefore, 2 Cor 12:9 constitutes the first parallel between Paul and Theon's use of speech-in-character for consolation, as well as the first parallel with one of Theon's suggested starting places.

Romans 10:6-8

The final example of speech-in-character to discuss at this time (more to come in Chapters Seven, Eleven, and Appendix B) is present in Rom 10:6-8. Paul rounds out Rom 9's discussion of God's creation of Israel by noting that (non-Christian) Israel's failure to obtain righteousness ἐκ πίστεως was not ultimately her fault. Rather, in the race

[82] Paul, in his own voice, however, leaves room for both. First, the thorn "was given" (ἐδόθη) to Paul, suggesting intentionality (12:7). Second, the thorn was given for a specific purpose (ἵνα), which, though it does not require strict necessity, at least allows for it (12:7). Frank J. Matera, *II Corinthians: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 282, 284; Talbert, *Reading Corinthians*, 152; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 240; Sampley, *2 Corinthians*, 164-66.

to righteousness between Israel and the nations, God rigged the outcome by placing a stumbling block in Israel's path; God tripped Israel (9:30-33).[83] Paul then begins Rom 10 by reiterating his deep desire for Israel's salvation (10:1), and he explains that the problem separating Israel from salvation is that she has zeal for God but not "according to knowledge" (κατ᾽ ἐπίγνωσιν; 10:2). Rom 10:3 expands on what this means; Israel was ignorant (ἀγνοοῦντες) of "the δικαιοσύνη of God" (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην) and sought to establish her own δικαιοσύνη through law.[84] Again, however, Paul mitigates the blame attributed to Israel by noting God's role in Israel's experience; Israel was not subjected to God's δικαιοσύνη.[85] Romans 10:4, despite its deep and perennial exegetical "ruts," then highlights the dividing line between the law and Christ as the means of

---

[83] Beverly R. Gaventa, "Questions about *Nomos*, Answers about *Christos*: Romans 10:4 in Context," forthcoming.

[84] Rom 10:3 does not specifically state that Israel's sought after righteousness was *through law*, but the following discussion of νόμος in 10:4-5 indicates that this is the case.

[85] Paul refocuses the discussion once more, noting that the ultimate problem with Israel is that "they were not subjected to the δικαιοσύνη of God" (τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐχ ὑπετάγησαν; 10:3). Jewett's view of 10:3 is common. Jewett writes, "Ὑποτάσσω in the middle voice used here implies voluntary submission or subordination of oneself to a superior." Jewett, *Romans*, 618. See also Dunn, *Romans*, 588-89; Keck, *Romans*, 247-48; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 33; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993; reprint 2008), 583-84; C. E. B. Cranfield, *Romans: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (ICC; 2 vols.; London: T & T Clark, 1975-79), 515; N. T. Wright, *Romans*, 655; Moo, *Romans*, 636; Witherington and Hyatt, *Romans*, 260. The verb, however, is not technically in the middle voice but the passive, ὑπετάγησαν. BDAG (ὑποτάσσω 1.b.β) allows the passive verb in Rom 10:3 to carry the possible middle meaning of "subject oneself," but it also allows for the full passive sense, "be subjected or subordinated." In light of God's active role in regards to Israel in particular (Rom 9:6-10:3) and the world as a whole throughout Romans (especially 1, 5, 8, 11:25-32), the passive sense, as a divine passive, seems much more appropriate in 10:3. First, a divine passive in 10:3 makes better sense of God's role in tripping Israel in 9:30-33; as Israel's stumbling was caused by God's jutted out stone (9:30-33), so also Israel's ignorance was due to their not being subjected to God's δικαιοσύνη (10:3). Second, such an idea is not foreign to Romans or Paul. For instance, creation is subjected in Rom 8:20, and the Son will be subjected to "the one who subjects all things" in 1 Cor 15:28. In this passive sense, Israel's not being subjected to God's δικαιοσύνη is similar to the notion of God's "handing people over" (Rom 1:24, 26, 28). On this treatment of παραδίδωμι, see Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "God Handed Them Over," in *Our Mother Saint Paul* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007), 113-23.

In this reading, the participles ἀγνοοῦντες and ζητοῦντες can be taken as adverbial participles indicating result. God did not subject Israel to his δικαιοσύνη; as a result, Israel was (understandably) ignorant of God's δικαιοσύνη and sought to establish their own through law.

δικαιοσύνη.[86] As such, Paul signifies that Israel was chasing after δικαιοσύνη in all the wrong places. As a proof for 10:4,[87] Rom 10:5-8 also suggests that the simple act of chasing was itself problematic. Rom 10:5 cites scripture (Lev 18:5) as evidence that the "law righteousness" Israel was chasing after is a matter of "doing" (ποιήσας). Rom 10:6-8, however, argues that righteousness based on πίστις has nothing to do with "doing" by "ascending" or "descending" (i.e., "chasing"); rather, the proclaimed word about πίστις is already nearby in one's mouth and heart and requires no one to retrieve it.

In the course of making his argument, Paul employs the practice of speech-in-character.[88] In Rom 10:6-8, Paul writes:

> (10:6) ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει· μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου· τίς ἀναβήσεται εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν Χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν·(7) ἢ· τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον; τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν.
> (8) ἀλλὰ τί λέγει; ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ στόματί σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὅ κηρύσσομεν.
>
> (10:6) But, the δικαιοσύνη that is based on πίστις speaks in this way, "Do not say in your heart, Who will ascend into Heaven?" This means, in order to bring Christ down. (7) "And do not say, Who will descend into the abyss?" This means, in order to bring Christ up from the dead. (8) But what does it say? "The word is near to you in your mouth and in your heart." This is the word about πίστις which we preach.[89]

---

[86] Gaventa, "Questions about *Nomos*."

[87] Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans* (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 284; Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 342.

[88] Scholars who recognize 10:6-8 as speech-in-character (or a similar term) include Jewett, *Romans*, 625-29; Keck, *Romans*, 252; Arland J. Hultgren, *Paul's Letter to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 386; Frank J. Matera, *Romans* (Paideia Commentaries on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 246-47; Cranfield, *Romans*, 522; Käsemann, *Romans*, 284; Bultman, *Der Stil*, 87-88; Bates, *Hermeneutics*, 225-40; Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 236; Stowers, *Rereading*, 309-10; Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 343-47. Others who generally recognize the introduction of a second speaker include Gaventa, "Questions about *Nomos*," forthcoming; Luke Timothy Johnson, *Reading Romans: A Literary and Theological Commentary* (Reading the New Testament; New York: Crossroad, 1997), 160.

[89] Bates argues for a significantly different script in 10:6-8. Bates argues, "Not only does Paul make the Righteousness by Faith the speaker of Deuteronomy 9:4 and 30:14 in Romans 10:6-8, Paul also assigns another prosopon to the 'you' whom the Righteousness by Faith addresses, and it is this 'you' whom Paul understands to be the speaker of Deuteronomy 30:12-13." Bates then defines this "you" as "Paul's unbelieving compatriots—addressed via a collective singular—who have been unflatteringly

The third person verb of speech, λέγει, marks that the following discourse is not spoken in Paul's voice, and the nominative phrase, ἡ... ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη, identifies the imaginary speaker as "the δικαιοσύνη based on πίστις" (10:6).[90] The quality of πίστις is Paul's overriding characterization of δικαιοσύνη, and he has been discussing (i.e., characterizing) the concept of δικαιοσύνη on the basis of πίστις throughout the course of Romans, beginning in 1:17.[91] Of the several nuances Paul applies to δικαιοσύνη and πίστις in Romans, one aspect stands above the rest as particularly relevant to Rom 10:6-8; πίστις-based δικαιοσύνη has nothing to do with works or "doing."[92] In 3:21-22, God's δικαιοσύνη is made manifest *not* by νόμος (i.e., "doing;" cf. 10:5), but specifically through Jesus' πίστις. Romans 4:3, 5-6 stipulate that it is πίστις that results in δικαιοσύνη,

---

assimilated by Paul to the presumptuous Israelites described in Deuteronomy 9:4." As such, Rom 10:6-8 is "a speech that itself contains *reported speech*. The Righteousness by Faith is reporting the direct speech of the addressee, the Presumptuous Person, and it is the Presumptuous Person whom Paul assigns by way of prosopological exegesis as the speaker of Deuteronomy 30:12-13!" Consequently, for Bates, Paul speaks Rom 10:6a and 6d, 7c, 8a and 8c. The Righteousness by Faith speaks 10:6b, 7a, 8b. And the Presumptuous Person poses the questions of 10:6c, 7b. Bates, *Hermeneutics*, 226, 230, 232, 233-38, emphasis original. I agree completely with Bates' script for Paul. I disagree, however, that Paul casts ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη as placing speech-in-character in the voice of Paul's presumptuous compatriots. The argument in Rom 10:4-8 is not about non-Christian Israel *per se*, though it is of course connected; rather, the thrust of 10:4-8 is more narrowly to demonstrate how the τέλος νόμου is Χριστός, resulting in δικαιοσύνη for everyone characterized by πίστις (10:4). In this argument, Paul cites Lev 18:5 to establish the view that law-righteousness depends on "doing" (Rom 10:5). Paul, however, then places other texts from the law, Deut 9:4 (8:17) and 30:12-14, into the mouth of ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη in order to demonstrate that the law itself also affirms δικαιοσύνη on the basis of πίστις, at least as Paul interprets it (10:6-8). Consequently, Rom 10:6-8 has less to do directly with Israel and much more with the question of what νόμος affirms as a mediator of δικαιοσύνη. In this way, Rom 10:6-8 supports Paul's claim in 10:4 by indicating how the νόμος itself allows that δικαιοσύνη is based on πίστις (rather than "doing"). Therefore, the questions in Rom 10:6 and 7 make little sense if they are dialogically scripted in the voice of Paul's contemporary, non-Christian compatriots. Instead, ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη speaks these words simply as a scriptural proof from the law to support Paul's thesis in 10:4.

[90] Similarly, Jewett argues, "In view of the speech-in-character that Paul employs here, the δέ that opens verse 6 indicates a change of speaker from Moses to the personified Righteousness by Faith." Jewett, *Romans*, 625.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Gaventa, "Questions about *Nomos*," forthcoming. Similarly, Dunn writes, "What Paul is objecting to throughout this letter is *not* the law or the commandment as such, but the law and the commandment *understood in terms of works*" (i.e., doing). Dunn, *Romans*, 613.

and 4:9-10 reject the idea that Abraham's circumcision functioned as a work that produced δικαιοσύνη. Rom 4:11 even informs that Abraham's circumcision was simply a "sign" or "seal" of the πίστις-based δικαιοσύνη he already possessed. Romans 4:13 then distinguishes between νόμος and δικαιοσύνη πίστεως as the means through which God's promise to Abraham was effected. Additionally, Rom 5:17 identifies δικαιοσύνη as a gift (τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης) and thus not a self-attainable goal. Interestingly, δικαιοσύνη and πίστις language is wholly absent in Rom 7:7-12, 13b-24, 25b's discourse of the agonized "I" who "does" what he or she does not want to do but cannot "do" what he or she wants (7:15-21).[93] Finally, πίστις based δικαιοσύνη is that which the nations obtained *without even pursuing it* (9:30; see also my discussion of 2:12-16, 25-29 in Chapter Eleven). Thus, the attribution of speech which rejects any requirement of "doing" and affirms "πίστις" as the mediator of δικαιοσύνη is altogether appropriate to the characterization of δικαιοσύνη πίστεως Paul provides throughout Romans.

The attributed speech-in-character is not entirely a Pauline creation. Rather, the attributed speech in Rom 10:6-8 is Paul's recasting of Deut 9:4 (cf. 8:17) and 30:11-14. Rom 10:6's introductory line, μὴ εἴπῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, is verbatim with LXX Deut 9:4a (cf. 8:17a). Jumping to LXX Deut 30, Moses exhorts the Hebrews that the commandment (ἐντολή) is neither difficult or distant (μακρὰν ἀπὸ σοῦ; 30:11). The commandment is not in heaven, so that you Israelites say, "Who (τίς) among us will ascend (ἀναβήσεται) into heaven (εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν) and bring it to us, and when we hear it we will do it?" (30:12)? Nor is the commandment on the other side of the sea, so that

[93] In Rom 7, the only cognate, δικαία, refers to the law and not the "I" (7:12).

you say, "Who among us will cross over to the other side of the sea and bring it back for us and make it heard among us, and we will do it?" (30:13). Instead, "the word (τὸ ῥῆμά) is very near to you (ἐγγύς σου) in your mouth (ἐν τῷ στόματί σου) and in your heart (ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου) and in your hands (ἐν ταῖς χερσίν σου) in order to do it" (αὐτὸ ποιεῖν; 30:14).[94] Paul, however, significantly reivses Deuteronomy. Most notably, Israel no longer speaks; it is ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη that speaks in Rom 10:6-8, which Paul sets in juxtaposition with the way Moses characterizes τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νομοῦ as a matter of "doing" (10:5).[95] Paul also adjusts the depiction of the second phrase from the imagery of crossing the sea to that of descending into the abyss (10:7; cf. LXX Ps 106:26). In this way, Paul creates a vertical rather than horizontal depiction of the "doer's" attempt at δικαιοσύνη, which he describes as an attempt to bring Christ down or raise Christ up from the dead. Such "doing" is altogether misguided; Christ has already come down and been raised up (cf. Phil 2:6-11), and "the word of πίστις" is already present (10:8).[96] Third, Paul omits the references in Deut 30:12, 13, and 14 to the concept of "doing" (ποιέω; Rom 10:6, 7, and 8, respectively). Such omissions play an integral role in Paul's argument, since he is specifically addressing the opposition between πίστις and

---

[94] *Deuteronomy's* text, therefore, is an example of speech-in-character inside another speech-in-character. The first degree of speech-in-character is the attribution of speech to Moses (Deut 29:2-30:20). The second-level of speech-in-character is that which Moses ascribes to Israel. The nominative *masculine* participle (λέγων) and the first person plural pronouns (ἡμῖν) require the subject to be Israel or, more generally, "you" and not the nominative *feminine* commandment (ἐντολή).

[95] On the question of whether the relationship between Rom 10:5 and 10:6 is connective or adversative, see Jewett, *Romans*, 625; Dunn, *Romans*, 613; Thomas R. Schreiner, *Romans* (BECNT 6; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998), 551-54; Moo, *Romans*, 645-46; Bates, *Hermeneutics*, 226-29; Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 73-83; Stowers, *Rereading*, 308-10; Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 266-67, 267n.2; Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 343-47; Francis Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*: London: T & T Clark, 2004), 330-41.

[96] Jewett, *Romans*, 625-28; Keck, *Romans*, 251-53; Barrett, *Romans*, 185-86; Moo, *Romans*, 655-56.

human "doing" as a route to δικαιοσύνη.[97] Fourth, Paul offers alternative commentary on each phrase of the attributed speech.[98] The metaphorical travels are no longer conceived of as a way to grasp the commandment but Christ (10:6-7). Finally, 10:8 reiterates that it is not the commandment that is near in one's heart and mouth but "the word of πίστις." In

[97] Contra Bates, who argues that "the argument that Paul was theologically motivated to omit this phrase is cogent only with regard to popular English translations that cannot mark the difference between the feminine and the neuter, not on the basis of a careful inspection of the Greek text…in Deuteronomy 30:14 the 'in order to perform *it* (αὐτό)' is in the neuter, and refers to the 'the utterance' (τὸ ῥῆμα) of 30:14, which Paul goes on to gloss as 'the utterance of faith' (τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως). Paul's omissions of the performance theme throughout Romans 10:6-8 do not appear to be theologically motivated, since it would be unproblematic for the Presumptuous Person to favor doing the commandment and equally unobjectionable for the Righteousness by Faith to favor enacting the utterance from within the dramatic world." Bates, *Hermeneutics*, 237-38, see also 234n.31. Bates's argument contains several weaknesses. First, Bates makes much ado about Deut 30:11-14's references to the feminine "commandment" (ἐντολή, αὐτήν; 30:11-13) and the neuter "utterance" (τὸ ῥῆμα; αὐτό; 30:14). In context, τὸ ῥῆμα is a synonymous reference to ἡ ἐντολή. Though Bates's argument could stand in relation to Rom 10:6-7, if Paul retained the phrase "and in your hands in order to do it" from Deut 30:14 in Rom 10:8b, his argument would crumble. To retain the phrase would contradictorily affirm the notion that ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη is correlative with human "doing," the very thing Paul has been denying throughout Romans. Second, *even if* one grants Bates's argument that "Righteousness by Faith" attributes speech-in-character to "the Presumptuous Person" in 10:6b and 7a, that certain characters could have reasonably affirmed what Paul has omitted about the commandment and the utterance does not necessitate the conclusion that Paul's omissions were not theologically motivated. *According to his terms*, Bates is correct that the "Presumptuous Person" would have no problem affirming the concept of "doing" the commandment. In light of Paul's argumentative thrust, however, Bates is off course in suggesting that Paul could then allow ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη to affirm the concept of humans "doing" the utterance. Rather, one could argue all the more that though certain characters *could* have affirmed certain claims about doing the commandment or utterance, the fact that they *do not make such affirmations* is quite suggestive of Paul's agenda. What Bates has momentarily missed is the substance of Paul's juxtaposition in these verses. The juxtaposition is not between νόμος (or ἐντολή) and πίστις but between πίστις and "doing" (ποιέω), and Paul is working to obliterate completely the concept of human "doing" as a mediator of δικαιοσύνη. Rhetorically, one might very well expect Paul to work towards this theological goal by removing completely the affirmation of "doing" from any and all participants in the dialogue, which sets 10:6-8 over against the "doing" of 10:5. Third, and perhaps to belabor the point, Paul's argument about δικαιοσύνη is inherently theological, and the omission (three times) of the concept of "doing" is best understood as Paul's attempt to distance δικαιοσύνη from human "doing" as much as possible.

[98] On this point, Jewett is inconsistent. At first, Jewett agrees that 10:6c, 7b, and 8c represent "Paul's remarks in clarification" of δικαιοσύνη's words. Later, however, Jewett argues, "In the style of Jewish *pesharim*, the character called Righteousness by Faith comments on each phrase of the Deuteronomic citation, beginning with the traditional formula τοὺτ᾽ ἔστιν," i.e., 10:6c, 7b, and 8c. Jewett, *Romans*, 625, 626. Obviously, the speaker cannot be both Paul and δικαιοσύνη. Jewett overlooks two details that demonstrate the whole of 10:6b-8 does not constitute the speech of δικαιοσύνη. First, 10:8a, ἀλλὰ τί λέγει, indicates an undeniable return to Paul's voice as it is clearly a reference to δικαιοσύνη (and, therefore, cannot be spoken by δικαιοσύνη). Second, 10:8c, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως ὅ κηρύσσομεν, cannot be spoken in the voice of the singular δικαιοσύνη; 10:8c must be spoken in the voice of Paul and his cohort, as evidenced by the 1st plural κηρύσσομεν. Given that the τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν phrase in 10:8c must be spoken in Paul's voice, I likewise take the τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν phrases in 10:6c and 7b to be spoken in Paul's voice. So also Bates, *Hermeneutics,* 234; Watson, *Hermeneutics of Faith*, 336-37; Campbell, *Deliverance*, 798-97.

these ways, Paul does not simply script the words of Deuteronomy in another speaker's voice, but he recasts and shapes those words to fit his rhetorical needs.

In Rom 10:6-8, therefore, all of the primary expectations for speech-in-character are present. (1) Paul crafts speech and assigns it to an imaginary speaker. (2) The attributed speech appropriately matches the character of the speaker. (3) The attributed speech is actual speech; it is what δικαιοσύνη is imagined as actually saying. (4) The three major components are present: identification, characterization, attribution of speech-in-character. Finally, (5) for the second time,[99] Paul places speech on the lips of an abstract concept, δικαιοσύνη. On the secondary aspects of speech-in-character, Rom 10:6-8 most closely resonates with the use of the figure to introduce characters for a specific rhetorical context (Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.30). Paul is constructing an argument about the opposition between πίστις and human "doing" as a means to δικαιοσύνη. Introducing ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη and specifically portraying it as rejecting the concept of human achievement through support from the law itself emphasizes Paul's claim all the more.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed select Pauline texts that demonstrate Paul's awareness and implementation of the rhetorical figure of speech-in-character. The examples examined above do not comprise an exhaustive list of Paul's uses of speech-in-character. Instead, they are offered as representative of the majority. Additional examples may be found in Appendix B. Through engaging these texts, a number of conclusions are deduced.

[99] See the section Gal 4:6.

First, it is remarkably undeniable that Paul employed the figure of speech-in-character in his writings. No less than five (1 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, and Romans) of the seven undisputed Pauline letters evince this to be the case.

Second, in his implementations of speech-in-character, Paul is altogether able to match the conventions set forth in the treatments of rhetorical theory. Though most of Paul's examples cohere in one way or another to the conventions set forth, a number of them monotonously agree with the elementary conventions. The instances that agree with the conventions at the most basic level are: Gal 3:8; 4:6; 1 Cor 1:12; 3:4; 12:3c; 15:35; 2 Cor 12:9 (if one assumes epistolary unity); and Rom 10:6-8 (see also 1 Cor 10:28, in Appendix B).

Third, Paul was also capable of transcending the basic conventions and tailoring the form of his speeches-in-character for specific rhetorical goals, all the while maintaining the central essence of the figure. To begin, Paul can apply speech to specific people (1 Cor 1:12; 3:4), types of people (see 2 Cor 10:10), or unspecified people (1 Thess 5:3; 1 Cor 12:3; 15:35; see also 1 Cor 10:28). Paul, however, can also attribute speech to abstract concepts (Gal 4:6; Rom 10:6-8), inanimate objects (Gal 3:8; 1 Cor 12:15-16, 21; see also Rom 9:20), or the gods (perhaps Gal 4:6; 2 Cor 12:9). Furthermore, Paul can also forego any direct characterization of the imaginary speaker, supplying instead implicit characterizations for the reader or hearer to recognize and deduce accordingly (1 Thess 5:3; see also 2 Cor 10:10). If one understands 2 Corinthians to be a partition letter, then it is even possible that Paul has provided an instance of speech-in-character that depends on the audience's prior knowledge for characterization rather than

supplying a direct or implicit characterization that grounds the statements of the speaker.[100] In terms of appropriateness, on three occasions Paul scripts speeches altogether out of character (1 Cor 12:3b; 12:15-16, 21; cf. Rom 9:20). On each of these occasions, however, Paul negates the out-of-character speeches and, as a result, brings these examples of speech-in-character back into conformity with the criterion of appropriateness. Paul's ability to manipulate and tailor speeches-in-character to suit his rhetorical needs in each of these ways strongly demonstrates Paul's comfort and tact with the figure to be advanced beyond that of an elementary level.

Fourth, Paul's use of speech-in-character also parallels many of the secondary elements proposed in the theoretical treatments. Most notably, Quintilian's three suggested functions of speech-in-character seem quite relevant to Paul's use of the figure. To begin, on numerous occasions, it was easy to recognize how Paul introduced speech-in-character in order to address specific needs within the rhetorical context (1 Thess 5:3; Gal 4:6; 1 Cor 12:3; 12:15-16, 21; 2 Cor 12:9; Rom 10:6-8; see also 1 Cor 10:28; 15:35; 2 Cor 10:10; Rom 9:20).[101] Quintilian's allowance that speech-in-character is also useful for illustrating the thoughts of one's opponents also finds affirmation in Paul's letters (1 Thess 5:3; 1 Cor 1:12; 3:4; see also 1 Cor 15:35; 2 Cor 10:10). And, though one might argue that every example of speech-in-character creates vividness and variety, such a function was easily recognizable in texts like Gal 4:6; 1 Cor 12:3; and 12:15-16, 21. The

[100] This is only "possible," because there is no way of knowing what an editor may or may not have excluded in the process of assembling what we know as 2 Corinthians, and because we have no verifiable way of knowing what Paul might have discussed with the Corinthians when present with them.

[101] The generous degree to which Paul's use of speech-in-character overlaps with Quintilian's suggestion that speech-in-character can be useful for introducing characters into a specific rhetorical context cannot be taken as weighty proof that Paul was intimately aware of Quintilian. The very general nature of Quintilian's comment allows that speech-in-character can be used in any number of rhetorical contexts as needed. Additionally, Paul's letters, understood as circumstantial letters addressing particular historical situations, almost cannot help but to use speech-in-character in precisely this way.

final point of connection between Paul's use of speech-in-character discussed so far and Quintilian involves Paul's attempt to express the unnatural speech of inanimate body parts as naturally as possible through the use of hypothetical conditions (1 Cor 12:15-16, 21).

It is not only Quintilian's unique elements that find support in Paul's letters, however; elements from Theon's *Progymnasmata* also appear. Theon informs that speech-in-character is useful for exhortation or dissuasion, and these uses mirror several of Paul's examples (1 Thess 5:3; 1 Cor 12:15-16, 21; see also 1 Cor 10:28). Additionally, Paul even approaches one of Theon's suggested starting places for the use of speech-in-character as a means of consolation (2 Cor 12:9).

The primary unique element from Hermogenes concerning the chronological structure of speech-in-character, however, does not appear in any of the discussed examples. This is no doubt due, at least in part, to the very short nature of most of the examples.

In conclusion, it is altogether clear that Paul knows how and attributes speech to other speakers in his letters. Moreover, Paul's thorough agreement with the conventions (even and especially when he manipulates them for his rhetorical needs) is quite suggestive not only that Paul was well aware of them in one form or another, but also that his tact with the figure was at least somewhat advanced when compared to the elementary treatments. Paul's agreement with the rhetorical conventions stands firm, regardless of the degree to which Paul was or was not formally trained in Greco-Roman rhetoric.[102]

[102] For discussions and relevant bibliography of whether Paul was or was not trained in formal rhetoric, see Ryan S. Schellenberg, *Rethinking Paul's Rhetorical Education: Comparative Rhetoric and 2 Corinthians 10-13* (Society of Biblical Literature: Early Christianity and Its Literature 10; Atlanta; Society of Biblical Literature, 2013); Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*.

This sentiment is further supported by Paul's usage of the secondary aspects of speech-in-character, of which Paul employed many, and the examination of Rom 3:1-9 in Part Three will continue to build on this presentation of Paul's abilities with the figure.

At this point, it is time to shift away from speech-in-character in its own right and towards the concept of diatribe and its dialogical elements. After Chapter Six's discussion of secondary literature on diatribe, Chapter Seven will bring speech-in-character back into the discussion as an additional means of analyzing diatribe's dialogical sections. The combination of diatribe and speech-in-character will then, in Part Three, be particularly insightful for determining the script of the dialogue that takes place in Rom 3:1-9.

PART TWO

Diatribe

More than a century ago, Rudolf Bultmann directed the attention of Pauline scholars to elements of Greco-Roman diatribe in Paul's letters, most notably 1 Corinthians and Romans.[1] Almost seven decades later, Stanley K. Stowers significantly reassessed this issue, emphasizing the dialogical portions of diatribal and Pauline texts.[2] Part Two of this dissertation, "Diatribe," continues this trajectory.

Chapter Six, "Portrayals of Diatribe," examines (particularly New Testament) scholarly engagement(s) with diatribe beginning with Bultmann's predecessors. The product will be a history of research on diatribe and Paul among New Testament scholars that analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each approach along the way. Generally speaking, and though other voices must be heard, I concur with the consensus that Stowers's presentation of diatribe supersedes Bultmann's earlier analysis. The nuanced portrayal of diatribe that emerges from this survey may then be used as a hermeneutical lens through which to readjust our understanding of Paul's writings that evince diatribal features, culminating (in Part Three) with a detailed engagement with Rom 3:1-9.

Chapter Seven, "Examples of Diatribal Dialogue," serves two primary roles. First, it analyzes the use of dialogue by writers other than Paul that scholars generally agree employ diatribe and provide the foundation for our understanding of the practice in antiquity. Second, it analyzes each of these diatribal dialogues in light of the conventions

---

[1] Bultmann, *Der Stil*.

[2] Stowers, *Diatribe.*

set forth by speech-in-character. In this way, the hermeneutical lens of Greco-Roman diatribe is largely employed to shape the meaning and import of a given text, while the rhetorical conventions for speech-in-character carry the weight in terms of defining the boundaries of the various exchanges within the script of that dialogical text. Said otherwise, speech-in-character will determine who is speaking which lines in a dialogue, and the characteristic tones, goals, and trajectories of diatribe will indicate how that dialogue should be understood within its larger argumentative context. By blending these two features, this project offers methodological progress as it allows both to exercise exegetical influence simultaneously.

CHAPTER SIX

Portrayals of Diatribe

As indicated above, Bultmann constitutes the starting place for consideration of Greco-Roman diatribe and its relation to the Pauline literature, and his paradigm held sway for nearly seventy years.[1] With the work of Stowers, however, many scholars began to reconfigure their understandings of diatribe and to align more closely with Stowers's model. In the aftermath of Stowers's work on diatribe, although many simply adopt Stowers at face value, there have been a number of publications that have continued to challenge or at least nuance our understanding of diatribe. These scholars include Abraham J. Malherbe,[2] Thomas Schmeller,[3] Runar M. Thorsteinsson,[4] Thomas H. Tobin,[5] and Changwon Song.[6] The present task is to survey and analyze the ways these scholars portray diatribe, taking them up in chronological order. I will address the manner in which these scholars (and others) interpret Paul vis-à-vis their respective understandings of diatribe in Part Three.

Though Bultmann was the first to contribute an in-depth study of diatribe and its relevance for understanding Paul's letters, he was obviously not the first scholar to think

---

[1] Bultmann, *Der Stil*.

[2] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο."

[3] Thomas Schmeller, *Paulus und die "Diatribe:" Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation* (*NTAbdh* 19; Münster: Aschendorff, 1987).

[4] Runer M. Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function and Identity in the Context of Ancient Epistolography* (ConBNTS 40; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2003).

[5] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*.

[6] Song, *Reading Romans*.

about diatribe. In fact, many of Bultmann's views on diatribe were influenced by the previous one hundred thirty years of scholarship on the subject. Stowers provides a sufficient analysis of these earlier works, so an extensive rehashing of the material seems unnecessary for this project.[7] Rather, I will provide a brief sketch of the research preceding Bultmann that is tailored to highlight the themes and concepts related to the dialogical aspects of diatribe that will later appear in Bultmann, Stowers, or are otherwise significant for this project. Then, I will address Bultmann directly.

Bultmann's Predecessors

In the late 19th century, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff characterized Teles as a "Cynic preacher."[8] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff argued that the fragments of Teles's writings began life as schoolroom lectures and speeches and represented the earliest known example of an "oral preaching *Gattung*," which he considered to be a "*Litteraturgattung*."[9] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff contended that this *Gattung* came into existence through the mixing of the philosophical dialogue and rhetorical ἐπίδειξις, resulting in something of a "half dialogue" between the speaker and the imagined or real audience.[10] Teles represented a diminished form of this "half dialogue," however, since the remaining fragments of his writings fail to preserve any instances of ἠθοποίια

[7] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 7-17.

[8] Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Excurs 3: Der kynische Prediger Teles," in *Antigonos von Karystos* (Philologische Untersuchungen IV; Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1881), 292-319.

[9] Ibid., 292-93, 301, 306, 313. Stowers notes Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's problematic identification of Teles's fragments as representatives of oral discourse yet classification of them as belonging to a *Litteraturgattung*. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 8.

[10] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff writes, "*die ganze litteraturgattung ist durch eine kreuzung des philosophischen dialoges mit der rhetorischen epideixis entstanden*." Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Der kynishce prediger Teles," 307, 312.

attributed to the imaginary dialogue partner(s).[11] Nevertheless, this "half dialogue" preserved the polemical trajectory of the philosophical dialogue which preceded it, thereby permitting Wilamowitz-Moellendorff to identify the imaginary dialogue partner in polemical terms as an opponent.[12]

It was Herman Usener who was the first to classify this *Gattung* specifically as "diatribe," which he attributed specifically to the Bionean materials preserved in the Teles fragments.[13] Otto Hense attempted at length to identify the extent of the material belonging to Bion in Teles's writings, and he published the first critical editions of the Teles fragments that served as the standard editions until that of Edward O'Neil.[14] Then, in his work on Seneca and the *Gattung* of Bion, Heinrich Weber composed "the most extensive stylistic analysis of the diatribe prior to Bultmann."[15] Continuing in the trajectory of Usener and Hense by identifying Bion rather than Teles as the primary model for diatribe, Weber's characterization of the diatribe, while not limited to the following, identified as standard qualities the use of personifications, interjected objections, imaginary opponents, and fictitious conversations.[16] Due to Bultmann's strong reliance on Weber and the long period of time during which Bultmann was most

---

[11] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff writes, "*verträgt sich aber damit die dialogische form, die zwar eine recht ärmliche ist, da kein versuch einer ἠθοποίια des gegners gemacht ist, aber dafür fast durchgehends die ausdruckweise*?" Ibid., 307. We will see, however, that this is not true, as Teles in fact does script words for his imaginary interlocutor. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 51; Teles, Fragments I, II, III, IV, VII, VIII.

[12] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Der kynische prediger Teles," 315.

[13] Herman Usener, *Epicurea* (Berlin: Teubner, 1887), LXIX, writes, "διατριβαί *nomen erat*."

[14] Otto Hense, *Teletis reliquiae* (Tübingen: Teubner, 1889; 2nd ed., 1909). Edward O'Neil, *Teles (The Cynic Teacher)* (SBLTT 11; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977).

[15] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 9. Heinrich Weber, *De Senecae philosophi dicendi genere Bioneo* (Marburg: Friederici Soemmering, 1895).

[16] Weber, *De Senecae philosophi*, 6-33.

prominent on the topic, Stowers correctly notes, "Directly or indirectly, Weber's formal analysis has been the basis for all subsequent stylistic descriptions of the diatribe."[17]

Rudolf Hirzel continued the engagement with dialogue and diatribe, particularly with respect to the interlocutor. For Hirzel, the diatribe frequently employed an interlocutor who was recognized as an opponent. This opponent, however, was not to be identified as a specific individual. Rather, the opponent represented a general type, whose views were often presented in direct speech.[18] One possible way to achieve this was to engage in conversation with a personified object or idea.[19] Furthermore, like Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Hirzel stressed the likely relationship between the diatribe and schoolroom discussions. Hirzel, however, maintained that one could compose diatribal dialogue in written form, thereby allowing for oral and literary forms of diatribe.[20]

Eduard Norden similarly drew on the scholastic setting for the diatribe as well as the significance of the imaginary, antagonistic interlocutor. Additionally, Norden argued that Bion and Epictetus best represented the genre of diatribe, which would prove influential in future scholarship.[21]

---

[17] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 9.

[18] Hirzel writes, "*…bei Stoikern und stoisirenden Philosophen, bei Griechen und Römern finden wir als letztes Trümmerstück des alten dramatischen Dialogs das plötzlich einen Einwand in direkter Rede einführende "er sagt"* (φησι, inquit*), zu dem sich als Subjekt nur ein Gegner überhaupt, nicht eine individuell bestimmte Persönlichkeit denken last*." Rudolf Hirzel, *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch* (2 vols.; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1895), 1.371, see also 2.250.

[19] Ibid., 1.372.

[20] Ibid., I.368-74; 2.117.

[21] Eduard Norden, *Die Anitke Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Bis in die Zeit der Renaissance* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1898), 129-30.

Drawing ever closer to Bultmann and the apostle Paul, Paul Wendland jumped the gap from examination of strictly Greco-Roman personalities to consideration of a Jewish thinker. Specifically, Wendland demonstrated that Philo, a Jew, utilized diatribal elements in his exposition of Israel's scriptures.[22] With Wendland's recognition that at least one Jew could positively employ diatribal elements, the questions arose, "Why not others? Why not Christians? Why not Paul?"[23] Indeed, Wendland himself soon characterized diatribe as a "*Gattung* for delivering philosophical propaganda to the masses," which Christians eventually appropriated.[24] Similarly, Norden and Carl Friedrich Georg Heinrici had already suggested potential points of connection between the apostle Paul and the diatribe,[25] and Johannes Weiss likewise recognized a close proximity between Paul's style and that of the diatribe.[26] A thorough, dedicated analysis of Paul's writings and their relationship to the diatribal tradition, however, remained absent. Bultmann would attempt to fill this lacuna.

---

[22] Paul Wendland and Otto Kern, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1895).

[23] So also Stowers, *Diatribe*, 16.

[24] Quotation from Stowers, *Diatribe*, 14. For example, with respect to the Christian use of diatribe, Wendland argues, "*Wirksamkeit, Lebensart, Auftreten der freien christlichen Prediger der alten Kirche, die von Gemeinde zu Gemeinde wanderten, glich äusserlich dem Treiben der heidnischen Volksprediger, und es war natürlich, dass die Formen und Gewohnheiten der heidnischen Propaganda in den Dienst der christlichen Mission gestellt wurden und ihr zugute kamen*." Paul Wendland, *Die hellenistische-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum* (HNT 1; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1907), 51, see also 39-53.

[25] Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, 2.556; Carl Friedrich Georg Heinrici, *Das erste Sendschreiben des Apostel Paul an die Korinther* (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1880); idem., *Das zweite Sendschreiben des Apostel Paulus an die Korinther* (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1887); idem., *Der litterarische Charakter der neutestamentlichen Schriften* (Leipzig: Durr, 1908). Stowers, *Diatribe*, 12-16.

[26] Johannes Weiss, "Beiträge zur paulinischen Rhetorik," in *Theologische Studien: Bernhard Weiss ze seinem 70. Geburtstag dargebracht* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897); idem., *Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908); idem., *Der erste Korintherbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910).

Rudolf Bultmann

Bultmann[27] set out to demonstrate that Paul's letters shared a particular affinity with the well-known *Gattung* of the diatribe, though this was not due to any conscious effort on Paul's part.[28] This connection was significant for Bultmann for two reasons. First, Bultmann affirmed the earlier consensus that the diatribe was a form of oral street preaching.[29] Second, Bultmann was convinced that Paul's letters were representative of his preaching style.[30] Consequently, by showing the connections between the diatribe and Paul's letters, Bultmann thought he could simultaneously form a better understanding of Paul's preaching style.[31]

Bultmann's sources for the diatribe were: (1) Bion, (2) Teles, (3) Horace, (4) Seneca, (5) Musonius Rufus, (6) Epictetus, (7) Dio Chrysostom and (8) Plutarch.[32] Like earlier scholars beginning with Usener, Bultmann considered Bion to be the earliest source for the diatribe, and he held that Teles followed Bion's model. Epictetus later recapitulated the early Bionean model, for which reason Bultmann prioritized Bion and Epictetus as the principal sources for the diatribe.[33] The high degree to which the other

---

[27] Stowers's survey of Bultmann's treatment of the dialogical character of the diatribe is helpful and quite similar to what I offer below. Whereas Stowers limits his survey to Bultmann's engagement with the dialogical character of diatribe, I extend my survey to cover Bultmann's treatment of the tone and mood of diatribe as well. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 17-25.

[28] Bultmann writes, "*Die vorliegende Arbeit sieht ihre Aufgabe also in dem Nachweis, daß die paulinischen Briefe Verwandtschaft mit einer bestimmten literarischen Gattung zeigen. Es ist dies, wie man schon seit langem erkannt hat, die Gattung der Diatribe*." Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 2-3.

[29] Ibid., 3.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., 6-9. Stowers inadvertently omits Seneca from Bultmann's list. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 19.

[33] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 6-9.

sources were steeped in rhetoric or had been altered in the course of transmission resulted in the view that, while they were still valuable within reason, they were less important than Bion and Epictetus.[34]

Bultmann began to address the dialogical character of the diatribe by noting that diatribe took on "*der Form von Rede und Gegenrede*."[35] Such speech and reply were often created by the direct interjection of a fictitious opponent who objected to something the primary speaker had just stated. The objecting interlocutor usually posed a question introduced with ἀλλά, and the interlocutor's direct speech was systematically, "*in der Regel,*" introduced by a short introductory formula (φησί or *inquit*, for example).[36] Bultmann noted that the speaker could respond to the objector in a number of ways, such as by issuing a counter-question or a "blow by blow" string of questions, or by entering into dialogue with the opponent.[37] Additionally, it was not the case that the imaginary interlocutor must initiate the dialogue by objecting to the speaker, but the speaker could also initiate dialogue by addressing the interlocutor.[38]

According to Bultmann, the identity of the interlocutor usually remained unspecified. Instead, the interlocutor was often classified as an ἰδιώτης and considered a representative of the general audience (or *communis opinio*)[39] or even a member of an

---

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., 10. Stowers correctly notes that Bultmann over exaggerates when he limits diatribe so narrowly to cycles of speech and reply. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 20 n.105.

[36] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 10-11. It will become clear below that Bultmann was sorely mistaken concerning the degree to which the use of such an introductory formula can be considered a *Regel*. Rom 3:1-8 represents a fantastic case in point, as it contains no such phrases.

[37] Ibid., 11.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

opposing philosophical school.[40] Personifications (such as Law, Nature, the Fatherland, and the Virtues) also appeared and conversed with the speaker or the audience, often as allies rather than opponents.[41] Similarly, characters from legend and poetry could appear as allies with the speaker or as a proof for the woes of ideals falsely believed to be heroic.[42] The interlocutor might also be an entirely fictive individual made up by the speaker.[43] Additionally, the interlocutor need not address the speaker or the audience directly; instead, a group of imaginary speakers could appear and speak among themselves.[44] What is more, the speaker often used the interlocutor simply as a rhetorical device in order to emphasize and clarify his or her own thoughts rather than intentionally presenting the views of an opponent or the audience.[45]

In describing the tone and mood of diatribal dialogue, Bultmann argued that a primary characteristic was vividness and movement. Bultmann wrote, "*Schon nach wenigen Sätzen befindet sich der Redner im Feuer*."[46] Such fiery discourse was achieved through the use of

> lively questions, energetic imperatives, the back-and-forth of questions and answers, objections and rejections, in the change of mood between jest and earnest, in the change of tone between encouragement and enthusiasm, insult and humiliation.[47]

---

[40] Ibid., 12.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., 13.

[44] Ibid., 12-13.

[45] Ibid., 12.

[46] "After only a few sentences, the speaker finds himself in the fire." Ibid., 58.

[47] Bultmann writes, "… *in den lebhaften Fragen, in den energischen Imperativen, in dem Hinundher von Fragen und Antworten, von Einwänden und Zurückweisungen, in dem Wechsel der*

For this reason, the tone and mood of diatribe could be quite diverse. For instance, in the interest of being engaging and enlightening, the diatribe mixed humor with seriousness and jokes with insults and mockery.[48] Resentment or frustration, however, if strong enough, could come to the fore unhindered by humor to mitigate its sting.[49] Thus, the fast movement of the diatribe was visible in its ability to switch from a light to a heavy mood and back again, and to do so quickly.

Bultmann also described the diatribe as vivid. Vividness was best seen in the direct, concrete, and practical nature of diatribe. The speaker did not spend a great amount of time addressing theoretical philosophical aspects. Rather, the speaker's words painted a picture of the way things were; for example, instead of speaking theoretically about some philosophical concept, a personification of the theory was introduced in order to speak on its own behalf.[50]

In Bultmann's analysis, diatribe's vividness was also present in its purpose. The speaker's words were not pointless musings, but they were a personal appeal to elicit a desired effect in one's audience.[51] The speaker's personal appeal to the audience took on various moods as well, but the chief component was that of refutation (ἐλέγχειν).[52] The speaker refuted (censored) problematic popular opinions, false preconceptions and

---

Stimmung zwischen Scherz und Ernst, in dem Wechsel des Tones zwischen Ermahnung und Begeisterung, Scheltwort und Beschämung." Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid., 61.

[50] Ibid., 60.

[51] Ibid., 61.

[52] Ibid., 62.

dogmas, pleasure, pain, indecision, and weakness.[53] For a practical example, teachers could refute foolish students with such phrases as ὦ ταλαίπωρε, τάλας, μωρέ, ὦ πονηρέ, *infelix*, *miser* and *stulte*.[54] There was also a positive side to diatribe, exhortation (νουθετεῖν). The boundary between the two, however, was blurred, as comparison (*Vergleich*) frequently found a place in exhortation and inherently made demands on the audience vis-à-vis the thing to which they were compared.[55] Thus, both in its primary polemical mood and its muddied exhortative-protreptic mood, Bultmann's model for the diatribe displayed an agenda to generate a calculated change in the audience for the better, at least as the speaker envisioned it.

From Bultmann to Stowers

With respect to the period of research on diatribe spanning from Bultmann to Stowers, Stowers, no doubt in part creating room for his own contribution, remarks, "It is clear that there has been no fundamental advance in understanding the diatribe or its dialogical style among New Testament scholars since Bultmann."[56] Nevertheless, critique of the earlier works on diatribe eventually led to positive refinements during this period. Furthermore, a few scholars began to prioritize and nuance elements of the diatribe that were largely sidelined by Bultmann and his predecessors, particularly with respect to the social function of the diatribe. The former refinements strongly influence Stowers's understanding of the diatribe, and the latter emphasis on the sociological function of the

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., 14.

[55] Ibid., 63.

[56] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 45.

diatribe ultimately paves the way for his dissertation, which highlights the scholastic setting of the diatribe. A brief survey of these works are in order.

Bultmann's dissertation appeared at the end of the period of early work on diatribe, and it represented the general consensus at that time. In the wake of Bultmann's dissertation, however, a series of criticisms were aimed at the early portrayal. The most significant objection involved the question of whether diatribe belonged to a specific literary *Gattung* or genre. Scholars as far back as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff had described the diatribe as a *Litteraturgattung*, but was such a designation accurate? Otto Halbauer rejected the idea that the diatribe was a literary *Gattung*. In support of this view, Halbauer examined the use of διατριβή and διατρίβειν in the primary sources. Halbauer argued that the terms were primarily used within the scholastic setting to describe the interactions between the teacher and the student(s). For this reason, diatribe could not be a literary genre. If a diatribal discourse took written form, it would have been preserved in the form of a student's notes, ὑπομνήματα. Consequently, Arrian's ὑπομνήματα of Epictetus's lectures represented real diatribes, but, by definition, they were not diatribes—they were ὑπομνήματα.[57] Tadeusz Sinko similarly argued that diatribe did not belong to a literary genre on the grounds that "popular moral philosophy was such a common feature of Hellenistic and Roman times that one cannot attribute it to the influence of a Cynic-Stoic *Gattung*."[58] Hermann Throm attempted to locate the diatribe

[57] Otto Halbauer, *De Diatribis Epicteti* (Leipzig: Robert Noske Bornen, 1911), 1-7. For a similar assessment of the use of διατριβή in the ancient sources, see also Barbara P. Wallach, "A History of the Diatribe from its Origin up to the First Century B.C. and a Study of the Influence of the Genre upon Lucretius" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1974).

[58] Quoting Stowers, *Diatribe*, 30. Tadeusz Sinko, "On the So-called Cynic-Stoic Diatribe" (in Polish), *Eos* 21 (1916): 21-63.

within the genre of the rhetorical θέσις, classified as a paraenetic thesis.[59] Helmut Rahn simply opted to discuss literary works as "*Diatribenartiges*"—diatribal or diatribe-like.[60]

Instead of taking an overly negative stance towards the presentation of diatribe represented by Bultmann, Wilhelm Capelle and Henri-Irénée Marrou began with the earlier portrayal but modified it in order to account for the critiques raised by Halbauer, Sinko, Throm, and Rahn. In this way, Capelle and Marrou represented something of a synthesis of the early presentation and the critiques that followed. In his section on diatribe, Capelle affirmed the view that diatribe was a form of oral propaganda addressed to the masses. Thus, diatribe did not begin as a literary genre, even though it had a recognizable character from its outset.[61] Eventually, however, the recognizable character of the diatribe in fact became a literary *Gattung* characterized by personifications and dialogues, amongst other features.[62] George L. Kustas's approach was relatively similar. Kustas contended, "In the course of time the looser structure of the early pieces of diatribe would have been tightened and readily identifiable rhetorical parts established."[63] Though Kustas never agreed that diatribe ever was or eventually became a literary genre, the development he suggested in diatribal form approximated that of Capelle.

---

[59] Hermann Throm, *Die Thesis* (Rhetorical Studies 17; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1932).

[60] Helmut Rahn, *Morphologie der antike Literatur: Eine Einführung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-Gesellschaft, 1969), 156.

[61] Wilhelm Capelle and Henri-Irénée Marrou, "Diatribe," in *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum: Sachworterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt* (Theodor Klauser, ed.; vol. 3; Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1957), 990-92.

[62] Ibid., 992.

[63] George L. Kustas, *Diatribe in Ancient Rhetorical Theory* (Protocol of the colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture 22; Berkeley: Center for Hermeneutical Studies, 1976), 6.

Coming still closer to the view that Stowers would espouse was Hildegard Cancik. As with the previous critics, Cancik agreed with Halbauer that diatribe was not a literary genre. Instead, diatribe represented a "subliterary" form.[64] That is, diatribe, with all of its unifying characteristics, existed in its own right in oral form apart from carefully composed literary works.

Perhaps the most significant development in the period of research between Bultmann and Stowers, however, was the emphasis on the social setting or function of the diatribe. For instance, in the course of comparing diatribe with Greco-Roman satire, Mario Puelma Piwonka[65] and E. G. Schmidt[66] both concluded that the differences between diatribe and satire were explicable by the diverse social settings influencing the various authors and audiences. Might such differences in social setting help to explain the differences between representatives of diatribe? In this regard, Abraham J. Malherbe answered in the affirmative, stating,

> evidence suggests that there is a correlation between the style of the diatribes and the social setting in which they were delivered… We shall have to take more seriously the possibility that the discernible differences in form and style of what are known as diatribes are related to their sociological functions.[67]

In the tradition extending back to Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, on the one hand, the social setting of the diatribe was understood as the orations of the wandering street preacher. On the other hand, Wilamowitz-Moellendorf and Hirtzel had also noted the scholastic setting

---

[64] Hildegard Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas epistulae morales* (Spudasmata 18; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1976), 47-48.

[65] Mario Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1949).

[66] E. G. Schmidt, "Diatribe and Satire," in *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock* 15 (1966): 507-15.

[67] Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 50. Quoted in Stowers, *Diatribe*, 42-43.

of the diatribe, even if they chose not to assign it any real import. The emphasis on diatribe as the sermons of the Cynic-Stoic street preacher, therefore, resulted in little interest being paid by future scholars to the significance of a scholastic setting for the diatribe. This would become a primary agenda for Stowers.

Stanley K. Stowers

Stowers's approach for reassessing the diatribe is first to establish several points of what had become scholarly consensus for all intents and purposes, and then to engage each of these time-tested sources for the diatribe directly. After discussing each of his seven or eight diatribal sources, Stowers concludes by connecting the points of similarity and difference among them.[68]

The first point of consensus Stowers addresses pertains to defining the relevant sources. What counts as a legitimate source for diatribe? Stowers identifies eight sources: (1) Teles (Bion); (2) Lucius (Musonius Rufus); (3) Arrian (Epictetus); (4) Dio Chrysostom; (5) Plutarch; (6) Maximus of Tyre; (7) Seneca; and (8) Philo of Alexandria.[69] Stowers admits that Philo presents some unique problems for being included among other diatribal authors, but he nonetheless allows Philo's voice to be heard.[70]

---

[68] This section refers to Stowers's *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans*. Stowers has addressed diatribe in a number of other places, including "The Diatribe," in *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres* (SBLSBS 21; David E. Aune, ed.; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 71-83; idem., "Diatribe," in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary* (vol. 2; David Noel Freedman, ed.; New York: Doubleday, 1992), 190-93.

[69] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 48.

[70] Ibid. See below for more on this issue.

In agreement with his predecessors, Stowers notes that the criteria for categorizing these eight sources as representative of diatribe are primarily twofold. First, these sources share a "common appropriation of a certain body of popular philosophical traditions" and, second, combine a "dialogical style together with certain other stylistic or rhetorical features."[71] In addition to these attributes, based on his analysis of the material, Stowers adds a third criterion, namely, that each of these sources are dependent on or evince affinities for a "scholastic social setting."[72] This latter addition, which distances the social setting of diatribe from philosophical Cynic-Stoic street preaching for the masses and instead locates it in the school setting, will prove most influential for Stowers's interpretation of diatribal texts, including Paul.

Finally, before turning to the primary sources, Stowers addresses the question of whether or not diatribe constitutes a *Gattung* or genre. On the one hand, Stowers allows for the critique of scholars such as Halbauer and Cancik that diatribe does *not* represent a literary genre "in the sense of a family of writings which consciously reflect back on and follow a literary tradition with common literary form."[73] On the other hand, Stowers maintains that denying diatribe is a literary genre does not exclude diatribe from belonging to rhetorical or oral speech categories.[74] This insistence stems from the view that any form of communication must be conventional or belong to a certain genre or type in order to be comprehensible. Because the noted diatribal sources share a number of traits, such as the dialogical aspect and, at least for Stowers, the scholastic social setting,

[71] Ibid., 48-49.

[72] Ibid., 49.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

they either belong to or represent characteristic features of a type or genre, even if it is not a genre in the literary sense.[75]

Teles (Bion)

Turning to the primary literature, Stowers first discusses the fragments from Teles. Hense's attempt to define the limits of the Bionean materials in Teles's fragments had focused scholarly attention on Bion rather than Teles as the earliest representative of diatribe. Stowers, however, argues that it is often overly difficult to identify with precision where the attributions to Bion conclude, and it is equally onerous to determine whether they are actual quotations or general paraphrases.[76] In this respect, Stowers follows Jan Frederik Kindstrand, who, with respect to the extent of the Bionean materials in Teles, concludes, "While there is a strong probability that Teles contains more of Bion than meets the eye, I think the question is better left open, as we have *no* possibility of reaching a definite answer."[77] For these reasons, Stowers shifts the focus away from Bion and back to Teles as the earliest source for the diatribe.

Additionally, Stowers contends that the stylistic traits characteristic of diatribe belong (almost) exclusively to Teles and not to Bion. For example, with the exception of the speech of Poverty (II.19-44[78]), the attributions to Bion lack any trace of the dialogical element. On the contrary, dialogical exchanges and the use of objections characterize

---

[75] Ibid.

[76] Teles overtly refers to Bion's words seven times, four times in fragment II, one time in fragment III, and two times in fragment IVA. Ibid., 50.

[77] Jan Frederick Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 11; Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1976), 85; Stowers, *Diatribe*, 50-51.

[78] References to Teles's fragments refer to O'Neil's edition.

Teles's own material, which "warrants the conclusion that the dialogical element was an important feature of the Telean diatribe."[79] Plus, the brevity of the Bionean fragments disallows the possibility of constructing something of a complete Bionean discourse, since the evidence is simply lacking.[80] Consequently, Stowers not only prioritizes Teles as a chief representative of diatribe chronologically, but he also emphasizes Teles qualitatively, as it is Teles and not Bion who evinces the features most characteristic of diatribe.

Finally, Stowers reconsiders the social setting of Teles's discourses. As indicated above, early on Wilamowitz-Moellendorff classified Teles as a wandering Cynic preacher, whereby the social setting for Teles's discourses was believed to be public lectures delivered in the streets and marketplaces. Most scholars followed Wilamowitz-Moellendorff in this respect despite the absence of evidence that Teles was ever a wandering Cynic preacher, and despite Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's own recognition of evidence identifying Teles as a teacher (παιδαγωγός; III.60). Stowers allows Teles's self-designation as a teacher to come to the fore and to help explain certain features of his style. These features include the use of asides referring to previous conversations, the use of the first person plural, and, most notably, the extensive use of the dialogical style.[81] These dialogical elements include the use of unnamed and fictitious interlocutors, objections, responses, and rhetorical questions.[82] Teles's use of such stylistic elements (both dialogical and otherwise), Stowers contends, is best explained "as instances of

[79] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 51.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Dialogical elements appear in six of the eight fragments. Fragments V and VI do not contain dialogical elements. Ibid., 52-53.

[82] Ibid.

Teles speaking personally to his class."[83] Thus, these features are best understood in light of their scholastic context, and Stowers will form and nuance his understanding of these elements as he examines the additional diatribal sources, beginning with Epictetus.

Arrian (Epictetus)

Previous scholars generally interpreted Epictetus in light of the portrayal of Bion as a wandering street preacher. Kindstrand's work checking the prevalence of Bion's voice in the Teles fragments and Stowers's almost complete diminishment of Bion's relevance for understanding the diatribe, however, created an environment in which Epictetus could be seen in a different light. That is, freed from some presumed tie to Bion, Stowers prioritizes the fact that Epictetus "taught in a school," whereby his writings should be examined in light of this scholastic social setting.[84]

In fact, Epictetus's discourses only exist today because one of his students, Arrian, stenographically recorded them.[85] Epictetus's diatribes are not to be identified as his technical lessons on reading and interpreting classic texts. Rather, the diatribes are "more practical lectures and conversations which probably followed [the technical lessons]," during which time the teacher could address student questions and problems.[86] The diatribes may address the students as a group, or they could be "occasional responses

---

[83] Ibid., 52.

[84] Ibid., 54.

[85] Ibid.; W. A. Oldfather, *Epictetus: Discourses I-II* (LCL 131; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), xii-xiii.

[86] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 54-55.

addressed to specific problems, situations, or individuals."[87] Furthermore, the diatribes could be unsolicited or initiated by student questions.[88]

As with Teles, one of the most characteristic features of Epictetus's diatribes is his use of dialogical elements. Unnamed and/or fictitious interlocutors interject isolated comments or objections, or they engage in sustained dialogue with the primary speaker, Epictetus. At other times, Epictetus can initiate dialogue by addressing or questioning the audience or an imaginary interlocutor. Despite occasional difficulties involved in determining whether an interlocutor represents a real or fictitious person, Stowers classifies these dialogical exchanges according to three categories: (1) by or with a real person, (2) by or with a fictitious interlocutor, or (3) as self-dialogue.[89]

Stowers also notes the difficulty involved in defining the boundaries of the dialogical exchanges. As Kindstrand demonstrated the tenuous nature of determining the extent of Bion's voice in the Teles fragments, it is often similarly the case with distinguishing the extent of the speech of Epictetus's interlocutor. Stowers writes, "Often these dialogical flourishes are obscure and difficult to punctuate and edit since much which was communicated by voice intonation is now lost."[90] In other words, it is frequently the case that no overt textual markers exist to assist the reader to define the precise limits of each speaker's words. This makes perfect sense, assuming diatribe's oral rather than literary generic qualities. Instead, the primary speaker could indicate that an imaginary interlocutor was entering or exiting the conversation simply through changes

---

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid., 54-55.

[89] Ibid., 55.

[90] Ibid.

in his or her voice, which would have been perceptible to the original audience but lost in Arrian's written records.

The tone of Epictetus's diatribes varies; it can be polemical or reprimanding, such as in *Discourses* 1.23, 2.20, and 2.23, but it can also simply be educational.[91] In almost every case, however, Epictetus employs elements of censure (or indictment, refutation; ἐλεγτικός) and protreptic (προτρεπτικός) in keeping with the Socratic method of question and answer.[92] Stowers holds this to be particularly significant for and indicative of Epictetus's pedagogical method.[93] With censure, Epictetus can expose one's inner contradictions or errors. With protreptic, Epictetus makes clear the correct course of thought or action and encourages his students to appropriate it.[94] Thus, the purpose of the diatribe "is to point out error, to convince and to convict and then to lead one to the truth, to a right way of life."[95] The dialogical elements support this purpose, as they allow Epictetus to challenge his audiences' views and to convey his own (correct) thoughts through the use of question and answer.[96]

Lucius (Musonius Rufus)

As with Teles and Epictetus, Stowers identifies the school as the social setting for the diatribes of Musonius Rufus. First, Musonius was a teacher, having famously taught

---

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid., 55-58.

[93] Ibid., 57.

[94] Ibid., 55-58.

[95] Ibid., 58.

[96] Ibid.

Epictetus.[97] Second, one of Musonius's students, a certain Lucius, preserved twenty-one of Musonius's diatribes (with significant editing).[98] Third, in fragment VI, Musonius specifically uses διατριβή as a reference to what takes place in the philosophical school.[99]

Musonius presents a significant problem, however. Though Arrian produced a stenographic record of Epictetus's diatribes, Lucius did not. On the contrary, Lucius reveals that he often approximates or paraphrases Musonius's words.[100] As a result, Lucius's writings are not verbatim reports but are "semi-literary re-writings of Musonius's diatribes" and must be used with caution.[101]

Problems aside, Stowers identifies additional similarities between Musonius and the diatribes of Teles and Epictetus. First, though Lucius's re-writing removed much of the dialogical aspect of the discourses, dialogical elements still remain. For instance, conversational expressions and addresses in the second person singular amount for Stowers to "[clear] examples of the dialogical style of the diatribe, the addressing of an interlocutor."[102] Additionally, Musonius quotes and directly responds to Euripedes in discourse IX, and discourse XV includes a small dialogue with an objector.[103] Second, Epictetus cites Musonius as an example of a teacher who employed censure and

---

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid.; Otto Hense, ed., *C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1910), XIV; Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: "The Roman Socrates"* (Yale Classical Studies 10:3-147; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 6-7.

[99] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 58. The text reads, ὅσοι γε φιλοσόφου διατριβῆς μετεσχήκαμεν, ὡς οὔτε πόνος οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε πενία κακὸν οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ἄλλο τι τῶν κακίας ἀπηλλαγμένων.

[100] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 58.

[101] Ibid., 58-59.

[102] Ibid., 58.

[103] Ibid., 58-59.

protreptic in his pedagogical method (*Discourses* 3.23.28-29).[104] Consequently, Stowers argues that the similarities in social setting, dialogical style, and Socratic method between Musonius, Teles, and/or Epictetus fully justify the inclusion of Musonius as a representative for diatribe, even though unhindered access to his discourses is not possible.

Dio of Prusa

Dio of Prusa (Dio Chrysostom) was exiled by Domitian in 82 C.E., at which point he "took up the life of a wandering Cynic."[105] In exile, Dio's discourses address "popular philosophical-moral topics," and "most, if not all, of Dio's diatribes come from [this 'Cynic' period]."[106] Stowers divides Dio's philosophical discourses into two categories based on differing social contexts: (1) non-diatribal public orations, and (2) informal diatribal discourses directed toward specific audiences and modeled after Socrates.[107]

This means that Dio does not evince an *overt* scholastic social setting. Indeed, Stowers comments, "Dio does not seem ever to have had a formal school."[108] Nevertheless, Stowers argues, "The social context of Dio's diatribes… in some ways approximates that of a school. It is half way between the school situation and the public oration."[109] Stowers supports this view in several ways. First, though Dio delivered

---

[104] Ibid., 59-60.

[105] Ibid., 60.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid., 60-61.

[108] Ibid., 61.

[109] Ibid.

public orations at times, he also worked more directly with small groups.[110] Second, Dio's diatribes indicate that his interaction with groups lasted for a period of time and were not simply itinerant street lectures. For instance, Dio can refer to details from previous lessons, for which reason Stowers argues that "[Dio's] diatribes reflect a limited but established relationship with his audience and especially with his discussion partners."[111] So, though Dio can go so far as to express Socratic disdain for established schools, Stowers avers, "in his true diatribes he did establish a student-teacher relationship."[112]

What is more, Stowers suggests it is Dio's "unpolished discourses" and not his public orations that evince dialogical features. As elsewhere, the use of unidentified and/or imaginary interlocutors is common. These interlocutors may interject comments or objections to which Dio responds.[113] Thus, Stowers asserts that the dialogical method was a significant element in Dio's pedagogical method.[114]

Plutarch

In the early 20th century, F. Krauss argued that Plutarch's diatribal writings were composed during his youth, based on their overly rhetorical, lively, and morally vigorous character.[115] An insistence on the ability of writers to appropriate and imitate diverse

---

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid., 61-62.

[112] Ibid., 62, 207 n.340.

[113] Ibid., 62.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Fritz Krauss, *Die rhetorischen Schriften Plutarchs und ihre Stellung im Plutarchischen Schriftkorpus* (Nürnberg: J. L. Stitch, 1912); Stowers, *Diatribe*, 63.

styles coupled with the difficulty involved in precisely dating Plutarch's compositions served as a corrective to Krauss's methodology, as they illustrated the *non-sequitur* logic of the proposed link between a text's style and its compositional date.[116] Contrary to Krauss, therefore, Stowers maintains that Plutarch composed the majority of his works during his middle and later years when his school flourished. This once again leads Stowers to the conclusion that Plutarch's diatribal writings "are to be explained as a specific type of discourse growing out of a certain social setting," the scholastic setting.[117] Stowers buttresses his view by noting Plutarch's use of σχολή and διατριβή not only to refer to the school itself but also as a partial indication of the form of the instructional activity that took place in the school.[118]

Plutarch's works show a significant degree of diversity. Stowers classifies some works, such as *De vitando aere alieno*, as legitimate diatribes which are basically identical to the form in which they were delivered in the school. These works remain in an unpolished form and display traces of oral discourse. Moreover, these works share many traits with the diatribes of Teles, Epictetus, and Musonius.[119] Stowers's second classification involves works that Plutarch likely adapted from diatribes delivered in the school, perhaps for publication. Plutarch's *De fortuna* and *De virtute et vitio* belong to this group.[120] The third group consists of treatises or lectures that display certain affinities

---

[116] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 63-64.

[117] Ibid., 64.

[118] Ibid., 63.

[119] Ibid., 64.

[120] Ibid.

for the diatribe, such as *De virtute morali*.[121] Finally, the fourth category includes more polished literary works that similarly display affinities for the diatribe, such as *De tranquillitate animi*. These works are likely based on revised diatribes, or they incorporate material from diatribes.[122]

Stowers's classification of Plutarch's works and their varying dependence on or connection to real diatribes is not without warrant. Plutarch himself reports that he composed *De tranquilitate animi* from his class notes (464F).[123] Whether the notes in question refer to another teacher's diatribes or to Plutarch's own, Stowers's main point is that, in one way or another, "it is easy to see that… diatribal sources could have been incorporated into Plutarch's essay."[124] This phenomenon goes hand in hand with "the tendency of rhetoric to move in the direction of literary composition," known as *letteraturizzazione*.[125] Lucius edited Musonius's diatribes, Plutarch polished his own, and both Maximus of Tyre and Seneca produce highly developed rhetorical literature.[126] This tendency proves quite important for Stowers's understanding of whether diatribe constitutes a specific genre. In order for the primary, oral form of diatribe to be adapted for literary composition, Stowers writes, "Obviously, the diatribe must have been a rhetorical genre for such a process to have taken place."[127]

---

[121] Ibid.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Plutarch writes, ἀνελεξάμην περὶ εὐθυμίας ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὧν ἐμαυτῷ πεποιημένος ἐτύγχανον.

[124] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 65.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid.

[127] Ibid.

As in the previous sources, Plutarch's diatribal writings also display dialogical elements, albeit less prominently. Imaginary interlocutor's issue objections, and Plutarch occasionally initiates conversation by addressing his interlocutors.[128]

What Plutarch lacks in dialogical prominence, however, he makes up for with what he suggests about the tone of diatribe and the censure-protreptic pedagogical method. Stowers notes that Plutarch "displays the same language of indictment or censure as seen in the other diatribal authors."[129] Plutarch, however, also explains in *De recta ratione audiendi* the ways in which an audience member should react to this censure-protreptic method. When an audience member is censured, he or she should not respond as if it were nothing serious; the censure should weigh sufficiently in order to achieve its desired effect (47A). The initial censure, however, must not be the end goal. Rather, the censured audience member should wait in hope for the ensuing "sweet and bright" protreptic element (47A).[130] Said otherwise, in the censure-protreptic progression, harsh censure should give way to a great cure of the censured party's perceived illness(es).[131] As Epictetus and Musonius, Plutarch invokes Socrates as the exemplary model for this method and connects it to the diatribe, which Plutarch notes is a "type of discourse in the philosophical school" (43E).[132] Therefore, Plutarch's diatribes are significant not only because they demonstrate how oral diatribes could be shaped into

---

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid., 65-66.

[130] Plutarch writes, … ἐλπίζειν τι γλυκὺ καὶ λαμπρλον.

[131] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 66.

[132] Ibid., 67.

literary forms, but also because they provide a picture of the optimal audience response to the method of censure and protreptic which Stowers views to be so central to diatribe.

Maximus of Tyre

Maximus was a wandering orator in the latter half of the second century C.E. He is responsible for forty-one extant discourses, which "seem to have been delivered to aristocratic audiences of young men in Rome."[133] Stowers argues that "many of [Maximus's] discourses are lively and dialogical, reflecting the teaching style of the diatribe."[134] For instance, Maximus initiates conversation with imaginary interlocutors and/or scripts interlocutors as responding with objections or false conclusions.[135] Additionally, Maximus references Socrates's method of censure and occasionally employs the method of censure and protreptic as well, much like other diatribal sources.[136]

With respect to the social setting of Maximus's discourses, Stowers notes Maximus's use of διατριβή to refer to the educational activity in schools as well as an "equivalent" for the schools themselves.[137] Nevertheless, Stowers admits that Maximus's extant discourses "do not represent a typical philosophical school."[138] Neither, however, does Stowers think that they should be classified as public lectures addressed to different and heterogeneous audiences. Instead, Maximus's discourses fall somewhere in the

---

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid., 68.

[137] Ibid., 67-68.

[138] Ibid., 68.

middle, showing connections both to the diatribe and to "the florid ornamentation and standard techniques of formal rhetoric."[139] Due to Maximus's select audience, therefore, Stowers concludes that his discourses come out of a setting approximating that of a school.[140]

Philo

As previously discussed, Wendland's examination of Philo in light of diatribe not only fixed Philo squarely among those thinkers influenced by diatribe, but it also opened the door for scholars to begin consideration of other Jewish writers with possible diatribal influences, namely Paul. Philo's literature, however, presents certain unique problems (significantly for Stowers), and, though Stowers allows his voice to be heard, it does prove to be more of a whisper. This is the case not only because there is ambiguity concerning the date and social setting of Philo's works, but also because "there is almost nothing to indicate that any of them grew out of a school situation."[141] Add to this the fact that Philo only infrequently utilizes dialogical elements and that, even when he does, he uses them quite dully.[142] For Stowers, of all Philo's works, *Quod omnis probus liber sit* probably comes closest to being a typical diatribe.[143] By and large, however, Stowers asserts that additional work is needed to clarify Philo's use of diatribal elements in conjunction with the interpretation of scripture.

---

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Ibid., 68.

[142] Ibid., 69.

[143] Ibid.

Seneca

Stowers's analysis of Seneca emphasizes the *epistulae morales*. Stowers opts to prioritize Seneca's epistles over the *dialogi* because they provide a generic parallel to Paul. Namely, Seneca's moral epistles and Paul's letter to the Romans combine the style of the diatribe with the form of a letter.[144]

Seneca's literary epistles obviously differ in form from formal philosophical teaching in a school setting. Stowers insists that a student-teacher relationship nevertheless exists between Seneca and Lucilius. Following Cancik, Stowers affirms that ancient letters acted "as a surrogate for being together" and were a "method of self-revelation."[145] As such, though Seneca and Lucilius were physically separated, the letters create a literary environment in which it was as if Seneca was physically present before Lucilius's eyes, and vice versa.[146] In this way, "Seneca provides Lucilius with a type of epistolary paraenesis where he acts as spiritual guide and presents Lucilius with [himself as an] example."[147]

A third characteristic of the letter form, which overlaps with diatribe, is its dialogical quality. Stowers questions how to distinguish between the dialogical quality of letters and that of the diatribe.[148] Stowers asserts that the dialogical element of the letter primarily appears in its "philophronetic," friendly character, which manifests itself "in

---

[144] Ibid., 70.

[145] Ibid.; see also Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (Library of Early Christianity 5; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1989), 23, 38-39.

[146] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 70

[147] Ibid. For additional discussion regarding the use of letters for various rhetorical contexts/purposes, see also Rosenmeyer, *Ancient Epistolary Fictions*, esp. 45-60.

[148] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 71.

the tone of two friends holding a conversation."[149] The dialogical elements of the diatribe, however, are less personal, employ the methods of censure and protreptic, and tend to have a moral-philosophical subject matter.[150] Stowers argues that Seneca regularly shifts back-and-forth between the friendly epistolary tone and the didactic, diatribal style.[151] It is when Seneca dons the didactic, diatribal style with its method of censure and protreptic that Stowers thinks "[Seneca] presents himself as the popular philosophical teacher."[152]

With respect to the shape of the dialogical element in Seneca's epistles, the use of an imaginary interlocutor who objects and questions the teacher is common, as has been seen in other sources. Stowers divides Seneca's interlocutor's responses into three types.[153] First, the interlocutor's responses may represent the response of Lucilius to whatever Seneca is discussing. These responses are present primarily in the friendly and conversational tone of the letter, or in the more epistolary sections of the letter. Often Seneca introduces the responses with a general verb of speech, but at times he uses no introductory formula at all. The second group of responses contains those instances when the interlocutor's identity is less certain but is probably Lucilius. These responses are found in the primarily didactic portions of the letter and "appear to function in the argumentation like the objections of the fictitious interlocutor in the diatribe."[154] Occasions when the imaginary interlocutor interjects objections in a standard diatribal

---

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] Ibid., 72.

[154] Ibid. Stowers adds, these responses "are more like the questions he might ask in a classroom than in a personal conversation."

way belong to Stowers's third category. In this category, Stowers notes that "the interlocutor is typically anonymous and his views usually represent ideas or types of behavior which Seneca wants to censure."[155]

Furthermore, Stowers argues that, because all three categories of interlocutor responses frequently occur in a single letter, ambiguity exists with respect to "just who is objecting and to whom Seneca is responding."[156] Is Seneca addressing the interlocutor? Lucilius? Both? Stowers's explanation of the ambiguity is worth quoting at length. In this epistolary context,

> Seneca has skillfully created the same type of situation found in the diatribe where the philosopher moves back and forth between contact with his audience and the interlocutor, producing a calculated ambiguity about precisely who is being responded to or addressed. When Seneca censures the interlocutor, one often senses that Lucilius is the real target of the indictment. It is as if Lucilius were present in the school of Seneca.[157]

Thus, though the two men are separated, the epistles create space for Seneca to teach Lucilius in much the same way as would have occurred if the two men were together in a schoolroom setting.

Stowers's Conclusions

In light of his analysis of these primary diatribal sources, Stowers draws a number of conclusions based on their similarities and differences. First, all of the sources display dialogical elements, some more prominently than others. This dialogical aspect manifests itself primarily in two forms: (1) address to the interlocutor, and (2) objections from the

---

[155] Ibid., 73.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Ibid., 75.

interlocutor.[158] Second, with the possible exception of Philo, each of the sources belong to a philosophical scholastic social setting. This is in distinction from earlier works on diatribe, which imagined the social setting as the public, propagandistic lectures of the wandering Cynic street preacher. Teles, Epictetus, Musonius, and Plutarch headed formal schools; Dio and Maximus created discourses for a social setting approximating that of a school; Seneca approximated the context of a school and its dialogical context through the use of his epistles to Lucilius.[159] Third, diatribe is not the technical instruction on various topics, but the conversations that follow the formal lectures.[160] Fourth, in this scholastic setting and through the use of diatribe and its dialogical elements, the pedagogical method of censure and protreptic aims to point out errors and inconsistencies (censure) and to correct them by explaining the correct course of action and encouraging students to adopt it (protreptic).[161] The audience should take this process seriously, but it is not to be considered destructive or overly onerous. Instead, the audience should endure the censure and wait in hope for the sweetly bright protreptic to follow. Nevertheless, diatribe may still appropriate polemic against its interlocutor or audience, as represented by Epictetus's *Discourses* 1.23, 2.20, and 2.23.[162] Finally, fifth, the diversity among the diatribal sources is due to the personal background of each author, the varying degree to which the diatribes have been adapted and prepared for composition (*letteraturizzazione*),

---

[158] Ibid., 76-77.

[159] Ibid., 76.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Ibid., 76-77.

[162] Ibid., 55.

and the varying relationships of each source's discourses to the philosophical scholastic context.[163]

Consequently, these characteristics account for the significant similarities among these sources. What is more, these similarities also shape the way these sources should be considered as a group—as a genre. To be sure, it is incorrect to speak of diatribe as a literary *Gattung* or genre. In its primary form, diatribe was an oral endeavor. These core characteristics, however, attest that these works belong to a specific rhetorical type, for which "diatribe" is an appropriate and useful term.[164] Said otherwise, diatribe and diatribal features would have been recognizable, and one can expect Paul's audiences in Rome to have recognized its influence on his letter to them in a similar fashion.

The publication of Stowers's dissertation represented a watershed moment in the history of research on diatribe. Before Stowers, Bultmann's synthesis of the early work on diatribe held sway with the vast majority. Stowers's reassessment, however, illumined a new path for scholars.[165] Since Stowers's dissertation, no significant reassessment of the diatribe has been published. On the contrary, scholars have opted to prioritize one or another of the two prominent views, Bultmann or Stowers, and Stowers receives the vast majority of endorsements. To be sure, most of the offerings discussed below will nuance points in Bultmann or Stowers in this way or that, but, by and large, the holistic presentations of the diatribe remain the same, respectively. Is the diatribe the propagandistic street preaching of the wandering philosopher addressed to the masses

---

[163] Ibid., 76.

[164] Ibid., 76-78.

[165] Technically, Stowers did not reveal a "new" path; rather, Stowers pressed a point recognized but not pursued by several previous scholars to its logical extreme, i.e., the scholastic social setting.

(Bultmann)? Or, is diatribe best understood as a type of scholastic discourse, through which a teacher uses censure and protreptic as a way to point out and correct contradictions and errors among his or her students as a means of transformation?

The following works will be analyzed so as to answer the following questions: (1) Does this scholar ultimately endorse Bultmann's or Stowers's presentation of diatribe, (2) In what ways does this work nuance its preferred depiction of diatribe? (3) What strengths or weaknesses in this work should influence one's understanding of diatribe at this point in time, over a century past Bultmann and almost four decades after Stowers's initial work?

Thomas Schmeller

In *Paulus und die "Diatribe,"* Thomas Schmeller offers a sustained attempt to reshape *how* scholars define and apply diatribe. Particularly, Schmeller presents two novelties to diatribal studies, both of which are related to methodology. First, Schmeller proposes a new method for how to define what is and what is not diatribal, which relies on what he calls the *Strukturprinzip* ("principal of structure"). Second, Schmeller limits his engagement with diatribal texts to a very narrow selection, which he confirms against a second even narrower selection of texts. I will address each of these issues as they arise in the course of Schmeller's work. Ultimately, I suggest that Schmeller's project fails in both of these regards.

Schmeller begins with a discussion of "*Die Problematik der 'Diatribe.'*"[166] Here, Schmeller questions whether any concept of diatribe existed in antiquity or whether it is a modern scholarly construct. Connected to this is the question of whether it is correct to

[166] Schmeller, *Diatribe*, 1-54.

discuss diatribe in terms of a *Gattung*. Schmeller's consistent placing of quotation marks around the term "diatribe" is indicative. Schmeller argues that the ancients never used the term diatribe to refer to a specific genre;[167] the term communicates nothing about the form or content of a given work. Rather, the term only suggests that a work was connected to oral discourse in some fashion.[168] It was modern scholars, beginning with Usener, who began to use the term in a sense different from that of the ancient sources.[169] Consequently, representative texts should not be considered to belong to some specific genre known as "diatribe."[170] These texts, however, *do* share identifiable literary, stylistic, and philosophical features.[171] Thus, to answer the question of whether diatribe is a modern fiction or not, Schmeller concludes, "*ja und nein*."[172] On the one hand, the very designation of these texts as "diatribe" is a fiction. On the other hand, the similarities shared among these texts connect them as a group.[173] Thus, with respect to the question of genre, Schmeller disagrees with Bultmann that diatribe is a literary *Gattung*, and he disagrees with Stowers that diatribe is a legitimate oral / rhetorical type or genre. Instead,

---

[167] Relying on the work of Halbauer, Schmeller thinks the ancients would have called this *dialexis*. Ibid., 17-20. Stowers's critique of Halbauer is appropriate. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 28-29.

[168] Schmeller, *Diatribe*, 6-13.

[169] Ibid., 1, 13-14.

[170] Ibid., 33-54.

[171] Ibid., 20; see also 205-7, 215-16, 219.

[172] Ibid., 20.

[173] Schmeller writes, "*Eine Fiktion ist die Bezeichnung an sich: Sie wird seit Ende des letzten Jahrhunderts in einem anderen Sinn als in der Antike gebraucht und soll nun eine Art sprachlicher Äußerungen benennen, die zur Zeit ihrer Entstehung anders benannt wurde. Keine Fiktion ist dagegen das, was mit dieser Bezeichnung belegt wird. Es gibt eine Reihe antiker Texte, die solche Gemeinsamkeiten in Form und Inhalt aufweisen, daß sie zu Recht unter einem gemeinsamen Namen zusammengefaßt werden*." Ibid., 20.

Schmeller situates himself among the early critics of Bultmann's paradigm, the chief of which is Halbauer.

Schmeller chooses his diatribal camp, however, when he discusses the question of the social context for diatribe. Schmeller agrees with Stowers that Teles, Musonius, and Epictetus might legitimately be read in the context of a philosophical school.[174] Schmeller contends that Stowers's thesis falls short, however, with respect to Maximus, Plutarch, Philo, Seneca, and Dio.[175] Instead, Schmeller's diatribe fits three main contexts: (1) mass propaganda, (2) use in philosophical schools, and (3) literary production.[176] Though diverse, these three contexts share a common element. Namely, in every context, diatribe proclaims popular philosophy aimed at the general public.[177] Essentially, it is philosophy for everyman; Schmeller argues, "*eine 'Diatribe' ist eine persönliche und existentielle Anrede an jedermann mit ethischer Prägung*."[178] Schmeller, therefore, ultimately sides with the view of diatribe represented by Bultmann rather than by Stowers.

Schmeller's new method for deciphering what qualifies as genuine diatribe is a search for what he calls the *Strukturprinzip*.[179] Schmeller's goal is not to identify which individual traits, when combined together in specific ways, are able to prove that a text is or is not a diatribe. For Schmeller, these features are merely products of the

---

[174] Ibid., 51; cf. 47-51.

[175] Ibid., 51.

[176] Ibid., 52.

[177] Schmeller writes, "*Was das Publikum betrifft, besteht demnach die Gemeinsamkeit innerhalb der 'Diatribe' lediglich in einer populären Tendenz, in einer Ausrichtung auf Laien statt Fachphilosophen.*" Ibid., 52.

[178] Ibid., 99.

[179] Ibid., 98-99.

Strukturprinzip, which may or may not utilize other elements.[180] The *Strukturprinzip* is the underlying essence that holds all of these individual features together and integrates them into a textual unit. To uncover the *Strukturprinzip*, one brings to bear various approaches, such as the historical aspects of the text, the themes engaged, the means of expression (including diction, sentence structure, ornamentation, tropes, and figures), and the type and structure of the argument. To borrow Stowers's translation of Schmeller's definition, what Schmeller concludes is, "The [*Strukturprinzip*] for the diatribe is 'the transformation of intellectual content into existential encouragement with ethical delivery.'"[181] Perhaps stated overly simplistically, Schmeller's *Strukturprinzip* is reducible to ethical exhortation.

Schmeller's selection of sources, which he uses to identify the *Strukturprinzip*, is interesting. Rather than attempting to engage the bulk of diatribal literature, Schmeller opts for "comprehensive analysis and interpretation" of a very select number of texts from three sources, which he then compares to an even narrower selection from three different sources. Schmeller's primary selection of texts includes: (1) Fragments 16A, 17, 21, and 68 from Bion; (2) Fragment XVII from Musonius Rufus; and (3) *Diss*. I.12.8-35 from Epictetus. Schmeller then "confirms" his reading of these texts against: (1) Teles's second diatribe, Περὶ αὐταρκείας; (2) Dio's *Or*. 16, Περὶ λύπης; and (3) Plutarch's Περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας.[182] Schmeller recognizes that he is utilizing a very limited number of

[180] Ibid., 99.

[181] Stanley K. Stowers, Review of Thomas Schmeller, *Paulus und die 'Diatribe': Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation*, *JBL* 108.3 (1989): 540.

[182] Schmeller, *Diatribe*, 203-24.

texts in comparison to work's such as Stowers. Nevertheless, Schmeller insists that such selectivity can still produce positive results.[183]

Schmeller's project is problematic on both methodological fronts. First, given the amount of diatribal literature, Schmeller's highly selective selection of texts can hardly be considered representative. Plus, it would seem quite difficult to critique more holistic approaches based on such a small sample. Second, as Stowers notes, Schmeller is searching for something of an Aristotelian form or essence for diatribe. Unfortunately, Schmeller defines this form, the *Strukturprinzip*, so broadly that it can encompass almost any if not all hortatory literature.[184] Diatribe, however, is but one type of exhortation; not all exhortation is diatribe.[185] Schmeller's overly broad definition of the *Strukturprinzip* is perhaps connected to his limited concept of genre. By denying that diatribe might be a rhetorical or oral (rather than literary) genre, one wonders whether Schmeller inevitably diminishes the significance of the similarities these sources share, which results in an overgeneralization of his proposed underlying principle. In any case, Schmeller's suggested methodology, as well as his own method for defining that suggested methodology, contain severe issues and ultimately fail to convince. What is more, since Schmeller's publication, to the best of my knowledge, no work on diatribe adopts his views on these methodological points.[186]

---

[183] Ibid., 99.

[184] As Tobin writes, "Definitions [of genres] often have to be so general that they prove virtually useless in understanding the conventions and expectations of ancient works of literature or rhetoric." Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 90. This would certainly apply to Schmeller.

[185] Stowers, Review of Schmeller, 539-40.

[186] At most, Schmeller is generally listed as an alternative source for diatribe in addition to those of Bultmann and Stowers, primarily. For a representative selection, see Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 120 n.2; Song, *Reading Romans*, 11 n.8; Douglas A. Campbell, *Deliverance*, 1078 n.29; and Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 91

Finally, Schmeller's dismissal of Maximus, Plutarch, Philo, Seneca and Dio as indebted to the scholastic social setting is overly simplistic. A meager assertion that these sources do not belong in the scholastic social setting does not an argument make, nor does it indicate where Stowers has gone astray. Though it is correct that the scholastic context is more readily identifiable for Teles, Musonius and Epictetus, which Stowers acknowledges, Schmeller offers nothing constructive to refute Stowers's arguments with respect to the other diatribal sources.[187]

Runar M. Thorsteinsson

Thorsteinsson adds nothing to scholarship dedicated specifically to diatribe. In fact, Thorsteinsson endorses Stowers completely on the characteristics of the diatribe.[188] The reason Thorsteinsson is important for the current project is because his work is an attempt to answer the question, "How can one identify an imaginary interlocutor, especially in Paul's epistles?" The correlative questions, of course, are, "How can one deduce when the interlocutor is or is not speaking?" and "Why does it matter?" These questions sound strangely familiar, as they are some of the same basic questions I am currently pursuing as well. Thorsteinsson's method is quite different than my approach, however. I am aiming to analyze diatribe in tandem with the rhetorical exercise of speech-in-character, which transcends generic categories; Thorsteinsson, on the other hand, attempts to bring in evidence only from epistolary materials.

---

n.35. Thorsteinsson plainly suggests that Schmeller's project fails in comparison to Stowers's. Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor*, 124 n.6.

[187] Stowers, Review of Schmeller, 538-39.

[188] Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor*, 123-30.

Thorsteinsson identifies many similarities between the diatribal and epistolary uses of dialogical elements, but he also finds differences. First, as in diatribe, one of the principal dialogical features is the use of an interlocutor. This interlocutor is envisioned as entering into conversation in order to question, object, or be questioned by the author. Whether or not this interlocutor's speech is explicitly marked or not varies.[189] If it is overtly marked, it is marked with a verb of speech.[190] When the interlocutor's speech is not marked, however, certain clues often hint to the reader the presence of an additional voice, such as interrogative phrases (i.e., τί οὖν), adversative or inferential conjunctions, or an author's immediate response to a statement.[191] In most cases, the immediate context is also helpful for determining whether an interlocutor has entered the scene.[192]

Second, the epistolary interlocutor typically represents the letter's recipient. This feature likely developed from the notion that the letter is a kind of dialogue with an absent audience, whereby the interlocutor fills the dialogical roll of the absent party.[193] In this respect, epistolary interlocutors vary from diatribal interlocutors, which are used much more broadly.[194] When epistolary interlocutors do not represent the letter's recipient(s), it is usually clearly indicated, often with a verb of saying and an indefinite

[189] Ibid., 135.

[190] Ibid., 135-36.

[191] Ibid., 137-39.

[192] Ibid., 140.

[193] Ibid., 141.

[194] Ibid., 136, 140.

pronoun.[195] Also, unless otherwise noted, the identity of the interlocutor generally remains the same throughout the course of a letter.[196]

Finally, despite what Thorsteinsson identifies as the epistolary norm, similar to the diatribe style, "the epistolary interlocutor may represent different groups and views of people… specific types of persons, or common opinion."[197] Also similar to the diatribe's use of interlocutors, the epistolary interlocutor functions as a device to develop the argument as desired, and as a means of engaging the audience.[198]

Thorsteinsson's analysis and presentation of epistolary evidence are helpful, and he will be a useful conversation partner in Part Three in the discussion of Paul's interlocutor in Rom 2-3. But several questions remain unanswered. For instance, how many exceptions to a rule are required to problematize said rule? Seneca's epistles contain numerous examples in which the interlocutor does *not* represent the recipient, as Stowers and Thorsteinsson have documented. At what point does the general rule for the interlocutor to represent the recipient become less significant? Additionally, what if an epistle displays heavy diatribal features? Should epistolary norms or diatribal norms (when they differ) receive priority in these instances? As a case in point, why does Thorsteinsson say so little about Stowers's treatment of Seneca's epistles, especially concerning Stowers's division of epistolary dialogical and diatribal dialogical features? Is it not possible that Paul moves in and out of more diatribal sections in Romans, as argued

[195] Ibid., 141

[196] Ibid., 144.

[197] Ibid., 141.

[198] Ibid., 140-41.

by Tobin,[199] so that it would make more sense to evaluate these diatribal pericopae in light of diatribe rather than epistolography? For another example, could diatribe's allowance for the primary speaker to initiate conversation with an interlocutor mitigate the epistolary tendency to introduce interlocutors with the interrogative τί οὖν?

Thomas H. Tobin

Tobin's work proceeds from his conviction that genre matters significantly in terms of how an author intends his composition to be understood, as well as with respect to how an audience would have in fact read or heard the composition. Tobin writes,

> a genre [is] the fairly stable clustering of different conventions such that they formed a commonly recognized pattern. These patterns then informed the ways in which authors composed, and readers and hearers understood, these compositions.[200]

For Tobin, the body of Romans belongs to the genre of diatribe, and it would have readily been recognizable as such.[201]

As far as Tobin's conception of diatribe is concerned, for all intents and purposes, Tobin fully endorses Stowers. Diatribe belongs to the philosophical, scholastic social setting, and it "usually [has] an ethical-religious nature."[202] Additionally, diatribes were not the technical instruction but were "discourses or instructions of a more popular sort in

---

[199] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 84-88.

[200] Ibid., 90.

[201] Ibid., 89. Tobin's identification of the body of Romans as diatribe will be discussed in more depth in Part Three. Tobin of course recognizes that, technically, Romans is an epistle. Correctly, Tobin also notes that it is perfectly permissible and common for the body of an epistle to vary in and employ diverse generic categories, which problematizes Thorsteinsson's narrow epistolary approach. Said otherwise, there is no reason, based simply in terms of genre, that Romans cannot contain a diatribal body situated within an epistolary frame. Ibid., 96. See also David E. Aune, "Romans as a *Logos Protreptikos*," in *The Romans Debate* (Karl P. Donfried, ed.; rev.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991), 278-96; Rodriguez, *If You Call*, 37 n.40.

[202] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 91.

which there was a strong dialogical or Socratic component."[203] The goal of diatribe was to transform, "to point out error and cure it," that is, Socratic censure and protreptic.[204] Thus, Tobin's concept of diatribe willingly endorses Stowers through and through.

Tobin, however, makes one contribution of particular import for the study of Romans. Namely, Tobin looks at the macrostructure of select diatribes from Epictetus. In doing so, Tobin observes that some of Epictetus's diatribes contain passages of a more expository nature. These passages, Tobin argues, represent "less controversial explanation[s] and foundation[s] for the other arguments."[205] In the ensuing more lively and diatribal sections, Epictetus then applies these less controversial explanations and foundations in more controversial ways to how he thinks humans should conduct their lives.[206] Thus, some of Epictetus's diatribes demonstrate a pattern in which more expository passages are further expounded in passages with a heightened diatribal style. Tobin contends this to be the case with Romans as well.[207] To this end, it will be fruitful to bring Tobin into consideration concerning the function(s) of Rom 3:1-9 in 1:18-3:31 and in the body of Romans as a whole.

Changwon Song

Song represents another scholar who adopts Stowers's presentation of the diatribe basically in a holistic fashion. Song notes that Stowers "convincingly demonstrates" diatribe's implementation of a Socratic censure and protreptic method, so that the

---

[203] Ibid.

[204] Ibid., 91, 93.

[205] Ibid., 94.

[206] Ibid., 95.

[207] Ibid., 84-88, 95-98.

dialogical elements are used for a pedagogical rather than polemical purpose.[208] Additionally, diatribe is not a form of mass propaganda; "its form and function presuppose a student-teacher relationship."[209] As such, Song does not have much to offer in terms of any overarching understanding of diatribe. Rather, Song's contribution rests in his attempt to identify stylistic features that concretely identify diatribe as diatribe and not some other rhetorical or literary category.

Song identifies the following goals for his project: (1) identify the "diatribe markers," (2) carefully identify and define the diatribe pericopae in Romans, and (3) evaluate the implications of reading Romans as diatribe.[210] At this point, it is necessary only to discuss Song's first goal.

By "diatribe markers," Song means those elements of diatribe that are unique to diatribe and do not overlap with other rhetorical categories.[211] Such "markers" differ from general traits or characteristics that are shared by other generic categories. These diatribal "markers" include: (1) vivid dialogues, especially with fictitious interlocutors, (2) the emergence of an imaginary second-person singular, (3) characteristic rejection phrases, such as μὴ γένοιτο,[212] and (4) characteristic apostrophic vocatives.[213]

---

[208] Song, *Reading Romans*, 2-3. Thus, Song fails to notice Stowers's own concession that some of Epictetus's diatribes contain polemic. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 55.

[209] Song, *Reading Romans*, 2-3.

[210] Ibid., 6.

[211] Ibid., 6, 16.

[212] Song is heavily indebted to Malherbe, who argues that μὴ γένοιτο, "as it appears as a response in a dialogue without being part of a larger sentence, is unique to Epictetus and Paul." Malherbe, "Μὴ γένοιτο," 231-40, quote from 232.

[213] Song, *Reading Romans*, 16.

Theoretically, these markers belong to diatribe and diatribe alone. Thus, if a text has these categories, it is either a diatribe or diatribal.

Song's contribution is insightful, but it requires two qualifications. First, Song leaves himself open to criticism due to a lack of specificity. Allowing Song a generous reading, what he seems to mean is that each of these "markers" come from the primary speaker / author. For instance, one can conceive of vivid dialogue between fictive characters in a non-diatribal context, such as the example of speech-in-character discussed in Part One from *ad Herennium* 4.65.[214] Second, it should at least be noted that all of Song's markers belong to the dialogical aspect of diatribe. That is, Song's markers do not provide a holistic system by which to identify diatribe, because diatribe constitutes a much broader phenomenon than its dialogical element alone. All that to say, Song's contribution is still helpful in terms of trying to define ways of distinguishing diatribe from other literary or rhetorical categories. The significance of Song's reading of Romans, as with all of the above sources, of course remains to be seen until Part Three.

Conclusion

This review of research demonstrates that Stowers's model superseded that of Bultmann and continues to represent the general scholarly consensus.[215] This does not

---

[214] Witherington and Hyatt actually seem to identify *ad Herennium* 4.65 with diatribe. *Ad Herennium* 4.65 represents speech-in-character, not diatribe. *Ad Herennium* 4.65 depicts fictional characters speaking with one another; there is no dialogue between the primary speaker / narrator and the hypothetical speakers, which would be characteristic for diatribe. Witherington and Hyatt, *Romans*, 74-75. This is, of course, not to say that the conventions for speech-in-character cannot be used to create and fashion the words of the diatribal interlocutor, but more on this in Chapter Seven.

[215] In addition to the scholars discussed above, the following represents a list of scholars who adopt Stowers's presentation of diatribe and do not express any specific interest in adding to or nuancing Stowers's presentation. John L. White, *The Apostle of God: Paul and the Promise of Abraham* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1999), 76-77; Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 36-37; Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 91; Elliott, *Rhetoric*. 120 n.2; David E. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (LEC 8; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), 200-2; idem., *The Westminster Dictionary*, 127-29; Witherington and Hyatt, *Romans*, 74-75;

mean that Stowers is completely divorced from his predecessors. Quite the contrary, Stowers draws on elements extending all the way back to Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, and many in between, and capitalizes on them. The difference is that Stowers puts the pieces together in a way at which had previously only been hinted.

Concerning the works on diatribe chronologically following Stowers, Schmeller amounts to something of a methodological detour, while Thorssteinsson, Tobin, and Song each endorse Stowers as far as the general depiction of diatribe is concerned. This is not to say that these scholars have not made helpful contributions or nuances on various points, but neither have they successfully recast the nature of diatribe studies for future New Testament research. Three of them never even aimed to do so. This is also not to say that Stowers is correct in every single respect, either concerning the diatribe or his application of it to Paul. To be sure, these scholars and others will be assessed with respect to their application of diatribe to Pauline studies in the following chapters. Consequently, though it will be prudent to listen to other scholars at various points in the discussion of diatribal and Pauline texts (see my discussions above), the presentation of diatribe followed in this project is heavily indebted to Stowers.

What, therefore, are the characteristics of diatribe which will be employed in the remainder of this project? First, the social function of diatribe did not belong to the Cynic-Stoic propagandistic street preaching for the masses. Rather, diatribe was most at home in the setting of the philosophical school, in the teacher-student relationship. In this setting, diatribe was not the formal instruction or lecture about a given topic; diatribe was

---

Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *Principat* 26.1 (1992): 313-20, esp. 313 n.222.

the conversation that occurred after the formal instruction, during which the teacher could clarify his thoughts and/or correct his students.

Second, one of the most prominent characteristics of diatribe is its implementation of a dialogical element. Most notably, the primary speaker often introduces a fictitious interlocutor on to the scene and assigns speech in his, her, or its voice. The primary speaker may initiate conversation with the interlocutor through direct address, or the interlocutor can interrupt and address the primary speaker. This interlocutor can represent a general type of person, a specific person, or a personified object or abstract idea. Often the interlocutor is unidentified and/or simply a rhetorical device by which the primary speaker advances his own argument in a particularly measured rhetorical manner. Finally, sometimes the interlocutor's words are introduced with a basic verb of speech, but frequently they are not introduced at all. Thus, it is often difficult to determine when an interlocutor's speech begins or ends.

Third, Socratic censure and protreptic are significant aspects of the teacher's pedagogical method. Through censure, the teacher is able to point out contradictions or errors among his students. Through protreptic, the teacher provides the student(s) with the correct view or course of action and exhorts them to adopt it. Extending back to Socrates, this method capitalizes on the use of question and answer as a means of guiding one's conversation partner in a particular direction.

Fourth, the tone of diatribe varies. Early work on diatribe considered the tone to be heavily polemical. Stowers's reassessment swung the tonal pendulum in quite the opposite direction, so that the tone of diatribe became primarily that of collaboration and education. To this end, Plutarch is particularly significant in Stowers's argument.

Plutarch informs that, though the censure might be difficult, the audience should await the pleasant exhortation that follows.[216] Stowers himself, however, continues to allow for polemic in diatribe, citing three of Epictetus's *Discourses* as cases in point. But "polemic" in Stowers's presentation takes on a very narrow sense; Stowers's identification of polemic in Epictetus is limited to instances in which Epictetus specifically targets and attacks other philosophical movements.[217] For instance, in *Disc*. 1.23 and 2.23 Epictetus attacks Epicurus, and in 2.20 he targets Epicureans and Academics. But, to say that most diatribes are not "polemical" in this minimalistic sense does not demand that their scholastic settings are all fun and collegial games. Nothing necessitates that a teacher must be "nice" to his or her students. Indeed, the scholastic environment can be just as hot and heated as those diatribes Stowers identifies as "polemical" in his limited sense. As corroborating evidence, one needs simply to consider Figure 6.1, a painting from the house of Julia Felix in Pompeii of a student being punished. In this painting, the student is depicted as being stripped, restrained by two other students, and whipped by the schoolmaster. In fact, Teles comments to this end as well. Teles, in Fragment V, writes that if a child survives and escapes his nurse, a litany of teachers are the next in line to get their hands on him, and "by all of these he is beaten, scrupulously observed, and forcibly manhandled by the neck" (ὑπὸ πάντων τούτων μαστιγοῦται, παρατηρεῖται, τραχηλίζεται).

---

[216] Plutarch represents the ideal student response from the teacher's perspective. Both confirming and problematizing Plutarch's presentation is Epictetus's *Discourse* 2.21, Περὶ ἀνομολογίας. Here, Epictetus implicitly expects students to undergo transformation through attending his school, but he also documents the reality that not all students are actually prepared (or interested) to allow themselves to change and be transformed. As a result, Epictetus critiques such students who are unwilling to question or lay aside the preconceptions about various topics that they held upon entering his school. See especially *Disc*. 2.21.15-22.

[217] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 55 n.289.

Figure 6.1. Painting of a schoolboy being punished from the house of Julia Felix in Pompeii. This painting is held in the National Archaeological Museum of Naples, inv. 9066. Photo taken by Bruce Longenecker.

Thus, though the social setting for diatribe might be established as a scholastic environment, the tone within that environment is certainly malleable to the specific rhetorical context. To exclude the possibility of more general polemical tones from diatribe is a confusion of terms likely stemming from Stowers's narrow presentation of "polemical diatribes." This means that in the normal censure-protreptic progression of the scholastically situated diatribe, one must be open to finding both more negative / pejorative examples as well as more positive / optimistic instances of diatribal discourse.

Fifth, in this early scholastic setting, diatribe did not represent a literary genre.[218] The forms of the primary sources for diatribe are too diverse to permit such a claim. The sources, however, do share numerous characteristics that group them together and suggest they belong to a rhetorical genre or category. Indeed, it is only as a rhetorical category or genre that these texts or their characteristic features would be comprehensible, on the one hand, and able to be adapted for and into literary forms, on the other hand.

The following chapters seek to apply this presentation of diatribe, in combination with speech-in-character, to non-Pauline diatribal texts. In this way, Chapter Seven represents something of a demonstration of the method to be employed when examining Rom 3:1-9 in Part Three. Again, diatribe will carry much of the hermeneutical weight, whereas speech-in-character will assist in defining the limits of the various dialogical exchanges. This combination should allow significant progress to be made on Rom 3:1-9 and its place in the larger pictures of Romans and Paul's thought.

---

[218] For scholars who continue to argue that diatribe represents a genuine genre, see Stanley E. Porter, "The Argument of Romans 5: Can a Rhetorical Question Make a Difference," *JBL* 110.4 (1991): 657-59; Song, *Reading Romans*, 58-62.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Examples of Diatribal Dialogue

Introduction

Having addressed speech-in-character in Part One and diatribe in Part Two, Chapter Six, it is now possible to examine how these phenomena operate simultaneously in non-Pauline diatribal texts. Though never discussed in any great depth to my knowledge, the observation that speech-in-character can inform questions about diatribe, and diatribe questions about speech-in-character, has not gone entirely unnoticed. For instance, Kustas argues that diatribe's "special habit" of attributing speech to a fictitious interlocutor "has achieved a classification of its own" in the rhetorical treatises, which he identifies as *Ad Herennium*'s concept of *sermocinationes consequentes*—i.e., speech-in-character.[1] Additionally, at times, Stowers speaks primarily in terms of diatribe.[2] At other times, however, Stowers speaks more in terms of speech-in-character.[3] Nonetheless, these are to be considered mutually informative categories. Thus, there is a precedent in scholarship for associating diatribe and speech-in-character in some way or another, and the present chapter aims to address this relationship more fully.

So, what exactly is the relationship between the rhetorical figure of speech-in-character and diatribe? The most obvious connection is the practice of crafting and scripting (or attributing) speech in the voice of an imaginary speaker. In this way, it is

---

[1] Kustas, *Diatribe*, 11-12. See my treatment of *sermocinationes consequentes* in Part One.

[2] Stowers, *Diatribe*.

[3] Idem., "Apostrophe," 351-69.

specifically the dialogical aspect of diatribe that overlaps with speech-in-character. This similarity, however, runs deeper than surface level. For example, the identity of the imaginary speaker varies greatly; in both diatribe and speech-in-character, the imaginary speaker can be an actual person, a hypothetical person, an unidentified person, an inanimate object, or an abstract idea. What is more, in both diatribe and speech-in-character, the imaginary speaker's words may or may not be clearly marked by an introductory formula of some type. Finally, the purpose of diatribe often overlaps with that of speech-in-character. Stowers demonstrates the basic function of diatribe to be censure and protreptic, pointing out faults in one's dialogue partner and/or audience and attempting to correct them.[4] Similarly, Quintilian notes that speech-in-character is particularly useful for revealing the thoughts of an opponent or introducing appropriate characters for specific rhetorical situations (*Inst.* 9.2.30), and Theon lists protreptic as one of the primary uses of the exercise (*Prog*. 115.20-22). The attributions of speech in diatribe and speech-in-character, therefore, reflect a remarkable similarity. Indeed, each utterance of an imaginary, diatribal interlocutor represents the use of speech-in-character, as the primary speaker or writer crafts appropriate speech for his or her dialogue partner in order to move the discourse in a measured rhetorical direction.

This is not to say that one might not uncover differences between the dialogical sections of diatribe and speech-in-character. The very first example discussed below (Teles, fragment 1, "On Seeming and Being") deviates from the norm of speech-in-character by implementing a more complex and pluriform characterization than is typical

[4] Idem., *Diatribe*, 76-77.

for speech-in-character in the rhetorical treatises addressed in Part One. Moreover, it is unclear whether an interlocutor is even on the scene until half way through the dialogue.[5]

The biggest divergence between diatribe's dialogues and speech-in-character, however, is of a related but somewhat different sort. As discussed in Part One, speech-in-character contains several tools by which readers and auditors can usually cue in to the presence of an imaginary speaker. More specifically, two highly common aspects of speech-in-character can assist readers not only to identify *that* speech is being attributed to an imaginary speaker, but also to deduce *the extent* of the attributed speech. In this way, the reader or auditor can best understand the precise exchanges in the script of the dialogue and who is to be understood as responsible for speaking them. These two features are the tendency to provide a characterization of the imaginary speaker and the unanimous rule that the attributed speech must be appropriate vis-à-vis the characterization in order to be rhetorically effective. In theory, therefore, even if there are no overt markers distinguishing the limits of a given dialogical exchange (such as an introductory verb of speech), one should be able to define the boundaries within the script by measuring any phrase against the established characterization(s) of the speaker(s) imaginatively present.

On the contrary, diatribe, in its own right, benefits from no such guidelines with respect to determining the extent or the voice of individual lines in a discourse, and this is for several reasons. First, and most general, whereas multiple treatments of rhetorical theory directly address speech-in-character, no primary literature systematically discusses diatribe and unpacks its presumed conventions. Such guidelines simply do not exist in the

[5] But see below for my treatment of the passage and argument for the way in which Teles's diatribe nevertheless maintains appropriateness.

historical record.[6] Second, because no handbooks of rhetorical theory on diatribe exist, scholars must extrapolate diatribal tendencies from primary diatribal texts. When scholars make these extrapolations, the conclusion is regularly that the manners of creating dialogical exchanges in diatribe are diverse, inconsistent, loose, unsystematic, and so forth. Of course, there are various introductory formulas that often introduce an interlocutor's speech (such as φησί or *inquit*) and stock phrases that are frequently placed on the interlocutor's lips (such as τί οὖν or statements beginning with ἀλλά), but none of these tendencies are employed consistently. An introductory verb of speech very well might introduce an interlocutor's words, but it is equally acceptable for the interlocutor simply to enter the conversation without any introduction. Similarly, as Stowers notes, Epictetus can use identical forms (such as τί οὖν or μὴ γένοιτο) for his own words as well as for the words of his interlocutors, which creates a "looseness and variability of their usage."[7] Third, heretofore, speech-in-character has typically been ignored or not afforded the appropriate weight in terms of analyzing diatribe's dialogical exchanges. As I discuss in Part Three, Stowers's contributions are the most helpful in this respect, but they are not without fault and more remains to be said.

My project narrows the gap between diatribe's "inconsistent and loose" dialogical pericopae and speech-in-character's (typically) more systematic attributions of speech by allowing the conventions set forth for speech-in-character to offer insight into diatribe's dialogues, specifically with respect to the shape of the script. The merit of the method will of course be borne out in the exegesis of primary texts. The method will doubtlessly work better for some texts than it will work for others. For instance, in Fragment III, Περὶ

[6] At least, no such evidence has been discovered.

[7] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 128-29, 160. Cf. Malherbe, "Μὴ Γένοιτο;" Song, *Reading Romans*, 32-37.

φυγῆς, lines 9-31, Teles quotes a diatribal dialogue from Stilpon. In this discourse, no characterization of the interlocutor occurs (though perhaps it would have been present in the original context of the dialogue), and the extent of the interlocutor's comments amounts to nothing more than abrupt agreements with each of Stilpon's leading questions.[8] As it fortuitously turns out, the script of this particular discourse is quite clear. If, however, the script were more complex or difficult to deduce, speech-in-character would have a troubled time assisting in one's understanding of the conversation due to the lack of characterization and the limited amount of speech attributed to the interlocutor. When the necessary components are present, however, the conventions governing speech-in-character are quite forceful tools that are able to improve understandings of diatribal discourse significantly (see further below).

Under the assumption that all of the texts discussed below in one way or another belong to or evince features of a diatribal rhetorical category, diatribe will be alotted the primary hermeneutical role in terms of *how* these texts should be understood. From the perspective of diatribe, four questions will be posed to each text: (1) what is the identity of the interlocutor, (2) what is the function of the interlocutor, (3) is the scholastic tone more positively collegial and collaborative, or is it more negative or generally polemical, and (4) does, and how does, the argument employ censure, protreptic, or both? At the same time, the conventions for speech-in-character—especially characterization and the appropriateness of the attributed speech—will be employed in order to define and/or confirm as precisely as possible the various exchanges within the dialogical script under examination. I will also consider whether speech-in-character offers any additional

[8] The interlocutor's respective responses are: οὐ δή, line 13; οὐδὲ τοῦτο, line 16; and καὶ μάλα, line 21.

information regarding the identity of the interlocutor or the function of the attributed speech and/or dialogue. In these ways, speech-in-character largely provides and defines the content to be analyzed, while diatribe generally suggests how that content is to be best interpreted. The following three examples of diatribal dialogue serve as models for the proposed method.

Diatribal Dialogue In Primary Sources for Diatribe

Teles, Fragment I: Περὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι

Overview. In "On Seeming and Being," which is Fragment I of Teles's extant writings, Teles engages in conversation with an imaginary interlocutor concerning whether it is better simply to *seem* to have some quality or attribute or *actually* to possess or embody it. Teles begins the conversation as follows:

> Κρεῖττόν φασι τὸ δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι· μὴ καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι κρεῖττόν ἐστιν;
>
> Some claim [φασι] that seeming [τὸ δοκεῖν] to be [εἶναι] just [δίκαιον] is better than being [τοῦ εἶναι] just. Seeming to be good [ἀγαθὸν] is not better than being good, is it? (I.1-3)

Introducing the subject matter for the remainder of the discourse, Teles's opening statement posits that some unidentified people affirm the notion that seeming to be something is better than truly being so. Though Teles could have easily used direct speech to record the affirmation of these claimants, his use of the infinitive (τὸ δοκεῖν) suggests that he is reporting indirect rather than direct speech.[9] Thus, no attributed speech is present in the opening line; it is to be heard in Teles's own voice.

[9] Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, §2016-17, 2019-21, 2026-27. O'Neil also takes this as indirect speech. O'Neil, *Teles*, 3.

Following from his topical cue in the opening statement, Teles next poses a leading question to his interlocutor, petitioning the interlocutor to affirm or deny whether it is better to seem to be good or actually to be good (2-3). The interlocutor is never identified in the discourse, nor do any verbs of speech overtly distinguish the interlocutor's words from Teles's. As such, at first glance, one could be forgiven for wondering whether Teles's question was simply rhetorical, so that both the question and answer would be spoken in Teles's own voice. Teles, however, makes it perfectly clear elsewhere that he is in fact engaging an interlocutor; Teles addresses the interlocutor in the second person singular (βούλοιο, line 19, 21; βούλει, line 32), and he scripts the interlocutor as responding in the first person singular (βουλοίμην, line 29) and referring to himself with the first person singular personal pronoun (τιμήσουσί με, line 33). Therefore, it is clear elsewhere in the discourse that an interlocutor is in play and is answering Teles's questions. For these reasons, it is practically certain, and at least justifiably argued, that the response to Teles's first question is similarly to be heard in the interlocutor's voice. Thus, in this instance of diatribal dialogue, the primary speaker, Teles, poses a leading question to an unnamed, imaginary interlocutor. Teles then composes a response in the interlocutor's voice.[10]

The interlocutor's scripted response, ἀμέλει, rejects the possibility that seeming is somehow better than being (4). As such, the interlocutor and Teles are in agreement. This consensus gives rise to a series of three back and forth questions and answers. Teles ponders whether people are good actors because they seem to act well or because they actually act well (5-6), whether people play the cithara well because they seem to play it

[10] So also Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue," 711.

well or because they actually play it well (8-9), and whether it is generally the case that, with respect to whatever people do well, they simply seem to be good or actually are good at that particular undertaking (11-12). To each of these scenarios, the interlocutor responds, διὰ τὸ εἶναι (7, 10, 13). Consequently, at every turn to this point in the dialogue, the interlocutor agrees with Teles and affirms that people excel at various skills not because they seem to be good but because they actually are good.[11] So far, seeming is not better than being.

Having agreed that being good is better than seeming to be good (14-17), Teles proceeds by firing a litany of questions towards the interlocutor concerning whether it is preferable to see or simply seem to see, to be well or merely seem to be well, and so forth (17-25). Teles's question of whether it is preferable to be confident, fearless, and courageous (ἀνδρεῖος) or only to seem to be so, however, brings the dialogue partners' agreement to a crashing halt. Given the interlocutor's agreement that being good is better than simply seeming to be good, one would expect the interlocutor to respond in like kind here. Quite the opposite, the interlocutor answers in the first person,

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἂν μᾶλλον βουλοίμην δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι.

I would prefer to seem courageous rather than to be courageous. (I.29)

Contrary to the thrust of the conversation, the interlocutor now chooses seeming over being.

Naturally, Teles probes further and asks the interlocutor why he would prefer seeming to be courageous to actually being courageous (31-32). The interlocutor responds, because "they will honor me" (33), at which point Teles takes the opportunity

[11] Stowers rightly observes, "Teles asks questions which the student or interlocutor can only answer as Teles wishes." Ibid.

to inform his imaginary conversation partner of the dire outcomes of such a position. Teles hypothesizes that, because they (presumably soldiers) believe the interlocutor to be courageous, they will place him in the front of the battle formations and conscript him to fight in one-on-one combat (34-35). Furthermore, when the interlocutor is taken captive, the enemy will also perceive him to be courageous and able to endure considerable suffering. As a result, they will bind him, lock him away, torture him, stretch him on the racks, and burn him over a fire (35-45). All of these maladies will come upon the interlocutor because he feigned to be courageous, hiding his true character like the rhetoricians (45-47).

Diatribe. As already discussed, the identity of the imaginary interlocutor is entirely unspecified. Additionally, the words Teles attributes to the interlocutor are never introduced with verbs of speech. The clinching pieces of evidence that an interlocutor is on the scene are Teles's references to the interlocutor in the second person and the interlocutor's references to himself in the first person. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the interlocutor represents one of Teles's students or more generally a certain type of person. Assuming that Teles's leading question is directed to a schoolroom setting, it is perfectly plausible that the interlocutor's responses could represent a specific student's thoughts or concerns. It is also plausible, however, that the interlocutor's responses simply represent a general type that Teles uses rhetorically in order to model for his students a particular lesson about authenticity and hypocrisy. Whether addressing a particular student or the class as a whole, the interlocutor nevertheless functions to provide Teles with a character to engage with within a specific rhetorical situation. Through this engagement, Teles is able to demonstrate for his class the various ways in

which seeming to be something is deficient when compared to actually being or possessing some trait, and vice versa.

Moving forward, if censure and/or protreptic are the primary argumentative strategies in diatribe, how does Teles utilize them in this discourse? The presence of censure is unmistakable. Again, censure (ἐλεγτικός, ἐλέγχειν) is the feature by which the teacher or primary speaker exposes errors and contradictions endorsed by his students or the imaginary interlocutor. Here, the trajectory of the interlocutor's responses models Teles's use of censure perfectly. The interlocutor's first four responses agree wholly with Teles's view that being is better than merely seeming to be. Through Teles's continued probing and questioning, however, the interlocutor reveals that he ultimately wishes to seem to be courageous rather than actually to be so. Thus, Teles's use of censure points out a contradiction between what the interlocutor consents to early in the discourse (i.e., being is greater than seeming) and what he later discloses that he secretly desires for himself (i.e., merely to seem to be courageous).

Protreptic argumentation (προτρεπτικός, προτρέπω), on the other hand, is that which offers the correct course to pursue and encourages one's audience to follow it. Such protreptic argumentation, however, is less pronounced in Fragment I. Once the interlocutor has revealed his inner contradiction and broken consensus with Teles's point of view, Teles offers no positive protreptic argument to persuade the interlocutor to pursue some other—better—course of action. What Teles does, however, is to present a fully apotreptic (ἀποτρεπτικός, ἀποτρέπω) argument. Apotreptic argumentation is characterized not by an attempt to persuade positively (i.e., protreptically) towards some goal, but by an attempt to dissuade negatively away from something (see Theon, *Prog*.

116.22-117.6). In this manner, Teles outlines the numerous tragedies that will befall his interlocutor due to his desire simply to seem courageous (I.34-45). Such apotreptic argumentation would, Teles would hope, challenge the interlocutor's reasoning and implicitly suggest that he should abandon such a view. Thus, though it is not explicitly protreptic, technically speaking, Teles nevertheless maintains in "On Seeming and Being" a censure-exhortation (in the form of implicit dissuasion) progression aimed at confronting and correcting his interlocutor's error.

Finally, what is the tone of the diatribe? Does Teles engage with his interlocutor in a collegial and optimistic manner, does he treat his imaginary dialogue partner more pejoratively, or does he engage in polemic in the narrower sense employed by Stowers? Three features of the dialogue suggest that the tone should be heard in a more pejorative, if not narrowly polemical, sense. First, Teles never suggests that the interlocutor actually abandons his desire to seem courageous, comes full circle, and rejoins Teles's point of view. This means Teles and his interlocutor have not worked collegially or collaboratively (at least not successfully) in order to bring the interlocutor to the presumed correct way of thinking. As far as the dialogical evidence is concerned, the interlocutor remains in his folly.[12] Second, though it would implicitly suggest the need for reform, the apotreptic argumentation is thoroughly negative, only highlighting the terrible results that would follow from the interlocutor's foolish point-of-view.[13] Third, and quite

[12] Based on the extant evidence, this must be the conclusion. If the text were not a fragment, however, it is of course possible that the dialogue continues and Teles eventually persuades the interlocutor to abandon his desire to seem to be courageous. Until new copies of Teles surface, however, one must do his or her best with the extant fragments.

[13] The apotreptic argument would have a similar implicit effect on Teles's students / audience. The litany of tragedies that Teles suggests would befall the hypocritical interlocutor serve as a model aimed at dissuading others from following the interlocutor's manner of thinking.

suggestive, Teles derides the interlocutor for putting forth a false presentation of himself (I.45-47). Such hypocritical self-presentation, Teles avers, associates the interlocutor with the rhetors (ὥσπερ οἱ ῥήτορες; I.47). Teles's disdain for the rhetors as an opposing or anti-philosophical group, and his association of the interlocutor with them, is similar to Epictetus's treatment of the Epicureans and Academics (*Disc*. 2.20; see below), which Stowers identifies as polemic.[14] Consequently, though the censure-implicit exhortation argumentation of the scholastic setting is present, "On Seeming and Being" demonstrates that diatribe is fully capable of donning generally negative and even narrowly polemical moods, even within the student-teacher relationship of the scholastic setting.

Speech-in-Character. But what about speech-in-character? For all intents and purposes, the script of "On Seeming and Being" is quite straightforward, and speech-in-character is not really needed in order to help define it any further. For this reason, however, "On Seeming and Being" is a great entry point, as it constitutes a relatively stable control against which to test the validity of speech-in-character as a means of further understanding diatribe and the degree to which the two overlap.

Because the speaker is never identified in any way, the first items to consider with respect to speech-in-character are characterization of the speaker and the appropriateness of the attributed speech. In the entire discourse, Teles only once comments directly about the character of the interlocutor, and that comment comes only after the interlocutor's final words. In the onslaught of difficulties that Teles suggests merely seeming to be courageous will produce, Teles writes:

εἶτα τί οἴει πείσεσθαι δειλὸς μὲν ὤν, κινδυνεύων δέ;

[14] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 55 n.289.

> Then, what do you think you will experience, because you are a coward (δειλός) and are in danger? (I.37-38)

Teles characterizes the interlocutor ultimately as a coward. This cowardly character trait makes wonderful sense of the interlocutor's preference for seeming to be courageous rather than actually being courageous (I.29-30). For, as Teles clarifies, a truly courageous person is both fearless and painless (ἢ οὐχ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ἄφοβος καὶ ἄλυπος, οὐχ ὁ δοκῶν; I.31-32). The interlocutor, however, cannot actually be courageous since he would then have to be fearless as well, which is impossible because he is a coward. The interlocutor's speech in the latter half of the discourse, therefore, is entirely appropriate in light of the characterization.

More difficult is the question of how to explain the appropriateness of the interlocutor's speech in the first half of the dialogue. Since Teles later discloses that the interlocutor is a coward who prefers seeming over being courageous, how can the interlocutor's early agreements with Teles be considered appropriate? There is no explanation for why the interlocutor might agree that being is better than seeming with respect to certain realities but not others, nor is there any hint that the interlocutor has simply changed his mind. The best solution seems to be that the diatribal rhetorical category has superseded the singular characterization typical of speech-in-character.[15] Said otherwise, the very nature of diatribe can implicitly assume a particular characterization, namely, inner inconsistency and contradiction in the person of the interlocutor.[16] If a particular diatribe's primary aim is to expose and root out error and

[15] By "singular characterization," I mean that speech-in-character typically functions based on a single or fixed characterization of the imaginary speaker rather than multiple and/or contradictory characterizations. For examples, see my engagement with actual speeches-in-character in Part One.

[16] For characterization in diatribe, see also Stowers, *Diatribe*, 106-10.

inconsistency, then, by necessity, the interlocutor must display inconsistency. Thus, in this instance, speech-in-character, which usually operates based on a single characterization, is put to the service of diatribe, which here requires two characterizations, one of which is assumed (inconsistency and contradiction), and one of which is explicit (coward). In this way, when viewed through the overarching lens of diatribe, all of the interlocutor's speech can be considered appropriate as far as speech-in-character is concerned.

Speech-in-character also parallels diatribe in terms of the function of the attributed speech. In the rhetorical context of the diatribe, Teles's interlocutor provides him with a conversation partner against whom he can express to his class his views about seeming and being. Interestingly, such a use of the interlocutor maps seamlessly with Quintilian's allowance that speech-in-character is quite useful for "[providing] appropriate characters for words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or pity" (*Inst.* 9.2.30 [Russell, LCL]). In both conversations—diatribe and speech-in-character, respectively—the interlocutor serves an identical rhetorical function. As a result, with respect to the attributed speech, characterization, appropriateness, and the function of the imaginary speaker, speech-in-character fits quite snuggly inside the diatribal glove.[17]

Epictetus, *Discourses 2.20:* Πρὸς Ἐπικουρείους καὶ Ἀκαδημαϊκούς

Introduction. The second example of diatribal discourse to engage is Epictetus's "Against Epicureans and Academics" (*Disc.* 2.20). Here, Epictetus addresses the basic

[17] If Teles had brought the interlocutor around full circle and placed apotreptic speech on the interlocutor's lips rather than only in his own, another point of connection between diatribe and speech-in-character would be Theon's discussion of starting places for apotreptic, dissuasive argumentation. See Theon, *Prog*. 116.22-117.6.

view taught within the Middle Academy. Beginning with Arcesilaus (3rd century B.C.E.), Plato's Academy entered into a period of philosophical skepticism, which denied the possibility of absolute knowledge. Instead, the Academy's leaders insisted on delaying cognitive judgment.[18] Epictetus strongly disagrees with these skeptical sentiments. In the interest of demonstrating the validity of knowable, absolute truths, Epictetus begins by setting forth his primary premise:[19]

> Τοῖς ὑγιέσι καὶ ἐναργέσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες προσχρῶνται.
>
> Even those who oppose sound and obvious propositions use them by necessity. (*Disc*. 2.20.1)

That is, even critics of absolute and knowable truth must endorse the principle in order to reject it, and Epictetus considers this to be one of the strongest proofs effectively verifying the reality of such truth (2.20.1). To support his position, Epictetus enters into four dialogical exchanges, three of which will be discussed at this time.[20] I will first address each dialogue in isolation, and I will conclude with observations about the entirety of the discourse.

The first dialogical exchange: Disc. 2.20.1-5. In the first dialogical exchange, Epictetus enlists a number of interlocutors and exposes how each of their critiques of knowable truth are in fact statements proving such truth. Epictetus introduces each new interlocutor. First, Epictetus suggests that anyone who denies that any true universal

---

[18] Epictetus, *Discourses: Books I-II* (trans. W. A. Oldfather; LCL 131; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 360 n.95.

[19] It is, of course, technically Epictetus's student, Arrian, who stenographically wrote down Epictetus's discourses. Throughout these discussions, in order to streamline conversation and avoid confusion, I more simply refer to Epictetus as the authority and source behind these texts.

[20] I am reserving the fourth dialogical exchange for a future project. As Chapter Seven of this project primarily aims to model the ways in which speech-in-character and the dialogical pericopae in diatribe correlate, omitting this particular dialogical exchange does no disservice to the current project.

statement exists must also affirm the opposite. Epictetus writes,

> …δῆλον ὅτι τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀπόφασιν οὗτος ὀφείλει ποιήσασθαι· οὐδέν ἐστι καθολικὸν ἀληθές.
>
> … it is clear that (the person who rejects the existence of knowable truth) [οὗτος] is obligated to affirm the opposite and say [ἀπόφασιν], 'No universal statement is true.' (2.20.2)

Epictetus promptly opposes the interlocutor, referring to him as a captive (ἀνδράποδον), and clarifies that such a confession ultimately degenerates into the view that there is no absolute truth, whereby every universal statement is necessarily false (2.20.3). Epictetus then imaginatively scripts three additional interlocutors speaking to the same end as the first interlocutor. The second interlocutor[21] declares,

> γίγνωσκε, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι γνωστόν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀτέκμαρτα.
>
> Know that nothing is knowable; rather, all things are uncertain. (2.20.4)

The third interlocutor[22] remarks,

> πίστευσόν μοι καὶ ὠφεληθήσῃ· οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀνθρώπῳ πιστεύειν.
>
> Believe me and you will be benefited; one must believe a person in no way whatsoever. (2.20.4)

The fourth[23] states,

> μάθε παρ' ἐμοῦ, ἄνθρωπε, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται μαθεῖν· ἐγώ σοι λέγω τοῦτο καὶ διδάξω σε, ἐὰν θέλῃς.
>
> Learn from me, human, that nothing is possible to learn; I am telling you this, and I will teach you, if you are willing. (2.20.4-5)

Epictetus then explains that there is no difference between these four interlocutors and a

---

[21] Epictetus introduces the second interlocutor with the formula, ἄν τις… λέγῃ.

[22] Epictetus introduces the third interlocutor with the formula, ἢ ἄλλος.

[23] Epictetus introduces the fourth interlocutor with the formula, ἢ πάλιν ἄλλος.

fifth, the Academics (οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες), who claim,[24]

> ὦ ἄνθρωποι, συγκατάθεσθε ὅτι οὐδεὶς συγκατατίθεται· πιστεύσατε ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς πιστεύει οὐδενί.
>
> O people, agree completely (to the view) that no person can agree completely (to anything); believe us that no person can believe anyone. (2.20.5)

Consequently, in their respective attempts to deny the validity of knowable truth, Epictetus illustrates that all five interlocutors ironically and hypocritically nevertheless affirm the principle of knowable truth by employing it.

Transitioning to speak in terms of diatribe and the questions being posed to these texts, the identity of the interlocutor is clear enough. Epictetus specifically identifies the fifth iteration of the interlocutor as a body of skeptical "Academics" (2.20.5). Though Epictetus does not precisely identify the first four interlocutors, he suggests that there is no discernible difference between their proclamations and that of those he clearly identifies as Academics, so it is reasonable to group all five interlocutors within an overarching skeptical Academic umbrella. As such, the interlocutors represent Academics and the like who are skeptical about humanity's ability to know. Furthermore, for this reason, they are almost certainly to be differentiated from Epictetus's actual classroom audience.

The function of the dialogical exchange, therefore, is twofold. First, enlisting the Academic interlocutors affords Epictetus an avenue for illustrating the ways rejections of knowable, absolute truth nevertheless require statements of such truth in order to make their respective arguments. As a result, the interlocutors' comments buttress Epictetus's

[24] Epictetus offers no verb of speech to introduce the Academics' words. The textual features that suggest the Academics speak these lines include the use of the first-person plural personal pronoun (ἡμῖν), and the similarity between the scripted words with those of the other interlocutors, which Epictetus suggests should have no dissimilarities.

principal premise. Second, the use of the interlocutors allows Epictetus to set forth the Academics' skeptical sentiments about knowledge and truth. This, in turn, provides Epictetus with a contrasting view against which to pose his own particular views about knowledge and truth for the consideration of his actual audience.

On the one hand, it is somewhat premature to begin to speak about the tone of the diatribe, since much still remains to be discussed. On the other hand, certain features need to be addressed that begin to push the discourse in a particular direction. First, Epictetus's engagement with an opposing anti-philosophical group fits within Stowers's narrow presentation of diatribal polemic. In fact, Stowers directly cites *Disc.* 2.20 as a leading example of such polemic.[25] Second, Epictetus makes no collaborative attempt to engage the interlocutors in order to help, cure, or correct what he perceives to be their misconceptions about human knowledge. Quite the contrary, Epictetus leaves the interlocutors in, and uses them as examples of, their folly. Consequently, Epictetus's tone towards the interlocutors up to this point is far from collaborative and collegial and borders on straight polemic.

Implicit in the discussion about tone are observations about Epictetus's method of argumentation in this exchange. Again, Epictetus makes no attempt to help or cure the Academics. That is, up to this point, no protreptic exhortation is present. Censure, however, is rampant at every turn. Epictetus's primary premise is based on the observation that those who deny knowable truth necessarily contradict themselves. Indeed, each interlocutor(s)'s statement functions as an illustration of this self-contradiction. Thus, by using the interlocutors in this way, Epictetus points out their inner

[25] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 55 n.289.

contradictions and constructs this whole section of the diatribe on a series of five censures.

Given the structure of 2.20.1-5, in which each interlocutor is introduced practically one after the other, bringing in speech-in-character as a conversation partner is not really necessary, though it will be quite significant in subsequent conversations. In order to model once more the way speech-in-character and diatribe correlate, note the following brief observations. There is an introduction of each interlocutor, either by way of a verb of speech, or by way of referencing the new subject of an implied verb of speech (for instance, ἢ ἄλλος, 2.20.4; οἱ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς αὐτοὺς λέγοντες, 2.20.5). Additionally, Epictetus provides a characterization that covers all five interlocutors, namely, those who reject knowable and absolute truth nevertheless simultaneously use it (2.20.21). Furthermore, all five instances of speech attributed to the interlocutors appropriately fit the characterization, which is to be expected, since they are examples intended to prove the characterization. So, all of the primary features of speech-in-character are present: (1) identification, (2) characterization, (3) appropriate attributed speech-in-character. Finally, as in the example from Teles's "On Seeming and Being," Quintilian's allowance that speech-in-character effectively portrays the thoughts of one's opponents and introduces characters for words of reproach or complaint (*Inst*. 9.2.30) plainly overlaps with the function of the interlocutors up to this point in Epictetus's diatribe. Thus, diatribe and speech-in-character collaboratively speak to the same results.

The second dialogical exchange: Disc. 2.20.6-20. Epictetus does not stop with the Academics. From Epictetus's point of view, Epicurus's methodology is similarly suspect, as he also capitalizes on the very principle he intends to dismiss (2.20.6).

Namely, though Epicurus attempts to argue that rational people cannot share natural fellowship with one another, he expects such rational people nevertheless to share fellowship with himself, and, as Epictetus accuses him, his own concern for others' thoughts even models such fellowship. In the second dialogical exchange, Epictetus writes,

> τί γὰρ λέγει; μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ἄνθρωποι, μηδὲ παράγεσθε μηδὲ διαπίπτετε· οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πιστεύσατέ μοι. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ παραλογίζονται.
>
> For, what does (Epicurus) say [λέγει]? 'Do not be deceived, people, nor mislead; do not fall away. There is no natural fellowship [φυσικὴ κοινωνία] between rational people with one another. Believe me. Those who say otherwise are deceiving and defrauding you.' (2.20.7)

At once, Epictetus attacks Epicurus's view. Epictetus asks, if there really is no natural fellowship between rational people, why does Epicurus worry about what others think regarding the presence or absence of natural fellowship (2.20.8-14); why not rather maintain an Epicurean laxity and simply "eat, drink, have intercourse, defecate, and snore" (2.20.10)? Epictetus's answer is that it was the strongest force within people—nature—that drew Epicurus to write.

> τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ τὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἰσχυρότατον, ἡ φύσις ἕλκουσα ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτῆς βούλημα ἄκοντα καὶ στένοντα;
>
> For, what (was it) other than that which is the strongest of all things within people—nature (φύσις)—which compels the unwilling and groaning person to do her will? (2.20.15)

On a surface level reading, however, it is unclear whether Epictetus intends the immediately following words to be heard in his own voice or in the voice of personified Nature. Epictetus writes,

> ὅτι γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα τὰ ἀκοινώνητα, γράψον αὐτὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀπόλιπε καὶ ἀγρύπνησον δι' αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ κατήγορος γενοῦ τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων.
>
> For, since these anti-fellowship principles [ταῦτα τὰ ἀκοινώνητα] seem good to you (i.e., Epicurus), write them and leave them behind for others and lie awake thinking because of them and, in practice, you yourself become the critic [κατήγορος] of your own dogmas. (2.20.16)

Oldfather, for instance, uses quotation marks to place these lines in the mouth of personified Nature. Epictetus, however, does not introduce these words with a verb of speech indicating the presence of an interlocutor, nor do any grammatical aspects of the text strictly require Nature to be the subject speaking. As a result, *Disc.* 2.20.16 represents a prime example by which to test the proposed method of allowing the conventions for speech-in-character to inform the dialogical script of a diatribal text.[26] What can be said at this point is that Epictetus, whether in his own voice or in the voice of personified Nature, uses these words in order to point out the contradiction in Epicurus's logic, so that Epicurus becomes his own critic; being concerned with the thoughts of others essentially undermines Epicurus's whole rejection of natural fellowship. Moreover, Epictetus informs, such a natural appeal is altogether inescapable, just as it is impossible for the Academics to remove their sensory perceptions by which they can truly know (2.20.17-20). Both the Academics and Epicurus, therefore and respectively, inevitably affirm the issue they set out to reject, and they do so by ignorantly employing that very principle in attempting to make their case.

There are, therefore, two occasions within this pericope that deserve attention: first, Epicurus's speech, and, second, the potential speech of Nature. Epicurus's attributed speech is quite easy to address. With the exception of the different identity of the

[26] Below I ultimately affirm Oldfather's designation of these lines as spoken by personified Nature.

imagined interlocutor, the function, tone, and argumentation surrounding Epicurus's speech are identical to the conclusions deduced above with respect to the Academics. If for no other reason, this is supported by Epictetus beginning the discussion about Epicurus with οὕτως, suggesting a continuation of the previous argument along similar lines (2.20.6). In this vein, the function of Epicurus as an interlocutor simply provides yet another example of someone who employs and ignorantly affirms the same principle he hopes to reject. Epictetus clarifies how this is the case by petitioning Epicurus to explain how he can mentally reject natural fellowship yet practically maintain a concern for what others think about natural fellowship (2.20.7-14). Furthermore, Epictetus makes no attempt to correct Epicurus's logic; Epictetus opts only to censure Epicurus's self-contradictory viewpoint. The conventions for speech-in-character also operate on the same lines as in the previous engagement with the Academics; characterized by contradiction and utilizing the very principle he sought to reject, Epictetus places appropriately contradictory words on Epicurus's lips as a way to indicate the thoughts of his opponent and to provide a character for words of reproach.

The place where we begin to see the advantage of speech-in-character as a tool for explaining scripted speech in diatribe involves the potential discourse of Nature (φύσις; 2.20.15-16). As above, it is unclear whether the lines following Epictetus's introduction of nature are best heard in Epictetus's own voice or in the voice of personified Nature (2.20.16). Textually, there are no introductory verbs of speech or suggestions that another speaker has began to speak, nor, grammatically speaking, are there any verbal forms or pronouns (or any other indicators) within the speech that cue the audience into the use of attributed speech.

Considering the text in terms of characterization and whether or not the scripted speech is appropriate, however, is quite indicative of the usefulness of the conventions for speech-in-character. When Epictetus begins to discuss nature as the force capable of overpowering Epicurus's mental aspirations, he describes nature as "the strongest of all the forces within people," which "compels the unwilling and groaning person to do her will" (2.20.15). Assuming for the moment that this description amounts to a characterization typical of speech-in-character (see Part One), it is possible to consider whether *Disc*. 2.20.16 would be appropriately scripted for personified Nature, or whether it would better fit Epictetus's voice. As it turns out, 2.20.16 is altogether better suited for the voice of personified Nature. First, Epictetus implicitly characterizes himself as one who has no power to compel Epicurus to act one way or another; this is largely within the sphere of Nature (2.20.15). The combination of four imperatives addressed to Epicurus in the second person (γράψον, ἀπόλιπε, ἀγρύπνησον, γενοῦ; 2.20.16), therefore, would have no effect on Epicurus's decisions if they are heard in Epictetus's voice. Contrastingly, second, Nature, as the strongest force which characteristically draws unwilling and begrudging participants to do her will, could altogether appropriately command Epicurus to act in this way or that as she wishes. Thus, it is personified Nature that can appropriately speak 2.20.16, not Epictetus. As a result, the conventions of characterization and appropriateness that are intrinsic to speech-in-character strongly suggest that 2.20.16 represents speech attributed to an abstract or inanimate object and, in this way, constitute the primary evidence governing this portion of the script of the diatribe's dialogical discourse. The following first person plural, φῶμεν, then returns the discourse to Epictetus's voice (2.20.17).

Overlap between *Disc.* 2.20.15-16 and speech-in-character, however, goes further than characterization and the appropriateness of the attributed speech. Recall that Theon's elaborate treatment of appropriateness involves not only the speaker but numerous other elements as well, including the audience of the attributed speech (*Prog*. 115.22-27). Personified Nature addresses Epicurus as one who holds "anti-fellowship principles" (*Disc.* 2.20.16) and commands him to write them down and leave them for others. This is precisely the way in which Epictetus depicts Epicurus (2.20.6-9). This means the attributed speech is not only appropriate for the personified speaker, but it is also appropriate for the attributed speech's target audience.

Having established the script, how then shall Epictetus's use of personified Nature be understood in terms of diatribe? First, the function of personified Nature as an interlocutor is entirely different from the other interlocutors discussed to this point. Personified Nature does not afford Epictetus an opponent against whom to argue but rather a fellow critic. That is, Nature further explains and censures Epicurus's contradictory error, even reiterating how that contradiction ultimately dismantles Epicurus's views about natural fellowship. Second and third, though Epictetus is still pejorative and polemical towards Epicurus, his tone with, and manner of argumentation through, the interlocutor are quite different. Epictetus enlists Nature as a supporting rather than opposing voice in the development of his argument. Nature collaborates with Epictetus to expose Epicurus; the two are in complete agreement and work towards a common, collegial goal. In this way, Epictetus's use of Nature to censure Epicurus represents a positive engagement with an interlocutor.

The third dialogical exchange and closing: Disc. 2.20.21-37. Epictetus considers as altogether unfortunate (ἀτυχίας) the state of affairs in which the Academics and Epicurus respectively fail to recognize their flawed logic (2.20.21). As far as Epictetus is concerned, the Academics' and the Epicureans' views amount to nothing more than instances in which naturally endowed humans attempt to destroy the very natural endowments that allow them to know truth (2.20.21). Epictetus models this phenomenon with a third dialogical pericope, this time with a "philosopher." Epictetus asks,

> τί λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ποῖόν τί σοι φαίνεται;
>
> What do you say, philosopher? How do devotion and sanctity appear to you? (2.20.22)

Epictetus's leading question gives way to a sustained dialogue with the philosopher, but Epictetus never introduces the interlocutor's speech with a verb of speaking or any other introductory formula. Instead, the dialogue instantly shifts back and forth between Epictetus's voice and the interlocutor's. Below, I further confirm the script of this passage through the conventions of speech-in-character. For now, however, grammatical cues will suffice to set the boundaries within the dialogue. To Epictetus's leading question, the philosopher responds in the first person,

> ἂν θέλῃς, κατασκευάσω ὅτι ἀγαθόν.
>
> If you wish, I will prove that it is good. (2.20.22)

Epictetus retorts, "Yes! Prove it, so that our citizens might be turned back and honor the divine" (2.20.22). To this, the philosopher asks,

> ἔχεις οὖν τὰς κατασκευάς;
>
> So, do you possess the proofs? (2.20.22)

Up to this point, the philosopher seems to be working in conjunction with Epictetus's

requests. When Epictetus responds in the affirmative (2.20.23), however, the philosopher charts an unexpected course. Rather than proceeding to prove the goodness of devotion and sanctity, the philosopher declares,

> ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτά σοι λίαν ἀρέσκει, λάβε τὰ ἐναντία· ὅτι θεοὶ οὔτ' εἰσίν, εἴ τε καὶ εἰσίν, οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ κοινόν τι ἡμῖν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τό τ' εὐσεβὲς τοῦτο καὶ ὅσιον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλούμενον κατάψευσμά ἐστιν ἀλαζόνων ἀνθρώπων καὶ σοφιστῶν ἢ νὴ Δία νομοθετῶν εἰς φόβον καὶ ἐπίσχεσιν τῶν ἀδικούντων.
>
> Therefore, since these (proofs) are acceptable to you, receive (i.e., hear) the opposite [τὰ ἐναντία]. Namely, the gods do not exist, and even if they exist, they do not care about people, nor do we have anything in common with them. This devotion and sanctity spoken about by many people is a lie that comes from arrogant people and sophists and, by god, lawyers intended to cause fear and to check the unjust. (2.20.23)

Far from proving the goodness of devotion and sanctity towards the gods as proposed, in characteristic Epicurean fashion, the philosopher has attempted to demonstrate the opposite. No doubt sarcastically (see also 2.20.26-27), Epictetus lauds the philosopher for serving the citizens so well, who, in Epictetus's view, really needed to be turned towards the gods rather than repelled from them (2.20.22, 24). The philosopher's final response takes his views even further; he states,

> τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα; λάβε νῦν, πῶς ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ὁ υἱὸς οὐδέν ἐστιν.
>
> What then? Are these things not acceptable to you? Receive now how righteousness is nothing and how a son is nothing. (2.20.25)

In response, Epictetus simply heaps sarcasm upon sarcasm (2.20.26-27). Thus, though the philosopher possesses the proofs by which to know the goodness of devotion and sanctity, he abandons them and argues for the opposite. In this way, the philosopher mirrors the Academics and the Epicureans by sacrificing his faculties for knowing the truth.

Epictetus begins to draw the discourse to a close by depicting how he would engage with such a skeptic, if he happened to be enslaved to one (2.20.28).[27] Epictetus relates how he would spite his master at every turn, sarcastically feigning an inability to know this from that, intentionally serving him vinegar and fish sauce rather than actual food (2.29-31). Epictetus concludes with an appeal to his audience. Epictetus challenges them to think about what is good or evil, this way of thinking or the other (2.20.35). Moreover, Epictetus suggestively wonders whether there is any use whatsoever in further engaging with such skeptics, and he contends that "a person might rather hope, by god, to convert an altogether lewd person than such people who have become so deaf and blind" (2.20.37).

In diatribal terms, therefore, the "philosopher" as an interlocutor functions to depict even more clearly the way in which Epictetus thinks the Academics and Epicureans sacrifice their means of knowing truth. That is, the philosopher progresses Epictetus's diatribe by serving as a model through which Epictetus further supports his argument against the Academics and Epicureans. The tone Epictetus takes with the interlocutor is similarly pejorative-polemical, as he responds to the interlocutor with sarcasm and makes no attempt to correct the interlocutor's mistakes. This also means that the argument is based entirely on censure rather than protreptic; Epictetus criticizes the way in which the philosopher knows the correct proofs but abandons them in order to propose the opposite and, in Epictetus's view, incorrect conclusions.

Incorporating the conventions for speech-in-character as a means of checking the suggested script of the discourse, one finds that all three primary features are present. Epictetus establishes a characterization of people who destroy their naturally endowed

[27] This would constitute the fourth dialogical exchange.

ways of discovering and knowing truth (2.20.21), introduces the "philosopher" as just such a person, and then attributes speech to this interlocutor (2.20.22). Additionally, the sum total of the scripted lines proves to be appropriate to the established characterization; the philosopher initially agrees to prove the benefit of devotion and sanctity, indicates that he possesses the proofs for doing so, and finally commences to abandon those proofs and argue the opposite, namely, that devotion and sanctity are useless (2.20.23). Thus, from beginning to end, the philosopher abandons his faculties for knowing truth (i.e., the proofs) and demonstrates his inner inconsistencies, just like the Academics and Epicureans. Once more, the diatribal discourse functions on the same principles as established for speech-in-character.

Conclusions. In "Against Epicureans and Academics" (*Disc.* 2.20), Epictetus employs interlocutors of two sorts. First, Epictetus uses the Academics, Epicurus, and the "philosopher" as illustrations of his primary thesis that the best argument for a principle being true is the use of that principle by those who reject it (2.20.1). Epictetus's attitude towards these interlocutors is thoroughly negative and polemical. Epictetus never attempts to cure his interlocutors' maladies; he simply points out their errors and criticizes them. For this reason, censure is the dominant rhetorical trajectory in Epictetus's engagements with these interlocutors. Second, and quite differently, Epictetus enlists personified Nature as a fellow critic of Epicurus. Nature and Epictetus work together in a collaborative and collegial manner to explain and expose Epicurus's flawed logic. It is demonstrated, therefore, that interlocutors function, and primary speakers engage with them, in diverse ways in diatribal texts.

The conventions established for speech-in-character—especially characterization and appropriateness—correlate seamlessly with each iteration of the interlocutor. In every instance, the words Epictetus scripts for his interlocutor(s) appropriately align with the ways he characterizes that particular interlocutor. Additionally, the theoretical treatments of speech-in-character are able to explain the function of the imaginary speakers in terms that parallel the functions of diatribal discourse. Most importantly, however, in the case of personified Nature, the conventions for speech-in-character constitute the clinching evidence that Epictetus does in fact attribute speech to Nature. Without considering characterization and the appropriateness of the potentially attributed speech, it is at best ambiguous in whose voice the lines should be heard. As it stands, the conventions of characterization and appropriateness solidly suggest that Epictetus attributes speech to personified Nature, whereby speech-in-character sets the script of diatribe's dialogical discourse.

Epictetus, Discourses 2.23: Περὶ τῆς τοῦ λέγειν δυνάμεως

Overview. The final representative of diatribal dialogue to discuss with an eye towards the proposed method involves a conversation between Epictetus and yet another Epicurean. In the discussion of *Disc.* 2.20, I noted how Epictetus uses Epicurus strictly as a negative example to censure, ultimately treating him quite pejoratively. In *Disc*. 2.23, however, Epictetus engages the Epicurean in quite a different fashion. Rather than simply pointing out his flaws, Epictetus eventually brings the Epicurean interlocutor from a point

of disagreement to a point of agreement, so that the interlocutor himself becomes the witness proving Epictetus's point.[28]

To begin the diatribe, Epictetus remarks that denying a faculty or power of expression (δύναμις... ἀπαγγελτική) exists is impious and cowardly (2.23.2). It is impious because it appears as though one is dishonoring the gifts graced from god, such as vision, hearing, or speech (2.23.2). God graced these gifts for a purpose, Epictetus argues, and people should use them accordingly (2.23.3-4). While keeping these gifts in mind, however, people should not forget that god also provided something better than these gifts. In fact, this greater gift is able to use, judge, and determine the worth of the lesser gifts (2.23.6). As it is, the lesser gifts (i.e., sight, vision, and so forth) are appointed as ministers and slaves to serve the greater gift (2.23.7). This greater gift that controls the other faculties is the power of will (προαιρετική; 2.23.9).[29] An ear simply hears, and an eye simply sees, but the power of will informs the person concerning what to see or hear, how to interpret what is seen or heard, and how to respond in any number of situations (2.23.9-15). In every way, the power of will supersedes the other faculties, yet not in such a way as to render them unnecessary or useless. Moreover, nothing is able to thwart the power of will (προαίρεσιν) unless that same power of will corrupts itself. For this reason, the power of προαίρεσις ultimately constitutes the only vice or the only virtue (2.23.18-19).

In the course of presenting his case for the superiority of προαίρεσις, however, the interlocutor interjects. Introduced with the common verb φησίν, the interlocutor asks,

---

[28] For Epictetus's discussion of the Socratic method as a means for educational transformation, see *Disc.* 2.12, which loosely, and albeit briefly, discusses Plato's *Philebus* with Epictetus's authorial commentary. For a discussion of *Disc*. 2.12, see Stowers, *Diatribe*, 158-59; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 712.

` [29] Oldfather consistently translates προαιρετική as "moral purpose."

> ‘Τί οὖν,’ φησίν, ‘εἰ οὕτως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχει, καὶ δύναται τὸ διακονοῦν κρεῖσσον εἶναι ἐκείνου ᾧ διακονεῖ, ὁ ἵππος τοῦ ἱππέως ἢ ὁ κύων τοῦ κυνηγοῦ ἢ τὸ ὄργανον τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ ἢ οἱ ὑπηρέται τοῦ βασιλέως;’
>
> ‘What then,’ he says [φησίν], ‘if the situation is as follows, and the thing that serves is able to be better than that which it serves, (for instance), the horse over the horse rider, the dog over the hunter, the instrument over the musician, or the attendants over the king?’ (2.23.16)

In this interjection, the interlocutor willingly concedes that some faculties serve others, but he indicates that he is not content with Epictetus’s prioritization of προαίρεσις. The interlocutor’s concern is whether it is perhaps possible for one of the other faculties to be greater than the power of προαίρεσις, even though the former serves the latter. Epictetus will have nothing of it, and he rehashes his case once more for the supremacy of προαίρεσις (2.23.17-19).

Having established to his satisfaction that the power of will (προαίρεσις) governs the other faculties, Epictetus turns to his Epicurean interlocutor and addresses him directly (2.23.20). Based on the discourse up to this point, Epictetus draws out the conclusion that only the faculty of προαίρεσις, as that which judges and determines the value of the other faculties, could hypothetically declare the flesh to be the greatest of the faculties (2.23.20), and he presses Epicurus to answer which faculty is greater. Epictetus writes,

> νῦν δὲ τί ἐστιν, Ἐπίκουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον; τὸ περὶ Τέλους συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰ Φυσικά, τὸ περὶ Κανόνος; τὸ τὸν πώγωνα καθεικός; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε ἀπέθνῃσκεν, ὅτι “τὴν τελευταίαν ἄγοντες ἅμα καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν;” ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς καὶ οὐ μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς εἶ;
>
> Now, what is it, Epicurus, that declares these things? What composed the treatise *On the End*, or *The Physics*, or *On the Standard*? What grew out your beard? What wrote, (when he was dying,) ‘We are at the same time experiencing our last and a happy day?’ Was it flesh or the will [ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις]? So, do you agree [ὁμολογεῖς] that you have something greater than (the flesh), and are you

> not enraged (by this admission)? Are you so blind and dumb to the truth? (2.23.21-22)

Epictetus would need to question his interlocutor in this fashion only if the interlocutor does *not* initially share Epictetus's views. The interlocutor's previous interjection demonstrates that he in fact does not share Epictetus's hierarchical organization scheme for the various faculties (2.23.16). Based on the dichotomy Epictetus poses between σάρξ and προαίρεσις, he seems to presume that the Epicurean interlocutor would naturally prioritize the flesh rather than the will (ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις; 2.23.22). Epictetus's questions, however, demand the interlocutor to answer otherwise that the faculty of προαίρεσις is greater than that of σάρξ. As Epictetus already demonstrated, it is the faculty of will and not of flesh that judges and assigns value to the lesser faculties and could make a declaration concerning which is greatest. Thus, to continue answering Epictetus's line of questions, it is the power of προαίρεσις that motivated Epicurus to compose his various treatises, that moved him to become a philosopher and grow his beard (see *Disc*. 1.2.29), and that guided him to interpret his last day as a "happy" day. Following Epictetus's discourse and questions, therefore, the interlocutor can in no reasonable way maintain that σάρξ is greater than προαίρεσις. This is why Epictetus asks the interlocutor whether he is enraged, blind, and dumb; how, Epictetus wonders, could the interlocutor possibly continue to affirm σάρξ over προαίρεσις if he were in his right mind?

In order to make sense of Epictetus's barrage of questions in light of the continuing discourse, however, an unstated, but necessary, implication requires discussion. Namely, Epictetus's questioning is successful, and, as a result, the interlocutor grants Epictetus's prioritization of the faculty of will. Though the text does

not explicitly note the interlocutor's submission in the form of attributed speech, it does hint at it in Epictetus's questions, "So, do you agree (ὁμολογεῖς) that you have something greater than [the flesh], and are you not (οὐ) enraged [by this admission]?" (2.23.22). If the interlocutor could disagree and answer "no" to Epictetus's first question, there would be no reason for the interlocutor to be "enraged," as he would simply continue to maintain his initial position. The only reason the interlocutor would be "enraged" is if Epictetus has successfully persuaded him to abandon his former views about σάρξ and to answer "yes" to Epictetus's question of whether he "agrees" that προαίρεσις is the greatest faculty. Such an allowance by the interlocutor is the necessary response that allows the discourse to develop into the subsequent dialogical exchanges.[30]

So, having come to consensus that the faculty of the will is the greatest, Epictetus continues to ask his interlocutor what he thinks such a conclusion means for the lesser faculties. Epictetus asks,

> Τί οὖν; ἀτιμάζει τις τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις;
>
> What then? Does a person dishonor the other faculties? (2.23.23)

The interlocutor's prompt rejection indicates he believes that one faculty being greater results in no disservice to the lesser faculties; he simply declares,

> μὴ γένοιτο.
>
> Absolutely not! (2.23.23)

Satisfied, Epictetus poses a different, but related, question,

> λέγει τις μηδεμίαν εἶναι χρείαν ἢ προαγωγὴν ἔξω τῆς προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως;

[30] Coming to the same conclusion, in less detail, is Stanley K. Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue," 712-13.

> Does a person claim there is no use or progress outside of the faculty of the will? (2.23.23)

Epictetus himself has already addressed this very question earlier in 2.23.2-4, where he maintains that people must continue to use the lesser faculties and view them as god's gracious gifts. Consequently, the leading question tests to what degree the interlocutor has adopted Epictetus's views about προαίρεσις and their consequences. When the interlocutor responds to Epictetus's second leading question, he does more than simply reject it. This time the interlocutor replies at length, as follows,

> μὴ γένοιτο. ἀνόητον, ἀσεβές, ἀχάριστον πρὸς τὸν θεόν. ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδίδωσιν. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ ὄνου χρεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡλίκη βοός· ἔστι καὶ κυνός, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡλίκη οἰκέτου· ἔστι καὶ οἰκέτου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν πολιτῶν· ἔστι καὶ τούτων, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν ἀρχόντων. οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὸ ἄλλα εἶναι κρείττονα καὶ ἣν παρέχει τὰ ἕτερα χρείαν ἀτιμαστέον. ἔστι τις ἀξία καὶ τῆς φραστικῆς δυνάμεως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡλίκη τῆς προαιρετικῆς.
>
> Absolutely not! That would be thoughtless, impious, and thankless towards god. Rather, he gives to each its value. For, there is a use for a donkey, but not as much as for an ox. There is also a use for a dog, but not as much as for a slave. There is a use for a slave, but not as much as for the citizens. There is a use for these (citizens), but not as much as for the rulers. Nevertheless, although some (faculties) are better, one must not dishonor the use that the others provide. There is a value for the power of speaking [τῆς φραστικῆς δυνάμεως], but not as much as for the power of will [τῆς προαιρετικῆς]. (2.23.23-26)

That this material remains in the interlocutor's voice beyond the simple rejection (μὴ γένοιτο) is supported by the way in which the whole pericope answers Epictetus's leading question.[31] That is, given the prominence of the faculty of προαίρεσις, Epictetus asks whether anyone would claim that there is no use for the lesser faculties and, therefore, no need to pursue their development. The whole of *Disc*. 2.23.23-26 quoted above addresses this question; the correct response to the lesser faculties is not to devalue

[31] Stowers also supports the suggested script and observes that the dialogue continues in the interlocutor's voice after the μὴ γένοιτο rejection. "Paul's Dialogue," 712-13.

and abandon them (μὴ γένοιτο; 2.23.23), but for each person to give (ἀποδίδωσιν)[32] to each faculty its proper value (2.23.23-24), as all of the faculties have some value, even if none has more value than the faculty of προαίρεσις (2.23.24-26). The interlocutor, therefore, has made a full conversion. By the end of the scripted speech,[33] the interlocutor is confessing Epictetus's own argument; the faculty of will is greatest, but the others ought to be put to the correct service as well.

Diatribe. Many of the questions about the diatribal aspect of this discourse are answered above in the *Overview*. Consequently, some points only need to be reiterated briefly, and the others only require a bit more filling out of the specifics. First, the Epicurean identity of the interlocutor is obvious, as Epictetus specifically addresses him in the vocative as "Epicurus" (2.23.21).

Second, in the Socratic manner Epictetus outlines in *Disc*. 2.12, the interlocutor ultimately serves as Epictetus's witness. Though they initially have different views on the chief faculty, Epictetus's guiding questions bring the interlocutor to a position from which he can solidly affirm and declare Epictetus's own argument.[34] The interlocutor's confession is not an end in its own right, however, as the discourse takes on a larger rhetorical function in the whole of the diatribe. In its schoolroom setting, such a discourse

---

[32] No subject is supplied for the verb, ἀποδίδωσιν. I take the subject to be the τις from Epictetus's leading question. Thus, the interlocutor's point is that the person (τις) does not claim that there is no use or progress outside of the faculty of will; instead, he or she allots the proper value to each.

[33] The discourse shifts back to Epictetus's voice immediately following the quoted material, as evidenced by the verbal forms and pronouns (*Disc*. 2.26-29). For a detailed discussion, see below in the *Speech-in-character* section.

[34] So also Stowers, who writes, "Epictetus states the questions which represent false reasoning or unthinkable alternatives so sharply that the interlocutor is forced to reject the questions and, in fact, state the logical alternative toward which Epictetus is leading him. Thus, the interlocutor himself provides the evidence or conclusion." Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue," 712-13. Stowers is followed by Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 136.

would serve to undergird for Epictetus's students (and other auditors) the lesson Epictetus was communicating about the supremacy of προαίρεσις.

Third, the function of the diatribe tips its hat towards the tone of the diatribe as well. To be sure, Epictetus spouts off some words and accusations that could be perceived as pejorative or polemical, primarily with respect to the question of whether the interlocutor is blind or dumb (2.23.22). The manner in which the conversation unfolds, however, reveals that this is not the case. Instead, Epictetus's use of this Epicurean interlocutor represents a textbook example of collaboration and collegiality between the primary diatribal speaker and the interlocutor. As Epictetus corrects the interlocutor by guiding him towards the better view, the interlocutor sides with Epictetus and the two work together to present Epictetus's argument to his actual audience.

Fourth, censure and protreptic argumentation operate to achieve Epictetus's goal. With respect to censure, Epictetus illustrates the way in which the interlocutor's original view (i.e., that σάρξ is the primary faculty; 2.23.20) contradicts with his impending confession that προαίρεσις surpasses all of the other faculties (2.23.21-22). In terms of protreptic, Epictetus's leading questions, which rely on false conclusions based on the developing argument, successfully guide the interlocutor to think through the stipulations and consequences of his new position (2.23.23-25). Thus, censure and protreptic combine to reveal the interlocutor's inconsistencies and to propel him well into the correct view.

Speech-in-Character. Thinking in terms of identification, characterization, and appropriate attributed speech-in-character, *Disc*. 2.23 presents some difficult issues. The identification of the speaker is, of course, the same Epicurean interlocutor. With characterization, however, things become a bit more intricate. To begin, there is no direct

characterization of the interlocutor. Instead, the characterization of the interlocutor must be deduced from his interjection at 2.23.16 and the questions Epictetus poses to him leading up to the remainder of the dialogue under review. First, the interlocutor's challenge against Epictetus's prioritization of προαίρεσις by positing that a servant might actually be superior to that which it serves clearly reveals that the interlocutor is not yet on Epictetus's side. Second, the questions Epictetus directs toward the interlocutor suggest that the interlocutor, in opposition to Epictetus, originally prioritized the flesh rather than προαίρεσις (2.23.20-22). Therefore, especially when the interlocutor's challenge to Epictetus is combined with the implications of Epictetus's questions, auditors and readers are able to distinguish the interlocutor as initially at odds with Epictetus's line of reasoning about σάρξ, the lesser faculties, and προαίρεσις.

How, though, does this characterization avoid circular reasoning? The concern is that, as I have presented it, some of the interlocutor's words provide elements of characterization for the remainder of the conversation. If attributed speech must be appropriate to the characterization, but the attributed speech itself is used as evidence for the very characterization against which it is to be measured, circularity potentially threatens the validity of the argument. Epictetus's questions to the interlocutor concerning whether σάρξ or προαίρεσις is greater (2.23.20-22), however, alleviate the risk of circularity as they implicitly supply, and thereby confirm, the necessary characterization of the interlocutor as one who disagrees with Epictetus by favoring σάρξ. In this way, the interlocutor's question about whether it is possible for a servant to be superior to that which it renders service is scripted appropriately in light of the implications drawn from Epictetus's questioning, and circularity is avoided.

The next problem to consider is whether 2.23.23-26 actually contains any discourse from the interlocutor at all. Epictetus does not use any verb of speech or introductory formulas to demarcate that the interlocutor has returned in a dialogical role, nor does any speaker utilize any clarifying pronouns or verb forms in these lines. Three arguments, however, support not only that dialogue takes place in these lines, but also the form of the script as presented in the *Overview* section. First, Epictetus has already scripted an interlocutor into the discourse (2.23.16), and he specifically addresses and questions this interlocutor in 2.23.21-23. It would hardly be surprising, then, for the answers given to Epictetus's questions to be spoken in the voice of the interrogated interlocutor. Second, when the discourse has certainly returned to Epictetus's voice, verb forms and pronouns clearly distinguish between Epictetus, the interlocutor, and Epictetus's audience. In 2.23.26-27, one voice speaks in the first person singular. This same voice speaks to its conversation partners as "you" in both the singular (πυνθάνῃ) and the plural (ὑμᾶς). If the interlocutor were responsible for the first person singular lines, it would make no grammatical sense for him to address Epictetus with the second person plural ὑμᾶς. Contrastingly, it would be grammatically accurate for Epictetus to address his actual audience with the second person plural, thereby affixing these lines in Epictetus's voice. Third, there is no need for Epictetus to speak the extended lines I have placed in the interlocutor's voice, beginning with the second μὴ γένοιτο (2.23.23-24). The content of the lines amounts to a recapitulation of what Epictetus has already demonstrated; in Epictetus's voice, they would be quite redundant.[35] Based on these

[35] Every element in the summary of 2.23.24-25 has a parallel in Epictetus's previous discourse. Epictetus comments that neglecting the lesser faculties would be impious, cowardly, and thankless towards god (2.23.5), which is reiterated in 2.23.23. Epictetus argues that each faculty possesses a degree of value

arguments, therefore, it seems quite likely that Epictetus and the interlocutor engage in conversation in these lines.

Finally, granting that 2.23.23-26 documents an imaginary dialogue, how do the lines scripted in the interlocutor's voice cohere with the characterization of the speaker? At first glance, they do not cohere with the characterization at all. The only speech that appropriately fits the characterization is the interlocutor's interjection at 2.23.16, which I have already discussed. By the time the interlocutor enters into the conversation again, he has, perhaps begrudgingly (i.e., in an enraged fashion; 2.23.22), agreed with Epictetus about the primacy of προαίρεσις. As a result, the characterization of the interlocutor as one who disagrees with Epictetus no longer applies. As was the case with the example from Teles, it appears once more that the overarching diatribal agenda to transform and enlist the interlocutor as Epictetus's witness demands a double characterization, one implicit and one more explicit. In this Epictetian example, the more explicit characterization involves the interlocutor's initial disagreement with Epictetus. In order to achieve the transformation of the interlocutor and to employ him as witness for Epictetus's argument, however, the implicit characterization requires that he come to agree with Epictetus's point of view. Put to this diatribe's overarching goal, therefore, the interlocutor's rejections of Epictetus's proposed false conclusions and his summarizing endorsement of Epictetus's argument appropriately fit the implicit characterization. In this way, much like the faculty of προαίρεσις trumps yet uses that of σάρξ (or vision, etc.), the faculty of diatribe has superseded but nevertheless made use of the faculty of speech-in-character in an appropriate manner.

---

that must be determined (2.23.2-15); this is repeated in 2.23.24. Epictetus notes that one should put the lesser faculties to their proper use (2.23.5-7), just as in 2.23.25.

In terms of the functions of speech-in-character, Quintilian's general category that speech-in-character is useful for providing appropriate characters for specific rhetorical situations (*Inst*. 9.2.30) readily parallels the discussion of function in diatribal terms. The specific rhetorical situation is Epictetus's endeavor to persuade his actual audience that προαίρεσις is the superior faculty. The introduction of the interlocutor, therefore, appropriately fits the bill as he partners with Epictetus to prove Epictetus's argument. Similarly, Theon's note that speech-in-character is quite effective for exhortation (i.e., protreptic; *Prog.* 115.20-22) also tracks with the diatribal agenda for Epictetus's audience to endorse Epictetus's views, just like the interlocutor.

Conclusions

The preceding forays into the examination of the relationship between diatribe and speech-in-character are quite illustrative. To be sure, these three examples are not exhaustive. Rather, they are simply test cases by which to examine whether the proposed method is helpful and to what degree. That said, I did choose the examples in the hopes that they would be representative of both the commonality and diversity among diatribal texts. The examples demonstrate that diatribal texts vary in their depictions of dialogue, such as concerning the details they include or in whose voice certain phrases are spoken. Variety even exists within diatribes from single figures, such as Epictetus. The examples also illustrate, however, commonality, such as the significance of the dialogical element. This commonality allows for the application of a single method to each of the dialogues, and the diversity accounts for the range within which that method is helpful for confirming or determining the script of a dialogue. From these analyses, a number of conclusions are possible.

The first observation to make is that the dialogical passages in diatribal texts and speeches-in-character overlap to a remarkable degree. In both, speech is attributed to a diverse range of imaginary speakers, including unspecified people, specified people, abstract concepts, and inanimate objects. Moreover, both diatribe and speech-in-character have ways to discuss the functions of dialogical pericopae that parallel one another. Finally, diatribal texts often include an accompanying characterization along with the imaginary speech of an interlocutor. As in speech-in-character, this characterization can be implicit or explicit.

Second, the instances in which a diatribal script is quite certain due to verbal forms, introductory formulas, and/or other grammatical features provide a standard against which to test whether speech-in-character's conventions of characterization and appropriateness can reliably account for the exchanges within the script. In many instances, speech-in-character's conventions of characterization and appropriateness do in fact confirm the diatribe's script without further qualification. Said otherwise, these test cases indicate that a correlation often exists between the elements included in a diatribal dialogue and the way a reader or auditor should be able to distinguish a speech-in-character from the voice of the primary speaker by considering the established conventions of characterization and appropriateness.

Third, when a diatribal dialogue's script is uncertain or altogether ambiguous, there are occasions where speech-in-character's conventions can clarify or prove (or, at minimum, strongly suggest) that a particular text is scripted for the voice of an imaginary interlocutor. The example of personified Nature in *Disc*. 2.20 is a case in point. Examining the context for clues about characterization and considering whether the

potentially attributed speech would be appropriately spoken in Nature's voice in fact suggest that Epictetus has placed these words on Nature's lips. Left to its own faculties, diatribe can at best render the material as ambiguous. Speech-in-character, however, rises to the cause and helps to establish the script of diatribe's dialogical discourse.

Fourth, the rhetorical category of diatribe operates at a level beyond that of speech-in-character. At times, diatribe uses the conventions of speech-in-character seamlessly in relation to the rhetorical handbooks and *Progymnasmata*. At other times, however, diatribe's own goals require speech-in-character to be adapted for a particular purpose. This was seen in Teles, Fragment I, and Epictetus's *Disc*. 2.23, where diatribe required a more complex, contradictory, double characterization. Thus, though there is a correlation between diatribe and speech-in-character as evidenced by the numerous similarities, the correlation is not always 1:1; sometimes diatribe's rhetorical agenda takes precedence and manipulates speech-in-character as needed.

Fifth, speaking more strictly in terms of the diatribal examples rather than the relationship between diatribe and speech-in-character, the dialogues examined depict a high degree of diversity and fluidity. To begin, introductory formulas and common phrases cannot consistently (i.e., reliably) indicate which speaker in a discourse is responsible for this or that line. To repeat a point made above and illustrated in the examples, both Epictetus and his interlocutor(s) are able to use the famous negation, μὴ γένοιτο, just as both are capable of speaking the formula τί οὖν. As such, the mere presence of one of these (or other) formulas does not constitute a persuasive argument for the identity of the person speaking the relevant lines.[36] Additionally, the speaker can treat

[36] Cf. Malherbe, "Μὴ γένοιτο;" Song, *Diatribe*, 32-37.

the interlocutor collegially, pejoratively, or narrowly polemically. Epictetus's interactions with Epicurean interlocutors demonstrate this nicely; in *Disc*. 2.20, Epictetus is polemical towards his adversary, but, in *Disc*. 2.23, he treats his Epicurean interlocutor collegially and collaboratively, both of which presumably occur in classroom settings. As such, a speaker's engagement with an interlocutor cannot be assumed to project a particular mood; the tone of each discourse must be weighed on its own. Finally, some engagements between the speaker and the interlocutor employ censure, some protreptic, and some both. Said otherwise, the dialogical pericopae serve various functions. Quite generally, some dialogues serve simply to critique an interlocutor, some to transform the interlocutor, and some to go the whole way and enlist the interlocutor as one's principle witness. In all instances, engagements with the interlocutor function on a grander level to progress the argument the primary speaker is making to his actual audience.

In sum, although it is not absolutely perfect, the proposed method can be effective and helpful in terms of analyzing and even establishing the dialogical script of a diatribal discourse. I will argue in Part Three that the method is altogether useful for analyzing Paul's discourses with his interlocutor in Romans, to which I now turn.

PART THREE

Romans 3:1-9

In Part One, "Speech-in-Character," I examined the primary presentations of speech-in-character in circulation during the beginning to middle of the second century C.E. There, I set forth both the characteristic conventions and various intricacies represented in the four treatments. The goal of this examination was to explain how thinkers in and around the first century C.E. taught and thought about attributing speech to imaginary speakers and/or dialogue partners. Though many observations made in Part One are helpful in the explanation and interpretation of attributions of speech in a given text,[1] the most salient feature of effective speech-in-character is that the attributed speech (i.e., the actual speech-in-character) must be appropriate for the characterization of that particular speaker. This convention, furthermore, provides a measure by which an auditor or reader might be able to identify attributed speech as such and its extent. Namely, if the potentially attributed speech is more or only appropriately spoken in the voice of an imaginary speaker but not in the voice of the primary speaker or author, speech-in-character is very possibly in play, and vice versa.

In Part Two, "Diatribe," because no primary literature exists that explains how diatribe should or should not function, I surveyed secondary treatments of diatribe in which scholars attempt to draw implications from actual diatribal texts in order to deduce the common features and differences respresented in diatribe. Like others, I argued that Bultmann's analysis has been surpassed by Stowers. Diatribe was not primarily the

[1] See the examples provided in Part One, Chapter Five, and Part Two, Chapter Seven.

method of the wandering Cynic-Stoic street preacher; instead, it was most at home in a scholastic, student-teacher relationship, through which the teacher would point out errors (censure) in his students/audience and attempt to correct them (protreptic). One extremely common method teachers employ in this censure-protreptic process is to introduce imaginary speakers, or interlocutors, into the discourse and engage them in conversation. These imaginary conversations take on a number of tones (collegial, pejorative, polemical) and serve a number of functions (censure, protreptic, positive or negative example for the audience, etc). The remarkable phenomenon, however, is the degree to which the features of speech-in-character align with how speech is attributed to interlocutors in diatribal texts, as illustrated in the examples from Teles and Epictetus. This overlap between speech-in-character and diatribe often allows the conventions taught for speech-in-character to help define more precisely the script of a diatribal dialogue (as in the example of personified Nature in Epictetus's *Disc.* 2.20). Consequently, when the diatribal script is rightly defined, readers/auditors are better able to understand how the rhetorical category of diatribe is operating with and through a particular interlocutor. The two are mutually informative; speech-in-character defines (or confirms, if the script is already clear due to verbal or grammatical features) who is speaking when in a dialogical exchange, and diatribe provides the hermeneutical options illustrating how that correctly defined script might best be understood, both on its own and with respect to its function in the diatribe as a whole.

This project is staged, therefore, for Part Three, "Romans 3:1-9." As I discuss in Chapters Eight and Nine, many scholars understand Romans to evince diatribal features, and some even consider Romans to be a bona fide diatribe. Moreover, no matter how

they conceive of the relationship between Romans and diatribe, most scholars recognize Rom 3:1-9 to represent dialogue between Paul and a fictitious interlocutor, often consisting of a series of five question and answer exchanges. For these reasons, Rom 3:1-9 is an excellent entry point and test case for assessing the import of diatribe and diatribal dialogue in Romans.

But who is speaking which lines in 3:1-8 and 9-20? Paul offers no verbs of speech to differentiate the interlocutor's words from his own, nor does Paul include any overt and/or grammatical indication of the subject of each line, such as "the self-proclaimed Jew" (cf. 2:17) or the like. Unsurprisingly, this renders discerning the dialogical script of Rom 3:1-9 terribly difficult. For the most part, scholars have presented three opposing scripts of the dialogue. First, the traditional reading of the script understands the questions to be posed in the voice of an interlocutor who objects to Paul's argument.[2] Second, beginning with Stowers, some scholars begin to revise the script of the dialogue so that Paul asks some or, third, all of the questions for the interlocutor to answer. Naturally enough, the way in which each scholar conceives of the script then contributes, to some degree, to shaping his or her understanding of the letter as a whole. To be sure, understanding who's speaking when matters significantly.

Though Parts One and Two offer contributions in their own right, Part Three is the point to which this whole project has been building, as I address the question of who (Paul or his interlocutor) speaks which lines in Rom 3:1-9 and why it matters by applying the findings from Parts One and Two to Rom 3:1-9. Part Three begins with Chapter Eight, in which I engage the work of scholars who discuss Rom 3:1-8/9 as dialogue and

[2] I say "for the most part" because of minute variations in presentations of the traditional reading, in which a scholar will attribute this or that small phrase to a different voice than is the norm.

understand the script in a traditional arrangement. Chapter Nine similarly examines those works that revise or "rescript" the dialogue in 3:1-8/9. Chapter Ten begins my analysis of Romans, where I address the beginning of Paul's argument and his preparation for the imaginary conversation that begins in 3:1. Chapter Eleven examines the script of the dialogue in light of speech-in-character and diatribal conventions, after which I consider the ways a well defined dialogical script influences one's understanding of Romans and Paul's thought as a whole.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Traditional Readings of the Dialogue in Rom 3:1-9 and Its Role in the Letter

The vast range of generalizing comments scholars make about Rom 3:1-9 is fascinating. For instance, Frédéric Louis Godet touts Rom 3:1-9 as "one of the most difficult, perhaps, in the epistle."[1] William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam view the passage as a "digression."[2] More pessimistically, C. H. Dodd remarks that the passage is "obscure and feeble" to the extent that the whole epistle would make better sense if the pericope were omitted.[3] More recently and more optimistically, however, N. T. Wright argues that Rom 2:17-3:9 contains a key to understanding the whole of Romans.[4] Such a diversity of views about Rom 3:1-9 raises (at least) two types of questions. First, what is Paul doing *in* the dialogue in 3:1-9? If it is such a difficult passage, how is the passage best understood? Second, what is Paul doing *with* the dialogue in 3:1-9? How does it advance the argument of Romans as a whole? Do some readings of 3:1-9 cause tension with material elsewhere in Romans that other readings successfully alleviate, though they may cause others?

This chapter assesses readings that demonstrate a traditional understanding of 3:1-9's script. Necessarily, I highlight each approach's engagement with Rom 3:1-9 as dialogical and/or diatribal. In order to track the developments made in the history of

---

[1] Godet, *Romans*, 131.

[2] William Sanday and Arthur Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1902), 75.

[3] Dodd, *Romans*, 46.

[4] Wright, "Romans 2:17-3:9," 1-25.

scholarship on Rom 3:1-9, I begin with two treatments that precede the publication of Bultmann's dissertation. Then, beginning with Bultmann, I address scholars who see Romans as diatribal *and* affirm (some variation of) the traditional script. After I present the views under discussion, I draw a taxonomy of potential strengths and weaknesses for these works. Though not exclusively, I withhold critique of individual points until Chapters Ten and Eleven, so that I can combine analysis with detailed exegesis.[5]

Pre-Bultmannian Readings of Romans 3:1-9

Two readings that predate Bultmann provide a brief snapshot of how (at least some) scholarly works struggle to explicate Rom 3:1-9 without recourse to diatribe or diatribal tendencies, and they will suffice as a jumping off point into the discussion of Rom 3:1-9.

Frédéric Louis Godet

Arriving at Rom 3:1-8, Godet transitions into the pericope by positing that these verses represent Paul's own anticipation of an objection to the argument he has just set forth in the preceding text, which Paul feels the need to obviate. This objection revolves around the question of Jewish privilege, as set forth in Rom 3:1.[6] Rather than understanding the objection as the introduction of an opponent, Godet argues that such an introduction is altogether unnecessary. Godet argues based on the observation that "Paul does not here make use of the formula: *But someone will say*," which Paul utilizes

[5] With a few exceptions, I reserve discussion of the various commentaries and additional secondary literature until Chapters Ten and Eleven. My intent in this chapter and the next is to focus by and large on those publications that are specifically interested in diatribe and dialogue in Romans.

[6] Godet, *Romans*, 131.

elsewhere to indicate the presence of an imaginary speaker.[7] Instead, this objection and the subsequent objections in 3:3 and 5 "arise of themselves from the affirmations, and Paul puts them in a manner to his own account."[8]

Godet depicts the argument of 3:1-8 as follows. If Jews find themselves in the same sinful state as gentiles and deserving of God's wrath as Paul has argued in Rom 2, what has become of Jewish privilege (3:1)? Paul's answer is that Jewish privilege remains in the fact that they were deemed faithful to be "the *depositories* of the divine oracles," which are the Old Testament writings, especially the messianic promises.[9] This affirmation, however, gives rise to another logical objection. Has this advantage not (μή) been abrogated by (most of) Israel's unbelief and rejection of Jesus, its Messiah (3:3)? Can Israel's unbelief void God's faithfulness?[10] The use of μή in the objection implies and anticipates a negative response, which Paul forcibly supplies with μὴ γένοιτο; of course Jewish unbelief will not void God's faithfulness (3:4).[11] Rather, let God be found true and all people liars. The possibility that God's "veracity" might be magnified by Israel's unbelief, however, leads to yet another objection; if human unrighteousness establishes God's righteousness, is God not (μή) unrighteous for inflicting wrath upon those who cause his own righteousness to increase (3:5)? Though this question has "special application to the Jewish unrighteousness which gives rise to the objection,"

---

[7] Ibid., 131-32, italics original. See also 133, 136. Godet buttresses this argument based on the diction used to negate several of the questions in the pericope. See below.

[8] Ibid., 132.

[9] Ibid., 132-33, italics original.

[10] Ibid., 133-34.

[11] Ibid. For the use of negatives in interrogatives, see BDF §427.

Paul's inclusion of "all people" in 3:4 makes his use of "our" in 3:5 more naturally applicable to "*human*," rather than simply Jewish, unrighteousness.[12] Thus, again, the objection does not need to arise from an imaginary opponent; quite the contrary, "it is from the depths of the human conscience that the apostle fetches his question."[13] Furthermore, the use of μή in the interrogative, which, "as it always does," implies a negative answer, confirms that "it is certainly the apostle who is speaking and not an opponent, for the objection is thus expressed in the outset as one resolved in the negative."[14] Paul supplies the anticipated negative μὴ γένοιτο on the premise that no final judgment would be possible if the beneficial consequences of human sin (i.e., in magnifying God's righteousness) could justify the sinner.[15] In 3:7-8, Paul does not offer another objection but a further confirmation of the answer given in 3:6 to the objection in 3:5. The sense is, if God were unjust for inflicting wrath, any sinner could approach God, note the way his or her sin increases God's righteousness, be acquitted, and God's judgment would be brought to nothing.[16] Paul takes this even further in Rom 3:8 by positing, if God's judgment is abrogated, why not sin all the more and provide fodder for God to turn into his own righteousness.[17] Though unstated by Paul or Godet, if Godet's argument is correct, the same rejection Paul voices in 3:6 applies to 3:7-8, μὴ γένοιτο.

---

[12] Godet, *Romans*, 136, italics original.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid. The point is, an objector would not pose an objection in such a way as to presume Paul's rejection of it. Instead, an objector would pose a question in such a way as to hope Paul would have to consent positively to it.

[15] Ibid., 137.

[16] Ibid., 137-38.

[17] Ibid., 138.

As for the way in which 3:1-8 fits within the rest of Romans, as Rom 1 depicts the reign of God's wrath over the gentile world, 3:1-8 functions as an "appendix" to the depiction of God's wrath over the Jewish people in Rom 2, sweeping away the objections that preclude God's chosen people from becoming the obejct of "divine animadversion."[18] Nevertheless, this passage finds its further explanation in Rom 11, where Paul argues that God's judgment of the Jews "subserve[s] the salvation of mankind and that of Israel themselves."[19]

Concerning the structure (not a script, in this instance) of 3:1-8, therefore, Godet's argument outlines the passage in keeping with the way traditional dialogical readers outline the script of the passage (see below), with one minor exception. Romans 3:1, 3, and 5 represent (anticipatory) objections to Paul's arguments, and 3:2, 4, and 6 are Paul's asnwers. The minor exception is that though traditional readers tend to see 3:7-8c as a fourth objection and 3:8d as Paul's response, Godet takes these verses to be further affirmation of the answer in 3:6.

William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam

Sanday and Headlam do not present the argument of Rom 3:1-8 much differently than Godet.[20] The primary difference in the argument is that Sanday and Headlam read 3:7-8c as an objection in keeping with 3:5 rather than as an affirmation of 3:6, but from a different perspective.[21] Thus, Sanday and Headlam read 3:1, 3, 5, and 7-8c as objections,

---

[18] Ibid., 139.

[19] Ibid., 139, 391.

[20] Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, 68-74.

[21] Ibid., 73.

and 3:2, 4, 6, and 8d as responses, which is precisely how traditional dialogical readers generally structure the discourse.

What is remarkable about Sanday and Headlam is their discussion of 3:1-8 and the question of dialogue. Sanday and Headlam do follow the same course as Godet and reject the presence of real discourse in the pericope, but they seem to do so much more difficultly. Sanday and Headlam write:

> It is characteristic of this Epistle that St. Paul seems to imagine himself face to face with an opponent, and that he discusses and answers arguments which an opponent might bring against him… No doubt this is a way of presenting the dialectical process in his own mind. But at the same time it is a way which would seem to have been suggested by actual experience of controversy with Jews and the narrower Jewish Christians.[22]

It is clear that Sanday and Headlam see where dialogue might take place in Romans, but they are not able to explain it adequately. As with Godet, they simply do not have the tools—diatribe—to understand how such dialogical passages function. With Bultmann's dissertation, however, the tide begins to change.

Diatribal Readings that Affirm the Traditional Script of Romans 3:1-9

Part Two demonstrates that though Bultmann's predecessors begin to draw connections between diatribe and New Testament studies, it is Bultmann's dissertation that turns scholars to the question of diatribe and its relevance to Pauline studies, especially Romans.[23] In fact, quite recently, three scholars have advanced readings of Rom 3:1-9 that, like Bultmann, emphasize the diatribal and dialogical nature of the text and divide the script of the discourse along traditional lines. These readings include

[22] Ibid., 69.

[23] Bultmann, *Der Stil*.

Changwon Song[24] (who relies heavily on Abraham J. Malherbe's assessment of μὴ γένοιτο in Epictetus and Paul[25]), Thomas H. Tobin,[26] and Rafael Rodríguez.[27] This is not to say that these scholars understand diatribe in the same way as Bultmann, as each of these scholars to one degree or another endorse Stowers's presentation of diatribe. But it is interesting that, though they adhere to Stowers's model, they nevertheless argue for a different script of Rom 3:1-9 than Stowers does (see below). What is more, there are few exceptions to the rule that commentaries on Romans that recognize dialogue in 3:1-9 affirm a traditional script of the passage as well.[28] For instance, three powerhouses among Romans commentators suppose or affirm a traditional script: James D. G. Dunn,[29] N. T. Wright,[30] and Robert Jewett,[31] of whom I discuss the first two in this chapter.[32] Given the array of results that stem from a single pool of evidence, perhaps what is needed is a tool external to, yet broadly overlapping with, diatribal dialogue that is able to

---

[24] Song, *Reading Romans*.

[25] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο."

[26] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*.

[27] Rodríguez, *If You Call Yourself a Jew*.

[28] Exceptions include Witherington and Hyatt, *Romans*, 93-94; Keck, *Romans*, 89-95; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-8. Witherington and Hyatt and Keck follow Stowers's rescription; Byrne's is closer to Elliott's.

[29] Dunn, *Romans*, 128-49; idem., *Theology*, 45, 114-19.

[30] Wright, *Romans*, 452-55; idem., "Romans 2:17-3:9," 1-25; idem., *Paul and the Faithfulness of God* (Christian Origins and the Question of God 4; 2 vols.; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), 836-39.

[31] Jewett, *Romans*, 238-52.

[32] The commentaries of Jewett and Moo are also significant and deserve attention in this project. In the interest of not making this project even longer, however, I address their commentaries in the footnotes and conclusions, indicating where they significantly parallel or differ from other traditional readings. They receive equal attention in Chapters Ten and Eleven.

define and refine more precisely the breaks in a dialogical script, namely, speech-in-character (but see more on this below).

Rudolf Karl Bultmann

For all the emphasis on Bultmann's dissertation, he comments on Rom 3:1-8 very sparingly.[33] Bultmann argues that Rom 3:1 and 3 represent objections Paul introduces as questions without any introductory formula,[34] that Paul often crafts words for his opponent rather than recording their actual words,[35] and that 3:1 (and 4:2) are the only instances in Paul where one might glimpse the back-and-forth question and answer progression of a real dialogue.[36] Furthermore, Paul's quick rejections (cf. 3:4, 6) of the objections demonstrate that the objections amount to nothing more in Paul's thought than blatant absurdities.[37] Finally, Bultmann notes that Paul's scriptural citation in Rom 3:4 serves as evidence for, or an explanation of, his rejection of the objection posed in 3:3.[38]

Based on Bultmann's view of diatribe (see Part Two), though he does not actually discuss Rom 3:1-8 holistically in diatribal terms, one can rather confidently extrapolate

---

[33] On Bultmann's sparse engagement with 3:1-8, Paul J. Achtemeier comments, "What is noteworthy, I think, is the fact that Bultmann all but ignored [Rom 3:1-8]. In the whole of his book, if I have counted correctly, he refers only three times to any of the verses comprising Romans 3:1-8, twice on p. 67 (vv. 1, 3, and 1-3) and once on p. 95 (v. 4). In none of these instances is the reference more than passing, and there is no attempt to relate the whole passage to the diatribal form." Achtemeier, "Romans 3:1-8," 79.

[34] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 67.

[35] Ibid. Bultmann writes, "*Und er formuliert deshalb die Einwendung oft nicht mit direkten Worten des Gegners, sondern als seine eigenen Worte, freilich im Sinne des Gegners.*"

[36] Ibid. Bultmann writes, "*Auch zu einem wirklichen Zwiegespräch, zu einem Hinundher von Fragen und Antworten kommt es kaum. Rom. 3.1ff und 4.2 sind nur Ansätze dazu zu erblicken*."

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., 95.

what he would say about the passage.[39] Based on what Bultmann *actually* says about verses within 3:1-8, however, one can deduce even further, such as to how Bultmann understands the script of the dialogue. For instance, Bultmann identifies Rom 3:1 and 3 as absurd objections, and he argues that Paul formulates the objections for the fictitious interlocutor. Additionally, the instances of μὴ γένοιτο represent Paul's rejections of such absurd objections.[40] Thus, the fictitious interlocutor is responsible for Rom 3:1, 3, and 5, and Paul is responsible for 3:4 and 6.[41] Based on these fixed points in the script, it is easy to imagine that Bultmann would similarly identify 3:7-8c as the interlocutor's objection, and 3:2 and 8d as Paul's responses. Thus, Bultmann espouses a traditional script of the dialogue: the interlocutor poses objections to Paul in 3:1, 3, 5, (7-8c,) and Paul responds to the interlocutor in 3:2, 4, 6, (8d) in his own voice.[42]

Abraham J. Malherbe

Malherbe does not intend to treat 3:1-8 as a whole, but his article is quite influential and serves as a (corrective) bridge between Bultmann and later scholars like Song. Malherbe's "limited purpose" is "to examine the way μὴ γένοιτο ('by no means')"

---

[39] Bultmann would say something to the effect that Paul, in the form of a Cynic-Stoic street preacher, polemically attacks the Jewish interlocutor who raises objections against his argument.

[40] Ibid., 67.

[41] Rom 3:5 would be spoken in the voice of the interlocutor because 3:6 is spoken in Paul's voice as a rejection of whatever is said immediately preceding it.

[42] At this point in the chapter, things become a bit chronologically messy. Because I group traditional readings in this chapter and rescriptive readings in the next, I momentarily pass over Stowers, who temporally precedes the following traditional works. Stowers completed his dissertation in 1979, Malherbe published "Μη Γενοιτο" in 1980, and Stowers published his dissertation in 1981. Consequently, all of the following scholars in this section had access to Stowers's dissertation and generally endorse his conclusions about diatribe. With the exception of Malherbe, these scholars also had access to some or all of Stowers's later writings on diatribe and Romans.

functions in diatribal literature.[43] Malherbe concludes that, while Paul's use of the phrase does not parallel diatribe in general, it does align with one of Epictetus's common uses of the phrase to begin a new segment in an argument.[44]

Malherbe sees his work as a clarifying expansion and corrective to Bultmann's views about the phrase. Bultmann notes that when Paul rejects an objection with μὴ γένοιτο, he follows the phrase with an explanation that illustrates his own views and points out the objector's error.[45] Malherbe contends that scholars have given "insufficient attention" to this observation, especially since Paul is consistent in this regard.[46] For instance, Rom 3:4 and 6 contain and explain two of Paul's uses of the phrase with constructions characteristic of diatribe; 3:4 explains μὴ γένοιτο with an imperative introduced by δέ, and 3:6 explains the phrase through rhetorical questions introduced by πῶς.[47] More significantly, the supporting explanations provide the theme of the discussions that follow. Malherbe shows how the explanation in 3:4, which contains the verb δικαιόω, gives rise to the discussion in 3:5, which contains the cognates ἀδικία and δικαιοσύνη. Similarly, the supporting argument in 3:6 uses the verb κρίνω, which 3:7 follows by using κρίνομαι and 3:8 κρίμα.[48] In this way, Malherbe argues that

[43] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο," 231.

[44] Ibid., 239.

[45] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 67-68.

[46] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο," 236.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

the phrase μὴ γένοιτο does not function in Paul to conclude a conversation (as a certain reading of Bultmann allows), but to start a new line of reasoning.[49]

Though Malherbe had access to Stowers's dissertation—in fact, Malherbe supervised Stowers's dissertation—the publication of his article occurred just before the onset of rescriptive readings of Romans. This is because Stowers only sets forth his views about the shape of the script in 3:1-8 four years later.[50] It is, therefore, relatively unsurprising to find in Malherbe an affirmation of the traditional script of the dialogue in 3:1-8 for the verses Malherbe addresses. For Malherbe, "the characteristic short questions… function as introductions to the objections raised by the interlocutor," such as τί γάρ (3:3) and τί ἐροῦμεν (3:5).[51] Also, the uses of μὴ γένοιτο and their respective explanations represent Paul's rejections of the interlocutor's objections. Thus, the interlocutor speaks in 3:3 and his objection is given in Paul's words in 3:5, and Paul responds to the interlocutor in 3:4 and 6. Like Godet, Malherbe also seems to understand 3:7(-8?) as a further explanation of 3:6 rather than as another objection.[52] Malherbe does not discuss Rom 3:1-2, but his discussion of τί οὖν and τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν, as well as his endorsement of the shape of the rest of the script, point in the direction that 3:1 would belong to the interlocutor, and 3:2 certainly belongs to Paul.

---

[49] Ibid., 237.

[50] Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue."

[51] Malherbe, "Μὴ Γένοιτο," 233-34, but Paul's use of the first plural indicates that he has formulated the objection in his own words.

[52] Ibid., 236. Malherbe groups 3:6-7 as "rhetorical questions introduced by πῶς."

Changwon Song

Two works addressing Romans as diatribe and affirming the traditional script were published in 2004, those of Song and Tobin, respectively. Following Stowers, Song notes how a second-person singular apostrophe begins in Rom 2:1, and that the "theme of this chapter is an 'apostrophe to the ignorant and inconsistent judge.'"[53] Concerning the identity of this judge, Song avers, "it is indisputable that the second-person singular here is not an actual person,"[54] but it refers more generally to Jews.

For Song, Rom 3 transitions to the main body of the diatribe, which the μὴ γένοιτο formula dominates, and the Jewish judge Paul addresses in Rom 2 enters into conversation with Paul.[55] In typical, traditional script fashion, Song outlines the script of Rom 3:1-8 as follows: the interlocutor poses objections to Paul in 3:1,[56] 3, 5, and 7-8c; Paul, the teacher, responds in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d.[57] Rom 3:9-20 continues this pattern with the interlocutor objecting in 3:9a and Paul rejecting the objection in 3:9b-20.[58]

Unfortunately, Song does not comment on the meaning of the passage or on its function in the larger argument of Romans. Song does engage with Stowers's rescription of the pericope (Elliott's further rescription of 3:1-9 is absent from Song's project[59]), but he does so minimally and unpersuasively. Song outlines Stowers's script of the dialogue

---

[53] Song, *Reading Romans*, 92-93. Song notes that the title is adopted from Stowers.

[54] Ibid., 94.

[55] Ibid., 94.

[56] Song accidentally records 3:2. Ibid.

[57] Ibid., 94-95. See also 35-36.

[58] Ibid., 96.

[59] Elliott, *The Rhetoric of Romans*, 132-41.

(see below) and admits, "This analysis may be also possible."[60] Song's lone defense for his reading is that, in Epictetus, μὴ γένοιτο "as a statement of rejection and its supporting statements are usually attributed to the Teacher, not to the Interlocutor."[61] Song then lists a number of exceptions to his rule and admits to the difficulty involved in separating the voice of the teacher from that of the interlocutor in μὴ γένοιτο formulas.[62] Song's limited argument for the shape of the script in 3:1-9, therefore, rests on evidence that Song himself recognizes as unstable and capable of being argued in either direction. More solid evidence and argumentation must be brought to the discussion.

Thomas H. Tobin

Tobin offers a much more robust analysis of Romans and diatribe than does Song. Based on similarities between Epictetus's *Discourses* and the body of Romans (which he identifies as 1:16-11:36), Tobin argues, "Paul's Roman audience probably would have understood this section of Romans as a diatribe and that Paul himself was intentionally using the conventions of the diatribe as he wrote this section of the letter."[63] Tobin correctly notes how his assertion goes further than other interpreters, and he offers several reasons for other scholars' reluctance to identify Romans as *diatribe* rather than diatribal.[64] Tobin then discusses the multifaceted purpose of Romans, and why Paul

---

[60] Song, *Reading Romans*, 112n.5, 7.

[61] Ibid., 112 n.5. See also Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο."

[62] Song, *Reading Romans*, 112n.5, 51n.109.

[63] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 95. These similarities include: similar rhetorical devices, dialogical style, length, quotations from scripture and/or authorities, and alterations between shorter, calmer, expository passages and longer, more argumentative passages.

[64] Ibid., 96-98. Tobin is not at fault for being unaware of Song's work, which was published in the same year. The reasons Tobin gives for the reluctance of others to identify the body of Romans as diatribe include: the fact that Romans is a letter; the presence of expository passages in Romans, which did not

adapts and uses the genre of diatribe.[65] Tobin argues that Paul would have found diatribe attractive because of its broadness, especially since in Romans Paul addresses a wide range of issues in comparison with his other letters.[66] Additionally, the use of diatribe allows for a degree of indirectness (such as through censuring the interlocutor rather than the Romans directly) by which Paul is able "to place [the Roman Christians] rhetorically on his side from the beginning" and to address "their issues and misunderstandings of him without ever having to confront them directly."[67] Said otherwise, it is diatribe that allows Paul to confront, often critically, an unknown and distant audience.

Tobin begins his actual discussion of the body of Romans by noting that Paul and diatribal authors begin diatribes in a similar fashion. Tobin argues, "Paul begins his argument in Rom 1:16-17, as the authors of most diatribes do, by setting out the basic proposition he wants to argue in the body of the letter."[68] This proposition involves the gospel as God's power for salvation to everyone who has faith, the Jew first, and then the Greek, because God's righteousness is revealed in it through faith for faith, as Hab 2:4 records.[69]

Paul begins the first stage of his argument in 1:18-3:20 with a "subproposition," which argues that God's wrath is revealed against *all* human ungodliness and

---

appear to be diatribal before Tobin's comparison of Romans with some of Epictetus's *Discourses* (see Part Two); Paul's extensive use and interpretation of Jewish scripture; the level of generality in the diatribe versus that of Romans; and the appearance of Romans in juxtaposition with other diatribes.

[65] For Tobin's discussion of the purposes of Romans, see ibid., 98-103.

[66] Ibid., 103.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid., 104. For examples of this practice, see my discussions of Teles, Fragment I, and Epictetus, *Disc*. 2.20, in Part Two, Chapter Seven.

[69] Ibid.

wickedness.[70] In 1:18-32, Paul presents "standard Hellenistic Jewish apologetic motifs against *Gentile* religiosity and conduct."[71] Because in Tobin's reading most of Paul's Roman Christian audience would have previously been members of the Roman Jewish community or sympathizers with them, the Roman Christians would have readily recognized and agreed with Paul's presentation of "human godlessness" in these verses.[72] This means "Rom 1:18-32 is not so much an argument as an exposition of viewpoints Paul and the Roman Christians shared. On the surface, at least, there was nothing controversial about it."[73]

Tobin argues, however, that in 1:18-32 Paul stacks the deck in preparation for something of a bait-and-switch.[74] Namely, because Paul never refers to gentiles in 1:18-32, and because he opens the argument with the claim that God's wrath is revealed against "all" human ungodliness and wickedness, he stages the conversation for an unexpected broadening in the following sections.[75] As such, though the audience would have theoretically agreed with Paul's comments in 1:18-32, Tobin argues that 2:1-3:20 is a more argumentative and diatribal section of the letter that presents Paul's more controversial conclusions about the inclusiveness of human sinfulness. Paul does not, however, present his views all at once or bluntly, but "gradually and indirectly," slowly

---

[70] Ibid., 108.

[71] Ibid., 109, italics original. Examples include Wisdom 13-15 and *Sib. Or.* 3:8-45.

[72] Ibid., 16-46, 106, 109.

[73] Ibid., 109-10.

[74] "Bait-and-switch" is my term, not Tobin's.

[75] Ibid., 110.

building on the points he and his audience share (i.e., 1:18-32).[76] Paul begins by addressing a "fictitious person who hypocritically condemns those who commit the acts described in 1:18-32 but who also commits the same acts."[77] Paul's use of "all" (2:1) insinuates but does not explicitly state that both Jews and gentiles fall under this category—which his maintenance of an anonymous addressee further allows—and he asks whether such a person thinks he or she will escape God's judgment (2:3). It is only in 2:9-10, however, that Paul spells out for his audience how this anonymous, hypocritical addressee represents both Jews and gentiles, based on the principle of God's impartiality (2:11).[78]

In Rom 2:12-29, Paul turns to address Jews and their relation to the law. Romans 2:12-16 functions to transition from a passage primarily dealing with gentiles to an argument primarily addressing Jews, which Paul accomplishes by illustrating God's impartiality to punish Jews who sin under the law and gentiles who sin without the law.[79] Thus, Paul reformulates the argument of 2:6-11 in Jewish terms, showing how God judges Jews and gentiles by the single criterion of law observance.[80] Paul's address to a Jew in 2:17-29 further establishes the parallelism between 2:1-11 and 2:17-29.[81] Here, "Paul castigates the Jew who, while claiming to know the law and to be able to instruct

---

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid., 110-12.

[79] Ibid., 113-14.

[80] Ibid., 114-15.

[81] Ibid., 115, 117-18. Tobin now identifies the addressee of 2:1-11 as a gentile rather than as an anonymous hypocrite.

others in it, does not himself observe the commandments of the law."[82] Thus, both addressees, the gentile of 2:1-11 and the Jew of 2:17-29, are guilty of hypocrisy, and Paul expects his readers to condemn their actions based on the principle of divine impartiality.[83] As such, Tobin concludes his discussion of Rom 2 by stating,

> On the basis of this impartiality, both Gentiles and Jews, in terms of their conduct… are similarly liable to God's judgment. If Gentiles' knowledge of what is right means that they have no excuse (2:1) for doing wrong, then similarly Jews' knowledge of the law is not a privilege that can be appealed to in transgressing the law.[84]

As a result, Paul begins with agreed upon points of view about human sinfulness (1:18-32), broadens them out to include all people in light of God's impartiality (2:1-11), and finally illustrates how such sinfulness and culpability applies directly to Jews (2:12-29).

Arriving at 3:1-20, having argued that Jews and gentiles are on equal footing, Paul addresses possible objections to his (controversial) position in 2:12-29.[85] Tobin characterizes the passage as "objections from, and replies to, a fictitious interlocutor," thereby revealing his understanding of the dialogical script to be along traditional lines.[86] Tobin does interact with Stowers's rescription of the passage in 3:3-6 (but, like Song, not Elliott's). Tobin argues that 3:3 belongs in the interlocutor's voice and 3:4 in Paul's because "throughout Romans 1-3… Paul appeals to Scripture, and so the scriptural references in 3:4… are more naturally placed in his mouth."[87] Concerning Rom 3:5-6,

---

[82] Ibid., 115.

[83] Ibid., 117-18.

[84] Ibid., 118.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid., 119n.43.

Tobin argues, again contra Stowers, that 3:5 should belong to the interlocutor and 3:6 to Paul, "since Paul… is defending himself and answering objections, it is more natural to place the answers in Paul's mouth (3:6) and the objections in the interlocutor's. The end of 3:[5]… is Paul's editorial comment."[88] So, Tobin identifies 3:1, 3, 5a-b, 7-8c, and 9a as the interlocutor, and 3:2, 4, 5c, 6, 8d, and 9b and following as Paul.

Particularly interesting is Tobin's discussion of the interlocutor. Tobin correctly observes that Paul does not overtly identify the interlocutor in 3:1-8.[89] Though most scholars identify the interlocutor of 3:1-8 as the addressee in Rom 2:17-29 (variously defined), Tobin considers this unlikely.[90] Tobin characterizes the addressee in 2:17-29 as "a hypocrite who claimed to know the law but did not keep its commandments."[91] Tobin argues,

> The interlocutor in 3:1-8, however, is someone quite different. He is someone concerned over the negative implications of Paul's views about the equal sinfulness of Jews and Gentiles… In reality, Paul's fictitious interlocutor in 3:1-8 is the Roman Christian who is suspicious of, or hostile to, what he sees as the implications of Paul's controversial arguments.[92]

Again, the interlocutor is still anonymous, which allows Paul to be indirect in his dealings with issues held by his Roman Christian audience concerning God's faithfulness or righteousness in relation to the Jews.[93]

---

[88] Ibid., 120n.44. Tobin erroneously records 3:6 for 3:5.

[89] Ibid., 118.

[90] Ibid., 118-19.

[91] Ibid., 119.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

Tobin depicts the argument of Rom 3:1-20, therefore, in the following way. Paul answers the interlocutor's objection about whether there is any value to being a Jew or circumcised if Jews and gentiles are on equal footing before God (3:1) in the affirmative—God has entrusted to the Jews the Jewish scriptures (3:2). None of Paul's Roman audience would have objected to this affirmation of the value of the Jewish scriptures. When the interlocutor objects a second time and argues that Jewish unfaithfulness does not nullify God's faithfulness (3:3), Paul readily agrees and cites scripture in support (3:4).[94] Paul also agrees with the interlocutor's third objection concerning God's justice in judging sinners (3:5) and notes the absurdity of any opposing view (3:6). Tobin suggests that Paul intends these three agreements with his interlocutor to lead his audience to see him as sharing the same principles as they do and to render them open to his final two responses.[95]

In the final two objections, the interlocutor wonders why he is considered a sinner if his sin ultimately results in God's glory; why not do evil and build up God's glory (3:7-8)? At the same time, Tobin maintains, "In this objection, Paul explicitly mentions that there are some who blasphemously claim that this is indeed his position," whom he "summarily condemns" (3:8d).[96] The fifth and final objection wonders whether Paul is making excuses for human sinfulness (3:9a). Paul rejects the objection and reiterates that he has charged both Jews and Greeks all to be under sin (3:9), referring to the whole argument of 1:18-2:29.[97] Thus, Paul "finally states clearly and explicitly what he has only

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid., 120.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid., 120-21.

insinuated at crucial points earlier in his argument… this 'all' is now seen to include not only Gentiles but also Jews," and 3:10-20 further substantiate this claim.[98] Paul, therefore, "crafted his rhetoric very carefully in order to persuade his audience that his apparently controversial positions about the equal sinfulness of both Jews and Gentiles were really rooted in… the Jewish scriptures and Jewish tradition," which he and his Roman Christian audience shared.[99]

Tobin, therefore, presents a robust case affirming a traditional script of Rom 3:1-9. Tobin's argument evinces many strengths, but it has many potential weaknesses too. Before I can tend to these, a few more traditional readings deserve a hearing.

Rafael Rodríguez

Rodríguez's *If You Call Yourself a Jew* casts the traditional reading of Romans in a completely different direction. This is primarily due to Rodríguez's identification of Paul's interlocutor *not* as a Jew, but as a gentile proselyte, following Thorsteinsson (and others).[100] As Rodríguez rightly notes, "The choice between an actually Jewish interlocutor in Rom 2:17-29 and an ethnically-gentile-religiously-Jewish interlocutor [would] prove to be the fork in the road for [an] understanding of Romans as a whole."[101] How, then, does Rodríguez's argument take shape in, and influence readings of, Romans?

---

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid., 122.

[100] This is not to say that Rodríguez is the first to offer such a reading, especially of Rom 2. Rodríguez gives ample support to Thorsteinsson's *Paul's Interlocutor in Romans 2*, which Rodríguez draws upon heavily in his identification of Paul's interlocutor. I address Thorsteinsson in Part Two, Chapter Six, and Part Three, Chapter Ten.

[101] Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 51. I would say this decision is "a," rather than "the," fork in the road.

To begin with, Rodríguez takes up the audience of the letter, the primary question being whether Paul envisions his audience in Rome to be primarily Jewish, gentile, or mixed.[102] Rodríguez notes the tendency for commentators to favor a mixed audience, but he counters this tendency with a discussion of scholars who argue "for an exclusively gentile audience," citing Stowers and Andrew Das in support.[103] Consequently, Rodríguez argues, "Paul only ever explicitly identifies the audience he imagines himself addressing as gentiles," and, therefore, it is best to understand the audience of Romans as predominantly or exclusively gentile.[104] This carries over significantly in Rodríguez's interpretation of Rom 1-3.

As Rodríguez approaches the body of Romans, he identifies 1:16-17 as the thematic statement of the letter on the grounds that the rest of the letter relates to it in one manner or another. Here, Rodríguez connects God's righteousness to his faithfulness to the Abrahamic covenant, a feature Paul must explain in light of Israel's failure to maintain her part of the covenant.[105] Romans 1:18-32 then sets forth the problem for which the gospel is the solution.[106] In 1:18-32, Paul "employs standard Jewish rhetoric against gentile idolatry, which strongly suggests that Paul's critique aims at gentiles and

---

[102] Ibid., 7.

[103] Ibid., 7-8. See Stowers, *Rereading*, 29-30; Andrew Das, "The Gentile-Encoded Audience of Romans: The Church Outside the Synagogue," in *Reading Paul's Letter to the Romans* (ed. Jerry L. Sumney; RBS 73; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 29-46.

[104] Rodríguez cites Rom 1:5-6, 13; 11:13; 15:15-16. Rom 2:17 does not qualify as addressing a Jewish audience for Rodríguez, since he argues that "even here Paul is imagining himself addressing a *gentile* who 'call[s him]self a Jew.'" Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 10n.26, emphasis original.

[105] Ibid., 23-24.

[106] Ibid., 27.

not Jews."[107] Rodríguez agrees that elements in 1:18-32 might suggest universalistic possibilities and that it takes little imagination to apply this critique to humanity as a whole. Rodríguez argues, however, "a careful reading of the text… reveals that Paul does not apply his comments either to himself or to his gentile readers." Instead, "the knowledge of God is evident," Paul denotes, "among *them*," who exchanged God's incorruptible glory for corruptible images (1:23).[108] This suggests to Rodríguez that Paul is not railing against human depravity or gentile religiosity as a whole—nor against "the universal condition of human bondage"—but more narrowly against "the worship of graven images patterned after mortal creatures," idolatry, the failure to worship God as Creator.[109] At this point, Rodríguez argues that it is best to imagine Paul's Roman Christian audience "nodding in agreement along with him" as he offers critiques "*about* another party (debauched, idol-worshipping gentiles)."[110]

In Rom 2, however, Paul's rhetoric changes suddenly as he "turns his attention to a class of individual who, like him, condemns the very people he described in 1:18-32."[111] Scholars often identify this individual as a Jew, but Rodríguez argues that Paul continues to address a gentile, based on the connective function of διό in Rom 2:1 and a linear reading of the text unencumbered by chapter divisions, rather than reading retrospectively from 2:17.[112] Rodríguez identifies 2:1 as the first occasion of diatribe in

---

[107] Ibid., 28.

[108] Ibid., 28-29, emphasis original.

[109] Ibid., 29-30, 33.

[110] Ibid., 31-32, emphasis original.

[111] Ibid., 33.

[112] Ibid., 35-36.

Romans, and he follows Stowers's emphasis on its function as a pedagogical rather than polemical tool.[113] In 2:1, Paul "conjures up an imagined dialogue partner, a gentile moralist who, like Paul, disapproves of those who lose control of their emotions or desires and succumb to the power of their passions."[114] Rodríguez continues to argue that nothing in Rom 2:1-16 indicates that Paul's interlocutor has transitioned to Christian existence; for this reason, the interlocutor is "without excuse" for precisely the same reason as those described in 1:18-32, namely, the failure to worship God as God.[115] The moralist, therefore, is no better off than the gentile in 1:18-32, for "God judges everyone who refuses to acknowledge him as Creator, regardless of their moral status," "for there is no favoritism with God" (2:11).[116]

In 2:12-16, however, Paul draws a distinction between gentiles who do not have the Torah yet do the things of Torah and those who have the Torah but fail to do it. Rodríguez explains the case of gentiles who do not have the Torah but nevertheless do the work of the Torah inscribed on their hearts as those who worship God as creator, which, for Paul, is the summation of Torah observance.[117] Thus, these gentiles do not circumcise, observe Sabbath, or follow food laws, but they effectively do the Torah. On the contrary, gentiles who attempt to practice Torah inevitably fail to observe the Torah, the reason for which Paul (and Rodríguez) spells out later in the chapter.[118]

---

[113] Ibid., 36-37.

[114] Ibid., 37.

[115] Ibid., 38.

[116] Ibid., 39-43.

[117] Ibid., 44-46.

[118] Ibid.

With 2:17-29, a new interlocutor comes on the scene; the addressee in 2:1-11 is a gentile moralist who does *not* worship Israel's God, but the addressee in 2:17-29 is a "gentile proselyte to Judaism."[119] By taking on the name and calling himself a Jew, this ethnically gentile but religiously Jewish interlocutor has adopted the signs of the Mosaic covenant, including circumcision.[120] By adopting such an identity for the interlocutor, Rodríguez's reading "configures Paul's discussion here in terms of an *enthusiasm* for Torah among Paul's gentile audience rather than any anti-Jewish sentiment."[121] As such, Paul describes the interlocutor in positive terms in 2:17-22. In fact, Rodríguez reads 2:21-22, which are usually read as Paul's critique of the interlocutor, as functioning to bolster his character. Based on the presence of οὐ (which expects a positive answer) rather than μή in the interrogative, Rodríguez argues that "Paul grants his interlocutor the benefit of the doubt: His moral *behavior* is consistent with his moral *instruction*."[122] That is, the interlocutor teaches himself, does not steal, and so forth. In Rom 2:23-29, however, Paul reveals this interlocutor's problem. The interlocutor boasts in Torah rather than worshipping God as Creator (2:23) and transgresses the law by improperly observing the rite of circumcision by not completing it on the eighth day and by not being members of Abraham's household, as stipulated in Torah (2:25-29).[123] Thus, "rather than a sign of the gentile proselyte's 'ultimate commitment' to observe Torah's commandments and

---

[119] Ibid., 49-50. Rodríguez therefore distances himself from Thorsteinsson at this point, as Thorsteinsson holds that epistolary interlocutors tend not to change unless specifically indicated. Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor*, 144.

[120] Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 50-51.

[121] Ibid., 51.

[122] Ibid., 53-55, emphasis original.

[123] Ibid., 56-59.

prohibitions, circumcision has become the paradigmatic locus of the proselyte's *transgression* of Torah!"[124]

Rodríguez recognizes that rhetorical dialogue "usually involves the speaker characterizing his dialogue partner," and he considers 2:17-29 to fill this role. Thus, the gentile proselyte addressed in 2:17-29 remains on the scene for Rom 3's diatribal dialogue.[125] Indicative of his understanding of the script in 3:1-9, Rodríguez suggests that, in their discourse, Paul "[fields] questions and [explains] why [the interlocutor's] confidence in Israel's Torah and its ability to facilitate his worship of Israel's God was misplaced."[126] Rodríguez allows one alteration in the traditional script, 3:8. Rodríguez identifies 3:1, 3, 5a, 7, and 9a as the interlocutor, and 3:2, 4, 5c, 6, 8 and 9b as Paul. Consequently, with the exception of Paul's asides in 3:5b and 8, "The interlocutor consistently identifies an (erroneous) implication from Paul's argument, and Paul responds to correct the proselyte's misunderstanding."[127]

To move on to the dialogue, Rodríguez's proselyte has taken on the full yoke of the Torah and, as such, has missed what doing law really requires of gentiles. Understandably, the interlocutor's opening question is personal, as he asks what advantage exists for being called a Jew and undergoing circumcision (3:1).[128] Paul affirms an advantage "for being—and being called—a Jew," as represented by the

---

[124] Ibid., 59, emphasis original.

[125] Ibid., 62n.58.

[126] Ibid., 62.

[127] Ibid., 64-65.

[128] Ibid., 62-63, 62n.59.

covenant with Yahweh, i.e., Torah (3:2).[129] This leads the proselyte to wonder about the status of God's faithfulness in view of Jewish unfaithfulness, which Paul claims the proselyte has committed through inappropriate circumcision (3:3). Paul affirms God's faithfulness as fixed through and through (3:4). Noticing how unfaithfulness functions to magnify God's faithfulness, the proselyte then asks how God can be just for bringing wrath on those who magnify his righteousness. Essentially, the proselyte asks, "why would circumcision after the eighth day not be reckoned as faithful obedience of God's command?" (3:5, 7); Paul summarily dismisses these questions as absurd (3:6, 8).[130] Consequently, Rodríguez argues, the proselyte's questions "assume that neither Israel's nor his own transgressions of Torah nullify the promises God made with his people, and he attempts to wrangle from Paul a concession that, in fact, his circumcision brings him in the sphere of God's people," which Paul emphatically denies.[131] The proselyte's final plea again asks whether Jews have any advantage (3:9a). This time, however, Paul rejects Jewish advantage; "despite the advantage of Israel's election, her being entrusted with Torah/the oracles of God, of being the covenant people, and so on, *in actual fact no advantage has attached to being a Jew*… Because Jews, like Greeks, find themselves under sin."[132] Paul's catena in 3:10-18 further supports this view.

Paul returns to the question of Jew-non-Jew relations before God in chapters 9-11, where he argues that God deals equally with Jew and gentile. In fact, Rodríguez argues, God brings his promises to fruition for Jews and non-Jews according to a single set of

[129] Ibid., 63-65.

[130] Ibid., 66-67.

[131] Ibid., 66.

[132] Ibid., 68, emphasis mine.

mechanics: God meets disobedience with divine mercy. In 11:25-32, however, Paul apparently reverses his "for the Jew first, then for the Greek" formula, as it is non-Jews who first experience God's mercy, which only subsequently extends to disobedient Jews.[133] Nevertheless, Rodríguez contends, "The discrepancy hardly matters, however, for the point of Paul's argument, here in Romans 9-11 and throughout the entire letter, centers on the equality between Jew and gentile in God's economy."[134]

James D. G. Dunn

Discussions of two scholars who have each composed influential commentaries on Romans round out my engagement with traditional readings, Dunn first, then Wright, though their attention to dialogue in 3:1-9 is significantly less pronounced. In the concluding taxonomies of potential advantages and problems manifested in traditional readings, I show that their presentations also prove to contain significant gaps.

After the catalog of traditional Hellenistic Jewish critiques of non-Jews in 1:18-32 that ultimately applies to all humanity,[135] Paul begins to address an interlocutor. Dunn argues that though this interlocutor is initially unidentified, the "Jewish" style of 1:19-32 indicates that the interlocutor is a Jew.[136] In fact, the interlocutor is a Jew who agrees with the critiques of non-Jews in the *Wisdom of Solomon* that are paralleled in Rom 1:19-32.[137] Rom 2 builds in specificity regarding the interlocutor and Paul's critique of him.

---

[133] Ibid., 229.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Dunn, *Romans*, 55-56, 70.

[136] Ibid., 76-79; idem., *Theology*, 115.

[137] Idem., *Romans*, 82-83, 89; idem., *Theology*, 116.

By the end of the chapter, it is clear that the Jewish interlocutor presumes that his possession of νόμος and its physical manifestation in circumcision distinguish him from non-Jews in God's eyes. The effect of this presumption is overconfidence in God's favor for, and obligation to, Israel, such that God will only meet the privileged Jew's sin with mercy.[138] Thus, the Jewish interlocutor believes his possession of νόμος and circumcision functions as a "talisman" or "prophylactic" at the judgment and grants him a superiority over non-Jews, thereby demonstrating a nationalistic, or ethnocentric, exclusivity in which God belongs solely to the Jews.[139]

Paul, of course, critiques this view; God does not judge Jews who do not do νόμος any differently than gentiles who do not do νόμος (2:12-16). Thus, Dunn claims, "God's judgment will be completely evenhanded,"[140] and simple possession of νόμος affords the Jew no advantage over non-Jews. In this way, Paul aims to "deflate" the Jew's presumption that God is predisposed in Israel's favor.[141]

The dialogue in 3:1-8 clarifies that this is the case, as the interlocutor objects and wonders what advantage there is to being Jewish and circumcised (3:1).[142] In his own voice, Paul responds that Jews are advantaged by being entrusted with the λόγια (3:2), but he does not indicate how that constitutes an advantage.[143] At this point, however, the

---

[138] Idem., *Romans*, 77, 90-91, 108; idem., *Theology* 116.

[139] Idem., *Theology*, 117; idem., *Romans*, 110. The term "ethnocentric" comes from Bruce W. Longenecker, *Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11* (JSNTSup 57; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 27-31.

[140] Dunn, *Theology*, 117.

[141] Idem., *Romans*, 77.

[142] Ibid., 129; idem., *Theology*, 118n.75.

[143] Ibid., 45.

dialogue quickly begins to break down; Dunn claims that it gets "out of hand."[144] Dunn asserts that though "Paul at first perseveres with the diatribe style" of Rom 2 in 3:1-8, "the debate becomes increasingly with himself."[145] The only other comment Dunn makes relevant to the structure of 3:1:8 as dialogue is that Paul is surely responsible for the μὴ γένοιτο rejections in 3:4 and 6, on the grounds that Paul could not attribute such a phrase to another speaker.[146] Thus, to the degree that Dunn concerns himself with the dialogue in 3:1-8, he resembles the traditional reading at each of these points. In any case, by the end of the pericope, Paul illustrates that God does not only judge gentile idolatry, "but also the idolatrous misplaced confidence of his own people in their own God-given religion and status before God," including their nationalistic pride.[147] Thus, 3:1-8 draws the final connection that leads to the indictment of all in 3:9 and sets the stage for conversations to occur in the rest of the letter.[148]

One such conversation involves the question of Jewish advantage and Israel's fate. Are Jews advantaged over non-Jews (cf. Rom 2)? Do the λόγια really constitute an advantage for Jews (cf. 3:2)? According to Dunn, Paul says "no" to the former but "yes" to the latter. This conversation of course returns in chapters 9-11, where Paul addresses Israel's eschatological fate. Here, Dunn argues, Paul affirms Israel's call, election, and

---

[144] Idem., *Romans*, 145. So also Heikki Räisänen, "Zum Verständis von Röm 3,1-8," in *The Torah and Christ: Essays in German and English on the Problem of the Law in Early Christianity* (Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 45; Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1986), 185.

[145] Dunn, *Romans*, 129. Similarly, Moo argues, "Paul is not so much reproducing for his readers an argument between himself and another person as he is posing questions and objections to himself." Moo, *Romans*, 181.

[146] Dunn, *Theology*, 118n.75. Dunn intends his comment as critique of Elliott (*Rhetoric*, 139-41) and Stowers (*Rereading*, ch. 5), based on Malherbe's assessment in "Μη Γενοιτο."

[147] Dunn, *Theology*, 118-19.

[148] Idem., *Romans*, 77, 148-49, 156.

the promises, but these apply neither on the basis of genealogy nor covenant faithfulness (9:7-13), as Paul indicates in Rom 3-4.[149] Instead, God hardens or shows mercy to whomever he wills (9:18). God's sovereignty over creation, however, does not have as its primary purpose the hardening of humanity, but a display of mercy. Even if part of Israel is hardened and "fills the role of the 'vessels of wrath'" in the present, Paul's concept of predestination looks forward to the "not yet."[150] At that time, the division within historic Israel will be healed, and the division between historic Israel and the rest of those called by God will disappear.[151] Thus, Paul "does not weaken his commitment to the Gentiles in any degree. But he holds forth a hope for the final salvation of Israel which is characteristically Jewish through and through," being based on God's call.[152] In this way, "The gifts and calling of God are irrevocable… The God of Israel remains faithful to Israel; his righteousness endures to the end."[153]

N. T. Wright

The final scholar to consider in this group is N. T. Wright. For Wright, Rom 2:1-11 critiques all humans, but 2:17 turns specifically to a Jew.[154] The Jew Paul begins to address in 2:17 is, at first, quite similar to Dunn's. This Jew is not one who attempts "to use the law as a ladder of good works up which to climb to a moral self-righteousness,"

---

[149] Idem., *Theology*, 510-11.

[150] Ibid., 511-13.

[151] Ibid., 527.

[152] Ibid., 528.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Wright, "The Law," 147.

but one who relies on a "national righteousness."[155] That is, this Jew boasts in and relies on the law "as the covenant badge which would keep membership within that covenant limited to Jews and Jews only."[156] The covenant, therefore, in this Jew's mind, is exclusive and based on ethnicity and Torah possession.[157] This view stems from the sense that, though they have returned from Babylon, Israel remains in exile and longs for the renewal of the covenant, which they seek to establish on and as their own.[158]

The way Wright formulates Paul's problem with this Jewish position, however, is quite different.[159] Wright argues, "The presuppositions of all Paul's thought, as of more or less all serious Jewish thought, is that in some way or other Israel is the solution of the creator god, [Yahweh], to the problem of the world."[160] Said otherwise, Israel's vocation is to be the light of the world.[161] Israel, however, loses sight of that vocation and, by clinging to an exclusive nationalism and possession of law as that which sets Israel apart from other nations, becomes sinful. Israel, therefore, needs a "physician's physician, one who could do for Israel, and hence for the world, what neither could do for themselves or for each other."[162] In Wright's schematic, Paul argues that this physician had in fact come

---

[155] Ibid., 139.

[156] Ibid.

[157] Ibid., 142.

[158] Ibid., 147. The theme of Israel's continuing exile plays a significant role in many of Wright's publications.

[159] Not only is Wright's formulation different, it is also more difficult to discuss linearly. When Wright addresses Rom 2 and 3:1-8, he tends to argue from 3:2-3 backwards into Rom 2. My summary of Wright attempts a linear rather than retrospective presentation of Wright's argument.

[160] Wright, "The Law," 147.

[161] Idem., "Romans 2:17-3:9," 2.

[162] Idem., "The Law," 147.

and the covenant been renewed in Christ, as is clear from the existence of (Christian) gentiles who surprisingly and paradoxically keep the law (2:12-16; 25-29) and find themselves to be the beneficiaries of this new covenant.[163] Essentially, what Israel fails to do for the world, God accomplishes by sending Christ in its place, so that he, the creator God, might rescue the created order that he has committed himself to rescuing in some sense through Israel.[164]

For Wright, the "linchpin" for this view comes in 3:1-9, especially 3:2-3.[165] If the gospel and God's wrath equally apply to Jew and gentile, and if Paul "really does envisage people of any and every background being regarded as 'circumcision' and as 'Jew'" (2:25-29), then, indeed, Paul needs to ask what advantage there is to being Jewish (3:1).[166] Paul's answer is that Israel was "entrusted" with the λόγια (3:2), which means to be given something which one must "take care of *and pass on to the appropriate person*," as Paul speaks concerning his own gospel (1 Cor 9:17; Gal 2:7; 1 Thess 2:4).[167] In this sense, Wright argues, God gives the λόγια to Israel in order for Israel to pass them on to the people for whom they were intended, namely, the gentiles.[168] Israel, however, is unfaithful to this vocation (3:3); instead of sharing the λόγια with the world, Israel boasts in its exclusive possession of them. Thus, Paul does not critique Israel for a lack of πίστις

---

[163] Ibid., 147.

[164] Idem., "Rom 2:17-3:9," 2; idem., *Paul*, 836.

[165] Idem., "Rom 2:17-3:9," 2. Note that in Wright's numerous publications on Rom 3, he never addresses the question or significance of dialogue in the pericope, much less the issue of which voice speaks which lines.

[166] Idem., *Paul*, 836-37.

[167] Ibid., 837, italics original; idem., "Rom 2:17-3:9," 2-3.

[168] So also Jewett, *Romans*, 243, but see 244-45 where he connects ἀπιστία with a rejection of Jesus as Messiah.

in the Christian sense, but specifically for failing to relay God's λόγια to the world.[169] Nevertheless, despite Israel's faithlessness to her commission, God remains faithful to his promise to bless the world through Israel (3:4), which he accomplishes through Christ, the "*faithful Israelite*," "Israel's representative, Israel-in-person if you will" (3:21-26).[170] This insures that God cannot be found unfaithful, unjust (cf. 3:5-6), or untrue (cf. 3:7), and it (i.e., 3:1-9) provides a "summary of the key moves that Paul will make throughout much of the letter," especially Rom 9-11.[171]

For instance, the instrumentality in God's plan, not only of Israel but also of the church, rises again to the fore in Rom 9-11. On the one hand, it is through Israel's trespass, disobedience, and casting away that God rescues the world through Israel, "if not through their faithfulness, then through their unfaithfulness" and by means of the Messiah.[172] On the other hand, in keeping with Israel's own scriptures (cf. Deut 32:21), non-Jewish Christians play the part of making Jews jealous in order to shock Jews into faith (11:14).[173] Thus, Wright argues, it is indeed through Israel that God blesses the gentiles, and it is through the gentiles that God then works to rescue Jews. Moreover, lest it appear as though God in fact shows any degree of national partiality for Israel as the Jew in 2:17-29 supposes, chapter 11 concludes with a resounding note of equality. God imprisoned Israel and non-Israel under disobedience (11:32), so that the Messiah's

---

[169] Wright, "Rom 2:17-3:9," 3-4, 7. Moo argues the opposite point. For Moo, in light of Rom 11:17, Jewish faithlessness to the covenantal obligations (3:2-3) indeed carries the meaning of "the Jews' failure to embrace Jesus as the Messiah." Moo, *Romans*, 184-85.

[170] Wright, *Paul*, 838-39, italics original.

[171] Idem., "Rom 2:17-3:9," 5.

[172] Ibid., 20-21.

[173] Ibid., 21.

faithful and obedient death and resurrection procure salvation for all who come to faith in Jesus as the risen Messiah and Lord. Justification and salvation are matters of mercy not only for gentiles, but also for Jews. In this way, God is faithful to the covenant with respect both to Jews and gentiles.[174]

Conclusions

Traditional readings of the script of 3:1-8/9, therefore, tend to understand an imaginary interlocutor posing objections to Paul in the form of questions, which Paul responds to in his own voice. With minute variations, such readings identify the speaker in 3:1, 3, 5a, 7-8a, c, and 9a as the interlocutor, and the respondent in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, and 9b as Paul. Many view 3:5b and 3:8b as authorial asides or commentary by Paul that do not belong to the imaginary dialogue. The script is as follows:

> *Interlocutor*: Therefore, what advantage comes from being Jewish, or what benefit accrues from circumcision? (3:1)
>
> > *Paul's Response*: There is much [advantage] in every way! To begin, they were entrusted with the oracles of God. (3:2)
>
> *Interlocutor*: To what end? If some lacked πίστις, their lack of πίστις will not nullify God's πίστις, will it? (3:3)
>
> > *Paul's Response*: Absolutely not! Instead, let God be true but every human a liar, as it is written, "So that you might be justified in your words, and you will overcome when you are judged." (3:4)
>
> *Interlocutor*: But if our unrighteousness proves God's righteousness, what shall we say? God is not unjust when he brings wrath, is he? (3:5a)
>
> > *Paul's Authorial Aside*: (3:5b) I speak in a human way.
>
> > *Paul's Response*: (3:6) Absolutely not! Otherwise, how will God judge the world?

[174] Idem., *Romans*, 694-95.

Interlocutor: But if God's truthfulness is increased for his glory by my lie, why am I still being judged as a sinner? Why not, (*Paul's Authorial Aside*?) as we are slandered and as some claim that we say, (*Return to Interlocutor*?) "Let us do evil so that good might come?" (3:7-8c)

Paul's Response: Their judgment is justly deserved. (3:8d)

Interlocutor: What then? Are we advantaged or disadvantaged? (3:9a)

Paul's Response: By no means! For, we have charged both Jews and Greeks all to be under Sin, as it is written… (3:9b-10)

Each of the scholars discussed above who read Rom 3:1-8/9 according to a traditional script displays both areas of strength and areas in need of further clarification.[175] Points of obvious strength extend back to Godet, and no doubt even further. The shining points in Godet's treatment are his relatively simple but significant exegetical observations about the interrogatives in 3:1-8 that are negated with μή, which imply a negative answer, and his insistance that Paul speaks these verses (3:3, 5, [and 8, though he does not discuss it]).[176] Any arrangement of the dialogue in 3:1-9 must account for this use of μή, and traditional readings especially must explain why an interlocutor would pose "objections" he or she expects Paul to dismiss from the very beginning. For this reason, Godet's work impacts (or should impact) all subsequent dialogical readings of the pericope. Of the views discussed so far, only Tobin's portrayal of the dialogue accounts for this, since Paul employs this interlocutor specifically to demonstrate where he and his Romans Christian audience are in agreement.[177] Tobin, therefore, implicitly

[175] I do not intend the following discussions of strengths and weaknesses to be exhaustive or even determinative at this point. Rather, these taxonomies indicate points of both potentially positive and potentially negative sorts for which a successful treatment of Rom 3:1-8 must be able to account, in one way or another. I address the merit of these issues and others at the exegetical level in Chapters Ten and Eleven.

[176] Godet, *Romans*, 131-39; BDF §427.

[177] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 119-20.

identifies a hole in Godet's otherwise astute reasoning, namely, what if the imaginary interlocutor agrees with Paul on certain points? Then, such an interlocutor could naturally pose interrogatives with μή in expectation of Paul's negative response.[178]

Moving on, some of Bultmann's observations are also noteworthy. Bultmann's recognition that Paul formulates the words of the interlocutor in such a way as to advance his own argument is spot on, and this holds true whether Bultmann's arrangement of the script is correct or not.[179] To be sure, Bultmann arrives at this conclusion as a result of finding Paul's rhetorical acumen to be beneath that of other Greek writers.[180] One can, however, arrive at the same conclusion by attributing to Paul a more moderate degree of rhetorical sensibility. Speech-in-character teaches that it is the duty of the primary speaker or author to *craft* appropriate speech *for* an imaginary speaker and to do so in such a way as to meet various rhetorical goals (see Part One). Thus, Bultmann's conclusion matches the conventions for speech-in-character I set forth, even though he grounds his argument elsewhere. Also positive, especially when viewed in retrospect, is Bultmann's classification of the objections as "absurdities" (*Absurditäten*), incorrect conclusions based on the way Paul has developed his argument to this point.[181] This, too, can hold true regardless of the structure of the script.

---

[178] Moo correctly recognizes the significance of μή in the interrogatives, such that Paul should be the one responsible for formulating the interlocutor's objections in this way. Moo, *Romans*, 185-91, 194n.92. For Moo, however, this becomes the undoing of any meaningful dialogue in Rom 3:1-8, as the dialogue essentially dissolves into a back-and-forth monologue between Paul and himself. Ibid., 181.

[179] After all, Paul is responsible for the whole letter. Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 67.

[180] Ibid. Bultmann writes, "*Die Fiktion des mitredenden Gegners hat für ihn nicht die Kraft, die sie bei den Griechen hat*."

[181] Ibid.

Additionally, Malherbe's refinement of Bultmann concerning the *function* of the μὴ γένοιτο formulas is quite helpful. Malherbe not only provides an historical example (Epictetus) which Paul's use of μὴ γένοιτο mirrors. Malherbe also persuasively documents the supporting, explanatory, and introductory role of the comments that follow the μὴ γένοιτο rejections.[182] Accordingly, Malherbe is followed by many, especially Song.[183]

Tobin's work contains many positive points as well. First, I am partial to Tobin's identification of the body of Romans as diatribe, or at least heavily diatribal, as long as "diatribe" is defined as a rhetorical genre or category rather than as a literary genre.[184] Also, Tobin's comparison of the structure of the body of Romans with some of Epictetus's diatribes that rotate cyclically between expository and argumentative pericopae is quite strong.[185] Second, on an exegetical level, Tobin's discussion of the anonymity and ambiguity at several points in Rom 1-3 helpfully paves the way for how to understand Paul's use of "all" throughout the letter.[186] Third, and finally, I especially appreciate Tobin's emphasis on God's impartiality as a, or the, driving hermeneutical key in this passage.[187] For, clearly, divine impartiality is a feature that ultimately renders Paul's inclusive gospel for the gentiles possible.

---

[182] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο," 236-37.

[183] Song, *Reading Romans*, 112n.5.

[184] See my discussion of Stowers on this point in Part Two, Chapter Six.

[185] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 91-98.

[186] Ibid., 108-12.

[187] Ibid., 104-18

The final contribution of these "traditional" views is represented by many, but specifically so and respectively by Dunn and Wright. This point has more to do directly with Rom 9-11, but it relates to 3:1-9 as well. At times, Paul speaks primarily about Jews. At other times, Paul speaks more about non-Jews. At still other times, Paul speaks about *all*, Jew and non-Jew, without distinction. It is important, however, to keep both Jew and non-Jew in mind at all times and not to lose sight of what Paul is saying about, and more importantly what God is doing to, one or the other. It may very well turn out that in texts where it seems Paul is speaking primarily about Jews or non-Jews, the other is equally in sight, if perhaps slightly in the background. Thus, even in Paul's discussion of Israel in 9-11, Dunn recognizes that Paul "does not weaken his commitment to the Gentiles in any degree."[188] Wright also finds non-Jews to be prominent in 9-11; as God works through Israel to procure the redemption of non-Jews, so also God will use non-Jews to provoke Israel to jealousy and faith.[189] In this sense, what God does to Israel, God also does to the gentiles, and reading Rom 9-11 with an eye only toward Israel risks missing this feature of Paul's argument (see Chapters Ten and Eleven).

Despite the contributions of these traditional readers, their approaches also have several important problems. First, I have already mentioned the use of μή rather than οὐ in the interrogatives of 3:3, 5, and 8 and the relevance this discussion has for understanding the script and import of the dialogue. It is only Tobin, however, who provides a reasonable explanation for this phenomenon. Rodríguez's explanation of the interlocutor and the dialogue accounts for the occurrence of μή in 3:3, but it fails to do so for 3:5. Rodríguez's argument accounts for 3:3 because his interlocutor actually wants

[188] Dunn, *Theology*, 528.

[189] Wright, "Rom 2:17-3:9," 20-21.

Paul to reject the premise that faithlessness might nullify God's faithfulness. Rodríguez's analysis fails with respect to 3:5, however, because, in order for the interlocutor's unseasonably late circumcision to be credited as faithful obedience to the Torah, he needs Paul to *affirm* rather than deny that it would be unjust for God to bring wrath on those who magnify his glory.[190]

Second, and a matter of fact rather than critique, many of these traditional readings appear before discussion of diatribe and Romans come into full swing, much less rescriptive readings of Romans. Godet and Sanday and Headlam do not find dialogue in 3:1-8, as they precede Bultmann and are not privy to later discussions of diatribal dialogue and Romans. Similarly, Malherbe's "Μη Γενοιτο" sits in limbo between traditional diatribal readings and rescriptive readings. Malherbe is aware of Stowers's dissertation,[191] but Stowers had not yet published "Paul's Dialogue," in which he argues for the first revised script of the passage. Thus, one would altogether expect Malherbe to affirm a traditional script based on the timing of his publication.

Third, even among traditional readings that appear after the onset of rescriptive readings, there is inadequate engagement with the rescriptive offerings. For instance, several (incorrectly) conclude that Stowers altogether dismisses polemic from diatribe in favor of collegial and educational discourse (see Part Two),[192] or they neglect to engage with relevant literature such as Elliott's *The Rhetoric of Romans* (1990, 2007) or

---

[190] Rodríguez, *If You Call,* 66-67.

[191] Malherbe supervised the dissertation and cites Stowers twice. Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο," 231n.2, 239n.23. At the same time, however, Stowers had read Malherbe's unpublished paper before the completion of his dissertation. Stowers, *The Diatribe*, 124.

[192] Cf. Jewett, *Romans*, 239n.3.

Campbell's *The Deliverance of God* (2009).[193] This latter critique is particularly pronounced, especially since scholars like Elliott, who is followed by Campbell, use Stowers's own terms to argue for an even more aggressive revision of 3:1-9 than Stowers imagines (see below).

Fourth, practically all presentations of the traditional script of 3:1-9 are based on impermissible arguments, 'which are not really other arguments' (cf. Gal 1:6-7) but sweeping assumptions. On the one hand, it is often the case that no argument whatsoever is made about the script of the dialogue, and the traditional formulation is holistically appropriated.[194] Bultmann, for example, gives no voice to the possibility that the script might be altered or flipped; such a question is altogether unconsidered at his point in time. Similarly, Rodríguez assumes rather than argues for his presentation of the dialogue's arrangement. Rodríguez at least suggests that his presentation maintains consistency in that the interlocutor asks all the questions,[195] but he does not take diatribe's high degree of variability into account in the least (see Part Two), which limits the import of this consistency.[196]

On the other hand, when supporting points are presented, even they are by and large based on unwarranted assumptions. This is particularly true regarding the use of μὴ γένοιτο. To begin, Stowers's dissertation demonstrates that Epictetus can use μὴ γένοιτο

---

[193] Song engages with Stowers and confesses that his reading "may be also possible," but there is no awareness of Elliott (*Rhetoric*), and the same is true for Tobin. Similarly, Rodríguez neglects to engage Campbell (*Deliverance*). Song, *Reading Romans*, 112n.5, 7; Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*; Rodríguez, *If You Call*.

[194] See Jewett, *Romans*, 239-52, especially 239n.1.

[195] Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 64-65.

[196] Though this is true, note that the script I ultimately propose appeals to a consistency as well, but as a second-order piece of evidence.

as a rejection either in his own voice or in the voice of an interlocutor.[197] I illustrate this further in my discussion of *Disc*. 2.23 (see Part Two). As far as Malherbe is concerned, however, his shape of the script in Rom 3:1-8 is a foregone conclusion; given the assumed identity of the speaker behind occurrences of μὴ γένοιτο elsewhere in Paul, the phrase belongs irrevocably to Paul's voice in 3:4 and 6.[198] So also Song, who actually comments on Epictetus's *Disc*. 2.23 but ignores the question of who speaks which lines. Instead, Song simply assumes Epictetus must be responsible for the μὴ γένοιτο formula, just like he assumes Paul must be responsible for the formula in Rom 3:4 and 6.[199] This line of thinking is crystal clear in Dunn's work as well. Dunn critiques Elliott's "surprising" proposal and Stowers's "only partially more plausible reading," both of which identify the interlocutor as responsible for the rejection formulas in 3:4 and 6 rather than Paul, simply on the grounds that the phrase is used elsewhere in Paul.[200] Matera too dismisses Stowers's reading on the grounds that "it attributes questions that begin with [μὴ γένοιτο] (of course not) in 3:4 and 3:6 to Paul's dialogical partner, whereas in the rest of Romans, Paul reserves this expression for himself (3:31; 6:2, 15; 7:7, 13; 9:14; 11:1, 11)."[201] Matera, however, makes no argument for the case that any of these examples of the phrase actually belong to Paul (at the moment, whether they do or do not makes no difference). The point is, Matera assumes they belong to Paul, the case

[197] Stowers, *The Diatribe*, 128-29.

[198] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο," 234-36.

[199] Song, *Reading Romans*, 35-36, 66-67, 94-95, 112n.5, 7.

[200] Dunn, *Theology*, 118n.75.

[201] Matera, *Romans*, 80.

is closed, and Matera's reading of Romans is unjustifiably limited with respect to possible outcomes.[202]

The problems with this line of reasoning are pluriform. To begin, the whole system is based on circular reasoning; because this phrase is present elsewhere in Paul's letters in his own voice, it is assumed it must also be spoken in Paul's voice in 3:4 and 6. In addition, scholars who appeal to the use of the phrase elsewhere in Paul's writings neglect to consider whether or not those other instances are *actually* spoken in Paul's voice. In fact, more than one scholar has argued that the dialogue of the infamous "I" in Rom 7, which contains two instances of the μὴ γένοιτο formula (7:7, 13), is best understood as spoken in a voice *other than Paul's*.[203] Furthermore, the view that all μὴ γένοιτο formulas must be spoken in Paul's voice altogether ignores the fact that *Paul* is responsible not only for his own side of the dialogue but also for crafting his interlocutor's speech, as Bultmann notes[204] and the conventions for speech-in-character presuppose (see Part One). Since Paul is so comfortable with μὴ γένοιτο, it is surely possible that Paul could attribute this language to his interlocutor in an appropriate context, especially a diatribal context in which Epictetus represents a precedent for the use of the phrase both on the diatribal teacher's lips as well as on the interlocutor's. The point I am trying to make is not whether μὴ γένοιτο does, does not, or cannot be spoken in Paul's voice in 3:4 or 6; this will be addressed in Chapter Eleven. The point I am making is that arguments for the traditional script are based on insufficient logic. If the

[202] Similarly, see Jewett, *Romans*, 245n.61.

[203] Amongst others, Stowers, "Romans 7.7-25;" Longenecker, *Rhetoric*, 88-93.

[204] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 67.

traditional script is going to be maintained, so that Paul speaks 3:4 and 6 and the μὴ γένοιτο formulas therein, actual evidence must be offered, arguments weighed, and conclusions drawn. Simple assumptions cannot suffice, especially given the presence of rescriptive alternatives.

I argue rather bluntly here not only because the (ab)use of the μὴ γένοιτο phrase is so problematic and entrenched among traditional readers, but also because the same type of assumptions seep into other supporting claims for the traditional reading of 3:1-9. For example, concerning 3:3-4, Tobin argues that Rom 3:4 belongs to Paul because he cites scripture elsewhere in chapters 1-3, and 3:4 contains a citation of scripture. Consequently, 3:3 belongs to Tobin's interlocutor.[205] Tobin's attempt to identify Paul's speech by his practices elsewhere is not necessarily wrong-headed, but neither is it overly strong in this case. By itself, it is no less circular than arguments regarding μὴ γένοιτο. *Plus*, on the premise that Paul would only attribute speech to his interlocutor that appropriately models the interlocutor's character (see Part One), attributing to the interlocutor a citation of scripture would not be problematic in the least. For, in Tobin's own terms, Paul's Roman Christian audience, who the interlocutor represents, reveres the Mosaic law and Jewish scriptures. Given Tobin's own characterization of the interlocutor, therefore, a citation of scripture would fit quite nicely on the interlocutor's lips. Similarly, concerning 3:5-6, Tobin argues that Paul speaks 3:6 (and the interlocutor 3:5) because Paul is defending himself and answering objections.[206] This, too, is based altogether on an assumption resulting from decades of the traditional script occupying the position of the

[205] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 119.

[206] Ibid., 119-20.

majority view. Again, the point is not that such a script necessarily cannot be argued for; the point is that no one has *actually argued* successfully for it.

Fifth, to put the last point plainly, speech-in-character and its conventions are widely ignored among these readings, though they arguably provide the best point of view from which to consider the attributed speech in 3:1-9's dialogue.[207] Rarely a scholar will include a line about the importance or applicability of speech-in-character, but the reference inevitably amounts to nothing more than a "name drop." For instance, Rodríguez correctly notes the norm for characterization to precede imaginary dialogue, but he does not provide any detailed discussion of it, nor does he draw on the characterization as a way to define the divisions within the script.[208] Instead, the reference to speech-in-character remains relatively untapped and all its possible supporting evidence stored away to continue fermentation.

Sixth, traditional readings present a dialogical script that is potentially incoherent. For example, the authorial asides in 3:5 and 8 are obviously disruptive to the flow of the discourse—that is how traditional readers recognize them as authorial asides. These awkward interruptions surely contribute to Dunn's view that the dialogue "gets out of hand"[209] and to Wright's decision not to talk about dialogue in 3:1-9 at all.[210] The presumed authorial asides, however, are not only intrusive; they are also unnecessary. Tobin suggests that Paul inserts an editorial comment in 3:5b, "lest even the mention of

---

[207] For instance, Moo, *Romans*, 177-97; Dunn, *Romans*, 129.

[208] Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 62n.58.

[209] Dunn, *Romans*, 129, 146. See also Moo, *Romans*, 181.

[210] Wright, "Rom 2:17-3:9;" idem., *Romans*; idem., *Paul*.

the possibility of God being unjust be taken amiss."[211] Such a comment, however, ends in redundancy. Granting momentarily that the questions in 3:1-9 represent the interlocutor's objections, surely Paul's μὴ γένοιτο denial in 3:6 (emphatically translated "hell no!") would sufficiently stifle any potential misunderstanding about God's justice from the objection in 3:5. Moreover, why would Paul allow *any* of these objections to have the possibility of being misunderstood by his audience? Why does Paul feel obliged to offer supplemental authorial commentary on *this* objection? For instance, surely God's πίστις (3:3) is not (μή) less significant than his δικαιοσύνη (3:5), is it? Absolutely not (μὴ γένοιτο), but Paul apparently feels no need to issue an authorial comment in 3:3.

Finally, connected to the previous issue of incoherency, the traditional script seems to depict Paul both *affirming* (3:2) and *rejecting* (3:9) Jewish advantage over non-Jews. To many, the affirmation in 3:2 is particularly surprising given Paul's universal leveling in Rom 1-2. As C. H. Dodd famously puts it, "the logical answer" to the question of Jewish privilege "on the basis of Paul's argument is, 'None whatever!'"[212] The question therefore arises, if God is impartial and ultimately treats all equally (2:9-11), how can the Jews possess any real, substantive advantage over gentiles? How can the "oracles" (λόγια) give the Jews a salvific edge if God himself orchestrates their stumbling over them (Rom 9:32-33; 11:8; cf. 11:32)?[213] Of course, though some scholars do not comment at any length on this seemingly strange juxtaposition,[214] others offer possible solutions. Perhaps the point is that Jews have an advantage, but it is not a salvific

---

[211] Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 120n.44. So also Jewett, *Romans*, 248.

[212] Dodd, *Romans*, 43.

[213] On this latter point emphasizing God's tripping of Israel, see Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "Questions about Nomos, Answers about Christos: Romans 10:4 In Context," forthcoming.

[214] For example, Bultmann, *Der Stil*; Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο;" Song, *Reading Romans*.

advantage.[215] Perhaps Paul is here holding in tension the idea of God's impartiality to all along with his faithfulness to Israel.[216] Perhaps a better translation of key terms in 3:9 eases the apparent contradiction.[217] Or, perhaps the emphasis rests on 3:9, and Paul altogether rejects Jewish privilege.[218] Again, deciding the correct or best view is not presently the agenda; that is the task of Chapters Ten and Eleven. The point is, in every case, 'traditional readings first and rescriptive readings,' scholars must be able to account for Paul's ceaseless insistence on God's impartiality to all, on the one hand, *and* his discussion of Israel, non-Israelites, and God's faithfulness to his promises to Abraham, on the other hand. Such arguments will doubtlessly extend well beyond Rom 3:1-9 in both directions and address multiple issues throughout the letter, not least Paul's discussion of Abraham in Rom 4 and Israel in 9-11.

But addressing any of these strengths and weaknesses is contingent first and foremost on 'correctly dividing the words' and lines of 3:1-9's dialogical script. Again, a properly arranged script cannot simply be assumed but must be argued for with valid evidence and critical analysis. No one, however, has in fact done this for the traditional reading. Consequently, the long-standing, majority view of the traditional reading can no longer be assumed to be the best reading *simply on face value*. The reality that scholars, and much more the church, have read 3:1-9 according to the traditional script for so long does not suffice as an acceptable reason to endorse such a reading. As such, the door stands open for more persuasive arguments regarding the script of the diatribal dialogue

---

[215] For example, Hultgren, *Romans*, 135.

[216] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 195-97, 251-52.

[217] So Jewett, *Romans*, 256-57.

[218] Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 68.

Paul stages in Rom 3:1-9 and following, whether that proves to adhere to a traditional script or some rescripted version of the discourse. With one small interlude, therefore, I turn now to consider rescriptive alternatives in order to investigate what they offer as far as readings of Rom 3:1-9 and its place in the letter are concerned.

CHAPTER NINE

Rescriptive Readings of the Dialogue in Romans 3:1-9 and Its Role in the Letter

In the previous chapter I surveyed traditional readings of Rom 3:1-9 and concluded that such readings have a number of strengths, but they also regularly produce problems. I turn now to engage rescriptive readings to see whether they offer better explanations of the text. In order to set the stage for rescriptive readings, I begin with the work of David R. Hall, who rejects the presence of diatribe and dialogue in Rom 3:1-8 and heavily critiques those who employ diatribe to argue for the traditional script of the pericope. Then, beginning with Stowers, I assess those scholars who recognize Romans to be diatribal and 3:1-9 to be dialogical, but who rearrange, or rescript, the dialogue between Paul and his fictitious interlocutor. Because I outline in the previous chapter's conclusions the points that any successful reading of Rom 3:1-9 must address, it is possible to attend to the rescriptive readings on more of a case-by-case basis. It will still be important to consider whether rescriptive readings might add anything to that list that does not appear among the traditional readings.[1]

David R. Hall: Non-Diatribal Critique of Traditional Readings

The brief interlude between traditional and rescriptive readers takes this conversation back in time over three decades with David R. Hall's article, "Romans 3.1-8 Reconsidered." On the one hand, Hall represents something of an unresolved thorn in the

[1] Again, with a few exceptions, I reserve discussion of the various commentaries and additional secondary literature until Chapters Ten and Eleven.

side of traditional readings, as Hall recapitulates many Godet-esque critiques. On the other hand, discussing Hall at this point resets the stage for the consideration of rescriptive readings of Rom 3:1-9, as they begin to appear soon after the publication of Hall's article.

Hall critiques readings of Rom 3:1-8 that follow "the diatribe hypothesis." The readings Hall specifically has in mind are those that understand the questions in 3:1-8 as objections spoken by an imaginary interlocutor, i.e., traditional readings of the script. Hall first argues against traditional readings on the ground that it is best not to read Rom 3:1-8 as diatribe in the first place. Then, Hall raises a number of exegetical observations that problematize the traditional script of the passage. Thus, Hall addresses both the forest and certain trees in the traditional reading's standard position.

Hall pushes against reading the passage as diatribe in two ways. First, Hall notes that in traditional readings of Rom 3:1-8, "the objections are stated in detail, and Paul's replies are brief and inadequate." This arrangement, Hall thinks, falls clearly outside of the norm for diatribal dialogue, which would balance the discourse in precisely the opposite direction.[2] Second, Hall argues that when Paul introduces interlocutors elsewhere, he uses common introductory formulas that indicate a new speaker. Hall understands the phrase, τί ἐροῦμεν (3:5), however, as an indicator for "internal debate rather than external objection," so that the "origin" for Paul's argument "is to be found not only in his debates with Jewish objectors, but also in the internal debate within his own conscience."[3] For these reasons, according to Hall, it is best not to read Rom 3:1-8

[2] Hall, "Romans 3.1-9," 183.

[3] Ibid., 183-84.

as diatribe. Instead, Rom 3:1-8 is better understood as Paul's own exposition of Ps 51:4, quoted in Rom 3:4, and defense of God's righteousness.[4]

For his critiques of the traditional script of the passage, Hall first draws on the same grammatical rules as Godet concerning the use of μή and οὐ in interrogatives. Concerning Rom 3:5, Hall writes, "There is, however, a major difficulty in the hypothesis that in this verse Paul is quoting an imaginary objector. The question is introduced by the word μή, and is a 'rhetorical question anticipating a negative answer.'"[5] Hall continues, "This is not the way in which objectors speak," and he quotes Godet to the end that Paul must be the speaker of this verse.[6]

Then, concerning 3:7-8a, Hall argues that the position of the "diatribe hypothesis," which also places these verses in the mouth of an interlocutor, "presents two minor difficulties and one major difficulty."[7] The first minor difficulty Hall sets forth is that, if these verses are spoken in the mouth of an interlocutor, one should favor textually the reading εἰ δέ rather than the also well attested εἰ γάρ. The former is supported by א and A, but the latter is supported by B D G K L P Ψ, amongst others on both accounts. Hall nevertheless admits that both readings have sufficient textual evidence to justify the adoption of either one.[8] The second minor difficulty Hall finds involves the parenthesis, καθὼς βλασφημούμεθα… Hall argues that the first person plural "'we' refers to 'Paul and his colleagues,'" so that the parenthesis "comes very awkwardly in the middle of a

---

[4] Ibid., 195.

[5] Ibid., 190. Hall quotes Cranfield, *Romans*, 184.

[6] Hall, "Romans 3.1-8," 190.

[7] Ibid., 192.

[8] Ibid.

sentence attributed to the objector."[9] The major difficulty for the traditional reading is, again, that Paul dismisses the lengthy objection of 3:7-8a with a terse, five-word rejection, which "conflicts with the normal diatribe style."[10] Hall actually raises yet a fourth problem for the script of 3:7, arguing that the first-person phrase, κἀγὼ ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι, has as its subject "'I, Paul,' as it always does in his letters."[11]

Hall's overall argument is not without fault, however, since Hall interacts with an overly narrow understanding of diatribe and diatribal readings of Rom 3:1-8. This is largely due to the timing of his publication. At the time of Hall's publication, no rescriptive readings of 3:1-8 were in print. Stowers's dissertation had been published—with which Hall does not interact—but, as I show momentarily, Stowers's initial discussion of 3:1-9 is far from an exhaustive or even clear demonstration of his thoughts about the shape of its dialogue. As a result, Hall fails to comprehend the diversity and variability represented in diatribe, supposing it instead to be one monolithic practice that produces a similarly fixed interpretation of 3:1-8.

Hall does nevertheless (re-)raise multiple issues against the traditional script of the dialogue in 3:1-8, several of which go without any persuasive rejoinder from traditional readers who chronologically follow him (see above). How can one make sense of the interrogatives, traditionally understood as objections posed to Paul, which contain μή and *expect* to be rejected? Furthermore, if 3:8 contains a parenthesis, how would the audience know how to separate the first-person plural references to Paul and his colleagues from those spoken in the voice of his imaginary interlocutor(s)? Would they

---

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., 194. Hall is referring specifically to the phrase, κἀγὼ.

know how to identify the first-person singular reference in 3:7 in relation to the various first-person plural references elsewhere in the passage? Also, how are the brief rejections to be explained in light of the more lengthy and detailed objections, which Hall suggests fly in the face of diatribal norms? On this latter point, traditional readers would rightly respond that Paul addresses these issues in more detail later in Romans (e.g., Rom 6, 9-11),[12] but this begs Hall's very question of just how far Romans can deviate from diatribal style and still be readable as diatribe. So, can a traditional reading answer these questions? Or, can a rescriptive reading solve some of these reoccurring concerns?

Rescriptive Readings of the Dialogue of Romans 3:1-9

As is clear by now, by "rescriptive readings," I have in mind those engagements with Rom 3:1-9 that revise the script of the dialogue by reassessing which lines are most appropriately spoken in which voice, Paul's or his interlocutor's. Such rescriptions of the dialogue take on two shapes. In the first place is Stowers, who offers the first significant revision for consideration shortly after the publication of his dissertation. The second arrangement of the revised script belongs to Elliott, whom Campbell follows. Though Elliott and Campbell share the same script of the pericope, it will be quite clear that this in no way results in identical understandings of the dialogue in the argument of Romans. I address each of these scholars in order.[13]

[12] Examples are legion. For instance, Wright, "Rom 2:17-3:9," 5; Moo, *Romans*, 180.

[13] Note that Stowers and Elliott both have multiple relevant publications on Rom 3. I address all of Stowers's work together, and similarly with Elliott's, rather than tracking the conversation chronologically.

Stanley K. Stowers

Stowers has four publications that are particularly relevant for the purposes of this project, taken here in chronological order.

The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans. In his dissertation, after presenting his reassessment of the diatribal primary sources, Stowers narrows his engagement to illustrate three diatribal phenomena as represented in both diatribal texts and Romans. The three features Stowers discusses include: (1) address to the imaginary interlocutor, (2) objections and false conclusions, and (3) dialogical exchange and *exemplum*. Stowers addresses Rom 3:1-9 in chapter three, "Objections and False Conclusions."

Stowers opens his discussion by defining objections and false conclusions, which is helpful to quote in full:

> An objection raises a problem, contradicts or takes exception to something in the author's line of argument. A false conclusion is indicated when the author himself or an interlocutor states a false inference deduced from the author's position. False conclusions are usually stated rhetorically and usually imply an objection. Objections and false conclusions are often the same or very similar in form. These basic observations also apply to Paul's use of these devices in Romans.[14]

Stowers then outlines the instances in Romans where he finds objections and false conclusions.[15] With respect to Rom 3:1-9, Stowers argues as follows. The two interrogative clauses in Rom 3:1 are objections that "[imply] a false conclusion from what precedes," and 3:2 answers the questions with explanation. Rom 3:3 introduces another objection, which is a false conclusion or objection to Paul's argument in 2:17-29, and which is rejected with reasoning in 3:4. Rom 3:5 presents yet another pair of

[14] Stowers, *The Diatribe*, 119.

[15] Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraph is based on ibid., 119-20.

objections, the latter of which is a false conclusion that expects a negative answer; 3:6 rejects these objections and explains why. Rom 3:7-8c poses two more objections and contains a parenthetic statement. Rom 3:8d responds to the accusers introduced in the parenthetic statement. Finally, 3:9a presents a false conclusion repeated from 3:1, which 3:9b rejects and explains. So, in Stowers's analysis, 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c and 9a are objections or false conclusions, and 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, 9b-20 are responses to those objections / false conclusions.[16]

Stowers's, however, makes almost no comment regarding the voice in which each line of the discourse is spoken, and Stowers himself argues that false conclusions can be spoken by *either* voice in a dialogue.[17] The sole instance where Stowers might comment regarding the arrangement of 3:1-9 is with regards to Rom 3:4. Stowers writes, "Quotations from the scriptures play an important part in Paul's reply to objections in 3:4," whereby Stowers seems to suggest that Paul is responsible for speaking this verse.[18] As I show below, this is markedly *not* what Stowers argues in subsequent publications. As such, it is quite unclear precisely what Stowers thinks about the script of the dialogue in 3:1-9 based solely on his dissertation.[19] Furthermore, Stowers does not attempt to

[16] It is unclear to me why Stowers identifies certain verses as "objections," but then describes them as false conclusions or false interpretations. Later, Stowers writes that 3:1a contains objections stated as questions, and 3:3, 5, 7, 8, and 9 are false conclusions put forth as questions. Ibid., 134.

[17] Ibid., 119.

[18] Ibid., 137.

[19] The ambiguity in Stowers's dissertation impacts other scholars as well. For instance, Song attempts to support (albeit marginally) his traditional reading of the script of 3:1-9 by noting that "Stowers' original reading of this section was very similar to mine in his dissertation published in 1981." Song seems to suppose that "objections" and "false conclusions" in Stowers's analysis must belong to the interlocutor. Song, *Reading Romans*, 112n.5, 7. Similarly, Elliott supposes Stowers's comments in his dissertation adhere to the traditional script. Elliott, *Arrogance*, 205n.74.

situate 3:1-9 within the larger argument of Romans; this too must wait for later publications.

Stowers does, however, discuss 3:1-9 in a diatribal, educational context. Commenting against the frequency with which the passage is understood as polemic against Jews or Judaizers, Stowers argues,

> The objections in 3:1-9 and elsewhere should not be thought of as aimed at Jews as opponents, but rather as addressed to the Roman church in the mode of indictment and censure. Their intent is not polemical but pedagogical.[20]

Thus, Stowers differentiates between the tone Paul takes with his imaginary interlocutor and his intended historical audience. Though Stowers clearly indicates his thoughts about Paul's tone towards his audience, he unfortunately does not comment on Paul's tone towards his interlocutor. Is Paul's tone towards his interlocutor indeed polemical (which Stowers maintains as one possible function of diatribe, as depicted in Epictetus's *Disc*. 2.20 and 23), or is it similarly collaborative and educational?

"Paul's Dialogue with a Fellow Jew in Romans 3:1-9." In his 1984 article, Stowers engages Rom 3:1-9 and traditional readings more completely and proposes the first revised script of the dialogue. Stowers begins by noting numerous difficulties he finds with traditional readings, including: (1) to the degree traditional readings view the passage as a "digression" or "Paul getting ahead of himself," they fail to account adequately for the function of the passage in the letter as a whole;[21] (2) traditional readings lack unity and coherence; (3) traditional readings fail to make sense of the dialogical exchanges, specifically concerning the identity of the interlocutor; (4) the

[20] Stowers, *The Diatribe*, 153.

[21] Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue," 707-10.

traditional view's accepted reading (i.e., the script) of the text is incoherent, especially the bewildering transitions between voices in first-person speech; and (5, but essentially a reiteration of 1) traditional readings fail to account "satisfactorily for the function of the passage in the rhetoric of the letter."[22] Through his revision of the script in light of diatribal practices, however, Stowers hopes to alleviate these tensions.

How then does Stowers address Rom 3:1-9? Stowers's criteria for understanding the pericope depend on "one of the most common methods of characterization," namely, "an apostrophe to the imaginary person,"[23] the tendency for the diatribal teacher to lead the questioning after an initial interruption from an interlocutor,[24] and other contextual and/or diatribal clues. So, in addressing Rom 3:1-9, Stowers begins with 2:17-29, which he identifies as "an apostrophe to an imaginary Jewish interlocutor in the style of the diatribe."[25] In this apostrophe, "Paul characterizes the interlocutor as a person who proudly claims to be a Jew and a teacher of truth, but whose behavior is inconsistent with these claims."[26]

This interlocutor's intrusion at 3:1 then leads into a dialogue between the interlocutor and Paul. Stowers narrates the dialogue according to the following progression:[27]

> *Interlocutor*: What then is the advantage of the Jew, or what is the value of circumcision? (3:1)

---

[22] Ibid., 710.

[23] Ibid., 713.

[24] Ibid., 714.

[25] Ibid., 715; idem., *The Diatribe*, 79-118.

[26] Idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715.

[27] Ibid. Stowers notes that his text, which I have quoted, follows the RSV as much as possible.

Paul's Response: Much in every way! To begin with, the Jews were entrusted with the oracles of God. (3:2)

Paul's Guiding Question: What else! If some were unfaithful, their unfaithfulness does not nullify the faithfulness of God, does it? (3:3)

Interlocutor's Response: By no means! Let God be true, though every man be false, as it is written, "That thou may be justified in thy words, and prevail when thou art judged."[28] (3:4)

Paul's Guiding Question: But if our wickedness serves to show the righteousness of God, what shall we say? That God is unjust to inflict wrath on us? (I speak in a human way.) (3:5)

Interlocutor's Response: By no means! For then how could God judge the world? (3:6)

Paul's Guiding Question: But if through my falsehood God's truthfulness abounds to his glory, why am I still being condemned as a sinner? And shall we then say (as certain people also slanderously charge us with saying), "Let us do evil, that good may come?" (3:7-8c)

Paul's Own Response: Those who so slander us are deservedly condemned. (3:8d)

Interlocutor's Question: What then? Are we Jews at a disadvantage? (3:9a)

Paul's Response: Not at all! For we have already charged that all, both Jews and Greeks, are under sin… (3:9b)

Thus, Stowers maintains the frame of the traditional reading (3:1-2 and 9a-b) but inverts each exchange in the middle of the discourse (3:3-8). So, the interlocutor speaks 3:1, 4, 6, 9a, and Paul speaks 3:2, 3, 5, 7-8, 9b.

According to Stowers's reading, based on Paul's comments in 2:17-29 about God's impartial judgment contingent on behavior, the Jewish interlocutor wonders whether membership in the Jewish community provides any benefit and asks the logical question about Jewish advantage (3:1). Perhaps unexpectedly, Paul answers in the

[28] So, either Stowers changed his mind about the voice of 3:4 between the time of his dissertation and this article, or his dissertation does not clearly communicate his views about the verse.

affirmative; Jews were entrusted with the oracles of God (3:2). Rather than reading 3:3 as a return to the interlocutor's voice, however, Stowers argues that it is "more plausible… to read 3:3 as a diatribal teacher's leading question," so that "Paul begins to question him and will lead the interlocutor not only to answer his own objection, but also to an admission of the apostles basic theological claims."[29] Said otherwise, Paul leads the interlocutor "to be the witness, to provide the evidence" for Paul's own argument.[30] The interlocutor, therefore, emphatically rejects Paul's leading questions about God's (lack of) faithfulness (3:3) and (lack of) righteousness (3:5) with μὴ γένοιτο in 3:4 and 6, respectively.[31] Then, due to the interlocutor's belief "in a kind of cheap grace for Israel," Paul offers himself (hypothetically) as a *reductio ad absurdum*, clearly demonstrating the absurdity involved with a member of the covenant community complaining that he should not be punished for his sin since it ultimately magnifies God (3:7-8). In this way, Paul leads his interlocutor "to see that, on the one hand, God has not abandoned his people… but, on the other hand, that God is at the same time the judge of the world."[32] Supposing Paul to be eliminating God's mercy toward Israel, the interlocutor then asks whether Jews are actually at a disadvantage in relation to gentiles (3:9a). Paul rejects the interlocutor's concern and reiterates that all people are on equal footing under sin (3:9b).[33]

---

[29] Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue," 716.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., 716-17.

[32] Ibid., 717-18.

[33] Ibid., 720. Stowers takes the difficult verb προεχόμεθα as a passive, "are we Jews at a disadvantage." See my discussion of this below and in Chapter Eleven.

Stowers suggests that his reading solves many of the problems he finds with the traditional reading. First, the apostrophe in 2:17-29 and the dialogue in 3:1-9 form a coherent unit, so there is no break or digression in the discussion. Second, understanding the first-person plural references as the dialogical 'we,' "meaning Paul and his discussion partner… makes sense consistently for the whole text."[34] Third, whereas the traditional reading is unable to explain 3:1-9 in its larger epistolary context, Stowers argues that his reading illustrates how the passage is "a continuation of the discussion of God's impartiality, only now by means of the dramatic fiction of a dialogue with a Jewish interlocutor," both in terms of God's judgment and his righteousness (cf. 3:21-26).[35] Fourth, it resolves anti-Semitic tendencies, since the dialogue is not a polemic against Jews or Judaism, but provides a pedagogical and protreptic "model of reasonable discussion with Jews," which Paul's Roman audience is allowed to overhear.[36]

I will have more to say about Stowers's views after my discussion of his next work, *A Rereading of Romans*, which is very similar to his presentation in "Paul's Dialogue." I do wish to note a number of strengths and weaknesses at this point. At minimum, it is commendable that Stowers approaches the text with open eyes rather than blindly adhering to previous, traditional, readings. Additionally, Stowers *does* offer a reading that resolves one of the problems that perennially plague the traditional reading. That is, though Stowers could make the point more clearly, his rescription of 3:3 and 5 into Paul's voice entirely eliminates the concern of scholars like Godet and Hall who find the use of μή in the interrogatives to be a massive stumbling block for the traditional

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., 721.

[36] Ibid., 722.

script. In Stowers's reading, the μή works wonderfully in the interrogatives, as Paul intentionally guides his interlocutor to reject (as μή expects) the false conclusions he raises. Furthermore, Stowers offers a coherent reading of 2:17-3:9 (and following) that does not resort to labeling 3:1-9 as a digression or deserving of omission, and he correctly recognizes that the dialogue with the interlocutor functions not as an end in its own right but as a model for Paul's actual Roman audience.[37]

Stowers does not solve all of the problems, however. In fact, Stowers creates additional problems. First, Stowers believes he has resolved the tension between Paul's various comments about Jewish privilege in Rom 2-3 (cf. 9-11). Stowers argues that Paul affirms Jewish advantage in 3:1-2 but rejects Jewish *dis*advantage in 3:9. This, however, only results in 3:1-9 not holding seemingly opposing views in tension, at least until one digs a little deeper. The tension still exists between Paul's comments about divine impartiality and the equality of Jew and gentile in Rom 2, on the one hand, and those supposedly about Jewish advantage in Rom 3, on the other hand. The tension remains as real as ever. What is more, Stowers's analysis of 3:9 does not actually cohere with 3:2. For Stowers, Rom 3:2 positively affirms Jewish advantage. Rom 3:9, however, negatively rejects Jewish disadvantage, only to remark once again on the *equality* of Jew and gentile in the remainder of 3:9-20. Thus, in Stowers's reading, 3:1-2 offers Jews an advantage that ultimately amounts to nothing as 3:9-20 completely obliterates it.

Second, though Stowers substantially revises the script of 3:1-9, his argumentation for doing so rests on little solid evidence. For instance, Stowers's identification of 3:3 as a shift to Paul's leading questions is supported merely by the not

[37] Note that more recent traditional readings like Tobin's can accomplish this as well. Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*.

uncommon practice for diatribal teachers to take over the questioning after an interlocutor's initial interjection. This suffices as evidence for Stowers, despite the fact that he is well aware of the vast variability of expression and form among diatribal texts. The same argument applies to Stowers's identification of 3:5 and 7-8 as Paul's voice, and 3:4 and 6 as the interlocutor's. Moreover, Stowers offers no argument for why the interlocutor resumes asking questions in 3:9; he simply assumes it to be the case and narrates how he would understand such a script. If, however, Paul is leading his interlocutor to be the witness and make Paul's case for him as Stowers suggests, would it not make all the more sense for Paul to go all the way and have the interlocutor answer *Paul's* leading question (3:9a) in 3:9b?

A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, & Gentiles. Stowers's chapter on Rom 3:1-9 in *Rereading* largely repeats "Paul's Dialogue" with a few revisions.[38] *Rereading* does, however, afford Stowers the space to explore other features relevant to Rom 3:1-9 more broadly, and the feature of particular interest is Stowers's discussion of speech-in-character as a tool for understanding diatribe.

Though Stowers emphasizes diatribe in *The Diatribe* and "Paul's Dialogue," he does not abandon it in *Rereading*, but he does make a concerted effort to highlight the role of speech-in-character. Stowers identifies speech-in-character in Rom 2:1-16, 17-29; 3:1-9; 3:27-4:2; and 7:7-8:2, amongst others.[39] Stowers's discussion of the rhetorical

---

[38] Stowers, *Rereading*, 159-75. For the repeating of Stowers's script of 3:1-9, see pages 165-66.

[39] Ibid., 16-20. I completely agree that portions of 3:1-9; 3:27-4:2; and 7:7-24, 25b contain speech-in-character. Stowers's identification of 2:1-16 and 17-29 as speech-in-character, however, is highly problematic. Stowers argues that Rom 2:1-16 and 2:17-29 represent the use of apostrophe, and that "Paul's apostrophe so much resembles speech-in-character in the diatribe that one must begin by assuming that it functions similarly." Indeed, Stowers equates apostrophe with a type or subset of προσωποποιία. Thus, for Stowers, Rom 2:1-16 and 17-29 (amongst other texts) represent speech-in-character in Romans. Stowers,

exercise provides a brief summary of its conventions, such as composing speech that appropriately fits the character and/or situation of the imaginary speaker. In fact, Stowers concludes that "the reader and critic determine who is speaking [in a given text] *by criteria of appropriateness*," as I have also argued in Parts One and Two.[40] What is more, Stowers also argues that speech-in-character and the criterion of appropriateness are particularly applicable to diatribe. Stowers comments: "Almost all of the dialogical techniques characteristic of the so-called diatribe would be types of speech-in-character,"[41] and "one form of speech-in-character consists of the speaker or writer simulating an imaginary dialogue with a fictitious interlocutor. One finds this technique with great frequency in the diatribal literature."[42]

Without question, an application of speech-in-character to diatribal dialogue as Stowers intimates is central to my project. Unfortunately, speech-in-character makes little headway into *Rereading*'s analysis of Rom 3:1-9. Stowers never discusses whether the lines he assigns to the interlocutor appropriately fit his understanding of the characterization of the interlocutor in Rom 2:17-29, nor does he (perhaps more

---

Rereading, 100-2, 144-49. R. Dean Anderson Jr., however, has critiqued Stowers for these classifications of Rom 2:1-5/16 and 2:17-29 as προσωποποιία, but he is unable to pinpoint precisely Stowers's motivation for labeling these texts as such. In any case, Anderson correctly allows that 2:1-5 and 17-29 indeed represent apostrophe, but he contends that they do not represent προσωποποιία, because "no speech is put into the mouth of another party." Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 201-3, cf. 203n34. In response, Stowers returns to his reading of Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.30-33, which discusses the functions of speech-in-character, one of which is to "introduce conversations." For Stowers, "contra Anderson," this means that "Quintilian tells us that apostrophe, dialogue, and simulating the words of another person, including imaginary objections, were seen as related phenomena and could all be included in the category of προσωποποιία." "Apostrophe," 358. As argued in Part One, Chapter Two, however, Stowers has misidentified apostrophe as speech-in-character. As such, I side with Anderson that Rom 2:1-5(/16) and 2:17-29 reperesent apostrophe *but not* speech-in-character. Naturally, Rom 2 will be addressed in detail in Chapter Ten in conjunction with the examination of Rom 3:1-9.

[40] Ibid., 19, emphasis mine.

[41] Ibid., 20. Rather than suggesting "almost all" of the dialogical techniques of diatribe (presumably including apostrophe), I limit this statement to actual attributions of speech to another speaker.

[42] Ibid., 162.

importantly) consider whether lines he attributes to Paul might make better sense voiced by the interlocutor. For one example, if the interlocutor is an opposing, pretentious, Jewish teacher who thinks "he can transform the gentiles by getting them to do works from the law" as Stowers argues,[43] would it not be more appropriate for this interlocutor to proclaim Rom 3:2's affirmation of Jewish advantage on account of their possession of the λόγια, rather than for Paul—who preaches a gospel of impartiality and equality—to do so? As Stowers describes the interlocutor, this rescription would at least seem to cohere better with speech-in-character's convention of appropriateness to characterization. Stowers takes up the discussion of speech-in-character in more detail in yet another offering.

"Apostrophe, Προσωποποιία and Paul's Rhetorical Education." This fourth and final piece from Stowers is his response to criticism from R. Dean Anderson Jr. Anderson challenges Stowers's identification of 3:1-9 as an example of speech-in-character on the premise that speech-in-character dialogues "are *always* of such a nature that the remarks of the two speakers concerned are immediately identifiable without the aid of separate markers in the text."[44] Because the supposed dialogical exchanges in Rom 3:1-9 are not obvious from the text, Anderson argues that it is "much better characterized as dialogue-*like* due to its use of αἰτιολογία." Furthermore, "With respect to dialogue, it should be noted that unless it is absolutely obvious from the text which words belong to which

[43] Ibid., 151.

[44] Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 217n.59, emphasis mine.

person, the ancients indicated this in the text."[45] Anderson concludes, therefore, that 3:1-9 contains no dialogue and should be understood as spoken by Paul from beginning to end.

Before attending to Stowers's response, I wish to make two rebuttals to Anderson's argument. First, Anderson notes Quintilian's allowance that speech-in-character can occur without any indication of the identity of the imaginary speaker (*Inst*. 9.2.37). Anderson, however, refuses to allow Quintilian to be applicable merely because "there is little room for misunderstanding that προσωποποιΐα is being used" in the example Quintilian cites from Vergil.[46] This refusal constitutes the sole opportunity for Anderson to reject outright even the possibility of dialogue in Rom 3:1-9. In fact, Quintilian's use of Vergil supplies an excellent comparison to Rom 3:1-9; what is missing in both instances is *not* an identification of the speaker but any overt (such as a verb of speech) indication that another character is speaking at all.[47]

Second, Anderson's own premises are at least confusing if not self-contradictory. On the one hand, Anderson writes, speech-in-character dialogues "are always of such a nature that the remarks of the two speakers concerned are immediately identifiable *without the aid of separate markers in the text*."[48] On the other hand, Anderson claims, "With respect to dialogue, it should be noted that *unless it is absolutely obvious from the text* which words belong to which person, the ancients indicated this in the text."[49] Which is it? Are dialogical exchanges always obvious from the text, or must an author or

---

[45] Ibid., emphasis original.

[46] Ibid., 203.

[47] For my discussion of Quintilian's use of Vergil, see Chapter Two.

[48] Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory*, 217n.59, emphasis mine.

[49] Ibid., emphasis mine.

speaker specifically indicate these transitions? Anderson is unclear. Consequently, Anderson's contention that Stowers's division of 3:1-9 is not obvious from the text is to no avail as evidence for dismissing the possibility of dialogue in Rom 3:1-9.[50]

Speaking on his own accord, Stowers demonstrates that Anderson is dealing with an overly narrow understanding of how a reader or auditor might recognize speech-in-character. That is, Stowers argues, speeches-in-character can be introduced in diverse ways. An overt verb of speech may occur but is not a necessary feature of the exercise. For instance, an apostrophe might serve to introduce an imaginary character to which speech is then applied.[51] Stowers argues that this is precisely the case in Rom 3:1-9. The passage contains no verb of speech, but "the apostrophes of 2:1-16 and 17-29 are introductions for the dialogue that follows and would have made the προσωποποιία clear for the ancient reader."[52] In this way, Stowers dismantles Anderson's primary ground for contention, the notion that no introductory material paves the way for the supposed dialogue in Rom 3:1-9.

One final note about Stowers's "Apostrophe" is in order. Richard Hays also critiques Stowers's *Rereading*, suggesting that Stowers's argument for the dialogue of Rom 3:1-9 lacks "methodological controls."[53] In response, Stowers argues,

> I find this to be a somewhat silly criticism. The only criterion is sense. When something that looks exactly like a dialogue follows the apostrophe of the Jewish

---

[50] Ibid.

[51] Stowers correctly writes, speech-in-character "was sometimes identified in a passage by the form of the characterization and not only with some language that said, in effect, 'now I am going to shift into προσωποποιία.'" Stowers, "Apostrophe," 353. For examples, see Part One.

[52] Ibid., 362, 365.

[53] Richard Hays, "'The Gospel is the Power of God for the Gentiles Only'? A Critique of Stanley Stowers' *A Rereading of Romans*," in *CRBR* 9 (1996): 27-44.

> teacher of gentiles in 2:17-29 and certain words make excellent sense as words of that character, in light of the previous discourse, then it probably is a dialogue.[54]

Generally I agree with Stowers that one can identify 3:1-9 as dialogue based on its similarity to other diatribal texts. Where I find Stowers particularly wanting, however, is once again on the issue of neglecting to analyze the attributed speech in relation to the characterization of the imaginary speaker. Stowers suggests the "words make excellent sense as words of that character," but he never demonstrates this to be the case. Might such examination effectively compel Stowers to re-rescript the dialogue again?

Conclusions. In his sequence of publications, Stowers makes genuine progress in the interpretation of Rom 3:1-9. Stowers is able to demonstrate that 3:1-9 is not a digression but is integrally tied to the rest of the letter. He reasonably accounts for the interrogatives that expect a negative response. And he sufficiently defends Rom 3:1-9 as dialogical *and* representative of speech-in-character. Stowers's shortcomings, however, limit his contributions significantly. The lack of argument concerning which lines in the discourse belong to which voice vis-à-vis the convention of appropriateness in speech-in-character is particularly crippling. As it stands, Stowers has convincingly identified 2:17-29 as apostrophe and (parts of) 3:1-9 as speech-in-character, but such an observation in and of itself is equally applicable to traditional and rescriptive readings alike, the only difference being which lines of the discourse count as speech-in-character. Thus, Stowers's overlaying of speech-in-character and diatribe promises much but fails to produce a persuasive argument for his understanding of the script. I aim to fill this argumentative gap in one direction or the other (see Chapter Eleven). Before I can get to my own analysis, however, examination of two more rescriptive scholars is important.

[54] Stowers, "Apostrophe," 365.

The Rhetoric of Romans. Elliott's treatment of Rom 3:1-9 is even more rescriptive than Stowers's; Stowers inverts the middle verses in the dialogue leaving the frame of the traditional reading intact, but Elliott goes the whole way and rescripts the dialogue at every turn. Remarkably, Elliott's argument for his deviations from Stowers at 3:1-2 and 3:9 amounts to an exercise in using Stowers's own terms against him. Elliott agrees completely with Stowers's script of 3:3-8c, though Elliott identifies 3:8d as the Jewish interlocutor's response to Paul's leading questions in 3:7-8c.[55] Concerning 3:1 and 9a, however, Elliott recognizes weaknesses in Stowers's maintenance of these lines for the interlocutor and echoes my concerns, "Why… is Rom 3.1 necessarily an 'objection' raised by an interlocutor?"[56] Elliott then appeals to Stowers's observation that interruptive objections from the interlocutor are usually clearly marked. From this, Elliott concludes that an "interruptive objection is to be distinguished, then, from the recapitulative 'leading question' by which the teacher guides the student to the appropriate conclusion by the Socratic procedure of question and answer." For this type of leading question, the regular marker is τί οὖν or an equivalent.[57] Consequently, Elliott argues that because nothing marks a change in speakers at 3:1, and because 3:1 begins with τί οὖν, "on purely formal grounds" the verse is best understood as a recapitulative leading question in Paul's own voice.[58] Elliott argues further, "The same is true at 3.9,"

[55] Elliott, *Rhetoric of Romans*, 140.

[56] Ibid., 138.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid., 139.

which also begins with τί οὖν.[59] The changes between Stowers and Elliott in 3:1-2 and 9 are as follows:

> *Paul's Leading Question*: What, then, is the advantage of being a Jew? Or what is the benefit of circumcision? (3:1)
>
> > *Interlocutor's Response*: Much in every way! First, they were entrusted with the oracles of God. (3:2)
>
> *Paul's Leading Question*: What then? Do we hold up anything as a defense? (3:9a)
>
> > *Interlocutor's Response*: Not at all! (3:9b)

So, in Elliott's script, Paul raises leading questions in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c, and 9a, and the interlocutor responds in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, 9b.[60]

Like Stowers, Elliott argues that Paul leads into the dialogue in 3:1-9 through the apostrophe in 2:17-29. Here, Paul addresses a Jew who "holds so high a view of his or her possession of Torah."[61] In the manner of diatribal indictment, Paul questions the Jew's consistency, but not in such a way as to accuse. Rather, Paul asks "penetrating questions, but not presumptive of the answer."[62] Paul's apostrophe to this Jew does not set before his Roman audience a depiction of "the paradigmatic braggart," but it illustrates and proves for them Paul's teaching that no human being can escape accountability to God.[63] The point is, "If anyone enjoyed the privilege of exemption from God's wrath, surely it must be the Jew" who has such great privileges, such as possession

---

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., 139-41. From *Rhetoric*, it is actually not entirely clear that 3:9b belongs to the interlocutor in Elliott's assessment, as he describes 3:9b simply as "conclusion." Elliott does, however, make this clear in *Arrogance*, 205n.74.

[61] Ibid., 128.

[62] Ibid., 131.

[63] Ibid., 130-31.

of the Torah.[64] Precisely because of these privileges, however, Paul argues, "The Jew, above all others, cannot plead ignorance... is not exempt from God's judgment when he or she violates the very Torah that constitutes those privileges."[65]

Following the apostrophe, the dialogue in 3:1-9 is Paul's attempt to clarify the Jew's covenantal advantage. Elliott argues that the questions in 3:1-9 do not stem from Paul's denial that the "Jew has any real advantage… but because Paul has shown that the Jew has no advantage that constitutes an exemption from God's righteous claim."[66] This observation makes sense of Paul's comments in 3:2 and 9; 3:2 asserts that Jews have a real advantage, but 3:9, recognizing προεχόμεθα as a genuine middle, declares that these advantages do not undermine God's righteousness to judge Jewish disobedience.[67] Said otherwise, Jews cannot cling to their advantages as a defense against God's righteous judgment, and, if even Jews cannot, neither can gentiles. Paul's argument begins with the particular (the Jew) and moves to the universal (gentiles). In order to communicate this point to his Roman audience, Paul draws upon the Jewish interlocutor in a collaborative sense, so that the interlocutor works with Paul to make Paul's point.[68]

Elliott makes a number of excellent points. First, he demonstrates that Stowers's own terms can be employed in such a way as to reshape the script of 3:1-9 quite differently than Stowers imagines. Obviously, Stowers and Elliott draw from the same evidence but end with divergent results. As such, Elliott implicitly reveals that diatribal

---

[64] Ibid., 131.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid., 132. See also 198-204.

[67] Ibid., 132-33.

[68] Ibid., 138-39, 202.

conventions alone might not be the strongest or most consistent pool of evidence for analyzing dialogical exchanges. Second, Elliott offers a reasonable argument for his rescriptions of 3:1 and 9 based on formal categories. Elliott does not simply state his view, but he shows how his reading adheres better to the more common criteria for objections and leading questions than Stowers's own assessment does.

Problems, nevertheless, persist for Elliott as well. First, Elliott's insistence that Paul can affirm a *real and actual advantage* for Jews and at the same time hold that this privilege *does not confer any real salvific benefit* in God's divine activity is representative of one line of thinking encountered in Chapter Eight. One wonders, however, what good is an advantage that ultimately (or eschatologically) conveys no benefit to Jews? Is such an advantage truly advantageous, or is it a contradiction in terms? Is there a better way to formulate Paul's presentation of the relationship between God's impartiality and faithfulness that does not put so much tension on this dichotomy or require a breach between God and his called people (which Elliott emphatically and correctly opposes)?[69] Suffice it to say that this question will occupy one of the primary threads in the discussions of Chapters Ten and Eleven. Second, though familiar with Stowers's *Rereading*, Elliott too seems unaware of the *real* advantage speech-in-character might play in analyzing a dialogue. As such, the foundation of Elliott's script rests on an argument as precarious as Stowers's.[70] Third, Elliott emends the script of 3:7-8 so that 3:8d consists of the interlocutor's response, but he offers no reasoning for doing so. Fourth, Elliott argues that Paul indicts the Jew in 2:17-29 and leads the interlocutor to

[69] For instance, see Käsemann, *Romans*, 78; Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 68.

[70] One's argument can only be as good as the evidence, after all, and Elliott's argument is based on Stowers's interpretation of a body of evidence that displays significant variability.

make his case in 3:1-9. But, according to Elliott's interpretation, there is no development in the Jew's responses; he simply confesses what Paul wants him to say in each instance. Supposing that Paul is guiding his interlocutor in the style of a Socratic questioner as Elliott maintains,[71] and momentarily granting Elliott's script, might Paul collaborate with his interlocutor in a different manner? Might Paul not simply use the interlocutor as a witness for his argument but also simultaneously lead him out of a place of folly and to a correct view in the manner of censure and protreptic, which Stowers shows is so characteristic of diatribe?[72]

The Arrogance of Nations. The treatment of Rom 3:1-9 in *Arrogance* summarizes Elliott's material in *Rhetoric*; he offers precisely the same arguments about the apostrophes in Rom 2 and the dialogue in 3:1-9 as in *Rhetoric*.[73] There is no need, then, to repeat the previous discussion. One element, however, deserves mention. Though Elliott argues the same point in *Rhetoric*, in *Arrogance* he highlights the fact that the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9 does not target Paul's Judean contemporaries but his largely non-Judean audience in Rome. Elliott argues, "It is *they* who need to hear that Judeans do not, in fact, presume on God's grace and mercy to indulge their sins."[74] Consequently, Paul does not indict but enlists his Judean colleague in order to make a point to the actual audience of the letter, not to the interlocutor, and the actual audience is to interpret Paul's

[71] Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 136-39.

[72] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 56-58.

[73] Elliott, *Arrogance*, 104-6.

[74] Ibid., 105, emphasis original.

point over against Rome's imperial claims.[75] The interlocutor, therefore, agrees with Paul through and through; "It would be hard to imagine a self-respecting Judean arguing *against* Paul" on any of these points about God's righteousness or faithfulness.[76]

The point I wish to raise is this: no matter whether one agrees with Elliott's assessment of the interlocutor, the script of 3:1-9, or the import of the dialogue, the interlocutor must be believable. The character must match the comments. In the vein of the rhetoricians discussed in Part One, a Jew must speak like a Jew, a gentile like a gentile, and so forth.[77] Thus, one of the basic measures for a valid characterization of the interlocutor is whether or not that character could appropriately speak the words attributed to him or her.

Douglas A. Campbell

Of the rescriptive readings under discussion, for all of its novelty otherwise, Campbell's *The Deliverance of God* is in one sense the least innovative in terms of its view of the script of 3:1-9. This is because Campbell altogether adopts Elliott's script with no additional argumentation.[78] Again, Paul submits leading questions in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c, and 9a, to which the interlocutor responds in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, and 9b. As a result, on the question of 'who's speaking when?,' Campbell's project is just as open to critique as Stowers's and Elliott's; none of them (save Elliott on 3:1-2, 9) persuasively argue *why*

---

[75] Ibid., 106-7.

[76] Ibid., 105.

[77] I understand the variety among Jews and among gentiles. I state this comment in this way simply for illustrative purposes.

[78] Campbell, *Deliverance*, 572-74; 1088n.117.

various verses are better heard in Paul's or the interlocutor's voice, respectively. This needs no further discussion here, but it surely merits a remedy.

Campbell, however, raises questions of a different sort concerning Rom 1-3 and 3:1-9 in particular that do require consideration. First, Campbell does not simply rescript 3:1-9; he also places 1:18-32 (and others) into the mouth of the interlocutor, an opposing Teacher.[79] This stems from Campbell's view that Rom 1-4 and 5-8 are fundamentally incompatible; Rom 5-8 represents Paul's apocalyptic, participatory, unconditional, and retrospective theology, but 1-4 proclaims a "Justification Theory" (i.e., justification by faith) that is antithetically *opposed* to Paul's gospel.[80] Campbell's solution is to appeal to diatribe and speech-in-character, to attribute all of the justification by faith language to Paul's interlocutor, and to argue that Paul engages in conversation with the Teacher to prove to the Roman audience the weakness of the Teacher's justification-by-faith gospel.[81]

Campbell's problem with reading 1:18-32 in Paul's voice is the passage's heavy language of retributive justice and judgment according to desert, which Campbell sees as un-Pauline. Instead, the Teacher, who endorses Jewish privilege over gentiles because of the Jews' possession of law and circumcision, speaks these lines as condemnation of gentiles who abandon and are consequently abandoned by God.[82] Paul recognizes and responds to the Teacher's endorsement of God's retributive justice in Rom 2 through a "universalization," which exploits the Teacher's theology of Jewish privilege and

[79] Ibid., 542-44.

[80] Ibid., 11-35, 65-66.

[81] Ibid., 530-41.

[82] Ibid., 543-44.

soteriological desert in order to use it against the Teacher himself.[83] To this end, Paul offers as examples bad Jews and good pagans; in the Teacher's retributive theology, bad Jews should be judged despite their privilege, and good pagans delivered despite the fact that they do not possess the advantageous law. Consequently, Paul argues that the Teacher's whole system is not only unfair to gentiles who do not possess the law, but it amounts to no solution at all since it has nothing to offer them.[84] Campbell argues, therefore, that by the end of Rom 2, Paul has shown the Teacher's mission to the gentiles to be completely bankrupt.[85]

In 3:1-9, Paul moves to show that the Teacher's gospel is equally damning for the Teacher and his followers, ultimately saving no one.[86] Paul's aim is to enlist the Teacher to affirm in advance and "rather stupidly" the basic claims that Paul makes in 3:9b-20, that "God will judge *all* for their sinfulness on the basis of desert, and irrespective of any special privileges or pleading."[87] Thus, Paul wants to employ the Teacher as chief witness in his own argument, and this is precisely what happens. Clinging to Jewish privilege, the Teacher answers Paul's question about Jewish advantage (3:1) in the affirmative on the basis of being entrusted with the law (3:2), despite Paul's earlier demonstration that the possession of the law and circumcision "do not confer any decisive ethical" or "eschatological advantage" (2:13, 25-29).[88] Given the Teacher's

---

[83] Ibid., 547-49.

[84] Ibid., 552-57, 564, 568-69.

[85] Ibid., 569-69, 571, 575.

[86] Ibid., 572.

[87] Ibid., emphasis original.

[88] Ibid., 575.

persistence, Paul makes it his task to elicit from the Teacher that circumcision and law confer no advantage, so that "if a Jew sins then, according to the Teacher's gospel, he or she will be crushed by a just God at the final assize."[89] Paul is successful; in the subsequent questioning, the Teacher clings to his central belief in judgment according to desert and, "perhaps a little shamefacedly," relinquishes his hold on Jewish advantage over the gentiles (3:4, 6, especially 9).[90]

The very next word in the letter, however, throws a significant obstacle Campbell's way, προῃτιασάμεθα (3:9). Other readings understand the προ- prefix as referring to the material in 1:18-3:8, so that the preceding material is summarized in 3:9 by Paul's assertion that both Jews and Greeks are all under sin. Such an interpretation would condemn Campbell's reading in one fell swoop, since in his view it is not Paul but the Teacher who condemns gentiles in 1:18-32, and since Paul only charges "some" but not "all" Jews with being under Sin in chapter 2. Campbell recognizes the problem fully and confesses that if he is unable to "provide a plausible alternative construal of this verb, my broader interpretive suggestion will founder significantly on this lexical shoal."[91] Campbell's proposed solution is to read the prefix not as temporal but as spatial, to understand the aorist as a statement of verbal aspect rather than temporality, and to explain the verb by what follows (3:10-18) rather than what precedes (1:18-3:8).[92] Therefore, προῃτιασάμεθα does not have the meaning of 'charge or proclaim previously' but 'make a public accusation,' which Campbell argues occurs in 3:10-18.

---

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid., 575-76.

[91] Ibid., 579.

[92] Ibid., 580.

Campbell has made significant contributions here. To begin with, Campbell is the first to suggest that Paul's interaction with his interlocutor in 3:1-9 *actually* follows the common diatribal pattern of censure and protreptic, whereby the teacher (Paul) exposes inconsistencies in the student or interlocutor (the Teacher) and seeks to cure them. Thus, by the end of the dialogue the interlocutor abandons her or his initial views (i.e., 3:2) and adopts the supposedly correct view of the primary speaker (i.e., 3:9). For instance, Stowers's interlocutor's final remark (in 3:1-9) is an additional objection (3:9a),[93] and Elliott's interlocutor never disagrees with Paul in the first place.[94] Second, Campbell's emphasis on the liberative and loving God's apocalyptic initiation, enablement, and maintenance of the redemptive / salvific process makes the most sense of Paul's letters (especially Paul's autobiographical narratives, his comments about Jesus' faithfulness, and his discussions of the Spirit). So, with Campbell, I think it is appropriately placed in close proximity to (or simply at) the center of Paul's theology.

I do, however, disagree with Campbell at multiple points. The first problem I have with Campbell's treatment is with his underlying methodological and motivational foundation. The root cause of Campbell's dissatisfaction with the juxtaposition of Rom 1-4 with Rom 5-8 seems to be that he cannot accept a Paul whose theologizing displays tension between certain points, much less a contradictory or incompatible Paul and the ramifications that come with it. For Campbell, Paul must be consistent. Essentially, Paul's thought and his presentation of it, even in his contextually contingent letters, must

---

[93] Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66. Jewett also suggests that the interlocutor's viewpoint shifts in the dialogue by taking up Paul's argument about divine impartiality. Jewett's interlocutor, however, only does so to "expose its inner contradictions" and therefore does not represent a censure-protreptic model. Moreover, Jewett's interlocutor "shifts" before the dialogue actually begins, not as a result of the dialogue. Jewett, *Romans*, 240-41.

[94] Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 136-41.

be without logical flaw. From a strictly historical perspective, however, Campbell has no grounds on which to prioritize or favor Paul's abilities over those of the Teacher, or to expect Paul to be completely free from inconsistency. Yet, Campbell is willing to accuse the Teacher and his gospel with the crippling charge of inconsistency. At the historical level, both Paul and the Teacher are equally capable of mistakes or misrepresentations.[95] As Campbell's obligatory yet assumed premise stands, however, Paul is on the verge of omniscience, and Campbell's expectation of Pauline perfection is historically indefensible. This is true whether one sees Rom 1-4 as incompatible with 5-8 or not.

The second problem is Campbell's introduction of the Teacher at 1:18-32. Of course, Quintilian allows that speech-in-character can occur without any indication of the speaker (*Inst*. 9.2.37). Recall, however, that Quintilian's example from Vergil does not actually demonstrate the rule. The identity of the speaker is clear ("we Trojans"); what is missing is the indication that anyone else begins to speak (see Chapter Two). Both features, however, are missing from Rom 1:18-32. There is no identification or characterization of a new persona on the scene. There is no verb of speech suggesting that Paul is no longer speaking in his own voice. So, though I must agree that speech-in-character out of the blue is possible, I find it far from probable in 1:18-32. Furthermore, the fact that speeches-in-character almost always begin with characterizing and identifying transitions further problematizes the lack of such elements in 1:18-32, especially when 2:17-29 provides just such a passage in preparation for the dialogue in 3:1-9. If Paul intends 1:18-32 as speech-in-character *and* knows he is going to address the speaker in 2:17-29, why not clarify the argument by moving the identifying and

[95] For an example of an innocent mistake in Paul, see 1 Cor 1.14-16.

characterizing materials in 2:17-29 to precede the imaginary speech? Yet there is more. In light of the problems already on the table concerning Campbell's analysis and the typical conventions for speech-in-character, it is perhaps peculiar that the weight of Campbell's argument teeters entirely on one of Quintilian's uniquely attested elements, especially when the material Campbell places in the mouth of the interlocutor is precisely the material he finds so objectionable if it represents Paul's theology. Indeed, it is not surprising to find scholars like Moo suggest that Campbell's argument "smacks of special pleading."[96]

Third, Campbell's interpretation of προῃτιασάμεθα fails to convince; rather than dismantling 'Justification Theory,' Campbell in fact runs ashore over the "lexical shoal" he saw looming before him. To begin, Campbell nowhere explains why the script returns to Paul's voice at the verb προῃτιασάμεθα. Does Paul speak this line, or does the interlocutor continue to make Paul's case? More significantly, Campbell's explanation that the first-person plural form is "most likely an 'apostolic' we, as it is in 1:5," fails to account for the use of the first-person throughout the dialogue of 3:1-9.[97] Why would the "we" of προῃτιασάμεθα be differentiated from the others, especially the other instance in 3:9a, προεχόμεθα? Whether προῃτιασάμεθα belongs on the interlocutor's lips or Paul's, Stowers's explanation of the "we" seems quite appropriate and preferable; in its diatribal and dialogical context, the first-person plural most likely refers in the first place to Paul and his dialogue partner.[98] That is, Paul and his interlocutor agree on this point, and

---

[96] Douglas J. Moo, "Review Article: *The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul* by Douglas A. Campbell," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 53.1 (2010): 148.

[97] Campbell, 580.

[98] Stowers, "Paul's Dialogue," 720. So also Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 325.

Campbell argues precisely this by illustrating how Paul moves the interlocutor to share his point of view during the course of the dialogue. The collaboration between the interlocutor and Paul in the first-person plural of προῃτιασάμεθα, therefore, throws the door half-way open for a temporal reading of the verb that Campbell attempts to slam shut. Merely granting for the sake of argument that the interlocutor speaks the condemnation in 1:18-32, Paul's collaboration with the interlocutor in 3:9's προῃτιασάμεθα positively aligns Paul with the interlocutor's previous accusation of idolatry and disobedience, so that Paul indirectly participates in 1:18-32's condemnation.

To clinch a temporal reading of προῃτιασάμεθα from Campbell's grasp, however, one must also explain how Paul condemns *all*, rather than only *some*, non-Jesus believing Jews. The key is noticing the criterion by which Paul argues God's judgment operates against humanity. God's judgment is against all human impiety κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, literally, "in accord with my gospel through Christ Jesus" (2:16). It does not matter whether διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ attributively modifies Paul's εὐαγγέλιόν or adverbially modifies the verb κρίνει; in either case, Christ is the contingent measure that determines the direction of God's judgment. By definition, *any* non-Jesus believer falls under God's judgment as far as Paul is concerned, and, like Paul's gospel, this is inclusive of Jew and gentile. Regardless of 1:18-32, therefore, in 2:16 alone Paul has in fact "previously charged (προῃτιασάμεθα) both Jews and Greeks *all* (πάντας) to be under Sin" and God's judgment (3:9). Campbell's quest for an opposing interpretation of προῃτιασάμεθα, therefore, turns out to be all for naught.

Conclusion

Despite so many scholars' efforts, honest engagements, and positive developments with the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9, the passage remains something of an enigma. If my analysis of the passage is to resolve any of these concerns, it must be able to explain: (1) the use of μή in the interrogatives, (2) the remarks about Jewish advantage, (3) the identity of the interlocutor, (4) how the audience would understand the character of that interlocutor, and (5) a number of exegetical concerns, such as the sense of προεχόμεθα in 3:9.

There is also the larger question of methodology, evidence, and argument. It is true that appeals to diatribal tendencies rest on less-than-solid, though not necessarily invalid, evidence. By nature, diatribe is a diverse and variable phenomenon (see Part Two). It is, therefore, hardly surprising to find that such diversity and variability in diatribe lead to equal diversity and variability among readings of Rom 3:1-9 that rely on such diatribal features alone. Traditional and rescriptive scholars alike regularly appeal to the same pool of diatribal evidence but consistently draw opposing conclusions. The discussion begs for further methodological constraint, which I argue is to be found in the rhetorical conventions outlined for speech-in-character. Stowers recognizes this potential methodological boon, but his analysis cuts short the advantages speech-in-character might offer since he never actually applies them to the script of 3:1-9. This gives rise to yet another element a successful account of 3:1-9 must address, namely, how is the script of 3:1-9 best arranged? Who speaks which lines? More importantly, *why* does a particular line belong in a particular voice, and *why* does it matter for understanding Romans? Answers that amount to little more than assertions are unacceptable; argumentation is

obligatory, as is appeal to the strongest and most valid evidence. I move now to my own examination of Romans and my attempt to meet these needs.

CHAPTER TEN

Romans 1-2: The Ethnically Inclusive and Impartial Gospel and the Characterization of the Interlocutor

Engagement with Romans 3:1-9 cannot begin with 3:1 but must start at 1:1, because Paul begins to prepare his audience for 3:1-9 as early as 1:1-7, not to mention the crucial apostrophic material in 2:1-29. As analysis builds towards the dialogue in 3:1-9, I will examine Paul's argument linearly (as much as possible), engaging those features that have particular relevance to 3:1-9 and its function in Romans.

Though considering Rom 1-3 will require ample time and space, such an undertaking is absolutely necessary given the goals of this project. To reiterate, the first goal is to account for the script of the staged dialogue in 3:1-9 through the established conventions for rhetorical speech-in-character and (as necessary) the tendencies documented in the diatribal primary sources. The second goal is to examine how 3:1-9 informs the argument of Romans as a whole, which requires a firm grasp on diatribe and Paul's argument up to and following Rom 3:1-9. Concerning this second goal, Chapter Ten prepares for 3:1-9 by tracing the development of Paul's argument in Rom 1-2, including Paul's description of the gospel and the ever-important characterization of the interlocutor.

Romans 1:1-12

Romans 1:1 might seem an odd place to begin, as one might suppose it merely contains introductory concerns common to epistles, such as identification of the sender,

the addressee, and maybe a stock thanksgiving.[1] Such an assumption would sell the introduction to Romans short, as Paul elaborates these introductory matters in ways that impact readings of the whole letter. These elaborations include detailed discussion of Paul's gospel and quite surprising descriptions of Paul's audience. Romans 1:1-7 is no standard epistolary introduction, but how does it begin to prepare Paul's readers and auditors for the argument(s) to follow?

Paul *does* begin his epistle to the Romans in customary fashion by introducing himself, Παῦλος (1:1), *but* he does not stop there. Though it would hardly be unfruitful to consider the anthropological and theological significance of Paul identifying as a "slave of Christ Jesus" (δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ; 1:1), the issue deserving immediate attention is rather that to which Paul also gives immediate attention—the gospel. In fact, it is not an overstatement to suggest that 1:1-5 is as much or more an introduction of the gospel than of Paul himself, though the two are of course inseparable. When Paul concludes 1:1 by declaring that he is set apart for the gospel of God (ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλλιον θεοῦ), he ceases to talk about himself and immediately begins defining for his Roman audience characteristics about the gospel (1:2-5). Paul's gospel is that which God himself promised long ago through his prophets in the holy scriptures (ὁ προεπηγγείλατο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις; 1:2; cf. 16:26)[2] about his Son (τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ; 1:3, 9), who is physically of Davidic descent (1:3), but who was declared the Son of God at his resurrection (τοῦ ὁρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ… ἐξ ἀναστάσεως), namely, Jesus Christ, our Lord (Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν; 1:5). Moreover, it is through Jesus that grace

[1] For treatments of ancient letters, see Hans-Josef Klauck, *Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006); Stowers, *Letter Writing.*

[2] See also Gal 3:8 and the discussion of it in Chapter Five.

(χάριν) is mediated to humanity, and it is through Jesus that Paul received his very apostleship and gospel to work toward πίστις among *all* the nations (ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; 1:5).[3] Paul, his mission, and his gospel, therefore, are necessarily about and dependent on God, Jesus, πίστις, and χάρις, and Paul primes his audience to think in this way beginning with 1:1.

What, however, does Paul have to say about the identity of his audience? The first thing to notice is that Paul views his epistolary audience as thoroughly Christian.[4] Paul writes to those in Rome who are "the called of Jesus Christ," "beloved of God," "called saints," and who share in the relationship of God as Father and Jesus Christ as Lord (1:6-7). The members of Paul's audience are those who already have πίστις, who are ἀδελφοί (1:13), and with whom Paul can be mutually encouraged (1:8,12), even if it should come to light later that Paul thinks they need correction on various points.

Second, Paul addresses his Christian audience as ethnically ambiguous and inclusive. Paul's apostleship is directed toward *all* the nations (πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; 1:5), and Romans is addressed to *all* (πᾶσιν) those beloved of God in Rome (1:7). Paul does not say, "to all of you non-Jews" but "to *all*;" there is no reason to understand the phrase,

---

[3] I momentarily withhold discussion of πίστις until 1:16-17, where the πιστ- stem appears four times in the context of God's effecting salvation through the gospel. Instead of offering a specific translation, I often simply refer to πίστις terminology in the original language. Especially since Hays's *The Faith of Jesus Christ*, scholars have problematized and nuanced the discussion of what Paul means by the πιστ- stem at a number of key points in his letters. Objectively, does Paul have in mind human "faith" or belief *in* Jesus or God? Or, subjectively, does Paul have in mind God's or Jesus' faith*fulness*? Often it is not overtly clear what nuance Paul has in mind, so evidence and arguments must be based on a collaboration of texts and one's understanding of the bigger picture of Pauline theology. Waiting to discuss the term until 1:16-17 allows for a *slightly* larger epistolary context to build, but it is also the point at which one must begin to make decisions, since 1:14/16-17 represents the jumping off point for the remainder of the letter. This will necessarily require a premature look ahead at the way Paul uses the terms elsewhere.

[4] I understand the anachronism in the use of "Christian," but the term is nevertheless helpful (and less cumbersome) for identifying "Jesus believers," "followers of Jesus," and other sobriquets.

πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, in any sort of sense limited only to non-Israelites.[5] This does not, however, suggest that the Roman congregations are comprised of any particular ratio of Jews to non-Jews, though Stowers, Elliott, Rodríguez, and others have persuasively argued that they most likely consist of a large majority of non-Jews.[6] The point is, Paul actually makes no distinction in the introduction between Jew and gentile concerning his gospel's effectiveness,[7] and recognizing the ambiguity and inclusiveness Paul employs at multiple other points in Romans will prove quite advantageous in determining more precisely what Paul is arguing in those pericopae and Romans as a whole.

Third, Paul characterizes his ethnically ambiguous Christian audience in a very surprising fashion. Paul describes his audience as "called" (κλητοί, κλητοῖς), "beloved" (ἀγαπητοῖς), and "holy" (ἁγίοις, 1:6-7). These are terms the Septuagint specifically applies to ethnic Israel as God's chosen people. For instance, Isa 48:12 records, "Hear me, Jacob and Israel, whom I call" (καλῶ). Though LXX Isa 48:12 records the active voice, the underlying Hebrew is a Pual participle with first-person singular suffix, "who are *called* by me" or "whom I *called*" (מקראי). Similarly, Deut 7:6-8; 14:2; and Isa 41:8 utilize the synonymous terms προαιρέω (I choose) and/or ἐκλέγομαι (I elect, select) to characterize Israel as God's chosen people. Then, concerning Paul's Roman audience as "beloved," Isa 41:8 depicts Israel as the one whom God loved (ἠγάπησα), and Jer 38:3

[5] Contra A. Andrew Das, *Solving the Romans Debate* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 54-60.

[6] Peter Lampe, "The Roman Christians of Romans 16," in *The Romans Debate: Revised and Expanded* (Karl P. Donfried, ed.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991), 224-25; idem., *From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 69-79. Stowers, *Rereading*, 21-33; Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 56; Das, *Solving*, 54-70; Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor*, 87-122; Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 7-10; Jewett, *Romans*, 70-72.

[7] Though Watson argues that Jewish Christians are the primary addressee of Romans, he nevertheless affirms that 1:6-7 does not exclude any on the basis of ethnicity. Francis Watson, "The Two Roman Congregations: Romans 14:1-15:13," in *The Romans Debate* (ed. Karl P. Donfried; rev; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991), 214. Similarly, Matthew Black, *Romans* (2nd ed.; NCBC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 24, argues that Paul is "deliberately vague."

envisions Israel as the one whom God "loved with an eternal love" (ἀγάπησιν αἰωνίαν ἠγάπησά σε). Furthermore, Deut 7:6 and 14:2 portray Israel as a "holy" (ἅγιος) people to the Lord God. Even more tellingly, Paul *himself* describes Israel in these terms in Romans. Paul discusses Israel in terms of God's "call" in 9:12 (ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος) and 11:29 (ἡ κλῆσις τοῦ θεοῦ), in terms of "election" in 9:11 and 11:28 (ἐκλογήν), and as "beloved" by God in 9:13 (Ἰακὼβ ἠγάπησα) and 11:28 (ἀγαπητοὶ διὰ τοῦς πατέρας). Thus, Paul describes his intended audience in 1:6-7 not only as Christian and ethnically ambiguous and inclusive, but also in the same terms scripture uses to illustrate God's relationship with ethnic Israel.[8] Paul confirms this characterization in 9:24-25 when he writes that God "*called* (ἐκάλεσεν) us (ἡμᾶς) not only from the Jews but also from the nations, as it says in Hosea, 'I will *call* (καλέσω) not my people my people, and not my beloved *beloved* (ἠγαπημένην).'" Though it would be premature to draw conclusions based on the introduction alone, it will be important to consider how Paul develops this portrayal as the letter progresses. Does Paul use these terms simply by happenstance? Or, intentionally drawing on these terms' scriptural *and Pauline* application to ethnic Israel, is Paul saying something about Israel as God's chosen people and/or about *all* of humanity's relationship to God?

By the end of 1:1-7, therefore, Paul's audience learns a great deal. Paul introduces his inclusive gospel about Jesus for *all nations*, and he identifies his audience in detail; they are Christian, ethnically ambiguous, holy, called, and loved by God. In light of

[8] Cf. Cranfield, *Romans*, 68-71; Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 238-39; Talbert, *Romans*, 34; Dieter Zeller, *Der Brief an die Römer* (Regensburg: Friedrick Pustet, 1985), 37; Howard Rhys, *The Epistle to the Romans* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), 16; Craig S. Keener, *Romans: A New Covenant Commentary* (NCCS; Eugene: Cascade, 2009), 22; Jewett, *Romans*, 113-14; Dunn, *Romans*, 19-20; Moo, *Romans*, 54-55; Hultgren, *Romans*, 51-52; Wright, *Romans*, 420-21; Witherington, *Romans*, 36-37; Byrne, *Romans*, 46; Sarah Whittle, *Covenant Renewal and the Consecration of the Gentiles in Romans* (SNTSMS 161; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1-2.

reading Romans (especially 3:1-9) as diatribe, these introductory points are quite important. First, Paul, as a diatribal teacher, wastes no time in beginning to set forth the content of his teaching, which he nuances and from which he draws implications later in the argument. Second, the dialogue in 3:1-9 is not a self-contained dialogue through which Paul isolates and speaks *only* to his interlocutor. The dialogue is set within a much larger letter composed to a specific audience for historically contingent reasons. The dialogue is meant to communicate something not merely to the interlocutor but, more importantly, to the actual audience of the letter. Knowing as much as possible about the audience and how Paul creatively envisions them, therefore, can only help to clarify precisely what Paul is arguing. The discussions below continue to unpack these points as Paul's argument develops.

Romans 1:13-15

Scholars routinely offer Rom 1:16-17 as the "theme" of Romans.[9] On the one hand, this might very well be true. On the other hand, I am not certain this is technically the case.[10] Let me qualify that if 1:16-17 is *not* thematic, it nonetheless resonates with the overarching goal of Romans. One problem, however, with identifying a particular verse or verses as the theme of Romans is the troubling decision with where to identify the division in 1:8-17 between the epistolary introduction and the main body of the letter. For example, Nestle-Aland cites 1:8-15 as a textual unit, and 1:16-17 as another, which benefits the standard identification of 1:16-17 as the theme by linking all of 1:8-15 together under the epistolary thanksgiving. The primary advantage with locating the

[9] For instance, Stanley E. Porter writes, "The introduction to the body of the letter provides the theme for the entire letter." Porter, *Romans*, 57.

[10] I am indebted to conversations with Beverly Roberts Gaventa for this hesitation.

division between 1:15 and 16 is that it keeps Paul's discussion of his botched travel plans intact, where Paul indicates that he planned to come strengthen the Romans, to be encouraged with them, and to bear fruit among them, but he was hindered (1:8-15). The primary disadvantage (see below), however, is that such an identification ignores other structural markers that might suggest otherwise.

Transitions to the main body of a letter often begin with a disclosure formula, "I want you to know," or "I do not want you to be ignorant." The transition in Philippians, for instance, reads, "I want you to know, brothers and sisters…" (Γινώσκειν δὲ ὑμᾶς βούλομαι, ἀδελφοί; 1:12).[11] Just such a formula occurs in Rom 1:13, "I do not want you to be ignorant, brothers and sisters…" (οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, ἀδελφοί). If the disclosure formula in 1:13 constitutes the transition between epistolary sections, perhaps one might rather identify 1:14 as thematic, "To Greeks and barbarians, to the wise and unwise, I am one under obligation" (Ἕλλησίν τε καὶ βαρβάροις, σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀνοήτοις ὀφειλέτης εἰμί). This arrangement favors the disclosure formula as a structural marker but divides Paul's discussion of his failed attempts to visit Rome. There are, it seems, six eggs in one basket and half a dozen in the other, thereby justifying a degree of hesitancy when it comes to identifying with precision "Paul's thematic statement in Romans."[12]

Again, this is not to say that 1:14 and 1:16-17 are opposed to one another. In fact, quite the opposite is true; 1:16-17 explains and develops Paul's preceding comments in 1:14-15 through the particle γάρ. I withhold discussion of 1:16-17 until the following

---

[11] For example, Peter T. O'Brien, *The Epistle to the Philippians* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 85; Gordon D. Fee, *Paul's Letter to the Philippians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 109.

[12] On the issue of where the body of Romans begins, see the literature cited in Hultgren, *Romans*, 85n.1, who favors 1:18 as the body opening.

section. At this time, I only wish to illustrate how 1:13-15 continues Paul's discussion of the scope of his ministry. As in 1:1-7, here too Paul's ministry is ethnically ambiguous and altogether inclusive. Paul hoped to have fruit among the Romans, as he did, no doubt hyperbolically, "among the *rest* of the nations" (ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν; 1:13). Even more to the point is 1:14; Paul considers himself obliged to "Greeks and barbarians, to wise and unwise" (Ἕλλησίν τε καὶ βαρβάροις, σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀνοήτοις). From the Greco-Roman perspective in and to which Paul writes, "Greeks and barbarians" account for the entirety of the world's populations. If one supposes that "Greeks and barbarians" somehow exclude Jews from the argument, Paul's equal obligation to "wise and unwise" nevertheless accounts exhaustively for all peoples.[13] Said otherwise, Paul considers himself, his apostleship, his gospel, and his God as ethnically unhindered and obligated to *all* (1:14).[14] How, then, does Paul advance the theme of ambiguity and inclusiveness in his discussion of the gospel and God's δικαιοσύνη in 1:16-17?

---

[13] Jewett, *Romans*, 130-33; Dunn, *Romans*, 32-33. Porter, *Romans*, 55, writes similarly, "It is more likely that [Paul] uses the two radical oppositions as disjunctions to include the extremes and all in the middle." Contra Wright, *Romans*, 422-23, and Hultgren, *Romans*, 66, who limit this to non-Jews. But see Hultgren's comment that the "phrase typically signifies all people in Hellenistic speech," which is precisely my point.

[14] Paul's comments in 1:11-15 and 15:20-21 raise problems. What does Paul hope to accomplish with the Romans? In 1:11, Paul indicates that he aims to "impart some spiritual gift" to strengthen them (ἵνα τι μεταδῶ χάρισμα ὑμῖν πνευματικόν), and 1:12 clarifies that he hopes to experience mutual exhortation with them (συμπαρακληθῆναι ἐν ὑμῖν). Somewhat differently, Rom 1:13 seems to suggest that Paul wants to evangelize in Rome, as he writes, "So that I might have some fruit among you," and 1:15 speaks of Paul's eagerness to preach the gospel in Rome (ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ εὐαγγελίσασθαι). Thus, one possible reading casts Paul as redundantly evangelizing Christians. Some manuscripts recognize this difficulty and attempt to fix it. D* b and vg^{mss} add ἐν before ὑμῖν, and G adds ἐπ', both in order to suggest that Paul aims to preach among or alongside (rather than *to*) the Roman Christians. The established reading, however, is more than sufficiently supported by the strongest manuscripts, and the naked dative can be nuanced in numerous ways.

A second problem surfaces at the end of the letter, as Paul argues that he "aspires to preach the gospel where Christ has *not* been named," so that he does not interfere with someone else's ministry (15:20). Does Paul hope to make Christians (of Christians!) in Rome where Christ *has* been named as evidenced by the Roman Christians themselves, or can the difficulties be explained some other way? The solution that solves both problems most simply is to allow the main verbs in the disclosure formula of 1:13 also to govern 1:15. In 1:13, Paul informs the Romans that, in the past, he often planned (aorist, προεθέμην)

Romans 1:16-17

Whether one ultimately views 1:14, 1:16-17, or some combination of them as broadly thematic for Romans, the two pericopae overlap considerably, the only difference being the perspective from which Paul states his case. In 1:14-15, Paul speaks on his own behalf as an apostle obligated to share the gospel with the world. In 1:16-17, however, Paul speaks about the gospel and its scope in terms of God and his δικαιοσύνη.

In Rom 1:16, Paul begins to explain his obligation to the world and his consequent eagerness to preach in Rome (1:14-15) as it relates to the gospel. In effect, Paul says that he is under obligation to the world, and thus he aimed to preach the gospel in Rome, "for" or "because" (γάρ) he is not "ashamed of the gospel" (ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον; 1:16). Despite the gospel's proclamation of a crucified messiah and its counter-cultural implications,[15] Paul argues that the gospel actually "is the power of God for salvation to everyone characterized by πίστις, to the Jew first and to the Greek"

---

to come to them so that he might have some fruit among them. Again in the past Paul was hindered (aorist passive; ἐκωλύθην) from carrying out his plans. Rom 1:15, however, has no verb, so one must be supplied. On the surface, the most obvious answer is to allow εἰμί (present) from 1:14 to govern 1:15, as it is the verb in closest proximity. The content similarity between 1:13 and 15 concerning Paul's desire to preach the gospel and bear fruit in Rome, however, suggests that 1:15 should similarly be understood in the past. The sense is then, "I, Paul, am obligated to preach the gospel to *all* people (1:14) where Christ has not been named (15:20). Therefore (οὕτως), I planned to come to you to bear fruit (1:13) as it was my eagerness to preach the gospel to you (1:15), but I was hindered (1:13). Now, however, I hope to strengthen your Christian life and to be encouraged together with you (1:11-12)." Contra Günter Klein, "Paul's Purpose in Writing the Epistle to the Romans," in *The Romans Debate* (ed. Karl P. Donfried; rev; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991), 37-39. Peter Stuhlmacher, "The Purpose of Romans," in *The Romans Debate* (ed. Karl P. Donfried; rev; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991), 241n.25, opposes Klein on the grounds of Rom 6:17 and 16:17. For solutions like mine, see Byrne, *Romans*, 56; Stuhlmacher, "The Purpose of Romans," 236-37; idem, *Paul's Letter to the Romans: A Commentary* (Scott J. Hafemann, trans.; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1994), 26. Jewett makes the same argument connecting 1:13 and 15, but he applies it such that Paul *never* intended to preach to non-Christians in Rome but within Christian congregations. Jewett, *Romans*, 134.

[15] For instance, whether or not Paul intended them as such or whether they are implications generally extrapolated from Paul's comments, it is easy to imagine a Roman hearing Paul's language of slavery to Christ, God's gospel (1:1), Son of God (1:4), grace, peace, Lord, Father, and God (1:7) as antithetical to Roman imperial claims. For example, see Elliott, *Arrogance*, 59-85.

(δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστιν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι).[16] Paul does not yet disclose exactly from what situation God powerfully effects salvation through the gospel; he only begins to address that issue in 1:18. As such, Paul identifies the gospel as the salvific solution to an as of yet unidentified problem, with the only criterion being πίστις (cf. 1:5). What Paul *does* (re)indicate, however, involves the scope of God's salvific activity in the gospel. The gospel is not applicable for Jews only or non-Jews only. God effects salvation through the gospel universally "for *everyone* characterized by πίστις" (παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι). This necessarily includes *both* Jews and Greeks (Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι). The scope of the gospel's solution is, once again, ethnically inclusive, just as Paul argues in 1:5-7 and 1:14.

In explaining why he is not ashamed of the gospel, Paul not only discusses what the gospel is and for whom it is applicable; he also indicates *why* the gospel is "the power of God for salvation," though his explanation is terribly truncated at this point in the letter. The gospel is God's power for salvation, Paul argues, because (γάρ) "in it, God's δικαιοσύνη is apocalyptically revealed on the basis of πίστις for the purpose of πίστις, as it is written, 'The person who is just on the basis of πίστις will live'" (δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται; 1:17).[17] Paul's explanation, however, raises as many or more questions than it answers, partly because Paul only develops some of these key concerns at later

[16] The phrase beginning with δύναμις either lacks a subject that takes δύναμις as a predicate nominative, or it lacks a predicate nominative or adjective modifying δύναμις θεοῦ. The explanatory function of γάρ suggests that the phrase beginning with δύναμις is tied to the previous comment about the shameless gospel, and 1:17's reference to God's righteousness being revealed "in it" (ἐν αὐτῷ) must refer back to τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. Consequently, what is missing is the subject of the clause, "the gospel."

[17] An alternative translation of the Hab 2:4 citation is, "The just person will live on the basis of πίστις." I find the difference between the two translations somewhat marginal for my purposes. In either instance, πίστις is the contingent factor that results in life. Cf. Rom 4:13.

points in Romans, and partly because pinpointing the most accurate connotation for some of these terms is, quite simply, terribly difficult. What is "God's δικαιοσύνη?" What does Paul mean by πίστις? What does the cryptic phrase, ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, mean? Whose πίστις is in view in the reference from Hab 2:4? My main goal in the following (brief) discussions is not to review the prolific discussions on these questions but to look at the way *Paul* develops these concepts, especially as it relates to the present task at hand concerning Rom 3.

With regards to Paul's use of πιστ- terminology, the first item to consider is whether the concept applies to God or Jesus (subjectively, as in God's or Jesus' faithfulness) or to humans (objectively, as in humanity's faith or trust in God or Jesus).[18] In different ways, the answer is both. Paul clearly has human πίστις in mind when he speaks of the Romans' "πίστις being proclaimed in all the world" (1:8, see also 1:12), and, to some degree, when he claims that the gospel is the powerful means by which God effects salvation "for everyone who is characterized by πίστις" (παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι; 1:16). But Paul also speaks specifically of divine πίστις; Rom 3:3 asks, if some failed with regards to πίστις, will that in any way nullify God's πίστις (πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ). Regardless of which voice in the dialogue asks or answers the question, the answer is a resounding "No!" God will be faithful and true. This is, therefore, a prime example of the subjective genitive following πίστις, as confirmed by 3:4's appeal for God always "to be found true;" this is God's own faithfulness under question.

Before returning to 1:16-17 and considering the πίστις language in the abbreviated phrase, ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, two more questions are applicable. First, to

[18] Of course, see Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ*.

what is God invariably "faithful?" To stick with the discussion of God's faithfulness in 3:2-4, the context requires that, though some Jews have been unfaithful (ἠπίστησαν) to the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ with which "they were entrusted to be faithful" (ἐπιστεύθησαν),[19] God remains faithful specifically to those λόγια.[20] This, of course, raises the question, what are the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ? The λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ are the Jewish scriptures, "the law and the prophets," with their promises,[21] such as God's promise to Abraham that he would be the heir of the world (τὸ κληρονόμον αὐτὸν εἶναι κόσμου) and the father of many nations (πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν; 4:1-17); these λόγια are the same Jewish scriptures in which God pre-*promised* the gospel about his Son (1:2-3).[22] God will be faithful, therefore, to his promises to bless Abraham and his seed, to extend Abraham's family to the "world" at large (4:13) so as to include "many nations" (4:17), and to his pre-*promised* Christological message (1:2-3) of salvation for all people characterized by πίστις (1:16). That is, God is invariably faithful to bring his ethnically ambiguous, nationally inclusive,

---

[19] On the sense of ἐπιστεύθησαν, see Paul's usage in Gal 2:7; 1 Thess 2:4; 1 Cor 9:17, and Cranfield, *Romans*, 178-9; Sam K. Williams, "The 'Righteousness' of God in Romans," *JBL* 99.2 (1980): 267-68; Stowers, *Rereading*, 166-67; Jewett, *Romans*, 243; Wright, *Romans*, 453; idem, "Romans 2:17-3:9," 1-3; idem, *Paul*, 837-38. *But*, see my explanation of it in the section on 3:3-4 in Chapter Eleven.

[20] So also Byrne, *Romans*, 109.

[21] On the meaning of λόγια, J. W. Doeve, "Some Notes with Reference to ΤΑ ΛΟΓΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ in Romans III 2," in *Studia Paulina in honorem J. de Zwann* (ed. J. N. Sevenster and W. C. van Unnik; Haarlem: Bohn, 1953), 111-23; Dunn, *Romans*,130-31; Käsemann, *Romans*, 78-79; Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 326; Black, *Romans*, 53; C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (BNTC; 2nd ed.; London: Black, 1957), 60; John Murray, *The Epistle to the Romans: the English Text with Introduction and Notes* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), 92-93; Rhys, *Romans*, 35; Frank J. Matera, *Romans* (PCNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 81; Hultgren, *Romans*, 135; Longenecker*, Eschatology*, 195; Tobin, *Rhetoric*, 119.

[22] As Richerd B. Hays writes, "[3:2, 21, 31] share in common a view of the Law as proleptic, prefiguring the economy of salvation that is revealed in the gospel," which he then ties to Rom 1:2. Richard B. Hays, "Three Dramatic Roles: The Law in Romans 3-4," in *Paul and the Mosaic Law* (ed. James D. G. Dunn; WUNT 89; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996), 158, 160, more generally 158-64. See also Stowers, *Rereading*, 171, 199. Contra Cranfield (*Romans*, 55-57), Fitzmyer (*Romans*, 233), and Hultgren (*Romans*, 44) who take 1:2 and 3 as parallel but unconnected attributes of εὐαγγέλιον.

and salvific promises to fruition through the Christological gospel, and he will do so despite humanity's faults (Rom 3:3; Gal 3:8).

Second, granted that Paul can talk about πίστις as either human or divine, is humanity the source of its own πίστις, or does human πίστις come from some other entity? To state the issue cumbersomely but more indicative of the point—if, on the one hand, πίστις is the primary criterion by which the gospel is applicable to all (Rom 1:16) and a person who is just on the basis of πίστις will live (1:17), *but*, on the other hand, if Paul can ultimately claim that "*no one whatsoever* is just" (οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς; 3:10), the criterion for which is πίστις according to Paul's citation of Hab 2:4 (1:17), then how can the gospel *ever* be effective? If *no* humans are δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως in and of themselves (3:10; cf. 1:17), then it stands to reason that no human actually has her or his own πίστις by which the gospel can save. So, what is the source of human πίστις that allows Paul's gospel to function? Paul preempts human πίστις by identifying its origin as dependent on God's initiative to act decisively on humanity's behalf. In Romans, Paul writes that "πίστις comes from hearing, and hearing comes through the word of Christ" (ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ διὰ ῥήματος Χριστοῦ; 10:17), so that πίστις arises out of an engagement with Christ. More to the point, in 12:3, Paul plainly states that God "distributes to each a measure of πίστις" (ἑκάστῳ ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἐμέρισεν μέτρον πίστεως; see also 12:6). Philippians perhaps contains Paul's clearest comment to this end, as he argues that πίστις is a gracious gift from God, "It was graced to you… to have πίστις in him" (ὅτι ὑμῖν ἐχαρίσθη... τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύειν; Phil 1:29; cf. Rom 1:5, δι' οὗ ἐλάβομεν χάριν… εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως). Plus, in Galatians, Paul identifies πίστις as one of the gifts, or "fruits," that accompany participation in the Spirit (5:22; cf. 3:5). For Paul, therefore,

the source of human πίστις is not humanity's own volition, decision to believe, or mental consent but God's own gracious initiative to cause or enable πίστις within humanity.[23]

Though almost anyone (including myself) would admit that the shorthanded phrase, ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν (1:17), is simultaneously highly enigmatic and remarkably important for understanding Paul's explanation of God's δικαιοσύνη, I think the two preceding conversations offer the best context from which to view this cryptic little phrase. The phrase does not mean "with faith upon faith" or "with exceeding amounts of faith" as some take the lemma as a statement of extent, and as Paul, in a different grammatical construction, describes Abraham's hope in 4:18 (παρ᾽ἐλπίδα ἐπ᾽ἐλπίδι). The phrase explains how and why God's δικαιοσύνη (which I address momentarily) is being apocalyptically revealed (ἀποκαλύπτεται). The phrase works surprisingly well when read in view of God's faithfulness and role as the agent who effects human πίστις; God's δικαιοσύνη is apocalyptically revealed "on the basis of (ἐκ) [his] faithfulness (πίστεως), for the purpose of enabling (εἰς) [human] πίστις (πίστιν)."[24]

To begin, understanding God's δικαιοσύνη as stemming from his faithfulness and enabling human πίστις functions logically in the soteriological discussion of Rom 1:16-17. To paraphrase, Paul writes that 'the gospel is God's powerful means of effecting

---

[23] This causes additional problems for Campbell's argument. For Campbell, justification *by faith* amounts to little more than an impossible legalistic theology. When one considers God's role in gracing humanity with πίστις, however, πίστις no longer approximates a human work, much less an impossible one. Quite the contrary, God's gracing humanity with πίστις fits snuggly in God's apocalyptic deliverance of humanity through Jesus' faithfulness so characteristic of Rom 5-8. In this light, Rom 1-4 and 5-8 are not so contradictory as Campbell imagines. Campbell, *Deliverance*, 55-61.

[24] Hays, *Echoes*, 39-41; Dunn, *Romans*, 44-45, 48; Wright, *Romans*, 425; Rhys, *Romans*, 21-22; Witherington, *Romans*, 48, 55-56. Cf. Douglas A. Campbell, "Romans 1:17 – A Crux Interpretum for the ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΗΡΙΣΤΟΥ Debate," *JBL* 113.2 (1994): 265-85, who reads similarly, but with Christ's faithfulness rather than God's. For surveys of various approaches, see Colin G. Kruse, *Paul's Letter to the Romans* (PNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 75-78; and Charles L. Quarles, "From Faith to Faith: A Fresh Examination of the Prepositional Series in Romans 1:17," *NovT* 45 (2003): 1-21.

salvation for everyone characterized by πίστις, since God's δικαιοσύνη is apocalyptically revealed in the gospel. God's δικαιοσύνη extends out of his faithfulness (ἐκ πίστεως) to his pre-promised gospel (1:1-3) and the promises to Abraham and Abraham's ethnically ambiguous seed (3:2-4; 4:13-17), which God's δικαιοσύνη creates and maintains by gifting humanity with πίστις.' Stated linearly, the gospel is God's power for salvation to everyone characterized by πίστις because God's δικαιοσύνη actualizes human πίστις, which is the gospel's sole criterion. Paul's citation of Hab 2:4 confirms this reading once more; "the person who is just on the basis of πίστις will live" (1:17)—it is the person who is just on the basis of πίστις for whom the gospel is God's powerful means of salvation.[25]

Furthermore, such a reading not only suggests a particular nuance for how to understand God's δικαιοσύνη in 1:17, but it suggests a nuance that is supported elsewhere in Paul's thought as well. Read in the context of 1:16-17, God's δικαιοσύνη is at least as active as it is qualitative of God's character.[26] That is, God's δικαιοσύνη does not simply describe God as "just" or "righteous," though it does; God's δικαιοσύνη actively effects human πίστις and thereby enables the gospel.[27] Paul does at times speak qualitatively of God's character as "un/just" or "un/righteous" using δικ- stem

[25] This understanding of "from faith for faith" in many ways renders the question of whose faith is in view in the citation of Hab 2:4 a moot point; a person is just because God acts faithfully to his promises and because God graciously creates πίστις for the person. This explains the omission of any personal pronoun in the citation of Hab 2:4. Hays, *Echoes*, 39-41; Dunn, *Romans*, 44-46, 48-49.

[26] For discussion of the nuances of God's δικαιοσύνη, including its active sense, see Jewett, *Romans*, 141-42; Wright, *Romans*, 397-406; idem, *Paul*, 841, 1055n.49; Hultgren, *Romans*, 75-76; 605-15; Moo, *Romans*, 70-75; A. Katherine Grieb, "The Righteousness of God in Romans," in *Reading Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLRBS 73; ed. Jerry L. Sumney; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 65-78; Campbell, *Deliverance*, 683-88; J. Louis Martyn, "God's Way of Making Right What Is Wrong," in *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 141-56; idem, *Galatians*, 263-75; Ernst Käsemann, "'The Righteousness of God' in Paul," in *New Testament Questions of Today* (W. J. Montague, trans.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 168-82; Richard B. Hays, "Psalm 143 and the Logic of Romans 3," *JBL* 99.1 (1980): 107-15.

[27] Thus, God's faithfulness, righteousness, and truthfulness are *not* "virtual equivalents." Contra Williams, "Righteousness," 268.

terminology. For example, following its juxtaposition of God's δικαιοσύνη with human ἀδικία, Rom 3:5 asks whether "God is not unjust" (ἄδικος) when he brings wrath. Also, Rom 3:26 considers God's "demonstration of his δικαιοσύνη" in the present time as indicative that he is "just" (εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον). But Paul often uses this terminology in an active sense. In Rom 3:26, Paul also speaks about God as "the one who justifies" (εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν... δικαιοῦντα), as he similarly does in 3:30 (δικαιώσει), 4:5 (τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ), 8:30 (ἐδικαίωσεν), and 8:33 (ὁ δικαιῶν). Concerning δικαιοσύνη, the form used in 1:17, Paul employs it actively elsewhere as well. Romans 3:21-26 links God's δικαιοσύνη (twice in 3:21-22) to his salvific activity in Christ, so that those who sin and lack God's glory (3:23) "are justified freely by [God's] grace" (δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι; 3:24). This salvific activity amounts to a demonstration of God's δικαιοσύνη (twice in 3:25-26) in the present time, so that God's δικαιοσύνη is largely synonymous (here) with his inclusive salvific initiative. Additionally, in an equally salvific context, Rom 10:1-3 distinguishes between God's δικαιοσύνη and Israel's endeavor to establish its own, the point being that Israel did not recognize (ἀγνοοῦντες) God's Christological plan for salvation. Finally, numerous passive instances of δικαιόω imply God as an active agent, such as 2:13; 3:20, 24. Consequently, one can say that God's δικαιοσύνη is often his "act of making just," "act of right-wising," or "rectifying" an otherwise hopeless humanity (cf. 3:10-18), and 1:16-17 fits this category as well. Therefore, reading ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν such that God's "rectifying activity" (δικαιοσύνη) actualizes his faithfulness to the λόγια by effecting and enabling the very human πίστις by which the gospel functions is in fact quite a strong reading, despite the phrase's abridged nature.[28]

[28] Recognizing the universal scope of God's promises and the active nuance of God's δικαιοσύνη

Before transitioning to Paul's argument in 1:18 and following, one lingering question remains. Given that in Paul's argument God works through the gospel in an equative and ethnically ambiguous manner, what does Paul mean by the phrase, "to the Jew *first* and to the Greek" (Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι)? It is perhaps easier to say first what the phrase cannot mean. If we follow Paul's argument linearly, the phrase cannot mean that Paul attributes to Jews any eschatological or salvific advantage over non-Jews, as Paul stresses multiple times in 1:1-16 (and *throughout* Romans!) that his gospel is equally applicable to *all* (πᾶς). For Paul ultimately to allot the Jews salvific advantage in this way would be a contradiction of terms and a breach of the anthropological equality he masterfully paints elsewhere in Romans (and Gal 3:28 and 1 Cor 12:13). Though a contradiction or tension on Paul's part is possible, such conclusions should be a last resort, especially when textual evidence suggests otherwise. For example, second, reading πρῶτον as a chronological rather than qualitative marker not only avoids contradiction with the terms of Paul's gospel, but Paul's earlier claims about the gospel also support such a view. In Rom 1:2, Paul argues that God "*pre*-promised the gospel in advance through his prophets in the holy scriptures" (προεπηγγείλατο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις), referring of course to the Jewish scriptures. Paul suggests, therefore, that the gospel about Jesus was present in the Jewish scriptures all along,

---

that is effective for all, manifested in the present, and Christological unsettles readings that staunchly prioritize the applicability of God's δικαιοσύνη *to Israel* by placing it in a scriptural context. For instance, Hays insists that Paul's use of scripture "[spirals] in around a common focus: the problem of God's saving righteousness *in relation to Israel*" and that scripture "presses home a single theme relentlessly: the gospel is the fulfillment, not the negation, of God's word *to Israel*." Hays, *Echoes*, 34, italics mine. As John M. G. Barclay argues, "Whatever the previous connotations of this motif, and however 'the law and the prophets' bear witness to it (3:21), its meaning emerges only in the good news itself." Furthermore, "This suggests that the meaning of this phrase *for Paul* can hardly be determined by its contextual sense in biblical or Second Temple texts." Barclay, *Gift* , 475-76, 476n.65, italics original. Hays is of course correct that God's δικαιοσύνη has implciations for Israel, but Paul indicates that it has equal and synonymous implications for non-Israelites too (Rom 1-16, esp 4, 9-11; see below).

though it only became recognizable in the Christ event (cf. Rom 10:1-16). Thus, in 1:16 Paul simply states explicitly what he only implies in 1:2; Jews had the first or earliest access to the gospel, but not in such a way as to privilege them qualitatively on an eschatological or salvific basis.[29]

In fact, to foreshadow further conversation below, a chronological reading of πρῶτον meshes quite well with Paul's other comments about Israel, such as his olive tree analogy (Rom 11). God calls Israel and commissions them to exercise πίστις towards the λόγια, the Jewish scriptures (3:2), which contain God's pre-proclaimed gospel about Jesus (1:1-3). According to the metaphor, because some of Israel lacks Christ-based πίστις (ἀπιστία),[30] God breaks them from the tree's root, his gracious election (11:18; cf. Rom 4).[31] In their place, God grafts in non-Israelites who display πίστις (11:19-20). If the

[29] So, the burden is on readings that maintain a real *salvific* advantage for Jews over non-Jews *via* the term "first" to show what salvific advantage Jews actually have before a just and impartial God. This will certainly involve discussion of Rom 9-11. Witherington, *Romans*, 51, for instance, claims that the meaning of "[first] cannot be limited to the notion that Jews were first offered salvation and then Gentiles were. Paul still sees that God has a plan for the salvation of non-Christian Jews in the future." In light of Rom 9-11, especially 11:25-32, Witherington's claim is true enough. What Witherington and other similar readings fail to account for, however, is the degree to which God's eschatological plan for Israel differs not at all from his eschatological plan for non-Israel. Even in Rom 9-11, there is no difference; what God does for Israel, God does for *all*. Jewish salvific advantage cannot be held in one hand and divine equality and impartiality in the other. In light of the universal Abrahamic promises, it is more true to say that *all* are advantaged. See my further discussion of 9-11 in Chapter Eleven.

[30] On the Christological center of Rom 11, see also Jonathan A. Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (NovTSup 152; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 207-26.

[31] Identifying the root (ῥίζα) in the metaphor is tricky. In Rom 11:1 Paul begins to discuss a remnant of faithful—Christian—Jews, including himself. This remnant exists because of God's gracious election (11:5), but God hardens the rest (11:7-10). Paul still hopes for the salvation of those hardened, declaring that if the first portion is holy, so is the whole lump, and if the root is holy, so are the branches (11:12-16). In 11:16, Paul "lumps" the remnant and the hardened together; both constitute the whole lump and all the branches. God, however, breaks the hardened branches from the tree due to a lack of πίστις (11:17, 20). Though unstated, the inference is that the remaining branches represent the faithful remnant, and God grafts Christian-gentile branches in with them (11:17). The root, therefore, is something the Jewish remnant and Christian gentiles share through πίστις but from which others are omitted, at least temporarily, due to a lack of πίστις (cf. 11:20, 23). In Romans, Jews and non-Jews belong by πίστις to the people God graciously calls into being through his promises to Abraham (Rom 4). Thus, it is God's gracious call or election as expressed in the Abrahamic promises that is identified as the ῥίζα that supports

broken off Israelites cease in their ἀπιστία and demonstrate πίστις, God will reattach them to the tree (11:23). In Paul's analogy, inclusion or exclusion from the tree is based solely on the criterion of πίστις, just like Paul's gospel. Israel possessed the earliest access to God's people and the pre-proclaimed gospel, but such chronological priority does not afford them any eschatological or salvific advantage over against non-Jews, as God willingly breaks πίστις-less Jews from the tree.[32] What is more, God will not graft faithless Israel back on to the tree unless they illustrate πίστις. The criterion for Israel, therefore, is no different than for non-Israel; the gospel is God's powerful means of salvation to the Jew *first*, but the stipulations remain the same for *all*.[33] Appropriately, Paul concludes, "God locked *all* (τοὺς πάντας) away in disobedience, so that he might show mercy to *all* (τοῦς πάντας)" (11:32).[34]

---

both faithful Jews and non-Jews (cf. 9:24). See Barclay, *Gift*, 550-51. The implications of this view are significant, as it suggests that Paul is trying to say less about the way gentiles are incorporated into *Israel's* history and more about the way gentiles were always within *God's* purview, even from the universal Abrahamic promises that begin to call Israel into being. Thus, both Israel and non-Israel were in view from the very beginning, though this is only made recognizable in Paul's post-Christ-apoaclypse present. Contra Wright, *Paul*, 1212n.589; Byrne, *Romans*, 341; Moo, *Romans*, 704; Keck, *Romans*, 274; Witherington, *Romans*, 271, who suggest the "root" might generally refer to the patriarchs; and Hultgren, *Romans*, 410, who argues the root relates more generally to "the Israelite/Jewish people's spiritual heritage." Though Hultgren is generally right, more precision is possible. Jewett is incorrect to identify the root holistically as Israel, since Israelites/Jews cannot be both root *and* branches in the analogy. Jewett, *Romans*, 682-86.

[32] Israel's chronological priority also accounts for the distinction between "natural" and "unnatural" branches. That is, Israelites are only the "natural" branches because they were the earliest constituents to belong to the tree.

[33] In this project, I differentiate between *what* God is doing *eschatalogically* and *how* God is achieving that goal in the *present* time. I emphasize the former. Concerning the broader picture of salvation history (the "how"), or what I later refer to as "chronological jostling," see the nuances in Bruce W. Longenecker, "Different Answers to Different Issues: Israel, the Gentiles and Salvation History in Romans 9-11," *JSNT* 36 (1989): 95-123; idem., "Sharing in Their Spiritual Blessings? The Story of Israel in Galatians and Romans," in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment* (Bruce W. Longenecker, ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 58-84; idem., "Salvation History in Galatians and the Making of a Pauline Discourse," *JSPL* 2.2 (2012): 65-87. Note, however, how God not only uses Israel on behalf of non-Israel but also non-Israel on behalf of Israel in Rom 9-11.

[34] For yet another chronological progression, see also 11:30-31. "As you (non-Israelites) were formerly disobedient to God but now have been shown mercy because of [Israel's] disobedience, so also

So, to be sure, God's call had implications for Israel "first," but his promises and call are not ethnically exclusive but inclusive, extending to all the "world" and "many nations" (4:13, 17), and God deals equally with Israelite and non-Israelite alike on the basis of πίστις. For these reasons, Paul's description of his ethnically ambiguous audience in Rome as "called," "beloved," and "holy" (1:6-7) seems more intentional than accidental, especially given Paul's comments in 9:24-25. Surely Paul is trying to say something about God, Israel, and non-Israel, but what is it exactly? Paul continues to set forth his views about the relationship between Jews and gentiles throughout much of Romans.

Romans 1:18 introduces into the letter a remarkable shift in emphasis, as Paul turns from the apocalyptic revelation of God's active δικαιοσύνη to the equally apocalyptic revelation of his wrath (ὀργή). Before addressing this shift, a brief summary of 1:1-17 is in order. Paul's intended audience is Christian, and he addresses them as ethnically ambiguous, inclusive, and in the same terms the Septuagint employs to describe ethnic Israel as God's people. The essential content of Paul's teaching is his gospel about Christ, the scope of which is also ethnically unhindered and inclusive of all peoples. The sole criterion for the gospel is πίστις, which God, in his active δικαιοσύνη, graciously enables in incapable humans as a demonstration of his faithfulness to the pre-promised gospel and his promises to Abraham. Though Jews had the earliest access to the pre-promised gospel in their scriptures, this access affords them no eschatological or salvific privilege; the gospel is equally applicable for *all* on the basis of πίστις. Finally, God's actualizing of human πίστις renders the gospel God's powerful means for salvation,

---

[Israel] is now disobedient at the time when mercy is being shown to you, so that they might be shown mercy (as well)."

though Paul has not yet indicated from what the gospel offers such salvation. Paul, of course, begins to address this in 1:18.

Romans 1:18-32

Scholars struggle to explain the shift from God's δικαιοσύνη in 1:17 to God's ὀργή in 1:18. Recall, for instance, that Campbell finds such a stark contrast between the two that he creatively imagines 1:18 transitioning into the voice of an opposing Teacher, who proclaims his "gospel" of retributive justice and judgment according to desert in 1:18-32.[35] Weaknesses notwithstanding, Campbell's argument finds a way to explain the logic between 1:17 and 18, albeit unlikely on both rhetorical and exegetical levels (see Chapter Nine).

Such radical solutions are unnecessary in this instance, as the logic flows from 1:16-18 quite smoothly. The gospel is God's powerful means of salvation for everyone characterized by πίστις (1:16). The gospel is effective for salvation because (γάρ) God's δικαιοσύνη makes it so by enabling human πίστις (εἰς πίστιν; 1:17), the gospel's one criterion. The gospel is also God's salvific solution because (γάρ) God's ὀργή is being apocalyptically revealed (1:18), but God is invariably faithful to his promises (ἐκ πίστεως; 1:17). The apocalyptic revelations of God's δικαιοσύνη and ὀργή, therefore, both explain Paul's statement about the gospel as God's powerful means for salvation. Essentially, by enabling human πίστις, God's δικαιοσύνη (1:17) explains *how* the gospel is God's means for salvation, and God's ὀργή (1:18) reveals *why* and *from what* the

[35] Campbell, *Deliverance*, 542-47.

gospel is God's salvific solution.[36] Paul confirms this latter point in 5:8-9; God's love is demonstrated in the fact that "while we were still sinners" and under wrath, Christ made justification possible by dying on humanity's behalf, and, as a result, Christians will be saved "from ὀργή."

More, of course, remains to be said about 1:18-32. First, who is the target of God's ὀργή? Scholars often correctly note various elements in 1:18-32 that parallel accusations of idolatry that *Wisdom of Solomon* aims at non-Jews. For example, Wis 13:1 proclaims,

> All people (πάντες ἄνθρωποι) in whom ignorance of God (ἀγνωσία θεοῦ) exists are naturally foolish (μάταιοι), and they were unable to know (οὐκ ἴσχυσαν εἰδέναι) the one who is (τὸν ὄντα) from the good things that are visible (ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων), nor did they recognize (οὔτε… ἐπέγνωσαν) the architect (τὸν τεχνίτην) when they paid attention to his works (τοῖς ἔργοις).

Paul writes quite similarly; the target of Rom 1:18-32 is able to know God from creation but instead chooses to be ignorant and becomes foolish. Paul writes,

> The knowledge of God (τὸ γνωστὸν θεοῦ) is evident among them, because God appeared to them. For, his unseen attributes (τὰ... ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ) are clearly visible (νοούμενα καθορᾶται) from the creation of the world (ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου) in the things that are made (τοῖς ποιήμασιν), both his eternal power and deity, so that such people are without excuse (ἀναπολογήτους), because, although they knew God (γνόντες τὸν θεόν), they did not glorify or give thanks to him as God (οὐχ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν ἢ ηὐχαρίστησαν), but they became futile in their thoughts (ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς) and their foolish heart was darkened (ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία). (1:19-21)

Additionally, both *Wisdom* and Paul indicate that the alternative to recognizing God as Creator and worshipping him correctly is idolatry. *Wisdom* claims that such people consider the natural elements to be "gods" (θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν; 13:2) and that this extends to "likenesses of animals" (ἀπεικάσματα ζῴων; 13:10). Paul also writes, "They exchanged

[36] Cf. Jewett, *Romans*, 151-52; Moo, *Romans*, 99; Witherington, *Romans*, 63; Byrne, *Romans*, 65-66; Keck, *Romans*, 56-58.

the glory of the imperishable God for the likeness of an image (ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος) of perishable humanity (φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου) and birds and four-footed creatures and snakes," (1:23) such that "they worshipped and served (ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν) the creation (τῇ κτίσει) rather than the Creator (τὸν κτίσαντα; 1:25)." Both texts even fire a litany of accusations against their respective targets in extensive vice lists, including charges of evilness, hypocrisy, murder, deception, lying, and the like (Wis 14:22-25; Rom 1:28-32). For many scholars, these parallels strongly indicate that Paul, like *Wisdom*, specifically targets non-Jews in 1:18-32.[37]

It is peculiar, however, that Paul actually makes no ethnic distinctions in 1:18-32. Paul never mentions gentiles, Jews, or Israel, much less does he distinguish between these groups. Rather, Paul talks about "them";[38] the knowledge of God was evident "among them" (ἐν αὐτοῖς; 1:19); God appeared "to them" (αὐτοῖς; 1:19); "they" (αὐτούς; 1:20) are without excuse; "they" became futile (ἐματαιώθησαν; 1:21) in "their" (αὐτῶν; 1:21) thoughts and "their" (αὐτῶν; 1:21) foolish heart was darkened; God handed "them" (αὐτούς; 1:24) over; "they who" (οἵτινες; 1:25) worshipped and served creation; and so forth. It is clear that "they" are non-Christians, as "they" do not glorify or worship God, there is no discussion of Christ or the Spirit, and God himself hands "them" over to disobedience. But neither is there any talk of ethnicity. Why might Paul employ conventional Jewish critique of gentiles yet neglect to identify his target as such?

Though Paul withholds unveiling its full import until later in the letter (see 2:1-3:20), the logic of the argument up to this point prepares the reader for the answer. Paul's

---

[37] For instance, Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 269-70; Black, *Romans*, 39; Murray, *Romans*, 35; Keck, *Romans*, 60-62; Byrne, *Romans*, 64-65; Witherington, *Romans*, 63-64.

[38] Cf. Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 28-29, who also notes Paul's emphasis on "them," but who argues that "them" does not apply to Paul's previous self or his gentile audience.

God, gospel, and apostleship are invested "in *all* the nations" (ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; 1:1-7) without any ethnic boundaries. As Paul claims, he is exhaustively "under obligation to Greek and barbarian, to wise and unwise" (1:14), because in the gospel God's δικαιοσύνη effects salvation for *all* peoples characterized by πίστις (παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι; 1:16-17). The gospel is the ethnically unencumbered salvific solution for *all* (παντί; 1:16-17), because (γάρ) God's ὀργή is also unhindered by ethnic boundaries (1:18). As Paul declares, "God's ὀργή is being apocalyptically revealed from heaven against *all* (πᾶσαν) ungodliness and unrighteousness of *humanity* (ἀνθρώπων) who suppress the truth in unrighteousness" (1:18). The solution and the problem are ethnically universal, and thus 1:18-32's discussion is ethnically ambiguous and inclusive of all humanity.[39] This is perhaps easier to see when one recognizes that 1:18-32 contains not only conventional Jewish critique of non-Jews but also *Jewish critique of Jews*. The discussion of "them" exchanging (ἤλλαξαν, μετήλλαξαν) God's glory (δόξαν) for idolatrous (ἐν ὁμοιῶματι εἰκόνος) images of people and animals (1:23) and God's truth for a lie (ἐν τῷ ψεύδει), so that they worshipped the creation rather than the Creator (1:25), significantly overlaps Israel's idolatry with the golden calf as depicted in MT Ps 106.[40] The text reads, "They exchanged (ἠλλάξαντο) their glory (τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν) for a likeness (ἐν ὁμοιώματι) of a calf that eats grass" (LXX Ps 105:20), which they "worshipped" (προσκύνησαν; LXX Ps 105:19). It is an overstatement, therefore, to classify Rom 1:18-32 as Paul's

[39] See Kruse, *Romans*, 82n.1; Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 172-73; Ulrich Wilckens, *Der Brief an die Römer* (EKK; 3 vols.; 3rd ed.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1997), 121; Jouette M. Bassler, *Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom* (SBLDS 59; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1982), 122, 135-36; Jonathan A. Linebaugh, "Announcing the Human: Rethinking the Relationship between Wisdom of Solomon 13-15 and Romans 1.18-2.11," *NTS* 57.2 (2011): 214-37; idem., *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 93-121.

[40] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 173-74; Jewett, *Romans*, 160-61; Wright, *Romans*, 433; Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 122, 135, 195-97; Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 114.

condemnation *specifically of gentiles*; Paul himself says *all... of humanity* (πᾶσαν... ἀνθρώπων) and draws on Jewish critique of both non-Jews *and* Jews to establish his point.[41] Accordingly, Paul's discourse in 1:18-32 is thoroughly ethnically ambiguous and inclusive, and Paul builds on this through 2:1-3:20.

Paul is not the only one to apply God's ὀργή (and θυμός; 2:8) to Jews and non-Jews alike, as his view finds ample precedence in Israel's scriptures. On the one hand, in the Septuagint, God's ὀργή is poised against an idolatrous Israel in texts like Deut 29:19-28; Isa 10:5-6; Jer 7:1-20; and Ezek 7:1-20. Synonymously, God's θυμός falls upon Israel for idolatry in Isa 1:19-29; Jer 7:1-20; Ezek 7:5/20; 8:18; and 9:8. On the other hand, God's ὀργή targets non-Israelites in texts like LXX Ps 58:6-14 (MT 59:5-13); and 78:1-7 (MT 79:1-7). It is, therefore, quite unsurprising for Paul to poise God's ὀργή against an inclusive and ethnically ambiguous target.[42]

Second, why does God direct his ὀργή against such people? As in *Wisdom* and MT Ps 106:19-20, the answer is idolatry, which Romans expands in terms of hypocrisy. The targets of 1:18-32 have knowledge about God (1:19), but they "suppress the truth" and neglect to glorify or give thanks to him as God (1:18, 21). That is, they refuse to give God due worship (1:25). Their knowledge and behavior are inconsistent. Because of this hypocrisy, "they" are without excuse (1:20) when they exchange God's glorious presence for idols of people and animals (1:23), the truth for a lie (1:25), and "natural use" for unnatural (1:26-27). For these reasons, "God handed them over" (παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ

[41] Contra Rodríguez, who confesses that it is easy to find in the text "universalistic possibilities" though he rejects such a conclusion. Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 28.

[42] See Linebaugh for the insightful argument that Paul's use of *Wisdom* (or similar traditions) is in order to subvert it. Linebaugh, "Announcing the Human," 214-37; idem., *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 93-121.

θεός) to uncleanness (ἀκαθαρσίαν; 1:24), dishonorable passions (πάθη ἀτιμίας; 1:26), and a useless mind (ἀδόκιμον νοῦν; 1:28).

In Paul's argument, therefore, God is the orchestrator of humanity's stumbling (cf. 11:8) by handing them over to what Paul later discusses as "slavery to Sin" (Rom 6), but he is also the faithful agent of their rescue. In the gospel, God's δικαιοσύνη saves humanity from slavery to Sin apocalyptically conceived and, ultimately, from God's own ὀργή (5:9). The argument of Rom 1:1-32 flows naturally along these lines; the distance between 1:16-17 and 1:18 is not so broad as it is deep and mysterious (cf. 11:25-32). In Rom 2, however, Paul begins to advance his argument through the use of other stylistic features. In diatribal fashion, Paul directly addresses an imaginary persona and in this way prepares for the dialogue beginning in 3:1. Understanding Paul's argument in Rom 2, therefore, is of critical importance for correctly analyzing the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9.

Romans 2

By the end of 1:32, Paul's Christian audience in Rome likely feels none the worse for wear; Paul seems aware that their πίστις is being proclaimed in all the world (1:8), he wants to be mutually encouraged with them (1:12), and they have experienced the salvation which God's δικαιοσύνη powerfully brings to fruition in the gospel (cf. 1:16-17). Things are not, however, as they seem. Rom 1:1-32 certainly serves an important role in Paul's argument, but in it he makes no specific claims about the situation(s) he is addressing in Rome. Paul discusses ethnic ambiguity, inclusivity, and God's "righteous" sovereignty in the salvation process for *all*, but he only plainly sets forth the practical/ethical implications of his teaching as it relates to life in Rome later in the letter (see below). In chapter 2, however, Paul slowly begins to sharpen his focus, pericope by

pericope, as he turns in apostrophic fashion to address an imaginary interlocutor in preparation for the dialogue that takes place in 3:1-9.[43]

As we draw closer to Paul's use of speech-in-character in 3:1-9, a number of questions rise to the fore. Does Paul address one imaginary figure in 2:1-29, or does he engage two, one in 2:1-11/16, and one in 2:17-29? Who is (are) Paul's interlocutor(s), and how does Paul characterize him (them)? What is the relationship between Paul's interlocutor(s) and his actual audience in Rome? Previous issues return to discussion as well, such as Paul's theme of ambiguity and his use of the phrase, "to the Jew first." I address these issues (and others) as they appear in the text.

Romans 2:1-11

After Paul's discussion of God's ὀργή against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of humanity at large, Paul suddenly turns in 2:1 to address a figure in the second singular. Paul writes, "Therefore, you are without excuse, O human, everyone who judges" (διὸ ἀναπολόγητος εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων). Though Paul uses the second singular to address this figure, it is not as though he actually calls out a specific person, true-to-life or imaginary. Once again, that adjective that is so significant in Paul's argument returns—πᾶς.[44] Paul employs the second singular in typical apostrophic fashion,[45] but it has an immediately broader scope for any and *everyone* who judges (πᾶς ὁ κρίνων) in the way he outlines momentarily.[46] What is more, in 2:1-16 Paul never

[43] For Rom 2 as apostrophe, see Stowers, *Rereading*, 100-4, 127-28; idem, "Apostrophe," 357-65.

[44] So Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 111.

[45] Ibid.

[46] The sense is essentially, "Everyone of you people who judge, you are without excuse."

addresses this interlocutor in ethnic terms.[47] Paul talks about Jews and Greeks (2:9-10) and "nations who do not have the law" (2:14), but he resists applying these terms to his addressee. The scope of Paul's argument, and the identity of his addressee, is as broad and ethnically vague as ever.

How, then, does Paul characterize this addressee? The question cannot be more important, since Paul's characterization of his interlocutor must serve as the measure by which to gauge each line in 3:1-9's dialogue.[48] Just as those in 1:18-32 are "without excuse" (ἀναπολογήτους; 1:20), Paul lays the same verdict against his interlocutor (ἀναπολόγητος; 2:1). Paul explains, "When[49] you judge another, you condemn yourself, for you do the same things when you judge"[50] (ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις, τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις ὁ κρίνων; 2:1), and this is despite the fact that Paul and his interlocutor "know (οἴδαμεν) that God's judgment is true against those who do such things" (2:2).[51] Furthermore, Paul rhetorically asks his hypocritical and judgmental addressee whether he or she presumes to escape God's judgment (σὺ ἐκφεύξῃ τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ) or ignorantly (ἀγνοῶν) thinks lightly of God's kindness and patience (2:3-4), because the interlocutor is storing up "wrath" (ὀργήν) "on the day of wrath and the

---

[47] So also Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 111.

[48] Below I consider whether Paul addresses one or two interlocutors in Rom 2.

[49] For reading the phrase temporally, see BDAG, ὅς, f. A few textual witnesses (C*^{vid} 104 sy^{h**}) add κριματι after ἐν ᾧ, indicating that they take the phrase as something like "in the way in which" or "with the same judgment by which." Another possible translation is, "On the issue which."

[50] Or, "For, you who judge do the same things."

[51] Barrett proposes that the interlocutor speaks 2:2. Barrett offers no argumentative support for this unlikely view. Barrett, *Romans*, 42. First, Rom 2:2 makes little sense as an interlocutor's response to Paul's accusation in 2:1 that he "does the same things." One would expect the interlocutor to deny the accusation, not confess that God's judgment is true against the behavior of which Paul accuses him. Second, *if* the interlocutor makes the confession in 2:2, it renders Paul's question in 2:3 redundant and senseless.

apocalyptic revelation of God's just judgment" (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ; 2:5).

Paul, therefore, parallels the characterization of his interlocutor with five key points in his charges against those in 1:18-32. First and second, Paul's addressee "does the same things" as those in 1:18-32. Paul critiques the interlocutor for being judgmental, but judging does not appear as a concrete issue in 1:18-32. The fundamental issue in 1:18-32 is the failure to worship God and idolatry (1:21, 23). So too the interlocutor fails to worship God, specifically in God's role as judge. The interlocutor knows that God is judge and that God's judgment is true, but the interlocutor assumes God's role and submits his or her own judgments (2:1-3).[52] Paul even wonders whether the interlocutor believes he or she, as judge, will escape God's judgment (2:3). Further support for understanding the interlocutor's error in this way comes later in Romans. Exhorting his Roman audience to stop passing judgment on one another (14:10-13), Paul directly appeals to God's office as judge. Paul writes,

> But why do you judge (τὶ κρίνεις) your brother or sister?... For we will all stand before the judgment seat of God (πάντες γὰρ παραστησόμεθα τῷ βήματι τοῦ θεοῦ)… Each of us will give an account… Therefore, let us no longer judge one another (μηκέτι οὖν ἀλλήλους κρίνωμεν).

God's role as judge, therefore, constitutes the chief reason Paul's Roman Christian audience should *not* pass judgment on one another, and this is in clear contrast to the behavior of Paul's interlocutor in chapter 2. (I address the way Paul's interlocutor also succumbs to idolatry in the section on 2:17-29.)

[52] Dunn writes similarly; by doing the same things, "Paul could mean that the very attitude of passing judgment on others was in effect an attempt to usurp the role of the Creator and so improper to the creature." Dunn, *Romans*, 89.

Third, Paul's interlocutor is hypocritical. Those in 1:18-32 have access to the knowledge of God (1:19-21, 32), but they act contradictory to this knowledge (1:21-32). So also Paul's interlocutor knows that "God's judgment is true against those who do such things" (2:2) but nevertheless "does the same things" (2:1, 3).

Fourth, as noted above, Paul's assessment in 1:18-32 parallels material in *Wisdom*; Paul's telling rhetorical questions in 2:3-5 also parallel *Wisdom*. *Wisdom* writes,

> Though they have placed trust in lifeless idols and swear wickedly, they do not expect to suffer any harm (ἀδικηθῆναι οὐ προσδέχονται). But, on both accounts, just penalties will pursue them (μετελεύσεται τὰ δίκαια), because they thought wickedly about God by paying attention to idols (προσέχοντες εἰδώλοις), and in deceit they swore unjustly and thought lightly of holiness (καταφρονήσαντες ὁσιότητος). (14:29-31)

Just as *Wisdom*'s target expects not to suffer any harm, gives heed to idols, and "thinks lightly" of holiness, Paul rhetorically asks his interlocutor whether he or she presumes to escape God's judgment (λογίζῃ... ὅτι σὺ ἐκφεύξῃ τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ; 2:3) and whether he or she "thinks lightly" of God's kindness (καταφρονεῖς; 2:4), all the while storing up "God's just judgment" (δικαιοκρισίας; 2:5). It becomes more clear *why* the interlocutor thinks this way as Paul's argument develops through Rom 2:29.

Fifth, God unleashes ὀργή against those in 1:18-32. No less seriously, God's ὀργή stands at the ready against Paul's hypocritical and judgmental interlocutor, who is storing up ὀργή "on the day of ὀργή (ἐν ἡμέρα ὀργῆς) and the apocalyptic revelation of God's just judgment (ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ; 2:5)." Thus, based on these five points, Paul's judgmental interlocutor in 2:1 is qualitatively no different from those accused in 1:18-32.

One final note before moving on—the thematic thread of divine impartiality remains unbroken. As Paul portrays the gospel in 1:1-7, 14-17 and God's ὀργή in 1:18-32,

Paul also couches his critique of the interlocutor on the foundation of God's ethnic impartiality.[53] God does not only judge Jews, nor does he only judge gentiles. Rather, God "will render *to each* according to his or her deeds" (2:6). For "*every* human (ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχήν ἀνθρώπου; 2:9) who does evil," God will mete out "wrath" (ὀργὴ; 2:8), "anger" (θυμός), "affliction, and distress" (2:9). On the contrary, God will repay "*everyone* who does good" (παντὶ τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν; 2:10) with "eternal life" (ζωὴν αἰώνιον; 2:7), "glory, honor, and peace" (2:10). Such recompense operates, for the second and third times, "to the Jew first, and to the Greek" (2:9-10), because God shows no favoritism (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν προσωπολημψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ; 2:11). God's judgment, therefore, whether positive unto eternal life, or negative unto wrath, functions with no ethnic bias whatsoever.[54] Being Jewish affords no qualitative advantage at the judgment; equality, justice, (and grace) are the currencies that rule that day. The chronological (rather than qualitative) argument I pose for 1:16, therefore, offers the best explanation here as well.[55]

In sum, so far, Paul characterizes his interlocutor as ethnically ambiguous, judgmental, and hypocritical. The interlocutor neglects to worship God and is on the fast track towards God's ὀργή. Paul even appeals to the same Jewish tradition to characterize those in 1:18-32 as idolatrous and his interlocutor as one who expects to escape God's

---

[53] So also, Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 182-84.

[54] As Longenecker writes, Paul "finds it presumptuous to contain the principle of divine impartiality within an ethnocentric context." Ibid., 184. So also Kruse, *Romans*, 128; Wright, *Romans*, 438-40; Porter, *Romans*, 76.

[55] If Paul's own chronological comments in Rom 1 and 9-11 do not suffice (see above), Israel's own narrative also documents these points. God first judges according to their deeds Adam, Eve, and Cain (Gen 3-4), and he first brings cataclysmic destruction on Noah's generation (Gen 6-8). But God also first rescues and makes a covenant with the righteous Noah (Gen 6-8), and he first calls and blesses Abraham for the formation of a people (albeit with universal implications; Gen 12). Interestingly, even the terms ὀργή and θυμός as divine attributes first appear directed against Moses (Ex 4:14).

impartial judgment, though the reason for this latter point remains momentarily unclear. Paul continues to narrow the apostrophic characterization of his single (see below) interlocutor in 2:17-29, but first he comments further on God's impartiality and the standard by which God judges.

Romans 2:12-16

In 2:12-16, continuing to address his interlocutor, Paul clearly extends his discussion of divine impartiality, yet the way the argument advances is more difficult to track. Almost out of nowhere Paul begins to talk about law (νόμος), about those who do νόμος being justified (2:13), and even about those who never had the law somehow doing it successfully (2:14). All of this seems to oppose what Paul says later about *no one* being justified by works of νόμος (3:20). How then is Paul's extension of divine impartiality to be understood in terms of law observance? I begin by illustrating that divine impartiality is in fact the issue at hand. I then examine what Paul means by "doing the law" and "being justified by doing the law." Consideration of the standard that regulates God's judgment informs the discussion of 2:12-16 as a whole.

Following his declaration that God is impartial (2:11), Paul continues to explain why (γάρ) this is true. Paul argues that God knows no partiality because God does not judge based merely on possession of νόμος but on successfully doing νόμος; "It is not the hearers of νόμος who are just (δίκαιοι) before God, but the doers (ποιηταί) of νόμος will be justified" (δικαιωθήσονται; 2:13). To illustrate his case even further, Paul introduces "nations (ἔθνη) who do not possess νόμος" who nevertheless "do the requirements of νόμος" (τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν; 2:14). Paul argues that on the day of judgment, these νόμος-doers' conscience will bear witness and their thoughts will condemn or (in this

case) defend them before God, and they will be justified despite not actually possessing νόμος (2:15-16). The standard for God's judgment propels his impartiality even further. God's judgment for humanity (τῶν ἀνθρώπων) is based on the measure of Paul's gospel (κρίνει ὁ θεὸς… κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου) through Christ Jesus (διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ; 2:16).[56] Though the phrase, κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου, has "long been a puzzle," understanding it in this way takes it "in its most literal sense to mean that the gospel itself is the norm of judgment,"[57] and I show below how this fits within the context of 2:12-16. Paul argues, therefore, that God's judgment for humanity, regardless of ethnicity or possession of νόμος, is universally Christological and gospel-of-justification-by-πίστις oriented.[58]

This, of course, raises a number of questions: what does Paul mean by "doing νόμος," and how does it result in justification? How is God's Christological and gospel-oriented judgment a fair measure of νόμος fulfillment? Does 2:12-16 contradict or square with Paul's later comments about *no one* being justified by works of νόμος (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου; 3:20)? These are difficult questions, but I think a profitable way forward is

---

[56] It does not matter for my argument whether διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ adjectivally modifies τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου or adverbially modifies God's act of judgment. The phrase κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου necessarily modifies κρίνει adverbially. So, whether διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ adverbially modifies God's judging or adjectivally modifies Paul's gospel (which adverbially modifies God's judgment), the phrase διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ nevertheless sharpens the measure by which God judges.

[57] Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 157, though she opts for a different nuance. See Porter, *Romans*, 79-80 for an endorsement of the gospel as the measure by which God judges.

[58] Contra Black, *Romans*, 50; Matera, *Romans*, 65-67, who suggest two standards of judgment; and contra Murray, *Romans*, 77-79, who argues this "cannot be taken as the universal rule of judgment," since "this would contradict what the apostle said about those who 'sinned without the law.'" The error of each involves a misunderstanding of what Paul means by "doing" (or failing to do) νόμος, as a Christological understanding of νόμος fulfillment justifies 2:16 as a universal measure of judgment. Though we disagree regarding the thrust of 2:14-15, Dunn writes similarly, "Paul's addressees would probably understand the phrase thus: it will be by measuring them against the gospel which will show the extent to which these Gentiles 'do the things of the law.'" Dunn, *Romans*, 103, 106. Dunn seems to waver, however, in idem., *Theology*, 137.

possible by beginning with Paul's categorical statement about the measure of God's judgment. God does not judge some by one standard and others by another; God judges humanity (τῶν ἀνθρώπων) on the basis of the Christological gospel (2:16). The points that require further clarity, therefore, are how doing νόμος achieves justification and what it means to be one who does νόμος. I argue that "doing νόμος" in 2:12-16 entails being in a correct relationship with God as set out by the terms of the gospel (cf. 1:1-5; 16-17), which would be possible whether one actually possessed νόμος or not (2:14) and thereby maintains divine impartiality. This "Christian gentile" reading not only requires one to read δίκαιοι and δικαιοθήσονται (2:13) in their usual Pauline sense based on πίστις and God's initiative in the gospel, it also demonstrates how the Christological gospel is the just standard for God's judgment of humanity (2:16), both those ἀνόμως and those ἐν νόμῳ (2:12). Reading νόμος in this way, therefore, logically aligns all of the elements in 2:12-16 with themselves and with the rest of Romans (cf. 9:30).[59]

First, so far, Paul only speaks of humans as just or justified in 1:16-17. There, God's δικαιοσύνη effects human πίστις and enables salvation in the gospel for all, so that any person who is δίκαιος on the basis of πίστις shall live. Such an understanding of justification melds perfectly with Paul's other comments in Romans (or Galatians), such

[59] For alternative views and the maintenance of the "Christian gentile" position, see the discussions and literature cited in Kruse, *Romans*, 136-40; Cranfield, *Romans*, 151-73; Wright, "The Law in Romans 2," 131-50; idem, *Romans*, 441-42; Simon Gathercole, "A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2:14-15 Revisited," *JSNT* 85 (2002): 27-49; idem, *Where is Boasting?: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul's Response in Romans 1-5* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 126-29; Jewett, *Romans*, 213-14; Watson, *Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective* (rev.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 211-13. See the most recent support of this view in Barclay, *Gift*, 466-70. Cf. Charles H. Cosgrove, "What if Some Have Not Believed?: The Occasion and Thrust of Romans 3:1-8," *ZNW* 78 (1987): 102.

as 3:19-31.[60] It would surely seem strange for Paul to suggest an alternative view in 2:12-16. Any responsible reading of 2:12-16, therefore, must explain what Paul means by δίκαιοι and δικαιοθήσονται in 2:13, especially if it opposes Paul's use at all other points in Romans. In my reading, 2:12-16 does not diverge from Paul's basic use, as the terms in 2:13 remain wholly contingent on πίστις and God's decisive act in the Christological gospel. Further support of this reading requires a discussion of what Paul means by "doing νόμος."

Second, recall that as early as 1:1-5 Paul begins to define the gospel about God's Son, the Lord Jesus Christ, through whom grace and apostleship result (εἰς) in ὑπακοὴν πίστεως for *all* the nations (πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν). God pre-promises this gospel "through his prophets in the holy scriptures" (διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαίς ἁγίαις), one of which is Moses (Deut 34:10).[61] Paul's only other direct references to scripture in 1:6-2:11 are at 1:17, where Paul appeals to Hab 2:4 in support of his gospel of justification on the basis of πίστις, and 2:6, where Paul draws on Prov 24:12 / Psalm 62:13 (LXX 61:13) to illustrate God's impartiality. Paul only begins to discuss νόμος at 2:12. Consequently, all of Paul's engagements with scripture to this point speak in one accord concerning the scope and nature of God's activity in the gospel. By the time Paul's audience arrives at 2:12-16, these references constitute the epistolary context by which they might begin to understand his discussion of νόμος. Rom 2:15's probable reference to God's activity in Jer 31:33 (LXX Jer 38:33)[62]—a text originally addressing Jews but here applied to non-

[60] The difference between Rom 2:13-14 and Paul's citation of Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:12 is that in Rom 2:12-16 Paul expects the doers of νόμος to be justified. In Galatians, however, Paul's point is markedly the opposite. The difference must pertain to the portrayal of the Mosaic law in each instance.

[61] Cf. Cranfield, *Romans*, 55n.4.

[62] For example, Jewett, *Romans*, 215.

Jews—only provides additional parallels to God's impartiality, inclusivity, and sovereignty. Read in this light, νόμος comprises one of the prophetic avenues down which God pre-promises the Christological gospel (1:1-5) through which his salvific program operates impartially on the basis of πίστις (1:16-17; 2:6), which Paul confirms in 3:21-24. Furthermore, Paul's discussion of Abraham's πίστις-based δικαιοσύνη in Rom 4 (cf. Gal 3:8) provides the paradigmatic example of just how νόμος pre-promises Paul's πίστις-based gospel. Successfully "doing νόμος" in this context, therefore, would entail being in a correct relationship with God as set out by Paul's gospel, i.e., being justified ἐκ πίστεως (1:16-17).

Third, this reading coheres with Romans's larger argument about νόμος. By doing the "things/requirements of νόμος" as it relates to the proclamation of the Christological gospel, Paul writes that people demonstrate the singular "work of νόμος written on their hearts" (τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν; 2:15). Immediately in 2:17-29 Paul praises "circumcision of *the heart*" (περιτομὴ καρδίας) over against literal and outward observance of, and boasting in, νόμος. In 3:21-24, Paul argues that the νόμος and prophets bear witness to God's δικαιοσύνη, which functions through Christ's faithfulness (διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ) for all people characterized by πίστις (εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας) without distinction (οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν διαστολή; see also 3:27-31). Similarly, Rom 8:3-4 connects God's sending of the Son and defeat of Sin with the fulfillment of the singular "righteous requirement of the law" (τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου). Rom 10:4 also makes the connection between the τέλος... νόμου and Christ (cf. Gal 3:24). Paul's claims connecting νόμος and Christology throughout Romans, therefore, provide a basis for the view that being justified by "doing νόμος" in 2:12-16 is ultimately Christological and

based on God's δικαιοσύνη in the gospel.[63] Questions about νόμος, answers about Χριστός indeed.[64]

Fourth, in Rom 13:8 (and Gal 5:14) Paul sums up the scope of νόμος fulfillment simply as love for one another (ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον νόμον πεπλήρωκεν). Love for others, however, is dependent on two things. To begin, love for others is contingent upon recognizing God as God of Jews and non-Jews alike (3:29) so that God's people constitute a unified and equal whole. In fact, this is a main thrust of Paul's argument in Rom 1-11, as it specifically relates to the concrete situation Paul is addressing among the Roman Christians (see below). Additionally, νόμος fulfillment by loving others is only possible through engagement with the gospel and the indwelling "Spirit of Christ" (πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ), without which "it is impossible to please God" (θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται; 8:8-9). Fulfillment of νόμος, therefore, is once again ethnically inclusive, Christological, and gospel oriented.

Fifth, scholars often critique the "Christian gentile" reading based on the grammatical structure of 2:14, in which the adverbial adjective φύσει ("naturally") stands between two phrases it could potentially modify. Critics argue that φύσει should belong with what follows, (φύσει) τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, not with what precedes, τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα (φύσει), as the Christian gentile reading requires.[65] It is far from grammatically necessary, however, for φύσει to modify what follows rather than what precedes,[66] and

---

[63] Kruse, *Romans*, 138-40; Wright, *Romans*, 441.

[64] Cf. Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "Questions about *Nomos*, Answers about *Christos*: Romans 10:4 in Context," forthcoming. Gaventa should not be held accountable for my use, or theft, of the title.

[65] For example, Dunn, *Romans*, 98; Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 141-44.

[66] Gathercole, "A Law," 35-37; Wright, *Romans*, 441-42; Jewett, *Romans*, 213-14.

arguments based on the way Paul uses the term elsewhere (e.g., Gal 2:15; 4:8; Rom 2:27; 11:21, 24) to discuss identity rather than behavior strongly tip the scale in favor of φύσει modifying what precedes.[67] Thus, 2:14 discusses not those who "naturally do" νόμος but those who "do not naturally (i.e., by birth) have νόμος."

Paul, therefore, does not imagine those who do not possess νόμος keeping the whole of the Mosaic law (or some abridged version of it[68]) magically, "naturally," or otherwise by happenstance. Rather, Paul redefines what it means to be a successful "doer of the law"—the very law through which God pre-promises his Christological gospel of justification on the basis of πίστις for all (1:2-4).[69] In keeping with God's active δικαιοσύνη, it is God's ethnically unbound provision of salvation in the gospel that renders one a "doer of the law."[70] In this way, Paul extends his endorsement of divine impartiality in two respects. On the one hand, these Christian gentiles testify to God's inclusive and impartial δικαιοσύνη in the gospel. On the other hand, the gospel is shown to be the just measure of νόμος observance in 2:12-16, both for those "without the law" (ἀνόμως) *and* those "in the law" (ἐν νόμῳ; 2:12).[71] In 2:17-29, however, Paul returns to

---

[67] Gathercole, "A Law," 35-37; Achtemeier, *Romans*, 45; Philip Maertens, "Une etude de Rm 2.12-16," *NTS* 46.4 (2000), 510.

[68] Gathercole, "A Law," 35-37. Contra, for example, Hultgren, *Romans*, 117-18.

[69] This also allows Paul to unsettle the distinctions of "Jew" and "(un)circumcision in 2:25-29. Wright, *Paul*, 836-37.

[70] As Barclay writes, "For both Gentiles and Jews it is the act of God that produces the necessary human obedience, and in that act the God of Israel will display his righteousness in spite of human sin." Barclay, *Gift*, 467. It is at this point that Cosgrove's argument wavers a bit. Cosgrove argues that by the time the audience arrives at 3:1-8/9, "Paul has not yet pointed to anything specific that would disqualify the inner and outer obedience of the Torah-faithful across the board as authentic obedience." In fact, the main thrust of Cosgrove's argument about Jewish ἀπιστία in 3:1-8 is presupposed in 2:12-16. Cosgrove, "What if Some," 90-105.

[71] Contra Bassler, by appealing to Christian gentiles, Paul does *not* deviate from his view of divine impartiality but in fact upholds it *in light of* Christ. Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 143-44.

honing the characterization of his imaginary interlocutor, at which time it becomes clear that the interlocutor holds to a different understanding of νόμος than Paul discusses in 2:12-16.

Romans 2:17-29

With regards to Paul's interlocutor in Rom 2, Thorsteinsson argues that epistolary interlocutors usually remain the same unless clearly indicated otherwise, so Paul's apostrophe should be understood as directed to a single interlocutor throughout Rom 2.[72] Though Rodríguez follows Thorsteinsson on other major points, he disagrees on the number of interlocutor's in Rom 2, finding not one, but two. For Rodríguez, Paul addresses Rom 2:1-16 to one interlocutor and 17-29 to another.[73] Tobin even finds three interlocutors in 2:1-3:8.[74] As noted earlier, I think Paul only engages one interlocutor in Rom 2-3, so that "judging" in 2:1-16 is further defined in 17-29, and this is for two reasons, each with multiple supporting points.

First, nothing in the text *necessarily* contrasts the identity of the addressee in 2:1-16 with that of 17-29. To begin, in apostrophic style, Paul uses the second singular in both pericopae.[75] In 2:1, the second singular is broadened by the accompanying πᾶς; similarly, Paul's adaptation of LXX Isa 52:5 broadens the scope of his address by using

[72] Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor*, 144. It should be noted, however, that I disagree with the basis of Thorsteinsson's argument. Thorsteinsson bases his argument on what he finds to be a general rule for epistolary interlocutors, namely, that they represent the letter's recipients. Ibid., 136, 140-41. As I argue below, this is not the case in Rom 2-3.

[73] Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 49-50. See also Keck, *Romans*, 73-78, 82-88; Witherington, *Romans*, 87; Porter, *Romans*, 80-81.

[74] Tobin, *Rhetoric*, 119.

[75] Cf. Byrne, *Romans*, 96.

the plural (ὑμᾶς; Rom 2:24). Both passages, therefore, address "all of you" or "anyone who…" Additionally, Paul includes no strong contrastive related specifically to the addressee's (or addressees') identity; there is no ἀλλά or μέν… δέ formula, such that Paul distinguishes between "you who judge" (2:1) and "you who call yourself a Jew" (2:17). Rom 2:17 *does* have a δέ, but δέ takes a number of connotations. It might simply be a connective particle on par with καί, such as "you who judge… *and* call yourself a Jew."[76] Or, if contrastive, perhaps the contrast does not concern actual identity but the interlocutor's views about νόμος, gospel, and divine impartiality, which Paul discusses immediately prior in 2:12-16. Further investigation will carry this forward. For the moment, let it simply suffice that δέ does not *have* to contrast identities in 2:17.

Furthermore, in both pericopae, the σύ is ethnically ambiguous (see above for 2:1). Rom 2:17-29 is, of course, more difficult to define in this way, since the interlocutor calls him/herself a "Jew" (Ἰουδαῖος). Naturally, many scholars understand the identity of the interlocutor as Jewish in a combined ethnic-religious sense,[77] but evidence suggests that actual ethnicity may not be an issue. If nothing else, Paul does not address the interlocutor as someone who necessarily and existentially "is" (e.g., εἶ, γίνου) a Jew, but as one who "calls [him/herself] a Jew" (σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ).[78] More to the point, Paul must define what he means by "calling oneself a Jew." Paul's definition, however,

[76] BDAG, δέ, 1.

[77] For instance, Jewett writes, "The Jew is 'one who identifies with beliefs, rites, and customs of adherents of Israel's Mosaic and prophetic tradition.' The Jew was an 'adherent to the religion and member of the nation of the Jews.'" Jewett, *Romans*, 222. Cf. Byrne, *Romans*, 99.

[78] Porter notes that with this phrase Paul "implies that the label of being a Jew counts less in his scheme than it might in the schemes of others." Porter, *Romans*, 80.

has nothing to do with ethnic but with what we might call *religious* emphases.[79] Paul, for example, defines himself in Rom 11:1 in terms of ethnicity; "I myself am an Israelite (Ἰσραηλίτης), from the seed of Abraham, from the tribe of Benjamin." But none of these elements appear in Paul's definition of "calling one's self a Jew (Ἰουδαῖος)." Instead, Paul highlights altogether different points, such as one's view of νόμος and God (2:17-18, 23-24, 25-27), one's engagement in the Jewish religious obligation to help and teach others (2:19-22), and the Jewish religious practice of circumcision (2:25-29; cf. Phil 3:5-6, where Paul defines himself in ethnic *and* religious terms). Paul's definition of "calling oneself a Jew," therefore, contains *religious* or *theological* rather than necessarily ethnic qualifiers. In this way, anyone, Jew or non-Jew (i.e., a proselyte), can "call oneself" or "dedicate oneself to being" religiously Jewish.[80] So, not only does Paul *not* overtly indicate a shift in addressee, but neither is ethnicity a distinguishing factor between 2:1-16 and 17-29.

Second, in 2:17-29, Paul accuses the addressee of the same problems as in 2:1-16, albeit more finely defined.[81] In 2:1-16, Paul charges his interlocutor with behavior that is incongruous to his knowledge, failure to worship God, idolatry, and the presumption that one will escape God's judgment though God's ὀργή builds against him or her.[82] No differently, Paul argues that the interlocutor in 2:17-29 finds rest in νόμος (ἐπαναπαύῃ νὸμῳ) and boasts in God (καυχᾶσαι ἐν θεῷ; 2:17) and the law (ἐν νόμῳ καυκᾶσαι; 2:23),

---

[79] Cf. Kruse, *Romans*, 146; Moo, *Romans*, 159.

[80] For such treatments of ἐπονομάζῃ, see Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor*, 196-97; Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 48-51; LSJ, ἐπονομάζω, especially entry 1; BDAG, ἐπονομάζω. Cf. Stowers, *Rereading*, 148.

[81] Cf. Keener, *Romans*, 42.

[82] Cf. ibid., 46-48; Wilckens, *Römer*, 121.

he knows God's will and approves the superior things (2:18), he has devoted himself to help and teach others (2:19-20), and he lives according to his teaching by not stealing, committing adultery, or robbing temples (2:21-22).[83] Nevertheless, despite knowledge of God and the law, the interlocutor inevitably transgresses νόμος.[84] What is more, the interlocutor's incongruous views and actions have disastrous results. The interlocutor's behavior fails to glorify and worship God as God. Quite the contrary, the interlocutor dishonors God (τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις; 2:23) and causes God's name to be blasphemed among the nations (ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; 2:24).

The interlocutor's error is rooted in his failure to understand νόμος correctly. Rather than finding in νόμος the proleptic promise of justification on the basis of πίστις (1:1-5, 16-17; 2:12-16; 3:21-24), the interlocutor boastfully holds up his Jewishness, possession of νόμος, and circumcision as advantageous over others.[85] That the interlocutor thinks this way is strengthened by Paul's immediate discussion of whether any benefit accrues from circumcision (περιτομὴ μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ; 2:25-29) and by the probing questions about Jewish advantage that open and close the dialogue in 3:1-9. "So, what advantage is there to being Jewish (τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου), or what benefit comes from circumcision (τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς; 3:1)?" "What then? Are we at

[83] For a positive treatment of 2:21-22, see Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 53-56, whose argument is based on the οὐ in the interrogative, expecting a positive answer, "Yes, I teach myself." Contra, for only one example, Porter, *Romans*, 81-82. With others who argue similarly, Porter fails to recognize that the interlocutor transgresses the law *not* by the actions mentioned in 2:21-22, but by treating status, νόμος, and God's promises as exclusive rather than universal.

[84] One can even allow the conditional phrase to make this point more strongly, such as "*If* you call yourself a Jew, *if* you find rest in the law, *if* you boast in God and the law, and *if* you do all these things good religious Jews do, *then* you transgress the law and dishonor God because you neglect the πίστις-based gospel."

[85] See Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 297; Barrett, *Romans*, 43; Dunn, *Romans*, 108; Jewett, *Romans*, 221-23; Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 174.

any advantage or disadvantage (προεχόμεθα; 3:9)?"[86] The interlocutor, therefore, clings to his exclusive possession of νόμος and circumcision in place of God's ethnically inclusive and divinely orchestrated plan of salvation through the Christological gospel.[87]

Characterizing the interlocutor in this way sheds further light on Paul's charge that the interlocutor condemns himself when he judges because he does the same things (2:1). Again, "doing the same things" implies failing to worship God and engaging in idolatry, but how does the interlocutor engage in idolatry? The interlocutor has "exchanged" (cf. 1:23-27) δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως for a reliance on status, νόμος possession, and observance. Consequently, the interlocutor "does the same thing" by treating status and νόμος in an idolatrous manner, expecting that it will exempt him or her from undergoing God's judgment (2:1-4).[88] To complete the parallel characterizations of the interlocutor, though Paul does not use the language of "wrath" (cf. 2:5), he makes clear that the interlocutor is subject to judgment (2:27) and that God does not praise the interlocutor's behavior (2:28-29).

---

[86] I address προεχόμεθα in my detailed discussion of 3:9. Dunn argues similarly regarding the usefulness of 3:1 in this respect. Dunn, *Theology*, 117-18.

[87] Wright, therefore, begins with the wrong foot forward in suggesting that Israel's ἀπιστία (cf. 3:3) has nothing to do with what one might call a Christian πίστις relating in some way from and to God or Jesus. This, however, is the distinction drawn between Jews and Christian gentiles in 2:12-16; non-Christian Jews fail to recognize in νόμος God's pre-promised gospel, but God makes these gentiles successful doers of νόμος through the Christological gospel. Thus, a (if not the) major issue at stake is whether or not one correctly understands God's intent in νόμος for *both* Jews *and* non-Jews, and Wright misunderstands this point just like the interlocutor. Wright, *Paul*, 838-39.

[88] Bassler finds Jewish idolatry in 1:23's allusion to Israel's idolatry with the golden calf, through which Paul "intended above all to superimpose references to Jews and Gentiles." Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 197. Dunn writes similarly, "For Paul, then, the power of sin has manifested itself characteristically in misdirected religion. And that included not just Gentile idolatry, but also the idolatrous misplaced confidence of his own people in their own God-given religion and status before God." Dunn, *Theology*, 118-19.

When one recognizes that Paul's characterization of the interlocutor in 2:1-11 aligns with his developing and more narrowly defined characterization in 2:17-29[89] on all five points—incongruous knowledge and actions, failure to worship God, idolatry, privileged expectation to escape judgment, and God's displeasure—it becomes evident that the δέ of 2:17 does not contrast two different interlocutors. Instead, the δέ contrasts the interlocutor's view of νόμος, gospel, and divine impartiality with Paul's presentation of those concepts. Paul identifies his single interlocutor, therefore, as ethnically ambiguous and religiously Jewish (defined in such a way that opposes Paul's view),[90] characterized as follows: the interlocutor (1) is hypocritical; (2) does not worship God according to the ethnically inclusive, impartial, and Christological gospel of δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως; (3) believes that Jewish status and νόμος possession and observance, rather than God's decisive act of δικαιοσύνη, place an individual in the right; (4) believes that status and νόμος preclude an individual from undergoing God's judgment and thus provide him or her an advantage over others; and (5) is nevertheless confronted with God's disapproval. This characterization of Paul's interlocutor is the measure by which to assess the dialogical script of 3:1-9, since attributed speech must appropriately align with the character of the imaginary speaker.

Before getting to 3:1-9 at long last, however, one final discussion is in order; does the interlocutor directly represent Paul's audience or are they different, and what are the

---

[89] Byrne writes similarly, "In the first instance the address is couched in fairly general terms. But as the sequence develops, the identity of the implied addressee emerges more and more." Byrne, *Romans*, 96. Cf. Dunn, *Romans*, 108; Hultgren, *Romans*, 112; Watson, *Paul*, 198-99; Gathercole, *Where is Boasting*, 197-200; Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 174.

[90] So, I agree with Thorsteinsson and Rodríguez that the interlocutor identifies as religiously Jewish, but I disagree that he or she is specifically *gentile*. Contra Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 32-50; Thorsteinsson, *Paul's Interlocutor*, 188-204.

implications? The first question is easier. The interlocutor cannot be a direct representative of the historical audience. Paul writes to Christians in Rome. Paul's interlocutor, however, clings to νόμος and circumcision and *not* to the gospel through which God's δικαιοσύνη operates; Paul's ethnically ambiguous interlocutor is not Christian but religiously Jewish. Paul's dialogue with the interlocutor, therefore, does not represent imaginary conversation directly with the Roman Christians. Paul employs the interlocutor for a different purpose, an educational purpose, in order to teach or communicate a particular point (or points) to his Roman audience indirectly.[91] What Paul aims to teach his audience comes out more fully in the forthcoming dialogue (3:1-9) and summaries (3:10-31). As we will see, the message Paul communicates through the interlocutor directly pertains to the themes he develops so far in the letter—divine impartiality, ethnic inclusiveness, and God's δικαιοσύνη actively taking effect through the Christological gospel of justification on the basis of πίστις. This project is finally staged to hear the dialogue of 3:1-9 in light of speech-in-character, diatribe, *and* the argument Paul is currently developing in Romans.

[91] That Paul uses his interlocutor to educate his historical audience does not omit the necessity to consider the tones Paul takes with his interlocutor and audience. For instance, in *Disc*. 2.20, Epictetus treats his interlocutor polemically but he nevertheless uses the interlocutor to teach his students.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Romans 3:1-9 and the Argument of Romans

It is now possible to reconsider Rom 3:1-9 in view of my treatment of speech-in-character, diatribe, and other exegetical considerations. As staged, the foremost question to answer is, who is speaking which lines in the dialogue, Paul or his interlocutor? Does the interlocutor ask the questions, as the traditional view argues? Or, does Paul ask some or all of the questions as rescriptive readings contend? I thoroughly disagree with the sentiment of scholars like Keck, who suggests that "following the argument does not… require knowing exactly who says what."[1] Quite the contrary, the question—and even more so the answer—is of utmost significance, as the second goal is to explain why a correct arrangement of the dialogical script matters for understanding the larger argument of Romans. For instance, what does Paul argue about Jewish advantage and God's promises? Moreover, is Paul's treatment of Jews and/or Judaism polemical, or does Romans engage Jews / Judaism on a different dimension altogether? The exegetical choices one makes concerning the script of the dialogue in 3:1-9—especially 3:2 and 3:9—sharply influence one's views of these bigger questions about Romans and Paul's thought. Given the high stakes surrounding the issue, the deepest level of scrutiny to the text and the supporting evidence are of utmost importance indeed.

[1] Keck, *Romans*, 90.

Romans 3:1-9

> (3:1) Therefore, what advantage comes from being Jewish, or what benefit accrues from circumcision? (3:2) There is much [advantage] in every way! To begin, they were entrusted with the oracles of God. (3:3) To what end? If some lacked πίστις, their lack of πίστις will not nullify God's πίστις, will it? (3:4) Absolutely not! Instead, let God be true but every human a liar, as it is written, "So that you might be justified in your words, and you will overcome when you are judged." (3:5a) But if our unrighteousness proves God's righteousness, what shall we say? God is not unjust when he brings wrath, is he? (3:5b) I speak in a human way. (3:6) Absolutely not! Otherwise, how will God judge the world? (3:7) But if God's truthfulness is increased for his glory by my lie, why am I still being judged as a sinner? (3:8a) Why not, (3:8b) as we are slandered and as some claim that we say, (3:8c) "Let us do evil so that good might come?" (3:8d) Their judgment is justly deserved. (3:9a) What then? Are we advantaged or disadvantaged? (3:9b) By no means! (3:9c) For we have charged both Jews and Greeks all to be under Sin, (3:10) as it is written…

So who is speaking when and why does it matter? Given the terms of the method, must some lines be heard from one speaker, or do certain lines at least fit better in a particular voice? How do different arrangements impact readings of Romans? Recall that traditional readings generally envision the interlocutor posing objections in the form of questions to Paul in 3:1, 3, 5a, 7-8a, 8c, and 9a with only minor variations, so that Paul speaks 3:2, 4, (5b,) 6, 8b, 9b and following. For some or all of the questions, however, rescriptive readers place Paul in the role of Socratic questioner who guides the interlocutor to affirm a particular view. Few readings on either side of the spectrum, however, offer any evidence in support of their dialogical arrangements, and when they do it is typically sparse or otherwise problematic. But getting the script right matters, and in 3:1-9 this has particular relevance to questions of Jewish advantage, divine impartiality, and the overall message Paul communicates to his Roman audience. In the following analysis, I first engage each question-answer unit independently (as much as possible) in

order to define the shape of the script, then as a complete diatribal dialogue. Afterwards, I consider the dialogue's impact on the remainder of Romans.

Romans 3:1-2

Directly following Paul's apostrophic characterization and critique of his ethnically-ambiguous but religiously-Jewish interlocutor who boasts in his advantages rather than the gospel, the dialogue naturally opens as follows, "Therefore, what advantage comes from being Jewish, or what benefit comes from circumcision?" (τί οὖν τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου ἢ τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς; 3:1). The opening phrase, τί οὖν, connects 3:1 to the apostrophe, as it regularly advances an argument by drawing on the content from the preceding material.[2] Here, the concepts of being Jewish (Ἰουδαῖος, Ἰουδαίου; 2:17, 28-29; 3:1), circumcision (περιτομή, περιτομῆς; 2:25-29; 3:1), and salvific advantage (ὠφελεῖ, περισσόν, ὠφέλεια; 2:25; 3:1) comprise the content of the question.[3] The question expects that being Jewish and undergoing circumcision confer some positive result on the circumcised Jew, or it is addressed to someone who holds such an expectation.[4]

But who asks the question? Balking at Paul's critique in 2:23-29, does the interlocutor fire this objection at Paul as traditionalists and some rescriptive readers hold?[5] Or does Paul, knowing his interlocutor's character, submit a leading question that

---

[2] Cf. Stowers, *Rereading*, 166; Jewett, *Romans*, 241.

[3] I speak about 3:1 as a single question. It could with no ill effect be punctuated as two questions: "Therefore, what advantage comes from being Jewish? Or what benefit comes from circumcision?"

[4] Cf. Dunn, *Romans*, 130, "Both questions presuppose the standpoint of one who has hitherto assumed that being a Jew is an advantage."

[5] For example, Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 119; Song, *Reading*, 94; Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 64-65; Jewett, *Romans*, 241-42; Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Porter, *Romans*, 84.

compels the interlocutor to come face-to-face with his own views, as other rescriptive readers contend?[6] Based on Paul's characterization of the interlocutor, the answer is—both are possible, at least initially. First, the interlocutor personally holds that an advantage accrues from being Jewish and possessing νόμος. It could be perfectly appropriate for such an interlocutor to interrupt Paul in order to ask about the implications of Paul's comments for God's covenantal promises to Abraham and, thus, the interlocutor's place within those promises. Essentially the interlocutor would be asking, "Based on what you are saying, Paul, does God offer no advantage for Jews like myself?" In this respect, traditional readings are off to a fair start. On the other hand, second, Paul is thoroughly familiar with the character of the interlocutor (he crafted it, after all[7]) and could just as surely pose the question in Socratic fashion to force the interlocutor to explain his views in light of Paul's argument. Furthermore, as Elliott argues, there is no overt indication of a shift in speaker between 2:29 and 3:1 as might be expected,[8] and τί οὖν regularly functions in diatribe as a marker for leading questions in the primary speaker's voice, as even Stowers notes but fails to consider at this point.[9] So, technically, both voices could reasonably and appropriately speak 3:1, but there is more to consider.

---

[6] Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14.

[7] Cf. Keck, *Romans*, 89-90, who correctly writes, "Since the interlocutor, in accord with the diatribe style, is the speaker's rhetorical device, the whole passage is Paul's creation." This, however, hardly requires that Paul and the interlocutor agree at any given point, such that it is unnecessary to determine who speaks which lines, as Keck argues. For instance, Teles and Epictetus are responsible for crafting their respective interlocutors' speeches, but they regularly disagree with the views they place in their interlocutors' mouths (see Chapter Seven).

[8] Of course, such a shift is not absolutely necessary, according to Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.37. And, no matter where one identifies speeches-in-character in 3:1-9, *none* of them are introduced in any overt manner. Characterization and appropriateness must be the primary guides.

[9] Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 138. Cf. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 125-29; Moo, *Romans*, 180.

The question in 3:1 is only reasonably posed by either speaker when considered in isolation from the rest of the dialogue, particularly from the response in 3:2. This is because, based on the conventions for speech-in-character, only one voice can appropriately speak 3:2—and it is not Paul's. To the question of Jewish advantage, Rom 3:2 replies, "Much in every way! To begin,[10] they were entrusted with the decrees of God" (πολὺ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. πρῶτον μὲν [γάρ] ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ).[11] The answer, therefore, is positive; Jews have an advantage as far as the speaker in 3:2 is concerned.[12] Throughout Rom 1-2, however, Paul repeatedly proclaims the scope of God's activity as ethnically inclusive and equally grounded on the same Christological gospel for *all*. Being Jewish, possessing νόμος, and being circumcised give Jews no salvific advantage over non-Jews. As Paul says in Gal 5:6, "In Christ Jesus, neither circumcision nor uncircumcision amount to anything; what matters is πίστις taking effect through love," and in 6:15, "circumcision and uncircumcision are nothing; what matters is new creation (καινὴ κτίσις)." So, as Dodd noted so long ago though failing to recognize the full import of his observation, if Paul responds to 3:1's question about

---

[10] πρῶτον μέν is to be taken as a phrase indicating the first example in a presumably longer list. BDF 447.4. Otherwise, πρῶτον might be taken simply as an adverb modifying ἐπιστεύθησαν, so that the Jews were chronologically entrusted with the decrees "first." A few manuscripts advocate a chronological reading by attesting the adjectival textual variant πρωτοι instead of πρῶτον (6. 1739; Eus). The weight of the witnesses for πρῶτον, however, is overly substantial (א, A, B, D, etc). *Even if* the phrase was intended chronologically, it would only confirm my explanation for Paul's use of the phrase "to the Jews πρῶτον" as chronological rather than qualitative.

[11] I address ἐπιστεύθησαν (entrusted) in the section on 3:3-4.

[12] *In Rhetoric,* 133, 136-37, Elliott fails to consider the importance of the interlocutor speaking 3:2. For Elliott, 3:1-2 claims that Jews have real privileges, but 3:3-9 reveals that these privileges "do not undermine God's righteousness when Jews are disobedient." At the same time, Elliott argues that Paul guides the discussion to a point of agreement, so that 3:9 represents the interlocutor's capitulation to Paul's point of view. If 3:9 constitutes the point of agreement between the two dialogue partners, on what basis does 3:2, spoken by the interlocutor, serve as Paul's support of Jewish privilege? Though still quite brief, Elliott is more accurate in *Arrogance*, 106, when he writes, "The Judean interlocutor is not concerned to protect his privilege over against God's claim; to the contrary, he enthusiastically agrees with Paul that Judeans enjoy no defense against God's judgment."

salvific advantage for Jews over non-Jews, "The logical answer on the basis of [his] argument is, 'None whatever!'"[13] Eschatologically and salvifically, Paul's argument requires that Jews possess no special advantage over non-Jews before an impartial God.[14] For Paul to affirm Jewish advantage in 3:2 would be contradictory to his argument and, essentially, out of character. (See my argument in the section on chapters 9-11 for an explanation of why 9:4-5 also disallows Paul from affirming Jewish privilege over non-Jews. As a foretaste, it seems quite difficult to define 9:4-5 as comparative advantages for Jews over non-Jews when Paul indicates that Christian gentiles also partake in each of these would-be advantages except for the biological connection to Christ.)[15]

The questioner in 3:1, therefore, is most reasonably Paul, because it is only the interlocutor who can appropriately speak the response in 3:2.[16] Clinging to νόμος, circumcision, and Jewishness as advantageous over non-Jews, of course the interlocutor would assert that much advantage and benefit accrue to Jews, especially as it relates to the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ, the decrees of God, i.e., scripture and God's promises.[17] Paul's

---

[13] Dodd, *Romans*, 43.

[14] On 3:1-2 as specifically salvific advantage, Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 326; Witherington, *Romans*, 93; Campbell, *Deliverance*, 573-78. Note the distinctions of Hultgren and Longenecker. Hultgren argues, "The Jew has some advantages, even if no privileges." Hultgren, *Romans*, 135. Longenecker argues, "Because Paul considers the scriptures to contain the promise that God's righteousness will be revealed through faith… the advantage of 'the Jew' is that he stands first in line to enter into right relationship with God when that promise is fulfilled." Nevertheless, "the advantage of 'the Jew' does nothing to remedy his position in the state of sin." Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 195-96.

[15] Barrett argues that a negative answer to 3:1 would be "offensive" to Jews and theology. Barrett, *Romans,* 59. But Barrett assumes that a denial of "Jewish privilege" also rejects God's faithfulness to the promises and diminishes or downgrades Jews *rather than elevates non-Jews*. This is not the case; though it may seem bleak at the moment, things are not always as they seem. I further discuss Paul's views about God's promises in the sections on 3:3-4 and 3:9, and more holistically in the final section in light of the letter as a whole, especially Rom 4 and 9-11.

[16] Concerning 3:1-2, therefore, my treatment provides the argumentative basis for the script of Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139; idem., *Arrogance*, 105; Campbell, 572-73; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-9, 111-12.

[17] For discussion of λόγια as scripture and God's promises therein, see the section on 1:16-17.

leading question in 3:1, therefore, essentially asks, "Based on what I have argued about God's impartiality, ethnic inclusiveness, the gospel, and your transgression of νόμος, do you *really* hold any advantage or benefit over non-Jews?" Contrary to the thrust of Paul's question, but completely true to his character, the interlocutor affirms the exclusive Jewish advantage in which he himself trusts.[18] Thus, against traditional readings, some version of a rescriptive reading takes hold in 3:1-2, and one that is markedly *not* Stowers's.[19]

Romans 3:3-4

Based on the conclusion that Paul opens the dialogue in 3:1 with a leading question for his "privileged" interlocutor to answer in 3:2, it would be easy to assume that the rest of the dialogue progresses similarly, with Paul asking questions for the interlocutor to answer. Though this very well might be the case, such an assumption would mirror the "method" of the projects I critique by failing to argue *why* the discourse is best heard according to a particular script. Each line must receive its due diligence.

Following the interlocutor's affirmation of exclusive Jewish privilege, Rom 3:3 asks, "For what? If some lacked πίστις, surely their lack of πίστις will not nullify God's

[18] For Stowers, *Rereading*, 166-67, Paul speaks 3:2, retorting that Jewish advantage is that "God has entrusted Jews with the good news to the gentiles… His answer is a dismissive rebuke, although he is quite serious about Jewish priority." As Stowers is keen to note of traditional readings elsewhere, his own reading does not work. According to Stowers's script, the interlocutor asks what salvific advantage belonging to the Jewish community confers (3:1). Paul's answer, however, has nothing to do with Jewish salvific advantage, but with good news for the gentiles. Not only is Paul's hypothetical answer a *non sequitur*, but it is also nonsensical, as it is a Jewish advantage with no actual advantage for the Jew. Cf. Keck, *Romans*, 90.

[19] Though Stowers appeals to speech-in-character and understands the requirement of appropriateness to characterization, by neglecting to consider the script in terms of these conventions (at least in writing), he fails to adjust the dialogue appropriately. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 129, 167; idem., *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715. My reading similarly disqualifies the scripts of those who simply follow Stowers, namely, Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93.

faithfulness, will it?" (τί γάρ; εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες, μὴ ἡ ἀπιστία αὐτῶν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ καταργήσει;). The opening phrase, τί γάρ, illustrates that 3:3 is an objection to the content of 3:2.[20] The sense is, "For what purpose or goal were they entrusted," or more bluntly, "So what if they were entrusted with the λόγια? Surely their lack of πίστις concerning the λόγια will not nullify God's faithfulness to those λόγια, will it?" Furthermore, as Godet and others observe, the μή in the interrogative clarifies that the questioner intends the respondent to answer negatively, "No, their lack of πίστις will not nullify God's πίστις."[21]

Understanding the argument hinges on what 3:2 means by suggesting that the Jews "were entrusted (ἐπιστεύθησαν) with the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ." As I argue in the section on 1:16-17, the λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ are the Jewish scriptures, in which God promises to bless Abraham and his ethnically exhaustive seed, and in which God pre-promises the Christological gospel through which his δικαιοσύνη effects salvation for all on the basis of πίστις (1:1-7; 16-17; 3:21-31; 4:1-25); the two are of course one and the same in Paul's theology (see Gal 3:6-18). The term "entrusted" (ἐπιστεύθησαν) suggests that God intended the Jews to exercise πίστις towards the λόγια. Paul uses the term elsewhere to speak of God "entrusting" or "commissioning" him with the ethnically unhindered gospel, for which the correct response is to proclaim that gospel (1 Cor 9:17; Gal 2:7; 1 Thess 2:4). The λόγια, therefore, and being entrusted with them, contain both a message of

---

[20] Stowers, *Diatribe*, 119. Stowers, however, incorrectly suggests that the objection is in reference to 2:17-29 rather than 3:2. That 3:3 objects to the response in 3:2 is supported by the use of πίστις terminology in both verses, as well as the general trend for the questions in the discourse to build off the previous response. Plus, how can Paul object to his own critique of the interlocutor in 2:17-29? Cf. Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο," 236-37.

[21] Godet, *Romans*, 134; BDF §427. "God's faithfulness to the faithless" allows Barclay one of many opportunities to speak of the "incongruity of the gift" that grounds Paul's hope for a world universally corrupted by Sin as well as Paul's confidence that "God pays no regard to ethnic background, moral upbringing, or access to the Law." Barclay, *Gift*, 473.

redemption for all *and* the expectation to share that impartial and inclusive message. The non-Christian Jews under discussion in 3:1-3, however, fail in both respects regarding the λόγια. First, they neither recognize nor respond in πίστις to God's pre-proclamation of the ethnically unbound gospel (cf. 2:12-16; 11:17-23),[22] though this is largely God's mysterious doing (11:25).[23] Second, but connected, they do not advance God's promises among the nations, *at least not correctly*. As characterized, the Jewish interlocutor embodies his role as a guide for the blind, a light for those in the darkness, an educator of the simple-minded, and a teacher of infants (2:19-20).[24] His behavior even coheres with his teaching (2:21-22).[25] Nevertheless, boasting in λόγια/νόμος possession and observance over against non-Jews—and thereby failing to understand its universal scope and Christological fulfillment—the interlocutor transgresses the central Christological thrust of λόγια/νόμος and causes God's name to be blasphemed among the nations (2:23-25). That is, the problem in 3:2-3 as it relates to God's promises for non-Jews is not so much whether or not the interlocutor has proclaimed the message of λόγια/νόμος,[26] but whether he has proclaimed the *correct* message, which he largely has not. On the

---

[22] Similarly, Moo, *Romans*, 184; Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 196; Jewett, *Romans*, 243-44; Dunn, *Romans*, 131-32, 139-40; Cosgrove, "What if Some," 90-105; Hall, "Romans 3.1-8," 185-86. Readings that neglect or reject this aspect fail to recognize that the λόγια have eschatalogical and salvific implications for *all* humanity (1:1-5, 16-17; 2:12-16; 4:16; 11:25-32), not only for non-Jews. Contra Stowers, *Rereading*, 166-68, 170-71, but see 169; Wright, *Romans*, 453; idem., "Romans 2:17-3:9," 1-4; idem., *Paul*, 837-38, cf. 931; Keck, *Romans*, 91.

[23] Susannah Ticciatti, "The Nondivisive Difference of Election: A Reading of Romans 9-11," *JTI* 6.2 (2012): 261-62.

[24] Wright correctly notes Paul's willingness to grant the interlocutor this praise, though he fails to see it through to its logical end (see below). Wright, *Paul*, 837; idem., "Rom 2:17-3:9," 11-14.

[25] Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 53-55.

[26] It does not matter whether this is directly through "mission" work or indirectly through the way Jews lived. See Wright, "Rom 2:17-3:9," 14-15.

contrary, he considers the λόγια/νόμος as exclsuive advantages over non-Jews, thereby misrepresents God's intent, and ultimately places boundaries around who can or cannot belong to God's people.[27]

Despite this lack of πίστις by some (i.e., non-Christian) Jews,[28] the question in 3:3 assumes that God nevertheless maintains his faithfulness to bring those λόγια to completion,[29] namely, to fulfill his promises to bless Abraham *and* Abraham's ethnically inclusive seed through the gospel. As characterized by Paul, the interlocutor is wholly incapable of posing such a question; not only is 3:3 an *objection* to the interlocutor's response in 3:2, but the question depends on an understanding of λόγια the interlocutor does not—yet—endorse. The interlocutor is an unrepentant (2:4) transgressor of νόμος (2:23-29) and thus one of those "unfaithful" (ἀπιστία; 3:3) Jews (religiously speaking) who fail to exercise πίστις regarding the λόγια in Paul's terms. At this point, the interlocutor and Paul have different understandings of λόγια, just like they have different understandings of νόμος, exclusive Jewish advantage, and God's impartiality.[30] Such an understanding of God's faithfulness, however, altogether agrees with Paul's argument in

[27] Consequently, readers like Wright who limit God's purposes in the λόγια to non-Jews achieve the same result as these privileged Jews, only in reverse order, ultimately boxing out God's purposes for *Jews* in the λόγια. For all parties involved, these privileged Jews and readers like Wright, this stems from a misunderstanding of the scope of God's activity in the λόγια and its relation to the pre-promised gospel. Contra Wright, *Romans*, 453; idem., "Romans 2:17-3:9," 1-3; idem., *Paul*, 837-38; Stowers, *Rereading*, 166-71; Keck, *Romans*, 91

[28] Stowers suggests this is the first instance where Paul accuses more than one Jew of being unfaithful, but he overlooks the plural ὑμᾶς in 2:24's scripture citation. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 168.

[29] So also Byrne, *Romans*, 109.

[30] On the different levels of discussion between the interlocutor and Paul regarding how they understand various terms differently, cf. Campbell, *Deliverance*, 577-78.

Rom 1-2. Rom 3:3, therefore, is most appropriately spoken in Paul's voice as a second leading question.[31]

Rom 3:4 follows with the expected negative response, "Absolutely not! Let God be true and every human a liar, as it is written, 'so that you might be justified in your words, and you will overcome when you are judged'" (μὴ γένοιτο· γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής, πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης, καθὼς γέγραπται· ὅπως ἂν δικαιωθῇς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου καὶ νικήσεις ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαί σε). Given that 3:3 is a leading question from Paul, it would make sense for the response to come from the interlocutor.[32] Does 3:4 with its citation of LXX Psalm 50:6 fit his character? Indeed it does. The interlocutor is religiously Jewish and boasts in God (2:17) and νόμος (2:23); of course he would uphold God's faithfulness and be familiar with scripture. After all, it is advantageous for the interlocutor to exalt God's faithfulness, since his presumed privilege wholly relies upon it, *especially* after being characterized by Paul as an unrepentant transgressor (2:4, 23-29). Furthermore, the interlocutor judges the "unprivileged" (i.e., non-Jews; 2:1-4) and even seems to concede that he himself is a transgressor in keeping with Paul's characterization of him (at least, he does not object to it; 2:23-29). The universalization from "some

[31] My argument, therefore, supports a rescriptive reading, all of which are identical at this point in the dialogue. Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14; Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93.

[32] The interrogative construction with μή is in some ways a two-edged sword, especially as a leading question intended to guide the interlocutor. On the one hand, it is helpful for understanding the intent of the dialogue. On the other hand, it makes the thrust of the question so similar to the answer that, technically, Paul himself could speak both question and answer. This is not so much a problem with the method *per se* but with the grammatical construction. Sufficiently tipping the scale in favor of the interlocutor's voice are: the characterization of the interlocutor, the Socratic method of question and answer frequent in diatribal dialogue to guide an interlocutor to a particular point of view, the common implementation of an interlocutor to provide the evidence in the primary speaker's argument, the logic of the argument in Rom 1-3, and the message Paul communicates to his audience through the interlocutor (see below on several of these points).

unfaithful non-Christian Jews" (3:3) to the falsehood of "all humanity" (πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος; 3:4), therefore, is possible within the interlocutor's characterization.[33] Consequently, as guided, the interlocutor correctly answers Paul's question in 3:4.[34]

One further point bears mentioning. The first instance of μὴ γένοιτο belongs not on Paul's lips but the interlocutor's. This significantly problematizes the arguments of Malherbe, Song, and Matera (amongst others), who assume that the phrase must be spoken by Paul (see my critique in Chapter Eight).[35] Furthermore, such arguments overlook the fact that Paul is responsible for crafting and composing the whole dialogue; though the phrase is particularly Pauline, nothing hinders him from applying it to any voice he wishes. Rescriptive readers recognize this possibility, and Stowers even shows how the same applies to the speech-in-character in Rom 7 as well.[36] The instance in 3:5-6 must similarly be approached with openness of mind.

Romans 3:5-6

Rom 3:1-4 focuses on God's faithfulness to the λόγια to bless Abraham and his seed through the gospel. Following the interlocutor's cue in 3:4,[37] Rom 3:5-8 transitions to discuss God as judge. Rom 3:5 asks, "But if our unrighteousness demonstrates God's

---

[33] Cf. Keck, *Romans*, 92, who argues that the interlocutor here condemns himself as a liar. Cf. Dunn, *Romans*, 140.

[34] Considering the conventions for speech-in-character again confirms rescriptive readings. Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14; Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93.

[35] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο;" Song, *Reading*, 94-95, 95n.5; Matera, *Romans*, 78-80; Jewett, *Romans*, 245n.61.

[36] Stowers, *Rereading*, 264-69; idem., "Romans 7," 191-202. See also Longenecker, *Rhetoric*, 88-93, who demonstrates that the "I" of Rom 7 is spoken from a different perspective than Paul's own.

[37] Malherbe, "Μη Γενοιτο," 236-37.

δικαιοσύνη, what will we say? Surely the God who brings wrath is not unjust, is he?"[38] (εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην συνίστησιν, τί ἐροῦμεν; μὴ ἄδικος ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν;). Again, the μή indicates that the questioner expects a negative answer, which 3:6 supplies, "Absolutely not! Otherwise, how will God judge the world?" (μὴ γένοιτο· ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον;).

Multiple points indicate that Paul once again plays the role of Socratic questioner. First, again, μή suggests that 3:5 is a leading question guiding one's conversation partner in a particular direction.[39] Second, Rom 3:5 expresses a correlative relationship between God's δικαιοσύνη and ὀργή by which God is both judge and justifier; Paul draws this very connection between 1:16-17 and 1:18—2:16.[40] Third, Paul's previous discussion paves the way for him to pose such a leading question to the interlocutor, in which he presses his interlocutor to consider Jewish privilege over non-Jews in light of Paul's comments about God's ethnically inclusive δικαιοσύνη and ὀργή. Fourth, the previous discussion also renders 3:5 redundant and unobjectionable if voiced by the interlocutor, as Paul has already addressed it. Fifth, 3:5 is posed as a conditional, like Paul's objection in 3:3, thus creating an element of parallelism both in style and, presumably, the speaker responsible. Sixth, hearing 3:5 in Paul's voice omits the need to suppose that he awkardly or apologetically interjects an authorial aside in 3:5b, "I speak humanly" (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον

[38] An alternative translation is, "Surely God is not unjust *when* he brings wrath, is he?"

[39] Stowers, *Rereading*, 170.

[40] Contra Moo, *Romans* 189-90, who finds no reference to God's active δικαιοσύνη here. See Wright, "Rom 2:17-3:9," 5n.5.

λέγω).[41] Instead, the first-person speech in 3:5 hangs together as spoken by a single voice, Paul's (I consider below the use of first- and third-person speech in 3:1-9 as a whole).[42]

Whose voice does the response in 3:6 best fit? It certainly would fit Paul's, as expected with the use of μή. Plus, the language of God judging "the world" (τὸν κόσμον) aligns with Paul's discussion of God as judge of an inclusive and ambiguous people (1:18-2:16).[43] But this too is expected in a diatribal discourse in which the primary speaker guides an interlocutor in a particular direction (see below). Given that 3:5 is a leading question from Paul, does 3:6 fit the interlocutor as one might also expect in a diatribal discourse? The interlocutor knows that God's judgment is true,[44] and he even steps incongruously into God's role and judges non-Jews, for which he is without excuse (2:1-4). Furthermore, the interlocutor holds that Jews have an advantage that will rescue them from God's negative judgment (2:3-4, 17-23; 3:2). Thus, the interlocutor can readily speak about God's role as judge, even if his own relationship to that judgment

---

[41] See my discussion of this in Chapter Eight.

[42] Dunn represents a case in point for Stowers's critique that traditional readings fail in respect to their treatment of the pronouns in the dialogue. Dunn argues that with the first person plural, ἡμῶν, "the voice of the interlocutor is finally merged into Paul's own debate with himself… Paul identifies himself with the unfaithful Jews." Dunn, *Romans*, 141. Dunn's reading fails particularly at two points. First, it neglects the function of first-person speech in diatribal discourse, which should push traditional readers to reconsider the arrangement of the dialogue. More importantly, second, Dunn is unable to explain 3:1-8/9 in such a way as to maintain a sustainable dialogue.

[43] In attributing this verse to Paul, Dunn argues that "Paul has now boxed himself completely into a corner, from which he cannot escape. All he can do is hang on to these two basic assertions of his faith: that God is eschatological judge… and that God has not abandoned his purpose for Israel, his saving outreach through Israel to the world, and his continuing faithfulness to Israel despite Israel's unfaithfulness and unrighteousness." Dunn, *Romans*, 142. Dunn's theology is more or less on point, as I argue below with nuances. Dunn's description of the nature of the dialogue, however, crumbles against the diatribal norms for the primary speaker to be ever in control of the discourse and to guide it towards a specific point. In Dunn's analysis, Paul is no longer in control but must grasp for whatever he can find to keep his head above water. Cf. Jewett, *Romans*, 247.

[44] Stowers discusses this as a "shared axiomatic belief." Stowers, *Diatribe*, 170. Cf. Byrne, *Romans*, 110, 114; Dunn, *Romans*, 142.

does not cohere with Paul's perception of it. Additionally, the μὴ γένοιτο rejection mirrors the phrase in the interlocutor's voice in 3:4. Based on characterization, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that 3:6 is *not* the interlocutor's response to Paul's leading question in 3:5.[45] The interlocutor continues to follow Paul's lead and answers appropriately; despite human unrighteousness (ἀδικία), God both exercises δικαιοσύνη *and* is not "unjust" (ἄδικος) when he brings wrath.

Romans 3:7-8

In the final exchange before the discussion partners return to the question of Jewish advantage or disadvantage that functions as bookends to 3:1-9, Rom 3:7-8c asks, "But if, because of my falsehood,[46] the truth of God abounded for his glory, why am I still being judged as a sinner? Should we not, as we are slandered and as some claim that we say, 'Let us do evil so that good might come?'" (εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, τί ἔτι κἀγὼ ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι; καὶ μὴ καθὼς βλασφημούμεθα καὶ καθώς φασίν τινες ἡμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι ποιήσωμεν τὰ κακὰ, ἵνα ἔλθῃ τὰ ἀγαθά;). Once more, the μή in the interrogative indicates that 3:8a is a leading question by which the questioner expects the respondent to answer negatively.[47] As in 3:5, attributing 3:7-8c to Paul in keeping with the question-response pattern so far in the dialogue places all the first person speech in one mouth and omits any need to presume that Paul awkwardly interjects his authorial commentary in the middle of the

[45] 3:5-6, therefore, also maintain a rescriptive reading. Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14; Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93.

[46] Wright's contention that the first singular is a rhetorical way of talking indirectly about Israel fails in light of the ethnic ambiguity so prevalent in Rom 1-3. Wright, *Romans*, 454.

[47] So also Byrne, *Romans*, 114; Jewett, *Romans*, 251.

interlocutor's objection.[48] Furthermore, though 3:6 supplies the key word (κρινεῖ; 3:4 also contains κρίνεσθαι) that advances 3:7-8 (κρίνομαι, κρίμα),[49] both 3:5 and 7-8c draw potential but false and absurd conclusions from the interlocutor's response in 3:4. That is, Rom 3:7 begins with a consideration of "God's truth" (ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ) and human "falsehood" (ψεύσματι)—issues 3:4 raises. From this, 3:7-8c absurdly posits continuing in error in order to advance God's glory all the more. Rom 3:5 and 7-8c, therefore, stand together as leading questions stemming from the interlocutor's responses in 3:4, 6.

It would be altogether out of character for the interlocutor to consider the viability of "doing evil so that good might come";[50] the interlocutor actively judges those who do evil (1:18-2:4) and (albeit incorrectly) prides himself on being in the right (2:17-23). Nor is there reason to suppose that the interlocutor was slandered and accused of proclaiming such a view, as if he were responsible for speaking the entirety of 3:7-8c. The slanderous charge makes little sense if it targets those who cling to νόμος like the interlocutor. If, however, it targets non-observers like Paul as the majority hold, it makes fine sense as a law-contingent critique of Paul's non-law-contingent gospel.[51] Paul, therefore, speaks 3:7-8c as a guiding question drawing on his own experience.[52]

This leaves 3:8d for consideration, and it is significant. The respondent declares, "The judgment of them is just" (ὧν τὸ κρίμα ἔνδικόν ἐστιν). In context, "them" does not

[48] Contra traditional readings.

[49] Malherbe, Μη Γενοιτο, 236-37.

[50] Contra Stowers, who argues the saying "is the logical objection that a competitor like the teacher might make to Paul's explanation for the widespread Jewish failure to recognize the gospel of Christ." Stowers, *Diatribe*, 173. This view falls apart when one recognizes that the interlocutor is rather one of those who accuse Paul of endorsing this position (see below). Cf. Jewett, *Romans*, 251.

[51] Jewett, *Romans*, 251.

[52] Ibid.; Moo, *Romans*, 195; Hultgren, *Romans*, 139. For Paul's considering himself a "sinner," see Rom 5:8; Gal 2:14-17. Cf. Hall, "Romans 3.1-8," 193-94.

refer to people who propose that the end justifies the means[53]—in this script, there are no such people other than Paul, who uses this as a false conclusion—"them" (ὧν) most reasonably refers to the "some" (τινες) who slander Paul as a libertine.[54] These are the same "some" who Paul claims are "unfaithful" to the λόγια (3:3) though they cling to νόμος / λόγια as advantageous (2:23-29; 3:2). As Jewett writes, "The key to this passage… is that those who advocate such slanders are the very legalists represented by the interlocutor."[55] This means that the respondent does not actually answer Paul's question about doing evil for the purpose of good. Instead, the respondent condemns the actions of those who slander Paul as a libertine.[56]

---

[53] Contra Porter, *Romans*, 86.

[54] Cf. Byrne, *Romans*, 110. It might be objected that ὧν is not a masculine reflexive pronoun referring to τινες, but a neuter referring to the saying. Though this seems unlikely given the presence of τινες as an extant antecedent and the interlocutor's characterization as one who judges others, the main thrust of my argument would still work with only minute alterations, as the interlocutor would nevertheless side with Paul in 3:8b (see below).

This is also the point where Paul J. Achtemeier's structural analysis of 3:1-8 falters. Achtemeier's *structural* (not scriptive) analysis of 3:3 and 5 is accurate. Achtemeir argues that 3:3, 5 begin with statements that are assumed true (εἰ), a false inference follows (μή), and a strong denial rejects the false inference (μὴ γένοιτο) with some explanation. In 3:7-8, this structure allows Achtemeier to suggest that 3:8d is not, contra Stowers, an *ad hominem* retort, but an educational statement of fact explaining why one should not play "fast and loose" with God's eschatological justice. Achtemeier, "Romans 3:1-8," 84-86. Achtemeier's analysis of 3:7-8, however, does not fit the mold. First, Achtemeier has to supply the rejection that is so critical for establishing the structure of 3:3, 5 but otherwise missing in 3:8. Second, for 3:8d to be an explanation for the rejection of the false inferences Achtemeier proposes (he considers two), ὧν would have to refer to the statement rather than to the τινες who falsely accuse Paul. Third, Achtemeier neglects to consider how 3:8d might function in the interlocutor's voice, which changes things significantly and ironically resolves the problem Achtemeier finds with 3:8d in the first place.

[55] Jewett, *Romans*, 251. Again, the convention of appropriateness confirms a rescriptive reading for 3:7-8a. Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14; Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93.

[56] Campbell, therefore, is mostly right on this point. Campbell argues that the respondent (the Teacher) condemns those who proclaim libertinism *and* those who slander Paul as such, one of whom would be the Teacher himself. The respondent, however, never condemns those who proclaim libertinism, though I agree he would as one opposed to Paul's gospel. Textually speaking, the respondent only condemns those who slander Paul, to whom the interlocutor belongs. Campbell, *Deliverance*, 576-77.

Though Paul would agree with the response, the interlocutor must be the respondent.[57] Without 3:8d, the interlocutor never overtly makes the final step that allows him to join with Paul in 3:9 (see below). He is religiously Jewish and presumptuously privileged; of course he affirms God's faithfulness, righteousness, and judgment of the world—the latter of which sufficiently characterizes him to speak of judgment in 3:8d, albeit not necessarily of "privileged" Jews. Thus, Stowers's script (with Keck and Witherington) fails at the beginning (3:1-2) *and* end (3:7-9; see below on 9). Attributing the whole of 3:7-8 (especially 3:8d) to Paul's voice creates a dialogue in which the interlocutor is never compelled to rethink his view about Jewish salvific advantage over non-Jews; the teacher fails to guide the interlocutor to the correct view. This is crystalized in such scripts by the interlocutor's return to the question of Jewish (dis)advantage in 3:9a, which *Paul* must answer for the interlocutor (according to their script)—the interlocutor *still* does not understand the scope of God's impartiality and equality.[58] That is, in Stowers's arrangement, the interlocutor does not actually join with Paul in 3:9, nor does he make the concluding point in Paul's argument. If, however, one recognizes that it is in 3:7-8 where the interlocutor finally comes face-to-face with the contradictory nature of his views and the implications of Paul's leading questions throughout the dialogue, the teacher's guidance is successful and the dialogical

[57] Byrne, Stowers, Keck, and Witherington suggest that Paul speaks 3:7-8, which means the interlocutor provides no response to 3:7-8a. Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14; Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93. Arguing for a rescriptive reading with 3:8d in the interlocutor's voice, however, validates Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73.

[58] Contra Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93. Cf. Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14; Jewett, *Romans*, 257-58.

collaboration near complete. Further explanation requires a discussion of the *inappropriate* speech-in-character attributed to Paul in 3:8.

Paul claims that he is "blasphemed" or "slandered" (βλασφημούμεθα) by some who attribute to him the proclamation, "Let us do evil, so that good might come" (3:8). As far as speech-in-character is concerned, the hypothetical speaker is identified (Paul et. al.; ἡμᾶς), and a verb of speech (λέγειν) introduces the attributed speech. Paul, however, avows that the attributed speech is *out of character*, as it is falsely, slanderously, or otherwise inappropriately attributed to him.[59] But more is at stake. By slandering Paul in this way, the Jews speaking confirm the interlocutor's characterization (cf. Rom 2) by revealing that they require νόμος possession and observance as a necessary prerequisite for belonging to God's people. Thus, they hinder the advancement of God's inclusive promises and are "unfaithful" to the λόγια as defined by Paul (1:1-5; 16-17; 2:12-16); they not only "blaspheme" Paul but cause God's name to be "blasphemed" among the nations as well (2:24). They are without excuse and deserving of God's judgment, which the interlocutor now recognizes. The discussion of 3:9 continues to fill out this argument.

Romans 3:9

In 3:9, Paul returns to the theme that begins the dialogue, τί οὖν; προεχόμεθα;[60] As in 3:1, "What then?" (τί οὖν) prepares the interlocutor to consider a question in light of the previous discourse. Essentially, the phrase compacts all of 3:1-8. To paraphrase,

---

[59] This is further evidence that Paul understands the convention of characterization and appropriateness when attributing speech-in-character to imaginary speakers.

[60] Interpretive difficulties regarding προεχόμεθα, witnessed by ℵ B K and others, have resulted in several variants attempting to improve the "difficult and probably original wording προεχόμεθα οὐ πάντως." P omits οὐ πάντως, A D^2 L record προεχώμεθα, and D* G Ψand others record προκατέχομεν περισσόν. Jewett, *Romans*, 253.

> You (the interlocutor) believe that Jews have an exclusive advantage over non-Jews because they were entrusted with the λόγια (3:1-2). But you also affirm that God's faithfulness to his λόγια does not depend on Jewish πίστις towards those λόγια (3:3-4), and you maintain that God is the just judge of the world's unrighteousness, including Jewish ἀπιστία and ἀδικία (3:3-6) like my (Paul's) own previously (3:7). So what about those Jews, like you, who hold up Jewishness and νόμος as a contingency for belonging to God's people? Your views seem to contradict. Recall that God's actions in νόμος / λόγια are ethnically inclusive and according to πίστις, not possession or observance (Rom 1-2; see also 3:10-29). Is it right for you to limit the scope of God's actions, slander me with such an absurdity, and cause God's name to be blasphemed among the nations (3:7-8c)? Of course not; you answer correctly that you who limit the scope of God's universal activity are unfaithful to the λόγια and fall under God's judgment (3:8d). So, τί οὖν, what do you *really* think about Jews and non-Jews before an inclusive and impartial God? Do either have an advantage (3:9a)?

Before considering the response, a quick note is due concerning Paul's use of προεχόμεθα. The verb is particularly difficult, but I suggest that the difficulty, though real, is only marginally significant. Most scholars view the verb as middle with active force, meaning, "Do we have an advantage?" Some understand the verb as a true middle, "Do we offer anything in defense." Still others read προεχόμεθα as a passive, "Are we at a disadvantage?"[61] In light of what follows, however, how one takes the verb matters little.[62] The summary makes painfully clear that neither Jews nor non-Jews are advantaged, disadvantaged, or have anything to hold up in defense before God. *All*—Jews and Greeks—are under Sin and on equal footing before a just, inclusive, and impartial God; *all* are justified by God's grace on the basis of πίστις (3:9-31; Gal 3:28). God is not the God of Jews only, but equally of Jews and non-Jews (3:29-31). That said, I think the middle with active force makes the most sense of the dialogue, as it creates an

[61] For discussions of the verb, see the following and the literature cited there. Jewett, *Romans*, 256-57; Stowers, *Rereading*, 173-74; Nils Alstrup Dahl, "Romans 3:9: Text and Meaning," in *Paul and Paulinism: Essays in Honour of C. K. Barrett* (Morna D. Hooker and S. G. Wilson, eds.; London: SPCK, 1982), 184-204; Moo, *Romans*, 198-201.

[62] Similarly, Robert H. Mounce, *Romans* (NAC 27; Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1995), 107; Kruse, *Romans*, 163; Murray, *Romans*, 101-2; Keener, *Romans*, 54n.11; Moo, *Romans*, 200-1.

inclusio between 3:1 and 9 and, in diatribal fashion, allows the interlocutor to reconsider his initial thoughts in view of Paul's guidance.[63]

And the interlocutor does reevaluate his thoughts.[64] Confronted again with the question of advantage or disadvantage, the interlocutor affirms equality and rejects the possibility outright, οὐ πάντως, "not at all" (3:9b).[65] By holding up νόμος as an exclusive prerequisite for belonging to God's family rather than recognizing in it God's Christological plan for *all* based on πίστις, some Jews transgress God's intent in νόμος and fall under judgment no differently than non-Jews. This confession, however, opposes the interlocutor's characterization as one who clings to Jewish advantage (2:17-29). What has happened? As illustrated in Chapter Seven, the overarching category of diatribe, which often requires an implied double-characterization, overcomes the conventions of speech-in-character that work so well for 3:2, 4, and 6. In keeping with the Socratic tendency to reveal a conversation partner's errors and guide him/her to the correct view, the interlocutor recognizes his inconsistency and undergoes development. Though he originally endorses Jewish advantage over non-Jews as characterized, by the end of the discourse Paul's leading questions guide him to forego such advantage, agree with Paul,

---

[63] Jewett argues that "the most serious weakness with this popular solution is that the diatribal logic is thereby destroyed, because the Jewish interlocutor could hardly think of himself sharing an advantage after the condemnation of… the result of the entire preceding diatribe in vv. 1-8." *Romans*, 257. Jewett's judgment is based on his traditional script, in which it *would* be ridiculous for the interlocutor to pose such a question. Jewett's script, however, handicaps his keen observation; Jewett does not realize the same argument *supports* a rescripted dialogue in which the interlocutor does not speak 3:9a but the rejection in 3:9b.

[64] Thus I affirm the scripts of Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73; but not Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93. Byrne ceases consideration of the dialogue at 3:8, so Paul speaks all of 3:9 in his analysis. Byrne, *Romans*, 119. Furthermore, a rescriptive reading resolves most of the problems raised by critics like Hall (see Chapter Nine). Hall, "Romans 3.1-9," 183-92.

[65] In its diatribal context, οὐ πάντως carries the same force as μὴ γένοιτο. Jewett, *Romans*, 257; Song, *Reading*, 96. Contra Porter, *Romans*, 88.

and make Paul's concluding point for him,[66] namely, "Jews have no salvific advantage over non-Jews; all are equal."[67] Speech-in-character's single characterization, therefore, is effectively supplemented by diatribe's necessary double-characterization.

Romans 3:1-9 Rescripted

Analyzing the lines in the dialogue in view of Paul's characterization of the interlocutor demonstrates that certain lines are appropriate for one speaker but inappropriate for another (e.g., 3:2, 3, 5, 7-8c, 9a). It also shows that some lines can be appropriate for either speaker (3:1, 4, 6, 8d, 9b). In these latter instances, the opposite lines in the exchange, overlaid with diatribe's Socratic method, indicate the proper arrangement of the script. For instance, 3:1 is best heard in one voice because only the other can appropriately speak 3:2's response; or, that one speaker can appropriately speak both 3:3 and 4 is presupposed by the grammatical formulation of 3:3 with μή. When the dust settles, contrary to traditional scripts, the conventions of speech-in-character and diatribe suggest that Paul plays the part of Socratic questioner throughout the dialogue. Accordingly, Paul poses leading questions in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c, and 9a for the interlocutor to answer in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, and 9b, respectively. As a historical-critical and methodological tool, therefore, the convention of appropriateness in speech-in-character not only opposes traditional readings but the rescriptive reading of Stowers, Keck, and Witherington too,

[66] On making Paul's point for him, see Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139; idem., *Arrogance*, 106; Campbell, *Deliverance*, 574-76.

[67] Though he distances himself from 3:9 as dialogue, Byrne agrees, "as Paul has maintained all through, the law does not give the Jews any advantage" in terms of eschatological justification. "God is impartial." Byrne, *Romans*, 116.

since their script is identical to traditional scripts at the beginning and end.[68] Speech-in-character also provides the argumentation to establish the script of Elliott and Campbell (as well as the script of Byrne to 3:8 and the interior of the script of Stowers, Keck, and Witherington).[69] Charted, the various readings appear as follows in Table 11.1:

Table 11.1. Points of transition between speakers in arrangements of the script of Rom 3:1-9 compared to my arrangement informed by speech-in-character.

Line in Script	Traditional	Stowers	Elliott	King
3:1	Interlocutor	Interlocutor	Paul	Paul
3:2	Paul	Paul	Interlocutor	Interlocutor
3:3	Interlocutor		Paul	Paul
3:4	Paul	Interlocutor	Interlocutor	Interlocutor
3:5a	Interlocutor	Paul	Paul	Paul
(3:5b)	Paul; authorial aside			
3:6	Paul	Interlocutor	Interlocutor	Interlocutor
3:7	Interlocutor	Paul	Paul	Paul
3:8a				
(3:8b)	Paul; authorial aside			
3:8c	Interlocutor			
3:8d	Paul		Interlocutor	Interlocutor
3:9a	Interlocutor	Interlocutor	Paul	Paul
3:9b	Paul	Paul	Interlocutor	Interlocutor

As I argue, the most appropriately scripted dialogue of 3:1-9 reads as follows:

> *Paul's Guiding Question*: Therefore, what advantage comes from being Jewish, or what benefit accrues from circumcision? (3:1)
>
> > *Interlocutor's Response*: There is much [advantage] in every way! To begin, they were entrusted with the oracles of God. (3:2)

[68] Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93.

[69] Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139-41; idem., *Arrogance*, 105-6; Campbell, 572-73; Byrne, *Romans*, 106-14, excluding 3:9; Stowers, *Rereading*, 165-66; idem., "Paul's Dialogue," 715; Keck, *Romans*, 89; Witherington, *Romans*, 93.

Paul's Guiding Question: To what end? If some lacked πίστις, their lack of πίστις will not nullify God's πίστις, will it? (3:3)

> *Interlocutor's Response*: Absolutely not! Instead, let God be true but every human a liar, as it is written, "So that you might be justified in your words, and you will overcome when you are judged." (3:4)

Paul's Guiding Question: But if our unrighteousness proves God's righteousness, what shall we say? God is not unjust when he brings wrath, is he? I speak in a human way. (3:5)

> *Interlocutor's Response*: Absolutely not! Otherwise, how will God judge the world? (3:6)

Paul's Guiding Question: But if God's truthfulness is increased for his glory by my lie, why am I still being judged as a sinner? Why not, as we are slandered and as some claim that we say, "Let us do evil so that good might come?" (3:7-8c)

> *Interlocutor's Response*: Their judgment is justly deserved. (3:8d)

Paul's Guiding Question: What then? Are we advantaged or disadvantaged? (3:9a)

> *Interlocutor's Response*: By no means! (3:9b)

Paul's Conclusion: For we have charged that both Jews and Greeks are all under Sin, (3:9c) as it is written…

When viewed as a whole, additional evidence surfaces in support of my rescription. Paul is responsible for *all* the first-person speech. Thus, the texts traditionally understood as authorial asides fit seamlessly in the flow of the dialogue rather than being awkwardly interruptive. With the exception of the citation of LXX Psalm 50:6, the interlocutor speaks entirely in the third person (until 3:27-31).[70] Furthermore, Paul's use

[70] My script, therefore, makes even more sense of the pronouns than does Stowers's, who assigns first-person speech to both the interlocutor and Paul (cf. 3:9). Stowers, *Rereading*, 174-75.

of the first person in 3:1-9 mirrors his usage of the first person elsewhere, especially with the phrase, τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν (4:1; 6:1; 7:6a, 13a).[71]

This brings us to several other questions about speech-in-character and diatribe in 3:1-9. First, concerning speech-in-character, just how well does Rom 3:1-9 fit with the bigger picture of the exercise in the primary literature (see Part One)? Paul's use of speech-in-character in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, and 9b[72] mirrors Quintilian's use of Vergil's *Aeneid* (Quintilian, *Inst*. 9.2.37; Vergil, *Aen*. 2.29). Quintilian references Vergil as an example of speech-in-character without any identification of the speaker. Recall, however, that Quintilian's example actually demonstrates another rule; speech-in-character can occur without any overt indication that another identified character actually begins to speak. Vergil identifies and characterizes the Trojans on the scene, but no verb of speech (or similar) marks the interjection of their wonder at the abandoned Greek camps. Rom 2-3 is the same. Paul identifies his ethnically-ambiguous, religiously-Jewish interlocutor and characterizes him as judgmental, presumptuously advantaged, and dependent on but transgressor of νόμος (Rom 2). Then, without any verbs of speech or overt textual markers, Paul simply attributes speech to the interlocutor. The convention of appropriateness to characterization is the only measure by which to determine, first, that another speaker responds and, second, which lines he/she is responsible for speaking. Furthermore, Rom 2-3 follows the general trend for speech-in-character to progress in three steps: (1) identification, (2) characterization, and (3) attributed speech-in-character.

---

[71] This does not include the use of the first person in 7:7b-12, 13b-24, 25b, since these verses are not spoken in Paul's voice. Stowers, *Rereading*, 264-69; idem., "Romans 7," 191-202; Longenecker, *Rhetoric*, 88-93.

[72] Again, not all of 3:1-9 is speech-in-character, contra Stowers. Only those verses where Paul attributes speech to the interlocutor qualify. See the discussion of Stowers in Chapter Nine.

Second, though it should be clear above, how does 3:1-9 cohere with diatribe's chief function of censure and protreptic? In diatribe, censure discloses a student's or interlocutor's contradictions or errors, and protreptic guides her/him to endorse the correct view. These features are readily identifiable in Romans. Paul's use of censure even begins in the characterization;[73] Paul notes that the interlocutor rests and boasts in νόμος but nevertheless transgresses it (2:17-23). This continues in 3:1-9; the interlocutor endorses Jewish advantage, but Paul demonstrates how affirming God's faithfulness despite Jewish ἀπιστία (3:3-4), and God's judgment and δικαιοσύνη despite humanity's ἀδικία (3:5-6), ultimately contradicts Jewish advantage over others given the inclusive nature of the divine promises contained in the λόγια. Thus, Paul censors the interlocutor's contradictory views, but he also protreptically guides the interlocutor in the right direction. Paul's questions in 3:3, 5, 7-8c gradually lead the interlocutor closer to Paul's view, so that the interlocutor is able to recognize his error and join Paul's side in 3:8d and 9b (see also 3:27-31). In 3:1-9, censure and protreptic run their full course, dislodging the interlocutor from his previous endorsement and winning him over for Paul's view.

Considering censure and protreptic thusly gives rise to a third set of questions. What role does the imaginary interlocutor play for Paul's historical audience? How would the progymnasmatists and rhetoricians featured in Parts One and Two discuss Rom 3:1-9 in terms of speech-in-character's functions? These questions are naturally connected to even larger questions, such as the purpose(s) of Romans, which I discuss in the final section of this chapter. As I argue above, Paul's non-Christian, religiously-Jewish, presumptuously-privileged interlocutor does not directly represent his Christian

[73] It is even arguable that censure begins in 1:18-32. Humanity is critiqued for behavior being contradictory to knowledge (1:18-32), and the interlocutor "does the same things" (2:1).

Roman audience (though affinities appear in discussion of 9-11 and 12-15). Thus, 3:1-9 does not simply tell the Romans to stop holding νόμος or λόγια as advantageous over non-Jews; that is not the point of the dialogue. Still, Paul communicates something to the Romans through the interlocutor, and this directly relates to the portryal of the gospel he develops beginning in 1:1. To repeat, the gospel is God's anthropologically universal and Christological means of demonstrating his faithful and active δικαιοσύνη on the basis of πίστις. This gospel is the necessary solution because God's ὀργή is also being unleashed against all human unrighteousness. The dialogue in 3:1-9 fits into Paul's argument by showing that Jews too fall under God's impartial judgment—even if they suppose to escape it—and are equally in need of God's initiative in the gospel. Nobody has any salvific advantage over another before a just and impartial God, and Paul enlists the very person who might (does) presume to have an advantage over others to make this concluding point in the argument, someone religiously Jewish.[74]

Discussing the role of the interlocutor in diatribal terms, however, only addresses one side of a two-headed coin; the technical treatments of speech-in-character also speak in this vein. Most notably, though he receives little attention in Part One due to the brevity of his comments, Cicero writes about speech-in-character in *de Inventione*, "At times you can sum up in your own person... but at other times you can bring on the stage (*inducere*) some person or thing (*personaram aut rem aliquam*) and let this actor sum up the whole argument" (1.99 [Hubbell, LCL]). Quintilian would speak of 3:1-9 as a way to introduce conversations between oneself and others in a credible manner, and as a way "to provide appropriate characters for words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or

[74] On this point, Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 141, writes, "The argument in 2.17-3.9 is not nakedly that 'Not even the Jews have an excuse', but that '*Since* not even the Jews have an excuse, no one does.'"

pity" (*Inst*. 9.2.30 [Russell, LCL]). Quintilian even demonstrates how Cicero employs speech-in-character to set up characters for certain rhetorical functions, specifically rebuke and encouragement, which approximates diatribe's use of censure and protreptic. Quintilian writes, "Cicero in *Pro Caelio* makes Appius Caecus and Clodius, her brother, address Clodia, the one to rebuke her vices, the other to encourage them" (*Inst*. 3.8.54 [Russell, LCL]). Finally, Theon would speak of Rom 3:1-9 as belonging to the protreptic species of rhetoric (εἶδος… προτρεπτικῶν; *Prog*. 115.20-22; P 70), noting how Paul exhorts the interlocutor towards a particular view. Diatribe and speech-in-character, therefore, overlap considerably and can speak of the interlocutor's role in Rom 3:1-9 practically synonymously.

Finally, fourth, what tone does Paul take with his audience and the interlocutor? Does Paul polemicize his religiously-Jewish interlocutor as most pre-Stowers readings argue, or does he educate or collaborate with him as some post-Stowers arguments adopt? Paul's attitude towards his historical audience is easier to pinpoint. Because the interlocutor does not represent the audience but communicates to them a more general or bigger premise in the argument, Paul's tone towards them is more educational than anything else. In Rom 11 and 12-15, Paul shows his audience that there is more to the interlocutor than meets the eye (still probably not polemically), but at the present he only aims to validate the inclusive gospel through which his impartial God procures salvation for all.

Paul's tone with the interlocutor is a bit more difficult to deduce. According to a traditional script, it is easier to hear polemic in Paul's voice, as he curtly rejects the

interlocutor's presumptuous objections time and time again.[75] In a revised script, especially one that thoroughly situates Paul as Socratic questioner, this is not the case. Quite the contrary, after pointing out and censoring the interlocutor's error (2:1-29), Paul simply asks questions for the interlocutor to consider in light of some occasion (i.e., what if some Jews lacked πίστις). Paul does not critique the interlocutor directly in 3:1-9 (though he does in 2:1-5, 23-29), nor does he call him "foolish," an "idiot," or the like. True, Paul guides the interlocutor to answer in a certain way, but he refrains from attacking the interlocutor for answering on the basis of erroneous views about λόγια / νόμος, much less for being "Jewish." After all, the thrust of 3:1-9 is not so much to single out Jews as it is to make a point about *all* (3:4, 6, 9b-31).[76] After the interlocutor responds, Paul just moves on to the next occasioned question until the interlocutor connects the dots for himself between Paul's previous discussion (Rom 1-2), Paul's leading questions (3:3, 5, 7-8c), and his own contradictory views (3:2, 4, 6). Once connected, the interlocutor joins with Paul and issues the concluding statement, "Nobody has any salvific advantage or disadvantage." In this sense, Paul's tone with the interlocutor is primarily collaborative; through Paul's guidance, the two discussion partners ultimately work together to make the intended point in Paul's argument for his Roman audience.[77]

As a result, it is not only the convention of appropriateness to characterization that helps elucidate Rom 3:1-9. Diatribe and speech-in-character contain reasonable

---

[75] See, for instance, Käsemann, *Romans*, 68-85. One of the primary impasses between scholars is the unfortunate fact that a consensus or standard definition of "polemic" does not exist. What some might call polemic, Stowers would simply call censure, and vice versa.

[76] On the indirectness of what Luke Timothy Johnson calls "NT polemic against the messianists' fellow Jews," see Luke Timothy Johnson, "The New Testament's Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient Polemic," *JBL* 108.3 (1989): 426.

[77] Cf. Elliott, *Rhetoric*, 139; idem., *Arrogance*, 106; Tobin, *Paul's Rhetoric*, 120.

explanations for the various additional features of the appropriately scripted dialogue as well, such as the role of the interlocutor, Paul's tone, and the rhetorical function of the pericope. But 3:1-9 is only one piece of the Romans puzzle; decisions made about the script of the dialogue and its meaning carry significant weight for the argument of Romans as a whole. This is why one must ask both "who is speaking when" and "why does it matter?" I turn now to examine what impact this reading has on the bigger picture of Romans and Paul's thought.

Ramifications for the Remainder of Romans

In this final section, I consider how my reading of 3:1-9 fits and effects the bigger picture of Romans on three immense questions in the study of the letter and Paul's thought: (1) the reoccurrence of questions and themes in Romans; (2) the concepts of "advantage" and God's promises as they relate to Jews and non-Jews in Paul's thought; and (3) the purpose(s) of Romans.

The Reoccurrence of Questions and Themes

Virtually all of the questions and themes raised in 3:1-9 reappear at some point in Romans. Though this issue is not as massive as questions regarding God's faithfulness to his promises and the Romans debate, it plays an important role. Many scholars argue that 3:1-9 raises issues briefly in order for Paul to address them later in more detail, and such scholars are on the right track regarding how the reoccurrences function.[78] What I aim to

[78] Cf. William S. Campbell, "Romans III as a Key to the Structure and Thought of the Letter,"*NovT* 23.1 (1983): 22-40.

show is how these reoccurrences confirm the reading I offer of Rom 1-3, especially 3:1-9.[79]

Romans 3:10-31. Rom 3:10-31 is an obvious point of departure, as it summarizes and confirms the ethnic ambiguity and exhaustiveness of God's ὀργή and δικαιοσύνη in 1:1-3:9.[80] Following 3:9's determination that *all*—Jews and Greeks—are under Sin, the catena and conclusion in 3:10-20 further confirm this point. "*No one* is just (οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος), *not even one*" (οὐδὲ εἷς; 3:10), "*no one*" understands or seeks for God (3:11), "*all* turned away" (πάντες; 3:12), "*no one* does kindness (οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ποιῶν χρηστότητα), *not even one*" ([οὐκ ἔστιν] ἕως ἑνός; 3:12). What νόμος speaks to those under it, it speaks "so that *every* mouth might shut and *all the world* might be accountable to God" (ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ; 3:19). And, "From works of νόμος *no person at all* will be justified before [God]" (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ; 3:20). There is no talk of religion; there is no talk of ethnicity. There is only talk of *all*.

The same is true concerning God's δικαιοσύνη in 3:21-26. God's active δικαιοσύνη does not operate on the basis of Jewishness or νόμος possession and observance, but "διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ for *all* characterized by πίστις" (εἰς πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας; 3:21-22). God's salvific program operates in this way for *all* because "there is no distinction" (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν διαστολή; 3:22); "*all* sinned and lack God's glory" (πάντες γὰρ ἥμαρτον καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ; 3:23; cf. 5:12-14) and as a

[79] These are not necessarily exhaustive treatments tracing the reoccurrences of themes throughout Romans.

[80] As Bassler argues, "'No distinction' applies both ways" regarding God's judgment and δικαιοσύνη. Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 156.

result "are being justified (δικαιούμενοι) freely by [God's] grace through the redemption available in Christ Jesus" (3:24; cf. 5:15-17).[81] Furthermore, God's act of sending Jesus on his salvific mission for all is a manifestation (εἰς / πρός ἔνδειξιν) of God's active δικαιοσύνη in the present time (3:25-26). Such equality for all proves God to be just (δίκαιον) and justifier (δικαιοῦντα) of those characterized by Jesus' πίστις (3:26). Again, in keeping with Paul's gospel, there is only talk of *all*.[82]

Rom 3:27-31 resumes the dialogue and concludes chapters 1-3.[83] Paul asks the previously boastful interlocutor (2:17, 23), in light of our discussion and your confession, "Where, then, is boasting?" The interlocutor must answer, "It is excluded;" there is none. Paul continues, "Through what sort of νόμος was boasting excluded? Through a νόμος characterized by works (τῶν ἔργων)?" The interlocutor, "No, it is excluded through a νόμος characterized by [Christological] πίστις (διὰ νόμου πίστεως)," like you have been saying (3:27; cf. 1:1-5; 2:12-16).[84] Paul explains, "Good, for we consider [people] to be justified on the basis of πίστις and not works of νόμος" (λογιζόμεθα γὰρ δικαιοῦσθαι πίστει ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου; 3:28),[85] and he asks, "Or (ἢ), is God only over Jews (Ἰουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον)? Is he not also over non-Jews (οὐχὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν; 3:29)?" As

[81] Thus, despite his ethnic categories for 1:18-32 and 2:1-3:8, Fitzmyer is on the right track in arguing that 1:18-3:20 depicts God's "reaction to humanity without the gospel." Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 270.

[82] See Barclay, 476, 476n.65.

[83] Distributing the lines of 3:27-31's dialogue is impossible in terms of speech-in-character's conventions, since Paul and his interlocutor seem to be in complete agreement here, beginning with 3:8b and 9b. For this reason, I maintain the pattern of 3:1-9 with Paul as Socratic questioner. Cf. Stowers, *Rereading*, 231-37.

[84] Here, the νόμος under discussion is one and the same. The distinction Paul is making involves how the Mosaic νόμος is fulfilled.

[85] Rom 3:28 could also make sense as an explanation from the interlocutor, siding with Paul's view of justification. My decision to place it in Paul's voice is based on the phrasing of 3:29 with ἤ, which seems to presuppose a comment from the same speaker.

expected with οὐχί in an interrogative,[86] the interlocutor responds, "Yes, he is also over non-Jews, since God is One who will justify the circumcision on the basis of πίστις and the uncircumcision through πίστις" (3:29). In the final exchange, Paul asks, "Therefore, do we nullify νόμος through πίστις?" (3:31; cf. 3:8a-c). To this, the previously νόμος-advantaged interlocutor concludes by proclaiming the fullness of Paul's argument; "Absolutely not (μὴ γένοιτο)! Justification on the basis of πίστις is what really upholds νόμος," as you have argued (3:31; cf. 1:1-5, 16-17; 2:12-16). Thus, 3:10-31 supplements the cosmic scope of God's ὀργή and δικαιοσύνη, upholds the primacy of πίστις, and once again allows the interlocutor to supply the concluding statement to Paul's argument.

Romans 4: God's faithfulness and the λόγια. Rom 3:3-4 argues that God will be faithful to the λόγια despite Jewish ἀπιστία. I argue that God's λόγια are the ethnically exhaustive promises to Abraham that God is bringing to fruition through the πίστις-based gospel. Paul advances this view in Rom 4.[87] Paul argues that Abraham was justified on the basis of πίστις (4:3-5, 22). David even speaks about how blessed people are to whom God reckons justification apart from works (λογίζεται δικαιοσύνην χωρὶς ἔργων; 4:6-8). Abraham receives this blessing while he was *un*circumcised (4:9-10). As a result, Abraham became the father of *all* people characterized by πίστις, both uncircumcised (πατέρα πάντων τῶν πιστευόντων δι' ἀκροβυστίας) and circumcised (πατέρα περιτομῆς; 4:11-12). Given God's promise (ἐπαγγελία) that Abraham and his seed would "be the heir of the world" (τὸ κληρονόμον αὐτὸν εἶναι κόσμου), the promise cannot be

[86] BDF §427.

[87] Note that Rom 4 is also dialogical, though I pass over it now in the interest of brevity. God willing, I will return to the dialogical aspect of Romans beyond Rom 3 in a future project.

contingent on exclusive possession or observance of νόμος but on δικαιοσύνη πίστεως (4:13), because only a promise based on πίστις and χάρις can be effective (βεβαίαν) for *all* the seed (παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι; 4:16).[88] Said otherwise, only a promise based on divine πίστις and χάρις addresses the universal scope of God's redemtpive program. Accordingly, God made Abraham "the father of us *all*" (πατὴρ πάντων ἡμῶν; 4:16) and "a father of *many nations*" (πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν τέθεικά σε; 4:17).[89] Furthermore, God continues to reckon this justification and blessing to those characterized by πίστις (4:22-25). Paul's discussion of the ἐπαγγελία (λόγια) in Rom 4, then, is in perfect harmony with his definition of the gospel and my explanation of the dialogue in 3:1-9.

Romans 6: Shall we continue in Sin? In 3:8a-c, Paul asks whether it would be better to do evil so that good might come, since God's "truth" is increased by human falsehood (cf. 3:4). The implied answer (μή) to the absurd false conclusion is, "Absolutely not (μὴ γένοιτο)!" The interlocutor, however, does not answer the question; instead, he comments about those who slander Paul, hold out νόμος as an exclusive advantage, and hinder God's inclusive λόγια (3:8d).

Paul, however, returns to the question in chapter 6. Like 3:4, 5a, and 7, Rom 5:20 declares, "Where Sin increased, grace super-abounded" (οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὑπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις). Accordingly, like 3:5b and 8a-c, Rom 6:1 asks, "What, then, will we say?[90] Shall we remain in Sin, so that grace might increase?" (ἐπιμένωμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ;). Though the interlocutor does not supply the obvious

[88] Cf. Cranfield, *Romans*, 242; Kruse, *Romans*, 214-15; Barrett, *Romans*, 90; Jewett, *Romans*, 329-30.

[89] Cf. Matera, *Romans*, 118-20.

[90] Note the dialogical nature of Rom 6, too.

answer in 3:8d, Rom 6:2 does, μὴ γένοιτο! Christians cannot continue in Sin because Sin is in league with Death (5:12-14). Christians, however, are "baptized into [Jesus'] death," and, just as "Jesus was raised from the dead," so also Christians "walk in new life" (6:3-4). Christians "are not enslaved to Sin" (6:6) but in Christ are "dead to Sin" and "alive to God" (6:11). Thus, "Sin will not rule as lord (ἁμαρτία… οὐ κυριεύσει)" over Christians (6:14), for "[they] are not under Sin but grace" (6:14).

This latter affirmation gives rise to another formulation of the question. "What then? Shall we sin, because we are not under νόμος but under grace?" (6:15). The answer is another resounding μὴ γένοιτο (6:15). According to Paul, the anthropological condition is such that humans are "slaves" (δοῦλοι) to whomever they obey (6:16). In Christ, however, God frees Christians from slavery to Sin and "enslaves" them to δικαιοσύνη and himself, so that they serve him (6:17-23). On all accounts, the response to continuing in Sin is a reverberating "absolutely not!" Humans can only have one L(l)ord; for a Christian to continue serving Sin is a contradiction of terms in Paul's thought (cf. 8:9-11).

Additional elements from 3:1-9 reappear later in Romans. For instance, 3:5's question of divine ἀδικία returns in 9:14, and 3:7's imaginative consideration of why God finds fault quickly follows in 9:19. Paul couches these questions, however, within his narrower discussion of God, Israel, and the gentiles in Rom 9-11. Because of the vast importance decisions about 3:1-9 have on these latter matters, and because of the vast importance these latter matters have on Romans as a whole, I address them in their own section.

God's Inclusive and Universal Promises: Rom 3:1-9 and 9-11

The biggest "advantage" of traditional readings of 3:1-9 in which Paul overtly supports Jewish advantage of some sort is that explaining Paul's discussion of Israel in 9-11 becomes easier—not easy, easier—especially if we do not look for clues to the contrary. Nevertheless, the best traditional readings still have to wrestle with how to explain Paul's ceaseless appeal to divine impartiality with his endorsement of Jewish advantage over non-Jews. For example, Longenecker argues that Paul himself wrestles with this tension throughout Romans 1-11. Beginning in 1:16, Paul qualifies "the universalism of his gospel" by noting that it is "to the Jew *first*," whereby "we can already notice a peculiar tension in his perspective, a tension which includes an ethnic advantage or priority within his universalistic outlook."[91] Paul resolves this issue in 9-11, where he draws a distinction between the ages.[92] "In the present age, ethnic lineage has no part in determining the membership of the community of grace; with the culmination of this age, however, all Israel will be turned to faith in Christ."[93] By itself, Longenecker's conclusion is fine and plays a significant part in the following discussion. What such readings miss, however, is the degree to which God does nothing for Israel that he does not equally do for non-Israel. God does not show mercy only to ethnic Israel, but to *all* (πάντας; 11:32) and to all fully conceived (πλήρωμα; 11:12, 25). Thus, if one must use the language of "advantage," rather than limiting eschatological redemptive benefits to Israel over against non-Israel, it would be more accurate to say that *all* are "advantaged" or "privileged" in light of the promises' universal scope.

---

[91] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 168, italics original.

[92] Ibid., 168, 195-99, 256-57.

[93] Ibid., 257.

Allowing speech-in-character's convention of appropriateness to guide interpretation of Rom 3:1-9 helps make this point more clear, since it requires the νόμος-boastful interlocutor to proclaim the affirmation of Jewish advantage over non-Jews in 3:2, not Paul. Such an affirmation would conflict with the ethnic vagueness and incessant inclusivity to which Paul appeals in Rom 1-3, but it constitutes the very identity of the interlocutor. Paul, therefore, never suggests that Jews have any salvific edge over non-Jews. But what does this say about Paul's conception of God's relationship to the promises? Λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἀπώσατο Παῦλος τὴν διαθήκην τοῦ θεοῦ; Μὴ γένοιτο! Rather, Paul appeals to the impartial and universal core of God's promises and presses them to their extremes.

This conversation of course comes to a head in Rom 9-11. In Rom 3, Paul can only guide his interlocutor to dismiss Jewish salvific advantage in the interest of equality; in 9:1-5, however, Paul speaks quite positively about what we might call "ethnic" Israel. Paul lists a number of would-be "advantages" for Israel.[94] These "advantages" include: possessing adoption (ὧν υἱοθεσία), the glory/presence (ἡ δόξα), the covenants (αἱ διαθῆκαι), the giving of the law (ἡ νομοθεσία), the ministry (ἡ λατρεία), the promises (αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι), and the ancestors (οἱ πατέρες; 9:4). Furthermore, the Messiah genealogically descends from Israel (ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστός; 9:5).

Alas, Israel's possession of these would-be "advantages" does not make one iota of difference for them *over against* non-Israel. At the time of writing, Paul believes unbelieving Israel is in dire straits, so much so that he expresses his great grief for them (9:1-3) and feels compelled to address the question of whether God's word has failed

[94] Given the history of interpretation, it is striking that Paul does not actually speak about 9:4-5 as περισσόν or ὠφέλεια, nor does he include the λόγια in this list.

(9:6). Something is definitely amiss. Yet, in his discussion of the problem, Paul never says, "Don't worry, you possess νόμος," or "everything will be okay, you serve in the temple," much less "God deals with Israel differently than the rest of the nations."[95] Nor is it important that Israel was chronologically privy to the λόγια / νόμος with its διαθῆκαι and ἐπαγγελίαι. What matters is what God does to Israel,[96] but what God does to Israel, he does equally to *all*.[97] Consequently, in Rom 9-11's discussion of Israel, Paul demonstrates over and over how God deals with Israel and *all* on the same basis (see below).

Romans 9. Given Israel's state of affairs, Paul posits whether God's word has failed, or whether God has been unfaithful, contra 3:3-4. The answer is of course, "no," and Paul draws out the scope of God's "word" (ὁ λόγος; 9:6) in two ways.[98] First, Paul argues that God's word is only applicable to the "children of the promise" (τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας; 9:8). All Abraham's children do not count as his "seed," since God promises "a seed (σπέρμα) will be called [for him] in Isaac" (9:7; Gen 21:12). Paul's discussion of Abraham helps explain what he means in the infamously cryptic comment about "not all these from Israel are Israel" (Rom 9:6b); just as Abraham's seed is limited, neither do all

[95] I.e., there are no "two ways." Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 257n.1.

[96] Fitzmyer, therefore, advances the right theology in the wrong place when he argues that "Jewish advantage" rests on what God does for Jews but applies this view to 3:2, since presumed advantage in 2:1-3:2 involves exclusivist possession rather than the universal applicability of the λόγια as Paul insists. Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 325.

[97] This does not suggest that "Israel" in Romans equals "all." Instead, Israel is one constituent within the "all." Contra Wright, *Romans*, 690-93; idem, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 250. So also Rodríguez, *If You Call*, 226; Dunn, *Theology*, 527, whose opposing argument is based on 11:28-29; Beker, "The Faithfulness of God and the Priority of Israel in Paul's Letter to the Romans," *HTR* 79.1-3 (1986): 10-16; Ticciatti, "Nondivisive," 266, who argues, "At the eschatological climax… difference remains without division."

[98] Similarly, Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 253.

of Israel's descendants constitute God's Israel (9:6).[99] Second, Paul illustrates that God elects impartially. Before Isaac and Rebekah's children do anything good, evil, or otherwise, God chooses to love Jacob, not Esau (9:11-13). God's choice of Jacob maintains the "election" (ἐκλογήν; 9:11) aspect of his plan, so that what matters for belonging to God's people is not one's "works" (ἐξ ἔργων) but God's call (ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος; 9:12).[100] Thus, God's word has not failed; it has divinely selective applicability in accord with God's promise, election, and call.

God's impartiality, however, sparks the reoccurrence of 3:5's question about divine ἀδικία. Given that human ἀδικία makes room for God's active δικαιοσύνη (3:5), Paul's leading question in 3:5 asks whether God is "unjust" (ἄδικος) for exerting wrath. Similarly, 9:14 asks, "What, then, shall we say? There is no injustice with God, is there?" (τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; μὴ ἀδικία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ;).[101] The question asks whether God is unjust for impartially choosing some but not others. As in 3:6, 9:14's answer is, "Absolutely not" (μὴ γένοιτο)! God's impartial election is part and parcel in keeping with his character; he even informs Israel that he will show mercy and compassion to whomever he wishes (9:15; Ex 33:19). Consequently, belonging to God's people does not depend on the human who wills or runs, but on God's preemptive mercy (τοῦ ἐλεῶντος θεοῦ; Rom 9:16), for he hardens or shows mercy to whomever he wishes (9:17-18).

This depiction of God as orchestrator of both election and non-election prompts another question from Rom 3:1-9. Rom 3:7 imaginatively considers why Paul is

---

[99] On this latter point, see Beverly Roberts Gaventa, "On the Calling into Being of Israel: Romans 9:6-29," in *Between Gospel and Election* (WUNT 257; Florian Wilk and J. Ross Wagner, eds.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 255-69.

[100] Thus, "election" and "call" are roughly synonymous.

[101] Note the dialogical style.

considered a sinner during his period of "falsehood" (i.e., πίστις-lessness), since that falsehood magnifies God's "truth" (i.e., faithfulness). In an interlocutor's voice (ἐρεῖς μοι), Rom 9:19 asks, if God is responsible for hardening humanity, "Why does he still find fault? Who has opposed his will?" Paul is more blunt here than in 3:1-9; Paul essentially answers, "God is God and who are you to question his decisions?" (9:20-21). God can demonstrate ὀργή on some and ἔλεος on others prepared for this purpose, namely, "us whom he called not only from Jews but also from non-Jews" (οὓς καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἐθνῶν; 9:24). Again, what matters—for Jews *and* non-Jews—is nothing short of God's *call*, and Paul documents this from scripture. Concerning God's call of non-Jews, Paul appeals to Hosea, "I will call (καλέσω) not my people (τὸν οὐ λαόν μου) my people, and not my beloved (τὴν οὐκ ἠγαπημένην) beloved… they will be called (ἐκληθήσονται) children of the living God (υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος; 9:25-26; LXX Hos 2)."[102] At the same time, Isaiah proclaims concerning Israel that though most perish, God will preserve a remnant (Rom 9:27-29; Isa 1:9; 10:22; cf. Hos 2:1 LXX). Once more, divine initiative trumps ethnicity and any other presumed advantage.

In drawing Rom 9 to a close, 9:30-33 allows for additional discussion of how God interacts identically with Israel and non-Israel. Rom 9:30 asks, if God "calls not my people my people" (9:25) and only saves a remnant of Israel (9:27-29), "What, then, will we say?" The answer is quite reminiscent of 2:12-16;[103] the nations (ἔθνη) not pursuing

[102] As Gaventa writes, "The capstone comes in v. 25 with the citation of Hosea's words to Israel now applied to both Israel and the Gentiles. Just as God called Israel into being, God has called into being this people from those who were 'not my people.'" Gaventa, "On the Calling," 267.

[103] Thus, 9:30-33 provide additional support for the "Christian gentile" reading of 2:12-16.

δικαιοσύνη obtain it on the basis of πίστις, but Israel's pursuit of "law-righteousness" (νόμον δικαιοσύνης) fails because their pursuit is not based on πίστις but ἔργα (9:30-31). In this respect, Israel stumbles because they do not understand God's δικαιοσύνη, but this is not primarily Israel's fault. God places the stumbling and scandalizing stone in Israel's path, over which safe passage requires divinely graced πίστις. God, however, does not grace to (most of) Israel a vehicle with appropriate ground clearance—πίστις–-at least not yet. Thus, God orchestrates Israel's crash (9:32-33; Isa 8:14; 28:16).[104]

Rom 9, therefore, argues that inclusion in God's people depends on nothing short of God's impartial promise, election, call, and gift of πίστις, *not* νόμος, ἔργα, or ethnicity.[105] For any and all, divinely orchestrated lack of πίστις only results in stumbling over the stumbling stone (cf. 1:24, 26, 28). In this way, Rom 4 and 9 speak in one accord that the criterion is one and the same for *all* humanity.

Romans 10. Rom 9 identifies Israel's problem as a lack of πίστις. When Paul grieves for Israel, therefore, he grieves for "unbelieving," "non-Christian," or "non-πίστις" Israel (see 10:16; 11:1-2). Paul further explains Israel's dilemma in Rom 10. In Rom 1:18-32, humanity has knowledge of God but does not worship him because they chase after idols; Paul practically argues the same for Israel in Rom 10. Israel has "zeal for God but not according to knowledge" (κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν; 10:2). Instead, "Being ignorant (ἀγνοοῦντες) of God's δικαιοσύνη and seeking to establish their own, they [are] not subjected (ὑπετάγησαν) to God's δικαιοσύνη" (10:3). This is because God's δικαιοσύνη

[104] Gaventa, "Questions about *Nomos*."

[105] Though not identical, I see God's promise, election / call, and graced-πίστις all as interrelated parts of a single creational and salvific matrix.

is Christological and effective for *all* based on πίστις (παντὶ πιστεύοντι), not on "doing" or "possessing" νόμος, as the speeches-in-character in 10:6-8 denote.[106] Such a relationship with νόμος essentially exalts νόμος as an idol rather than recognizing in it God's salvific plan for *all* (cf. Rom 1:18-2:29).[107] As scripture says, πίστις is the basis for "*all*" (πᾶς; 10:11; Isa 28:16), because there is "no distinction between Jew and Greek (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν διαστολὴ Ἰουδαίου τε καὶ Ἕλλενος). The same Lord is over *all*" (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κύριος πάντων; Rom 10:12), and he offers salvation equally to "*all*" (πᾶς; 10:13; LXX Joel 3:5).

So far, however, Rom 10 seems to suggest that Israel is simply ignorant. Rom 10:14-21 corrects this potential misconception. Rom 10:16 indicates that Israel's problem is related to the gospel (τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ), but 10:18-19 imaginatively attempts to alleviate this problem by considering whether Israel has not had an appropriate encounter with the gospel, μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; (10:18) and μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω; (10:19). As indicated by μή, the answer is, "No, Israel heard and knew." The proclamation went out "to *all* the earth (εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν)" and "to the corners of the world" (10:18; LXX Ps 18:5). God even tells Israel he will make them jealous by what is "not a nation" and that he was "found by those not seeking him… all the while he held out his hand to a disobedient and obstinate people" (Rom 10:20-21; Deut 32:21; LXX Isa 65:1-2). Indeed, Israel knew and heard; their "ignorance" is no less culpable than humanity's in Rom 1, but neither is it any less divinely orchestrated, as Rom 11's conclusion puts so succinctly.

---

[106] For a discussion of 10:6-8, see Part One, Chapter Five.

[107] See Dunn, *Theology*, 114-19. Though not connecting this to idolatry, Longenecker writes, "Israel has stumbled by their lack of faith (as Isaiah prophesied), for they considered the covenant to be restricted to the community of the Jews, whereas Scripture foretold that no such restrictions would apply in the eschatological age." Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 254.

Romans 11. Israel's precarious situation provokes yet another question, "Surely God did not reject his people, did he?" (μὴ ἀπώσατο ὁ θεὸς τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ;). "Absolutely not (μὴ γένοιτο; 11:1)!" Paul offers himself as proof that God has not rejected his people, "I myself am an Israelite (Ἰσραηλίτης), from the seed of Abraham (ἐκ σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ), from the tribe of Benjamin" (11:1). Lest anyone suppose that Paul's autobiographical comments support some sort of ethnic advantage, consider what Paul says about these qualifications elsewhere. In Phil 3, Paul declares that he could have more confidence in the flesh than others; he was

> circumcised on the eighth day, from the race of Israel, from the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew from Hebrews, a Pharisee according to the law, according to zeal a persecutor of the church, and according to righteousness in the law blameless. (3:4-6)

Because of Christ, however, Paul rejects these previous "advantages" (κέρδη; 3:7) and considers them "dung" (σκύβαλα). Rather than rely on these qualifications, Paul claims that justification comes not from νόμος but διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ and from God, based entirely on πίστις (3:9). No differently, Gal 1 reveals how God's apocalyptic revelation of the Son altogether halts Paul's "*previous* conduct in Judaism" (1:13-17) and points him toward justification διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ on the basis of πίστις for *all* (2:15-16). Only in this way can Paul equally and impartially proclaim, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female; for *all* (πάντες) are one in Christ" (3:28).

Rom 11 further clarifies that Paul's ethnic qualifications provide him no advantage over non-Jews before a just and impartial God, as God operates on a different standard. As in Elijah's day (Rom 11:2-4), so also in Paul's, God preserves a remnant based not on ἔργα but on his gracious election (λεῖμμα κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος; 11:5-6; so also 9:6-13), not only from Jews but also from non-Jews (9:24). Israel failed to obtain

what it was seeking, but the "elect" (ἐκλογή) obtained it (11:7). The rest—the "non-elect," "not-yet-elect," or perhaps the "momentarily-hardened-elect"—God hardened (11:7); "God gave them (ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεός) a spirit of stupor, blind eyes, and deaf ears" (11:8-10; cf. Deut 29:3; Isa 6:9; 29:10; LXX Psa 68:23). Even more clearly than tripping Israel over the stumbling stone (9:32-33), God orchestrates non-Christian Israel's failure.

God's hardening of many Jews prompts Paul finally to consider the ultimate fate of these Israelites; "Surely they did not (μή) stumble permanently, did they" (11:11)? The answer provides a beginning glimpse of hope for Israel; absolutely not (μὴ γένοιτο), "their fullness" (τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν) is still possible (11:12, cf. 11:15). Non-Christian Israelites were "broken off" because of ἀπιστία, and non-Israelites were included because of πίστις (11:20). If, however, Israel "[does] not persist in ἀπιστία," they will be reattached (11:23). Israelite or non-Israelite, Jew or Greek, slave or free, male or female, divinely-graced Christological πίστις or lack thereof is the sole criterion for whether or not one belongs to God's people, and this avenue remains open in the present time.[108]

In 11:25-36, Paul expands on 11:11-24's glimmer of hope and makes a final plea for the equality of Jew and non-Jew in God's salvific program. As in 11:7-10, Paul argues that Israel has been hardened (πώρωσις ἀπὸ μέρους τῷ Ἰσραὴλ γέγονεν). Now, however, Paul temporally qualifies this hardening; it only lasts "until the fullness (πλήρωμα) of the nations enter" God's people (11:25).[109] In this progression, "all Israel will be saved" (πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται) when the rescuer comes in accord with the

[108] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 258.

[109] J. Ross Wagner, *Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul "In Concert" in the Letter to the Romans* (NovTSup 101; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 277.

covenant and forgives Israel's sins (11:26-27; cf. Isa 27:9; 59:20; Jer 31:33).[110] So, though Israel is currently an enemy with respect to the gospel, they remain "beloved" (ἀγαπητοί) with respect to "election" (κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐλκογήν; Rom 11:28) because God's "gracious gifts and calling are irrevocable" (ἀμεταμέλητα γὰρ τὰ χαρίσματα καὶ ἡ κλῆσις τοῦ θεοῦ; 11:29).

From Paul's perspective this is truly hopeful news for Israel, but this does not change the fact that God engages Israel and non-Israel equally.[111] God's calling (κλῆσις) is irrevocable (11:29), but God does not only call Jews; God calls (ἐκάλεσεν) a "fullness" (πλήρωμα) from both Israel and non-Israel (9:24-25; 11:12, 25). And, as 11:32 concludes, "God confined *all* (πάντας) to disobedience, so that he might show mercy to *all* (πάντας)" (cf. 3:9). Furthermore, though Israel's "fullness" (πλήρωμα; 11:12) remains a possibility, their "fullness" depends on non-Israel's "fullness" (πλήρωμα; 11:25). Whatever Israel's "fullness" means (11:12), it means the same for non-Israel's "fullness" (11:25). If "fullness" (πλήρωμα) means "all" (πᾶς) for Israel (11:26), it means "all" for non-Israel.[112] Paul makes no distinction. Instead, as Paul argues from Rom 1:1-11:36, God's graced-πίστις, promise, and election / call remain the valid currency, and these are impartially and exhaustively operable for *all*. Indeed, what God does for Israel, God does equally for *all*.

---

[110] Käsemann correctly observes that Paul's hope for Israel does not devolve into "speculative fantasy," but that one "must leave it in the [eschatological] horizon which determines it." Käsemann, *Romans*, 314.

[111] Dunn observes, "[Paul] does not weaken his commitment to the Gentiles in any degree. But he holds forth a hope for the final salvation of Israel…" Dunn, *Theology*, 528.

[112] For the parallel treatment of πλήρωμα in 11:12, 25 and interpretive options, see Cranfield, *Romans*, 558, 575-76; Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 611, 621-23; Kruse, *Romans*, 428-29, 443, 448-51; Barrett, *Romans*, 206; Rhys, *Romans*, 146; Jewett, *Romans*, 678; Dunn, *Theology*, 527.

The import of Rom 3:1-9 and 9-11. Though not exclusively, Rom 9-11 focuses on God's dealings with Israel, at least on the surface. God's dealings with Israel, however, are no different than his engagement with non-Israel. To be sure, there is some chronological jostling in both directions as God uses Israel on behalf of non-Israel *and* non-Israel on behalf of Israel. God, however, ultimately—eschatologically—deals the same with *all*.[113] In conjunction with 3:1-9, this has a number of implications for understanding Romans. First, it is quite significant that Paul does *not* speak the affirmation of Jewish advantage in 3:2.[114] Based on Rom 1-2, it must be concluded that Paul would reject any view of Jewish privilege that affords Jews a salvific advantage over non-Jews; God's promises to Abraham are universal, and according to Paul's gospel God's active δικαιοσύνη faithfully saves *all* people characterized by πίστις (1:16-17). The fact that Jews were "entrusted" with the λόγια confers to them no salvific edge over non-Jews, as Paul leads even the "privileged" interlocutor to conclude in 3:9. The same is true of 9-11. Israel's "advantages" (9:4-5) also belong to Christian gentiles; neither has an inherent step ahead of the other. What truly matters is God's choice, and God chooses from Jews and non-Jews alike (9:24, 30-33). He condemns *all*, and he shows mercy to *all* (11:32). Paul's views about Jewish "advantage" neither contradict nor display a paradox between Rom 1-2 and 3:1-9, between 3:1-2 and 9, or between 3:1-9 and 9-11. Paul

[113] See Ticciatti, "Nondivisive," esp. 261. Ticciatti is right to caution that universalism does not reduce distinction to sameness, and that distinction and uniqueness do not equate to inequality. By my reading, however, Ticciatti's limited scope (Rom 9-11) casts her conclusions slightly off center. For instance, Ticciatti does not discuss the universal scope of God's promises to Abraham (Rom 4), and her identification of Christ as the τέλος specifically of *Israel's* law (10:4) fails to account for Paul's discussion of gentiles who Christologically do it (2:12-16). As a result, Ticciatti's argument reads as though in Romans Paul is more interested in saying something about Israel than he is in saying something about God's election and call of non-Israel or, more correctly, all.

[114] Contra Keck, *Romans*, 90, who suggests understanding the arrangement of the script is of little import.

categorically affirms that God deals equally with all. Consequently, what Paul says about his own "gains" in Phil 3:4-11 equally applies to the interlocutor's presumptuous "advantages" in 3:1-2 and Israel's (exclusively conceived) in 9:4-5.

Second, τί οὖν; μὴ ἀπώσατο Παῦλος τὴν διαθήκην τοῦ θεοῦ; Μὴ γένοιτο! Paul's avoidance of salvific advantage for Jews over non-Jews does not mean that Paul denies God's faithfulness to his promises to Abraham as well. The exact opposite is true. Paul staunchly maintains that God will be faithful to the λόγια (3:3-4) and that he continues to operate based on the promises (ἐπαγγελίαι; 4; 9:6-13; Gal 3:15-18). Paul's post-Christ-apocalypse understanding of the promises is simply infinitely broader than the interlocutor's. Given the amount of time and space Paul spends developing this theme, it seems clear that it represents one of his main aims in Romans.

Third, Paul's novelty in this respect, and the way he maintains God's faithfulness to the promises despite avoiding Jewish superiority, is that he does not view the promises as applicable only to Jews. Unlike the interlocutor, for Paul, the promises have an universal outlook. It seems that when Paul says "all," he really means "*all*."[115] This is what Paul argues through Rom 4. Justification and belonging to Abraham's promised "seed" are based on πίστις and God's grace for *all*, uncircumcised *and* circumcised (4:11-12), such that "the promise (τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν) is effective (βεβαίαν) for *all* the seed (παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι), not only those under νόμος but *also* those with Abrahamic πίστις" (4:16). In the truest sense of the word, Paul demonstrates that the promises are applicable on a *cosmic* scale, as Abraham and his "seed" will be the "heir of the κόσμος" (4:13). Thus, according to the promise, God made Abraham the "father of many nations" by calling

[115] I am indebted to Beverly Roberts Gaventa for this way of phrasing Paul's conception of "all" in Romans, though she should not be held accountable for my application of it.

(κληθήσεται, ἐκάλεσεν) for him a "seed" not only from Jews but also from non-Jews (4:17-18; 9:6-9, 24). Paul's silence concerning exclusive Jewish "advantage" does not abandon God's concern for Israel—it upholds it by proclaiming the ethnically unhindered and cosmic intent of God's promises, Israel included.[116] As Paul writes in 15:8-9, "Christ became a servant of the circumcision for the sake of God's truthfulness (i.e., faithfulness), in order to actualize the *promises* made to the fathers (εἰς τὸ βεβαιῶσαι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας τῶν πατέρων), so that the *nations* (τὰ ἔθνη) might glorify God."[117]

Fourth, recognizing that a significant thread in Rom 1-11 aims to stitch together the ethnically inclusive "seed" God promised to Abraham requires a return to Paul's interesting characterization of his Roman Christian audience in the prescript (see Chapter Ten). Paul identifies his audience as "called (κλητοί, κλητοῖς)," "beloved (ἀγαπητοῖς), and "holy (ἁγίοις)" (1:6-7)—terms the Septuagint *and* Paul use for Israel as God's chosen people. Given the way Paul unveils the universal intent of God's promises and thereby dismantles the boundaries imposed on them by the interlocutor, it seems all the more certain that Paul's characterization of his audience in this way is intentional. By describing his ethnically ambiguous but gentile-majority audience no differently than as God's chosen people, Paul demonstrates that the breadth of God's promises does not stop with Israel but extends to *all* God's people. Jews and non-Jews, Israel and non-Israel, equally reside within the reach of the promises and God's "called," "beloved," and "holy"

---

[116] Contra Barrett, who finds such a view "offensive." Barrett, *Romans*, 59.

[117] The δέ requires explanation. Many take the conjunction as a connective; Jesus became a servant for this *and* (δέ) for this. The thrust of Romans, however, *especially* 4:16, suggests the conjunction should be read as explanatory, shedding further light on Jesus' effectuating the promises. So, "Jesus became a διάκονον of the circumcision… in order to make effective the promises made to the fathers, that is, for the nations to glorify God." See Wallace, *Greek Grammar*, 673. For various approaches, see Moo, *Romans*, 875-78; Jewett, *Romans*, 890-93. See especially Wright, "Rom 2:17-3:9," 21-22.

people.[118] What is more, positioned at the beginning of the letter, this ethnic equalizing sets the course for the remainder of the letter and primes its audience to read and hear as such.[119]

One final note on this point is necessary. Paul's universalizing of God's promises does not shame, downgrade, or reject Israel's place in those promises. It elevates non-Israelites to their rightful place (as Paul sees it). God still acts on behalf of Israel, but he acts all the same on behalf of non-Israel as well. In view of God's promises, the relationship between Jew and non-Jew is either one of no advantage or of universal "advantage." This is why Paul demonstrates that non-Israelites share the same would-be "privileges" as Israelites in 3:2 and 9:4-5: adoption (8:15, 23); glory (8:18-21); covenants and promises (4:13-16); νόμος (8:2-4); worship (12:1); the ancestors (4:16-18); and of course the Messiah, the Lord over *all* (10:12), though not on a bio-geneological basis.[120] The interlocutor initially denies non-Jews a place in the promises. Paul's response is not to expel Israel, but to demonstrate how non-Jews are no less a part of God's created

---

[118] Whittle's basic conclusion that Jews *and* gentiles are included in God's people on the same Christological basis, therefore, is basically accurate. Her argument, however, remains open to misunderstanding, if not misrepresentation. That is, Whittle argues that Paul's use of select "covenant renewal" texts in 9-11 explains how Paul can identify his Roman audience as "holy," despite that there is "little or no explicit evidence [elsewhere] in the letter to connect Israel's consecration at the mountain to the consecration of the Gentiles, or [to] explain how Paul might arrive at such a conclusion." Beginning for all intents and purposes in Rom 9, Whittle far too quickly passes over Rom 4, where Paul's overt discussion of Abraham solidly establishes non-Jews within the scope of God's promises—the same promises that begin God's relationship with Israel. This is why there is no overt or extended discussion in Romans of Sinai or covenant renewal; Paul understands gentile inclusion in God's people to be even more fundamental than Whittle's presentation suggests, grounded not on the events at Sinai but on the promises to Abraham "that came four hundred thirty years earlier" (cf. Gal 3:17) and are pre-promised in scripture (Rom 1:2). Whittle, *Covenant Renewal*, 31-75, cf. 146-51.

[119] On the function of the prescript, see Philip L. Tite, "How to Begin, and Why? Diverse Functions of the Pauline Prescript within a Greco-Romans Context," in Stanley E. Porter and Sean A. Adams, eds., *Paul and the Ancient Letter Form* (Pauline Studies (Past) 6; Leiden: Brill, 2010), 59.

[120] Keener, *Romans*, 116-17; Wright, *Climax*, 237; Dunn, *Theology*, 503-4; Whittle, *Covenant Renewal*, 36-37.

people than the Jews[121] and how all belong through the sole criterion of God's call and divinely-graced πίστις. In this light, Paul is able to proclaim, "Rejoice, (you) nations (ἔθνη), *with* his people" (15:10; LXX Deut 32:43), and "Praise the Lord, *all* the nations (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη), praise him, *all* peoples (πάντες οἱ λαοί)" (Rom 15:11; Ps 117:1).[122]

A Purpose of Romans

A final, but relatively brief, discussion of the "Romans debate" begins to bring this project to a close. This project highlights the dialogue in 3:1-9, but conversation necessarily and inevitably extends into much of Rom 1-11. The results of these investigations, with consideration of 12-15, have particular bearing on why Paul wrote the letter. To be sure, the "purpose" of Romans is pluriform, with explanations generally focusing on Paul's trip to Jerusalem, Spain, or Rome (15:22-29), the latter of which is often more narrowly tied to some potential misunderstanding of the gospel in Rome (cf. 1:15).[123] It is on the latter of these points that this study is particularly relevant.[124]

As with 3:1, discussion in this respect begins at 1:1-7. In Chapter Ten, I argue that much of Romans evinces an ethnically ambiguous nature, such that it is often

---

[121] On Paul's intentionality, see Dunn, *Theology*, 504.

[122] One potential reading of the Deuteronomy citation allows a relatively strong distinction between "nations" and "his people." The citation from Ps 117, however, indicates that such a reading is off course. Rom 15:11 / Ps 117:1 harmoniously joins Jews and non-Jews in praising God, as the parallelism between "all nations" and "all peoples" suggests.

[123] As entry points to the consideration of the purpose of Romans, see Donfried, *The Romans Debate*; A. Andrew Das, *Solving*; Williams, "Righteousness," 245-55; or most any commentary.

[124] Despite Karl Paul Donfried's need to distance Romans from diatribe (at least in generic terms) in view of the Romans Debate, his insistence that the use of rhetorical patterns in no way precludes the likelihood that Romans is addressed to particular and contingent situations in Rome is correct. Karl Paul Donfried, "False Presuppositions in the Study of Romans," in *The Romans Debate* (Karl P. Donfried, ed.; rev.; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 118-19. Stowers's work shows, and my examples above add to, the probability that diatribe and diatribal dialogue operate on multiple levels, one with the interlocutor, and one with the actual audience. Thus, the "typical" of diatribal dialogue cannot help but address something of the "particular pedagogical needs of the audience," even in Romans. Stowers, *Diatribe*, 180-81.

indeterminable whether Paul is addressing Jews, non-Jews, or both. For instance, Paul's gospel and apostleship are for *all* nations (1:5). Paul writes Romans to *all* God's beloved, called, and holy people in Rome (1:6-7). The gospel is God's powerful means of effecting salvation for *all* (1:16-17), just as his wrath is unveiled against *all* humanity's wickedness (1:18-32). *All* are confined under Sin (3:9). God calls a seed for Abraham from Jews and non-Jews (4:11-12, 13, 16; 9:24). Additionally, Paul never identifies the interlocutor in any ethnic terms; the interlocutor is *anyone* who religiously considers oneself a Jew (ch. 2).

Such ethnic vagueness is present in most of Romans. The few instances where Paul approaches ethnicity become occasions not to stress difference or distinction but equality. God procures salvation through the gospel for Jew and non-Jew alike (1:16-17). God's positive and negative judgment falls impartially on Jew and non-Jew (2:9-11). When Paul specifically addresses non-Jews in 9-11's discussion of Israel, it is to stifle haughtiness and arrogance over non-Christian Israel (11:13-24). But at this point we perhaps get slightly ahead of ourselves; there is more to say about Rom 1.

The beginning of ancient letters, especially epistolary thanksgivings, often reveal information about the contents of the letter and approximate something of a table of contents.[125] For example, the thanksgiving in Philippians mentions their repeated "partnership in the gospel" (ἐπὶ τῇ κοινωνίᾳ ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον; 1:5), which one later learns is a technical term to refer to their financial support of Paul's mission (4:10-20).[126] Given the ethnic ambiguity and equality of Romans, one comment in the thanksgiving

[125] Cf. Matera, *Romans*, 26.

[126] Gerald Peterman, *Paul's Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift Exchange and Christian Giving* (SNTS 92; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 90-103.

calls for additional consideration. Paul writes that he wants to strengthen the Romans by imparting to them some spiritual gift (1:11). Paul, however, quickly qualifies this claim. Paul writes, "I mean, I want to be mutually encouraged (συμπαρακληθῆναι) with you (ἐν ὑμῖν) through each other's πίστις (διὰ τῆς ἐν ἀλλήλοις πίστεως), both yours and mine" (ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῦ; 1:12). Though easily missed on a first, second, or tenth reading/hearing, this qualification takes on new meaning when one considers it in light of Rom 11 and 12-15.[127]

In Rom 1, Paul, a Jewish Christian—perhaps the Jewish Christian *par excellence*—expresses his desire to engage mutually with a gentile Christian majority. In short, Paul models that Jewish and non-Jewish Christians can and should profitably co-exist—and "co-exist" puts the matter too lightly.[128] At least some of the Roman Christians, however, seem to be acting otherwise. Again, the interlocutor in Rom 2-3 does not immediately represent Paul's actual audience, but similarities nevertheless exist between 2-3 and 11-15. For instance, chapters 2-3 engage a judgmental, privileged, and religiously-Jewish interlocutor who boasts over non-Jews, Rom 11 addresses Christian pride over non-Christian Israel, and 12-15 exhorts against Christians judging other Christians. That is, Rom 2-3:2 portrays non-Christian Jews who "judge" (κρίνεις, ὁ κρίνων, cf. κατακρίνεις, τὸ κρίμα; 2:1-3) non-Jews because of a sense of privileged and boastful superiority. Quite similarly, in 11:13-24, Paul advises his gentile-majority, Christian audience not to boast over non-Christian Israel (μὴ κατακαυχῶ τῶν κλάδων;

[127] Similarly, Marty L. Reid, "A Consideration of the Function of Rom 1:8-15 in Light of Greco-Roman Rhetoric," *JETS* 38.2 (1995): 181-91, esp 189-91.

[128] Rom 1:12, therefore, is more than a "humble apology" or "diplomatic correction" for 1:11. Contra, for examples, Barrett, *Romans*, 26; Kruse, *Romans*, 63; Mounce, *Romans*, 67-68; Bruce, *Romans*, 72; Fitzmyer, *Romans*, 246.

11:18) or to think too highly (μὴ ὑψηλὰ φρόνει; 11:20) given their status within God's people.[129] Rom 12-15 translates this judgmentalism into the Christian communities. In Rom 12, Paul exhorts (παρακαλῶ; 12:1) *all* Christians in Rome (παντὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν ὑμῖν; 1:7) not to think arrogantly (μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν) but moderately (ἀλλὰ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν), because, though there are many members of Christ's body, all are equally important members of the unified body (12:1-8; cf. 1 Cor 12; Gal 3:28). Rom 14 makes this rather general exhortation concrete; some Roman Christians—also ethnically ambiguous[130]—are quarrelling over trivial disputes (as Paul sees it), such as what to eat. Like the non-Christian interlocutor who clings to a restricted understanding of νόμος and hinders God's promises from taking full effect, some Roman Christians cling to the freedom that comes from their "measure of faith" and potentially cause other Christians to stumble (Rom 14). In order to resolve these divisive conflicts, Paul directs both sides of the dispute not to judge one another (σὺ δὲ τί κρίνεις; μηκέτι οὖν ἀλλήλους κρίνωμεν), because God is the judge of *all* (πάντες γὰρ παραστησόμεθα τῷ βήματι τοῦ θεοῦ; 14:10-13; cf. 12:19-21).[131] Instead, the Roman Christians should "love one another" (13:8-10), "welcome" others (14:1; 15:7), not cause others to stumble (14:13), and the truly strong should sacrifice their rights for the benefit of others (14:15-15:1).

---

[129] Paul addresses "you nations" (ὑμῖν δὲ λέγω τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; 11:13). Given Paul's frequent reference to *all* nations in Romans, and given the focus in 9-11 on *non*-πίστις Israel, might Paul's use of "nations" in 11:13 include Jewish Christians like Paul within its scope?

[130] Jewett, *Romans*, 70ff.

[131] See also Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 162-63, who argues that a "real sociological spin-off" of Paul's concept of divine impartiality in eschatological judgment is visible. "As a result of God's impartial treatment of the two groups the immediate social consequence is proclaimed that no distinction is to be made within the community itself." Instead, "Christians are *now* to refrain from judging *each other*." Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 163, italics original.

Romans, therefore, is at minimum a letter of unification, and Paul prepares his audience for the exhortation in 12-15 from the very beginning. Paul's display of mutual encouragement, the religio-ethnic ambiguity, the inclusive scope of the gospel, and God's exhaustive and impartial ὀργή and δικαιοσύνη seek to remove any sense of exclusivity within the Christian communities in Rome.[132] One might even say that Paul's argument in 1-11 sets a trap for his actual audience, which he finally springs when he begins to address the divisiveness of the Roman congregations in 12-15. In this way, Paul seeks the united, singular, corporate (ὁμοθυμαδόν) glorification of God from *all* God's people (15:6). All are to rejoice *together* (15:10). *All nations* (πᾶντα τὰ ἔθνη) and *all peoples* (πάντες οἱ λαοί) are to praise God (15:11).

Correcting the inner-Christian divisiveness among the Roman congregations is, therefore, almost certainly one facet of the purpose of Romans. Rom 3:1-9 plays only a small role in the large-scale argument of Rom 1-15, but it plays a significant role nonetheless by arguing for ethnic equality before a just and impartial God, even for Jews. Correctly understanding the script, therefore, is actually quite significant. How can Paul argue for equality and unity yet affirm that Jews have a salvific advantage over non-Jews, as traditional readings must paradoxically affirm or hold in tension? Μὴ γένοιτο! Rescripting the dialogue in 3:1-9 altogether alleviates this problem. Rom 3:1-9 and 9:4-5 no longer appear as paradoxical or in tension with Paul's sweeping concern for equality and impartiality. Quite the contrary, Paul's Socratic guidance of the interlocutor towards equality firmly aligns 3:1-9 with the rest of Romans and puts forth a united front concerning the relationship between Jews and non-Jews. Said in Pauline terms, a

[132] Bassler is correct, therefore, to surmise that Paul's ethnic evasiveness is not accidental. Bassler, *Divine Impartiality*, 136.

correctly rescripted dialogue of 3:1-9 frees the passage from slavery to confused contradiction and enslaves it in service of the pervasive message of God's impartial δικαιοσύνη and the unity of the body.

Conclusion

Before the reader ever arrives at Rom 3, Paul makes substantial progress defining his gospel and characterizing the interlocutor (Rom 1-2). Paul argues that when God's δικαιοσύνη brings about human πίστις, this actualizes the saving power of the gospel, which ultimately rescues its objects from God's wrath. This divine initiative knows no bounds, ethnic or otherwise; God's δικαιοσύνη is impartial and thoroughly so. But so is God's wrath, and in Rom 2 Paul begins to address an imaginary persona who thinks quite differently than Paul. Paul argues that failure to worship God and idolatry fall squarely under God's judgment, and he accuses the interlocutor precisely of these faults. The interlocutor, however, presumes to have a trump card over God's judgment, namely, his exclusive privilege of Jewish identity and possession of νόμος, and this characterization sets the stage for Rom 3:1-9's ensuing dialogue.

Despite the majority view in the passage's history of interpretation, the transitions in the conversation between Paul's voice and the interlocutor's are a far cry from obvious or easy to distinguish. Adhering to the proposed method in which characterization and attributed speech should appropriately correlate, however, presents a new way forward. Since attributed speech should be appropriate to an imaginary speaker's characterization, characterization can serve as the interpretive key to determine which lines in a discourse belong to which speaker, especially when the transitions are not overtly marked. Applied to the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9, this methodological approach exposes problems within the

traditional reading and provides the argumentative basis for the rescripted arrangement of the discourse by Neil Elliott, which is otherwise presented quite shallowly. As a result, the conventions for speech-in-character and diatribe suggest that it is not the imaginary interlocutor who fires objections at Paul in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c, 9a, but Paul who, in the role of Socratic questioner, presents leading questions to censure his interlocutor and guide him from his original, faulty, point of view towards Paul's more correct understanding. Through the course of the dialogue, the interlocutor in fact develops. Though he initially affirms exclusive advantages for Jews (3:2), he eventually relinquishes that hold (3:8-9) in view of God's faithfulness, justice, and impartiality (3:3-6). Jews possess no salvific edge over non-Jews; all equally fall within the scope of God's judgment and within the scope of his merciful and graciously incongruous δικαιοσύνη.[133]

A correct arrangement of the script, especially attributing 3:2 and 9 to the interlocutor, has a remarkable impact on holistic readings of Romans. Traditional readings must often argue that Paul holds in tension his view of divine impartiality for Jew and gentile with his belief that Jews possess a unique eschatological advantage with God. Such tension, if not contradiction, is resolved if Paul is not responsible for speaking the affirmation of Jewish salvific advantage in 3:2. Rom 3:1-9 then falls seamlessly into Paul's central emphases on divine impartiality and anthropological equality. This is buttressed by Paul's demonstration that non-Jews are privy to the same would-be advantages as Jews (Rom 1, 4, 6, 8, 9), and even where Paul addresses God's dealings with Israel at length (9-11) I illustrate that God's eschatological plan for Israel is "fully" synonymous with his eschatological plan for non-Israel. Indeed, God hardens *all*, so that he might show mercy to *all*. This in no way diminishes Israel's relationship with God;

[133] On the "incongruous" nature of God's grace, see Barclay, *Gift*.

quite the contrary, it maintains Israel's position as beloved of God and elevates gentiles to their rightful place as equal objects of the divine promises to Abraham that call into being the people of God from both Jews and non-Jews. Additional implications from rescripting 3:1-9 will be discussed in the following conclusion to this project as a whole.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Conclusion

This project focuses on the questions of who is speaking which lines in the dialogue of Rom 3:1-9—Paul or his imaginary, diatribal interlocutor—and why it matters for understanding Romans. Though evincing diverse conclusions, previous traditional *and* rescriptive readings of Rom 3:1-9 display a remarkable but unacceptable consistency, namely, the preponderance of assumptions rather than arguments based on valid and/or persuasive evidence. None are exempt or without excuse. Even at the most recent annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature,[1] which included several papers featuring discussions of Rom 3:1-9, this reality remained the norm (at least for those papers I was able to attend, each of which understood 3:1-9 along traditional lines).[2]

This absence of methodological constraint and persuasive argumentation, however, proves surprisingly refreshing, since it allows both traditional and rescriptive readings to receive an equal hearing. Indeed, from the outset, there is no reason to show partiality to either view as far as sustainable and persuasive arguments are concerned. Interestingly, this project ends on a similar note, with one outstanding difference. As previous traditional and rescriptive readings succumb to a common error, so also in Romans Paul holds that all of humanity—Jews and non-Jews—equally, exhaustively, and

[1] Atlanta, 2015.

[2] For two examples, Joshua Garroway, "Under Sin: Finding the Antecedent for Paul's Charge in Rom 3:9b" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, Atlanta, November 21, 2015); Michael T. Graham Jr., "An Examination of Paul's Use of Ps 51:4 in Rom 3:4 and Its Implications on Rom 3:1-8" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL, Atlanta, November 22, 2015).

impartially fall under the common judgment of God and the power of Sin. Whereas a certain rescriptive reading ultimately edges out traditional (and other rescriptive) readings when viewed in light of the conventions for speech-in-character, however, Paul consistently maintains that neither Jews nor non-Jews ever salvifically or eschatologically surpass the other. God deals equally with *all* humanity, just as he promised to Abraham (Gen 12, 15; Rom 4). This means that whatever God plans to do for the fullness of all Israel, God plans to do equally for the fullness of all non-Israel (Rom 11). But getting to this point took some doing, and Rom 3:1-9 played a critical role. In this final chapter, I briefly summarize my conclusions.

This project began in Part One by examining the primary literature for the rhetorical practice of speech-in-character and Paul's use of the skill in his letters. The primary sources include the pseudonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, Theon's *Progymnasmata*, and the *Progymnasmata* falsely attributed to Hermogenes, each of which agrees that speech-in-character must appropriately align with the characterization of the imagined speaker. This essential convention of appropriateness to character undergirds the whole project, as it constitutes the plumb line by which one can often determine whether an imagined speaker could or could not speak given lines.

Largely following Stowers's reassessment of diatribe as an educational technique by which a teacher guides students to adopt better views through censure and protreptic, I then demonstrated in Part Two the remarkable similarity between speech-in-character and diatribe's dialogical passages. In fact, every instance of diatribal dialogue utilizes speech-in-character in the creation of staged discourses. Consequently, when the transitions

between speakers in diatribal dialogues are unclear or otherwise difficult to distinguish, readers may refer to the conventions for speech-in-character to help confirm or define which speaker is responsible for which lines in the imaginary conversation. Thus, in addition to Pauline studies, this project also makes contributions to rhetorical, *Progymnasmata*, and diatribal studies.

Finally, Part Three applies the method developed in Parts One and Two to Paul's dialogue with an interlocutor in Rom 3:1-9. Traditional readings of the passage generally imagine the interlocutor posing objections to Paul in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c, and 9a, which Paul responds to in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, and 9b. Rescriptive readings, however, rearrange the dialogical exchanges primarily in one of two ways. One model begins with the interlocutor posing objections in 3:1 and 9a but inverts the middle of the dialogue so that Paul poses the questions in 3:3, 5, 7-8. The other arrangement completely reverses the traditional script, so that Paul raises questions in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c, and 9a for the interlocutor to answer in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, and 9b.

I argue that *all* previous traditional and rescriptive readings fail to persuade. To begin, most readings neglect to provide any argument at all, opting instead simply to assume a given script. Additionally, the readings that try to support their dialogical arrangements do so equally unsatisfactorily. Such "arguments" either reduce to assumptions in their own right (such as the required speaker of the μὴ γένοιτο rejections), or they rely on diatribal evidence that is routinely recognized as diverse and inherently inconsistent. Given the variety of views available, not to mention the significance of their unique implications for understanding Romans, assumptions and invalid evidence cannot be allowed to pass as acceptable. As such, all previous readings fall within the category

of weighed and wanting as far as arguments offered (or not offered) are concerned. To remedy this problem, I propose that a more consistent body of evidence must be incorporated into discussion of the diatribal dialogue in Rom 3:1-9. This body of evidence involves the rhetorical figure of speech-in-character. Because diatribe must employ speech-in-character in its composition of imaginary dialogue, and because Romans is diatribal, the introduction of speech-in-character is hardly onerous or problematic from a methodological point of view.

In my assessment of Romans, beginning with the very epistolary prescript, Paul gradually builds toward the dialogue in Rom 3:1-9. In chapter 1, Paul emphasizes the universal scope of his gospel; it is applicable to *all* without exclusion. Accordingly, Paul addresses the letter to *all* the Christians in Rome. Paul even applies to this ethnically ambiguous audience terms the LXX and Paul himself later use to refer to Israel as God's chosen people. *All* God's people are called, beloved, and holy; this includes Jew as well as non-Jew, Israel as well as non-Israel. Paul's disclosure in the proem that he hopes to experience mutual encouragement with the Roman Christians further buttresses this claim, as it models for his audience the equal status and unified relationship that Paul argues should exist between Jewish and non-Jewish Christians. Paul is able to maintain this equality between Jew and non-Jew because, due to God's faithfulness to his universal promises to Abraham, God's δικαιοσύνη activates πίστις within humanity and thereby causes the gospel to effect salvation for *all* people characterized by such πίστις. This salvation rescues humanity from God's wrath, to which *all* of humanity are also subjected due to their disposition towards idolatry. Left to their own devices and despite their

knowledge of God, humanity does not worship him as God, and for this reason God hands them over.

Romans 2 represents Paul's characterization of the interlocutor with whom he engages in conversation in 3:1-9. Contrary to Paul's description of God's impartial wrath, Paul's religiously Jewish interlocutor supposes that, though others fall under God's judgment, he will not. This is because the interlocutor believes that his status as a Jew and possession and observance of νόμος provide him with a salvific and eschatological advantage over non-Jews. Paul, however, accuses the interlocutor of "doing the same things" and consequently falling no less completely within the breadth of God's wrath. A stark difference, therefore, exists between Paul's presentation of God's impartial gospel and wrath in Rom 1 and the characterization of the interlocutor's views in Rom 2. Paul's message is one of equality, impartiality, and inclusivity; the Jewish interlocutor's view is one of privilege, partiality, and exclusivity, and this characterization sets the stage for the ensuing dialogue.

Arriving at Rom 3:1-9, using Paul's characterization of the interlocutor as the measure against which to determine the appropriateness of lines in the imaginary dialogue, I conclude that a rescriptive reading of the dialogue is in order. Traditional readings assume that the interlocutor poses the questions in 3:1 to Paul, and that Paul answers in 3:2. Thus, in traditional readings, when the interlocutor asks about Jewish advantage, Paul affirms that Jews possess an advantage over non-Jews. When one considers the conventions for speech-in-character, however, a different picture develops. In Rom 1-2, Paul holistically argues for anthropological equality and divine impartiality. The interlocutor, however, maintains that Jews possess a salvific advantage over non-

Jews based on Jewishness and the possession and observance of νόμος. Given that attributed speech must be appropriate to the characterization of an imaginary speaker, it must be concluded on methodological grounds that the interlocutor most appropriately speaks the affirmation in 3:2. Similar arguments take root in 3:3-9. In the end, the conventions for speech-in-character mount to suggest that Paul plays the role of Socratic questioner (or diatribal teacher) throughout 3:1-9's dialogue. In this role, Paul poses leading questions that compel the interlocutor to rethink his previously held privileged and exclusive views. My analysis, therefore, provides actual argumentation for the rescriptive model that casts Paul speaking the questions in 3:1, 3, 5, 7-8c, and 9a and the interlocutor responding in 3:2, 4, 6, 8d, and 9b. This model is only fully represented by Elliott, who is followed by Campbell.

This rescriptive reading offers numerous advantages over other readings. First, my reading stems from and accounts for a body of evidence that is much more consistent and widely documented than the diatribal evidence referenced by previous scholars. Because the prosopopoetic material is intrinsically tied to the creation of diatribal dialogue, incorporating this material is the most natural solution to the search for a stronger base of evidence relevant to the diatribal script of Rom 3:1-9. Second, my rescriptive reading makes better sense of the dialogue. Paul and the interlocutor maintain consistent roles throughout, and all the first-person speech is attributed to Paul. Moreover, what the traditional reading identifies as authorial asides no longer appear as awkward interjections into the interlocutor's speech since they align with Paul's guiding questions. Third, my rescriptive reading removes unnecessary contradictions or tensions from Paul's argument regarding divine impartiality and anthropological equality. Other readings must

explain why Paul affirms Jewish advantage in 3:2 but rejects it in 3:9b. My reading avoids this issue because these lines are attributed to the interlocutor. In fact, for the interlocutor to respond differently in 3:9 than in 3:2 is altogether expected in a diatribal discourse interested in transformation through the use of censure and protreptic. The interlocutor begins with an erroneous view of Jewish salvific and eschatological advantage over non-Jews, but Paul exposes the inconsistencies in the interlocutor's view and leads him to endorse Paul's view of universal equality. The interlocutor even makes for Paul the concluding point in his argument. Thus, my reading not only answers the question of who is speaking when, but it also addresses the issue of *why* it matters.

My reading not only makes better sense of 3:1-9, it also makes better sense of the dialogue's function in the argument of Romans. Rom 3:1-9 is not a digression, aside, or passage otherwise in need of excision. Rom 3:1-9 fills a particular role in arguing for exhaustive and universal divine impartiality and anthropological equality. If not even Jews are excused from undergoing God's judgment, no one is. All are equal. This point is further developed as the questions Paul raises in 3:1-9 reappear in nuanced forms later in the letter, but it is most prominent in Paul's discussion of Israel in Rom 9-11. Because Paul largely focuses on Israel in these chapters, scholars often allow Paul's discussion of the gentiles to fall out of sight. Paying attention to what Paul says about God, Israel, *and* non-Israel in Rom 9-11, however, demonstrates Paul's consistency regarding divine impartiality and anthropological equality. Interestingly, what Paul believes God will do for Israel, Paul declares that God will do the same for non-Israel. Is the fullness of Jews going to enter into God's people? Not until the fullness of non-Jews enter in as well. Did God cause most Jews to stumble over the stumbling stone? Yes, but God equally

confined *all* to disobedience. Is God going to show mercy to Israel? Yes, but he will show mercy equally to *all*. If (or "since") God's promises to Abraham have salvific and eschatological implications for Israel, Paul insists the promises' universal scope demands that they have the same salvific and eschatological implications for non-Israel (cf. Rom 4). There is no qualitative hierarchy; none is salvifically advantaged over another. The rescripted dialogue of 3:1-9 is, therefore, in accord with Paul's argument about Israel and *all* in Rom 9-11 and throughout Romans. Whatever God does to Israel, Paul argues, God will do for non-Israel. In this light, Paul's declaration in Gal 3:28 rings true for Romans as well and brings this study to an—appropriate—conclusion:

Οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλλην,
οὐκ ἔνι δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος,
οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ·
πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἷς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

Though this project is coming to a close, it has laid the foundation for a number of future research trajectories. First and foremost, Rom 3:1-9 is not the only passage in the letter that contains dialogue or speech-in-character. Just to identify a few, Rom 3:27-4:1, 7:7-25, and 9:14-33 employ these elements as well. What light can the method developed in this project and applied to 3:1-9 shed on our understanding of these additional discoursive pericopae (or others)? Furthermore, how are these passages related? Does Paul engage the same interlocutor throughout the letter? If so, does the interlocutor continue to develop through sustained conversation with Paul, and how does the interlocutor function as a pedagogical tool for Paul's Roman audience? As something of a test case, therefore, my investigation of Rom 3:1-9 opens the door for a fresh reading of the whole letter that highlights the text's dialogical qualities.

Second, as discussed in Part Two, one sweeping difference between Bultmann's presentation of diatrtibe and Stowers's recasting of the material involves the issue of polemic. What, however, qualifies as polemic? Answering this question seems to involve a considerable degree of subjectivity, such that what one reader calls polemic, someone like Stowers might call censure, and vice versa. Can progress be made towards a more formal definition of polemic, and, if so, how might that guide our understanding of Romans, diatribe, or Romans as diatribe?

Third, I argued that Paul was able to manipulate the conventions for speech-in-character in order to suit certain rhetorical contexts. How else might Paul draw on rhetorical figures but employ them in more complex or nuanced ways? Do any of Paul's contemporaries, such as Epictetus, nuance rhetorical figures in ways that are similar to Paul's? To stay with speech-in-character, might Paul be reconfiguring the criterion that speech is to be attributed to *another* speaker when he presents his "foolish boast" in 2 Cor 11, and might Epictetus be doing something similar in *Disc*. 2.20.28-31? How would this help us understand each writer's respective argument?

These are but a few of the avenues for future research that this project has disclosed, and I look forward to continuing to think about and discuss them with the scholarly community. But all things must eventually come to an end, especially this long project. So, these conversations and others will have to wait in hope just a bit longer, not altogether unlike Paul's exhortation to the Romans in 8:24-25 concerning the already-not yet quality of Christian existence: εἰ δὲ ὅ οὐ βλέπομεν ἐλπίζομεν, δι' ὑπομονῆς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Progymnasmata Texts on Speech-in-Character and Translations

Theon

Text[1]

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΠΟΙΙΑΣ [115.11; P 70]

Προσωποποιΐα ἐστὶ προσώπου παρεισαγωγὴ διατιθεμένου λόγους οἰκείους ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀναμφισβητήτως, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους ἀνὴρ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα μέλλων ἀποδημεῖν, ἢ στρα- [15]
τηγὸς τοῖς στρατιώταις παρορμῶν[2] ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους. Καὶ ἐπὶ ὡρισμένων δὲ προσώπων, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους Κῦρος ἐλαύνων ἐπὶ Μασσαγέτας, ἢ τίνας Δάτις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἐντυγχάνων τῷ βασιλεῖ.
Ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῆς γυμνασίας πίπτει καὶ τὸ τῶν [20]
παρηγορικῶν[3] λόγων εἶδος, καὶ τὸ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν,
καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐπιστολικῶν.[4] Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἁπάντων [22]
ἐνθυμηθῆναι δεῖ τό τε τοῦ λέγοντος πρόσωπον ὁποῖόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος, τήν τε παροῦσαν ἡλικίαν,
καὶ τὸν καιρόν, καὶ τὸν τόπον, καὶ τὴν τύχην, καὶ τὴν [25]
ὑποκειμένην ὕλην, περὶ ἧς μέλλουσιν οἱ λόγοι ῥηθήσεσθαι.[5] Ἔπειτα δὲ ἤδη πειρᾶσθαι λόγους ἁρμόττοντας εἰ-

---

[1] For the text of Theon, I follow Patillon and Bolognesi, *Aelieus Theon*, 70-73. See also Leonardus Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2; Leipzig: Teubner, 1854), 115-18; and Butts, *Theon*, 444-64. Scholars traditionally cite references to Theon's *Progymnasmata* by noting Spengel's page and line numbers. Patillon's text, however, disrupts Spengel's divisions without providing an alternative reference system. Thus, Spengel's system is the most accessible, but Patillon's text does not fit the mold. I have readjusted the line divisions of Patillon's text to cohere with Spengel's divisions. The bracketed numbers refer to the text's page and line numbers in Spengel. Additionally, [P #] indicates the page number in Patillon.

[2] παρορμῶν is not present in Spengel's or Butts's text. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 115.16; Butts, *Theon*, 444.

[3] Spengel has πανηγυρικῶν. *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 115.21.

[4] Patillon's edition begins a new paragraph here in 115.22. *Theon*, 70.

[5] The order in Spengel and Butts is οἱ μέλλοντες λόγοι ῥηθήσονται. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 115.26-27; Butts, *Theon*, 446.

πεῖν· πρέπουσι γὰρ δι’ ἡλικίαν ἄλλοι ἄλλοις, πρεσβυ-
τέρῳ καὶ νεωτέρῳ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν τοῦ νεωτέ-
ρου λόγος ἡμῖν ἁπλότητι καὶ σωφροσύνῃ μεμιγμένος [30]
ἔσται, ὁ δὲ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου συνέσει καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ· καὶ [116.1]
διὰ φύσιν γυναικὶ καὶ ἀνδρὶ ἕτεροι λόγοι ἁρμόττοιεν ἄν,
καὶ διὰ τύχην δούλῳ καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ, καὶ δι’ ἐπιτήδευμα [P 71]
στρατιώτῃ καὶ γεωργῷ, κατὰ δὲ διάθεσιν ἐρῶντι καὶ σω-
φρονοῦντι, καὶ διὰ γένος ἕτεροι μὲν λόγοι τοῦ Λάκω- [5]
νος παῦροι καὶ λιγέες, ἕτεροι δὲ τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ ἀνδρὸς
στωμύλοι. Καὶ βαρβαρικῶς φαμὲν εἰπεῖν πολλάκις τὸν
Ἡρόδοτον καίπερ ἑλληνιστὶ γράφοντα, ὅτι τοὺς ἐκεί-
νων λόγους μεμίμηται. Πρέπουσι δὲ λόγοι καὶ τόποις
καὶ καιροῖς· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατοπέδου οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ [10]
ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, οὐδὲ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ πολέμῳ, οὐδὲ νικῶσι
καὶ ἡττημένοις, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοῖς προσώποις παρα-
κολουθεῖ.[6] Καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἕκαστα ἔχει
πρέπουσαν ἑρμηνείαν.[7]

Ταύτης δ’ ἂν ἐγκρατεῖς γενοίμεθα, ἐὰν μήτε περὶ [15]
μεγάλων πραγμάτων ταπεινῶς λέγωμεν, μήτε περὶ μι-
κρῶν ὑψηλῶς, μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μήτε περὶ
δεινῶν ἐκλελυμένως, μήτε περὶ αἰσχρῶν θρασέως, μήτε
περὶ ἐλεεινῶν περιττῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ τῶν
πραγμάτων ἀποδιδῶμεν στοχαζόμενοι ἅμα καὶ τοῦ ἁρ- [20]
μόττοντος τῷ τε προσώπῳ καὶ τῷ τόπῳ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ
καὶ τῇ τύχῃ καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν προειρημένων.[8] Ἐπεὶ οὖν ποι-
κίλη ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν προσώπων καὶ τῶν πραγμά-
των διαφορά·[9] (ἢ γὰρ αἰτούμεθά τι, ἢ προτρέπομεν, ἢ ἀποτρέπο-
μεν, ἢ παρηγοροῦμεν, ἢ συγγνώμην αἰτοῦμεν ἐφ’ οἷς [25]
ἐπράξαμεν, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων)[10], ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι[11]
καθ’ ἕκαστον τούτων ἀφορμὰς οἰκείας εἰπεῖν. – Προ- [P 72]
τρέποντες τοίνυν ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι ἐφ’ ὃ προτρέπομεν, καὶ
δυνατὸν γενέσθαι καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ πρέπον

---

[6] Spengel and Butts have παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς προσώποις. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 116.12-13; Butts, *Theon*, 448.

[7] Patillon’s edition does not begin a new paragraph in 116.14-15. *Theon*, 71.

[8] Patillon begins a new paragraph here in 116.22. *Theon*, 71.

[9] Spengel’s and Butts’s arrangement is διαφορά καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 116.23-24; Butts, *Theon*, 448.

[10] Spengel does not set this pericope in parentheses. *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 116.24-26.

[11] Spengel and Butts have καί καθ’. Ibid., 116.27; Butts, *Theon*, 448.

ἐστίν· ὅτι συμφέρον, ὅτι δίκαιον, ὅτι ὅσιον (διττὸν δὲ[12] [30]
τοῦτο, ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ἢ πρὸς τετελευτηκότας), ὅτι
ἡδύ, ὅτι μὴ μόνοι πράττομεν μηδὲ πρῶτοι, ὅτι εἰ καὶ
πρῶτοι, πολὺ κρεῖττον ἄρξασθαι καλῶν ἔργων,[13] ὅτι [117.1]
μὴ μετάνοιαν φέρει πραχθέν. Ὑπομνηστέον δὲ καὶ εἴ τι
προϋπῆρκται ἀπὸ[14] τοῦ προτρέποντος εἰς τὸν προτρεπό-
μενον, καὶ εἰ ἄλλοτε πεισθεὶς ὠφελήθη. – Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς
τρόπος ἔσται τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, κἂν αἰτώμεθά[15] τι, ἀπο- [5]
τρέποντες δὲ ἀπὸ[16] τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιχειρήσομεν. – Ἐαν δὲ παρηγορῶμεν,[17] οὕτω
χρησόμεθα τοῖς λόγοις, ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον καὶ πάντων κοι-
νὸν τὸ γεγενημένον, ὅτι[18] ἀκούσιον· ἥκιστα γὰρ οἱ νοῦν
ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις λυποῦνται. Ἐὰν δὲ ἑκούσιον
ᾖ, ῥητέον ὅτι αὐτὸς αὑτῷ αἴτιος· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῆς φιλαυ- [10]
τίας ἧττον λυποῦνται δι' ἑαυτοὺς δυστυχήσαντες. Λεκ-
τέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτου μεῖζον κακὸν ὑπάρχει, ὃ παθόν-
τες ἕτεροι πολλοὶ ἤνεγκαν εὐκόλως· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
ὅτι εἰ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ ἀνιαρόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὖν καὶ καλὸν
καὶ ἔνδοξόν ἐστιν· ἔπειθ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμον καὶ ὅτι μηδὲν [15]
ὄφελος τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἤδη γεγενημένοις λύπης. Καὶ ὁ οἰκ-
τος δὲ μεγάλην ἰσχὺν ἔχει πρὸς παραμυθίαν, μάλιστα [P 73]
ὅταν τις ἐπὶ κηδείᾳ τοὺς λόγους ποιήσηται[19]· οἱ γὰρ ἀνι-
ώμενοι πρὸς μὲν τούτους τοὺς οἰομένους μηδέν τι δει-
νὸν αὐτοὺς πεπονθέναι πεφύκασιν ἀντιτείνειν καὶ πρὸς [20]
τῇ λύπῃ οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι τοῖς παραμυθουμένοις, παρὰ
δὲ τῶν συνολοφυρομένων εὐμενέστερόν πως προσιέναι,
ὡς παρ' οἰκείων, τὰς παρηγορίας. Διόπερ μετὰ τοὺς θρή-
νους ἐποιστέον τῶν λόγων τοὺς νουθετικούς. – Ὅταν δὲ
συγγνώμην αἰτῶμεν, τὰς ἀφορμὰς ἐντεῦθεν ἕξομεν, πρῶ- [25]
τον μὲν ὅτι ἀκούσιον τὸ πραχθέν, τοῦτο δὲ ἢ[20] δι' ἄγνοι-

---

[12] Spengel and Butts have καί τοῦτο. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 116.31; Butts, *Theon*, 450.

[13] Spengel has καί ὅτι. *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 117.1

[14] Spengel has ὑπό. Ibid., 117.3.

[15] Butts has αἰτιώμεθα. *Theon*, 450.

[16] Butts records ἐκ. Ibid.

[17] The phrase Ἐαν δὲ παρηγορῶμεν is not in Spengel. *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 117.6.

[18] Spengel records καί. Ibid., 117.8.

[19] Butts records ποιήσαιτο. Butts, *Theon*, 452.

[20] ἢ is not present in Spengel or Butts. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 117.26; Butts, *Theon*, 454.

αν ἢ διὰ[21] τύχην ἢ δι'[22] ἀνάγκην· ἐὰν δὲ ἑκούσιον ᾖ, λεκτέον ὅτι
ὅσιον, ὅτι σύνηθες, ὅτι ὠφέλιμον, ὅτι εὐλαβές[23]. – Ἐπιχειρεῖν δὲ δεῖ, ἐξ
ὧν ἐνδέχεται τόπων· οὐ γὰρ πάντες ἁρμόττουσι πρὸς πά-
σας τὰς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος οὔσας προσωποποιΐας.[24] Τοῦτο [30]
δὲ τὸ γύμνασμα μάλιστα πάντων[25], ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ἐπιδεκτικόν
ἐστιν. Ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν εἰσαγωγῇ ἀπόχρη, κἂν
ἐκ τοσούτων τόπων τὰ μειράκια γυμνάζηται, τοῖς δὲ [118.1]
ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τελεώτερον βουλομένοις τὰς προσωπο-
ποιΐας μεταχειρίζεσθαι, πάρεστι χρῆσθαι καὶ ταῖς μικρὸν
ὕστερον ῥηθησομέναις ἡμῖν ἀφορμαῖς τῶν ἐπιχειρημά-
των πρὸς τὰς θέσεις. [5]

Translation[26]

[115.11; P 70] On Prosopopoiia [προσωποποιία]

[115.12] Prosopopoiia [προσωποποιία] is the introduction of a person [προσώπου] who non-controversially [ἀναμφισβητήτως] sets forth words that are appropriate [οἰκείους] both to the person himself and to the subjects [πράγμασιν] being set forth,[27] such as what words a husband would say to his wife when he is about to depart, or what a general would say to his soldiers when encountering dangers. Or, when certain persons are specified, what words Cyrus would say while marching against the

[21] διὰ is not present in Spengel or Butts. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 117.27; Butts, *Theon*, 454.

[22] δι' is not present in Spengel or Butts. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 117.27; Butts, *Theon*, 454.

[23] ὅτι εὐλαβές is not recorded in Spengel or Butts. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 117.28; Butts, *Theon*, 454.

[24] Patillon places a paragraph break here in 117.30. *Theon*, 73.

[25] Spengel and Butts do not record πάντων. *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 117.31. Butts, *Theon*, 454.

[26] For additional translations of Theon, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 47-49; Butts, *Theon*, 444-64.

[27] Here, πράγμασιν may be more exhaustive than the specific translation "subjects" suggests. For Theon, πράγμασιν certainly includes the subject to be discussed, but it could also apply to the circumstantial or contextual details set forth in which a speech is to take place. Thus, the translation of πράγμασιν more generally as "things," "holisitc circumstances," or something similar. On this note, see also Butts, *Theon*, 460n.3.

Massagetae, or what Datis would say while conversing with the king after the battle of Marathon. Under this genus [γένος] of exercises [γυμνασίας] fall the species [εἶδος] of consolation [παρηγορικῶν], exhortation [προτρεπτικῶν], and epistolary [ἐπιστολικῶν] speeches.

[115.22] First of all, then, one must consider what the character [πρόσωπον] of the one who is speaking is like, as well as that of the one to whom the speech is addressed [τὸ (πρόσωπον) πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος], the speaker's present age [ἡλικίαν], the occasion [καιρόν], the place [τόπον], the social status [τύχην], and the matter [ὕλην] being set forth about which speeches are going to be delivered.

[115.27] Only after making these considerations should one attempt to speak suitable [ἁρμόττοντος] words. For, due to age [ἡλικίαν], certain speeches only fit [πρέπουσι] certain persons; the same speeches are not fitting for an old and a young person. Rather, to us, the speech of a young person will be mixed with simplicity and moderation, [116.1] but the speech of an elder will be mixed with intelligence and experience. Moreover, because of nature, different speeches would be suitable [ἁρμόττοιεν] for a female than for a male; because of social status, different speeches would be suitable [P 71] for a slave than for a free person; because of vocation, different speeches would be suitable for a soldier than for a farmer; in accord with one's disposition, different speeches would be suitable for a lover than for one showing moderation; and, because of race, the speeches of a Laconian are few and clear, but the speeches of an Attic person are loquacious. And, we often say that Herodotus made speeches like a non-Greek, although he wrote them in Greek, because he was imitating (μεμίμηται) their speeches.

[116.9] Speeches also fit [πρέπουσι] different places [τόποις] and occasions [καιροῖς], for the same speeches are not fitting for the military camp and in an assembly, nor in times of peace and in times of war, nor for victors and for losers (and for any other traits that necessarily apply to the persons [προσώποις]).

[116.13] Additionally, the subjects [πράγματα] themselves each have a fitting expression. We would become masters of these different expressions if we do not speak about grand subjects in a lowly way, nor about small subjects loftily, nor about trifling subjects piously, nor about fearful subjects carelessly, nor about shameful subjects boldly, nor about pitiable subjects excessively. Instead, we must apply what is fitting [πρέπον] to each of the subjects, simultaneously aiming to apply what is suitable [ἁρμόττοντος] to the person [προσώπῳ], the place [τόπῳ], the time [χρόνῳ], the social status [τύχῃ], and each of the circumstances previously mentioned.

[116.22] Therefore, since the diversity [διαφορά] among persons [προσώπων] and subjects [πραγμάτων] is complex—for we either request something, or we exhort [προτρέπομεν], or we dissuade [ἀποτρέπομεν], or we console [παρηγοροῦμεν], or we request forgiveness for the things we have done, or we do something else like these things—it is necessary [P 72] to discuss appropriate [οἰκείας] starting places [ἀφορμάς] for each of these subjects.

[116.27] When we exhort [προτρέποντες], then, we will say that what we are exhorting [προτρέπομεν] is possible; that it is easy, good, and fitting; that it is beneficial, just, reverent (and reverence is of two sorts, either towards the gods or towards the dead), pleasant; that we are not the only ones doing it, nor are we the first; that even if we are [117.1] first, it is much better to begin good works; and that when done it brings no regret.

One should also mention if any relationship previously existed between the one exhorting [προτρέποντος] and the one being exhorted [προτρεπόμενον], and whether at another time he was benefited by being persuaded.

[117.4] The same manner of reasoning [ἐπιχειρήσεως] will be followed if we are requesting something, but if we are trying to dissuade [ἀποτρέποντες] we will argue from the opposite points.

[117.6] If we are consoling [παρηγορῶμεν], we will argue the points that what has happened was necessary and common to all; that it was unintentional, for those who have intellect are grieved the least by what occurred unintentionally. But if it was intentional, one should say that the person himself is responsible for what happened to him, for, due to self-love, people are less grieved when misfortune has occurred by their own doing. And one should say that an even greater evil than this exists, which many others have suffered and borne calmly. In addition to these points, one should say that even if it is painful for a short time, it is also good and honorable. Then one should say that it was beneficial and that nothing advantageous comes from grief over what has already happened. Also, pity has great power for comforting [παραμυθίαν], [P 73] most of all whenever someone makes speeches at a funeral, for those grieving naturally resist those who think they have suffered nothing terrible, and, in addition to their grief, they can become angry with their consolers, but they are better disposed to accept consolations [παρηγορίας] from those who lament with them, as if the consolations were from family. Therefore, one should introduce words of admonishment [νουθετικούς] after the lamentations [θρήνους].

[117.24] Whenever we request forgiveness, we will have starting places [αφορμάς] from the following: first, that what has happened was unintentional, and this is either due to ignorance, chance, or necessity. But if it was intentional, one should say that it was reverent, customary, beneficial, and cautious.

[117.28] One must argue from whichever common-places [τόπων] are admissible, for all common-places are not suitable [ἁρμόττουσι] for all prosopopoiiai [προσωποποιίας] which are under the same species [εἶδος].

[117.30] This exercise [γύμνασμα] is, most of all, receptive to character types [ἠθῶν] and emotions [παθῶν]. Therefore, generally, this exercise is sufficient in an introduction, even if [118.1] the young are being exercised [γυμνάζηται] in so many common-places [τόπων]. But, for those who want to utilize prosopopoiiai [προσωποποιίας] more accurately and completely, it is also possible to use the starting-places [ἀφορμαῖς] of epicheiremes [ἐπιχειρημάτων] for theses [θέσεις], which we will speak about a little later.

[Hermogenes]

Text[28]

Περὶ ἠθοποιίας. [20.6; S 15]

Ἠθοποιία ἐστὶ μίμησις ἤθους ὑποκειμένου προσώ-
που, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἀνδρομάχη ἐπὶ Ἕκ-
τορι. προσωποποιία δέ, ὅταν πράγματι περιτιθῶμεν
πρόσωπον, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἔλεγχος παρὰ Μενάνδρῳ, καὶ [10]
ὥσπερ παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστείδῃ ἡ θάλασσα ποιεῖται τοὺς

[28] For the Greek text of Hermogenes' Προγυμνάσματα, I rely on Hugo Rabe, ed., *Hermogenis Opera* (Rhetores Graeci VI; Leipzig: Teubner, 1913), 20-22. References to Hermogenes will indicate the page and line number(s) of a given text in Rabe's edition. [S #] refers to the respective page number in Spengel's edition.

λόγους πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ δήλη· ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ὄντος προσώπου λόγους πλάττομεν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐκ ὂν πρόσωπον πλάττομεν. εἰδωλοποιίαν δέ φασιν ἐκεῖνο, ὅταν τοῖς τεθνεῶσι λόγους περιάπτωμεν, ὥσπερ Ἀριστείδης ἐν τῷ Πρὸς Πλάτωνα ὑπὲρ τῶν τεσσάρων· τοῖς γὰρ ἀμφὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα περιῆψε λόγους.

Γίνονται δὲ ἠθοποιίαι καὶ ὡρισμένων καὶ ἀορίστων προσώπων· ἀορίστων μέν, οἷον ποίους ἂν εἴποι λόγους τις πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μέλλων ἀποδημεῖν, ὡρισμένων δέ, οἷον ποίους ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἀχιλλεὺς πρὸς Δηιδάμειαν μέλλων ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐξιέναι.

Τῶν δὲ ἠθοποιιῶν αἳ μέν εἰσιν ἁπλαῖ, ὅταν τις αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτὸν[29] ὑποκέηται λόγους διατιθέμενος, αἳ δὲ διπλαῖ, ὅταν πρὸς ἄλλον· καθ' ἑαυτὸν μέν, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους στρατηγὸς ἀπὸ τῆς νίκης ἀναστρέφων, πρὸς ἄλλον δέ, οἷον τίνας[30] ἂν εἴποι λόγους στρατηγὸς πρὸς τὸ στρατόπεδον μετὰ τὴν νίκην.

Πανταχοῦ δὲ σώσεις τὸ οἰκεῖον πρέπον τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις τε καὶ καιροῖς· ἄλλος μὲν γὰρ νέου λόγος, ἄλλος δὲ πρεσβύτου, ἄλλος δὲ γεγηθότος, ἄλλος ἀνιωμένου.[31]

Εἰσὶ δὲ αἳ μὲν ἠθικαί, αἳ δὲ παθητικαί, αἳ δὲ μικταί· ἠθικαὶ μέν, ἐν αἷς ἐπικρατεῖ διόλου τὸ ἦθος, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους γεωργὸς πρῶτον ἰδὼν ναῦν· παθητικαὶ δέ, ἐν αἷς διόλου τὸ πάθος, οἷον ποίους ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἀνδρομάχη ἐπὶ Ἕκτορι· μικταὶ δὲ αἱ σύνοδον ἔχουσαι ἤθους καὶ πάθους, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος διὰ τὴν τοῦ Πατρόκλου σφαγὴν καὶ τὸ ἦθος, ἐν ᾧ περὶ τοῦ πολέμου βουλεύεται.

Ἡ δὲ ἐργασία κατὰ τοὺς τρεῖς χρόνους πρόεισι· καὶ ἄρξῃ γε ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων, ὅτι χαλεπά· εἶτα ἀναδραμῇ[32] πρὸς τὰ πρότερα, ὅτι πολλῆς εὐδαιμονίας μετέχοντα· εἶτα ἐπὶ τὰ μέλλοντα μετάβηθι, ὅτι πολλῷ δεινότερα τὰ καταληψόμενα.

Ἔστω δὲ καὶ σχήματα καὶ λέξεις πρόσφοροι τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις.

[15] [20] [21.1] [5] [10] [15] [S 16] [20] [22.1] [5]

[29] Spengel has αυτόν. *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2), 15.23.

[30] Spengel has ποίους. Ibid, 15.26.

[31] Spengel has δὲ λυπουμένου. Ibid., 15.31.

[32] Spengel has ἀναδραμεῖ. Ibid., 16.5.

Translation[33]

[20.6; S 15] On Ethopoiia [ἠθοποιίας]

[20.7] Ethopoiia [ἠθοποιία] is an imitation [μίμησις] of the character [ἤθους] of an imagined [ὑποκειμένου] person [προσώπου], such as which words Andromache would say about Hector. Prosopopoiia [προσωποποιία], however, is when we apply a personality [πρόσωπον] to a thing [πράγματι], such as Elenchos in Menander, and as the Sea makes [ποιεῖται] speeches to the Athenians in Aristides's speech. The difference is clear: for, there (ethopoiia), we invent [πλάττομεν] speeches for a person that exists [ὄντος προσώπου], but here (prosopopoiia), we invent a person that does not exist [οὐκ ὂν πρόσωπον]. And, they say it is eidolopoiia [εἰδωλοποιίαν] whenever we attribute speeches to the dead, like Aristides does in his speech, *Against Plato on Behalf of the Four*, for he attributed speeches to those with Themistocles.

[20.19] Ethopoiia covers both definite [ὡρισμένων] and indefinite [ἀορίστων] persons [προσώπων]. For indefinite persons, ethopoiia is concerned with what type of words someone would say to his family when he is about to depart; for definite persons, ethopoiia considers what sort of words Achilles would say to Deidamia when he is about to depart for war.

[20.24] Among the ethopoiiai, they are single [ἁπλαῖ] whenever someone [21.1] is imagined [ὑποκέηται] to be delivering a speech by himself, but they are double [διπλαῖ] whenever someone is imagined to be delivering a speech to another person. An example of an ethopoiia by oneself involves what words a general would say when he returns from

[33] For an additional translation, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 84-85.

victory; an example to another person, however, includes what words a general would say to his army after a victory.

[21.6] Throughout, you will preserve what is appropriately fitting [τὸ οἰκεῖον πρέπον] for the imagined [ὑποκειμένοις] persons [προσώποις] and occasions [καιροῖς], for the speech of a young person is one thing, but the speech of an old person is another, and the speech of a rejoicing person is one thing, but the speech of a grieving person is another.

[21.10] Some ethopoiiai are ethical [ἠθικαί], some are pathetical [παθητικαί], and some are mixed [μικταί]. Ethopoiiai that are ethical are those in which the character [ἦθος] is emphasized throughout, such as what words a farmer would say the first time he sees a ship. Pathetical ethopoiiai, however, are those in which emotion [πάθος] is emphasized throughout, such as what words Andromache would say about Hector. And, mixed ethopoiiai are those with a combination of character and emotional traits [ἤθους καὶ πάθους], such as what [S 16] words Achilles would say about Patroclus, for there would be emotion [πάθος] because of the death of Patroclus and character [ἦθος] in his plans for war.

[21.19] The elaboration [ἐργασία] advances according to the three times [χρόνους]; begin with the present [τῶν παρόντων], because it is difficult; then run back [22.1] to the past [τὰ πρότερα], because it shares in much happiness; then, jump forward to the future [τὰ μέλλοντα], because the things that are going to happen are much worse.

[22.4] Let both figures [σχήματα] and diction [λέξεις] be appropriate [πρόσφοροι] for the imagined persons [ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις].

Text[34]

ΠΕΡΙ ΗΘΟΠΟΙΑΣ [34.1; S 44]

Ἠθοποιία ἐστὶ μίμησις ἤθους ὑποκειμένου προσ-
ώπου.

Διαφοραὶ δὲ αὐτῆς εἰσι τρεῖς, εἰδωλοποιία, προσωπο-
ποιία, ἠθοποιία. καὶ ἠθοποιία μὲν ἡ γνώριμον ἔχουσα [5]
πρόσωπον, πλαττομένη δὲ μόνον τὸ ἦθος· ὅθεν καὶ
ἠθοποιία προσαγορεύεται· οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους
Ἡρακλῆς Εὐρυσθέως ἐπιτάσσοντος· ἐνταῦθα ὁ μὲν Ἡρα-
κλῆς ἔγνωσται, τὸ δὲ τοῦ λέγοντος ἦθος πλαττόμεθα.
εἰδωλοποιία δὲ ἡ πρόσωπον μὲν ἔχουσα γνώριμον, τε- [10]
θνεὸς δὲ καὶ τοῦ λέγειν παυσάμενον, ὡς ἐν Δήμοις
Εὔπολις ἔπλασε καὶ Ἀριστείδης ἐν τῷ Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεσ-
σάρων· ὅθεν καὶ εἰδωλοποιία προσαγορεύεται. προσωπο- [S 45]
ποιία δέ, ὅταν ἅπαντα πλάττηται, καὶ ἦθος καὶ πρόσω-
πον, ὥσπερ ἐποίησε Μένανδρος Ἔλεγχον· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος [15]
πρᾶγμα μέν, οὐ μὴν ἔτι καὶ πρόσωπον· ὅθεν καὶ προσω-
ποποιία προσαγορεύεται· πλάττεται γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ ἤθους
καὶ πρόσωπον.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν διαίρεσις αὕτη· τῶν δὲ ἠθοποιιῶν αἳ μέν [35.1]
εἰσι παθητικαί, αἳ δὲ ἠθικαί, αἳ δὲ μικταί. καὶ παθητι-
καὶ μὲν αἱ κατὰ πάντα πάθος σημαίνουσαι, οἷον τίνας
ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἑκάβη κειμένης τῆς Τροίας. ἠθικαὶ δὲ
αἱ μόνον ἦθος εἰσφέρουσαι, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους [5]
ἠπειρώτης ἀνὴρ πρῶτον θεασάμενος θάλασσαν. μικταὶ
δὲ αἱ τὸ συναμφότερον ἔχουσαι, καὶ ἦθος καὶ πάθος,[35]
οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ
κειμένῳ βουλευόμενος πολεμεῖν· ἦθος μὲν γὰρ ἡ βουλή,
πάθος δὲ φίλος πεσών. [10]

Ἐργάσῃ δὲ τὴν ἠθοποιίαν χαρακτῆρι σαφεῖ, συντόμῳ,
ἀνθηρῷ, ἀπολύτῳ, ἀπηλλαγμένῳ πάσης πλοκῆς τε καὶ
σχήματος. Καὶ διαιρήσεις ἀντὶ κεφαλαίων τοῖς τρισὶ
χρόνοις, ἐνεστῶτι, παρῳχηκότι καὶ μέλλοντι.

---

[34] For Aphthonius' treatment of speech-in-character, I follow the Greek text of Hugo Rabe, ed., *Aphthonii Progymnasmata* (Rhetores Graeci X; Leipzig: Teubner, 1926), 34-36. As with references to Theon, scholars traditionally document citations of Aphthonius by referring to Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 2; Leipzig: Teubner, 1854), 21-56. Because I am following Rabe's text, and because Rabe offers an alternate reference system, I will employ Rabe's system as well. Bracketed numbers refer to page and line numbers in Rabe, and [S #] indicates the relevant page number(s) in Spengel.

[35] The phrase καὶ ἦθος καὶ πάθος is not present in Spengel. Ibid., 45.12.

Ἠθοποιίας μελέτη[36]· τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους [15]
Νιόβη κειμένων τῶν παίδων.

Οἵαν ἀνθ' οἵας ἀλλάσσομαι τύχην ἅπαις ἡ πρὶν εὔ-
παις δοκοῦσα; καὶ περιέστη τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἔνδειαν καὶ
μήτηρ ἑνὸς οὐχ ὑπάρχω παιδὸς ἡ πολλῶν τοῦτο δόξασα
πρότερον. ὡς ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τεκεῖν ἢ τίκτειν εἰς [20]
δάκρυα. τῶν οὐ τεκόντων οἱ στερηθέντες εἰσὶν ἀτυχέ- [36.1]
στεροι[37]· τὸ γὰρ εἰς πεῖραν ἧκον ἀνιαρὸν εἰς ἀφαίρεσιν.

Ἀλλ' οἴμοι, παραπλησίαν ἔχω τῷ τεκόντι τὴν τύχην.
Ταντάλου προῆλθον, ὃς συνδιῃτᾶτο μὲν[38] θεοῖς, θεῶν
δὲ μετὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἐξέπιπτε, καὶ καταστᾶσα Ταντά- [5]
λου βεβαιῶ τὸ γένος τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι· συνήφθην Λητοῖ
καὶ διὰ ταύτην κακοπραγῶ καὶ τὴν ὁμιλίαν εἰς ἀφαίρε- [S 46]
σιν εἴληφα παίδων καὶ τελευτᾷ μοι πρὸς συμφορὰς
συνουσία θεοῦ. πρὶν εἰς πεῖραν ἀφικέσθαι Λητοῦς ζη-
λωτοτέρα μήτηρ ὑπῆρχον, καταστᾶσα δὲ γνώριμος ἀπορῶ [10]
γονῆς, ἣν πρὸ τῆς πείρας εἶχον εἰς πλῆθος· καὶ νῦν
ἑκατέρων παίδων κεῖταί μοι γόνος[39] καὶ θρηνεῖν ἀπορώ-
τερον, ὃ κατέστη σεμνότερον.

Ποῖ τράπωμαι; τίνων ἀνθέξομαι; ποῖος ἀρκέσει μοι
τάφος πρὸς ὅλων παίδων κειμένων ὄλεθρον; ἐπιλείπουσι [15]
πρὸς τὰς συμφορὰς αἱ τιμαί. Ἀλλὰ τί ταῦτα ὀδύρομαι,
παρὸν αἰτῆσαι θεοὺς ἑτέραν ἀλλάξασθαι φύσιν; μίαν
τῶν ἀτυχημάτων τεθέαμαι λύσιν, μεταστῆναι πρὸς τὰ
μηδὲν αἰσθανόμενα· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δέδοικα, μὴ καὶ τοῦτο
φανεῖσα μείνω δακρύουσα. [20]

---

[36] Spengel has παθητική. Ibid., 45.20.

[37] For the phrase τεκόντων οἱ στερηθέντες εἰσὶν ἀτυχέστεροι, Spengel has τεχουσῶν αἱ στερηθεῖσαί εἰσιν ἀτυχέστεραι. Ibid., 45.26-27.

[38] Spengel has τοῖς θεοῖς. Ibid., 45.29.

[39] Spengel reads γόος. Ibid., 46.5.

Translation[40]

[34.1; S 44] On Ethopoiia [ἠθοποιίας]

[34.2] Ethopoiia [ἠθοποιία] is an imitation [μίμησις] of the character [ἤθους] of an imagined [ὑποκειμένου] person [προσώπου].

[34.4] There are three different forms of this imitation: eidolopoiia [εἰδωλοποιία], prosopopoiia [προσωποποιία], and ethopoiia [ἠθοποιία]. Ethopoiia involves a known person [πρόσωπον], so only the character [ἦθος] is invented [πλαττομένη]. For this reason, it is called "character-making." For example, ethopoiia involves what words Heracles would say when Eurystheus gave a command. Here, Heracles is known, but we invent [πλαττόμεθα] the character [ἦθος] of the speaker. Eidolopoiia involves a known person [πρόσωπον], but the person has died and has ceased to speak, like Eupolis invented in his *Demoi*, and like Aristides invented in his *On Behalf* [S 45] *of the Four*. For this reason, it is called "apparition-making." Prosopopoiia is whenever everything is invented [πλάττηται], both the character [ἦθος] and the person [πρόσωπον], like Menander created Elenchos, for *elenchos* [ἔλεγχος] is a thing [πρᾶγμα] and in no way a person [πρόσωπον]. For this reason, it is called "person-making," for the person [πρόσωπον] is invented along with the character [ἤθους].

[35.1] On the one hand, this is the division [διαίρεσις]; on the other hand, some ethopoiiai are pathetical [παθητικαί], some are ethical [ἠθικαί], and some are mixed [μικταί]. Pathetical ethopoiiai are those that reveal emotion [πάθος] in everything, such as what words Hecuba would say when Troy was destroyed. Ethical ethopoiiai are those that only introduce the character [ἦθος], such as what words a man who lives inland would

[40] For additional translations, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 115-17; Patricia P. Matsen, Philip Rollinson, and Marion Sousa, eds., *Readings from Classical Rhetoric* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 266-88.

say when he beholds the sea for the first time. Mixed ethopoiiai are those that combine both character and emotion, such as what words Achilles would say about Patroclus' death while planning to go to war, for planning introduces character, and the fallen friend reveals emotion.

[35.11] You will elaborate [ἐργάσῃ] the ethopoiia in a style [χαρακτῆρι] that is clear [σαφεῖ], concise [συντόμῳ], brilliant [ἀνθηρῷ], unconstrained [ἀπολύτῳ], and freed [ἀπηλλαγμένῳ] from any inversion [πλοκῆς] or figure [σκήματος]. Also, rather than headings [κεφαλαίων], there is division [διαιρήσεις] into three times [χρόνοις]: the present [ἐνεστῶτι]; the past [παρῳχηκότι]; and, the future [μέλλοντι].[41]

Nicolaus the Sophist

Text[42]

Περὶ[43] ἠθοποιίας. [63.10; S 488]

Τινὲς μετὰ τὴν σύγκρισιν εὐθὺς τὴν ἔκφρασιν τάξαντες,
τὴν δὲ ἠθοποιίαν μετὰ τὴν θέσιν οὕτως ἔγραψαν· 'κα-
λῶς μετὰ τὴν θέσιν ἡ ἠθοποιία τέτακται· τρόπον γάρ
τινα ὁδός ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῆς θέσεως διὰ ταύτης ἐπὶ τὰς τε-
λείας ὑποθέσεις. οἷόν ἐστί τις θέσις, εἰ φιλοσοφητέον· [15]
αὕτη κατασκευάζεται δι' ὧν εἴπομεν ἐργασιῶν ἐν τοῖς
περὶ αὐτῆς λόγοις· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἠθοποιίᾳ ἐροῦμεν· γεωργὸς [S 489]
φιλοσοφεῖν τὸν υἱὸν προτρέπεται· προστεθεῖσα οὖν ἡ
τοῦ πατρὸς ποιότης οὔπω μὲν ἐποίησε τελείαν ὑπόθεσιν,
ἐπειδὴ ἔτι λείπει[44] τῇ περιστάσει, τελειοτέραν μέντοι ἔδειξεν [20]

[41] Following Aphthonius' treatment of speech-in-character, he includes a model exercise in ethopoiia, concerning "what words Niobe would say while her children lie dead." (35.15–36.20).

[42] The Greek text of Nicolaus is that of Joseph Felten, ed., *Nicolai Progymnasmata* (Rhetores Graeci XI; Leipzig: Teubner, 1913), 63-67. See also Leonardus Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 3; Leipzig: Teubner, 1856), 488-91. References to Nicolaus follow Felten's edition; bracketed numbers indicate Felten's page and line numbers. The formula [S #] denotes page numbers in Spengel's text.

[43] Spengel's text has ΟΡΟΣ. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* (vol. 3), 488.24.

[44] Spengel's edition has λείπεται. Ibid., 489.3.

ἢ κατὰ τὴν θέσιν'. καὶ οὕτω μὲν ἐκεῖνοι γεγράφασιν· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τῷ κεκρατηκότι ἕθει ἑπόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἠθο-
ποιίαν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν σύγκρισιν τιθέντες φαμέν· ἠθο- [64.1]
ποιία ἐστὶ λόγος ἁρμόζων τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἦθος ἢ πάθος ἐμφαίνων ἢ καὶ συναμφότερα. ἁρμόζων μὲν τοῖς ὑπο-
κειμένοις, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ
πρὸς ὃν λέγει. ἦθος δὲ ἢ πάθος ἢ καὶ συναμφότερα,[45] [5]
ἐπειδὴ ἢ πρὸς τὰ καθόλου τις ἀποβλέπει ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐκ περιστάσεως γενόμενον· ταύτῃ γὰρ ἦθος πάθους διαφέ-
ρει· οἷον εἰ λέγοιμεν ὅτι ποίους ἂν εἴποι λόγους δειλὸς ἐπὶ μάχην μέλλων ἐξιέναι, τοῦ καθόλου τοῖς δειλοῖς
προσόντος ἤθους φροντιοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ λέγοιμεν, ποίους [10]
ἂν εἴποι λόγους τυχὸν Ἀγαμέμνων ἑλὼν τὴν Ἴλιον, ἢ Ἀνδρομάχη πεσόντος Ἕκτορος, δώσει τὴν εὐπορίαν τὰ πάθη τὰ νῦν γενόμενα.

Τῶν δὲ ἠθοποιιῶν αἳ μέν εἰσιν ἠθικαί, αἳ δὲ [εἰσι] παθητικαί, αἳ δὲ μικταί· ἠθικαὶ μὲν καὶ παθητικαί, ἃς [15]
ἤδη ἐδηλώσαμεν, μικταὶ δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ ἀμφοῖν, οἷον ἐὰν εἴπω, ποίους ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐξιὼν ἐπὶ πόλεμον μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦ Πατρόκλου· προσθήσω γὰρ τῷ ἤθει καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πάθους καὶ μικτὴν ἐργάσομαι.

Τὴν δὲ προσωποποιίαν καλουμένην, οὖσαν σχεδὸν τὴν [20]
αὐτὴν τῇ ἠθοποιίᾳ, ἕτεροι ἑτέρως διαφέρειν αὐτῆς ἐνό-
μισαν· οἳ μὲν γὰρ προσωποποιίαν[46] ἐκάλεσαν τὴν ἔχουσαν [65.1]
ὡρισμένα καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα, ἠθοποιίαν δὲ τὴν πανταχόθεν ἀναπλαττομένην, ἣν καὶ
ῥῆσιν καλοῦσι, τοῦτο αὐτῇ τιθέντες ὄνομα· εἰσὶ δέ, οἳ
καὶ κάλλιστον ἔδοξαν, ἠθοποιίαν μὲν τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὡρι- [5]
σμένων προσώπων, προσωποποιίαν δέ, ἐν ᾗ καὶ πρόσωπα [S 490]
πλάττομεν καὶ περιτίθεμεν αὐτοῖς λόγους· ταύτην[47] δὲ μάλιστα τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἀνατιθέασιν, οἷς ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἄψυ-
χα μεταπλάττειν εἰς πρόσωπα ἐξουσία καὶ περιποιεῖν αὐτοῖς ῥήματα. [10]

Καὶ περὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν δὲ πολλῆς οὔσης τοῖς περὶ αὐτῆς διαλαμβάνουσι τῆς διαφορᾶς τὴν κρατοῦσαν δεῖ ἐκθέσθαι, ὅτι τρισὶ χρόνοις διαιρεῖται, ἐνεστῶτι, παρ-
εληλυθότι καὶ μέλλοντι· ἃ γάρ τινες ὠνόμασαν κεφάλαια[48],
ταῦτα ἐνθυμήματά εἰσι τῶν περὶ ἕνα τῶν χρόνων τού- [15]
των εὑρισκομένων. ἀρξόμεθα οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος

[45] Spengel's edition has συναμφότερον. Ibid., 489.11.

[46] Spengel records προσωποποιίαν αὐτήν. Ibid., 489.27.

[47] Spengel records ταύτα. Ibid., 490.1.

[48] Spengel records κεφάλαια ὠνόμασαν. Ibid.490.7-8.

καὶ ἀναδραμούμεθα ἐπὶ τὸν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον, εἶτα ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν ἀναστρέψομεν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα· οὐ γὰρ ἀμέσως ἥξομεν ἐπὶ τὸν μέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μνημονεύσομεν διὰ βραχέων τῶν νῦν συνεχόντων[49] καὶ οὕτως ἐξετάσομεν τὰ μέλλοντα. οἷον ἡ ἠθοποιία· ποίους ἂν εἴποι λόγους Πηλεύς, τὸν θάνατον ἀκούσας τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως· οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀναμνησθήσεται τῆς παλαιᾶς εὐδαιμονίας, ἀλλὰ πρότερον θρηνήσας τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην ἀντιπαραθήσει τὰ πάλαι αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότα ἀγαθά, τὸν γάμον τῆς θεᾶς, τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τιμήν, τὰς πολλὰς ἀριστείας, εἶτα δὲ δακρύσει τὰ νῦν, προστιθείς, οἷα ἐξ οἵων αὐτὸν περιέστηκε, καὶ οὕτως οἷον μαντεύσεται, πόσοις εἰκὸς αὐτὸν περιπεσεῖν κακοῖς δι' ἐρημίαν τοῦ βοηθήσοντος.

Χρὴ δὲ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν κομματικωτέραν εἶναι μᾶλλον καὶ οἷον πρὸς <...> ἀλλὰ[50] μὴ περιοδικῶς συμπληροῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ περὶ τὴν φράσιν καταγίνεσθαι πάθους ἀλλότριον, ἴδιον δὲ καὶ χαιρόντων καὶ θρηνούντων τὸ συντόμως καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἕτερα ἐφ' ἑτέροις ἐπάγειν. οὐ δόξει οὖν πεπονθέναι <ὁ> ἐν καιρῷ τοιούτῳ κάλλους τοῦ περὶ τὴν φράσιν ἐπιμελόμενος.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ προγύμνασμα πρὸς τὰ τρία εἴδη τῆς ῥητορικῆς χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντες ἠθοποιιῶν πολλάκις δεόμεθα· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστολικὸν ἡμᾶς γυμνάζειν χαρακτῆρα, εἴ γε καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ δεῖ τοῦ ἤθους τῶν τε ἐπιστελλόντων καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἐπιστέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν. αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστολικὸν εἴτε ὑφ' ἓν τούτων τῶν τριῶν ἀνάγεται εἴτε ὑφ' ἕτερον, οὐ τοῦ νῦν ἐστι καιροῦ σκοπεῖν, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐγκωμίων ἀρκούντως ὡς πρὸς εἰσαγωγὴν ἐλέχθη.

Προοιμίων δὲ ἐνταῦθα συνεστραμμένων, ὅπου γε μηδὲ τῆς ἄλλης φράσεως τοιαύτης χρεία, οὐ δεησόμεθα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διηγήσεων σῳζουσῶν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν—εἰ δὲ μή, λύοιτο ἂν τὸ πάθος—, οὐδὲ ἀγωνιστικὸς ἔσται ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ μόνον κινῶν τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς ἡδονὴν ἢ εἰς δάκρυα.[51]

[20] [66.1] [5] [10] [15] [67.1] [S 491] [5] [10] [15]

[49] For νῦν συνεχόντων, Spengel has ἐνεστώτων. Ibid., 490.13.

[50] Spengel records ἄλληλα. Ibid., 490.24.

[51] Spengel records δάκρυον. Ibid., 491.13.

Translation[52]

[63.10; S 488] On Ethopoiia [ἠθοποιίας]

[63.11] Some place ekphrasis [ἔκφρασιν] immediately after synkrisis [σύγκρισιν] and ethopoiia [ἠθοποιίαν] after thesis [θέσιν], and they have thusly written, "Ethopoiia has been correctly placed after thesis, for, in some sense, there is a path from thesis, through this (ethopoiia), to complete hypothesis [τελείας ὑποθέσεις]. For instance, there is a certain thesis concerning whether one should philosophize; this thesis is prepared through the elaborations [ἐργασιῶν] of which we spoke in the discussions about it (thesis). But, in an ethopoiia, we will say, [S 489] 'A farmer exhorts [προτρέπεται] his son to philosophize.' Adding the character [ποιότης] of the father did not yet make a complete hypothesis, however, since it still lacks the circumstance [περιστάσει], although it explained more completely than did the thesis itself." These are the things they have written. We, however, following in the dominant custom and placing ethopoiia [64.1] immediately after synkrisis, say, "Ethopoiia is speech suitable [ἁρμόζων] to the imagined persons [ὑποκειμένοις], exhibiting character [ἦθος] or emotion [πάθος], or both at the same time." Ethopoiia is "suitable to the imagined persons," because one must account for the speaker and the one to whom he is speaking. Ethopoiia exhibits "character or emotion, or both at the same time," because someone either focuses on general principles [τὰ καθόλου; i.e., character] or on what has happened from a given circumstance [περιστάσεως; i.e., emotions], for in this way character differs from emotion. For example, if we were to speak with respect to what words a coward would say when about to depart for battle, we will reflect on the character generally belonging to cowards. But, if we were to speak regarding what words Agamemnon would perhaps say after taking

[52] For additional English translation, see Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 164-66.

Ilium captive, or what Andromache would say when Hector fell, the emotions of the concurrent events will provide an abundance (of things to say).

[64.14] Among ethopoiiai, some are ethical [ἠθικαί], some are pathetical [παθητικαί], and some are mixed [μικταί]. Ethical and pathetical ethopoiiai are those we already clarified. Mixed ethopoiiai are those with both elements, such as if I were to speak regarding what words Achilles would say while marching out to battle after the death of Patroclus; for I will add elements of his emotions to his character and create a mixed ethopoiia.

[64.20] With respect to what is called prosopopoiia [προσωποποιίαν], though it is almost the same as ethopoiia, different writers determine to distinguish it in different ways. [65.1] For, some call prosopopoiia that which has defined [ὡρισμένα] both the persons [πρόσωπα] and the imagined subjects [τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα], but they define ethopoiia as that which is altogether invented [ἀναπλαττομένην], which they also call a "speech" [ῥῆσιν], giving this name to the same phenomenon. But those who have the best opinion think that an ethopoiia is that which begins with defined persons [ὡρισμένων προσώπων], but prosopopoiia is that in which we both [S 490] invent [πλάττομεν] the persons [πρόσωπα] and apply [περιτίθεμεν] words to them. They attribute these especially to the poets, to whom belongs the authority to transform lifeless things [ἄψυχα] into persons [πρόσωπα] and to supply words for them.

[65.11] It is also necessary to set forth the prevailing view concerning the division [διαίρεσιν] (of ethopoiia), because there is a wide difference (of opinion) among those who debate about it. That is, ethopoiia is divided [διαιρεῖται] into three times [χρόνοις]: the present [ἐνεστῶτι], the past [παρεληλυθότι], and the future [μέλλοντι]. For, what

some call headings [κεφάλαια] are enthymemes [ἐνθυμήματα] of the things discovered [εὑρισκομένων] about one of these times [χρόνων]. Therefore, we will begin from the present, and we will run back to time past, then, from there, we will return again to the present, for we will not come directly to the future, but we will briefly make mention of the present constraints, and in this way we will approximate [ἐξετάσομεν] the future. The ethopoiia regarding what words [66.1] Peleus would say when he heard about the death of Achilles serves as an example. Peleus will not immediately recall his former [παλαιᾶς] happiness, but, after first lamenting his present [παροῦσαν] fate, he will contrast it with the good that happened to him in the past [πάλαι]—marriage to a goddess, honor from the gods, and many excellent deeds. Only then will Peleus weep about the present circumstances [τὰ νῦν], adding what has surrounded him and from whence it came. In this way, Peleus will prophesy [μαντεύσεται] with respect to how many evils will likely fall against him due to the loss of one to help him in the future.

[66.9] The reported speech [ἀπαγγελίαν] should be composed with rather short [κομματικωτέραν] and natural [προσφυή[53]] phrases, but not with long periods [περιοδικῶς], for to be concerned with one's way of speaking [φράσιν] is foreign to emotion [πάθους], and it is characteristic for those who rejoice and for those who lament to bring forth concisely [συντόμως] and briefly one thing after another. Someone who takes care for the beauty [κάλλους] of his or her way of speaking [φράσιν] on such an occasion [χαιρῷ] will not seem to have suffered.

[66.16] Now, this preliminary exercise [προγύμνασμα] is useful for the three species of rhetoric [εἴδη τῆς ῥητορικῆς], for, when we speak encomiastically

[53] The manuscript tradition evinces a lacuna of roughly three letters in 66.10 as follows: πρὸς <...> ἀλλά. Felten, *Nicolai*, 66. I follow Kennedy's reading, which he attributes to D. A. Russell, of προσφυή, "natural." Kennedy, *Progymnasmata*, 166n.101.

[ἐγκωμιάζοντες], [67.1] judicially [κατηγοροῦντες], or deliberatively [συμβουλεύοντες], we often need ethopoiiai. [S 491] To me, ethopoiia also seems to exercise [γυμνάζειν] us in the style [χαρακτῆρα] of letter writing [ἐπιστολικόν], since in it one must foresee the character [ἤθους] of those sending letters and to whom they send them. Whether letter writing itself belongs under one of these three species or under another is not something to investigate at the present time, especially since enough has been said about them for an introduction in the sections on encomia.

[67.10] Here, where there is no use of any other such way of speaking, we have no need of a collection of prooimia [προοιμίων], nor of narratives [διηγήσεων] preserving a sequence of events—otherwise, the emotion [πάθος] would be lost—nor will the speech be argumentative [ἀγωνιστικός]; rather, it only moves the hearer to pleasure or to tears.

APPENDIX B

Supplemental Examples of Speech-in-Character in Paul

The following treatments of Pauline texts are considered to be supplemental to the materials discussed in Chapter Five. In each of these supplemental examples, Paul scripts speech in the mouth of an imaginary dialogue partner(s), whose identity is routinely left unspecified. As such, the reader / auditor must examine the larger context in order to identify the supposed speaker with any greater specificity. The following engagements model such examinations.

1 Corinthians 10:28

With περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰδωλοθύτων in 1 Cor 8:1, Paul engages the issue concerning whether Christians should eat meat sacrificed to idols. Paul's conclusion to this conversation in 10:23-11:1 contains speech-in-character. Paul begins the concluding pericope by quoting twice what many scholars hold to be a Corinthian slogan, "All things are permissible" (πάντα ἔξεστιν; 10:23; cf 6:12 for the addition of μοι).[1] Paul qualifies this view, however; whether or not all things are permissible, "not all things are advantageous" (συμφέρει)… "not all things edify" (οἰκοδομεῖ). That is, no one should seek his or her own concerns, but the concerns of others (10:24). Paul then provides an example of considering the concerns of others specifically related to eating sacrificial meat (10:25-30). Namely, even though it is permissible to consume anything sold in the

[1] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 108-9; Morris, *First Epistle*, 99; Barrett, *First Epistle*, 144; Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 256.

market (10:25) since all things belong to God (10:26), one must pay attention to the company with whom one eats such meat. On the one hand, if an unbeliever invites a Christian to dinner, the Christian may eat whatever is served (10:27). On the other hand, if someone indicates that the meal includes "sacrificial meat" (ἱερόθυτον), the Christian should not eat it (10:28) because of the conscience of the informant (10:28-29). Scripting the words of this informant, Paul writes in 10:28:

> ἐὰν δέ τις ὑμῖν εἴπῃ· τοῦτο ἱερόθυτόν ἐστιν, μη ἐσθίετε δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν μηνύσαντα καὶ τὴν συνείδησιν.
>
> But if someone tells you, "This is sacrificial meat," do not eat it on account of the one who informed you and [his or her (cf 10:29)] conscience.

In this way, the Corinthians can imitate Paul (11:1) by seeking the advantage of others rather than of the self.

Though the transition into another's voice is clearly marked (ἐὰν δέ τις ὑμῖν εἴπῃ; 10:28), attempting to identify the imaginary speaker is more difficult.[2] Is the imaginary speaker the unbeliever who invited the Christian to dinner in 10:27 or another person, perhaps an additional dinner guest? If the informant is not the non-Christian host, is he or she a Christian or a non-Christian? Paul simply does not overtly specify; rather, he leaves the speaker unidentified as "someone." In fact, Conzelmann suggests that the identity of the speaker is "a matter of indifference," for which "reason it will be best not to inquire too closely about the τις… We have here of course a hypothetical instance of church law."[3] By virtue of his argument, however, Conzelmann inevitably limits the identity of

[2] Without identifying this example as speech-in-character, other scholars recognize that these words are not spoken in Paul's voice. For instance, Barrett writes, "Paul here puts [the word ἱερόθυτον] on the lips of either the non-Christian host, or a fellow-guest, possibly also not a Christian." *First Epistle*, 241. Similarly, Morris, *First Epistle*, 149-50; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 177-78.

[3] Ibid., 178. Though he agrees that Conzelmann "goes too far in saying that the 'who' should not be pressed," Garland also thinks that the identity of the τις "ultimately… makes no difference." Garland, *1*

10:28's τις to a Christian, since he sees the matter of dispute specifically as a concern for the church.[4] Though Conzelmann does not argue his case in any detail, identifying the speaker as a Christian whom the meat-eating Christian should not offend seems altogether appropriate in light of Paul's agenda in 1 Corinthians to reconcile and unify the Corinthian Christian church (for example, 1 Cor 1-3; 6; 8; 11:17-34; 12-13). Moreover, a Christian speaker in 10:28 makes the best sense in light of Paul's previous discussion of "idol meat." In 1 Cor 8:7-13, Paul portrays the conflict as taking place between Christian meat eaters and those who are "weak" or have a "weak conscience" (συνείδησις… ἀσθενής, 8:7; ἀσθενέσιν, 8:9; ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος, 8:10; ὁ ἀσθενῶν, 8:11; συνείδησιν ἀσθενοῦσαν, 8:12). Paul further identifies the "weak," however, as none other than "brothers and sisters for whom Christ died" (ὁ ἀδελφὸς δι᾽ ὃν Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν; 8:11), thereby indicating that this is a dispute among Christians. When joined with Paul's overarching program in 1 Corinthians to restore the Corinthian church, the parallel emphases on the conscience (συνείδησις) of the offended person (see 8:7, 10, 12; 10:28-29) and the shared theme of sacrificed meat render the conclusion that the unspecified speaker in 10:28 represents one of the Corinthian Christians with a weak conscience

---

Corinthians, 496, 496n.13. Similarly, Hays writes, "It seems to matter little whether one interprets the identifier as a believer or not." Hays, *1 Corinthians*, 921.

[4] Mitchell also sees the issue of Christians eating meat as taking place in the church, and she summarizes the problem quite nicely. "The community is divided on this particular issue, with some saying that there is nothing wrong with eating meats which have been sacrificed to idols, and others arguing against that practice on the grounds of the prohibition of idolatry. Paul is well acquainted with the arguments on both sides, and grants concessions to each side as far as he is able." *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 237-38. Additionally, "Paul's overriding concern throughout this proof section 8:1-11:1 is *ecclesiological*." Ibid., 241, emphasis original.

highly probable.[5] In sum, though Paul technically leaves the speaker unspecified, focused exegetical spadework uncovers the most likely candidate for the speaker in 10:28.

Interestingly, Paul's characterization of the offended Corinthians as "weak" or having a "weak conscience" (8:7-13) ultimately serves as a key for identifying the

---

[5] Some scholars do, however, identify the speaker as a non-believer. For example, offering very little argument except to cite 1 Cor 10:27-29a and 10:32-33, Charles H. Talbert reads 10:28 as spoken in the voice of an unbeliever, "If an unbeliever raises a question." Talbert, *Reading Corinthians*, 81. What seems to drive Talbert's identification is Paul's comment that the Corinthian Christians should "give no offense to Jews or Greeks so they may be saved" (10:32-33). Ibid. Though Talbert concludes his argument with the "Jews and Greeks," Paul does not. Instead, Paul continues to specify that the Corinthians are not only to be without offense before Jews and Gentiles, but also "before the church of God" (τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ; 10:32). To be sure, what Talbert has omitted proves to problematize his identification of the speaker in 10:28, as it clearly includes Christians. Thus, the identification of 10:28's speaker as a Christian remains thoroughly possible and, in light of the evidence set forth above drawing connections between 1 Cor 8 and 10, to be preferred. What Paul does in 1 Cor 10:31-32, then, is to universalize what he has argued in chapters 8-10. Paul first expands the subject matter under discussion from simply eating sacrificed meat to include *anything* one eats, drinks, or even does (10:31). Second, Paul broadens the scope of the Corinthians' concern for others beyond their inner-Christian conflict to encompass not only Christians but the whole world (10:32). Very oddly, though Talbert specifically identifies 1 Cor 10:28's speaker as an unbeliever, he cites 10:27-28 on the very next page as evidence for Paul's argument that the Corinthians should "[abstain] from eating such meat if responsibility for a weaker *[brother or sister]*, probably Gentile, demands." Ibid., 82, emphasis added.

Fee also argues for a pagan speaker in 1 Cor 10:28, but he does so less by arguing *for* such a reading and more by arguing *against* a Christian identification. Like Talbert, Fee notes that "the possibility of offending non-Christians is explicitly mentioned," but, like Talbert, Fee also fails to account for the immediately following inclusion of God's church (10:28). Additionally, Fee argues that the use of the term ἱερόθυτον (10:28) instead of the Jewish-Christian term εἰδωλόθυτον suggests a pagan speaker. Fee, however, affirms that "it is possible, of course, that a person could be reverting to his/her prior pagan vocabulary." Fee thinks such a possibility "misses the fact that this is a Pauline creation, not a report of an actual event. Since Paul himself composed it so that the person speaking uses pagan terminology, it seems unlikely that he would thereby have understood the interlocutor to be a believer." Fee, *The First Epistle*, 483-84. If, however, this speaker was a "weak" Christian who thought that sacrificed meat actually imparted some connection between the consumer and the entity to which the meat was sacrificed—i.e., if the speaker indeed perceived of sacrificed meat as ἱερόθυτον rather than εἰδωλόθυτον—then such an attribution by Paul would seem all the more likely, espcially in light of the convention for speech-in-character to be appropriate in relation to the character of the speaker. For this argument, see below.

In suggesting that the speaker in 10:28 is probably the pagan host, Garland also attempts to problematize the Christian identification of the speaker. Garland writes, "Several questions make this option unlikely. Again, how does the informant know that this is idolatrous food? Did the guest nose about the kitchen beforehand or rudely make inquiries after arriving? Why would this weaker Christian be invited to, or attend, such a banquet? Their poverty, as some have classified the 'weak,' or their fuzzy scruples, as others have pigeonholed them, would have made their presence unlikely... why would a weak Christian have stayed after making this discovery?" *1 Corinthians*, 495-96. Garland's argument (questions), however, offers zero substantive evidence. Rather, Garland's attempt to discount a Christian identification of the speaker amounts to nothing more than hypothetical questions posed of the text that the text never intends to answer. Such "evidence" can only highlight what we do not know; it does not, however, make a positive argument for or against the identify of the speaker. Instead, the evidence within the text must guide interpretation, and the textual evidence suggests a "weak" Christian speaker. Again, see below.

imaginary speaker. In conjunction with being "weak," however, Paul adds some additional traits of these particular Corinthians. First, though the meat-eating group knows idols are nothing and that there is only one God (8:4), so that there is nothing special or different about food sacrificed to idols, the "weak" have concerns regarding this knowledge (8:7). Indeed, the "weak," because of past and present customs involving idols, continue to think about [meat] as if it were sacrificial food (8:8). That is, the "weak" are concerned that there is still something meaningful in the sacrifice of meat to pagan idols, such that consuming it aligns the eater with the idol or deity to whom it was sacrificed (8:8).[6] Second, though the "weak" would otherwise not eat sacrificed meat because it, in their view, constituted idolatry, their "weak conscience" (συνείδησιν ἀσθενοῦσαν) would be beaten (8:12) and they might be enticed to eat it if they saw other Christians doing so (8:10). By eating the meat, however, the "weak" stumble (8:9), are destroyed (8:11), and are scandalized (8:13).

The attributed hypothetical (ἐὰν... εἴπῃ) speech (10:28a) and Paul's advice to the meat eaters (10:28b-29) makes fine sense in light of Paul's characterization of the "weak" Christians. Though it is generally acceptable for Christians to eat meat as far as Paul is concerned (8:4; 10:25-27), some members of the community continue to view such a practice as engaging in idolatry (8:7-8), for which reason they point out that the meat is ἱερόθυτον and should be avoided (10:28). In response, Paul advises the meat eaters to forego eating meat for the sake of the informant and the informant's conscience (10:28-29). By abstaining, the meat eaters would not beat or wound the conscience of the "weak" (cf. 8:12), nor would they trip, destroy, or scandalize the "weak" (cf. 8:9, 12, 13). Rather,

[6] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 237-38. See also 1 Cor 10:14-17, where Paul makes this very claim about Christians and Christ in the Lord's Supper.

the meat eaters would imitate Paul by showing concern for others instead of focusing on the self (8:13; 10:33-11:1). In these ways, the characterization of the speaker, the identity of the (unspecified) speaker, and the attributed speech cohere with one another quite appropriately.

Thus, Paul's use of speech-in-character in 1 Cor 10:28 meets all of the primary requirements for the rhetorical figure. (1) Paul has crafted speech and scripted it in the voice of an imaginary speaker. (2) The assigned speech appropriately models the "weak" character of the speaker. (3) The assigned speech is hypothetical. (4) The three structural elements are present; Paul indicates that another person is speaking (10:28a), characterizes the imaginary speaker (8:7-13), and attributes an appropriate speech-in-character (10:28a). Finally, (5) though Paul does not overtly identify the speaker, introducing an unspecified speaker is well within the bounds of the theoretical conventions.

When considering whether Paul's use of speech-in-character in 1 Cor 10:28 appropriates any of the secondary theoretical elements of the figure, Quintilian's suggestions for the function of speech-in-character (*Inst.* 9.2.30) come to the fore. Specifically, given Paul's ongoing attempt to unify the Corinthian church by exhorting the meat eating Corinthians to consider the needs of the "weak," it is easily understandable that Paul's use of speech-in-character would serve to provide an appropriate character for this specific rhetorical situation. By introducing the concerns of the "weak," Paul creates an avenue through which he can further depict what it looks like for the meat eating Christians to consider the needs of others rather than insisting on their own freedom or rights. In this way, 1 Cor 10:28 also mirrors Theon's suggestion that

speech-in-character could be used effectively for exhortation (*Prog*. 115.20-22; 116.27-117.4).

1 Corinthians 15:35

In 1 Cor 15, Paul embarks on a lengthy conversation about resurrection. Building on the proclamation that Christ was raised (ἐγήγερται) from the dead on the third day (15:4), Paul discusses the significance of the resurrection of the body (15:12-32). Here, Paul begins by indicating that there is an issue in Corinth regarding the concept of resurrection;[7] Paul asks, "If it is proclaimed that Christ was raised from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead" (πῶς λέγουσιν ἐν ὑμῖν τινες ὅτι ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν; 15:12)?[8] To counter this sentiment, Paul presents the logical outworking of such a view. Namely, if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ was not raised (15:13, 15-16), Paul and his partners' preaching was in vain and misleading (15:14-15), and Christian πίστις and hope are worthless (15:14, 17-19).

In 15:20, Paul returns to his working assumption that Christ in fact has been raised from the dead, the results of which he also works out logically. Paul first

[7] Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 176-77.

[8] 1 Cor 15:12, therefore, would be a prime candidate for speech-in-character. What is difficult to determine, however, is whether the ὅτι functions as a marker of direct or indirect discourse. The conjunction ὅτι, of course, can indicate either direct or indirect discourse. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, §2579, 2590, 2592a; Wallace, *Greek Grammar*, 454-58; BDF, §397.5, 470.1. Most scholars read 15:12 as indirect discourse. For examples, Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 263; Barrett, *First Epistle*, 346-47; Mitchell, *Rhetoric of Reconciliation*, 176. Furthermore, with one exception, Paul elsewhere introduces speech-in-character without the use of ὅτι (refer to the other examples analyzed in this chapter). The one exception is 2 Cor 10:10 (see below). For these reasons, I tend to take 1 Cor 15:12 as indirect discourse and, therefore, not speech-in-character. If 15:12 is direct discourse, however, it would cohere relatively well with the conventions, with one alteration. (1) Paul attributes speech to some Corinthian speakers (ἐν ὑμῖν τινες). (2) The attributed speech models the (implied) character of the respective Corinthians who think there is no resurrection. (3) The speech is portrayed as having happened or happening, so it is actual speech. And, (4) there is an identification of the speaker and an appropriate attribution of speech, but the common element of characterization is only implied and left for the reader to discern (though the original Corinthian audience would have known from experience quite well about whom and what Paul was talking).

juxtaposes the resurrection and gift of life that come through Christ over against the death that comes through Adam (15:21-22). Paul then argues that Christ is the "first-fruit" (ἀπαρχή) of the resurrection, and that Christians (οἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ) will experience this resurrection at Jesus' παρουσία (15:23, cf. 15:20). Afterwards, Christ will hand the Kingdom over to God (15:24a), at which time all things, including Christ, will be subjected to God, so that God might be "all things in all" (15:24b-28). Finally, Paul appeals to the Corinthians' experience of baptism "on behalf of the dead" (15:29) and his own troubled past (15:30-32) as further confirmations of the bodily resurrection of the dead before offering an exhortation and judgment (15:33-34).

In 15:35, however, the conversation takes a slightly different direction. Paul writes:

> Ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις· πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροί; ποίῳ δὲ σώματι ἔρχονται;
>
> But someone will say, "How are the dead raised? In what kind of body are they coming?"

Having defended the reality of bodily resurrection of the dead to his satisfaction (15:12-32), Paul imagines one of the Corinthians interjecting further questions at this point in the conversation with respect to the type or form of the resurrected body.[9] The transition out of Paul's voice is clearly marked by the phrase, "But someone will say" (15:35). Though Paul leaves the speaker's identity unspecified (τις), it seems certain that this speaker represents one of the Corinthians who reject bodily resurrection. Such an identification seems best in light of Paul's attribution of similar indirect speech to them in 15:12.

[9] Conzelmann recognizes the shift in speakers to be representative of "loose diatribe style." *1 Corinthians*, 280, as does Fee, *The First Epistle*, 779; Perkins, *1 Corinthians*, 186; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 130; Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 726-27; Sampley, *1 Corinthians*, 986, but he also suggests, oddly, that this is "another example of *indirect* speech." Ibid., emphasis added. I will examine in depth the overlapping relationship between diatribe and speech-in-character in Part Two and Part Three.

Additionally, Paul's response that the speaker of 15:35 is a "fool" (ἄφρων; 15:36) strongly suggests that the speaker is someone who does not share Paul's view, just like the speakers of 15:12.[10] Consequently, the characterization of these speakers as those who reject a bodily resurrection of the dead and Paul's additional comments about them once again help the reader to identify the otherwise unspecified speaker of 15:35.

Understanding the attributed questions as objections to what Paul has previously discussed about the resurrection,[11] therefore, fits tightly with the characterization of the speaker. Since the speaker is someone who rejects the notion of bodily resurrection, it makes perfect sense that the attributed questions about the form of the resurrection body would be aimed at refuting Paul's argument; the two go hand in hand.

Paul's use of speech-in-character in 1 Cor 15:35, therefore, precisely follows the primary conventions outlined in the theoretical treatments of the figure. (1) Paul crafts and assigns speech to an imaginary speaker. (2) The assigned speech models the character of the speaker appropriately. (3) The assigned speech is hypothetical, as Paul imagines what someone would theoretically say in light of his previous discussion of resurrection. (4) The three primary elements of characterization, identification, and the attribution of speech-in-character are present. And, (5) Paul follows the convention to assign speech to an unspecified speaker.

Quintilian's list of suggested uses for speech-in-character (*Inst*. 9.2.30) appears once again in 1 Cor 15:35. Most obvious is the prescription that speech-in-character is useful for presenting the thoughts of one's opponents, given that Paul has demonstrated

---

[10] Barrett argues similarly, "The questions of verse 35 are (in view of the uncomplimentary epithet in verse 36) to be taken as objecting questions, seeking to apply a *reductio ad absurdum* to Paul's position." *First Epistle*, 369. So also Morris, *First Epistle*, 223.

[11] Ibid.

the way in which he believes the Corinthian dissenters think about the resurrection. The suggestion that speech-in-character allows one to introduce characters for specific rhetorical contexts also seems relevant, as the objections allow Paul to comment further on the resurrection, the nature of the resurrected body, and God's role in the undertaking (15:36-58).[12]

2 Corinthians 10:10

2 Corinthians 10 exposes a conflict between Paul and select Corinthians who had begun to critique Paul's self-presentation and ability to communicate (10:10), and 2 Cor 10 represents the beginning of Paul's defense. Indicating the root of the problem in 10:10, Paul writes:

> ὅτι αἱ ἐπιστολαῖ μέν, φησίν, βαρεῖαι καὶ ἰσχθραί, ἡ δὲ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενὴς καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος.
>
> "His letters," he says, "are weighty and strong, but his bodily presence is weak and his speech is contemptible."

The verb of speech, φησίν, clearly marks that the words are spoken in the voice of someone other than Paul, but Paul does not specifically identify the speaker.[13] There is confusion, however, concerning whether the verb refers to a specific individual, "he/she says," or whether one should read the verb as impersonal, "it is said."[14] In view of the

[12] So also Sampley, who argues, "Paul uses his interlocutor's queries as an occasion to reflect on two interconnected issues." Sampley, *1 Corinthians*, 986.

[13] Text critically, B lat sy record the third plural φασίν instead of the third singular φησίν. That the third singular form is to be preffered is evidenced by its better attestation and by the singular subject (ὁ τοιοῦτος) of 10:11, which must refer to the same person. Contra J. Paul Sampley, who maintains the translation, "they say." J. Paul Sampley, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections* (NIB 11; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 140. Talbert notes the diatribe style of 2 Cor 10:10. Talbert, *Reading Corinthians*, 137.

[14] BDAG, φημί 1.c; cf. Ralph P. Martin, *2 Corinthians* (WBC 40; Waco: Word Books, 1986), 311; Margaret E. Thrall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. (ICC;

literary context, it seems most likely that the verb refers to a specific person or type of person.[15] First, in 1 Cor 10:7, Paul focuses the Corinthians' attention on a specific situation, "Notice (second plural) what is before you." Paul then explains what the Corinthians are to watch for, "If someone (τις, third singular) has convinced himself that he belongs to Christ, let him remember that, as he (αὐτός) belongs to Christ, so also we belong to Christ" (10:7). In this way, Paul focuses the Corinthians' attention on a particular situation, which Paul thinks reveals a failure to understand the Kingdom and its inhabitants, and which Paul thinks the Corinthians will be able to recognize. This means that Paul is not imagining some hypothetical scenario; rather, Paul is engaging a real issue currently on the ground in Corinth, with real people advocating against him.[16] Second, Paul's remark, "Let such a person consider..." (λογιζέσθω ὁ τοιοῦτος; 10:11), further indicates that Paul has a specific person or type of person in mind, since ὁ τοιοῦτος (10:11) only makes sense if it is equivalent with the subject of φησίν (10:10).[17] Ultimately unverifiable, however, is any conclusion concerning whether Paul has in mind a specific individual (i.e., "this particular opponent says") or generally any member of the opposition (i.e., "such an opponent says"). Thus, with one adjustment, Barrett seems to be on the right track, arguing that "the multiplication of references adds to the probability that Paul has in mind a [member] of the opposition, though... others were associated with

---

2 vols.; London: T & T Clark, 2000), 629; C. K. Barrett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 260.

[15] Talbert, *Reading Corinthians*, 137-38; Frank J. Matera, *II Corinthians: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 227. Calvin J. Roetzel, *2 Corinthians* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 2007), 100.

[16] Barrett, *Second Epistle*, 260; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 629; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 311.

[17] Barrett, *Second Epistle*, 260-11; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 629-30; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 311-13.

him."[18] Again, the surrounding context assists the reader to make a reasoned identification of the speaker, even though Paul technically leaves the identity unspecified.

In terms of a specific characterization of the imagined speaker of 2 Cor 10:10, Paul offers very little. The only specific characterization Paul offers is that this person thinks he or she belongs to Christ (10:7). Otherwise, though perhaps impossible to miss, the only additional characterization is implicit. That is, the speaker of 10:10 is an opponent of Paul, and Paul's conversation with him in 10:7 and 11 demonstrate this to be the case. The attributed speech, therefore, which attacks Paul's "weak bodily presence" and "contemptible speech" (10:10), aligns nicely with the characterization of the speaker as an opponent of Paul.

Consequently, 2 Cor 10:10 represents yet another example of Paul's use of speech-in-character. (1) Paul has assigned speech to an imaginary speaker. (2) The assigned speech models the implied character of the imagined speaker. (3) The speech is portrayed as actually happening among the Corinthians. (4) The three elements of identification, characterization, and attribution of speech-in-character are present, even though the most important details of the characterization are implicit. Also, (5) Paul opts to leave the speaker's identity unspecified, which is well documented in the theoretical treatments of the exercise.[19] Additionally, Quintilian's suggestion that speech-in-character can be useful for expressing the views of one's opponents (*Inst.* 9.2.30) is

---

[18] Barrett, *Second Epistle*, 260. Barrett argued that Paul had in mind a "leader" of the opposition. Barrett's view is, of course, possible, but it is perhaps too specific, as there is no evidence to determine whether the imaginary speaker was a leader of the opposing group or simply a member of it. It seems clear, however, that the speaker was *at least* a member.

[19] Paul's decision may be influenced by the practice to leave one's opponents unnamed. Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1987), 341-48; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 630n.249.

altogether appropriate, as this is precisely what Paul has achieved by giving voice to his opponent's critique of his appearance and speaking abilities.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Texts and Translations

Aelius Aristides. *In Defence of Oratory*. Translated by C. A. Behr. Loeb Classical Library 458. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Aristotle. *The Art of Rhetoric*. Translated by J. H. Freese. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926.

Baldwin, Charles Sears. "The Elementary Exercises (ΠΡΟΓΥΜΝΑΣΜΑΤΑ) of Hermogenes." Pages 23-38 in *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400): Interpreted from Representative Works*. New York: Macmillan, 1928.

Butts, James R. "The Progymnasmata of Theon: A New Text with Translation and Commentary." Ph.D. diss., The Claremont Graduate School, 1987.

Cicero. *De Inventione; De Optimo Genere Oratorum; Topics*. Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library 386. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949.

———. *De Oratore*. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 349. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

———. *De Partitione Oratoria*. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 349. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

———. *In Catilinam*. Translated by C. MacDonald. Loeb Classical Library 324. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

———. *Pro Caelio*. Translated by R. Gardner. Loeb Classical Library 447. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Cornelius Nepos. *On Great Generals: Militiades*. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. Loeb Classical Library 467. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929.

Ctesias. *History of Persia*. Translated by Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones and James Robson, in *Ctesias'* History of Persia: *Tales of the Orient*. London: Routledge, 2010.

———. *La Perse*. Translated by Dominique Lenfant, in *Ctésias de Cnide: La Perse: L'Inde: Autres Fragments*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2004.

Demetrius. *On Style*. Translated by Doreen C. Innes. Loeb Classical Library 199. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Demosthenes. *Private Orations: Against Neaera*. Loeb Classical Library 351. Translated by A. T. Murray. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939.

Dio Chrysostom. Translated by J. W. Cohoon and L. Crosby. 5 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932-51.

Diodorus Siculus. *Library of History: Book IX-XII.40*. Loeb Classical Library 375. Translated by C. H. Oldfather. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946.

Epictetus. *Discourses.* Translated by W. A. Oldfather. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Reprint. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Gibson, Craig A., trans and ed. *Libanius' Progymnasmata: Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric*. Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Roman World 27. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008.

Hense, Otto, ed. *C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1910.

———. *Teletis reliquiae*. Tübingen: Teubner, 1889. 2nd ed., 1909.

Herodotus. *The Persian Wars*. 4 vols. Translated by A. D. Godley. Loeb Classical Library 117-120. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998-2001.

Homer. *The Iliad*. Translated by A. T. Murray. Revised by William F. Wyatt. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, reprinted 2001.

John Chrysostom. *Hom. I-XLIV in 1 Cor*. Migne, *PG* 61.9-382.

Kennedy, George A, trans and ed. *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric*. Society of Biblical Literature Writings from the Greco-Roman World 10. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Kirkstrand, Jan Frederick. *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary*. Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 11. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1976.

Livy, *History of Rome: Books 1-2*. Translated by B. O. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 114. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919.

Lutz, Cora. *Musonius Rufus, "The Roman Socrates*." Yale Classical Studies 10. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.

Maximus of Tyre. *Philosophumena*. Translated by Hermann Hobein. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910.

Menander. *The Principal Fragments*. Translated by Francis G. Allison. Loeb Classical Library. Revised. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930.

Musonius Rufus. *Reliquiae*. Translated by Otto Hense. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910.

Nadeau, Ray. "The Progymnasmata of Aphthonius in Translation." *Speech Monographs* 19 (1952): 264-85.

O'Neil, Edward, trans and ed. *Teles (the Cynic Teacher)*. Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977.

Patillon, Michel and Giancarlo Bolognesi, eds. *Aelius Theon: Progymnasmata*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2002.

Philo. Translated by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker, and R. Marcus. 12 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949-61.

Plato. *Laws: I-VI*. Loeb Classical Library 187. Translated by R. G. Bury. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Plutarch. *Lives: Aristides*. Loeb Classical Library 47. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.

———. *Moralia*. Translated by F. C. Babbit, W. Helmbold, et al. 14 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926-69.

Quintilian. *Institutio Oratoria*. Translated by Donald A Russell. 5 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Rabe, Hugo, ed. *Hermogenis Opera*. Rhetores Graeci VI. Lepizig: Teubner, 1913.

Rhetorica ad Herennium. Translated by Harry Caplan. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Seneca. *Epistulae Morales*. Translated by Richard M. Gummenre. 3 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917-25.

———. *Letter to Lucilius*. Translated by E. Phillips Barker. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932.

———. *Tragedies*. Translated by Frank Justus Miller. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960-61.

Spengel, Leonhard von, ed. *Rhetores Graeci*. 3 vols. Reprint. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966.

Suetonius. *De Grammaticus et Rhetoribus*. Edited and translated by Robert A. Kaster. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Vergil. *Aeneid I-VI*. Translated by H. Rushton Fairclough. Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann, 1916, reprinted 1930.

Romans Commentaries

Achtemeier, Paul J. *Romans*. Interpretation. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985.

Barrett, C. K. *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*. 2nd ed. Black's New Testament Commentaries. London: Black, 1957.

Barth, Karl. *The Epistle to the Romans*. Translated by D. H. van Daalen. Richmond: John Knox, 1933.

———. *A Shorter Commentary on Romans*. 2nd ed. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960.

Black, Matthew. *Romans*. 2nd ed. The New Century Bible Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989.

Bray, Gerald, ed. *Romans*. Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: New Testament 6. Downers Grove: InterVaristy, 1998.

Bruce, F. F. *The Letter of Paul to the Romans: An Introduction and Commentary*. 2nd ed. The Tyndale New Testament Commentaries. Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1985.

Byrne, Brendan. *Romans*. Sacra Pagina 6. Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1996.

Cranfield, C. E. B. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*. 2 Vols. International Critical Commentary. London: T & T Clark, 1975-79.

Dodd, C. H. *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans*. Moffatt New Testament Commentary. London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1932.

Dunn, James D. G. *Romans*. 2 vols. Word Biblical Commentary 38a – 38b. Dallas: Word Books, 1988.

Edwards, James R. *Romans*. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1992.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*. Anchor Bible 33. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, reprinted 2008.

Godet, Fredric Louis. *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans*. Translated by A. Cusin. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1886-87.

Haacker, Klaus. *Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer*. Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament 6. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2006.

Heil, John P. *Paul's Letter to the Romans: A Reader-Response Commentary*. New York: Paulist Press, 1987.

Hultgren, Arland J. *Paul's Letter to the Romans: A Commentary*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011.

Jewett, Robert. *Romans: A Commentary*. Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007.

Johnson, Luke Timothy. *Reading Romans: A Literary and Theological Commentary*. Reading the New Testament. New York: Crossroad, 1997.

Käsemann, Ernst. *Commentary on Romans*. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980.

Keck, Leander. *Romans*. Abingdon New Testament Commentaries. Nashville: Abingdon, 2005.

Keener, Craig S. *Romans: A New Covenant Commentary*. New Covenant Commentary Series. Eugene: Cascade, 2009.

Kruse, Colin G. *Paul's Letter to the Romans*. The Pillar New Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012.

Leenhardt, Franz J. *L'épitre de Saint Paul aux Romains*. Commentaire du Nouveau Testament 2. Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1995.

Lohse, Eduard. *Der Brief an die Römer*. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament 4. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003.

Matera, Frank J. *Romans*. Paideia Commentaries on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010.

Moo, Douglas J. *The Epistle to the Romans*. The New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996.

Morgan, Robert H. *Romans*. New Testament Guides. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995.

Morris, Leon. *The Epistle to the Romans*. Pillar New Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988.

Mounce, Robert H. *Romans*. The New American Commentary 27. Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1995.

Murray, John. *The Epistle to the Romans: the English Text with Introduction, Exposition and Notes*. The New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968.

Nygren, Anders. *Commentary on Romans*. Translated by Carl C. Rasmussen. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1949.

Porter, Stanley E. *The Letter to the Romans: A Linguistic and Literary Commentary*. New Testament Monographs 37. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2015.

Rhys, Howard. *The Epistle to the Romans*. New York: Macmillan, 1961.

Sanday, William, and Arthur Headlam. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*. 5th ed. International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1902.

Schreiner, Thomas R. *Romans*. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament 6. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998.

Stuhlmacher, Peter. *Paul's Letter to the Romans: A Commentary*. Translated by Scott J. Hafemann. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994.

Talbert, Charles H. *Romans*. Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary. Macon: Smyth and Helwys, 2002.

Wilckens, Ulrich. *Der Brief an die Römer*. 3rd ed. 3 Vols. Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1997.

Witherington III, Ben, with Darlene Hyatt. *Paul's Letter to the Romans: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004.

Wright, N. T. "The Letter to the Romans." Pages 393-770 in *The New Interpreter's Bible*. Vol. 10. Edited by Leander E. Keck. Nashville: Abingdon, 2002.

Zeller, Dieter. *Der Brief an die Römer*. Regensburg: Friedrick Pustet, 1985.

Ziesler, J. A. *Paul's Letter to the Romans*. London: SCM Press, 1989.

Other Works

Achtemeier, Paul J. “Romans 3:1-8: Structure and Argument.” *Anglican Theological Review* 11 (1990): 77-87.

Amato, Eugenio and Jacques Schamp, eds. Ἠθοποιία: *La representation de caracteres entre fiction scolaire et réalité vivante a l'époque imperial et tardive*. Cardo 3. Salerno: Helios, 2005.

Anderson Jr., R. Dean. *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*. Revised. Contributions to Biblical Exegesis & Theology 18.Leuven: Peeters, 1999.

———. *Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms Connected to Methods of Argumentation, Figures and Tropes, From Anaxamenes to Quintilian*. Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 24. Leuven: Peeters, 2000.

Aune, David E. *The New Testament in its Literary Environment*. Library of Early Christianity. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987.

———. “Romans as a *Logos Protreptikos*.” Pages 278-96 in *The Romans Debate*. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Revised. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991.

———. *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric*. Lousiville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003.

Baldwin, Charles Sears. *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic: Interpreted from Representative Works*. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1924, reprint 1959.

Barclay, John M. G. *Paul and the Gift*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015.

Barrett, C. K. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. Harper's New Testament Commentaries. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

———. *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. Harper's New Testament Commentaries. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

Bassler, Jouette. *Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom.* Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 59. Chico: Scholars Press, 1982.

Bates, Matthew W. *The Hermeneutics of the Apostolic Proclamation: The Center of Paul's Method of Scriptural Interpretation*. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2012.

Bauer, Walter, Frederick William Danker, W. F. Arndt, and F. W. Gingrich, eds. *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature*. 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Beker, J. Christiaan. “The Faithfulness of God and Priority of Israel in Paul's Letter to the Romans.” *Harvard Theological Review* 79 (1986): 10-16.

Betz, Hans Dieter. *2 Corinthians 8 and 9*. Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985.

———. *Galatians: A Commentary*. Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979.

Blass, F. and A. Debrunner. *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. Translated and Revised by Robert W. Funk. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.

Bonner, Stanley F. *Education in Ancient Rome: From the elder Cato to the younger Pliny*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Bornkamm, Günther. *Die Vorgeschichte des sogennanten Zweiten Korintherbriefes*. Heidelberg: Winter, 1961.

Bruce, F. F. *Commentary on Galatians*. New International Greek Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982.

Bultmann, Rudolf. *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments 13. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1910. Repr., Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1984.

Campbell, Douglas A. *The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009.

———. “Romans 1:17 – A Crux Interpretum for the ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ. Debate.” *Journal of Biblical Literature* 113.2 (1994): 265-85.

Campbell, W. S. “Romans III as a Key to the Structure and Thought of the Letter.” *Novum Testamentum* 23.1 (1983): 22-40.

Cancik, Hildegard. *Untersuchungen zu Senecas epistulae morales.* Spudasmata 18. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1976.

Capelle, Wilhelm, and Henri-Irénée Marrou. “Diatribe.” Pages 990-1009 in *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum: Sachworterbuch zur Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit der antiken Welt*. Theodor Klauser, ed. Vol. 3. Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1957.

Clark, Donald Lemen. *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1957.

Conzelmann, Hans. *1 Corinthians*. Hermeneia. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975.

Cosgrove, Charles H. “What if Some have not believed: the Occasion and Thrust of Romans 3:1-8.” *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche* 78 (1987): 90-105.

Dahl, Nils A. “Romans 3:9: Text and Meaning.” Pages 184-204 in *Paul and Paulinism: Essays in Honour of C. K. Barrett*. Edited by M. D. Hooker and S. G. Wilson. London: SPCK, 1982.

Das, A. Andrew. “The Gentile-Encoded Audience of Romans: The Church Outside the Synagogue.” Pages 29-46 in *Reading Paul’s Letter to the Romans*. Edited by Jerry L. Sumney. Resources for Biblical Study 73. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012.

———. *Solving the Romans Debate*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007.

De Boer, Martinus C. *Galatians: A Commentary*. New Testament Library. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011.

Doeve, J. W. “Some Notes with Reference to ΤΑ ΛΟΓΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ in Romans III 2.” Pages 111-23 in *Studia Paulina in honorem J. de Zwann*. Edited by J. N. Sevenster and W. C. van Unnik. Haarlem: Bohn, 1953.

Donfried, Karl P. “False Presuppositions in the Study of Romans.” Pages 102-25 in *The Romans Debate: Revised and Expanded Edition*. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991.

Donfried, Karl P, ed. *The Romans Debate: Revised and Expanded Edition*. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1991.

Dunn, James D. G. *The Epistle to the Galatians*. Black's New Testament Commentary. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993.

———. *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998.

Dunn, James D. G., ed. *Paul and the Mosaic Law*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 89. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996.

Elliott, Neil. *The Arrogance of Nations: Reading Romans in the Shadow of Empire*. Paul in Critical Contexts. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008.

———. *The Rhetoric of Romans: Argumentative Constraint and Strategy and Paul's Dialogue with Judaism*. Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement 45. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990. Repr., Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007.

Fee, Gordon D. *The First and Second Letters to the Thessalonians*. The New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009.

———. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. The New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987.

———. *Paul's Letter to the Philippians*. The New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995.

Fitzgerald, John T., Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White, eds. *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe*. Supplements to Novum Testamentum 105. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

Garland, David. *1 Corinthians*. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003.

Garroway, Joshua. "Under Sin: Finding the Antecedent for Paul's Charge in Rom 3:9b." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature. Atlanta, November 21, 2015.

Gathercole, Simon J. "A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2:14-15 Revisited." *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 85 (2002): 27-49.

———. *Where is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul's Response in Romans 1-5*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002.

Gaventa, Beverly Roberts. *First and Second Thessalonians*. Interpretation. Louisville: John Knox, 1989.

———. "God Handed Them Over." Pages 113-23 in *Our Mother St. Paul*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007.

———. "Is Pauline Theology Just a 'Guy Thing'?" Pages 63-75 in *Our Mother St. Paul*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007.

———. "On the Calling-into-Being of Israel: Romans 9:6-29." Pages 255-69 in *Between Gospel and Election*. Edited by Florian Wilk and J. Ross Wagner. *Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament* 257. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.

———. "Questions about *Nomos*, Answers about *Christos*: Romans 10:4 in Context." Forthcoming.

———. "'Where Then is Boasting?': Romans 3:27 and its Contexts." *Proceedings* (1985): 57-66.

Gibson, Craig A. "*Prosopopoeia* in the New Testament: Where should we look, and what should we expect to find?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Philadelphia, PA, November, 2005.

Gignac, Alain. "Proces de l'human ou proces de Dieu? Le jeu intertextuel entre Rm 3, 1-9 et Ps 50 (LXX)." *Revue Biblique* 112 (2005): 46-62.

Graham Jr., Michael T. "An Examination of Paul's Use of Ps 51:4 in Rom 3:4 and Its Implications on Rom 3:1-8." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature. Atlanta, November 22, 2015.

Grieb, A. Katherine. "The Righteousness of God in Romans." Pages 65-78 in *Reading Paul's Letter to the Romans*. Society of Biblical Literature Resources for Biblical Study 73. Edited by Jerry L. Sumney. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012.

Halbauer, Otto. *De Diatribis Epicteti*. Leipzig: Robert Noske Bornen, 1911.

Hall, David R. "Romans 3:1-8 Reconsidered." *New Testament Studies* 29.2 (1983): 183-97.

Hays, Richard B. *The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel's Scripture*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005.

———. "'The Gospel is the Power of God for the Gentiles Only'? A Critique of Stanley Stowers' *A Rereading of Romans*." *Critical Review of Books in Religion* 9 (1996): 27-44.

———. *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

———. *The Faith of Jesus Christ: the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11*. 2nd ed. The Biblical Resource Series. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002.

———. *The Letter to the Galatians: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections*. New Interpreters Bible 11. Nashville: Abingdon, 2000.

———. "Psalm 143 and the Logic of Rom. 3." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 99.1 (1980): 107-15.

———. "Three Dramatic Roles: The Law in Romans 3-4." Pages 151-64 in *Paul and the Mosaic Law*. Edited by James D. G. Dunn. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 89. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996. Reprinted in *The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel's Scripture*. Pages 85-100. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005.

Heath, Malcom. “Theon and the History of the Progymnasmata.” *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 43 (2002/3): 129-60.

Heinrici, Carl Friedrich Georg. *Das erste Sendschreiben des Apostel Paul an die Korinther.* Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1880.

———. *Das zweite Sendschreiben des Apostel Paulus an die Korinther*. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1887.

———. *Der litterarische Charakter der neutestamentlichen Schriften*. Leipzig: Durr, 1908.

Heusch, Christine. “Die Ethopoiie in der griechischen und lateinischen Antike: von der rhetorischen Progymnasma-Theorie zur literarischen Form.” Pages 11-33 in 'ΗΘΟΠΟΙΙΑ*: La représentation de caracteres entre fiction scolaire et réalité vivante a l'époque imperial et tardive* (edited by Eugenio Amato and Jacques Schamp; Cardo 3; Salerno: Helios, 2005).

Hirzel, Rudolf. *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch*. 2 Volumes. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1895.

Hock, Ronald F. “The Rhetoric of Romance,” pages 445-65 in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period: 330 B.C. – A. D. 400.* Edited by Stanley E. Porter. Leiden: Brill, 1997.

Hock, Ronald F., and Edward N. O’Neil. *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric: Volume I: The Progymnasmata*. Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations Series 27. Graeco-Roman Religion Series 9. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986.

Hooker, Morna D. and S. G. Wilson, eds. *Paul and Paulinism: Essays in Honour of C. K. Barrett*. London: SPCK, 1982.

Johnson, Luke Timothy. “The New Testament’s Anti-Jewish Slander and the Conventions of Ancient Polemic.” *Journal of Biblical Literature* 108.3 (1989): 419-41.

Käsemann, Ernst. “‘The Righteousness of God’ in Paul.” Pages 168-82 in *New Testament Questions of Today*. Translated by W. J. Montague. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969.

Keener, Craig S. *1-2 Corinthians*. The New Cambridge Bible Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Kennedy, George A. *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

———. *Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors*. A History of Rhetoric 3. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

———. *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Klauck, Hans-Josef. *Ancient Letters and the New Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis*. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006.

Klein, Günter. "Paul's Purpose in Writing the Epistle to the Romans." Pages 29-43 in *The Romans Debate*. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Revised. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991.

Krauss, Fritz. *Die rhetorischen Schriften Plutarchs und ihre Stellung im Plutarchischen Schriftkorpus*. Nürnberg: J. L. Stitch, 1912.

Kustas, George L. *Diatribe in Ancient Rhetorical Theory*. Protocol of the colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture 22. Berkeley: Center for Hermeneutical Studies, 1976.

Lampe, Peter. *From Paul to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003.

———. "The Roman Christians of Romans 16." Pages 216-30 in *The Romans Debate*. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Revised. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991.

Lausberg, Heinrich. *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*. Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, and David E. Orton. Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson. Leiden: Brill, 1998.

Linebaugh, Jonathan A. "Announcing the Human: Rethinking the Relationship between Wisdom of Solomon 13-15 and Romans 1:18-2:11." New Testament Studies 57.2 (2011): 214-37.

———. *God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul's Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation*. Supplements to Novum Testamentum 152. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Longenecker, Bruce W. "Different Answers to Different Issues: Israel, the Gentiles and Salvation History in Romans 9-11. *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 36 (1989): 95-123.

———. *Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11*. Journal for the Study of the New Testament, Supplement 57. Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991.

———. "*Pistis* in Romans 3.25: Neglected Evidence for the 'Faithfulness of Christ'?" *New Testament Studies* 39 (1993): 478-80.

———. "Salvation History in Galatians and the Making of a Pauline Discourse." *Journal for the Study of Paul and His Letters* 2.2 (2012): 65-87.

———. "Sharing in Their Spiritual Blessings? The Story of Israel in Galatians and Romans." Pages 58-84 in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment.* Edited by Bruce W. Longenecker. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002.

———. *The Triumph of Abraham's God: the Transformation of Identity in Galatians*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998.

Longenecker, Richard N. *Galatians*. Word Biblical Commentary 41. Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990.

Maertens, Philip. "Une etude de Rm 2.12-16." *New Testament Studies* 46.4 (2000): 504-19.

Maier, Harry O. *Picturing Paul in Empire: Imperial Image, Text and Persuasion in Colossians, Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles*. London: Bloomsbury, 2013.

Malherbe, Abraham. "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament." *Principat* 26.1 (1992): 313-20.

———. *The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*. Anchor Bible 32B. New York: Double Day, 2000.

———. "Μη Γενοιτο in the Diatribe and in Paul." *Harvard Theological Review* 73 (1980): 231-40.

———. *Social Aspects of Early Christianity*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.

Marshall, Peter. *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2.23. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1983.

Martin, Ralph P. *2 Corinthians*. Word Biblical Commentary 40. Waco: Word Books, 1986.

Martyn, J. Louis. *Galatians*. Anchor Bible 33A. New York: Doubleday, 1997.

———. *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997.

Matera, Frank J. *II Corinthians: A Commentary*. The New Testament Library. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2003.

Mitchell, Margaret M. *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians*. Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1992.

———. "Paul's Letters to Corinth: The Interpretive Intertwining of Literary and Historical Reconstruction. Pages 307-38 in *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth, Interdisciplinary Approaches*. Edited by Daniel Showalter and Steven J. Friesen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Morris, Leon. *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians*. Tyndale New Testament Commentaries 7. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980.

Myers, Alicia D. *Characterizing Jesus: A Rhetorical Analysis on the Fourth Gospel's Use of Scripture in its Presentation of Jesus*. Library of New Testament Studies 458. London: T & T Clark, 2012.

Norden, Eduard. *Die Antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Bis in die Zeit der Renaissance.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1898.

O'Brien, Peter T. *The Epistle to the Philippians*. New International Greek Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991.

Oakes, Peter. "Re-mapping the Universe: Paul and the Emperor in 1 Thessalonians and Philippians." *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 27.3 (2005): 301-22.

Palmer, Michael. "*Ti oun*: the Inferential Question in Paul's Letter to the Romans with a Proposed Reading of Romans 4:1." Pages 200-218 in *Discourse Analysis and Other Topics in Biblical Greek*. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and D. A. Carson. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995.

Perkins, Pheme. *First Corinthians*. Paideia. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012.

Pernot, Laurent. *Rhetoric in Antiquity*. Translated by W. E. Higgins. Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005.

Peterman, Gerald. *Paul's Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift Exchange and Christian Giving*. Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Piwonka, Mario Puelma. *Lucilius und Kallimachos.* Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1949.

Pogoloff, Stephen M. *Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians*. Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 134. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992.

Polster, Carol. "A Conversation Halved: Epistolary Theory in Greco-Roman Antiquity." Pages 21-51 in *Letter Writing Manuals and Instruction from Antiquity to the Present*. Edited by Carol Polster and Linda C. Mitchell. Historical and Bibliographic Studies. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007.

Porter, Stanley E. "The Argument of Romans 5: Can a Rhetorical Question Make a Difference." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 110.4 (1991): 655-77.

Porter, Stanley E., ed. *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period: 330 B.C. – A. D. 400.* Leiden: Brill, 1997.

Quarles, Charles L. "From Faith to Faith: A Fresh Examination of the Prepositional Series in Romans 1:17." *Novum Testamentum* 45 (2003): 1-21.

Rahn, Helmut. *Morphologie der antike Literatur: Eine Einführung*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-Gesellschaft, 1969.

Räisänen, Heikki. *Paul and the Law*. 2nd ed. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 29. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987.

———. "Zum Verständnis von Röm 3, 1-8." Pages 185-203 in *The Torah and Christ: Essays in German and English on the Problem of the Law in Early Christianity*. Publications of the Finnish Exegetical Society 45. Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1986.

Reichel, Georg. "*Questiones Progymnasmaticae*." Ph.D. diss., Leipzig, 1909.

Reid, Marty L. "A Consideration of the Function of Rom 1:8-15 in Light of Greco-Roman Rhetoric." *Journal of the Evangelical Theology Society* 38.2 (1995): 181-91.

Rodríguez, Rafael. *If You Call Yourself a Jew: Reappraising Paul's Letter to the Romans*. Eugene: Cascade, 2014.

Roetzel, Calvin J. *2 Corinthians*. Abingdon New Testament Commentaries. Nashville: Abingdon, 2007.

Rosenmeyer, Patricia A. *Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Sampley, J. Paul. *The First Letter to the Corinthians: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections*. The New Interpreter's Bible 10. Nashville: Abingdon, 2002.

———. *The Second Letter to the Corinthians: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections.* The New Interpreter's Bible 11. Nashville: Abingdon, 2000.

Schellenberg, Ryan S. *Rethinking Paul's Rhetorical Education: Comparative Rhetoric and 2 Corinthians 10-13*. Early Christianity and its Literature. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013.

Schmeller, Thomas. *Paulus und die "Diatribe:" Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation*. Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen 19. Münster: Aschendorff, 1987.

Schmidt, E. G. "Diatribe and Satire." *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock* 15 (1966): 507-15.

Schouler, B. "L'éthopée chez Libanios ou l'evasion esthétique." Pages 79-92 in 'ΗΘΟΠΟΙΙΑ*: La représentation de caracteres entre fiction scolaire et réalité vivante a l'époque imperial et tardive* (edited by Eugenio Amato and Jacques Schamp; Cardo 3; Salerno: Helios, 2005).

Sinko, Tadeusz. "On the So-called Cynic-Stoic Diatribe" (in Polish). *Eos* 21 (1916): 21-63.

Smith, Abraham. *The First Letter to the Thessalonians: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections*. New Interpreters Bible 11. Nashville: Abingdon, 2000.

Smyth, Herbert Weir. *Greek Grammar*. Revised by Gordon M. Messing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Song, Changwon. *Reading Romans as a Diatribe*. Studies in Biblical Literature 59. New York: Peter Lang, 2004.

Stanley, Christopher D. *Arguing with Scripture: The Rhetoric of Quotations in the Letters of Paul*. New York: T & T Clark International. 2004.

Stegemann, Willy. "Theon (5)," *PW* 5A (1934): 2036-54.

Stendahl, Krister. "Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West." Pages 78-96 in *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976.

Stowers, Stanley K. "Apostrophe, Προσωποποιια, and Paul's Rhetorical Education." Pages 351-69 in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (eds. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; NovTSup 105; Leiden: Brill, 2003).

———. "Diatribe." Pages 190-93 in *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Vol 2. Edited by David Noel Freedman. New York: Doubleday, 1992.

———. “The Diatribe.” Pages 71-83 in *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres*. Edited by David E. Aune. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988.

———. *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans*. Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 57. Chico: Society of Biblical Literature, 1981.

———. *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*. Library of Early Christianity 5. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1989.

———. “Paul’s Dialogue with a Fellow Jew in Romans 3:1-9.” *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 46 (1984): 707-22.

———. *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

———. Review of T. Schmeller, *Paulus und die ‘Diatribe’: Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation*. *Journal of Biblical Literature* 108.3 (1989): 538-40.

———. “Romans 7:7-25 as a Speech-in-Character Prosopopoiia.” Pages 180-202 in *Paul in his Hellenistic Context*. Edited by Troels Engberg-Pederson. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995.

Stuhlmacher, Peter. “The Purpose of Romans.” Pages 231-44 in *The Romans Debate*. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Revised. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991.

Talbert, Charles H. *Reading Corinthians: A Literary and Theological Commentary*. Reading the New Testament. Revised edition. Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 2002.

Thiselton, Anthony C. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text*. The New International Greek Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000.

Thorsteinsson, Runar M. *Paul's Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function and Identity in the Context of Ancient Epistolography*. Coniectanea Biblica New Testament Series 45. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 2003.

Thrall, Margaret. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians*. 2 vols. The International Critical Commentary. London: T & T Clark, 2000.

Thromm, Hermann. *Die Thesis*. Rhetorical Studies 17. Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1932.

Ticciatti, Susannah. “The Nondivisive Difference of Election: A Reading of Romans 9-11.” *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 6.2 (2012): 257-78.

Tobin, Thomas H. "Controversy and Continuity in Romans 1:18-3:20." *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 55 (1993): 298-318.

———. *Paul's Rhetoric in its Contexts: The Argument of Romans*. Peabody: Hendrickson, 2004.

Tonstad, Sigve. "The Revisionary Potential of 'Abba! Father!' in the Letters of Paul." *Andrews University Seminary Studies* 45.1 (2007): 5-18.

Usener, Herman. *Epicurea*. Berlin: Teubner, 1887.

Vouga, François. "Romains 1.18-3.20 comme narration." Pages 145-61 in *La Narration: Quand le récit deviant communication*. Edited by P. Bühler and J.-F. Habermacher. Lieux Théologiques 12. Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1988.

Wagner, J. Ross. *Heralds of the Good News: Isaiah and Paul "In Concert" in the Letter to the Romans*. Novum Testamentum Supplements 101. Leiden: Brill, 2002.

Wallace, Daniel B. *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996.

Wallach, Barbara P. "A History of the Diatribe from its Origin up to the First Century B.C. and a Study of the Influence of the Genre upon Lucretius." Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1974.

Watson, Francis. *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, London: T & T Clark, 2004.

———. *Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective*. Revised and expanded. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007.

———. "The Two Roman Congregations: Romans 14:1-15:13. Pages 203-15 in *The Romans Debate*. Edited by Karl P. Donfried. Revised. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1991.

Weber, Heinrich. *De Senecae philosophi dicendi genere Bioneo*. Marburg: Friederici Soemmering, 1895.

Weima, Jeffrey A. D. "'Peace and Security' (1 Thess 5:3): Prophetic Warning or Political Propaganda?" *New Testament Studies* 58.3 (2012): 331-59.

Weiss, Johannes. "Beiträge zur paulinischen Rhetorik," in *Theologische Studien: Bernhard Weiss ze seinem 70. Geburtstag dargebracht.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897.

———. *Der erste Korintherbrief*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910.

———. *Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908.

Welborn, L. L. "On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Ancient Politics." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 106 (1987): 83-113.

Wendland, Paul. *Die hellenistische-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum*. Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 1. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1907.

Wendland, Paul and Otto Kern. *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion*. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1895.

White, Joel R. "'Peace and Security' (1 Thessalonians 5:3): Is it Really a Roman Slogan?" *New Testament Studies* 59.3 (2013): 382-95.

White, John L. *The Apostle of God: Paul and the Promise of Abraham*. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1999.

Whittle, Sarah. *Covenant Renewal and the Consecration of the Gentiles in Romans*. Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 161. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. "Excurs 3: Der kynische Predifer Teles." Pages 292-319 in *Antigonos von Karystos*. Philologische Untersuchungen IV. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1881.

Williams, Sam K. "The 'Righteousness' of God in Romans." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 99.2 (1980): 241-90.

Winter, Bruce W. *After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001.

Witherington III, Ben. *1 and 2 Thessalonians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006.

———. *Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Galatians*. Grand Rapids: Eermans, 1998.

Wright, N. T. *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology*. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993.

———. *Paul and the Faithfulness of God: Book II*. Christian Origins and the Question of God. Vol. 4. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013.

———. “Romans 2:17-3:9: A Hidden Clue to the Meaning of Romans?” *Journal for the Study of Paul and His Letters* 2.1 (2012): 1-25.

———. “The Law in Romans 2.” Pages 131-50 in *Paul and the Mosaic Law*. Edited by James D. G. Dunn. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 89. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1996.