ABSTRACT

More than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East, a Study of Presidential Foreign Policy Rhetoric

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Announced on January 5, 1957, Eisenhower Doctrine represented a major shift in American rhetoric and policy toward the Middle East. This study performs a unique task by analyzing the specifically rhetorical significance of the Eisenhower Doctrine as it pertained to defining the relationship between the United States and the Middle East. Before Eisenhower, the Middle East was depicted in presidential rhetoric as existing outside the realm of American political or military responsibility, a precedent the Eisenhower Doctrine Address clearly broke. Eisenhower initially embraced the rhetorical strategy of his predecessors, as illuminated by his rhetoric of misdirection employed alongside Operation Ajax in Iran. Confronted by the Suez Crisis, however, Ike positioned America as an impartial and necessary arbiter in the region, anticipating the Eisenhower Doctrine. Finally, Ike's rhetorical redefinition of America's role in the Middle East was enacted to material effect during the occupation of Lebanon in 1958, cementing this shift.

More than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East, a Study of Presidential Foreign Policy Rhetoric

by

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DEDICATION

To the memory of
Drew Patrick Fowler
and
Daniel Aaron Jones

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The Middle East plays an important role in American politics, and, like many features of the modern world, the presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower influenced it greatly. Though perhaps better known for his numerous other feats—ending the Korean War, enforcing integration at Little Rock, incorporating West Germany into NATO, creating the Interstate Highway system, and, most significantly, avoiding nuclear war—Ike also oversaw a substantial expansion of America's presence in the Middle East. In a way more popularly reminiscent of his successors, Eisenhower brokered peace deals, toppled governments, formed alliances, accelerated decolonization, and deployed US military forces to Arab lands during his eight years in office. It is Ike's rhetoric which anticipated, authorized, and attended this shift in American Middle East policy which comprises the subject of this study.

Eisenhower came into office promising to prioritize the Middle East. Although the Truman administration did much to shape the region—securing the Dardanelles and Iran from Soviet interference, granting recognition to Israel, announcing the Truman Doctrine to support Greece and Turkey, and issuing the 1950 Tripartite Declaration with Britain and France—the president himself did not speak much of or seemingly devote much attention to the Middle East. This presidential inattention changed during Ike's 1952 campaign. Eisenhower told the

electorate that, in terms of pure territory, there was "no more strategically important area in the world."[1] Once appointed, his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles undertook a tour of the Middle East and announced it was "high time that the United States government paid more attention to the Near East and South Asia."[2] Moreover, Ike delivered on these promises. From the Iranian coup to the deployment of troops to Lebanon, amidst quiet support for American oil companies and an Israeli-Egyptian settlement (Project Alpha), the Eisenhower administration can be said, in the words of Steven Spiegel, to have been "the first presidency to view the Middle East as a prime region of foreign policy concern."[3] But while Ike's interest in the region was more or less unchanging, the way in which he chose to communicate the Middle East's importance to the American public shifted dramatically throughout his presidency. His rhetoric swung from totally denying and downplaying US regional involvement—declaring the Iranian shah's 1953 return to power a purely "internal" matter—to strident oratory demanding from Congress virtually unlimited authority to fight any regional threat from "International Communism"—the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine speech. And, as with all things Eisenhower, his rhetoric was replete with strategic ambiguity.

Focus of Study

The study proposed here will examine the utterances of Eisenhower and the members of his administration regarding the Middle East during the years 1952-1958 for the purpose of tracking the changing ways in which Ike articulated America's relationship to the Middle East. Undergirding my analysis is a belief in the scholarly importance of presidential rhetoric as a lens into American political

life. If, as Mary Stuckey argues, "Presidential words matter"[4] and that even "when presidents speak instrumentally, that rhetoric may still have constitutive consequences,"[5] then it is worth investigating how presidents use their power of definition to constitute certain realities for their auditors, regardless of their immediate instrumental aims. In this case, that means studying how Eisenhower's Cold War rhetoric helped change the frame by which Americans understood the Middle East. Although much of this work will be devoted to analyzing Ike's strategic use of rhetoric, the underlying aim of my thesis is to investigate how Eisenhower articulated the Middle East to the American public during a period in which the United States of America's role in the region underwent a dramatic transformation.

Like much of American foreign policy in the early Cold War, the words, actions, and rhetorical strategies I will examine here were an outgrowth of the overarching doctrine of "containment" of the Soviet Union and Communist power. The Eisenhower-Dulles team came into office asserting the need for a more robust conception of this strategy. In his famous *Life* magazine article Dulles argued that America needed to eschew the passivity of containment for an active policy of "liberation" aimed at rolling back Soviet influence in the satellite states.[6] While significantly more restrained in his rhetoric, in his first inaugural address Eisenhower also gave voice to the global need for universal liberty: "Conceiving the defense of freedom, like freedom itself, to be one and indivisible, we hold all continents and peoples in equal regard and honor. We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable."[7] America, as the exemplar of such freedom, had a special role to play in defending it

from Soviet totalitarianism. Under Ike, the containment doctrine sanctioned halting any perceived Communist expansion through the aggressive use of military and covert means.

The complex way in which this doctrine was applied and expressed to the public can be seen most clearly in the Eisenhower administration's treatment of the Middle East. The Eisenhower Doctrine speech, perhaps the clearest articulation of containment in the entire Eisenhower presidency, set forth the logic of containment in a way that was accessible to the American public and won congressional approval for a robust policy of intervention—and its subject matter was not Eastern Europe, Korea, or Southeast Asia, but the Middle East. This fact has profound ramifications, as the Eisenhower Doctrine speech fundamentally altered the way in which the region is conceived in presidential rhetoric and American political discourse more generally.

In other words, the claims I wish to prove are these: the foreign policy rhetoric of the early Cold War and Eisenhower's first years in office positioned the Middle East as a region that was important to the West but not a direct American concern. Eisenhower's rhetoric of misdirection, most clearly demonstrated in the Iran coup, worked to conceal the growing level of authority the USA was assuming in the region as its power displaced that of the British and French. When Britain and France, in coordination Israel, initiated the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower broke from this rhetorical strategy and chose instead to make a case for America's unique responsibly to maintain peace in the region. Enacting this principle, Ike then proclaimed what quickly became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, an open-

ended American commitment to active interventionism in the Middle East to prevent communism from taking root. In 1958, Ike chose to apply the Eisenhower Doctrine and intervene in Lebanon. Although observer groups in Lebanon found no evidence of Communist instigation of the conflict,[8] Eisenhower characterized the turmoil in Lebanon as Soviet-inspired and declared that the United States had a moral duty to protect the Lebanese. By announcing an American obligation for the Middle East and backing up this claim with several thousand marines, Eisenhower established an American rhetoric of responsibility for the region that has not been repudiated by any subsequent president. Since Eisenhower, the United States, not Europe, has become the regional policeman at which the buck stops.

To mitigate the considerable scope of this project, the central focus of my thesis shall consist of Ike's Suez Crisis address and the subsequent Eisenhower Doctrine speech itself, the utterances which I argue constitute a major shift in presidential rhetoric regarding the Middle East. However, limiting my analysis only to these obvious and eminently rhetorical situations would not effectively contextualize Eisenhower's rhetorical redefinition of the relationship between the United States and the Middle East. Thus, I will expand my analysis to include a prominent example of Eisenhower's rhetoric both before the Suez Crisis (Iran) and after the Eisenhower Doctrine speech (Lebanon) to better demonstrate the evolution of Ike's rhetoric throughout his presidency.

I also contend that this approach will be academically edifying. Like metaphors, themes, identity construction, or other schemata by which presidential rhetoric can be analyzed, I believe alongside Jeff Bass that the official

"interpretations" of certain regions of the world, which guide "the relationship between such regions and the…United States," are worthy of scholarly study.[9] That is, I hold that a sustained examination of presidential rhetoric on a specific subject matter, in this case America's relationship to the region known as the Middle East during the mid-1950s, will yield scholarly insight. By expanding my analytical frame to encompass more than just the Suez Crisis and the Eisenhower Doctrine speech, I hope to facilitate a more comprehensive view of the shift in presidential rhetoric concerning the Middle East that occurred under Ike.

Prior Research on Topic

The Eisenhower presidency has enjoyed something of a surge in popular interest in recent years. During the years 2011-2015 alone, new presidential biographies by Jim Newton, Evan Thomas, Paul Johnson, and Jean Edward Smith have been published on Ike.[10] In the same span, books regarding Ike's leadership, public relations, nuclear strategy, and conduct during the Suez Crisis,[11] as well as slightly older reevaluations of Eisenhower's relationship with George Marshall and his propaganda strategy, have emerged also.[12] These new accounts stand alongside seminal works of Eisenhower presidential scholarship including Stephen Ambrose's many books (most notably *Eisenhower: The President*) and Fred Greenstein's *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader.*[13] Given this level of renewed interest, it is perhaps unsurprising that Eisenhower continues to rise in the estimation of the American public at large.[14]

As far as books concerning Eisenhower and the Middle East, the list of works is equally impressive. Numerous regional history volumes discuss the Eisenhower

administration's Middle East policy, most notably Barrett's *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War*, Badeau's *The American Approach to the Arab World*, Finer's *Dulles Over Suez*, Hahn's *Caught in the Middle East*, Melanson's *Reevaluating Eisenhower*, and Spiegel's works.[15] Many other studies discuss Eisenhower's influence in Suez, Iran, Lebanon, Anglo-American relations, as well as his role in the Cold War generally. The Eisenhower Doctrine itself has been analyzed as a study of alliance politics,[16] a failed program of diplomatic action on the part of the West,[17] a case study of comprehensive policy formulation,[18] an attempt to contain Arab Nationalism,[19] the ignoble culmination of an era of American-Egyptian relations,[20] and as a precursor to intervention in Lebanon.[21] As one might expect for such a broad subject, the Eisenhower administration's Middle East policies and actions have been thoroughly documented within the fields of political science, diplomatic studies, and history.

More pertinent to my analysis, Eisenhower has also garnered significant attention from scholars of rhetoric. Martin Medhurst, whose extensive work on Eisenhower—encompassing *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic Communicator*, the edited volumes *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History* and *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership*, coauthorship of *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, and numerous journal publications including essays on Atoms for Peace and Ike's Farwell Address[22]—stands as the authority on Ike's rhetoric, especially in relation to its strategic usage. In addition to Medhurst, Philip Wander describes the ideological elements of Eisenhower's rhetoric and how Eisenhower and Dulles' "Prophetic Dualism" influenced the debate

surrounding Vietnam.[23] Robert Ivie discusses Ike's use of metaphor, Ike's "cold warrior" orientation, and argues that Eisenhower's "Quest for Peace" speech should be understood as the opening salvo of a psychological "crusade."[24] Ira Chernus focuses particularly on the ideological elements of Eisenhower's rhetoric in his books *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse* and *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* in addition to his essay analyzing Ike's peaceful utterances regarding the Soviet Union from 1945-1947.[25] Ned O'Gorman's work on the Cold War, specifically his book *Spirits of the Cold War* and his article "Eisenhower and the American Sublime," investigates the worldviews borne of Cold War discourse and how Eisenhower embraced this means of understanding the conflict; specifically, O'Gorman argues that Ike related to the public in a "priestly" way, mediating the Cold War to the electorate in such a way as to imbue the Cold War with divine meaning.[26]

Additional works on Eisenhower within the field of rhetorical studies touch on his mutual rhetorical accommodation with Khruschev,[27] rhetorical treatment of postwar Korea,[28] manipulation of the press,[29] leadership on agricultural issues,[30] and compare Ike's campaign commercials to those of Barack Obama.[31] Older analyses of Eisenhower's rhetoric within communication journals discuss his crisis[32] and campaign rhetoric.[33] Additional analyses exist within the more generalized field of Communication Studies as well.

Justification of Study

As the above list makes clear, a rich tradition of Eisenhower scholarship exists within the fields of Rhetoric, Middle East Studies, and History. What is

missing from all these accounts, however, is a work that links them; no one has yet undertaken a comprehensive rhetorical analysis of Eisenhower's rhetoric regarding the Middle East. While not intended to be exhaustive, my thesis seeks to address this gap in scholarship. As I see it, this project will make a strong contribution to the study of presidential rhetoric, Middle East Studies, and Eisenhower scholarship more generally. I will elaborate.

First, this study will contribute to the field of presidential rhetoric by providing a baseline by which scholars can compare later presidents' rhetoric on the Middle East. As Eisenhower was the first president to consistently articulate the region's overall importance to America (i.e. beyond the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict), this study will enable future scholars to better situate the *rhetorical* context of other presidents' utterances concerning the Middle East as well as better track the evolution of how presidents have articulated the nation's regional role. By doing so, it is my hope that this thesis encourages future investigations into presidential rhetoric regarding specific regions of the world, much as Denise Bostdorff's article examining Nixon's rhetoric regarding China helped inspire this analysis.[34] Like the major acts of our nation's history, the understanding Americans have of other areas of the world is necessarily selective and therefore rhetorical. As such, the constructions we have of other places, like other times, often cohere into narratives imbued with ideological and constitutive dimensions. By examining Eisenhower's rhetoric regarding the Middle East, I hope to better illuminate how the president participated as a major actor in the creation of one such narrative—and

perhaps provide other scholars a resource for their own studies of narratives surrounding the Middle East that exist in American political discourse.

Second, this study will contribute to the field of Middle East studies by approaching the events of Suez, Iran, Lebanon, and the Eisenhower Doctrine from a distinctly rhetorical perspective. While numerous scholars have examined the Eisenhower administration's Middle East policy, no one has done so from an explicitly rhetorical vantage. Rhetoric draws the critic's attention to explorations of the exigencies which give rise to rhetorical action, the rhetor's intentions and strategic choices, and the audiences he seeks to persuade. Because Eisenhower often incorporated his public utterances into larger strategic programs of psychological warfare, such an approach would seem to be well justified for almost any study of Ike's foreign policy.[35] The Middle East, as an area few Americans knew well in the 1950s, would appear to be especially apt for this kind of analysis given the outsized role Eisenhower played in shaping Americans' perception of the region. However, few have robustly analyzed how Ike *communicated* his administration's progressively interventionist policies in the Middle East to the American people, and no one has done so in a way that encompasses Ike's entire presidency and employs the range of analytical options that the rhetorical discipline offers.

Third, this study will offer a fresh perspective to ongoing conversations regarding Eisenhower and will thus be of benefit to academic and popular work on his presidency more generally. As with any major figure, the process of determining just what to make of Eisenhower is ongoing and ever-changing; what seemed important yesterday might not be today, and so new analyses are always of benefit.

This point becomes increasingly salient when one considers the important role scholarly revisionism has played regarding Eisenhower specifically. At the end of his second term, Eisenhower was widely considered to have been a passive, genteel president: "He is moved by forces," declared journalist Marquis Childs in his 1958 book *Eisenhower: Captive Hero*, "He does not undertake to move them himself."[36] Since then substantial reevaluations of Ike's time in office have been made, initially by Eisenhower himself and later by scholars such as Ambrose, Greenstein, Immerman, Medhurst, Chernus, and Osgood. By revisiting Ike's actions and rhetoric in the Middle East—and doing so from an explicitly rhetorical perspective—I hope to add to the process of Eisenhower reevaluation while addressing an important area of concern that has not garnered the attention it deserves: Ike's Middle East rhetoric.

Methodology

According to Medhurst, rhetoric is "a power that operates from history and in history to make history,"[37] and as such this study will draw from a number of sources that could be characterized as historical in nature: memoirs, biographies, diplomatic papers, intelligence briefings, cabinet meeting minutes, secondary accounts, and regional histories. However, my primary texts for analysis shall be the public utterances of Eisenhower and members of his administration regarding the Middle East during the years 1952-1958. Specifically, I shall draw heavily from texts which compose Ike's rhetoric of misdirection surrounding Iran from March until August of 1953; the Suez Canal Crisis Address of October 31, 1956; the Eisenhower Doctrine Speech of January 5, 1957; and Eisenhower's statements

regarding Lebanon given July 15, 1958, as well as Ike and his subordinates' many other statements and private remarks regarding the Middle East.

The act of rhetorical criticism is inherently subjective, and I am sure that my selection of texts will undoubtedly exclude others that some might find more pertinent for the study proposed. My aim is not to exhaustively examine every utterance of Eisenhower on the Middle East—such a project would be far beyond the scope of this project and my own ability—but rather to provide snapshots of a rhetorical transition in motion and to give a sense of what Eisenhower accomplished through his rhetoric. My central goal is to chart the changing ways in which Eisenhower redefined America's stake in the Middle East. In doing so, my aim is to insert myself as little as possible into the analysis and strive for as much objectivity as can be attained: as Edwin Black reminds us, "the critical methodology that minimizes the personal responses, peculiar tastes, and singularities of the critic will be superior to one that does not."[38] In examining the various exigencies and strategic aims which shaped Eisenhower's Middle East rhetoric, then, I wish to analyze Ike and his subordinates in light of their own contextual frame.

Outline of Study

The thesis will be divided into six chapters. The first chapter will introduce the study, discuss the study's aim, and provide an overview of the upcoming chapters. It will discuss previous studies of Eisenhower within the field of rhetorical studies and situate this thesis as a contribution to that scholarly discourse.

The second chapter will be devoted to more fully considering the work that has been done concerning the Eisenhower Doctrine and contextualizing the events

to be analyzed. It will consist of several sections. The first will be the text of the Eisenhower Doctrine speech itself. The second shall discuss the rhetorical context of the address and the Eisenhower administration's evolutionary understanding of containment. The third section will be comprised of a rhetorical analysis of the address, with the primary focus being on the domestic audiences. I will conclude the chapter by discussing how the Eisenhower Doctrine speech was not given in a vacuum but was both a historical and rhetorical development with origins beginning with the start of the Eisenhower presidency, setting up the next three chapters which will prove this claim.

Chapters Three through Five will proceed chronologically, respectively dealing with the Iran coup (Operation Ajax), the Suez Crisis, and the intervention in Lebanon. The third chapter will draw upon existing rhetorical scholarship of Eisenhower by emphasizing the rhetorical strategies which accompanied his hidden-hand leadership and penchant for clandestine intervention. Specifically, I will show how the Eisenhower administration employed the rhetoric of misdirection to downplay the nature and level of the government's activity in the Middle East. This strategy worked to mask the changing realities of power in the Middle East, namely America's assumption of the role of senior partner in the region to make up for the weaknesses of the European imperial powers. Eisenhower's rhetoric thus worked to misdirect not only the American public, but also the nation's allies insofar as they did not adjust their policies to account for this new status quo. Central to my analysis will be the concepts of polyvalence and strategic ambiguity.

The fourth chapter will deal with the Suez Crisis. I will build upon Richard Gregg's work analyzing Eisenhower's address of October 31, 1956 by showing how this speech worked to position America as the primary world power in the Middle East.[39] Drawing upon the work of Robert Ivie, Ned O'Gorman, and Edward Said, I will demonstrate in this chapter how Eisenhower gave the first comprehensive case for a uniquely American responsibility to maintain order and safeguard the Middle East independently of other powers. Whereas earlier Ike had sought to misdirect, at Suez he publicly assumed American responsibility to end the conflict and enforced the UN peace resolution even over the stringent objections of the nation's allies. By doing so, he inaugurated a new public understanding of the region.

In the fifth chapter I will investigate how Ike applied the Eisenhower Doctrine, boldly making material the rhetorical shift that had occurred in the relationship between America and the Middle East by authorizing Operation Blue Bat, an American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. In the eyes of many Arabs, after this action "It became much easier for Lebanese and Arab peoples to think and speak of the US in imperial terms."[40] My aim in this chapter will be to examine exactly how Ike employed the rhetorical resources developed over his previous years in office to provide a warrant for a major intervention in a faraway country for reasons unclear to many Americans. By authorizing and rhetorically justifying Operation Blue Bat—an operation so extreme as to be viewed as "imperial" by the native Lebanese—Eisenhower made manifest the dramatic transition that had occurred under this presidency.

The sixth chapter will be the conclusion of this study. It will recapitulate the overall arc of the study—the transformation of presidential rhetoric regarding America's relationship to the Middle East that occurred under Eisenhower—as well as the complicated legacy of the Eisenhower Doctrine. I will offer several analytical frames by which to view Eisenhower's Middle East rhetoric. And while some scholars argue that the Eisenhower Doctrine ultimately failed as a policy, I will show how the rhetorical shift it signified continued to thrive long after the Eisenhower presidency.

Many Americans came to understand the Middle East via the rhetoric of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In examining how he articulated American responsibility for the Middle East during the Cold War, I hope, in short, to provide profitable avenues for similar kinds of analyses devoted to later presidents and eras, including our own.

Notes

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35 Martin J. Medhurst, "Introduction: The Rhetorical Construction of History," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*, 11.

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37 Martin J. Medhurst, "Afterword: Rhetorical Perspectives on the Cold War" in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*, 267.

38 Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 76.

39 Richard B. Gregg, "The Rhetoric of Distancing: Eisenhower's Suez Crisis Speech, 31 October 1956," in Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 157-188.

40 Maurice Labelle, quoted by Alasdair Soussi in "Legacy of US' 1958 Lebanon Invasion," Al Jazeera English. July 15, 2013. Accessed September 8, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/201371411160525538.html.

CHAPTER TWO

Full Text of the Eisenhower Doctrine Address: January 5, 1957

First may I express to you my deep appreciation of your courtesy in giving me, at some inconvenience to yourselves, this early opportunity of addressing you on a matter I deem to be of grave importance to our country.

In my forthcoming State of the Union Message, I shall review the international situation generally. There are worldwide hopes which we can reasonably entertain, and there are worldwide responsibilities which we must carry to make certain that freedom—including our own—may be secure.

There is, however, a special situation in the Middle East which I feel I should, even now, lay before you.

Before doing so it is well to remind ourselves that our basic national objective in international affairs remains peace—a world peace based on justice. Such a peace must include all areas, all peoples of the world if it is to be enduring. There is no nation, great or small, with which we would refuse to negotiate, in mutual good faith, with patience and in the determination to secure a better understanding between us. Out of such understandings must, and eventually will, grow confidence and trust, indispensable ingredients to a program of peace and to plans for lifting from us all the burdens of expensive armaments. To promote these objectives, our government works tirelessly, day by day, month by month, year by year. But until a degree of success crowns our efforts that will assure to all nations

peaceful existence, we must, in the interests of peace itself, remain vigilant, alert and strong.

I.

The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the security of the region was largely built around their power. But since the First World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged. Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East.

The evolution to independence has in the main been a peaceful process. But the area has been often troubled. Persistent crosscurrents of distrust and fear with raids back and forth across national boundaries have brought about a high degree of instability in much of the Mid East. Just recently there have been hostilities involving Western European nations that once exercised much influence in the area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been heightened and, at times, manipulated by International Communism.

II.

Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks. The reasons are not hard to find. They

do not affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United States entertained such a thought.

The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first resort to aggression.

That statement I make solemnly and emphatically.

Neither does Russia's desire to dominate the Middle East spring from its own economic interest in the area. Russia does not appreciably use or depend upon the Suez Canal. In 1955 Soviet traffic through the Canal represented only about three fourths of 1 percent of the total. The Soviets have no need for, and could provide no market for, the petroleum resources which constitute the principal natural wealth of the area. Indeed, the Soviet Union is a substantial exporter of petroleum products.

The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East.

This region has always been the crossroads of the continents of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Suez Canal enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the commerce that is essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded and prosperous economies. The Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Africa.

It contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and

Africa. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as to production! This has been vividly demonstrated since the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipelines. Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate sources of power can, if necessary, be developed. But these cannot be considered as early prospects.

These things stress the immense importance of the Middle East. If the nations of that area should lose their independence, if they were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The free nations of Asia and Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy. And the countries of the Middle East would lose the markets upon which their economies depend. All this would have the most adverse, if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's economic life and political prospects.

Then there are other factors which transcend the material. The Middle East is the birthplace of three great religions-Moslem, Christian and Hebrew. Mecca and Jerusalem are more than places on the map. They symbolize religions which teach that the spirit has supremacy over matter and that the individual has a dignity and rights of which no despotic government can rightfully deprive him. It would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle East should be subjected to a rule that glorifies atheistic materialism.

International Communism, of course, seeks to mask its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and by superficially attractive offers of

political, economic and military aid. But any free nation, which is the subject of Soviet enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look behind the mask.

Remember Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania! In 1939 the Soviet Union entered into mutual assistance pacts with these then dependent countries; and the Soviet Foreign Minister, addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet in October 1939, solemnly and publicly declared that "we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs." Yet in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Soviet control of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe has been forcibly maintained in spite of solemn promises of a contrary intent, made during World War II.

Stalin's death brought hope that this pattern would change. And we read the pledge of the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 that the Soviet Union would follow in satellite countries "the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs." But we have just seen the subjugation of Hungary by naked armed force. In the aftermath of this Hungarian tragedy, world respect for and belief in Soviet promises have sunk to a new low. International Communism needs and seeks a recognizable success.

Thus, we have these simple and indisputable facts:

1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism.

2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends.

3. The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.

III.

Our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a protector of small nations. Its charter gives it primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Our country has given the United Nations its full support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in Egypt. The United Nations was able to bring about a cease-fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt because it was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decent respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the United Nations General Assembly. But in the case of Hungary, the situation was different. The Soviet Union vetoed action by the Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly. The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved.

IV.

Under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a nation's dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours during recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.

If the Middle East is to continue its geographic role of uniting rather than separating East and West; if its vast economic resources are to serve the well-being of the peoples there, as well as that of others; and if its cultures and religions and their shrines are to be preserved for the uplifting of the spirits of the peoples, then the United States must make more evident its willingness to support the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area.

V.

Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter

aggression, to give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world.

There have been several Executive declarations made by the United States in relation to the Middle East. There is the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, followed by the Presidential assurance of October 31, 1950, to the King of Saudi Arabia. There is the Presidential declaration of April 9, 1956, that

> the United States will within constitutional means oppose any aggression in the area. There is our Declaration of November 29, 1956, that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, or Turkey would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and the increased danger from International Communism, convince me that basic United States policy should now find expression in joint action by the Congress and the Executive. Furthermore, our joint resolve should be so couched as to make it apparent that if need be our words will be backed by action.

VI.

It is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security.

We have joined to create and support the security system of the United Nations. We have reinforced the collective security system of the United Nations by a series of collective defense arrangements. Today we have security treaties with 42 other nations which recognize that our peace and security are intertwined. We have

joined to take decisive action in relation to Greece and Turkey and in relation to Taiwan.

Thus, the United States through the joint action of the President and the Congress, or, in the case of treaties, the Senate, has manifested in many endangered areas its purpose to support free and independent governments—and peace—against external menace, notably the menace of International Communism. Thereby we have helped to maintain peace and security during a period of great danger. It is now essential that the United States should manifest through joint action of the President and the Congress our determination to assist those nations of the Mid East area, which desire that assistance.

The action which I propose would have the following features.

It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations.

The legislation now requested should not include the authorization or appropriation of funds because I believe that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal year ending June 30. I shall, however, seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of $200,000,000 to be available during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programs for the area hereafter provided for by the Congress.

VII.

This program will not solve all the problems of the Middle East. Neither does it represent the totality of our policies for the area. There are the problems of Palestine and relations between Israel and the Arab States, and the future of the Arab refugees. There is the problem of the future status of the Suez Canal. These difficulties are aggravated by International Communism, but they would exist quite apart from that threat. It is not the purpose of the legislation I propose to deal directly with these problems. The United Nations is actively concerning itself with

all these matters, and we are supporting the United Nations. The United States has made clear, notably by Secretary Dulles' address of August 26, 1955, that we are willing to do much to assist the United Nations in solving the basic problems of Palestine.

The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect. There is imperative need that any lack of power in the area should be made good, not by external or alien force, but by the increased vigor and security of the independent nations of the area.

Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against direct aggression; where the government disposes of loyal security forces, and where economic conditions are such as not to make Communism seem an attractive alternative. The program I suggest deals with all three aspects of this matter and thus with the problem of indirect aggression.

It is my hope and belief that if our purpose be proclaimed, as proposed by the requested legislation, that very fact will serve to halt any contemplated aggression. We shall have heartened the patriots who are dedicated to the independence of their nations. They will not feel that they stand alone, under the menace of great power. And I should add that patriotism is, throughout this area, a powerful sentiment. It is true that fear sometimes perverts true patriotism into fanaticism and to the acceptance of dangerous enticements from without. But if that fear can be allayed, then the climate will be more favorable to the attainment of worthy national ambitions.

And as I have indicated, it will also be necessary for us to contribute economically to strengthen those countries, or groups of countries, which have governments manifestly dedicated to the preservation of independence and resistance to subversion. Such measures will provide the greatest insurance against Communist inroads. Words alone are not enough.

VIII.

Let me refer again to the requested authority to employ the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression. Such authority would not be exercised except at the desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all.

Nothing is more necessary to assure this than that our policy with respect to the defense of the area be promptly and clearly determined and declared. Thus the United Nations and all friendly governments, and indeed governments which are not friendly, will know where we stand.

If, contrary to my hope and expectation, a situation arose which called for the military application of the policy which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would of course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and if the situation had grave implications, I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session.

In the situation now existing, the greatest risk, as is often the case, is that ambitious despots may miscalculate. If power-hungry Communists should either

falsely or correctly estimate that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they might be tempted to use open measures of armed attack. If so, that would start a chain of circumstances which would almost surely involve the United States in military action. I am convinced that the best insurance against this dangerous contingency is to make clear now our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East in ways consonant with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. I intend promptly to send a special mission to the Middle East to explain the cooperation we are prepared to give.

IX.

The policy which I outline involves certain burdens and indeed risks for the United States. Those who covet the area will not like what is proposed. Already, they are grossly distorting our purpose. However, before this Americans have seen our nation's vital interests and human freedom in jeopardy, and their fortitude and resolution have been equal to the crisis, regardless of hostile distortion of our words, motives and actions.

Indeed, the sacrifices of the American people in the cause of freedom have, even since the close of World War II, been measured in many billions of dollars and in thousands of the precious lives of our youth. These sacrifices, by which great areas of the world have been preserved to freedom, must not be thrown away.

In those momentous periods of the past, the President and the Congress have united, without partisanship, to serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free world.

The occasion has come for us to manifest again our national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep respect for the rights and independence of every nation—however great, however small. We seek not violence, but peace. To this purpose we must now devote our energies, our determination, ourselves.[1]

Notes

1 Full text taken from "President Eisenhower's Speech on the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine), 1957." Council on Foreign Relations. 2015. Accessed November 19, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/president-eisenhowers-speech-us-role-middle-east-eisenhower-doctrine-1957/p24130.

CHAPTER THREE

The Eisenhower Doctrine: A Species of Containment

The America to which Eisenhower announced his eponymous doctrine was a nation in the midst of great changes. Consumerism, manifested by the advent of popular new products like the refrigerator and television, was on the upswing. Transportation patterns were disrupted by the widespread acquisition of the automobile. Debt, as well as marital infidelity, was on the rise. The domination of Mainline Protestantism on America's public spiritual life would soon be undercut by the fiery Manhattan crusade of Billy Graham. Massive migration to the South, school integration, and a nascent feminist labor movement all signified a society on the cusp of social upheaval. The political realm was full of tumult as well. Korea and Joseph McCarthy had been weathered, only to be replaced by the frightening specter of Mutually Assured Destruction, the disintegration of the French and British colonial empires, and ICBMs. Soviet tanks in Budapest crushed any hope that communism's grip on Eastern Europe might be peacefully "rolled back," and in a few short months Sputnik would soar across the skies, taking with it the warm assurance many Americans had of their country's technological superiority.

It was in this atmosphere of transition that Dwight D. Eisenhower, on January 5, 1957, gave what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine address. More than anything, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a regionally specific articulation of the larger policy of "containment." First formulated by George Kennan in his 1946 State

Department "Long Telegram" and 1947 "X Article" in *Foreign Affairs*, Kennan's basic premises were (1) that because of internal Russian historical and ideological factors "there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*" with the Soviet Union, and therefore (2) the "Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be *contained* by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force" by the United States and its allies (emphasis mine).[1] In other words, the immutability of Soviet hostility and the prohibitive cost of overthrowing the Soviet Union combined to make limiting further Communist expansion the most prudent strategic policy option.

The contours of what exactly defined containment, as this strategy came to be called, quickly became the subject of debate amidst rapidly deteriorating relations between the United States and Russia.[2] The highly classified Clifford-Elsey report, which drew heavily from Kennan's "Long Telegram," framed the conflict as largely ideological in nature. It asserted that the Kremlin's leaders considered themselves the "defenders of the communist faith," and that

> The key to an understanding of current Soviet foreign policy, in summary, is the realization that Soviet leaders adhere to the Marxian theory of ultimate destruction of capitalist states by communist states, while at the same time they strive to postpone the inevitable conflict in order to strengthen and prepare the Soviet Union for its clash with the western democracies.[3]

This ideological alarmism—belief that the Soviets' Communist worldview made them implacably dedicated to the violent overthrow of the West—reached its apotheosis in National Security Council Report 68, better known as "NSC-68." Developed under the aegis of Paul Nitze and given to President Truman in April 1950, this document stated that the Soviet Union, as the latest of many "aspirants to

hegemony," was "animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world." Conflict between the United States and Soviet Union was therefore "endemic" and was "waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency."[4] Given this analysis, it is unsurprising that NSC-68 advocated a massive increase in defense spending to counter what its authors considered the growing Soviet threat. When Truman implemented NSC-68 in December 1950, chiefly due to the outbreak of war in Korea, the 1951 defense budget swelled from a projected $13 billion ceiling to well over $60 billion.

Although he did not disagree with the basic concept of containment, Eisenhower was horrified by these levels of expenditure. In his June 1952 speech announcing his candidacy for the presidency, Ike identified four "threats" to the "American way of life": "disunity, inflation, excessive taxation, and bureaucracy." All four threats were the fault of the Democrats, and all four were a direct outcome of Truman's bloated defense budget. In concluding his address, Eisenhower restated his desire for a more fiscally lean military: "I believe we can have peace with honor, reasonable security with national solvency."[5] To meet his goal, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles implemented a new version of containment after the 1952 presidential election. The "New Look," as their overarching defense strategy came to be called after a speech by Dulles in 1954, was designed to dramatically decrease defense spending. [6] According to John Lewis Gaddis, the New Look had four main components: (1) asymmetric response, or a dependence on full-scale atomic retaliation to deter enemy use of conventional forces, (2) reliance on

alliances, especially for manpower, (3) use of what Eisenhower called "psychological warfare," or the utilization of all colors of propaganda and public posture to discredit the Soviet regime, and (4) dramatically expanded covert operations by the CIA. The goal of this iteration of containment was "to achieve the maximum possible deterrence of communism at the minimum possible cost"[7] so that, in Eisenhower's words, "the free world can pick up this burden… and do it in a way that we don't have to abandon it" because of the "extravagant" expense.[8] Interestingly, the Eisenhower Doctrine speech more resembled NSC-68's version of containment than the New Look by pivoting away from reliance on America's allies and promising a conventional, not nuclear, response to future provocation in the Middle East.

On the surface, then, the Eisenhower Doctrine speech can be understood as simply a more specific articulation of the policy of Soviet containment that had guided American foreign policy for a decade. Just as the United States once shielded Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and Korea from Soviet ambitions of "Communizing the world," so now the United States would take responsibility for thwarting Russia's "long sought" goal "of dominating the Middle East." By announcing an intention to prevent Soviet encroachment in the Middle East, Eisenhower was attempting to cordon the region off from additional Communist influence, consistent with the overarching strategy of containment.

An interpretation of this address only focusing on containment would be limited, however, and would belie the complexity of the Eisenhower Doctrine's historic, political, and rhetorical implications. Salim Yaqub identifies one such undercurrent of the Eisenhower Doctrine in his authoritative account *Containing*

Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. Yaqub describes how in addition to Soviet containment, "the Eisenhower Doctrine also sought to contain the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and to discredit his policy of 'positive neutrality' in the Cold War, which held that Arab nations were entitled to profitable relations with both Cold War blocs."[9] Yaqub's work shows how the Eisenhower Doctrine, both as speech and policy, was a debate with the Nasserist movement over the acceptable bounds of Arab nationalism within the larger Cold War conflict.

Other studies of the Eisenhower Doctrine focus on how it affected relations between the United States and its traditional allies, Nasser's Egypt, or friendly nations in the Middle East. Much of the scholarly debate surrounding the Eisenhower Doctrine stems from divergent views as to America's intentions toward the British. Were Ike and Dulles trying to supplant London, in which case the Suez Crisis and subsequent Eisenhower Doctrine represent the ultimate success of this strategy? Or were they trying to work in cooperation with Whitehall, in which case these events were a distraction from the larger goal of sidelining radical movements whose aim was to disrupt the regional status quo? Advocates of the first view include Stephen Freiberger, Ayesha Jalal, Donald Cameron Watt, and Michael Yizhar, with Steven Spiegel arguing that America's distancing of itself from Britain and France inadvertently forced it to assume the "imperialist mantle."[10] Those who support the latter view, to which I am sympathetic, include Yaqub, Ray Takeyh, and George Raymond Salami.[11] In either case, while it is inarguable that the Eisenhower Doctrine and American Middle East policy more generally were driven by the

exigencies of the Cold War and the perceived need to prevent any Communist advances in the region, it is equally true that the policies and rhetoric advanced by the Eisenhower administration had ancillary effects beyond their original Cold War purpose.

While the above list of scholars is not meant to be exhaustive, their work does illustrate a tendency to examine the Eisenhower Doctrine through a strictly political/diplomatic lens. Even studies whose primary subject matter is the Eisenhower Doctrine itself tend to adopt this frame. They usually draw upon diplomatic cables, internal memoranda, memoirs, and correspondences to demonstrate how American interests and strategic aims evolved in the region to the extent that the Eisenhower Doctrine, as both an act of oratory and a policy, became a natural outgrowth of US diplomatic aims—or at least constituted a logical response to the supposed regional power vacuum following the Suez Crisis. These accounts offer insights such as the fact that Eisenhower oftentimes really did allow Dulles a large degree of autonomy regarding Middle East policy[12] and that Ike occasionally viewed America's relationship with Israel as a major liability.[13] While these studies ably demonstrate how policies were formulated, developed, and implemented—and what these policies meant for issues like Arab nationalism or alliance politics—they are not concerned so much with how those same policies were communicated to the American people and how that communication functioned rhetorically. That is, their focus is generally not to explain the complicated interrelationships among the rhetor, discourse, constraints, exigence, and audience or the way these texts invited their auditors to perceive themselves and their world in a certain way—the stuff of

rhetoric. But just as the Eisenhower Doctrine has special relevance for studies of Arab nationalism, so this speech also bears significance for the study of presidential rhetoric. This address not only provided one of the clearest arguments for containment in Ike's presidency, but also publicly testified to the dramatic reconfiguration of America's relationship to the postwar Middle East, a subject largely untouched—at least rhetorically—by presidents before the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Rhetorical Significance of the Eisenhower Doctrine

According to David Zarefsky, presidential rhetoric "defines political reality."[14] That is to say, the president's rhetorical power stems not from his ability to sway an opinion poll with a single speech, but rather his capacity to set the terms of the debate. The president provides names to the various phenomena that populate the political arena, like the "death tax" or a "surgical strike." By virtue of addressing an issue, the president defines a subject as political and grants it a certain degree of salience. The president frames matters under deliberation and is able to "condense" different concepts and connotations into a coherent symbol, which then possesses emotional resonance such as "nation building at home" or "leading from behind."[15] In these ways and others, presidential rhetoric functions to educate the American people and influence political discourse as a whole.

It is important, then, that Eisenhower defined the "reality" of the Middle East in a starkly new way to the American people. The Eisenhower Doctrine speech, in contradistinction to any prior presidential address regarding the Middle East, directly requested permission from Congress "to employ the armed forces of the

United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area," in order to combat "Communist armed aggression." Previous presidents addressed different exigencies in the Arab world, and did so with differing notions of responsibility to it, but none attempted to directly intervene. In doing so, they predominantly "defined" the Middle East not as an area of concern, but as an afterthought.

In fact for most of American history—outside a handful of references to Barbary Pirates, the Ottoman Empire, the Egyptian cotton market, and Christian missions—American presidents virtually ignored the Middle East. Indeed, almost all presidential rhetoric regarding the region before Eisenhower's presidency was uttered by just three executives: Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. Reviewing the way these presidents spoke about the region will better contextualize the dramatic shift that the Eisenhower Doctrine represented.

The Rhetorical Context: Pre-Eisenhower Presidential Rhetoric on the Middle East

Under Wilson, a new force emerged within presidential discourse that would virtually monopolize presidential rhetoric and policy concerning the Middle East until the Cold War: Zionism.[16] While presidential interest regarding Jewish treatment in the Middle East dated as far back as the Van Buren administration,[17] the rise of modern Zionism, coupled with the dramatic increase of the American Jewish population, gave the "Jewish Question"—whether the Jewish people constituted a nation, and if so, if that meant they were entitled to a homeland—new salience during Wilson's presidency.[18] Motivated by a combination of biblical nostalgia—"To think that I, the son of the manse, should be able to help restore the

Holy Land to its people"— and practical politics—supporting Britain, an ally in wartime—Wilson resolved this issue by expressing his agreement with Britain's "Balfour Declaration," which authorized Jewish immigration and settlement in what was now British-controlled Palestine.[19] In doing so, Wilson enshrined two norms of presidential rhetoric regarding the Middle East that would last until 1945.

First, Wilson recognized Britain's role as the dominant power in the region.[20] By sanctioning the declaration Wilson acceded to the idea that Britain legally controlled Palestine. Accepting Balfour meant that Wilson effectively conceded hegemony of the region to Whitehall,[21] which already possessed Egypt, indirectly controlled much of Persia and the Hijaz, and would soon legally rule Transjordan and Iraq as well.[22]

Second, by supporting the Balfour Declaration Wilson embraced Zionism's basic premise that a Jewish homeland should be established in Palestine.[23] A year after his endorsement of Balfour, Wilson revisited his decision in a letter to Rabbi Stephen Wise:

> I welcome an opportunity to express the satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the Zionist movement in the United States and in the allied countries since the declaration of Mr. Balfour… of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and his promise that the British Government would use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object.[24]

The idea that a Jewish national home in Palestine should be established under British supervision was never seriously questioned during the interwar years.[25] During the same period, dissenting Arab viewpoints were seldom articulated in major American publications and were ignored in presidential discourse.[26] From

1916-1945, no president publicly called into question America's backing of British rule in the Middle East or support for a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Near the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency, however, these norms began to erode. In the background, American investment in Saudi Arabian oil—and the contacts necessary to develop such endeavors—had quietly been skyrocketing from the 1930s onward.[27] Roosevelt did not bring attention to this development until his return voyage from the 1945 Yalta Conference, when—much to Churchill's chagrin—he met individually with Egypt's King Farouk I, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud while aboard the *USS Quincy*.[28] Journalists noticed that Roosevelt enjoyed Ibn Saud's company in particular, and the two "got along famously together."[29] When asked later what he thought of Ibn Saud, Roosevelt replied, "The general feeling is that the Arabs *want to be let alone*. *Do not interfere with the Arabs*. Very interesting point of view."[30] (emphasis mine). By sharing this opinion publicly and describing Ibn Saud as representative of all Arabs, Roosevelt subtly called into question British imperial legitimacy in the Middle East while distancing himself personally from such a critical stance. No matter what Roosevelt said or Churchill wanted, however, American influence was rising in the Middle East—regardless of whether the region remained within a formal British sphere of influence.[31]

Although Truman's foreign policy and rhetoric were significantly more oriented to internationalism than his predecessors, little of what he said pertained to the Middle East directly.[32] Regarding the establishment of Israel, Truman sought any way possible to avoid US responsibility (and therefore troops) for Palestine,

using interviews and speeches to constantly deny that the area had become a "strategic consideration" of the United States.[33] As an outgrowth of this policy, he consistently vocalized his support for whatever solution seemed most viable at the time, be it British rule,[34] UN partition,[35] or Israeli statehood.[36]

The closest Truman came to publicly questioning British responsibility for the Middle East occurred in his "Truman Doctrine" speech of March 12, 1947.[37] Fearing Communist expansion into Greece and Turkey, Truman went before Congress to ask for increased foreign aid for those countries.[38] Laying out his case, he argued:

> Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.
>
> The United States must supply this assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate.
>
> There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.
> No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.
>
> The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.[39]

Notice that Truman's argument for intervention—that Greece needs assistance, if Greece does not receive assistance it may cease to be a democracy, and that America is the only democratic country able and potentially willing to help Greece—is completely dependent upon *British* inability to provide such aid. Far from undermining the idea of British hegemony in the region, Truman's speech, like those before it, is presumed upon this principle; Truman began from the premise that it was Britain's responsibility to look after Greece and by implication the Eastern

Mediterranean.[40] Indeed, as Truman framed the issue to the American people, the United States was only reluctantly picking up the slack in Greece so that Whitehall could "liquidate" its "commitment" there, ostensibly to devote its newly freed resources to places it was not withdrawing from such as Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq.

Truman's presumption of British responsibility for the Middle East became even more obvious as he shifted the discussion to Turkey:

> The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.
>
> As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

Here again, the president claimed that American aid was "essential to the preservation of order," but framed the extension of aid to Turkey as being done at the behest of London. By characterizing US intervention as limited and being done in cooperation with Britain's wishes, Truman reified the belief that the Middle East was primarily a British concern.

While he affirmed British hegemony, Truman also acknowledged that London's grasp on the region was fragile—hence the need for American aid. He continued:

> It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

The ultimate reason for American intervention in Greece and Turkey, according to Truman, was to prevent "confusion and disorder"—the seedbed of Communism—

from spreading. Though he recognized that Britain's control was weakening—after all, Churchill that same year decried the "hurried scuttle" and "shameful flight" of the British Empire[41]—Truman's speech did not call for replacing the imperial status quo. Earlier drafts of the speech sought to downplay Britain's decline by describing how the winter of 1946-47 hurt the British economy, which would theoretically recuperate using Marshall Plan funds.[42] The Truman Doctrine thus publicly reinforced the presumption that America would work within the existing British imperial paradigm to contain the Communist threat to the region, not that America would underwrite the entire region's security itself. This foundational assumption was explicitly reversed in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech, marking a new rhetorical pattern in presidential rhetoric regarding the Middle East.

Eisenhower Doctrine: Textual Analysis

Lloyd Bitzer famously argued that "rhetorical discourse comes into existence as a response to a situation," and in this instance his insight is apt.[43] In the Eisenhower Doctrine speech, Ike was responding to both the immediate exigence—the risk that Nasser and the Soviets would exploit Britain's post-Suez weakness to gain influence in the Middle East—as well as to the wider exigence of a shift in the regional balance of power in America's favor. His response was to propose a joint authorization, called the Middle East Resolution, allowing him to provide increased military and economic aid as well as American troops (upon request) to friendly regimes. Eisenhower's speech can thus be read as addressing both the short-term and long-term exigencies constitutive of the situation. Moreover, this proposal was a clear rhetorical break from previously stated US policy toward the Middle East.

Examining how Ike persuasively framed his proposal to his auditors will show how he effectively adapted existing rhetorical discourse surrounding containment to argue for the extension of American influence in the Middle East.

In meeting this multifaceted rhetorical challenge, Eisenhower was addressing multiple audiences. America's European allies, who went largely unmentioned in Ike's address, constituted an audience. Soviet leaders were likewise listening, and Eisenhower likely had them in mind when he gave a not-so-veiled threat that if "power-hungry Communists" should attack the Middle East "that would start a chain of circumstances which would almost surely involve the United States in military action." To listeners in the Middle East, Ike repeatedly emphasized that it was his "profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all," and if it were, it would only be at their request. All of these audiences are important and deserving of their own study; however, for purpose of this analysis I have chosen to limit my examination to the national scene.

Domestically, Eisenhower had two primary audiences: Congress and the American people. To address these audiences, the speech functioned on two levels reflective of the dual exigencies of the situation. On my analysis, Eisenhower's persuasive strategy directed toward Congress was designed to address the immediate exigence and was deliberative in nature, while at the same time he used narrative to appeal to the American people. Examining the strategies employed for these audiences will illuminate how Eisenhower utilized the rhetoric of containment to accomplish his persuasive tasks—and how in doing so he redefined the political reality of the Middle East for the people of the United States.

Congressional Persuasion

In terms of the immediate exigence, Congress was Eisenhower's most important audience because without legislative approval a joint resolution by definition cannot be passed. Despite Eisenhower's status as a newly reelected president and demonstrable skill in foreign policy, getting the votes necessary to pass the resolution was far from a given. The Republican Party actually lost two seats in the House and failed to increase its number in the Senate during the November 1956 elections in spite of Eisenhower's crushing victory over Adlai Stevenson. The electoral verdict, therefore, was hardly an endorsement of Republican leadership as Ike faced opposition majorities in both congressional chambers eager to capitalize on Democratic gains.

In addition to partisan hostility, the Eisenhower Doctrine also had to overcome the opposition of legislators who believed the resolution would infringe upon congressional authority to oversee foreign policy. The sweeping imprecision of Eisenhower's words—"The proposed legislation is *primarily* designed to deal with the *possibility* of Communist aggression, *direct and indirect*" (emphasis mine)—could be interpreted in a variety of ways, potentially enabling Eisenhower as commander-in-chief to circumvent Congress and act however he saw fit in the region. By putting forth the resolution, Ike was claiming for himself not only the right to determine what means should be used to counter Communist aggression, but also the freedom to determine whether such aggression was occurring in the first place. Senator Fulbright, along with other Democrats, fully seized upon this proposed executive independence as a line of criticism. During deliberation over

the Eisenhower Doctrine, Fulbright went so far as to charge that the resolution amounted to a "blank check for the administration to do as it pleased with our soldiers and with our money."[44] Although they did not all agree with the specific nature of Fulbright's criticism, Senators Mike Mansfield, Wayne Morse, Richard Russell, and Hubert Humphrey all joined him in vociferously combating what a few of them called "the so-called doctrine."[45]

Anticipating (though underestimating) Democratic opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine, Ike employed three major rhetorical strategies in his address designed to allay congressional concerns. First, he repeatedly characterized the proposed resolution as an accepted foreign policy strategy with established precedent. Even as he described recent events as constituting "a special situation in the Middle East," he nonetheless argued that "It is nothing new for the President and the Congress to join to recognize that the national integrity of other free nations is directly related to our own security." To support his case, Eisenhower pointed to the ratified United Nations treaty, the Truman Doctrine, the Formosa Straits Resolution, and the "security treaties with 42 other nations" agreed to by the United States as examples of successful joint foreign policy initiatives.

The clearest precedent in recent memory for the Eisenhower Doctrine was the Formosa Straits Resolution of January 1955, which was passed by Congress at Eisenhower's behest in response to Communist Chinese shelling of Quemoy and Matsu, two Nationalist Chinese-controlled islands off the shore of Fujian province. The resolution, utilizing strategically ambiguous language, authorized the president "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary" to protect

Formosa (Taiwan) from attack.[46] By not explicitly defining whether Quemoy and Matsu were "necessary" for the defense of Chiang Kai-shek's government, Congress allowed the Eisenhower administration to threaten reprisals against the Communist Chinese while not tying itself to an untenable defense policy. Similar to the Formosa Straits Resolution, the language of the Eisenhower Doctrine also granted the president significant independence from congressional oversight—a point not lost on Fulbright and his supporters.

Importantly, Eisenhower claimed continuity not only with the Formosa Straits Resolution, but with the UN treaty and the Truman Doctrine—both major diplomatic achievements of the previous Democratic administration—as well. Ike sought to ground his argument by appealing to precedents that predated his administration. In doing so, Eisenhower framed his proposed doctrine not as an exercise in executive overreach, but as consistent with the actions of the previous Democratic administration, thereby rendering the resolution's Democratic opposition partisan and inconsistent.

Expanding upon the theme of continuity, Ike also described the Eisenhower Doctrine as a mythic perpetuation of an idealized, bipartisan American foreign policy tradition: "In those momentous periods of the past, the President and the Congress have united, without partisanship, to serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free world." By characterizing the Eisenhower Doctrine as a natural extension of America's transcendent foreign policy tradition—and one with multiple, recent precedents—Ike sought to undermine congressional objections to the Eisenhower Doctrine, or at least to color any opposition to it as acting in

disharmony with American tradition. If previous Congresses and presidential administrations could selflessly put aside their differences to serve the nation, why, Eisenhower seemed to ask, could not current congressmen and women do the same? By asking Congress to "manifest again our national unity in support of freedom," Eisenhower placed the burden of breaking that unity on his opponents.

Second, Ike framed the Eisenhower Doctrine as a necessary measure without which disaster, in the form of Communist penetration, would befall the Middle East. His persuasive strategy rested upon three premises: (1) the Middle East was a region of vital US interest, (2) that Middle Eastern nations were unstable and therefore by definition vulnerable to communism, and (3) that the United States was the only country capable of providing security (and thereby ending instability) in the Middle East.

Although Eisenhower had trumpeted the importance of the Middle East since his 1952 presidential campaign, he seldom spelled out exactly *why* it was a major interest of the United States. After all, the country's domestic oil production was enough to meet the nation's needs. America had relatively little at stake in terms of investment in the region, and no major threat to national security existed there. However, Eisenhower noted, the Middle East "contains about two thirds of the presently known oil deposits in the world," and the "nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent upon this supply." According to the alliance logic of containment then, American security in Europe was dependent upon European access to Middle Eastern oil, thus elevating the region to a status of "immense importance." In addition to oil, however, Eisenhower was quick to point out that

"there are other factors which transcend the material." He emphasized the region's significance to the Abrahamic faiths, declaring that "It would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle East should be subjected to a rule that glorifies atheistic materialism." The Middle East, for reasons of faith and economics, demanded US interest.

Eisenhower's use of what Phillip Wander calls "prophetic dualism" is apparent in these arguments. As he describes it, prophetic dualism

> divides the world into two camps. Between them there is conflict. One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will. The other acts in direct opposition… there is no middle ground. Hence neutrality may be treated as a delusion, compromise appeasement, and negotiation a call for surrender.[47]

As Ned O'Gorman has also noted, Eisenhower's dualistic bifurcation of the region elided the potentially divisive complexities of the Middle East to his American audience.[48] Economically, many countries in the Middle East were bound to Europe through relations forged through colonialism. Iran, for example, possessed virtually zero control over the oil production of the oil plant at Abadan. Thus, although Eisenhower claimed disaster would strike if the Soviets took over the region, those nations were in a sense "dominated by alien forces" alreadyc even if they were engaging in capitalistic trade with Europe. Religiously, there existed powerful antagonisms between Muslims and Jews and growing divisions between Christians and Muslims. Eisenhower's dualistic rhetoric, borrowed from containment discourse, worked to flatten these distinctions. By dividing the region between economically free nations and the unfree Communists, between religious peoples and the Soviet atheists, Eisenhower presented to Congress a Middle East that was

important to America and that shared her moral orientation. He depicted a region that was in America's camp, in a sense, and therefore it was in America's interest to keep the Middle East on her side. In this way Ike's rhetoric worked to portray the Middle East as a region worthy of major American concern.

One of Eisenhower's most consistent rhetorical themes regarding the Middle East was to portray it as a region gripped by insecurity, and this address was no exception. He declared there to be "Persistent crosscurrents of distrust and fear" bringing about "a high degree of instability in much of the MidEast." While he blamed this state of affairs mostly on "hostilities involving Western European nations" and "the relatively large attack by Israel in October," Eisenhower made sure to emphasize that the unrest generated by these conflicts made the region susceptible to being "manipulated by International Communism." Indeed, Ike edited the card from which he read the speech to emphasize that the Soviets "soon" hoped to dominate the Middle East, adding urgency to the situation.[49] These claims from Eisenhower echoed and built upon earlier arguments made by Truman and George Marshall. The Truman Doctrine address described how rule by an "armed minority" (Communists) was productive of "Confusion and disorder," and in his Harvard address unveiling the plan soon to be named after him Marshall declared that without economic aid there could be "no political stability" and therefore "no assured peace" in Europe.[50] By invoking the established Cold War *topos* of equating a nation's instability to its defenselessness before communism, Eisenhower depicted the Middle East as an insecure region where containment was under threat.

Because no middle ground existed, to not provide stabilizing aid to these countries was, according to Eisenhower's dualistic Cold War logic, to invite a Soviet takeover. As Dulles had testified before a closed session of the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations three days prior to Eisenhower's speech, the administration believed that the Arab nations would "almost certainly be taken over by Soviet communism" without an American assurance of security to replace that of the British.[51] To Dulles and Ike it was axiomatic that when the "free world" retreated, "International Communism" advanced. Furthermore, as Ira Chernus notes, stability became an ideal worthy of pursuit in and of itself during the Eisenhower administration.[52] Thus, the question to be asked was not *whether* such aid should be provided, but *who* would provide it. Glibly ignoring any reference to the imperial security paradigm that had just collapsed at Suez, Eisenhower explained why the United Nations was not fit to fulfill its role as the "protector of small nations." Referencing the recent Soviet crackdown in Hungary, Eisenhower warned that "The United Nations… cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved." Because the Soviets showed "callous indifference" to world opinion in Budapest, in accordance with their exposited nature as an atheistic totalitarian regime, the only party capable of protecting the Middle East was the United States, upon whom "a great responsibility now devolves." Like Truman in 1947, Eisenhower depicted America as the only country capable of providing needed aid to an unstable region. This time the entire Middle East was in play, however, not just Greece and Turkey.

Eisenhower's third rhetorical strategy to dispel congressional criticism was to emphasize his trustworthiness. As Martin J. Medhurst and others attest, Eisenhower often relied upon his formidable ethos when making rhetorical appeals regarding foreign policy. He did so throughout the 1952 and 1956 campaigns, promising to "go to Korea" and reminding voters that he "kept the peace."[53] He employed this tactic again in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech, repeatedly assuring Congress that he could be trusted with the level of autonomy for which he was asking. Promising he would not abuse his power, Eisenhower said, "I would of course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress" if a "situation arose which called for the military application of the Eisenhower Doctrine." "And if the Congress were not in session," he continued, "I would, of course, at once call the Congress into special session." Clearly, Eisenhower's repeated reassurances that he would not abuse the Eisenhower Doctrine relied upon his reputation as a moral and trustworthy figure. If Ike was honest—and the American people (including most Democrats) thought he was—then his promise to work closely with Congress worked to negate any accusations of executive overreach. To dispute him on this count would be tantamount to calling him a liar and in effect calling the majority of Americans who reelected him bad judges of character.[54] Ike, as he often did, selectively and strategically invoked his ethos.

These appeals—framing the Middle East Resolution as consistent with prior US foreign policy, characterizing intervention as necessary, and emphasizing Eisenhower's trustworthy ethos—were structured to support a specific deliberative action: passing the Middle East Resolution. As such, their primary audience was

Congress, and they were utilized by Eisenhower to respond to the immediate exigence of preventing an increase of Communist influence in the Middle East. In addition to these appeals, however, Eisenhower also animated his address with persuasive devices designed for the American public, whose support was needed for the long-term viability of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Public Persuasion: Narrative Construction

Eisenhower's address also sought to influence the American people. While many of the strategies he used for one audience applied to the other as well—after all, legislators must heed their constituents—Ike had much more work to do with the public. Unlike Congress, the American people were not privy to closed-door briefings on the Middle East from Foster Dulles or his brother Allen. Until the Suez Crisis, the Middle East had not registered as a major concern for most Americans, and media coverage of the region was less extensive than that of say, Europe or East Asia. Thus, Ike's goal in addressing the American public was not to convince them to take a specific action—they were not a deliberative body anyway—but to explain to them that the Middle East was now an American responsibility and thereby build the long-term support necessary for sustained engagement in the region.

To do so, Eisenhower relied upon the use of narrative. Narrative is a uniquely powerful rhetorical tool for its ability to constitute a comprehensive reality for auditors.[55] As Walter Fisher, arguing for the primacy of the narrative paradigm, holds, "symbols are created and communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to human experience and to induce others to dwell in them."[56] Eisenhower, by utilizing narrative, imposed order upon a complicated situation and invited his

auditors to embrace his structuring of the "world" of the Middle East. In doing so, he drew heavily upon the rhetoric of containment to explain why America was obliged to underwrite the region's security.

Ike began his narrative by setting the stage. He described how "since the First World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government" in the Middle East, and how the United States "welcomed and encouraged" this development. This simplified story obfuscated the complexities of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, British imperialism, Zionism, nationalism, and Nasserism in shaping the region by instituting a unidimensional reading of the Middle East—as a collection of peoples moving toward independent rule. However, as described above, the region was "troubled" by "instability," for freedom opened the path to power for communist (or communist-sympathetic) actors. Eisenhower depicted a perilous, uncertain state of affairs in the Middle East.

He then highlighted the threat: "Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East…. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East." In Eisenhower's telling, the Soviet Union's motivation for taking over the Middle East was self-evident; both as Russians and as Communists they simply desired to rule the region. Moreover, because they did not need Arab oil or the Suez Canal, their interest was "solely that of power politics." As evidence for this characterization of the Soviets, Eisenhower alluded to three events as examples of their treachery: the forceful incorporation of the Baltic States into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Soviet occupation of the satellite states despite the Yalta agreement, and the "subjugation

of Hungary by naked armed force." These events, particularly Yalta, were seen by many Americans as examples of Soviet perfidy. Although Eisenhower and Dulles never unequivocally denounced the Yalta agreement,[57] many Americans embraced the late Senator Taft's interpretation that Roosevelt and Truman's "wrong-headed policies" led them to accept "all Stalin's promises," which he subsequently violated by occupying Eastern Europe.[58] Eisenhower's narrative alluded to this reading of history, establishing the Soviet Union as not only dangerous, but deviously so.

With the threat identified, Eisenhower then posited the problem: "The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence." By using the moniker "free" to describe these countries, Ike defined them as belonging to America's side of the dualistic system; additionally, these nations already existed in a state of independence, implying that they feely chose to caucus with the West. Eisenhower positioned "International Communism" as therefore seeking to alter the status quo, designating any action taken to assist the Middle East in thwarting this plan as inherently defensive in nature. The average American listening to the address likely heard an equivalency being made—the Middle East was free soil, and just like the free lands of Europe, Korea, and Turkey, it must be kept safe from communism.

Like the appeal to Congress, the overall narrative of Ike's speech led to a certain conclusion: the Middle East *must* receive help in its resistance of communism. Again Eisenhower completely ignored the fact that this role had until two months prior been predominantly played by Britain, avoiding uncomfortable questions of whether the United States was playing a game of imperial succession.

His narrative posited only the UN Security Council as a possible alternative protector of the region, which "cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom" due to Soviet veto power. Thus was no one was left but America. But would the United States answer the call? Ike left the ending of the narrative open, likely knowing that any sustainable answer to the affirmative required enduring public support.

Eisenhower used three strategies to encourage the American populace to positively answer his call. First, he described America as merely acting in the place of the United Nations in a place the United Nations could not act. He informed his audience that

> the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth.

The United States was not going into the Middle East for "political or economic domination" of the region. Its presence was a means by which its Middle Eastern friends could realize their own spiritual, political, and economic aims, which happened to coincide exactly with the goals of the United Nations. America was positioned as a UN surrogate, the friend of small nations. Eisenhower thus rhetorically linked his proposal to Roosevelt's metaphor of the "good neighbor."[59] This idea, that the American "resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others," extended the idea of equality to the international stage and continues to be a powerful rhetorical current in US foreign policy discourse.[60]

Second, Ike cited numerous precedents of US activity in the region: the 1950 Tripartite Declaration (which was secretly broken by France), presidential declarations given on April 9 and November 29, 1956, and a 1950 presidential assurance to Saudi Arabia. Of note is that all of these cited precedents were *rhetorical* in nature—in none of the given instances did the United States *act* in a significant way. Thus Eisenhower located the Middle East Resolution as a continuation of these prior rhetorical interventions in the Middle East, despite the fact that the resolution explicitly authorized him to mobilize military and economic forces. Indeed, he characterized the Eisenhower Doctrine as a rhetorical solution—providing assurance to Arab allies—to what he effectively characterized as a rhetorical problem—insecurity on the part of our allies.[61] Eisenhower's framing of the conflict as eminently rhetorical is apparent throughout the address (emphases mine):

- "… our joint resolve should be so couched as to make it apparent that *if need be* our words will be backed by action."
- "… it is my profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all…"
- "Nothing is more necessary… than that our policy with respect to the defense of the area be promptly and clearly determined and *declared*. Thus the United Nations and all friendly governments, and indeed governments who are not friendly, *will know where we stand*."
- "It is now essential that the United States should *manifest* through joint action… *our determination to assist* those nations of the Mid East area, *which desire that assistance*."
- "… I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the *reassurance* needed to deter aggression…"

By classifying his proposal as rhetorical in nature, Ike downplayed the possibility that it might require an actual investment of US blood and treasure; such a framing of the Eisenhower Doctrine was likely essential to gain the support of a public so

recently frustrated by the stalemate of the Korean War. It was literally, he claimed, a war of words.

Third, Ike concluded his address by asserting that the Eisenhower Doctrine was a step consistent with American belief in freedom and willingness to sacrifice for it. He declared that Americans had before seen "human freedom in jeopardy, and their fortitude and resolution have been equal to the crisis." He invoked the sacrifices of World War II, "by which great areas of the world have been preserved to freedom" a prize he insisted "must not be thrown away." And thus, Eisenhower finished, "The occasion has come for us to manifest again our national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep respect for the rights and independence of every nation—however great, however small." By identifying his proposed resolution with the promotion of freedom, Eisenhower appealed to one of the deepest of American ideals—and one made all the more salient by the Cold War context.

These three rhetorical strategies, when viewed from the public vantage, were designed less for a deliberative debate than for a project of conversion. Ike sought to instill the belief in the American people that US intervention in the Middle East was consistent with the essence of American identity, that this action was primarily rhetorical, and that Middle Easterners welcomed our arrival as friends. These appeals were designed to create support for a US presence in the Middle East generally, not to pass specific legislation, and were therefore a response to the wider exigence of the regional power vacuum caused by British imperial decline. Moreover, Eisenhower's use of narrative—a narrative laden with Cold War

discursive norms—invited the public to enter into and complete the president's story, and by doing so accept his rhetorical construction of the "world" of the Middle East. In short, Eisenhower created a compelling political reality for his audience, the effective component of which was US responsibility for the Middle East's security, using existing Cold War discourse.

Effects and Implications of the Eisenhower Doctrine Address

The immediate context must always be privileged in discussing the effects of a given text, and judged in this light the Eisenhower Doctrine address must be viewed as a relative success. Although the Middle East Resolution was debated fiercely in Senate committee hearings—resulting in a series of verbal gaffes by Dulles and an embarrassing delay for the administration—the Eisenhower Doctrine finally cleared the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on February 13, and it was approved by the full Senate on March 5 by a vote of 72-19.[62] An amendment by Senator Mansfield moderated the language used to grant the president authority, changing the phrasing from Ike being "authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States" to "the United States is prepared to use armed forces." More significantly, the Mansfield amendment also altered the opening statement of the resolution. The amended statement read, "The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." This sentence, sweepingly and explicitly, identified America's national interest with the Middle East status quo. Ironically, this new sentence provided the justificatory basis for the Eisenhower's administration later intervention in Lebanon.[63]

Another effect of the Eisenhower Doctrine speech was its acknowledgment that the United States now possessed a global sphere of influence. Prior to the Eisenhower administration, US defense policy was sometimes understood as consisting of a (gigantic) sphere of influence spanning the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, a development from prior strategists who conceived of America primarily as a naval power. This concept was exemplified by Dean Acheson's infamous "defensive perimeter" statement in which he implied that South Korea lay outside the American protective sphere, which many Republicans blamed for inviting the North Korean attack.[64] Regardless of whether this conception of American defense was seriously held in Washington, containment was rhetorically depicted as a kind of fencing in of the Soviet Union, and in this formula the United States was militarily responsible for helping maintaining the fence in Europe and East Asia. The Eisenhower Doctrine precluded this understanding of containment. It favored a more globalized conception of American defense that was more consistent with the asymmetric response thinking of the New Look. Breaking from prior presidential rhetoric, it completely eschewed any pretense of British primacy in the Middle East in favor of direct American intervention. Because any war with communism would be global, American commitment to containment needed to be global as well, a reality the Eisenhower Doctrine heavily underscored.

Lastly, perhaps the most significant effect of the Eisenhower Doctrine address was that it, to steal a phrase from Geoffrey Aronson, repositioned the Middle East "from sideshow to center stage" in American foreign policy discourse. In his work Aronson tracks the growing primacy of Egypt in American foreign policy

formulation after World War II, and he fittingly concludes his account on the eve of the Eisenhower Doctrine address.[65] In this sense the Eisenhower Doctrine can be understood, from a certain ontological vantage, as a case of rhetoric catching up to reality—or at least reality as it existed in the minds of policymakers. Like many other instances of US foreign policy, here rhetoric worked to make public the changed priorities of the government *post hoc*. For better or worse, the Middle East now constituted a major theater of the Cold War and, thanks to Eisenhower, was now openly acknowledged as such. After the Eisenhower Doctrine address, no one could pretend that the Middle East was not a major foreign policy priority for the United States. This is perhaps the most lasting effect of the Eisenhower Doctrine address because, from the decades of the Cold War to the War on Terror, the Middle East has seldom relinquished its role as a center stage of America's foreign policy attention.

However, the Eisenhower Doctrine speech is also notable for what it does *not* say. Important geopolitical issues pertaining to the Middle East simply went unmentioned in the speech, and many of the speech's rhetorical features appear problematic when taken on their own. Some of these features, like Eisenhower's silence regarding America's role in helping create and fuel the region's instability, are to be expected. Similarly would one expect Eisenhower to portray his own country's actions as defensive and the Soviet Union's as inherently aggressive. Other issues, however, are more puzzling. Why did Eisenhower hardly mention Europe, and fail to discuss Britain or France entirely? Given the dramatic ways these nations had shaped the region (not to mention the fact that they underwrote

its security for the previous 40 years), it seems odd that Eisenhower would literally cut them out from his speech[66]—especially when doing so broke completely with the precedent of previous presidential rhetoric.

Additionally, Eisenhower made a series of rhetorical leaps that presumed a sympathetic audience if his address was to have any coherence. He repeatedly characterized Russia (*not* the Soviets, so as to maintain continuity with tsarist imperialism) as a foreign actor in the region. He described how Russians operated from behind a "mask" and sought "domination" while asserting that "a greater responsibility now *devolves* upon the United States," as if it were perfectly natural for the United States to assume charge of a region two oceans away. Indeed, if Russia's interest was "solely that of power politics" because it was a major oil producer and was not dependent on the Suez Canal, then why should America's interest be understood differently, since it met both those criteria as well? Without the enthymematic premise that America was an accepted actor in the region, Ike's argument that America was needed to defend against an *outside* threat made little sense. Furthermore, Eisenhower's discussion of the United Nations also seemed out of place. On its face, would not that body object to a unilateral policy of US intervention? Yet Ike unproblematically presumed that "closer cooperation with the United States" was an obvious means by which the nations of the Middle East could hope "to realize…United Nations goals." Other issues, such as Eisenhower's assumption that Arab countries could not defend themselves, or his monolithic characterization of Middle Eastern countries despite the rise of Nasserist Egypt, are also perplexing.

The point is not that these omissions amounted to oversights from Eisenhower or that they are somehow unanswerable, but that each of these issues indicates the presence of other rhetorical forces at work in this address. In examining these features of the speech, it becomes apparent that Ike was trading in a rhetorical currency concerning the Middle East established outside this speech alone. The Eisenhower Doctrine speech did not occur in a rhetorical vacuum, and it operated upon presumptions established earlier in the Eisenhower presidency. Likewise, it also created certain liabilities—both political and rhetorical—within which Eisenhower would now have to operate.

It is the project of the remaining chapters to investigate the ways in which Eisenhower's previous rhetoric worked to establish a set of rhetorical norms regarding the Middle East and how his rhetoric post-Eisenhower Doctrine was similarly influenced and constrained. This investigation shall reveal how certain elements of Ike's rhetorical currency came to be, and how the Eisenhower Doctrine was understood in its subsequent application in Lebanon.

Conclusion

In light of previous presidential rhetoric, the Eisenhower Doctrine stands out all the more by discarding any pretense of the Middle East being another nation's responsibility. Eisenhower's claim that "the United States must make more evident its willingness to support the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area" through direct military support, while a logical extension of containment as expressed by Truman in 1947, nonetheless signified a major rhetorical shift by placing the onus for the security of the entire Middle East exclusively at America's

feet. Eisenhower adapted elements of containment discourse to structure his speech. The address contained a series of appeals designed to function deliberatively with Congress as well as a narrative which invited the American public to support intervention. These strategies coalesced to offer a rhetorical redefinition of the Middle East for Ike's American audience.

The Eisenhower Doctrine remains a seminal address in American foreign policy rhetoric, and for this reason it has suitably attracted the attention of scholars of all stripes and disciplines. Yet for all its significance, this speech exists not as a singularity but as one (albeit major) step in a rhetorical revolution under Eisenhower that changed how presidents speak about the Middle East. Like many episodes of rhetorical prominence, the Eisenhower Doctrine address was less a standalone moment of oratorical inspiration than a product of unfinished forces in motion. The ensuing chapters seek to capture more snapshots of this metamorphosis, and in so doing not only better contextualize the Eisenhower Doctrine, but also reveal the dramatic sweep of the Eisenhower Era in the Middle East.

Notes

1 For the full text of these documents, see Kennan, George. "George Kennan's "Long Telegram"" George Kennan's "Long Telegram" February 22, 1946. Accessed November 21, 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm and Kennan, George. "George Kennan (X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," July 1947." George Kennan (X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," July 1947. July 1, 1947. Accessed November 21, 2015. https://shafr.org/teaching/classroom-documents/the-x-article.

2 To get a sense of the rapidity of the shift in relations, consider the following: Stalin's "Election Day Speech," which was interpreted by many Western analysts as a virtual declaration of war, was given February 9, 1946. Kennan's "Long Telegram" was transmitted February 22, 1946. Eleven days later, Churchill gave his famous "Iron Curtain" address at Westminister College.

3 Report, "American Relations With The Soviet Union" by Clark Clifford ["Clifford-Elsey Report"], September 24, 1946. Conway Files, Truman Papers. Taken from Truman Library Website, Accessed November 21, 2015. https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf.

4 "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", April 12, 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers. Taken from Truman Library Website. Accessed November 21, 2015. https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf

5 Quoted by Martin J. Medhurst in *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic Communicator* (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 31.

6 This term was first used by Dulles in a speech given to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, and became popularized afterwards as a shorthand to describe the Eisenhower administration's defense strategy. See "Dulles speech to the Council on Foreign Relations," January 12, 1954, *Department of State Bulletin* XXX (January 25, 1954), 108.

7 Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 162.

8 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "The President's News Conference," March 10, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10177.

9 Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004): 2.

10 See Stephen Freiburger, *Dawn Over Suez: the Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957* (Chicago: Ivan R., 1992), Ayesha Jalal, "Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and the Middle East defence in the Cold War," *International History Review* (1989): 431, Donald Cameron Watt, *Succeeding John Bull: Britain in America's Place, 1900-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge H.W. Brands, Press, 1984): 17, Michael Yizhar, "The Eisenhower Doctrine: A Case Study of Amerian Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation," (PhD diss., New School for Social Research, 1968): 38-42, and Steven Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 85.

11 See Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 4, Ray Takeyh, *The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-1957* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000): xiii-xvii, 144-147, and George Raymond Salami, "The Eisenhower Doctrine: A Study in Alliance Politics," (PhD diss., The Catholic University of America, 1974), 55, 237-38.

12 Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 28.

13 Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 54-57.

14 David Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (2004): 611.

15 Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," 611-13.

16 By Zionism, I mean simply the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine. Late 19th century Jewish persecution in Eastern Europe, particularly in Russia, elicited a reaction from multiple sitting presidents (cases in point: Ulysses Grant's May 22, 1872 "Special Message," Benjamin Harrison's 1891 "Third Annual Address," and Grover Cleveland's 1895 "Third Annual Message"). While this persecution directly fed into the nascent Jewish nationalist movement, at this stage such a movement did not necessarily pertain to the Middle East, and so I have chosen not to highlight this particular theme within presidential rhetoric here.

17 Paul Merkley, *The Politics of Christian Zionism* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 57.

18 According to Melvin Urofsky, over 2.5 million Jews immigrated to the United States between the years 1880-1925 from Eastern Europe, joining an already 250,000 strong American Jewish community. Michael Urofsky, *American Zionism* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 56.

19 Quoted by Denis Brian, *The Elected and the Chosen: Why American Presidents Have Supported the Jews and Israel: From George Washington to Barrack Obama* (Gefen Publishing: Jerusalem, 2012), 179.

20 Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 27-28.

21 Wilson later tried to promote an abortive attempt at a US League of Nations mandate in Armenia, which as a former Ottoman province would have been up for grabs. Wilson's rationale for doing so was to provide humanitarian relief in the wake of the Armenian Genocide perpetrated by the Turkish government.

22 For a discussion on Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration, see Richard Ned Lebow's "Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration," *Journal of Modern History* 40 (1968): 501-523.

23 In embracing Zionism, Wilson implemented his philosophy of presidential leadership in which the executive's role was to "interpret" the will of the masses, as determined by the content of public discourse: by 1917 Zionism was almost universally supported in the editorial pages of four of the nation's major newspapers, the *New York Times*, the *L.A. Times*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *Washington Post*. For more, see Lawrence Davison's study "Historical Ignorance and Popular Perception: The Case of U.S. Perceptions of Palestine, 1917," *Middle East Policy* 3 (1994): 125-147.

24 Woodrow Wilson, *Letter to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise in New York City*, September 1, 1918. Quoted in William J. Federer, *Treasury of Presidential Quotations* (St. Louis: Amerisearch Publishing, 2004), 213-214.

25 Hoover and Roosevelt in particular articulated support for Zionism and Judaism in general, despite whatever policy decisions they made that might appear unfriendly to Jews. For more see Herbert Hoover, "Message for Jewish Organizations Meeting in Madison Square Garden to Protest the Events in Palestine," August 29, 1929 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21905.

26 Indeed, the total Arab population of the United States appears to have only been in the tens of thousands during this era, partially explaining the slant of domestic news coverage. For more information, see Yvonne Yasbeck Haddad's *Not Quite American?: The Shaping of Arab and Muslim Identity in the United States* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2004), 3-4, 17-18 and Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine*, 38-42; Herbert Hoover, "Message to the Zionist Organization of America on the Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration," November 3, 1932. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=23326; and Franklin Roosevelt, "Greeting to the United Palestine Appeal," February 6, 1937.

27 James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia* (New York: Facts on File Publishing, 2010), 187-201. For more on the early development of American oil interest in the Middle East, see Daniel Yergin's *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power* (London: Free Press, 2009), 168-261.

28 William A. Eddy, *F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud* (Washington: America-Mideast Educational & Training Services, 1954), 12-13.

29 Eddy, *F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud*, 27-33. Although much has been made of this meeting as the starting point in US-Saudi relations (see Taylor, Adam. "The First Time a U.S. President Met a Saudi King." January 27, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/27/the-first-time-a-u-s-president-met-a-saudi-king/), this was not Roosevelt's first time to meet a representative of the Saudi regime. At a dinner for foreign ministers held in Washington, Roosevelt gave a toast to Ibn Saud before the Saudi minister in attendance in which he highlighted the similarities of their two countries, acknowledged Saudi Arabia's vast resources, and intimated that "the United States is not a Nation which seeks to exploit any other Nation, no matter what its size." Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Toast to the King of Arabia at a Dinner for the Minister of Foreign Affairs," September 30, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16319

30 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Press and Radio Conference #991," February 19. 1945. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum.

31 Indeed, as historian Madawi al-Rasheed writes, "Saudi Arabia was the first area outside the western hemisphere where American political and strategic influence replaced that of Britain." Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 104.

32 For more on Truman's Middle East policy, see Steven Spiegel's *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 16-49.

33 Harry S. Truman: "The President's Special Conference With the Association of Radio News Analysts," May 13, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12884. See also Harry S. Truman: "The President's News Conference," January 15, 1948. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13171.

34 Harry S. Truman: "The President's News Conference," September 5, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12507

35 Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President on Palestine," June 5, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12661

36 Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President on Israel," October 24, 1948. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13065

37 For a comprehensive rhetorical analysis of the Truman Doctrine speech, see Denise Bostdorff's *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 99-102. See also Daniel Chomsky, "Advance Agent of the Truman Doctrine: The United States, The New York Times, and the Greek Civil War," *Political Communication* 17 (2000): 415-432.

38 Truman was following the advice of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who told him the only way he would get the aid passed through Congress would be "to scare the hell out of the country." Quoted by Eric Goldman in *The Crucial Decade—And After: America, 1945-1960* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 59.

39 Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846.

40 For a more full discussion of Britain's stake in Greece, see Procopis Papastratis's *British Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War 1941-1944* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

41 Quoted by Peter Clarke in *The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Birth of the Pax Americana* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010), 464-503.

42 Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 99-102.

43 Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 6.

44 Quoted by Philip J. Briggs, *Making American Foreign Policy: President-Congress Relations from the Second World War to the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1994), 99.

45 Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 89-97.

46 "Defense of Formosa, Pescadores." In CQ Almanac 1955, 11th ed., 277-80. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1956. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal55-1353305.

47 Phillip Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 432.

48 O'Gorman argues that Ike theologically flattened the Abrahamic religions in his project of promoting a generalized spirituality identifiable with American liberalism set in contrast to atheistic Communism. In his words, "Eisenhower here made topography, the Middle East, a kind of text, and then this text yet a mere sign: Mecca and Jerusalem were 'places on the map,' yet they were more than this. On a register of the ultimate, they were symbols of a spiritual truth, that of the supremacy of spirit…. Thus, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism—blithely conflated and reduced to symbols of the spiritual—validated the essentially metaphysical thrust of Eisenhower's American liberalism." Ned O'Gorman, *Spirits of the Cold War: Contesting Worldviews in the Classical Age of American Security Strategy* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2012), 220-221.

49 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Message to Congress on Mid-East," in folder Msg. to Congress on Mid-East 1/5/57 (1), Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Box 19, Speech Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

50 See Truman Doctrine speech outlined above. For George Marshall, see his "Marshall Plan Speech" in which he declared that "It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be *no political stability and no assured peace*." (emphasis mine). See "The Marshall Plan Speech." George C Marshall. Accessed November 8, 2015. http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/.

51 Quoted by Richard Immerman in *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington: SR Books, 1999), 157.

52 Ira Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 229.

53 For information regarding Eisenhower's promise to go to Korea, see Martin J. Medhurst, "Text and Context in the 1952 Presidential Campaign: Eisenhower's "I Shall Go to Korea" Speech," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 30 (2000), 464-484 and Medhurst, *Dwight D. Eisenhower,* 38-44. Regarding his 1956 campaign, see "Football/Peace Commercial," The Living Room Candidate - Commercials - 1956 - Football/Peace. Accessed August 31, 2015. http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1956/footballpeace

54 It is worth noting here that this speech was given several years before the U-2 incident with Francis Gary Powers and well before the Watergate scandal. As such, both the presidency and Eisenhower were held in a high esteem difficult to imagine today. Again, Eisenhower never had negative approval ratings—during his two terms in office, an average of 49% of *Democrats* said they approved of the job Ike was doing. See George Gao, "Presidential job approval ratings from Ike to Obama," Pew Research Center. Accessed November 10, 2015. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/16/presidential-job-approval-ratings-from-ike-to-obama/

55 For the rhetorical importance of narrative, see David G. Levasseur and Lisa M. Gring-Pemble, ""Not All Capitalist Stories are Created Equal: Mitt Romney's Bain Capital Narrative and the Deep Divide in American Economic Rhetoric," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15 (2015): 1-38; Lisa M. Gring-Pemble, "'Are We Going to Now Govern by Anecdote?' Rhetorical Constructions of Welfare Recipients in Congressional Hearings, Debates, and Legislation, 1992–1996," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 87 (2001): 341–65; John Louis Lucaites and Celeste M. Condit, "Re-constructing Narrative Theory: A Functional Perspective," *Journal of Communication* 35 (1985): 90–108; and Melanie C. Green, Jeffrey J. Strange, and Timothy C. Brock, eds., *Narrative Impact: Social and Cognitive Foundations* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002).

56 Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument," *Communication Monographs* 51 (1984): 6.

57 For more on Eisenhower's attitude toward the Yalta Conference, see Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President,* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 309-312. For more on Dulles's attitude toward the Yalta Conference, see Michael A. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 165-166.

58 Robert A. Taft, "Republican fund-raising dinner in Milwaukee, Wisconsin." June 9, 1951. *Congressional Record*, 82nd Cong. 1st Sess., vol. 97, pt. 13, pp. A3462-A3464.

59 See Mary Stuckey, *The Good Neighbor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of American Power* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2012).

60 Stuckey, *The Good Neighbor*, 16.

61 On this point it is worth noting that in his edits of the penultimate draft of the speech Eisenhower questioned whether the phrase "Words alone are not enough," was necessary, thus reinforcing the claim that Ike conceived of the situation in the Middle East as principally a rhetorical problem. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Jan. 4, 1957 draft, in folder Msg. to Congress on Mid-East 1/5/57 (2), Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Box 19, Speech Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

62 Though Eisenhower faced fierce opposition from Congressional Democrats, Truman actually supported the Eisenhower Doctrine fairly early on. In an article written for the North American Newspaper Alliance, he argued that "Congress has no alternative but to go along with the President in this program to prevent the Russians from taking over the whole strategic Middle East." Staking the future of the United Nations on the passage of the Eisenhower Doctrine, he reminded his readers that "The League of Nations collapsed without us, and the United Nations could crumble if we falter." Quoted by John Donovan in *U.S. & Soviet Policy in the Middle East: 1957-1966* (New York: Facts on File, 1974), 12-13.

63 Quotes taken from Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 111-112.

64 For the full text of Acheson's address, see "Speech on the Far East - Dean Acheson January 12, 1950 | Teaching American History." Teaching American History. Accessed November 14, 2015. http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-on-the-far-east/.

65 Geoffrey Aronson, *From Sideshow to Center Stage: U.S. Policy Toward Egypt 1946-1956* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986).

66 One of the earlier drafts of the speech (Draft #11, dated to 1/2/57) produced by John Foster Dulles included multiple references explaining Britain and France's historic and contemporary roles in the region; these references were reduced to a sentence in Dulles' next draft (Draft #13, dated to 1/3/57). That sentence was then crossed out, indicated that Eisenhower sought to virtually omit any reference to Britain and France in his speech. Earlier drafts explained even more fully the historic and economic ties between Europe and the Middle East, which were also cut. See Papers of John Foster Dulles, folder Middle East Message to Congress etc. 1/5/57 (1), Box 2, Draft Presidential Correspondence and Speeches Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Papers of John Foster Dulles, folder Middle East Message to Congress etc. 1/5/57 (2), Box 2, Draft Presidential Correspondence and Speeches Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

CHAPTER FOUR

Operation Ajax and the Rhetoric of Misdirection

The Shah should reign, not rule.[1]

- Mohammed Mossadegh

It is clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.[2]

- Doolittle Report to the President

Here [Iran] is where they will start trouble if we aren't careful…. if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they'll move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East. There's no telling what they'll do if we don't put up a fight now.[3]

- Harry Truman, discussion with George Elsey on June 26, 1950—one day after the start of the Korean War

In the September 20, 2015 edition of CBS's long-running news show *60 Minutes*, correspondent Steve Kroft interviewed Iranian President Hassan Rouhani regarding his nation's recently agreed-upon deal with the United States supervising Iran's nuclear program. In the course of the interview, Kroft asked Rouhani whether he, like Supreme Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, considered the United States to be "the Great Satan." After being pressed by Kroft for an answer, Rouhani defended Iranians' use of the term on the basis of America's past wrongdoings in his nation. He stated:

> Satan in our religious parlance is used to refer to that power that tricks others and whose words are not clear words, do not match reality. What I can say is that the U.S. has made many mistakes in the past regarding Iran, and must make up for those mistakes…. If America puts the enmity aside, if it initiates good will, and if it compensates for the past, the future situation between the United States and Iran will change.[4]

Of the many reasons why the United States must, in Rouhani's view, "compensate for the past," few are as significant as Operation Ajax, the CIA-organized 1953 coup 'd'état against the government of democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. The "28 Mordad 1332" coup, as the affair is known in Iran, is important for numerous reasons. The event marked the effective end of Iranian democratic constitutionalism, the termination of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's monopoly over the Abadan refinery, and the demise of the Iranian left wing. It inaugurated the increasingly authoritarian rule of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, thereby sowing the seeds of the 1979 revolution. Most of all, the coup established the United States as the dominant foreign economic and political power in Iran, thus setting the stage for the present day chill in US-Iranian relations following the Shah's demise.

Indeed, the impact of Operation Ajax has long outlived the events of 1953. As Rouhani's statement attests, the coup is often interpreted in Iran as historical evidence justifying hostility toward America today. The US government, for its part, has only officially acknowledged its covert role in the coup since a March 2000 speech by Secretary of State Madeline Albright, an admission Supreme Ayatollah Khamenei condemned as "deceitful" since it "did not even include an apology."[5] In addition to the official diplomatic and intelligence accounts, numerous historians, scholars, and journalists have offered their interpretations of the coup as well. As

historian Hugh Wilford writes in his 2013 account, the story of Mossadegh's fall has been retold in countless books, articles, documentaries, and even a graphic novel; he finds this popularity unsurprising "given that, quite apart from its historical importance, the coup had a dramatic, thrilling, almost literary quality that lends itself well to storytelling."[6] Nevertheless, there is still more to say.

My purpose in this chapter is not to resolve historically relevant questions of blame or responsibility for the coup. Neither do I seek to investigate in-depth the increasingly important role Iran played in US foreign policy formulation under Truman and Eisenhower. These issues, as well as the events of Operation Ajax, the decline of British imperialism in the Middle East, and domestic political strife in postwar Iran have been extensively explored elsewhere. However, with all the attention Operation Ajax has received, no account has concentrated on the Eisenhower administration's rhetorical strategy for dealing with the coup and the interpretive role presidential rhetoric played in presenting the events in Iran to the American people. To accomplish this task, Eisenhower and his subordinates adopted a strategy I have labeled the rhetoric of misdirection. In using this label, I am expounding upon the previous work done by Michael Martin, Lindon Layton Best, Mike Markel, and John Arthos Jr. surrounding misdirective or trickster rhetoric.[7]

Before analyzing the specific elements of Eisenhower's rhetoric of misdirection, I will first set the context, explaining how historical factors and the administration's policy choices functioned to constrain Ike and his subordinates' rhetoric. Then, I will elaborate on Ike's rhetoric of misdirection and its component

parts. After analyzing the rhetoric employed, I will offer several concluding thoughts on the implications of Ike's rhetorical strategy.

Context in Iran: Background

Postwar Iran possessed a stunning complexity borne from the country's long-held status as a site of tension between Russia and the West. Since the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay, Iran had increasingly ceased to operate independently and was instead a pawn in the "Great Game" between Britain and Russia for control of central Asia. Iran's imperial subjugation culminated in 1941 with "Operation Countenance," the undeclared invasion of the country by Soviet and British forces whose purposes were to create supply routes for American lend-lease equipment to the Eastern front, secure Iran's oil facilities, and end Iran's diplomatic flirtation with Germany. Reza Shah Pahlavi, a suspected Nazi sympathizer, was deposed as Iran's ruler in favor of his twenty-two year old son Mohammed. Iran was occupied by Soviet troops in the north and by British (and after 1942, American) forces in the south. The new Shah met Churchill, Stalin, and FDR at the 1943 Tehran conference, where the big three pledged to withdraw from Iran within six months after the conflict's end.[8]

Tensions quickly emerged among the occupying powers. Hoping to weaken the grip of their historic British and Russian enemies, the Iranians asked for American police, military, and economic advisors. In the fall of 1944 a dispute over an oil concession erupted between the Iranians and the Soviets, who objected to the presence of US oil companies in Iran. Utilizing the Tudeh leftist party as a fifth column, the Soviets organized massive countrywide protests against the

government. Only after the offending Iranian oil negotiators resigned and the United States expressed support for the Iranian government via a private letter (delivered by George Kennan to Vyacheslav Molotov) did the Tudeh-organized protests and roadblocks end.[9] The event passed unremarked upon by President Roosevelt, and outside a few back page news articles the situation merited little attention in the United States.[10]

However, in a move that would further hasten the onset of the Cold War, Stalin violated his agreement with the Western allies to withdraw all troops from Iran by March 2, 1946. Soviet forces refused to leave Azerbaijan under the official guise of protecting the minorities there from Iranian oppression (and with the unofficial purpose of incorporating these provinces into the Soviet Union). Confronted by a major diplomatic challenge, Truman refused to publicly discuss the Soviet policy. When asked by reporters about Russian escalation in Iran, he offered evasive answers, saying, "I only know about that from what I see in the papers" and "I have no comment" and "That is a matter that will be handled when it comes up."[11] Nevertheless, the administration strongly backed the United Nations Security Council resolution demanding Soviet withdrawal by May 6. Secretary of State James Byrnes, who argued in favor of the resolution at the United Nations, also stated in a March 16 address that "The United States is committed to the support of the charter of the United Nations. Should the occasion arise, our military strength will be used to support the purpose and principles of the charter."[12] Partially in response to this intimated threat (and partially due to the difficulties they faced in consolidating

power in Azerbaijan), the Soviets left Iran within the UN timetable. American aims were again achieved.

Although these two episodes were resolved rather quickly, they pertain to Eisenhower's subsequent rhetoric in two ways. First, these incidents established Iran as a site of Cold War conflict and cemented in the minds of American policymakers that the Tudeh party answered directly to Communist leaders in Moscow—a mistaken idea but one which came to be accepted by Eisenhower and Dulles.[13] Second, in both the 1944 and 1946 incidents the president did not publicly acknowledge what was at stake for the United States in Iran. By speaking so little on the subject, the president downplayed the importance of Iran in public while working actively to protect America's interests by private and diplomatic channels. Indeed, even Secretary Byrnes only framed the 1946 incident as an issue concerning the United States insofar as it validated the legitimacy of the United Nations. While this strategy worked to avoid an unnecessary escalation between the United States and Russia, it also had the effect of masking the significance of America's interest in Iran to the American public.

At the same time, Operation Countenance and the ensuing allied occupation of Iran also instigated a period of democratic upheaval in the country. Iran's main parliamentary body, the Majlis, had grown progressively more influential since its establishment (which induced the 1905-1907 Constitutional Revolution of Iran) under the Qajar Dynasty, and it served as the vehicle by which Reza Shah overthrew the Qajars and seized power in the early 1920s.[14] Under Reza Shah the Majlis held elections and possessed the formal power of passing the nation's laws, in spite of his

increasingly authoritarian tendencies.[15] Before Reza Shah's removal the Majlis had convened in secret multiple times to discuss ways to revive their power, and with him gone, the Majlis wasted little time in becoming the central power broker of Iranian politics.[16] The deliberative body was, however, less than representative, given to quarreling, and ultimately proved unable to form effective governments. In the years 1941 to 1951, for example, *seventeen* cabinets were organized to govern Iran, most of which failed to last longer than a few months. Revolt, chaos, and general misrule prevailed through the years leading to the rise of Mossadegh.[17]

To put the matter succinctly, the success of Mossadegh's National Front, a loose coalition of democratic constitutionalist nationalists, was fueled by its unyielding drive to eliminate foreign control over Iran's resources and politics. Mossadegh opposed oil concessions and advocated for free elections and a free press in the belief that these reforms would end British imperial domination of Iran, enabling truly democratic rule.[18] This platform was extremely popular.[19] As the Shah later wrote, "How could anyone be against Mossadegh? He would enrich everybody, he would fight the foreigner, he would secure our rights. No wonder students, intellectuals, people from all walks of life, flocked to his banner."[20] Thus on May 2, 1951, the same day Mossadegh became Prime Minister, the Majlis voted to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its plant at Abadan.[21]

The details of the ensuing conflict between the British government, which challenged nationalization using legal, diplomatic, and economic means, and Iran, which was subject to a punitive economic boycott of its oil, are recorded elsewhere. Both sides sought complete victory, and both sides sought American support.[22] As

the conflict progressed into the early Eisenhower presidency, several major factors emerged that constrained Ike's rhetorical and policy responses to the situation in Iran.

Context in Iran: Constraints

The Rhetoric (or Lack Thereof) of President Truman. While not constraining Eisenhower's range of action in a determinative sense—Ike was elected on a platform of change, after all, including a critique of the Truman administration's "little policy for the Middle East"—in reality Truman's rhetoric regarding Iran functioned to constrain the new president's ability to alter the situation.[23] By creating a discrepancy between Iran's perceived public significance and its significance to American policymakers, Truman bequeathed to Eisenhower a crisis in the making without having warned the American public that a crisis might occur. NSC 136/1, a new Iranian policy directive signed by Truman in late 1952, encapsulated the urgency with which US security officials viewed Iran. It stated,

> It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to intervention or armed attack by the USSR, and its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion…. Present trends in Iran are unfavorable to the maintenance of control by a non-communist regime for an extended period of time.[24]

In the event of a successful Communist takeover of Iran, one of the goals of NSC 136/1 was "if possible, to bring about the overthrow of the communist regime" and to determine whether such an action constituted a general *casus belli* with the Soviet Union. Yet despite the magnitude of this policy for the collapse of Iran *and the*

prediction that such an event was more likely to occur than not, Truman said nothing to the public.

Truman's silence on Iran was emblematic of his Middle East rhetoric as a whole. On one hand, the language of Cold War suggested America's need to combat communism *everywhere*. He articulated the global threat communist ideology posed, declaring that America had to be diligent in "helping free and independent nations to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes."[25] In Italy, Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Vietnam, and Korea, using all sorts of armaments, Truman furiously waged Cold War against the Communists. On the other, outside of support for Israel and security guarantees for Turkey, this project of rhetorically expanding the United States' global responsibility had done little to undermine the Wilsonian status quo of the Middle East being a primarily British area of responsibility.

This state of affairs left Eisenhower with difficult rhetorical options upon assuming office. He could inform the American people that Iran was a major priority over which the United States might start a world war—an unpalatable option given the recent stalemate in Korea and Ike's campaign promises to reduce defense spending. He could perpetuate Truman's silence. Or he could strike a middle path, which in the end he did—although from the public's perspective, Eisenhower's rhetoric on Iran much resembled that of Truman.

Eisenhower and Dulles's Conception of Containment. The Eisenhower administration sought to contain the Soviet Union while reducing defense

expenditures. This necessitated relying on the threat of an asymmetrical nuclear response to deter Soviet aggression, meaning that any war with the Soviet Union was likely to be atomic—and therefore to be avoided at all costs. As early as 1948 Dulles declared that "All peoples must end any complacency about war and see it as it really is, namely, something which would engulf all of humanity in utter misery and would make almost impossible the achievement of the ends for which we would profess to be fighting."[26] Likewise, Stephen Ambrose notes that "Eisenhower realized that unlimited war in the nuclear age was unimaginable, and limited war unwinnable. This was the most basic of his strategic insights."[27] Because of the atomic implications of American defense strategy, both men greatly feared a tinderbox war breaking out into a larger conflict as in World War I. In a 1946 *Life* article, Dulles wrote "If we have another great war, that is probably the way it will come…. It will be the result of miscalculating."[28] Iran, as was little lost on Eisenhower, was a particularly dangerous tinderbox with the potential to ignite World War III, and therefore American strategy in that country had to be coordinated with minute care so as to not provoke a rash response from the Kremlin. Thus in addition to his other concerns, Eisenhower also had to bear in mind that US actions in Iran, if too aggressive, could potentially start a global conflict.

The Need to Maintain Positive Relations with Britain. If forced to choose between Britain and Iran, there was little question that the United States would side with Britain. In addition to the "special relationship" that existed between the two nations, the United States needed the support of the still-considerable British

Empire in order for containment to work in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.[29] Although not a supporter of British imperialism, America could ill afford to alienate its most important global ally in the Cold War, even over an issue as important as Iran. For this reason, Truman chose to pursue a neutral policy with regard to the AIOC-Iran dispute over nationalization. However, the way in which Truman defined neutrality—refusing to grant any economic aid to Iran while the British-organized global embargo of Abadan's oil strangled the Iranian economy—clearly positioned America as implicitly on Britain's side. For Eisenhower, this meant that any deviation from Truman's rhetorical and policy neutrality, even to prevent the collapse of the Mossadegh regime, would likely alienate London and threaten the allied coordination needed for containment to function (especially under the soon-to-come New Look strategy). Indeed, as US Ambassador to Iran Loy Henderson reported to the National Security Council on June 25, "It is impossible for the U.S. to give further aid to Iran at this time because of what it would do to our relations with the British."[30]

The Need to Maintain Positive Relations with Iran and the Third World. As with Britain, the United States also needed to maintain the goodwill of the Iranians and the nonaligned nations at large. Ike knew that the Soviets sought to replace the governments of these countries with Communist regimes as they had done with the satellite states of Eastern Europe. However, he also realized they would not risk outright war to achieve this expansionist aim. As he wrote in a private letter, he thought the Russian strategy would be to advance "year by year, month by month, [the] Iron Curtain…. the hope of the Soviets is to attack each nation separately,

beginning with the weaker ones."[31] Because military conflict would be suicidal, Eisenhower knew the Soviets were more likely to rely upon subversion, coercion, and persuasion to expand their influence than open attempts at conquest.

Realizing that this meant American security rested on convincing other countries to reject communism, Ike sought to practice what he called "psychological warfare." He defined this term in a 1952 campaign speech as simply "the struggle for the minds and wills of men."[32] "As a nation," Eisenhower exhorted his San Francisco audience, "everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say or do, will have its impact in other lands."[33] In other words, American security now rested on its ability to win a public relations war with the Soviet Union. As rhetoric scholar Martin Medhurst explains,

> Eisenhower understood that the nature of that war was essentially rhetorical—that is, that it was a war of words, images, perceptions, attitudes, motives and expectations. It was a war in which the battlefield was in the hearts and minds of people, both in America and throughout the world, especially in those areas ripe for communist exploitation.[34]

Eisenhower's belief that the Cold War was fundamentally psychological in nature—a belief accepted by most Americans in the mid-1950s[35]—became all the more important when knowledge of Stalin's death went public on March 5, 1953. New Soviet leaders Georgi Malenkov and Lavrentiy Beria sought to liberalize Stalin's belligerent foreign policy and launched what was deemed a "peace offensive" to win hearts and minds across Europe, Africa, and Asia.[36] By deemphasizing Soviet military power, scaling back calls for global revolution, and articulating their desire for a permanent European peace settlement, the new Soviet leaders sought to split the Western alliance and frame the United States as a warmongering superpower.

The result was, in the words of Walter LaFeber, "a new kind of Cold War."[37] In such a context popular opinion in the resource-rich Third World mattered even more. Because many of these nations were either current or recently freed colonies of Western European powers, there were few quicker ways for the United States to alienate them than by supporting British imperialism. Thus for Eisenhower, direct intervention in Iran or overt support for the British were also unwise choices, as these decisions would risk undermining containment by driving nonaligned nations into Moscow's arms.[38]

In light of these constraints, it is unsurprising that the Eisenhower administration chose to employ covert action to resolve the issue. Because the status quo was perilous and unsustainable—both NSC 136/1 and the 1952 CIA National Intelligence Estimate for Iran predicted the possibility of an eventual "breakdown of government authority" that would "open the way for at least a gradual assumption of control by [the] Tudeh,"—action appeared necessary to preserve Iran's status as a Communist-free government.[39] Indeed, if Mossadegh himself was not perceived as a Communist sympathizer, he was at least seen as someone whose weakness might enable the Tudeh to achieve power.[40] Yet any action undertaken by the United States in Iran could potentially alienate Britain, poison relations with the nonaligned nations, start a war with the Soviet Union, or do all three. Thus Ike's solution: overthrow Mossadegh to secure Iran's anti-Communist status, but do so covertly to prevent the potential fallout from American intervention.[41]

Operation Ajax and the Rhetoric of Misdirection

The operational details of Ajax, from its birth as British-proposed "Operation Boot" to its consummation in the sun-drenched streets of Tehran, are recorded extensively in numerous volumes, including the official CIA history authored by Donald Wilber[42] and Kermit Roosevelt's memoir *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran*.[43] In terms of rhetoric, however, Eisenhower's choice to employ covert action to remove Mossadegh left him with a straightforward objective: conceal this fact. As Ike's biographers and the National Security Council archives demonstrate, Eisenhower was careful to leave little evidence for posterity that could tie him to the coup, receiving only oral briefings on the matter.[44] His public rhetoric was an extension and enlargement of this strategy, as he sought to conceal America's role in Mossadegh's fall from power.

However, because major events were in play—the removal of a democratic government in a friendly, strategically vital, oil-rich country—Eisenhower could hardly expect to replicate Truman's tactic of rhetorically neglecting Iran. Moreover, Ike had attacked the Truman administration's foreign policy during the 1952 campaign, including its ostensible neglect of the Middle East. Thus, rather than utilize the prior administration's strategy of rhetorically *misleading* the public, which was a simple matter of devoting more attention to Iran in policymaking than was admitted publicly, the Eisenhower administration prosecuted a strategy of rhetorical *misdirection*,[45] which entailed incorporating the concealment of Operation Ajax into the administration's larger rhetorical strategy regarding the Middle East. In effect, the Eisenhower administration sought to draw attention to

certain aspects of its Middle East policy while diverting suspicion away from its covert actions in Iran. This rhetorical strategy, Michael Martin notes, "contains a fundamental element of deception" in which "language is used simultaneously to reveal and conceal."[46] The result is "an obfuscation of meaning" for the audience, which is invited to embrace the rhetor's professed explanation of reality while he withholds some additional element of significance.[47] For Ike, that element was the CIA presence in Iran.

Many critics who study the rhetoric of misdirection have focused on the way this strategy can be used to subvert power hierarchies or "discourse regimes." In addition to Martin's account, which explores Dietrich Bonhoeffer's interactions with his Gestapo interrogators, John Arthos Jr., L.W. Levine, and Michael Hardin investigate racial and colonial dimensions to the rhetoric of misdirection.[48] They and others allude to the "shaman-trickster," a traditional figure in many cultures who utilizes deception instead of strength to cleverly achieve his goals. Although Eisenhower's rhetoric differs greatly from the examples of misdirection given by these scholars, all these discourses possess commonality in that their rhetors employed the "inventive exploitation of indeterminacy" in pursuit of their objectives. That is, by intentionally introducing an element of ambiguity that is meant *not* to be perceived by the audience, Ike and these other rhetors strove to achieve their aims on the backs of their auditors' ignorance.

In a similar way, Ike's rhetoric bears a functional resemblance to the corporatist rhetoric of misdirection studied by Mike Markel.[49] By seeking to project a certain image (America as an anti-imperial, benevolent good neighbor) while

acting in a way contrary to that image, Eisenhower, like a corporation manipulating the nuances of a privacy agreement, used his position of influence to structure the discourse in a way that concealed the true activity taking place. Since Ike was president, his rhetoric of misdirection was hardly a species of subversive discourse; indeed, it was exactly because of his powerful position that Eisenhower was able to project a noninterventionist, neutral conception of America's role in the Middle East while his administration worked to overthrow the Iranian regime. Thus, this episode can be seen as a unique intersection between the rhetoric of misdirection and presidential rhetoric. Mary Stuckey's insight that "Presidents both determine and reflect what (and who) is visible as well as what (and who) remains outside their national vision" applies to Eisenhower's Iran rhetoric: by emphasizing America's disinterested benevolence toward the Middle East, he rendered invisible that which he did not wish to be seen (Ajax) and directed the public's vision toward that which he did.[50]

Eisenhower's rhetoric of misdirection surrounding Operation Ajax had four component parts: distancing rhetoric, manipulation of the media, use of surrogates, and polyvalence. These elements worked tightly together to create a degree of strategic ambiguity that enabled the Eisenhower administration to assist in the overthrow of Mossadegh while avoiding the detrimental outcomes overt intervention could have caused.

Distancing Rhetoric

Eisenhower's interaction with Mossadegh began before his assumption of the presidency. On January 7, 1953, he received a cable from the Iranian Prime Minister

congratulating him on his electoral victory and exhorting the president-elect to provide much needed financial aid to Iran. After apologizing for "taking up with you the problems of my country even before you assume office," Mossadegh wrote:

> It is my hope that the new administration which you will head will obtain at the outset a true understanding of the significance of the vital struggle in which the Iranian people have been engaging and assist in removing the obstacles which are preventing them from realizing their aspirations for… life as a politically and economically independent nation….
>
> It is not my desire that the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom should be strained because of differences with regard to Iran. I doubt however whether in this day and age a great nation which has such an exalted moral standing in the world can afford to support the internationally immoral policy of a friend and ally merely in order not to disturb good relations with that friend and ally. The Iranian people merely desire to lead their own lives in their own way.[51]

Eisenhower responded to this request noncommittally, stating that he would "study these views with care and with sympathetic concern."[52] From Mossadegh's view, it was certainly a positive sign that Eisenhower responded promptly with a hand-drafted reply and assured the Prime Minister that he had "in no way compromised" his impartiality in the AIOC-Iran dispute.[53] Eisenhower's first inaugural address was likely also encouraging to Mossadegh, as Ike declared that "we Americans know and we observe the difference between world leadership and imperialism," the latter of which Mossadegh incessantly railed against.[54] However, this same speech in which Eisenhower enthusiastically reaffirmed America's spiritual and military commitment to East Asia, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere also conspicuously lacked any reference to Iran or the Middle East. As Mossadegh quickly learned, Eisenhower did not intend to significantly alter Truman's "neutral" policy anytime soon—not least because of America's own oil interests overseas.[55]

Although the existence of this original correspondence with Mossadegh became public knowledge in mid-1953, full details of its content were not made known until the publication of Ike's memoir *Mandate for Change* in 1963. In the intervening years, Eisenhower consistently used the language of observation to describe his relation to Mossadegh. In an April 1956 address Ike said, "The Iranian situation… only a few short years ago looked so desperate that each morning we thought we would wake up and read in our newspapers that Mossadegh had let them under the Iron Curtain," as if he was as unable to change the situation in Iran as an ordinary citizen reading the *Washington Post*.[56] Ike expressed similar sentiments as early as 1954, often lumping Iran in with other countries that after a period of uncertainty were "saved" from communism by domestic actors.[57] The effect of this rhetoric was to distance Eisenhower and the country at large from Mossadegh, and the effort persisted even after the Eisenhower Doctrine speech in 1957. In trying to reinterpret the historical account of what happened—describing himself as simply reading the news about Iran, as if he did not have direct communication with and influence over Mossadegh—Eisenhower continued his rhetorical campaign of misdirection even until the end of his presidency.

This initial exchange of messages is also noteworthy because it established the tone for Ike and Mossadegh's next interaction. As in the first exchange, Mossadegh attempted to communicate directly with Eisenhower in the hope of persuading him to adopt policies friendly to Iran, and Eisenhower responded in a politically reserved statement. The second series of telegrams was initiated by Mossadegh on May 28, 1953, after little change was made in US policy, negotiations

continued to fail, and the economic effects of the British-organized boycott were beginning to precipitate a political crisis for the Iranian Premier. By this time British and American planning for Operation Ajax was entering its final stages; work on the operation had begun in earnest following Eden's visit to the White House in March. Following a few introductory niceties and references to the January telegrams, Mossadegh cabled:

> Although it was hoped that during Your Excellency's administration attention of a more sympathetic character would be devoted to the Iranian situation, unfortunately no change seems thus far to have taken place in the position of the American Government….
>
> We are of course grateful for the aid heretofore granted Iran by the Government of the United States. This aid has not, however, been sufficient to solve the problems of Iran and to ensure world peace which is the aim and ideal of the noble people and of the Government of the United States….
>
> In conclusion, I invite Your Excellency's sympathetic and responsive attention to the present dangerous situation of Iran, and I trust that you will ascribe to all the points contained in this message the importance due them.[58]

As other commentators have noted, by characterizing the Iranian political situation as "dangerous" Mossadegh attempted to force Eisenhower's hand. If the situation was such that the government could collapse, the thinking went, then there was the possibility of a Communist takeover. Thus, Eisenhower should provide aid to prevent such an eventuality. Furthermore, Moscow had begun taking preliminary steps to repair Russo-Iranian relations. As the *New York Times* reported, "[some believe] Premier Mossadegh times his appeal for economic assistance to coincide with these Soviet gestures. He had hoped, according to this line of though, to induce the United States to offer aid as a means of competing with, or forestalling, Soviet aid."[59]

Unfortunately for Mossadegh, the Eisenhower administration reacted in the exact opposite of the way he intended. While his letter certainly confirmed suspicions that Iran's government was in danger of collapse or communist manipulation, Ike's reaction was not to provide aid for Mossadegh but instead to push forward with the covert plan to replace him. Unlike the first exchange, Eisenhower waited a considerable amount of time before replying, giving the appearance of deliberation. When he did respond on July 9, his answer was widely reported in the US media as having "stunned"[60] the Iranian government:

> The Government and people of the United States historically have cherished and still have deep feelings of friendliness for Iran and the Iranian people….
>
> The failure of Iran and of the United Kingdom to reach an agreement with regard to compensation has handicapped the Government of the United States in its efforts to help Iran… it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil and oil products if a reasonable agreement were reached…
>
> I fully understand that the Government of Iran must determine for itself which foreign and domestic policies are likely to be most advantageous to Iran and to the Iranian people. In what I have written, I am not trying to advise the Iranian Government on its best interests. I am merely trying to explain why, in the circumstances, the Government of the United States is not presently in a position to extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.

Eisenhower made two major argumentative moves in his telegram. First, he established that his decision to deny Mossadegh aid was borne not from American animosity toward Iran, but, instead, was due to the failure of Mossadegh to reach an agreement with the British. By blaming Iran for the negotiations' failure—despite the British displaying a sizeable amount of intransigence themselves—Ike exonerated Whitehall from any wrongdoing, and in so doing created a convenient

scapegoat for the worsening crisis. Second, if the failure of negotiations was Iran's fault, then the United States was not obliged to help the country. Such aid would "not be fair" to the American taxpayer and would be "unwise."[61] Thus, Eisenhower declared that additional aid would not be forthcoming.

This response can be read through the metaphor of the good neighbor. Unlike the good neighbor, who would respond positively to the request for aid, Ike instead counseled Mossadegh on how his predicament was the inevitable result of his own decisions—and how a strategic failure on Iran's part was not reason enough for American economic aid. The enthymematic premise of such a stance is that the United States *really did not* have anything to do with Iran's situation and truly was an observer of, not an actor in, the situation. Regardless of whether one considers America partially responsible for Iran's desperation, Ike's rhetoric worked to promote a conception of the United States as a distinctly neutral party. This positioning of America as an outsider can also be seen in Ike's conclusion: "I note the concern reflected in your letter at the present dangerous situation in Iran and sincerely hope that before it is too late, the Government of Iran will take such steps as are in its power to prevent a further deterioration of that situation." Eisenhower's language was like that of a friend offering guidance at an alcoholic intervention; his letter reflected both amicable earnestness and the firm belief that Iran's present course would lead to destruction. Most of all, Ike's language indicated that solving the present crisis was certainly not the responsibility of the United States but belonged to Iran.

Throughout his reply to Mossadegh, Eisenhower positioned America as an outside observer completely independent of the situation. As rhetoric scholar Richard Gregg notes of Ike's Suez Crisis address, Eisenhower used selective presentation of the facts, bracketing of important issues, and an assertion of American innocence to create distance between America and himself on one end and the crisis situation on the other.[62] In similar fashion, Eisenhower employed distancing rhetoric on the subject of Iran. He presented Tehran's impending economic troubles as predominantly the fault of Iran, declared that American friendship with Iran was a separate issue from providing economic aid, and asserted that the crisis was not the responsibility of the United States. As such, Ike's rhetoric preserved the image of America as a benevolently disinterested power in the Middle East, distancing the United States from any culpability in the current state of affairs and rendering US intervention in Iran a fanciful notion.

Manipulation of the Media

In addition to his cable exchanges with Mossadegh Eisenhower also spoke about Iran during his weekly press conferences. Again Ike gave no impression whatsoever to the American public that the United States was involved in Iran. During the planning phase for Ajax, Ike assured reporters that "our whole Government watches this [Iran situation] with the closest attention. It is a very delicate situation, and since it is an internal one, there is little that any outsider can do, even when they intend to be very helpful."[63] He even went so far as to say that "in any country where a Communist Party is recognized, for them it is an internal situation….. it is an internal situation, no matter where the inspiration for the Tudeh

Party comes from."[64] Although Eisenhower discussed Iran sparingly throughout the year, his other utterances resemble these in that he portrayed America as an outside observer and depicted Iran as a nation at risk.[65]

As presidential scholars Meena Bose and Fred Greenstein note, Eisenhower often used his press conferences to manipulate the American mass media.[66] By avoiding direct answers he created strategic ambiguity and preserved his personal popularity; his dissembling prose, according to *New York Times* columnist Arthur Krock, was one in which "numbers and genders collide, participles hang helplessly and syntax is lost forever."[67] Ike simply did not deliver hard truths in question and answer format before reporters. In sharp contrast to the logical rigor of his personal communication or the everyman eloquence of his public addresses, Eisenhower's press conferences were often muddled and confusing—which, Bose and Greenstein point out, was precisely the point. When dealing with the media, Eisenhower let slip *exactly* the information he wished to be known, and he often did so in a way that avoided firm policy stances or needless antagonism of opponents.

These same practices can be observed in Eisenhower's press conferences dealing with Iran. In a circuitous manner, Eisenhower conveyed important information. He defined Iran as meriting "the closest attention" for the United States, making clear the country was a foreign policy priority (thus avoiding a potential miscommunication like Dean Acheson's infamous "defensive perimeter" statement regarding Korea). Eisenhower also mentioned that he wished to find a resolution to the conflict, thus implicitly declaring the status quo unacceptable. His language indicated that America was unlikely to get involved directly, since "there is

little that any outsider can do, even when they intend to be very helpful." Such a statement likely put at ease the US public, which at the time still restively awaited a resolution to the Korean War. Lastly, Ike let slip that since it was an "internal" matter, America did not consider the possible assumption of power by the Tudeh to be a *casus belli.* In doing so he downplayed the perceived threat a Communist Iran would be to US security and reassured countries that feared an imperial America.

Overall, by characterizing the Iranian situation as "internal" and positioning the United States as an "outsider," Eisenhower employed evasive language to *appear* as though he had ruled out American intervention while not categorically rejecting this option. By this action, Eisenhower deftly evaded firmly answering the questions of reporters while still communicating salient information to his audiences. This rhetorical maneuvering constituted but one dimension of the Eisenhower administration's manipulation of the media, however, as much was also occurring behind the scene.

When Eisenhower appointed Allen Welsh Dulles (brother of John Foster Dulles) as Director of Central Intelligence on February 26, 1953, he ushered in what many have called "the golden years of the CIA's clandestine war against the Soviets."[68] Indeed, during the Eisenhower presidency Dulles would oversee not only Operation Ajax, but covert American interventions in Guatemala, Congo, Egypt, and countless other countries as well. One of the ways in which Dulles's CIA fought the Cold War's "war of words" was to infiltrate and establish media outlets, publishing houses, radio programs, news stations, and art institutions. By creating voices independent of the United States Information Agency (the official propaganda arm

of the US government) the CIA was able to effectively participate in the global campaign of persuasion with the veneer of objectivity. This *Kulturkampf* was all-encompassing; as Francis Stonor Saunders notes, "Whether they liked it or not, whether they knew it or not, there were few writers, poets, artists, historians, scientists or critics in post-war Europe whose names were not in some way linked to this covert enterprise."[69]

Like Europe, Iran was also a major site of psychological warfare. While much of this effort was designed to lay the groundwork for the August coup— namely, a mass propaganda campaign involving religious leaders, media outlets, forged documents, "spontaneous" demonstrations, and false flag terrorist attacks—the Eisenhower administration's propaganda effort also entangled American media outlets in its (dis)information campaign.[70] As Kenneth Osgood points out, the State Department worked to inspire the publication of editorials in US media outlets regarding Iran to convey "certain points of view" and for the "benefit" of the American public at large. State Department officials also reworked propaganda materials originally meant for distribution in Iran and gave them to sympathetic journalists in America.[71] In contrast to 1951, in which *Time* named Mossadegh person of the year, many of the articles published in 1953 used these adapted materials and therefore negatively portrayed the Iranian leader.[72] Hence, whether the result of CIA infiltration, State Department suggestion, or reporters acquiescing to the culturally accepted wisdom on the matter, the American media largely fulfilled the Eisenhower administration's wishes regarding their coverage of Iran—the sitting government was shown in a negative light and America was nowhere to

be seen. Mossadegh, for example, was routinely referred to as a "dictator" in the pages of the *New York Times*, a title the paper never bestowed upon the Shah during his 25 years of authoritarian rule after Operation Ajax.[73]

In 2000 the *New York Times* released an analysis of the American media's role in the Iran coup, and this study reinforced the conclusions drawn above.[74] First, although none of the reporters at major American newspapers who covered the events of the coup worked directly for the CIA, these same journalists chose to conceal the presence of CIA agents in Iran. While these reporters "filed straightforward, factual dispatches" regarding the August upheaval, they also "prominently mentioned the role of Iran's Communists" in creating street violence and "never reported that some of the unrest had been stage-managed by C.I.A. agents posing as Communists." In other cases reporters simply did not mention their CIA sources. By failing to disclose these facts, the media preserved Eisenhower's depiction of the coup as an internal event in which the United States was not involved.

Second, the report also shows that major US media outlets published CIA-supplied material or used such material in their reporting. In one instance, according to the report, the CIA was able to put on the news wire an article the CIA itself had written by using its contacts at The Associated Press. In another case, a CIA study was placed in *Newsweek* by "using the normal channel of desk officer to journalist," one of "several planted press reports" major US media outlets disseminated. Although the *New York Times* report downplayed the success rate of these attempts, by its own admission the intelligence agencies of the Eisenhower

administration were at least somewhat effective in planting news directed at American audiences.

Third, American media sources toned down accurate reports from Iranian and Russian-based news outlets that revealed the American role in Mossadegh's downfall. In the prelude to the coup Western correspondents in Iran devoted little attention to reports in Iranian newspapers and on Moscow radio claiming that America and Britain were secretly arranging the Shah's return to power. Little changed following Operation Ajax. While some newspapers did publish articles from Moscow reporting Russian charges that America was behind the coup, in the words of the report "neither The Times nor other American news organizations appear to have examined such charges seriously." Kennett Love, the *New York Times* reporter based in Tehran during the events of the coup, wrote later in a private letter to that newspaper's foreign editor that "The only instance since I joined The Times in which I have allowed policy to influence a strict news approach was in failing to report the role our own agents played in the overthrow of Mossadegh." By not reporting the CIA presence, Love enabled the Eisenhower administration's manipulation of the media to succeed: the image of America as a benevolently neutral party to Iran was maintained and few in the West suspected American involvement in Mossadegh's demise.

Use of Surrogates

While Eisenhower used distancing rhetoric and he manipulated the media to conceal America's involvement in the goings-on in Iran, the active element of his misdirection strategy was executed through the use of surrogates. As

counterintelligence specialists Michael Bennett and Edmund Waltz note, "misdirection directs the audience's attention towards the effect and away from the method that produces it."[75] Under this definition, Ike's distancing rhetoric and media manipulation worked to draw attention away from the chosen "method" of covert operations. Like all good misdirection, however, Eisenhower still needed to focus the audience's attention on something else, and his administration chose to emphasize the renewed importance of the Middle East to American Cold War strategy. To accomplish this task, Ike turned to one of his favorite strategies: rhetorical surrogacy.

As Ambrose and other Eisenhower scholars observe, in both the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections Ike's rhetorical strategy was to unleash Nixon to make the "hard-hitting partisan speeches" while Eisenhower stayed above the fray.[76] Such tactics were clearly effective, as Eisenhower remained widely popular despite the progressively worsening political climate for the Republican Party throughout his presidential tenure. As Eisenhower's surrogate, Nixon absorbed criticism from the press and the public but allowed his boss to remain untainted by partisan politics. This example ably demonstrates Eisenhower's leadership style, explored in-depth in Greenstein's *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, in which Ike selectively used publicity to create a genteel public image and often relied on mediators to communicate ideas—even within his own cabinet.[77]

In a way similar to his use of Nixon, Eisenhower relied on Secretary of State Dulles to be the face of the administration regarding foreign policy. While Ike certainly delegated to Dulles a large degree of authority (as he did with most cabinet

members), before Greenstein's work most students of foreign policy assumed Dulles was the senior partner in the relationship. Though it *appeared* so to the public, this was not the case. Eisenhower spoke daily with Dulles in person, on the telephone, or via coded cables if either were abroad. After consultation it was Ike who determined the course of action, but Dulles who was the publicly visible executor of American foreign policy. A similar tactic was used in their press conferences. Dulles met with the press on Tuesdays, introduced new policy, and often went into great detail while dialoguing with reporters. In contrast, Eisenhower spoke to the press on Wednesdays, using broad language and common sense expressions. In reality, all of Dulles' Tuesday utterances were cleared by Eisenhower beforehand. [78]

In the case of Iran, Eisenhower used Dulles and Ambassador Henderson as his primary surrogates. On May 9, after major planning for Operation Ajax was already underway, Dulles departed on a highly publicized three week tour of the Middle East. His official purpose for going on the trip was threefold: (1) to promote the concept of a Middle East security arrangement designed to prevent Communist penetration of the region, (2) to meet the leaders of the region in person, and (3) to publicize the new administration's more evenhanded approach toward the Arab states and Israel.[79] Although Dulles returned having concluded few official agreements, his trip helped lay the groundwork for the later Baghdad Pact and US Middle East policy as a whole. The trip also emphasized the Eisenhower administration's break with Truman's foreign policy, which in Dulles's estimation had "gone overboard in favor of Israel."[80]

More importantly, however, Dulles's trip received extensive media attention. Scores of articles in major newspapers, magazines, and radio news programs reported Dulles's meetings, statements, and travels from Cairo to Karachi. In drawing attention to the administration's diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, Dulles focused both the media and the public on the administration's recalibration of policy in the region—and away from any potential suspicion regarding American practices in Iran. He was apparently successful in this regard. The *New York Times* ran an editorial upon his return; it stated "The American stake in the Middle East is great for the first time in our history. We can even call it vital, when peace, defense, oil and other factors are taken into account."[81] Tellingly, no mention was made of Iran, Mossadegh, or the ongoing crisis. The newspaper also reprinted in its entirety a speech Dulles gave upon his return. Out of the address's 56 paragraphs, only two made mention of Iran. His summation was succinct and effectively channeled Ike's tone and message: "It's our policy on the part of the United States to avoid any unwanted interference in the oil dispute, but we can usefully continue technical aid."[82] No additional aid would be forthcoming, but the United States still wished for friendly relations with Britain and Iran.

Although Dulles was the primary surrogate, Henderson, who was considered "One of the outstanding officers of the Foreign Service," also played a role in Ike's rhetoric of misdirection.[83] He and his embassy staff worked to publish articles in *Newsweek,* the *New York Times,* and *Time Magazine* (which they could then show their Iranian counterparts) emphasizing the need for Iran to settle the dispute with Britain.[84] Henderson also accompanied Dulles on part of his Middle East tour, and

he advised the Eisenhower administration on some technical aspects of Operation Ajax. Most significantly, he was the visible face of the United States in Iran following the coup, granting interviews, issuing statements, and negotiating the new aid deal with Iran.[85] Like Dulles, Henderson's presence and rhetoric worked to focus the media and public's attention on the diplomatic dimensions of America's relationship with Iran, thereby diverting suspicion away from any covert activity.

Polyvalence

Finally, it is necessary to note that Eisenhower's rhetoric was dependent upon a certain level of strategically ambiguous polyvalence in order to successfully misdirect his audiences. Unlike polysemy, which is "a condition in which there are more than one denotative readings of a text," polyvalence can be defined as a situation in which there is a shared understanding of the denotation of the text, but an attitudinal difference with regard to its character.[86] In other words, all of Eisenhower's audiences understood that he was not offering additional aid to Iran and that the United States considered Iran important; each of his audiences differed, however, in the ways in which they interpreted the meaning of this information. While the Eisenhower administration clearly articulated that Iran was a foreign policy priority, did that mean, for example, that Ike and Dulles would potentially start World War III to prevent it from becoming a Communist state? Eisenhower's rhetoric seemed to leave this an open question. The Soviets, based on their prior experiences in Iran with Britain and the United States, probably thought so and ultimately chose not to find out. Many Americans, on the other hand, would have likely considered such an option unthinkable. Eisenhower's strategic use of rhetoric

allowed for these polyvalent readings of his statements to play out, as his ambiguity created room for these divergent interpretations.

In short, the Eisenhower administration anticipated how its audiences would respond to the rhetoric of misdirection by utilizing intentionally vague language. To take one instance, when Eisenhower stated in his second letter to Mossadegh that he and the American people "sincerely hope that Iran will be able to maintain its independence and that the Iranian people will be successful in realizing their national aspirations and in developing a contented and free nation," his audiences likely understood this message in different ways. To the US public, Eisenhower was merely reaffirming American goodwill toward a Middle Eastern country and articulating a general intention to maintain a friendly relationship, as Dulles had done many times on his trip. Churchill and Eden, with the benefit of knowledge about Opeartion Ajax, likely focused on the contingency of Ike's words: Americans "hope" Iran can be content and can realize its national ambitions; Eisenhower said nothing about *ensuring* such an outcome. The Soviets, whose interest in Iran was driven by security considerations, were predisposed to hear Eisenhower's emphasis on the language of freedom. Ike expressed the American desire for Iran to be a "free" and "independent" country. Since Iran was neither free from nor independent of Western influence (and to Soviet eyes American involvement in Iran was merely another form of imperialism anyway), Ike's language was likely interpreted as a being directed against any increase of Communist influence in Iran. Thus to the Kremlin, this statement could be read as a veiled threat.

The point is not that different audiences interpret a rhetorical performance differently—that much is obvious—but that Eisenhower used rhetoric in such a way as to encourage polyvalent interpretations of his words. By employing strategic ambiguity, Eisenhower and his subordinates allowed their audiences' biases and psychological predispositions to create divergent readings of their rhetoric. This use of polyvalence, when considered alongside the Eisenhower administration's distancing rhetoric, manipulation of the media, and use of surrogates, created enough misdirection to enable the successful covert execution of Operation Ajax. Just as Kermit Roosevelt later recounted, the result could be summarized in one word: "triumph."[87]

After Ajax: A New Status Quo

Taken as a whole, Operation Ajax and the Eisenhower administration's rhetoric of misdirection can be seen as having established a new status quo in American policy and rhetoric regarding the Middle East. In an unprecedented step, the United States had directly intervened in the affairs of a Middle Eastern nation by facilitating a coup d'état against Mossadegh. Although American policymakers had increasingly taken the Middle East into account since the early Truman administration, the decision to topple Mossadegh clearly marked a new stage in America's relationship to the region in terms of policy. Yet at the same time, Eisenhower's rhetoric of misdirection worked to conceal the dramatic lengths to which the United States would go to maintain its security objectives—dictated by the Cold War—in the Middle East. Though Dulles and Ike's rhetoric worked to emphasize the growing importance of America's relationship with the region, their

efforts were couched in the language of economic development, technical aid, and diplomatic goodwill—not military intervention. The true nature of the coup was concealed from the American electorate while other dimensions of the Eisenhower administration's Middle East policy were made salient through public discourse. The success of this rhetorical strategy, as I see it, led to two primary effects.

First, the success of Eisenhower's rhetoric of misdirection resulted in a disparity of knowledge surrounding Operation Ajax between the Iranian and American populations. While many Americans did not know about their government's involvement in the 1953 coup until the 1970s (especially following the 1979 revolution), the method of the Shah's restoration left a lasting pall over his legitimacy in his own country. As the *Economist* noted in 1973, "Even after 20 years, the ghost of Mossadegh, the politician who laid claim to the mantle of Iranian nationalism and outbid the Arabs in challenging the West, still haunts the Shah."[88] The coup seriously affected many Iranians' view of the United States—and continues to do so, as demonstrated by Hassan Rouhani—yet many Americans even today are not aware of this episode. Their ignorance of Ajax is a testament to the lasting success of the Eisenhower administration's rhetoric of misdirection.

Second, and more pertinent to the interest of this study, the successful execution of rhetorical misdirection by the Eisenhower administration promoted an understanding of containment that was functional within the British imperial paradigm in the Middle East. By maintaining a "neutral" position that effectively supported the British boycott and then providing aid only once the oil concession was restored at Iranian expense (not to mention overthrowing a government after

being asked by MI6 for assistance), Eisenhower communicated that the British Empire, for all its unseemliness, was reconcilable with America's overarching Cold War objective: containment of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, although the United States was rapidly assuming the role of senior partner in the region, Ike's preference for covert action and misdirection meant the public was largely unaware of the extent to which Washington had displaced Whitehall as the dominant power in the Middle East. Eisenhower continued to characterize America's role in the region as that of neutral arbitrator between the Arab states and Israel, "all of whom we want as our friends," much less make mention of America's anti-Communist covert activism or question British hegemony in the region.[89] In doing so, he established a new rhetorical status quo for the region: containment, but containment via the British Empire. This depiction was far from economic or political reality. As the writers of NSC 136/1 announced as early as 1952, "It is clear that the United Kingdom no longer possesses the capability unilaterally to assure stability in the area," and it was in no small part due to American support that Britain still nominally ruled the Middle East as can be seen in Operation Ajax.[90] This tension between perception and reality, fueled in large part by Eisenhower's rhetoric of misdirection, would erupt at Suez.

Conclusion

Operation Ajax and the rhetoric of misdirection born from it were a success: the Shah replaced Mossadegh, a showdown with Russia was avoided, the US public was kept in the dark, and a new oil concession was signed (this time with an equal share going to the United Kingdom and the United States). Eisenhower successfully

navigated the various constraints presented by the Iranian oil dispute in the shadow of a Cold War that was taking on increasingly psychological dimensions. He and his administration accomplished this task through distancing rhetoric, manipulation of the media, the use of surrogates, and polyvalence. However, this strategy of misdirection also maintained the rhetorical norm of treating the region as a primarily British area of interest and was therefore misleading regarding the nature of American power in the Middle East. As will be shown in the next chapter, it was not just the US public who believed Eisenhower's rhetoric of misdirection, but America's allies as well. In short, the new rhetorical status quo established by Ike set the stage for a far more visible—and far more dangerous—test of containment: The 1956 Suez Crisis.

Notes

1 Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations* (New York: The New Press, 2013), 169.

2 Quoted by Stephen Ambrose in *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), 188.

3 From the papers of George M. Elsey, quoted by Malcolm Byrne, "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953" in *Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran,* ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 201.

4 Steve Kroft. "President Rouhani." CBSNews - 60 Minutes. September 20, 2015. Accessed November 30, 2015. http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-president-hassan-rouhani-nuclear-deal-60-minutes/.

5 Knowledge of American involvement in the coup has been public information since at least the publication of Kermit Roosevelt's memoir-style account *Countercoup*, and was widely known in Iran soon after the Shah's restoration. Quoted by Malcolm Byrne in "Introduction," in *Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, xiii.

6 Hugh Wilford, *America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 160-161.

7 See Michael Martin, "The Rhetoric of Misdirection: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Response to the Gestapo's Investigation," *Journal of Communication and Religion* 28 (2005): 206-223; Lindon Layton Best, "Rhetorical Misdirection: Of Public Policy and Duplicitous Rhetoric." Master's Dissertation, University of Manchester, 2012; Mike Markel, "The Rhetoric of Misdirection in Corporate Privacy-Policy Statements," *Technical Communication Quarterly* 14 (2005), 197-214; John Arthos Jr., "The Shaman-Trickster's Art of Misdirection: The Rhetoric of Farrakhan and the Million Men," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 87 (2001): 41-60.

8 For background on the U.S. deliberation on this point, see Robert T. Handy, "Patrick J. Hurley and China, 1944-1945," (MA Thesis, Portland State University, 1971), 54-61.

9 See Stephen McFarland, "The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Onset of the Cold War," in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York: Routledge, 1994) and Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

10 Indeed, the October 29, 1944 *New York Times* article headline reporting the crisis literally read "Iran's Oil Problem Revived by Russia… Country in British Sphere of Influence, but Americans Also Are Involved." J.H. CARMICAL. "IRAN'S OIL PROBLEM REVIVED BY RUSSIA." *New York Times* (1923-Current File), Oct 29, 1944, http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/106992014?accountid=7014 (accessed December 8, 2015).

11 See Harry S. Truman: "The President's News Conference," March 8, 1946. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12600 and Harry S. Truman: "The President's News Conference," March 14, 1946. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12609.

12 Quoted by Denise Bostdorff in *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 29.

13 Indeed, Stalin and Molotov viewed the indigenous Tudeh Party with annoyance and started a new Soviet-backed puppet Communist Party in Iran, the Iranian Azerbiajan Party (ADN). See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khruschev* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 120-125.

14 See Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1-43.

15 For more on the relationship between Reza Shah and the Majlis, see Richard Frye, *Persia* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 90-104.

16 See Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy 1941-1953* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 37 and Homa Katouzian, *Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990).

17 See Azimi, *Iran,* 35-265 and Homa Katouzian, "Mosaddeq's Government in Iranian History," in *Mohammed Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, 1-3. One example provided by Katouzian of the chaos of this era was the 1946 offering of a bounty on the front pages of a major antiroyalist newspaper for the assassination of the newly elected prime minister.

18 See Fakhreddin Azimi, "The Reconciliation of Politics and Ethics, Nationalism and Democracy: an Overview of the Political Career of Dr Muhammad Mussadiq," in *Mussadiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil* ed. James A. Bill and WM. Roger Louis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 47-68.

19 One of the major reasons oil nationalization in particular was popular was because the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's profits were ten times its expenses, all of the profit going to the British. Richard H. Immerman, *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 65.

20 Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, *Mission For My Country* (London: Hutchinson, 1961), 90-91.

21 See Ambrose, *Ike's Spies*, 194-196.

22 The United States did, however, try to pressure both sides to improve their offer at the negotiating table, a tactic that apparently almost worked to secure an agreement. See Ronald W. Ferrier, "The Anglo-Iranian oil dispute: a triangular relationship," in *Mussadiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, 185

23 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Convention Hall, Philadelphia" Address, September 4, 1952, in folder July 12, 1952 to Sept. 14, 1952 (2), Box 1, Speech Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman file), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

24 "NSC 136/1." National Security Archive. November 20, 1952. Accessed December 8, 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/iran521120.pdf.

25 Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846

26 John Foster Dulles, "Christian Responsibility for Peace," May 4, 1948. Quoted by Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman in *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 63.

27 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 107. On this note, it is also worth referencing Eisenhower's 1956 letter to Richard Leo Simon in which he elaborated his view on war more fully: "…we are rapidly getting to the point that no war can be *won*. War implies a contest: when you get to the point that contest is no longer involved and the outlook comes close to the destruction of the enemy and suicide for ourselves—an outlook that neither side can ignore—then arguments as to the exact amount of available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues." Reprinted by David Broder, "Negotiate or Die—Eisenhower," *Washington Post*, Sept 7, 1983.

28 John Foster Dulles, "Thoughts on Soviet Policy and What to Do About It," *Life* 20 (June 3, 1946), 112ff. Quoted by Bowie and Immerman, *Waging Peace*, 64.

29 It is worth remembering that the British Empire, even after the loss of India and Pakistan, still comprised the world's third largest economy in the early 1950s. See Byrne, "Road to Intervention," 217-218 and Jim Tomlinson, "The Decline of the Empire and the Economic 'Decline' of Britain," *Twentieth Century British History* 14 (2003), 201-221.

30 Transcript of remarks, White House Office, "National Security Council Staff Notes on the Remarks of the Honorable Loy Henderson, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Before the NSC Planning Board," June 25, 1953, as found in *Documentary History of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidency, Volume 10: CIA Intervention in Iran and the Nationalization of the Iranian Oil Industry*, ed. Nancy Beck Young (Abilene: Library of Congress, Copyright LexisNexis, 2009), 86.

31 Dwight Eisenhower, "Letter to General George Sloan," quoted by Helen Bury in *Eisenhower and the Cold War Arms Race* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2014), 52.

32 Quoted by Kenneth Osgood in *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 46.

33 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File) SPEECH SERIES, Box 2 folder, Sept. 26, 1952 to Oct. 13, 1952 (3)

34 Martin J. Medhurst, "Introduction," in *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership,* ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 1.

35 Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 1-3.

36 See Jeffrey Brooks, "When the Cold War Did Not End: The Soviet Peace Offensive of 1953 and the American Response," *Kennan Institute Occasional Papers Series, Wilson Center* (2000). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/op278_when_cold_war_did_not_end_brooks_2000.pdf Accessed December 8, 2015.

37 Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1990* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 147.

38 For more on the psychological, rhetorical, and propaganda dimensions of the Cold War in this period, see Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands, eds., *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Martin J. Medhurst, ed., *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1994); Martin J. Medhurst, Robert L. Ivie, Phillip Wander, and Robert L. Scott*, Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, Ideology* 2nd ed. (Easting Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997); in addition to Francis Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2001); Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, 138-209; LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, 146-170; Walter Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: Palgrave Macmillon, 1997); and Osgood, *Total Cold War*.

39 Central Intelligence Agency, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953," NIE 75, November 13, 1952. Quoted by Mark Gasiorowski in "Coup d'État Against Mossadeq," in *Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran,* 230-231.

40 As James Bill points out, many in the US mass media confusedly portrayed Mossadegh himself as a Communist, with *Time* magazine calling his movement "one of the worst calamities to the anti-Communist world since the Red conquest of China." See James A. Bill, "The politics of intervention," in *Mussadiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, 275.

41 It is unclear how much oversight Eisenhower exercised over Operation Ajax; however, the plan had to be approved by Eisenhower before it could be put into effect. As Ambrose notes, "Eisenhower participated in none of the meetings that set up Ajax; he received only oral reports on the plan; and he did not discuss it with his Cabinet or the NSC. Establishing a pattern he would hold to throughout his Presidency, he kept his distance and left no documents behind that could implicate the President in any projected coup. But in the privacy of the Oval Office, over cocktails, he was kept informed by Foster Dulles, and he maintained a tight control over the activities of the CIA." Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 111.

42 Donald Wilber, *Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran: November 1952-August 1953*. Accessed via National Security Archive website, December 9, 2015. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/. Also see Homa Katouzian, "The CIA Documents and the 1953 Coup in Iran," in *The CIA Documents on the 1953 Coup*, ed. Gholamreza Vatandoust (Tehran: Rasa, 2000).

43 Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

44 Indeed, the records of the National Security Council Meetings from March 11, July 30, and August 27 all mention that the Director of Central Intelligence gave an oral briefing on the situation in Iran, and then make no mention as to the contents of this briefing. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Box 4, NSC Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

45 Misdirection as a strategy is discussed extensively by Peter Lamont and Richard Wiseman in their book *Magic in Theory*; however, I felt that introducing their framework for misdirection into this chapter might render my analysis overly technical. For those interested, see Peter Lamont and Richard Wiseman, *Magic in Theory: An Introduction to the Theoretical and Psychological Elements of Conjuring* (Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2005), 28-82.

46 Michael Martin, "The Rhetoric of Misdirection: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Response to the Gestapo's Interrogation, " *Journal of Communication and Religion* 28 (2005): 209.

47 Martin, "The Rhetoric of Misdirection," 210.

48 John Arthos Jr., "The Shaman-Trickster's Art of Misdirection: The Rhetoric of Farrakhan and the Million Men," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 87 (2001): 41-60; L.W. Levine, *Black Culture and the Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Michael Hardin, "The Trickster in History: The Heirs of Columbus and the Dehistorization of Narrative," *MELUS* 23 (1998): 25-45.

49 Mike Markel, "The Rhetoric of Misdirection in Corporate Privacy-Policy Statements," *Technical Communication Quarterly* 14 (2005): 197-214.

50 Mary Stuckey, *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 5.

51 Excerpts taken from: Dwight Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1953* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 160 and Arash Norouzi, "The Eisenhower - Mossadegh Cables: Complete Exchange of Messages." The Eisenhower - Mossadegh Cables: Complete Exchange of Messages. June 26, 2011. Accessed December 13, 2015. http://www.mohammadmossadegh.com/biography/dwight-d-eisenhower/cables/.

52 Quoted by Norouzi Arash, "The Eisenhower – Mossadegh Cables," Accessed December 13, 2015.

53 Ambrose, *Ike's Spies*, 196.

54 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1953. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9600

55 It bears mentioning that one of the main reasons the United States did not wish for the Iranian nationalization scheme to succeed (or result in an oil concession overly favorable to Iran) was to protect American oil interests in other countries like Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. As Acheson reported to Truman after meeting with US oil executives, "Representatives of the group emphasized the very grave consequences of giving the Iranians terms more favorable than those received by other countries. They expressed the opinion that if this were done the entire international oil industry would be seriously threatened…. [They] pointed out that not just the oil industry was involved but indeed all American investment overseas and the concept of the sanctity of contractual relations." Quoted by James Bill, "The Politics of Intervention," 276.

56 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address at Annual Dinner of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.," April 21, 1956. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10786

57 For examples of this rhetoric, see Dwight D. Eisenhower: "The President's News Conference," August 11, 1954. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9977; Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Remarks and Address at Dinner of the National Conference on the Foreign Aspects of National Security," February 25, 1958. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11308; Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Remarks at the President's Birthday Breakfast.," October 14, 1958. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11259.

58 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Exchange of Messages Between the President and Prime Minister Mossadegh on the Oil Situation and the Problem of Aid to Iran," July 9, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9633

59 Kennett Love, "MOSSADEGH IS SEEN FACING A DILEMMA." *New York Times* (1923-Current File), Jul 11, 1953, http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/112697032?accountid=7014 (accessed December 13, 2015).

60 Special to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. "IRAN SEEMS STUNNED BY EISENHOWER NOTE." *New York Times* (1923-Current File), Jul 12, 1953, http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/112567525?accountid=7014 (accessed December 13, 2015).

61 In later retellings, Ike framed the choice as one between wisdom (stewarding America's resources) vs. unwisdom (pouring more money into a failing and untrustworthy regime). Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 162.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Lion's Last Roar, Eagle's First Flight: Eisenhower at Suez

When the crisis was over, when the abscess had burst, the world was a different place. But, of all the nations involved, Great Britain was affected most immediately, most dramatically. For although Britain's economic and military strength had long been trickling away, Anthony Eden's Suez policy and its mortifying aftermath made it apparent to everyone there and to most people everywhere that Britain could no longer exercise power on a global scale. Sixty years after Queen Victoria's Jubilee, the lion roared for the last time.[1]

- Chester Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956*

All my life I have been a man of peace, working for peace, striving for peace, negotiating for peace. I have been a League of Nations man and a United Nations man and I'm still the same man, with the same convictions. I couldn't be other, even if I wished.[2]

- Sir Anthony Eden, BBC Address to the Nation, November 3, 1956

We have given our whole thought to Hungary and the Middle East. I don't give a damn how the election goes.[3]

- Dwight Eisenhower, telephone call with Anthony Eden, November 1, 1956

So significant was the Suez Crisis for Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister from 1955 to 1957, that he dedicated fully one-third of his 654-page memoir to the episode.[4] Indeed, as historian D. R. Thorpe writes, there has been a general tendency to "assess his career backwards" through the lens of Suez, so central was the event to Eden's legacy.[5] Unfortunately for Eden, most of these assessments are "unremittingly hostile" in their treatment of him, often viewing his choices made at Suez as incriminating evidence of "devious recklessness, anachronistic colonialism masquerading as a police action," revisionist efforts

aside.[6] Regardless of one's view of Eden, however, it is impossible to discuss the man without also addressing Suez.

As with Eden, so with rhetoric: the Suez Crisis, among its manifold implications, marked a clear end to the rhetorical neglect of the Middle East offered by American presidents, for better or worse. Occurring at the literal conclusion of Eisenhower's first term, the events of Suez—the nationalization and blocking of the canal, the Israeli invasion of Egypt followed shortly by the armies of Britain and France, Nikolai Bulganin's threat to rain rockets on Paris and London,[7] and the American decision to wage economic and diplomatic war on its allies to end the crisis—impacted the various nations involved in differing ways. For students of presidential rhetoric, however, the words by which Eisenhower addressed the situation are as significant as the events of Suez themselves, for it was in Ike's Suez Crisis speech that the president first argued for a uniquely American responsibility to solve the problems of the Middle East. In doing so, the president initiated the rhetorical transformation of America's relationship to the Middle East that would be consummated in the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Context: Eisenhower's First Administration

Eisenhower's first term was eventful, to say the least. The Cold War with the Soviets grew frostier still, with both superpowers in possession of hydrogen bombs and little progress made toward disarmament or peace beyond a nebulous "spirit" of the Geneva Conference. In addition to Operation Ajax, the United States had covertly intervened in Guatemala, planned to do so in Syria, and had sent CIA advisors to countries far and wide, including Egypt. West Germany was integrated

as a full NATO member after the European Defense Community failed to form, to which the Soviets responded by organizing their European satellite states into the Warsaw Pact. In Asia, Ike and Dulles successfully negotiated the end of the Korean War and avoided a military conflagration over Taiwan, and a tentative ceasefire was reached in Vietnam after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Though Eisenhower could honestly tell American voters that he "kept us at peace" as they went to the polls in 1956, after a decade of Cold War the world remained a tinderbox.[8]

In terms of presidential rhetoric, Eisenhower produced the majority of his most memorable campaigns and speeches in the years 1952-1956. These rhetorical performances, as Ira Chernus and Kenneth Osgood note, often inaugurated massive propaganda campaigns by which the United States sought to influence public opinion (both foreign and domestic) in an increasingly globalized, increasingly psychological project of containment.[9] From his sermonic first inaugural address to his "Open Skies" proposal, from "Atoms for Peace" to the "New Look," Eisenhower's major rhetorical performances coalesced around a singular purpose: to wage Cold War. Or, as Martin Medhurst puts it,

> Eisenhower operated from the premise that "The future shall belong to the free." Far from merely announcing this sentiment, Ike set about to make it a reality. Foremost among Eisenhower's weapons in this war was rhetorical discourse—"discourse intentionally designed to achieve a particular goal with one or more specific audience."… To Ike, the Cold War was not first and foremost "cold" it was first and foremost "war,"…[10]

And indeed, a rhetorical war it was. Nikita Khrushchev, who by the end of Ike's first term had consolidated control of the Politburo, proved just as adept a propagandist as Eisenhower. He shrewdly supported Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah and the Congo's Patrice Lumumba, both of whom thundered against their nations' former

West European colonial masters as well as their "American protectors," and he later "discovered" and adopted Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution. Khrushchev branded America a "warmongering" superpower intent on dominating the world in the mold of Britain or France.[11] In doing so, he positioned the Soviet Union as an anti-imperialist champion, exposed America's alliance with Britain and France as a propaganda Achilles heel, and put the United States on the psychological defensive in the rapidly growing post-colonial world.[12]

Given that few regions were as much affected by decolonization or were in as much political turmoil as the Middle East during Eisenhower's first term, it is unsurprising that the region quickly became a central—and volatile—front in the Cold War. Hashemite monarchies in Iraq and Jordan fought to contain restive nationalist movements within their borders, and teenage King Hussein especially struggled to consolidate control in Amman after the assassination of his grandfather (Abdullah I) and abdication of his father (Talal I). Bloody cross-border raids between Israeli forces and Palestinian Fedayeen based in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria became common, with both sides massacring civilian populations. Making matters worse, Israel violated the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 by secretly purchasing arms from France while Britain continued to arm and train the Jordanian military—even after British control of the Arab Legion diminished following the dismissal of John Glubb in March 1956.[13] Along the Nile, an army coup led by General Mohammad Naguib deposed King Farouk I, and after a power struggle Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged not only as the leader of Egypt, but the swaggering symbol of a rising pan-Arab nationalism across the Middle East. On the region's periphery,

Algerian nationalists began a violent war of independence against their French rulers, and tensions threatened to boil over in Yemen between British-controlled Aden and the northern Imamate. With every conflict, the potential for the Soviet Union to overstep containment—and thereby threaten Europe's energy source and economy—grew.[14] Because of the Eisenhower administration's New Look emphasis on collective security, a threat to Europe also constituted a threat to America, rendering such a scenario highly dangerous in the minds of American defense policymakers.

Rhetorically, the Eisenhower administration was largely quiet as it sought to safeguard the West's oil interests and maintain peace in the region. In 1953, for example, Ike dispatched businessman Eric Johnston as his personal ambassador to the Middle East. Johnston's mission was, in Eisenhower's intentionally vague words, to "explore with the governments of the countries of that region certain steps which might be expected to contribute to an improvement of the general situation in the region."[15] This directive was characterized as being primarily economic in nature, reinforcing the image of America as a helpful but ultimately distanced party. Covertly, however, Johnston was also tasked with negotiating an Arab-Israeli settlement via the secret Project Alpha peace talks between Egypt and Israel. After Johnston failed to secure an agreement, Eisenhower protégé Robert Anderson was sent on a similarly unsuccessful mission. While ultimately ineffective, these missions and their covert natures underscored not only the deepening US commitment to the Middle East, but also the way in which this commitment

remained largely hidden from the public eye beyond economic aid packages and diplomatic platitudes of friendship.

Even after Dulles publicized the Project Alpha talks in August 1955 in a last-ditch effort to arrive at a peace treaty, the American media's main reaction was to praise him for demonstrating "good will" and "characteristic courage" rather than seriously reevaluate America's deepening commitment to the Middle East. According to the *Providence Journal* the United States had done "a fine and inspiring" thing, not supplanted Britain; the *New York News*, in another case, wrote that "We don't doubt Mr. Dulles' sincerity… But it seems to us that the U.S. is once again finding out how rocky the road usually is for a nation that tries to be everybody's well-heeled sweetheart."[16] By emphasizing the idealistic naivety of America's effort to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement—in a speech in which Dulles admitted that Ike desired "the United States join in formal treaty engagements" for regional "collective security" purposes—these media outlets reinforced the narrative that America was not the dominant foreign power in the region.[17] Thus, the Eisenhower administration's rule of publicly downplaying its role in the Middle East remained largely intact into 1956.[18]

Khrushchev's propaganda offensive rendered this strategy problematic. By masking the American presence in the Middle East and allowing Britain (and to a lesser degree France) to remain the face of containment in the region, Eisenhower played into the Soviet critique that America was a supporter of imperialism. While not a new line of criticism, the salience of this argument increased throughout the 1950s as access to resources residing in (post)colonial lands was being determined

more and more by the formerly colonized people, not their colonizers. Eisenhower's public stances supporting America's allies—typically accomplished by declaring assent to the "neutral" status quo, as in the Operation Ajax episode—belied his conviction that America must not lose the Cold War by estranging the newly independent neutral nations of the world. As Ike wrote in a private letter, "among all the powerful nations of the world the United States is the only one with a tradition of anti-colonialism…. The standing of the United States as the most powerful of the anti-colonial powers is an asset of incalculable value to the Free World."[19] He would not risk losing this advantage, even if it meant going against his old allies and overturning decades of American policy and rhetoric. Of this fact Britain and France were unaware, setting the stage for Suez.

Richard Gregg's illuminating study of Ike's Suez Crisis address speaks to this tension present in Ike's Suez Crisis address.[20] Gregg's work shows how Eisenhower's rhetoric was shaped by the desire not to offend the postcolonial world and how he sought to distance the United States from the actions of its allies. Utilizing a situational analysis of the speech, Gregg shows how Eisenhower "employed idealistic rhetoric" to "distance two areas of conflict in the world [Eastern Europe and Suez] from the shores of this country and thus from the immediate concerns of the American public."[21] He also explains how Eisenhower's speech attempted to navigate the complex diplomatic dance of balancing America's need to reassure its allies of its continuing commitment to them with the need to appeal to their virulently anticolonial former subjects. However, as Gregg also states, the complexity of the Suez Crisis dictates that "Eisenhower's speech must be

explicated on several different levels."[22] To answer the question of how Ike negotiated the multifaceted demands confronting him, a closer analysis Eisenhower's proposed solution to the problem of Cold War-era imperialism in the Middle East is required. It is my contention that Ike not only sought to *distance* America from its allies, but that he used this speech and the crisis it addressed to make an argument for why America should *displace* them. In other words, Ike's speech marked the first time an American president made a comprehensive case for a uniquely American responsibility to maintain order and safeguard the Middle East independently of other powers, and therefore it marked a dramatic (though understated) shift in presidential rhetoric that prepared the way for the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Setting the Stage: Nationalization and Crisis

In 1954, Colonel Nasser came to power in Egypt following the Free Officers' Coup. He despised the continuing presence of British troops at Suez and became even more alienated by the Baghdad Pact—an anti-Soviet defensive alliance among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain—which he saw as strengthening Iraq at Egypt's expense.[23] Frustrated by successful Israeli military incursions in the Sinai (made possible by French weapons), he eventually circumvented the Tripartite Agreement himself and agreed to a $200 million arms deal with the Communists. These actions and others caused America and Britain to cancel their offer to finance the Aswan Dam.[24] In retaliation, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, infuriating British Prime Minister Eden[25] and French Premier Guy Mollet, who opposed Nasser for his pan-Arabist support for the Algerian rebels.[26]

Eisenhower, wishing to avoid an invasion of Egypt by its former imperial masters and the inevitable international backlash such an action would bring, sought to adjudicate the situation through a series of conferences overseen by Secretary of State Dulles. The British and French, however, secretly began plans to collaborate with Israel to bring down Nasser. In a Foreign Office cable, Undersecretary Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick described Whitehall's thinking, revealing the disparity in American and British Cold War strategy:

> I wish the President were right. But I am convinced that he is wrong.... If we sit back while Nasser consolidates his position and gradually acquires control of the oil-bearing countries, he can, and is, according to our information, resolved to wreck us. If Middle East oil is denied to us for a year or two our gold reserves will disappear. If our gold reserves disappear the sterling area disintegrates. If the sterling area disintegrates and we have no reserves we shall not be able to maintain a force in Germany or, indeed, anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. And a country that cannot provide for its defence is finished.[27]

As Kirkpatrick's quote indicates, British policymakers viewed the situation in the Middle East primarily as an issue of national security, as did Eisenhower and Dulles. However, Ike viewed virtually all security issues within the larger framework of containment; in this instance, containment meant not fueling Khrushchev's anti-imperialist propaganda machine. British planners such as Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, conceived of national security in terms of access to resources and preserving British prestige; they thus chose to attack Nasser. This response was in diametric opposition to the Cold War strategy of the Eisenhower administration. Yet because the British apparently did not realize that they were acting against the wishes of their strongest ally—no doubt in part because America consistently abstained from joining the Baghdad Pact and Ike refused to publicly identify the Middle East as an

area of American responsibility—neither the United States nor Britain was aware of the fact they were on a collision course.[28]

Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion's plan to overthrow Nasser was straightforward. Israel would attack Egypt in the Sinai claiming it was responding to Fedayeen attacks. Britain and France would next "intervene" to prevent further bloodshed; the Royal Air Force would destroy Egyptian military installations and demoralize the civilian populace. Delivering the coup de grâce, 80,000 European troops would then land in the Canal Zone, destroy whatever Arab resistance was offered, and depose Nasser if his own people had not already done so. The secret plot was aptly codenamed Operation Musketeer.[29]

The plan went into effect October 29. Complicating matters, on October 22 popular protests erupted in Budapest against the Russian occupation of Hungary, much as had happened in Poland earlier that year.[30] Though at first it appeared as though the protests might be successful, by October 31 Soviet troops poured into Budapest and crushed the uprising, initiating a week-long bloodbath starting just a few hours after Eisenhower's Suez speech.[31] These bewildering events took place, no less, during the final stretch of the 1956 presidential campaign between Ike and challenger Adlai Stevenson. Yet a mere six days from the election, with bombs falling on Cairo and Soviet soldiers rounding up Hungarian dissidents, Eisenhower went before the American public and addressed the nation.

Analysis of the Address

Medhurst, writing about how the "Cold War weapons" of "words, images, [and] symbolic actions" were employed, describes how the primary aim of Cold War

rhetors was to improve their nation's strategic position "without sacrificing the concomitant goal of avoiding world conflagration."[32] It is in consideration of this strategic use of rhetoric, within the frameworks of presidential discourse on the Middle East, the Cold War, and the president's sense-making capacity, that I analyze the president's address of October 31.

The speech was brief. Excluding the salutation and closing, it consisted of 48 paragraphs, 32 of which are one or two sentences long. Eisenhower opened, "My fellow Americans: Tonight I report to you as your President,"[33] clearly identifying the American public as his primary auditors, although his words bore significance for multiple audiences: Congress, unsure of whether military action will be taken or requested; Eden, Ben-Gurion, and Mollet; America's other allies around the globe; Nasser and the Egyptian people; the Communist bloc, mistrusting of America's intent in Hungary and Suez; and the nonaligned nations. Though his words carried obvious weight for the many parties involved, Ike continued to treat the American public as his primary audience by assuming the guise of a reporter giving only "a report of essential facts." He did his utmost to remove himself from the text; he continued to speak positioned as a third party, disconnected from the events which were taking place. The pronoun "I" was employed only 11 times in the body of this speech. In its stead, Ike referred to the actions of "your government," and used the plural pronoun "we" 35 times. Throughout the speech Ike's tone was firm, straightforwardly informing the nation about the "swiftly changing world scene." Yet by removing himself from the text, Ike maintained that the words he spoke were an accurate, objective interpretation of the world and thereby rendered competing

explanations by definition subjective—the realm of mere opinion. Commenting on the factual and inexpressive nature of the address, rhetorician James Pratt notes, "The speech could have been read by [news anchor] Chet Huntley."[34] Clearly, Eisenhower wished to insert himself sparingly in this speech, and in examining the domestic political setting we are given reason why.

As many have noted, especially Fred Greenstein, Eisenhower was supremely adept at propagating an image of noble statesmanship, even at times accused of inattention, all while astutely navigating the nation's political winds. This strategy insulated Ike from volatile issues like McCarthyism, civil rights legislation, and intra-party power struggles. He was perceived to be "confident but modest, cheerful but able to be appropriately stern, direct and candid in speech, paternalistically caring and honest."[35] Given his stature and success, many 1956 GOP candidates relied heavily upon Eisenhower's popularity in their bid to retake Congress, hoping to achieve reelection on the back of the "man of peace."[36] All this was thrown in doubt by the eruption of conflict in Hungary and Egypt. Democratic challenger Adlai Stevenson had repeatedly and thus far unsuccessfully attempted to criticize Eisenhower's foreign policy track record; the twin crises, conveniently arriving at the race's conclusion, presented evidence that Stevenson could be right about the president's foreign policy flaws.

However, by creating rhetorical distance with phrases like "your government" and using the protreptic "we," Eisenhower depoliticized the events taking place across the world and refuted Stevenson.[37] He acknowledged that "the full and free debate of a political campaign surrounds us," yet then immediately

asserted, "But the events and issues I wish to place before you this evening have no connection whatsoever with matters of partisanship. They are concerns of every American."[38] By defining the subject he was about to address as outside the bounds of the current presidential campaign, Eisenhower delegitimized any response the opposition could give. In doing so, he also claimed the epistemological high ground. As president, his perspective was not that of a mere candidate running for office but the lofty view of one who possessed all the available information, speaking not from opinion but fact; he was employing presidential rhetoric in the fullest sense of the term: "defining political reality."[39] Here Eisenhower's ethos worked to establish for his audience both the facts of the events and the perspective from which to view them. Since he was discussing foreign policy happenings of a military nature, Ike's perceived authority on the matter was unassailable.

Having identified himself and his audience, Eisenhower did not then relinquish his reporter guise but rather employed its authority to define the situation: "In Eastern Europe there is the dawning of a new day. It has not been short or easy in coming." Eisenhower next traced the reason why such a day had been long in arriving, explaining that "After World War II, the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the nations of Eastern Europe, governments of Soviet choice—servants of Moscow." Thus did the president, consistent with prior Cold War rhetoric, characterize the USSR as military oppressors occupying half of Europe.[40] After all, for what reason did "the people of Poland—with their proud and deathless devotion to freedom" desire a new government which would "strive genuinely to serve the Polish people," and why had the Hungarians "offered their

very lives for independence from foreign masters" if not because of Soviet occupation?[41] Eisenhower's language classified the actions of the Poles and Hungarians as freedom-loving—even going so far as to reference the role emigrants from those nations played in the American Revolution—enabling him to play upon the established dualism of Cold War rhetoric and characterize the Soviet Union as a threat to liberty without directly saying such a thing.

Consistent with Eisenhower's desire to not exacerbate the Cold War, he also did not blatantly vilify the Soviets.[42] In this speech he sought to remove any "false fears" from Soviet leaders that America "would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies. We have no such ulterior purpose." The last thing the president wanted was to precipitate a war. Yet, the distinction he made in the speech was clear. By suppressing the Eastern Europeans, the Soviets were an unabashed threat to democracy, rightful independence, and freedom. Indeed, given the American political climate at the time, having lived through six years of Senator McCarthy, it is likely that any additional Soviet demonization or saber-rattling on Eisenhower's part would have led to needless alarm[43] —after all, Bulganin *had* just threatened to attack London and Paris.[44]

In reality, Soviet soldiers had already begun cracking down on Hungarian protestors by the time Eisenhower gave his address. This disconnect highlighted even further the differences between America and her Communist rival. Whereas the Soviets were forcibly imposing their will on subjugated populaces, Eisenhower declared, "We see these people as friends, and we wish simply that they be friends who are free." According to Ike, the United States sought not to dominate smaller

nations. Instead, Americans "help to keep alive the hope of these peoples for freedom" while they suffered under Communist oppression. Ike repeatedly contrasted the Soviet Union, which refused to grant true independence and employed brute military might to overpower "Poland, Hungary, and Rumania [sic]," with America, who's only wish was for these people to experience the same liberty it enjoyed. Unlike the oppressive USSR, America's interest in Hungary was innocent.[45]

Robert Ivie identifies this force versus freedom contrasting technique as a common *topos* employed by American presidents to characterize enemies.[46] Metaphors of savagery often function as vehicles of decivilization, creating the image of an implacably hostile foe.[47] Describing how Communist enemies were represented during the Cold War, Ivie writes,

> Various terms characterize the enemy as irrational, coercive, and aggressive….They speak of Soviets as if they were snakes, wolves, and other kinds of dangerous predators, and as if they were primitives, brutes, barbarians, mindless machines, criminals, lunatics, fanatics, and the enemies of God.[48]

Such a rendering allowed the Communists to "symbolize the perfect enemy of freedom."[49] While Eisenhower stopped somewhat short of such a dramatic exposition of the Soviet Union in this speech, the theme of force versus freedom is present. With such a powerful enemy that is opposed to the liberty of humankind running globally amok, a necessary counterweight must emerge to ensure the rule of law and enable democratic values to flourish—the United States.[50] Thus Eisenhower, utilizing the contrasting *topos* of force versus freedom, firmly established American virtue (particularly dedication to freedom) before advancing to Suez.

At this critical juncture the president shifted his focus to "that other part of the world where, at this moment, the situation is somber." Before addressing the developing situation in Suez, he first situated the political context of the crisis for his listeners:

> I speak of course, of the Middle East. This ancient crossroads of the world was, as we all know, an area long subject to colonial rule. This rule ended after World War II, when all countries there won full independence. Out of the Palestinian mandated territory was born the new State of Israel.
> These historic changes could not, however, instantly banish animosities born of the ages. Israel and her Arab neighbors soon found themselves at war with one another. And the Arab nations showed continuing anger toward their former colonial rulers, notably France and Great Britain.[51]

Eisenhower's account portrayed Arabs in several desensitizing ways. First, he claimed that the Middle East existed in a different chronological reality than America. It remained an "ancient" land "long subject" to colonial powers, ruled by "animosities born of the ages"—an oft-iterated romantic trope used to describe the region by Westerners. In fact, this language is toned down from an earlier draft which read "these antagonisms are lost in legend."[52] Speaking to this phenomenon, in his seminal work *Orientalism* Edward Said identified the ways in which time and space have rhetorical imaginative functions; they acquire poetic dimensions, says Said, through which "anonymous reaches of distances are converted into meaning for us here."[53] Said noted that Western European characterizations of the "Orient" seemingly always associate it with being "not quite ignorant, not quite informed," a depiction he claims goes as far back as Classical Greece.[54] For the British and French this view of the Middle East often took a literary or poetic turn. However, Orientalism in its American iteration, Said argues, is not concerned with romantic reconstructions but rather with facts. He writes, "The net effect of this remarkable

omission in modern American awareness of the Arab or Islamic Orient is to keep the region and its people conceptually emasculated, reduced to 'attitudes,' 'trends,' statistics: in short, dehumanized."[55] By placing them in a different chronological reality and expositing them as being ruled by passion, Eisenhower denied the Arab Egyptians full (i.e. rational) personhood. They were not people, only static stock characters in his rhetorical drama.

By characterizing the Egyptians this way, Eisenhower borrowed heavily from the American Orientalist frame.[56] There existed very palpable causes and motivations for Egyptian behavior regarding the British occupation. The Arab-Israeli conflict was a relatively recent phenomenon beginning with the original Zionist settlement of the 1910s, and the failure of Project Alpha in addition to American and British refusal to sell Egypt arms or fund the Aswan Dam exacerbated Nasser's conflict with the West.[57] Yet Eisenhower chose to characterize the Middle East as a capricious territory ruled by ahistorical forces, often violent and full of vengeance. He ascribed Egyptian violence not to its immediate sources, but to vague cultural forces timelessly at work. In articulating an inert Middle East, Ike perpetuated an errant Orientalist understanding of the region to the American public.[58]

Second, having constituted in the minds of his listeners a Middle East outside of time and riddled with blood feuds, Eisenhower then allocated blame for the conflict's genesis. Showing "continual anger" toward the colonial powers, Egypt exercised "misguided policy" and "aggravated" tensions in the region by rearming via Soviet weapons and then "seizing" the Suez Canal. Ike's description of a young

nation-state prone to unwise and emotional decisions reinforced aspects of this Orientalist narrative and contrasted Egyptian behavior with that of the prudential United States. America did not turn to force after the canal's seizure, but rather "insistently urged" its allies not to act out of violence. The president, emphasizing the rationality of the United States, remarked how America desired the path of negotiation and sought the involvement of the United Nations. Furthermore, his characterization of Egypt's actions as an understandable, yet excessive, response to colonialism allowed a comparison to be drawn to America's own postcolonial experience, in which it restored diplomatic relations relatively quickly and became a major trading partner with Britain.[59] Through synchronic and diachornic contrast, Eisenhower set up unwise Arab Egypt as a foil to the sensible United States.

Third, Eisenhower described the intense regional conflict resulting in Israeli nationhood (and Palestinian lack of statehood) in passive, selectively factual language that obfuscated America's role in the creation of the modern Middle East. While independence had come to the region in a technical sense, in reality the British were still deeply embedded as a colonial power in the 1950s. Israel, moreover, was widely viewed as an extension of Western hegemony and had received extensive backing from France and the United States, much of it private. Thus, by declaring that "all nations there won full independence" and that the Israelis and Arabs simply "found themselves at war with one another," Eisenhower reified an Orientalist explanation of the past decade's violence—warfare is simply a regular occurrence in this region resulting from antediluvian animosities —and concealed the much more tangible factors leading to conflict, such as the creation of

Israel or the ongoing British military presence. In doing so, he censored his audience's knowledge of prior American activities across the Middle East: support for Israel, influence in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, or involvement in toppling the Iranian government, just to name a few.

Again, Eisenhower argued that the Egyptians existed atemporally, behaved out of irrational aggression, and reacted to colonial actions in which America was uninvolved. Thus, according to the speech's logic, Nasser, as the embodiment of Arab Egypt, could not be relied upon to resolve the situation, and neither could any of the other prominent Arab nations such as Iraq or Saudi Arabia (not that politically, as monarchies, they could have). However, as Eisenhower next pointed out, neither could Israel, Britain, or France be trusted because they acted outside the prudent leadership of the United States. While Eisenhower sympathetically painted all three nations as acting out of "anxiety" and "fear" for their interests, he elaborated more fully on America's relationship with Israel:

> We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the new state of Israel and—at the same time—to strengthen our bonds with both Israel and with the Arab countries. But, unfortunately through all these years, passion in the area threatened to prevail over peaceful purposes, and in one form or another, there has been almost continuous fighting.[60]

Israel was paradoxically viewed by the Eisenhower administration as both a Cold War asset—Israel shared American democratic values and was staunchly anti-Communist—and hindrance—American support for Israel contaminated its attempts to attract Muslim states as allies. In addition to its perceived strategic value, Israel also elicited widespread emotional sympathy in America. The electoral influence of American Jews was also strong in states such as New York and

California, and their importance would not have been lost on the president with voting six days away.[61] Despite this, Eisenhower condemned the attack on Egypt, resisting Zionist pressure and staying true to his belief in equal treatment of nations. Earlier that year he had written in his diary

> ...there can be no change in our basic position, which is that we must be friends with both [Arab and Jewish] contestants in that region in order that we can bring them closer together. To take sides could do nothing but to destroy our influence in leading… the world today.[62]

Remaining committed to his position announced in July, the president determined that any aggression under the Tripartite Agreement was unacceptable, even if conducted by America's closest allies. Unlike the United States and its president, which "since the close of World War II" had "labored tirelessly to bring peace and stability to this area," Britain, France, and Israel unceremoniously exposed themselves as acolytes of war.

Having completely misread Eisenhower, Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion consequently found themselves in the position they least expected and for which they had not prepared—in opposition to the United States.[63] Not only would America decline to support them, but it was stridently *opposed* to the actions of its allies. Eisenhower, transitioning to the last phase of the speech, announced his policy:

> As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right—if our judgment so dictates—to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes.[64]

Eisenhower, aware of the magnitude of his announcement and the weight it would hold for global diplomacy, restated America's desire to maintain friendships

with Israel, Britain, and France and affirmed that he understood their anxieties. Indeed, he sought to accomplish a difficult rhetorical task; namely, to dissociate his nation from the actions of its allies while remaining a part of the group.[65] Yet, his position was clear: "the action taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed…. *there will be no United States involvement in these present hostilities*." (emphasis mine) As Gregg and others note, one of Ike and Dulles's major concerns was that the Soviets would successfully submit a resolution at the UN General Assembly calling for a ceasefire, thus forcing America to effectively choose between supporting the nonaligned nations or its allies. This decision was made all the more frustrating by Soviet control in Eastern Europe beginning to break down, or so it seemed to Dulles.[66] Though Ike had publicly lamented the allies' imperialist tendencies in the Arab world since the 1952 campaign, here the decisive turn was made.[67] By quickly coming to a decision *against* his allies (and submitting a UN resolution before the Soviets did), Eisenhower demonstrated that a new day had dawned in American Middle East policy.

To review: Eisenhower opened his address in the guise of president-as-reporter, and as Timothy Cole states, "foreign policy rhetoric … must also account for the behavior and motives of foreign policy actors."[68] Like a good reporter, Ike extended his "objective" lens to define the actors on stage and their motivations. First he identified the Communist Soviet Union, a villain who knows no language but aggression and no reason but force. Next, Ike exposited Nasser's Egypt as an oriental Easterner who is yet to mature to enlightened statehood, the generator of

the conflict and an analogue for the Arabs at large. Finally, he advanced to the Israelis, British, and French—friends all, but friends who cannot be trusted with regency of the region as revealed by their foolish military retaliation. Thus, Eisenhower's rhetorical narrative still required an answer to the question: what is the solution? How will America respond to this threat? (implicitly: who is responsible for the Middle East)?[69] Here the president broke with the Truman Doctrine—and every other presidential precedent for articulating America's stake in the Middle East—by not reaffirming a commitment to the status quo, with minor adjustments. Eisenhower, having disqualified all other contenders, found that only America remained to answer the call of duty. A close reading of the text shows that, having discarding the idea of British responsibility, Ike proposed a new premise for American Middle East engagement: it was the nation's job.

Announcing the country's willingness to assume the leadership mantle in the Middle East, Eisenhower proclaimed "it is—and it will remain—the dedicated purpose of your government to do all in its power to localize the fighting and end the conflict." Despite its unwillingness to fight militarily, Eisenhower's America still devoted itself to resolving the conflict. Far from accepting the Middle East as a British area of concern, Eisenhower announced that the United States had already and would continue to work toward responsibly ending the fight via "the processes of the United Nations."[70] Here the president carefully described the United Nations as supporting *America's* policy, not vice versa; the United Nations was thus positioned as a means for achieving the American end: peace. Moreover, invoking the United Nations allowed Eisenhower to avoid direct American insertion into the

conflict. He claimed that, "In the past the United Nations has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed. We believe it can and that it will do so again," (despite the organization's complete failure in the region's most intractable conflict, Palestine).[71] Thus Eisenhower's speech provided a complete narrative of threat, conflict, need for solution, and entrance of the United States as the solution—in this case presenting America as the guarantor of liberty against imperialism.[72] That Ike was able to soften the impact of this narrative arc and concomitant redefinition of America's stake in the Middle East by excluding a call to US military intervention in favor of UN action did not change the speech's logic. The Middle East as a whole was now clearly defined as an American interest, and the foundational premise justifying American engagement there had been permanently altered.

This shift in thinking is made evident by a comparison to the Truman Doctrine address of 1947.[73] In that speech, President Truman argued for increased aid allotments for Greece and Turkey, claiming that "Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy," and "if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it."[74] However, Truman couched his argument by framing the additional investiture of American aid as necessary because of London's economic inability, not Whitehall's moral failings: "The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31…. [London] has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey."[75] According to Truman's framing of the issue, America was only providing aid to Greece and Turkey because Britain was incapable of doing so—not because Britain

was unworthy or unfitting for the task. As mentioned earlier, the underlying rationale for the Truman Doctrine was financial in nature and had little to do with a dispute over principle.

By contrast, Eisenhower characterized the failings of Britain, France, and Israel at Suez as *moral* in nature. They acted in opposition to "the principles and purposes" of peaceful coexistence enshrined at the United Nations, and "determined that, in their judgment, there could be no protection of their vital interests without resort to force."[76] Whereas Truman described an exhausted Britain in need of fresh American strength to uphold regional order, Ike depicted America's allies as doubly capricious and foolhardy, reminding his audience that "we are forced to doubt that resort to force and war will for long serve the permanent interest of the attacking nations." In his framing, America's obligation to the Middle East stemmed not from its economic might, as the Truman Doctrine argued, but from its prudential and moral exemplarity, as evidenced by its consistent pursuit of peace. America was thus at the same time dissociated from its allies on a moral plane while still justified in assuming their mantle as the regional power broker.

Having redefined America's role in the region, Eisenhower then justified this shift by using idealistic, almost supernatural language to diagnose the world's ideological needs. Ned O'Gorman goes so far as to describe this aspect of Eisenhower's rhetoric as "priestly," in that he mediated between the ultimate reality of "America's spiritual greatness and the mundane material world," loftily interpreting events in a way that gave meaning to America's Cold War experience.[77] In concluding his address Eisenhower divined the deeper, spiritual meaning of these

events and his chosen course of action for the American people. As he proceeded to wax philosophic, Ike invoked within his report transcendent themes such as equality, justice, and humankind's quest for peace, all of which he formulated in vague enough terms as to be universally appealing.[78] By so doing he also provided the moral basis for an increased American presence in the Middle East:

> There can be no peace—without law. And there can be no law—if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us—and another for our friends.
>
> The society of nations has been slow in developing means to apply this truth. But the passionate longing for peace—on the part of all peoples of the earth—compels us to speed our search for new and more effective instruments of justice.
>
> The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It means the acceptance of law, and the fostering of justice, in all the world.
>
> To our principles guiding us in this quest we must stand fast. In so doing we can honor the hopes of all men for a world in which peace will truly and justly reign.[79]

Eisenhower, having already announced his policy decisions, left his listeners with a simple argument. Without law, there is no peace. There presently is no law. Therefore, there is no peace—at Suez, and in the Middle East generally.

However, as Eisenhower claimed, *all peoples of the earth* desire peace, providing a moral basis for American engagement as the nation of peace. Again, regardless of the literal actions proposed, this language amounted to a *rhetorical* transformation of American Middle East policy because it was now America's solemn duty to "stand fast" and bring about a "world in which peace will truly and justly reign." This was a task for the pure United States, not compromised Britain. It was now America's job, perhaps via the "instrument" of the United Nations or

perhaps independently, to maintain peace in the Middle East—a peace that meant far more than mere lack of conflict, but the adoption and flourishing of justice and law. Such Wilsonian, American-value-spreading rhetoric underscored the fact that an interventionist shift in policy had actually already occurred, as evidenced by America's diplomatic role, economic presence, and covert activity across the region.[80]

Eisenhower's speech also contained a narrative often used to justify intervention, that of rescue and salvation.[81] If other nations had been "slow in developing means to apply this truth," then the responsibility again fell upon the United States to promote a world in which "peace will truly and justly reign." Only America could do this in the Middle East, as already established in the speech via respective contrast with the other countries. Where the Soviets seek domination, America wants freedom; where Egypt acts out of indignant immaturity, America prudently suggests negotiation; while Israel, Britain, and France wield power irresponsibly, America pursues interests that benefit the world. According to Eisenhower's narrative, the United States of America was the only nation with the requisite virtue and prudence to vouchsafe such a vision of global prosperity, which would "honor the hopes of all men."

Post-Crisis Postscript: the Suez Crisis and the Eisenhower Doctrine

Eisenhower's speech, by providing a new American *raison d'être* in the Middle East, rhetorically paved the way for a much more assertive Middle East presence. The Suez Crisis thus represents not only a major shift in American Middle East policy, as numerous historians, political scientists, and former diplomats have

attested, but equally marks a rhetorical evolution in the presidential speech authorizing this change. Several major effects of Ike's rhetoric stand out when considering the significance of this address.

As with all political discourse, Eisenhower's speech must first be understood within its immediate contextual frame. The president determined that America should use its influence to guide the Suez Crisis to a resolution agreeable to the nonaligned world, and he communicated his intent to oppose Britain, France, and Israel clearly, despite the amicable language used. This decision was supported with the threat and limited application of military, political, and economic force.[82] In bringing the former imperial masters of the Middle East to the brink of economic disaster, Eisenhower left no doubt that America was in charge—and would remain so.[83] Ike's rhetoric functioned within this strategy to frame the United States' new approach to the Middle East in as persuasive terms as possible, articulating an interventionist ethic borne not from imperialist ambition, but the necessary dictates of the Cold War. For the sake of containment—not grandeur—America assumed its new responsibility to protect the Middle East from unwarranted outside aggression. This step, while ultimately directed against Russia, also necessitated that the United States protect the neutrality of Nasser's Egypt. And indeed Eisenhower's speech was celebrated throughout the Middle East as just that, a defense of the rights of Arab nations against the rapacious Europeans and Israelis. In that sense, the Suez Crisis speech stands as a hallmark pronouncement of American support for the sanctity of international law.

More broadly, Ike's Suez Crisis speech can be understood as constructing the underlying rhetorical foundation of the Eisenhower Doctrine announced sixty-six days later. The address does this in three primary ways. First, and most importantly, Ike's speech positioned the United States as an *inside* actor in the Middle East standing in opposition to the *outside* forces which sought to subjugate the region. When confronted by the crisis Ike could have adopted a policy of "neutrality" and stated that, though he regretted the actions of US allies, the problems of the Middle East were in the end not America's concern. Instead, by announcing that the United States would do "all in its power" to resolve the conflict, Eisenhower implicitly asserted that America had a right to act as the region's protector. America was therefore not an outside party seeking to impose its will on the Middle East, but a friend of the region defending it from such aggressors. In framing the issue as he did, Ike created an unspoken discrepancy between the actions of the United States, which were assumed to be legitimate, and those of other powers, which were by nature hostile.

While in this instance Ike applied his rubric to Britain, France, and Israel, in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech he would articulate this principle in far more robust terms as it pertained to "Communist aggression, both direct and indirect."[84] Indeed, Eisenhower went so far as to state that the simple declaration of his eponymous doctrine would "serve to halt any contemplated aggression." In essence, Ike argued that America's policy of being ready to intervene militarily anywhere in the Middle East (to prevent the spread of communism) meant that these nations "will not feel that they stand alone, under the menace of a great power." The only

way in which US policy was *not* the menace of a great power in this context was if America's actions were inherently legitimate—the actions of an accepted defender, not those of an external aggressor. In the Suez Crisis speech, Eisenhower's rhetoric worked to establish the United States as exactly that, an approved internal actor in the Middle East.

Second, the Suez Crisis address functioned to categorize the United States as a suitable stand-in for the United Nations in the Middle East. In Eisenhower's parlance, the United Nations and America are virtually indistinguishable in terms of ideals: both abhor the use of violence and prefer negotiations, both are motivated by the desire to protect smaller nations, and both are wholly dedicated to the cause of peace. In terms of action, Ike characterized America and the United Nations as consubstantial in deed as well as word; though Britain and France vetoed the UN Security Council proposal, temporarily thwarting "justice under international law," America would unilaterally enforce justice via economic sanctions.[85] Where the United Nations could not go, America was willing to act—presumably in similar fashion. Eisenhower's rhetoric also functioned to characterize the United Nations as the vehicle by which America's regional objectives would be realized, thus blurring the boundaries between the two organizations' purposes in the Middle East.

This haziness would be directly addressed in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech, in which Ike explicitly laid out the argument for why the United Nations was incapable of adequately serving as the sole "protector of small nations." As he stated, "when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved," that nation's Security Council veto prevented UN resolutions from succeeding—yet the United States,

undeterred by the Communists, was willing to fulfill the United Nation's role as a "dependable protector of freedom." In Ike's formulation, the United States was clearly identified with the United Nations vis-à-vis the security of Middle Eastern countries, thus authorizing American intervention in the name of regional self-defense. By describing American and UN aims as virtually interchangeable, Eisenhower's rhetoric in the Suez Crisis speech began the process of identifying the United States with the mission of the United Nations in the region.

Third, the Suez Crisis speech worked to disqualify Britain and France from the mantle of leadership in the Middle East and thus explains their notable absence in the Eisenhower Doctrine address. As this analysis demonstrates, Eisenhower made the case that Britain and France opted to use an "instrument of injustice—war" instead of employing peaceful means to "remedy" the "wrongs" done to them. The brazen choice to use force, which Ike labeled not "a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes," could "scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed." In short, Britain and France violated their word through their naked use of power. This offense thus precluded any claim to authority in the Middle East either of those countries might have possessed, opening the way for the United States to assume their mantle as the preeminent Western power in the region. Rhetorically, Eisenhower revoked the British (and French) decades-old mandate to rule the region in the Suez Crisis address.

With the Western European powers out of the picture, Ike could then argue in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech that the United States needed to fill "any lack of

power in the area" should Communist aggression surface—a power vacuum supposedly caused by the collapse of the European imperial order imposed on the Middle East after World War I. The prior work of delegitimizing Britain and France performed in the Suez Crisis speech provided an answer for why America could not simply reinforce its allies' position in the region, as the backing of such unsavory imperialists would be counterproductive to the larger strategy of containment. This rendering of Britain and France as unfit for authority appears to function as an *enthymeme* in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech; that is, Ike never argued explicitly for why the European imperial system was no longer suitable for the Middle East and was not in keeping with America's interest, yet this idea was necessary for the speech's logic to work. In syllogistic form, Ike's argument went something like this: the Europeans underwrote the Middle East's security for decades (stated premise), Britain and France are no longer capable of fulfilling this function (unstated premise), therefore America needs to fulfill this role if communism is to be contained (conclusion). Without the Suez Crisis address, the argumentative heart of the Eisenhower Doctrine speech does not make sense. The former should thus be understood as preparing the way for the latter.

In the second chapter, I pointed out several features of the Eisenhower Doctrine speech that could not be easily explained by examining that address alone. As I have shown, the Suez Crisis speech worked to lay the groundwork for Ike's pronouncement of the Middle East Resolution by positioning the United States as an insider, by classifying the United States as an appropriate substitute for the United Nations, and by removing Britain and France from the pool of appropriate leaders of

the region. Taken together, these elements reappeared in the Eisenhower Doctrine address in a formulation meant to prevent the expansion of communism in the Middle East. In the next chapter, I will investigate how the Eisenhower Doctrine was applied to justify the landing of American troops in Lebanon—and how this event produced a rhetorical template for Middle Eastern intervention which endures to this day.

Conclusion

The meaning of Suez differs for the various parties involved. For Britain and France, which before the crisis appeared as weakened but still functional colonial powers, Suez provided an exclamation point on their increasing global impotence, economic fragility, and dependence upon the United States to protect Western interests. For Egypt and other Arab states, the crisis served as an affirmation of Gamal Abdul Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism and led to regime changes and uprisings in response to his message. For Israel, Suez increased hostilities with Egypt, resulted in access to the Red Sea, and revealed the need to develop closer ties with the United States, thus setting the stage for the 1967 War. And for the superpowers, the Suez Canal Crisis introduced full-scale Cold War to the lands of Ramses, Mohammed, and Moses.

Rhetorically, the speech reversed much of the Eisenhower administration's prior language regarding the Middle East. Far from being a disinterested neutral party, America was now an insider, defending the region from outside interference. Eisenhower's characterization of the crisis's events and actors enabled him to provide a new basis for US engagement in the Middle East—the role of guardian and

guarantor of liberty—which broke from previously articulated rationales for American engagement in the region premised upon neutrality and deference to European sensibilities. By envisioning America as an independent agent for peace, Eisenhower prepared the United States to be thrust into the role previous presidents had insisted belonged to Britain—that of regional hegemon. Ike's America, as exposited in this speech, was the only nation worthy of protecting the Middle East from communism, and in the Eisenhower Doctrine address Ike would claim that it must. As made evident by the Eisenhower administration's intervention in Lebanon a year later, the twilight of British suzerainty in the Middle East had faded into an American dawn. After the Lion's last roar, the Eagle took flight.

Notes

1 Chester L. Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956* (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), 281-82.

2 Quoted by Keith Kyle in *Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 432.

3 Quoted by David A. Nichols in *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis, Suez and the Brink of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 255

4 See Book III, Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 465-654.

5 See D.R. Thorpe, *Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897-1977* (London: Chatto & Windus, 2003), 557.

6 Thorpe, *Eden*, xvii.

7 Louis Menand, "Nukes of Hazard," *The New Yorker*, September 30, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/nukes-of-hazard (accessed December 8, 2014).

8 To see the way the Eisenhower's 1956 presidential campaign utilized this claim, see Football/Peace Commercial," The Living Room Candidate - Commercials - 1956 - Football/Peace. Accessed August 31, 2015. http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1956/footballpeace

9 See Ira Chernus, *Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002) and Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

10 Martin J. Medhurst, "Introduction," in *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership* ed. Martin Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 7-8.

11 See Frederick Charles Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 111-114.

12 For more on Khrushchev's anti-imperialist propaganda, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khruschev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 203-209 and Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 355-358.

13 For a full explanation of the significance of Glubb's dismissal, see Joseph Massad's *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

14 The importance of Middle Eastern oil to the economy of the United Kingdom (and indeed all of Western Europe) was enhanced by three factors. First, the North Sea oilfields would not be fully discovered and exploited until the 1960s, leaving Britain with no significant domestic oil sources. Second, the politics of the Cold War prevented access to energy resources in Communist states, including Russia. And third, the size of oil tankers was substantially smaller than today, making the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope economically impossible. See Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power* (London: Free Press, 2009), 168-261, 478.

15 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Statement by the President on Eric Johnston's Mission to the Near East.," October 16, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9731

16 Media quotes taken from State Department report of reactions to Dulles's speech. "Further Reactions to Secretary Dulles' August 26 Statement on Israel-Arab Settlement (as of August 31)," in folder Alpha Speech – etc. Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, August 26, 1955 (1), Box 1, John Foster Dulles Papers, Subject Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

17 John Foster Dulles, "An Address by John Foster Dulles Before the Council on Foreign Relations New York, N.Y., August 26, 1955," in folder Alpha Speech – etc. Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, August 26, 1955 (4), Box 1, John Foster Dulles Papers, Subject Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

18 See Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 185-186.

19 Quoted by William Bragg Ewald, Jr. in *Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days: 1951-1960* (Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 119-120.

20 Richard B. Gregg, "The Rhetoric of Distancing: Eisenhower's Suez Crisis Speech, 31 October 1956," in Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 157-188.

21 Gregg, "The Rhetoric of Distancing," 184.

22 Gregg, "The Rhetoric of Distancing," 169.

23 Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar,* 65.

24 J.C. Hurewitz, "The Historical Context," in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences*, ed. WM Roger Williams & Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 20-28, and Abrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, 352.

25 Eden actually found out about the nationalization while dining with the Iraqi royal family and Iraqi President Nuri al-Said. He phoned Eisenhower, saying "Our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be finally destroyed…. we must be ready, in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses." Quoted by Robert Bowie in "Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Suez Crisis," in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences*, ed. WM Roger Williams & Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 197.

26 Cooper, *Lion's Last Roar,* 91.

27 Quoted by Kyle in "Britain and the Crisis, 1955-1956," 123.

28 On this note, it also bears pointing out that Ike and Dulles were not very clear in their private communication with the British. They indulged the British in their characterization of Nasser as Hitler, Dulles describing him as "an extremely dangerous fanatic," while Ike said that "we do not intend to stand by helplessly and let this one man get away with what he is trying to do." At the same time, Dulles warned the British and French that "had not yet made their case" and cautioned them from doing anything rash. See Steven Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 72.

29 Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, *Suez: The Double War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979), 20. Also complicating the communication between Ike and Eden is that fact that the messages were being delivered by Dulles, who was stridently anti-Nasser. Although the record would seem to indicate that Eden should have known better, after the crisis he claimed to have been misled. In either case, Bose and Greenstein's verdict also would seem to apply to this episode: "An Eisenhower who did more to be publicly articulate might have prevented that outcome." Bose and Greenstein, "The Hidden Hand vs. the Bully Pulpit," 195. Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 620-634.

30 See John C. Campbell, "The Twin Crises of Hungary and Suez," in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 233-253.

31 See Jeno Gyorkei, *Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999) and Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez*: *Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East in 1956* (Brattleboro: Amana Books, 1988), 401.

32 Martin J. Medhurst, "Rhetoric and Cold War: A Strategic Approach," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* ed. Martin Medhurst (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 19-20.

33 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS; see also Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East," October 31, 1956. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10685.

34 James Pratt, "An Analysis of Three Crises Speeches," *Western Journal of Speech* 34 (1970): 199.

35 Gregg "The Rhetoric of Distancing," 164.

36 Medhurst, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic Communicator* (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 55-62.

37 This use of language, as mentioned previously, is examined more fully in Gregg's "The Rhetoric of Distancing" review.

38. Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

39 David Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (2004): 611.

40 Robert Ivie, "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor: A Framework of Criticism," in Martin J. Medhurst, et al., *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 71-72. As far as prior Cold War rhetoric, see Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991).

41 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

42 Eisenhower greatly feared the destruction a war between the USSR and United States would wreak and sought to avoid this possbility. For more information on how this understanding influenced his continual desire for détente, see Helen Bury's *Eisenhower and the Cold War Arms Race* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014).

43 Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), Xviii.

44 Eugene Rabinowitch, "New Year's Thoughts," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 14 (1958): 3.

45 As Ira Chernus writes, "The purity and innocence of America was a fundamental premise of Eisenhower's discourse; it legitimated every American policy and maneuver in the incipient cold war….Purity in his discourse, meant not an absence of sin but a voluntary refusal to act upon sinful impulses." Ira Chernus, *General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 113.

46 Robert Ivie, "Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War," *Communication Monographs* 47 (1980): 286.

47 Ivie, "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor," 72-74.

48 Ivie, "Cold War Motives and the Rhetorical Metaphor," 74.

49 Ivie, "Images of Savagery," 287-288.

50 By overcoming the devilish enemy, Ivie argues, America proves worthy of its exceptionalism and thus reinforces its own mythic character. Robert Ivie, "Fighting Terror by Rite of Redemption and Reconciliation," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10 (2007): 233.

51 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

52 Dwight Eisenhower, "Draft #2, Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

53 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 55.

54 Said, *Orientalism*. 56

55 Said, *Orientalism,* 293.

56 Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination 1945-1961* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 21.

57 Zach Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers: 1952-1960.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 19-20.

58 While I am relying primarily upon Said's original work for this paper, there obviously exists a multiplicity of interpretations of Orientalism and its validity as a scholarly paradigm. However, all I wish to demonstrate in this paper is the clear presence of Orientalism within Eisenhower's rhetoric and its implications in his characterization of Egypt in the Suez Crisis. For a summary and dissection of Postcolonialism within a Communication framework, see Vinay Lal's "The politics and culture of knowledge after postcolonialism: nine theses"' *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 26 (2012): 191-205.

59 P. J. Cain, "Economics: The Metropolitan Context," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume III*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 39.

60 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

61 Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars 1949-1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 22.

62 Dwight Eisenhower, quoted by Spiegel in *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 67.

63 Edward Drachman and Alan Shank, *Presidents and Foreign Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 70.

64 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

65 Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 325.

66 Gregg, "The Rhetoric of Distancing," 181.

67 Indeed, during the 1952 campaign Eisenhower consistently framed America's challenge in the region as a relational problem between the Western world and the Muslim Middle East. In a June 22 press conference, for example, Ike directly stated that "I believe there is no possibility this moment of establishing the kind of connection between the Middle East and the Western European powers which you are apparently seeking to do for the simple reason you have a very great hatred, you have a deep-seated prejudice. I is going to take long and patient work… to win the friendship of those nations." At another point, Ike stated that "In the Mid East you have a question of just cold hatred of us over a number of instances of the past, and there we have got to win friends…. All the way through the Moslem world." See Dwight Eisenhower, Press Conference of June 22, 1952, in folder June 4, 1952 to July 11, 1952 (2), Box 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States 1953-1961, Speech Series, DDE Library, and Dwight Eisenhower, Press Conference of June 24, 1952, in folder June 4, 1952 to July 11, 1952 (3), Box 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States 1953-1961, Speech Series, DDE Library.

68 Timothy Cole, "Avoiding the Quagmire: Alternative Rhetorical Constructs for Post-Cold War American Foreign Policy," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 2 (1999): 369.

69 Chernus characterizes Cold War rhetoric, including Eisenhower's, as an attempt to grapple with an indissoluble dilemma: if the role of the president is to assure the citizenry that the country is safe, how does one do that in the nuclear age of mutually assured destruction? Because resolution to this conflict would usher in the apocalypse, Chernus calls this style of rhetoric "apocalypse management." This state of perpetual insecurity, Chernus writes, paradigmatically requires "that threats might come from anywhere on the globe… peace and stability required the United States to control events everywhere." In his Suez speech, Eisenhower was merely working out the logical implications of this style of rhetoric. Ira Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 2008), 11.

70 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

71 America's relationship to the United Nations was also complicated by the Korean War. See Norrie MacQueen, *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2011), especially page 20.

72 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 224.

73 For a comprehensive rhetorical analysis of the Truman Doctrine speech, see Denise Bostdorff's *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 99-102. See also Daniel Chomsky, "Advance Agent of the Truman Doctrine: The United States, The New York Times, and the Greek Civil War," *Political Communication* 17 (2000): 415-432.

74 Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846

75 Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846.

76 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

77 Ned O'Gorman, "Eisenhower and the American Sublime," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 94 (2008): 55.

78 As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write, "The actual audience will be able to consider itself all the more close to a universal audience as the particular value seems to fade before the universal value it determines. It is thus by virtue of their being vague that these values appear as universal values and lay claim to a status similar to that of facts. To the extent that they are precisely formulated, they are simply seen to conform to the aspirations of particular groups." Perelmen and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*, 76.

79 Dwight Eisenhower, "TV Report to the Nation 10/31/56,"Box 19 folder "TV Report to the Nation," DDE Library, Abilene, KS.

80 See Douglass Little, "1949-1958, Syria: Early Experiments in Covert Action," *Press for Conversion!* 51 (2003): 12-13.

81 Jeff D. Bass, "The Appeal to Efficiency as Narrative Closure: Lyndon Johnson and the Dominican Crisis, 1965," *The Southern Speech Communication Journal* 50 (, 1985): 110.

82 Ike ordered the Sixth Fleet to shadow he European landing parties, passed a UN resolution condemning the actions of America's allies, and withheld much-needed energy supplies to the Europeans (now that the Suez Canal was blocked by Nasser) until they fully complied. The British almost liquidated their dollar reserve.

83 Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, 407-423.

84 "President Eisenhower's Speech on the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine), 1957." Council on Foreign Relations. 2015. Accessed November 19, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/president-eisenhowers-speech-us-role-middle-east-eisenhower-doctrine-1957/p24130.

85 I am using consubstantial in a loosely Burkean sense, in that Ike depicted America and the United Nations as remaining individual loci of motives yet identative in their purposes in the Middle East. See Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

CHAPTER SIX

The Doctrine Applied: Intervention in Lebanon and the Rhetoric of Justification

Of course, everybody is always scared of war. But, as I say, you have to face up to it.—it's a possibility every once in a while—if you're going to be effective in this business of maintaining the peace [1]

- Dwight Eisenhower, oral interview

This was one meeting in which my mind was practically made up… even before we met. The time was rapidly approaching, I believed, when we had to move into the Middle East, and specifically into Lebanon, to stop the trend toward chaos.[2]

- Eisenhower, on the Special NSC Meeting of July 14

The genius of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which makes us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to them we are missing.[3]

- Gamal Abdul Nasser

If, as I have argued, the Eisenhower presidency changed the way in which the Middle East is configured in presidential discourse, then one might expect these changes to manifest themselves in policy. In this chapter, I argue that this exact scenario played out in the Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy American troops to Lebanon in the summer of 1958. In that sense Ike's rhetoric regarding the Middle East, which had helped shape policy options over the course of his two administrations, found its apogee in this event. The addresses justifying Ike's choice to send the Marines to Beirut drew heavily from his previous rhetoric regarding the region, and in canvassing these familiar arguments to authorize yet another step of engagement in the Middle East—the landing of soldiers—Eisenhower laid the

rhetorical foundation for American regional hegemony upon which future presidents would build.

Context: Eisenhower Doctrine

A year and half after its declaration, the Eisenhower Doctrine was in retreat. Few Arab leaders had publicly aligned themselves with the new policy, fearful that openly supporting American aims in the region would incite revolt among populations still wary of Western imperialism and incensed at US support for Israel. The handful of leaders that did embrace Eisenhower's entreaty to denounce communism were not important enough to sway regional opinion in any significant direction. Nasser was still ascendant. Worse, he remained on friendly terms with the Soviet Union, going so far as visiting Moscow for a personal meeting with Khrushchev. Even American-Israeli relations were cool at best. After Israel defied a US-supported UN Resolution demanding the Jewish state withdrawal from all the Egyptian lands captured during the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower retaliated by publicly denouncing the occupation, considering trade sanctions, and threatening to cut off private American assistance to Israel.[4] By late March 1957 all Israeli forces had left the Sinai—but not before laying waste to every from of infrastructure in their path in a clear display of contempt for Eisenhower and the United Nations. And so it went. Though "International Communism" had not exactly invaded the Middle East, at every turn the Eisenhower administration met nothing but foreign policy failure in the region.

Indeed, events over the eighteen months following the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine seemingly conspired to wreck US ambitions for the region.

The new strategy, far from strengthening America's allies, worked to weaken them. In Jordan, for example, the doctrine worked to exacerbate internal political divisions regarding Amman's relationship to the West to the point of crisis, with King Hussein preserving his throne only by a series of high-risk political maneuvers.[5] The Eisenhower Doctrine also failed to prevent leftward drift. Syria was feared by US officials to be in the midst of becoming a "Soviet tool and base of Communist operations" in the Middle East, leading to a botched coup attempt attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency.[6] Sensationalist reports of the CIA attempt drove millions of Arabs across the Middle East even further from the US camp. Perhaps most alarming, Nasser's pan-Arab message directly led to the incorporation of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic in February 1958—which created the popular expectation that more nations would shortly follow. This move, while more the result of instability in Damascus than a master plan executed from Cairo, was nonetheless a major propaganda coup for Nasser and filled the imaginations of Middle Easterners from Algeria to Iraq with visions of pan-Arab unity. It also struck dread into the hearts of America's conservative Arab allies, who knew the populations they ruled were among those inspired.

Thus as a policy, the Eisenhower Doctrine mostly flopped. The doctrine's ostensive function—promising an American security guarantee to any Middle Eastern government that overtly opposed communism—worked to too closely identify supportive Arab regimes with the unpopular United States, thereby weakening US regional allies in the face of Nasser's Arab nationalism. If, as I argued earlier, Ike framed the Eisenhower Doctrine as a rhetorical solution to what was

effectively a rhetorical problem, then the ideological triumph of Nasser's pan-Arabism, fueled as it was by Cairo Radio and Egyptian popular culture, can be read as one rhetorical appeal trumping another. By the summer of 1958 the Eisenhower administration had grasped this reality and begun deemphasizing the confrontational Eisenhower Doctrine, seeking other means of protecting US interests in the region. However, just as Ike and his subordinates were seeking to move away from the Middle East Resolution, the unexpected intervened—and the United States of America, invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine, occupied Lebanon.

As numerous commentators have observed, Eisenhower's decision to send Marines to the beaches of Beirut in the afternoon hours of July 15, 1958, was, on the face of it, "puzzling at best, senseless at worst."[7] It was the only time during his presidency that Ike deployed American military personnel in a potential combat operation, and his ostensive justification for doing so—the Eisenhower Doctrine—seemed utterly inapplicable to the situation at hand. Civil war had erupted in Lebanon over President Camille Chamoun's refusal to rule out an unconstitutional second consecutive term after the assassination of a journalist on May 8. Hence, Beirut was not under threat from the "Communist aggression" stipulated in the Eisenhower Doctrine address, but rather Arab nationalists who wished to unite their country with the United Arab Republic.[8] The Soviet Union had little to do with Beirut's upheaval. Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration had allowed the political crisis to fester for weeks before intervening. Concerns regarding Lebanon's stability were raised as early as the March 14 meeting of the National Security Council,[9] and Chamoun—arguing that his opponents were being supplied UAR

weapons via Syria and that this act constituted a provocation worthy of invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine—formally requested military aid from Eisenhower on May 13.[10] It is thus necessary to ask why Eisenhower chose to ignore Chamoun for two months before dispatching the Marines, and why Ike felt it necessary after such a delay to send American troops at all. On the surface, Eisenhower's actions appear to be—at best—erratic.

The answer to these questions can be found in a combination of Ike's dedication to waging Cold War and the diplomatic constraints created by his prior rhetoric regarding the Middle East. By investigating Eisenhower's reasons for sending troops to Lebanon, I hope to illuminate the complex rhetorical task that confronted the president and shed light on how he utilized rhetoric to navigate the exigences and constraints presented by this particular situation. In other words, it is my aim to investigate the rhetorical strategies employed by Eisenhower to justify this military intervention, how these rhetorical choices were influenced by Eisenhower's prior rhetoric regarding the Middle East, and the importance of his rhetoric for future presidential discourse. As I will argue, Eisenhower's psychological conception of containment, in addition to the prominent rhetorical stance regarding the Middle East's defense taken in the Eisenhower Doctrine address, led to him ordering the American military to stabilize Lebanon. This decision, in turn, required a rhetorical justification, which Ike found by employing various elements of his prior presidential rhetoric regarding the Middle East alongside reinterpretations of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the UN Charter. In

doing so, Ike created a rhetorical template for intervention in the Middle East and elsewhere upon which future presidents would build.

Containment, Commitment, and Chamoun

Although American security concerns in the Middle East had multiplied following the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the tensions in Lebanon did not catch the Eisenhower administration unawares. CIA Director Allen Dulles gave periodic reports on the country's conditions in NSC Meetings throughout the spring and summer of 1958, and although he argued that "There is continued clear evidence of UAR financial and other resources to the rebel forces," the costs of intervening in Lebanon appeared to outweigh the benefits (in a later exchange with Senator Fulbright, Ike made clear that while the United Arab Republic was not Soviet-controlled, "whatever Nasser may think he is doing, the Soviets have a tremendous interest in this."[11]). Deploying troops to Lebanon, Ike and his advisors feared, would not only provide the Soviets with a major propaganda victory and "create a wave of anti-Western feeling in the Arab world," but also risk incurring the ire of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who made sure that Ike knew he was "opposed to the intervention of foreign troops in Lebanon, whether UN forces or other forces."[12]

Furthermore, there was doubt that American intervention would even be effective. NSC members believed that General Chehab, head of the Lebanese military and eventual successor to Chamoun, "could break the back of the rebel resistance if he would move vigorously," which he apparently declined to do to avoid politically alienating Chamoun's Maronite Christian base or their Arab

nationalist opposition.[13] In abstaining from decisively ending the conflict in Lebanon, Chehab sought merely to mitigate the violence and thereby preserve his viability as a national, not factional, leader. In a June 15 meeting reviewing the Sixth Fleet's provisional plan for deploying troops to Beirut, Eisenhower vented his own ambivalence regarding the use of US soldiers to prop up Chamoun's divisive regime. He remarked that in the face of such political machinations he had "little, if any, enthusiasm for our intervening at this time." Bewildered by Chamoun and Chehab's intransigence, at one point Ike even asked "How do you save a country from its own leaders?"[14] The case for inaction was, to put it mildly, strong.

Yet despite its initial unwillingness to contemplate intervention, the Eisenhower administration still sought to preserve all possible options. In his May 20 press conference, for example, Secretary of State Dulles reminded reporters that although Lebanon was unlikely to be subject to "an armed attack… from a country which we would consider under the control of international communism," that the Eisenhower Doctrine still provided a "mandate" for expanding US aid to Lebanon that could potentially include military personnel; these troops would among other things ensure the "protection of American life and property."[15] And indeed, Eisenhower and his subordinates acknowledged that inaction also had a price. Allowing the United Arab Republic to foment unrest in Lebanon "would add to Nasser's prestige," warned Dulles in a June 9 cable, "and seriously discourage Iraq and the other pro-Western elements in the area." In similar fashion, Ike felt that refraining from action would communicate that America was now "Nasser's lackey" in the Middle East.[16] Both men also believed that failure to come to an ally's aid,

even one as self-aggrandizing as Chamoun, could have dire consequences for American security guarantees elsewhere.

After the landings had occurred, Dulles retroactively explained his and Eisenhower's thinking on the matter in a July 18 meeting to his fellow cabinet members; while extensive, the quote below encapsulates the two men's interventionist logic:

> We were faced with the question of what to do – to respond or not to respond…. We have no illusions that this response will solve the problems of that area – in fact it may make them worse. It is not a popular action and in fact it is pregnant with difficulties….
>
> These moves will not, in our opinion, quickly or easily or perhaps at all solve the problems of that immediate area. *But failure to act would have shaken the foundations of the free world*—from Morrocco [sic] to the Western Pacific. In that arc, every free government would have felt that it was faced with a threat which it could not handle by itself – and would have noticed that when the need came, the United States looked the other way. Morroco [sic], Tunis, Sudan, Ethiopia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, S. Vietnam, Formosa, Phillippines [sic], Japan and Korea—all would have felt that the forces organized against them were so powerful that they could not resist – and that when the crisis came, we would not respond.
>
> We responded—not because this response showed the way to clear and easy solutions – it rather opens the way to more problems—to some very dangerous problems—*but to have done otherwise would have destroyed in one blow the faith and confidence which scores of nations have in the United States* – that we are strong and loyal to our friends in their hour of need in cases of indirect aggression.[17] (emphases mine)

As Dulles argued, if the United States allowed Chamoun and "free" government to fall in Lebanon, then nations around the world would question America's commitment to them—thus leading to defections away from the Western camp, inviting Soviet adventurism among the nonaligned nations, and ultimately weakening containment. Because Ike and Dulles conceived of the Cold War as total, it was both psychological and global.[18] Psychological containment meant that

perceived setbacks—such as if Chamoun was overthrown— were just as damaging as actual defeats. Containment was also global, which meant that a loss of American prestige anywhere harmed US security—which under the New Look relied heavily upon allied strength—everywhere. Thus in Ike's eyes the spectacle of Chamoun going down in ignominious defeat while America passively watched was unacceptable, as this could potentially threaten the entire project of containment.

In short, I am in agreement with Douglass Little's assessment: Eisenhower ultimately chose to intervene in Lebanon "for the same reason that Lyndon Johnson would plunge into the Vietnamese quagmire after 1964: credibility."[19] The possible cost, both psychological and military, of sending troops to Lebanon was prohibitive so long as its purpose was only to end Chamoun's self-inflicted stalemate. If the alternative was to watch an American ally lose power in a way that would seriously damage US credibility, however, then intervention became an imperfect but palatable option. Indeed, Ike believed that losing Lebanon could trigger a series of crises across the Middle East resulting in a loss of access to needed oil resources, and *that* disaster, in his words, "would be far worse than the loss in China" suffered by the previous administration.[20] As Ike's fellow Republicans loved to say, Truman lost China; Eisenhower, fearful of the domino effect and convinced of the psychological and global nature of the Cold War, refused to lose Lebanon.

Critically, then, it was not the loss of Lebanon *per se* that troubled Eisenhower, but what the loss of Lebanon might communicate to other US allies: American prestige was at stake in preserving, if not Chamoun, at least friendly democratic rule in Beirut.[21] And the Eisenhower Doctrine, by ostentatiously

promising American support to its Middle Eastern allies, now worked to constrain Ike; the same lofty rhetorical performance which announced American benevolent hegemony over the region—in which Eisenhower proclaimed "our national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep respect for the rights and independence of every nation—however great, however small"—now tied America's reputation to Chamoun, who more than nearly any other Middle Eastern leader vocally and proudly supported the Eisenhower Doctrine. Thus, it was Ike's prior rhetoric, more than any military or economic considerations, which functioned to constrain the field of allowable outcomes in Lebanon.

In effect, this situation can be read as the opposite of Operation Ajax in Iran. Unlike Ajax, whose underlying rationales were in nature military (the Soviets would gain strategic territory) and economic (the Abadan refinery was critical to the European economy), Ike's reasons for intervention in Lebanon were almost completely rhetorical (the United States could not appear to abandon an ally, lest other allies' confidence falter). Unsurprisingly then, Eisenhower's highly visible, even theatrical method of intervention—a beachhead landing by Marines at midafternoon—was also the inverse of the secretive Operation Ajax. Operation Blue Bat, as the Lebanon landing was codenamed, was meant to communicate one thing: that America could be counted upon to defend its allies. By initiating Operation Blue Bat, Eisenhower implemented a strategy that was openly acknowledged as a likely policy failure, one that could lead, in Dulles' words, to "very dangerous problems," almost entirely for reasons of appearance.[22]

Yet, for two months Eisenhower chose to disregard Chamoun's request for aid and not initiate Operation Blue Bat, and in fact by early July it appeared as though Lebanon's turmoil might be resolved without outside interference. Ike's strategy of non-intervention appeared to be working. Events of July 14, 1958, however, completely changed his thinking. In the early morning hours several Iraqi military officials who styled themselves after the Egyptian Free Officers Movement implemented a violent takeover of Baghdad and the central government by brutally wiping out the royal family and the prime minister; the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy, a stalwart ally of the West for decades, was eliminated in a few short hours. Stunned officials in Washington believed Cairo was behind the coup and therefore registered the event as belonging to a long series of successes enjoyed by Nasser and his pan-Arabism movement following the Suez Crisis. Ike's strategic calculus immediately changed. If Iraq could fall, which had been considered at least as stable as Lebanon and Jordan, then anything was possible. In the fog of war, it looked as though the first domino might be falling—which meant that free government in Beirut, and by extension American prestige, was under terrific threat. As Eisenhower resolved at the special NSC meeting shortly after 11:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, "This is our last chance to make a move. We cannot ignore this one."[23] Despite the risks, despite the cost, Ike unleashed the American military. Operation Blue Bat, under executive order, was set in motion.

Presidential rhetoric can serve many purposes. Rhetoricity is intrinsic to the presidential office, after all; in the words of Martin Medhurst, "the American presidency has always been a place of rhetorical leadership."[24] In this volume alone

I have examined how presidents can use rhetoric to misdirect their audiences, redefine the relationship between the American people and another region of the world, and navigate a high-stakes crisis situation. Presidential rhetoric can be administered anywhere from the bully pulpit to the witness stand, and its functionality as a means of political innovation is limited only by the opportunity, creativity, and skill of the commander-in-chief. But while presidential rhetoric can be used for such grandiose purposes as rallying a nation to war or declaring the "universal brotherhood of man,"[25] in this instance Eisenhower's overriding purpose was to accomplish a much more focused task: damage control.

The Rhetorical Task

To sum: In terms of rhetoric, there was no audience that Ike *had* to convince. Because of the Middle East Resolution of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Ike was free to act without congressional (much less public) approval, and because American troops were being deployed unilaterally and suddenly—the US military did not inform even the Lebanese government that troops were coming until mere hours beforehand—there was no international actor[26] whose persuasion was absolutely imperative for Operation Blue Bat's success (although Eisenhower did use private communication channels to closely coordinate US actions with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who was concurrently sending British troops to Jordan).[27] However, for the reasons enumerated above, the all-important cause of containment could still be damaged by the intervention in the long run if Eisenhower did not effectively frame US actions in a compelling way. Internationally, Ike's use of what has been derisively termed "gunboat diplomacy" could still be marshalled as

propaganda evidence of a renewed American imperialism by Nasser in the Arab world and Khrushchev worldwide.[28] Domestically, criticism of American actions in Lebanon could undermine the resolve of either Congress or the public to wage Cold War; indeed, the sending of American soldiers via executive order to a faraway shore for reasons not fully understood invited a powerful comparison to the recent—and in the public mind, costly—Korean War. Nothing less than Ike's ethos as a "man of peace" was at risk.

Therefore, Eisenhower's rhetorical task was to *justify* American military actions, both in terms of legitimacy and necessity, in what was effectively an attempt to limit the damage the landing was expected to cause. His audiences included a wary Third World, a skeptical Congress, and an uncertain American populace. As one letter to the White House commenting on the "explosive situation in the Middle East" stated, "for all anyone knows, U.S. intervention might mean the beginning of total war."[29] The situation demanded that Ike address the concern of this citizen and the millions like her around the world who were unsure as to what the presence of American troops in Lebanon meant in the context of the larger Cold War. To perform this task, Eisenhower needed to find a compelling warrant for the US landing. Assuming the mantle of critic-in-chief, he did so in part by seizing upon a suggestion originally floated by John Foster Dulles on May 13: invoking the Mansfield Amendment, which the Secretary argued "stated that the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East was vital to the national interests and world peace."[30] In addition to employing the Eisenhower Doctrine, Ike adapted and expanded upon the themes established in his prior Middle

East rhetoric to build the justificatory case for Operation Blue Bat—and thereby reassure his audiences of the legitimacy and necessity of America's actions.

Textual Analysis

From the moment he learned of the Iraqi coup, Eisenhower acted swiftly and decisively, and the rhetorical component of his response to the situation in Lebanon and the greater Middle East was no less focused. At 9:00 a.m. (Washington time) on the morning of July 15, an advance battalion of Marines were scheduled to land near Beirut with several thousand troops following swiftly; by midafternoon the president sent a message to Congress, and at 5:00 p.m. Eisenhower went before the television cameras to announce the landings to the American public (a pre-taped radio message was released at the same time). Though the Eisenhower administration produced a host of ancillary texts regarding the Lebanon intervention, my analysis will primarily focus on these two major addresses.[31]

As with all of Ike's Middle East rhetoric, his utterances justifying the American landings in Lebanon were salient for multiple audiences. In discussing the relationship between justificatory presidential rhetoric and audience, Richard Cherwitz and Kenneth Zagacki argue that, "In justificatory rhetoric, the American public and instigators of crises are the two major audiences for presidential addresses."[32] While their concept of justificatory rhetoric (which they define in strictly confrontational terms[33]) has limited applicability to Eisenhower's rhetoric of July 15, 1958, their basic insight is apt: Ike's rhetoric was primarily addressed to the international community and the American public, not Congress.[34] Congress, although crucial in its own way, was not among Ike's main audiences because it was

more or less deferential to his leadership, was well-informed as to US policy, and could do little to prevent Operation Blue Bat anyway. This reasoning appears to have been shared by the Eisenhower administration, which in an internal memo described the address to Congress as given "mainly for purpose of record," not persuasive intent.[35] Although the task of unpacking the nuance of Ike's rhetoric for the Soviets, Nasser, the nonaligned nations, and American allies around the globe is certainly worthwhile, in the interests of space and maintaining analytical continuity with the previous chapters I will focus on Ike's address from the vantage of his domestic audience—namely, the American public.

Eisenhower's rhetoric in this situation, as an example of a president seeking to justify the use of military force, is hardly singular. As Jason A. Edwards, Joseph M. Valenzano III, and Karla Stevenson argue, "U.S. presidents have ordered the use of military force for a variety of reasons. However, no matter what the reason, they first had to rhetorically ready U.S.'s citizens for these interventions."[36] Because of the extreme secrecy surrounding Operation Blue Bat pre-landing, however, Eisenhower did *not* have an opportunity to prepare the American people for the landing before it occurred. Moreover, the administration believed that "the people show no awareness of the seriousness of the Mid East crisis," meaning that the gravity of the situation—and therefore the duty of the United States to act— also needed to be made clear to the public if a backlash was to be avoided.[37] Thus, Ike's rhetoric was compressed; in addition to the need to "characterize the circumstances of compelling action," something that typically happens before the troops land, he also needed to justify an intervention that was already underway.[38] Hence, Ike's

rhetoric of justification simultaneously sought to set the stage for intervention, demonstrate the necessity of intervention, and justify US intervention as legally and morally legitimate. He accomplished this task through four rhetorical moves, each of which is identifiable in both his television address to the public and the more succinct congressional message.

Justificatory Rhetoric: Executive Authority

First, Eisenhower's rhetoric worked to establish the president as the appropriate authority to authorize American intervention in Lebanon. In the special message to Congress, Ike attempted to accomplish this task without direct reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The third paragraph of the text, presumably meant to elucidate the reasons for American intervention, reads as follows:

> United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace.[39]

Eisenhower's adoption of the passive voice in the final clause of this paragraph worked to elide the question of who exactly "deemed" the weighty issues of "national interests and world peace" to be at stake in Beirut. By using such evasive language, Eisenhower asserted his authority to deploy forces to Lebanon absent congressional approval without explicitly stating such a thing. In fact, evidence that the landings were purely the prerogative of the Eisenhower administration can only be found in the ninth (out of twelve) paragraph of the message. Here Eisenhower used the first person three times to communicate that every aspect of Operation Blue Bat was, in fact, completely his decision:

> After the most detailed consideration, *I* have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. *I* have considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility…. *I* repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence.[40] (emphases mine)

By using the first person, Eisenhower deployed his formidable military ethos in his description of the decision-making process surrounding the intervention. If Ike *personally* determined that the situation necessitated the services of the US military, then any congressperson who questioned this stance was inexorably drawn into a comparison with Eisenhower—a comparison that person would obviously lose. By phrasing his decision to dispatch troops in the first person, Eisenhower grounded his claim to authority in his unparalleled military expertise. In so doing he avoided having to make an overt reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine in the congressional message, sidestepping a potentially troublesome argument with the legislature over the bounds of executive authority.

Ike was more willing to rely on the Eisenhower Doctrine to substantiate his authority in his address to the public. Near the two-thirds mark of the address he cited the Middle East Resolution as the reason for intervention, stating:

> Last year, the Congress of the United States joined with the President to declare that "the United States regards as vital to the national interests and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."[41]

Interestingly, Ike chose to depict the Eisenhower Doctrine as the equal creation of Congress and his administration. While technically true in that the Eisenhower Doctrine was a joint declaration, by framing the Middle East Resolution in this way Eisenhower's rhetoric appears to have been designed to share culpability for the

intervention with Congress. Such a depiction could have proved politically useful if the landings had gone poorly, and it also worked to erase the memory of the prolonged debate over the doctrine that took place on the Senate floor. To the public, Eisenhower presented a united governmental front.

To be sure, Eisenhower's interpretive understanding of the Eisenhower Doctrine—upon which he based the US government's legal authority to intervene—was far from widely accepted. Because evidence for the presence of "International Communism" in Lebanon was speculative at best,[42] Eisenhower relied on Dulles's suggestion and cited the Mansfield Amendment of the Middle East Resolution, which his administration, ironically, had opposed when it was first introduced. Senator Mansfield himself, in fact, did not believe his amendment should be interpreted as justifying intervention in this instance. He argued that the Lebanon crisis appeared to be the result of internal disturbances, not communism or foreign intrigue.[43] Nevertheless, Ike quoted the amendment.

Although Eisenhower used the Middle East Resolution as the basis for Operation Blue Bat's legitimacy, he by no means neglected employing his reputation as a five-star general in the address to the public. Rather than use his ethos to provide evidence that he was the appropriate person to authorize the intervention, Ike instead used the first person to reassure the public that the chosen course of action would be effective and was indeed necessary. Immediately following his reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine, Eisenhower shifted to the first person singular for just the second time[44] in the address. In a clear shift of tone, Eisenhower stated, "I believe that the presence of the United States forces now

being sent to Lebanon will have a stabilizing effect," an estimate whose plausibility relied directly upon Ike's ability to diagnose a military operation's chances of success. A few paragraphs later he continued: "I am well aware of the fact that landing of United States troops in Lebanon could have some serious consequences….I have, however, come to the sober and clear conclusion that the action taken was essential to the welfare of the United States."[45] Acknowledging that the Marine landing could have "serious consequences," Eisenhower nevertheless reassured the American populace that this action was, in his "sober and clear" estimation, necessary.

While this language might be expected of a president attempting to justify the use of American forces in a foreign intervention, it is worth noting that Eisenhower avoided the word "I" throughout the rest of the address. By strategically using the first person singular in this section, Ike obliquely inserted his ethos as a military commander into the speech; the intent of this strategy appears to have been to reassure Americans across the nation that he *personally* sanctioned the intervention, and therefore all would be well. Thus, by establishing himself as the appropriate authority to authorize Operation Blue Bat, Eisenhower's rhetoric worked to persuade his audience that the effort was necessary, legitimate, and would be effective.

Justificatory Rhetoric: Threat Conflation

In both speeches Eisenhower's rhetoric worked to conflate the Soviet Union with the threat posed to Lebanon by Nasser's pan-Arabism movement. In his address to the public, for example, Ike began his speech by immediately

enumerating the recent events which had destabilized the region—but he did so without articulating *why* they were performed. He described how "In Iraq a highly organized military blow struck down the duly constituted government… with great brutality," while "At about the same time there was discovered a highly organized plot to overthrow the lawful government of Jordan."[46] To emphasize the ruthlessness of these actors, Ike explained in detail how many Iraqi leaders were "beaten to death or hanged and their bodies dragged through the streets." Ike did not, however, specify exactly *who* was behind the attempted coup in Amman or for what purposes the Iraqi military officers executed their bloody takeover of Baghdad. Yet, by describing both efforts as "highly organized" and in vividly violent terms, Eisenhower played upon the Cold War *topos* of depicting America's enemies—typically Communists—in mindless, mechanistic, and inhumanly violent terms. According to Robert Ivie and Oscar Giner such a characterization, with its "threatening picture of the enemy's evil savagery," is consonant with typical portrayals of foreign adversaries in presidential rhetoric.[47] Uniformity—an implicit characteristic of a group that is "highly organized"—is also identified by Ivie as a trait often imputed to the Communist enemy in Cold War presidential discourse.[48] Eisenhower, by using descriptive language usually linked to America's Communist adversaries, subtly conflated the nameless villains of Jordan and Iraq with the Soviet foe.

Less subtly, Ike also represented propaganda from the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic as equally responsible for inspiring the strife in Lebanon. Chamoun's "little country," in Eisenhower's words, had

> for about two months been subjected to civil strife. This has been actively fomented by Soviet and Cairo broadcasts and abetted and aided by substantial amounts of arms, money and personnel infiltrated into Lebanon across the Syrian border….Chamoun stated that without an immediate show of United States support, the Government of Lebanon would be unable to survive against the forces which had been set loose in the area.[49]

Again Eisenhower employed intentionally imprecise language in his description of the threat facing Lebanon: vague "forces" were at work, and they had been given "arms, money and personnel" of indeterminate origin to accomplish their destructive task. Having been conditioned to correlate subversive and nefarious forces with communism for years, it is not implausible to assume that many of Ike's listeners made such an associative leap here. The corollary of this inference was that the United States must oppose such dark powers, thus morally justifying the deployment of Marines to Lebanon.

The claim that Soviet and UAR radio broadcasts provoked the uprisings also advanced the thesis that American intervention was justified in another way: such an action demonstrated that external actors were already involved in the conflict in Beirut. Ike's rhetoric, by designating the unrest as being instigated unequivocally by outside forces, portrayed Chamoun's request for American aid as a natural response to a foreign threat and not an escalation of the conflict. In this telling, radio broadcasts from *both* Moscow and Cairo helped spark the civil strife. Thus, no matter what degree of UAR influence there was, the Lebanese rebels could now be labeled as Soviet-inspired—and therefore unquestionably enemies of the United States.

Similarly, in the message to Congress Ike explained how "a violent insurrection broke out in Lebanon….The revolt was encouraged and strongly backed

by the official Cairo, Damascus, and Soviet radios which broadcast into Lebanon in the Arabic language."[50] Here again Ike used sequential language to equate the Soviet efforts with those of the United Arab Republic. While his claims were technically true—the Soviets did broadcast propaganda in Arabic into Lebanon—there is little doubt that pan-Arabism, not communism, was the predominant ideology (if there was one) motivating the uprisings. Eisenhower's use of language worked to obfuscate this reality and elevate the Soviet threat.

In both the public address and congressional messages then, Eisenhower's rhetoric worked to complicate the relationships among the Lebanese rebels, the Soviet Union, and Nasser's United Arab Republic; in making murky exactly which parties were behind the uprisings Ike was able to frame the intervention in Lebanon as an exercise in limiting Communist expansion. By invoking the Soviet threat, Eisenhower reduced the complicated situation in Lebanon into a simple—and easily understood—binary between the unfree, Communist world and the free West; in this way he attempted to "camouflage the facts of international politics under the colors of domestic politics."[51] Ike allowed, in the words of Wander, the paradigm of "prophetic dualism" to provide the reasons for "why the United States should engage in certain kinds of action abroad."[52] In this case, dualism worked to provide the justificatory logic for why America needed to intervene in Lebanon—because the Soviets had already done so. Containment must be maintained.

Justificatory Rhetoric: Independence and Intervention

Because the civil strife in Lebanon was the result of foreign intrigue, Ike depicted Lebanon's request for outside support as an apposite response to the

situation and the United States as the appropriate party to respond to this request. Eisenhower's argument rested on two premises, namely (1) that Lebanon had a right to independence under the charter of the United Nations and (2) that it was the role of the United States to ensure that this right was not infringed upon.

Eisenhower argued these points clearly and succinctly in the congressional message. After having described the situation in Beirut, Ike offered his diagnosis. Because UN efforts were "insufficient" to protect Lebanon, he announced that the United States would step in:

> I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon…. Pending the taking of adequate measures by the United Nations, the United States will be acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent right—the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence.[53]

As he did during the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower did not present the United States as replacing the United Nations or intervening independent of its authority, but rather as acting in the UN Security Council's stead. The United States was doing what the United Nations would do if it were free from the Soviet veto; America's deployment of troops was "pursuant" to the United Nation's goals, not in circumvention of them. As if to underscore his point, Eisenhower followed the above statement by reminding his auditors that "we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence." Thus, not only was the United States under Eisenhower fulfilling the mission of the United Nations by intervening in Lebanon, but it also established itself as the arbiter of whether the UN steps taken were "effective" or not—and if

not, the US troops would simply stay. In describing the situation in this way, Eisenhower—as in his Suez and Eisenhower Doctrine speeches—insisted that the United States paradoxically acted in the Middle East both in the place of the United Nations (as the nation ultimately responsible for settling conflict) and in perfect accord with the United Nations (by affirming that the United Nations' forces would simply take the place of their American counterparts, Ike depicted the two groups' missions as perfectly identical).

In the address to the public, more explicitly premised on the Eisenhower Doctrine as it was, the argument that Lebanese independence was assured by the United Nations was dispersed throughout the speech. The effect of the speech's saturation with references to the United Nations was to again create the impression that American and UN purposes in Lebanon were indistinguishable. To cite several examples: (1) Eisenhower declared that the "primary responsibility" of the United Nations was to "maintain international peace and security," which was the reason given for Operation Blue Bat. (2) He referenced the UN "Peace through Deeds" resolution of 1950, which "called upon every nation to refrain from 'fomenting civil strife'" in other countries; by sending the Marines, Ike sought to counteract Soviet and UAR efforts to do exactly that (according to his representation of the situation). (3) Offering his analysis as interpreter-in-chief, Eisenhower insisted that the "basic pledge" of the UN Charter was "the preservation of the independence of every state." As with the Mansfield Amendment, Eisenhower argued that American commitment to the UN Charter thus required a reinforcement of the Lebanese *status quo ante*. (4) He contended that Lebanon was tacitly granted "measures of collective security

for self-defense" as an "inherent right," since the UN Charter guaranteed the right to independence, and that the United States was simply enabling the Lebanese to exercise their UN-recognized right.

Finally, near the conclusion of the address Eisenhower drew a parallel between the League of Nations failures in the 1930s and the current crisis. He reminded his audience that "the League of Nations became indifferent to direct and indirect aggression… The result was to strengthen and stimulate aggressive forces that made World War II inevitable. The United States is determined that that history shall not now be repeated." This tightly packed statement invoked multiple Cold War *topoi* and allusions: Ike explicitly stated that he wished to avoid encouraging "aggressive forces," a kind of antithesis to Acheson's infamous "defensive perimeter" statement regarding Korea; by indirectly referencing the Munich agreement Ike analogized Soviet aggression to German aggression, with the implication being that a show of force now would prevent total war later; in using the phrase "direct and indirect aggression," Ike made an explicit reference to the policy of containment articulated in the Eisenhower Doctrine and thus the strategic rationale behind America's commitment to aid Lebanon. Perhaps most effectively, this appeal was made following references to the United Nations. If the League of Nations failed because of the indifference of member states, then, Ike seemed to be saying, the United Nations could fail for the same reason. Thus, by intervening in Lebanon the United States preserved not only Chamoun, but the United Nations and the entire postwar international diplomatic system.

The effect of all these references to the United Nations was to more fully develop the argument Eisenhower made in the Suez Crisis address and in the Eisenhower Doctrine speech: namely, that because the United Nations was incapable of securing peace and the status quo in the Middle East due to the "ambitions of the Soviet Union,"[54] the United States would assume the mantle of responsibility for the region and act in the United Nations' place. This mission was depicted as being done not to the exclusion of the United Nations from the region, but rather as a means of fulfilling that organization's goals for the Middle East. However, this portrayal of the United States as acting in the place of the United Nations required a reinterpretation of UN aims in American terms, thus relegating the United Nations to little more than a rhetorical rubber stamp for US actions in the region.

The nation's capacity to serve in this role—as a UN proxy—can be understood as a redefinition of American exceptionalism. If, as Kundai Chirindo and Ryan Neville-Shepard argue, "the rhetoric of exceptionalism" is utilized "to both defend and rally support for America's peculiar mission on the world's stage," then by declaring America's role to be the peacekeeper of the Middle East, Eisenhower defined the nation's global responsibility in a new way. While Ike had made this argument about the United Nations since the Suez Crisis address, Lebanon was where Ike applied this new understanding of America's role as regional hegemon to material effect. In short, Ike created a new way "by which Americans understand their nation's orientation to the world," and this new orientation authorized the

landing in Lebanon—the first deployment of American combat troops upon Arab soil since the end of the Barbary Wars in 1815.[55]

Justificatory Rhetoric: Situational Transcendence

Eisenhower's rhetoric worked to situate Operation Blue Bat as a stand not only for a minor American ally, but also for transcendent, universal ideals. Ike argued near the end of his address to the public that in defending he independence of Lebanon, the United States was "striving for an ideal which is close to the heart of every American and for which in the past many Americans have laid down their lives." The purpose was not simply to secure Chamoun's hold on Beirut, but to create "a world in which nations, be they great or be they small, can preserve their independence."[56] Eisenhower elevated this loosely defined value of respecting other nation's independence to transcendent status by linking it to other moral principles. "To serve these ideals, Ike suggested to the public, "is also to serve the cause of peace, security and well-being, not only for us, but for all men everywhere."[57] Echoing the universalist rhetoric of the Suez Crisis address and the Eisenhower Doctrine, Ike claimed that the US intervention in Lebanon was done in the service of aims few would dispute. Indeed, in safeguarding these values not only for America or Lebanon but (in a very Wilsonian turn of phrase) for "all men everywhere," Ike reinforced his claim that the United States' efforts in the Middle East effectively took the place of the United Nations. Though not explicitly stated, by working for the welfare of all nations America rendered any UN effort redundant.

While less strongly put, the same sentiment was present in Eisenhower's congressional message. Tying American intervention to the norms of diplomatic

conduct, Ike informed Congress that "despite the risks involved this action is required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend."[58] In this formulation, failure to initiate Operation Blue Bat would have weakened the postwar global order and therefore increased the risk that a larger conflict might erupt. By exhibiting "an admirable characteristic of the American people"—in Ike's words, the "Readiness to help a friend in need"—the United States was not only rescuing Lebanon from its "grave peril," but also "acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the safety and security of the United States depend."[59] Here, Ike described the transcendent values America was defending as essential to American security; by following the virtuous path of the good neighbor the nation could thereby preserve its own safety. Ironically, it was this perceived need to enforce peace that led Eisenhower to deploy the military, thus increasing the risk that a global conflict might emerge; as Ira Chernus notes, such a contradiction was intrinsic to Ike's strategic thinking and discourse, in which "A single-minded pursuit of national security consistently undermined the nation's sense of security."[60]

Nevertheless, by framing the intervention in Lebanon as a defense of transcendent ideals, Eisenhower's rhetoric functioned to justify Operation Blue Bat as necessary and legitimate. It was necessary because a peaceful global order depended on the enumerated ideals, and it was legitimate because America claimed the moral high ground in defending such transcendent principles. Moreover, Ike continued to prosecute this argument—that the American troops in Lebanon were not merely protecting an allied regime but were serving a higher purpose—in the

days and weeks following July 15. On July 19, for example, Eisenhower issued a message to "the officers and men of our forces—Marines, Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen—who are now in Lebanon, on the Mediterranean Sea, or in the skies over that area."[61] Ike's message, which sought to more clearly explain to the troops the reason for their presence, was saturated with references to freedom and the right of the Lebanese to be free. They were to defend Chamoun's "democratic government" that was "based upon free popular elections." He expounded upon the mission of the soldiers in idealistic terms: they were to safeguard the "cherished independence" of the Lebanese people, who "want only to live in peace and in freedom." As Eisenhower bluntly directed, "You are helping the Lebanese people to remain free. You are there at their invitation—as friends—to preserve for them the same freedoms that we have here at home." By infusing his message to the troops with references to freedom—to the point of even equating the level of freedom enjoyed in Lebanon to that of America—Eisenhower justified their mission on the basis of a transcendent ideal (perhaps *the* ideal in American Cold War discourse). The threat to Beirut, which Ike described as coming largely "from outside forces," was thus elevated to the cosmic ground upon which the Cold War was fought—at least rhetorically.

In addition to the message to the troops, Eisenhower also made his case in a series of letters he exchanged with Khrushchev that were published in newspapers nationwide.[62] While this exchange is worthy of much deeper analysis than I can offer here, it is worth noting that in both letters Eisenhower situated "peace" as the heart of his appeal. Khrushchev's basic argument, contained in letters dispatched

July 19 and July 23, was that the United States and Britain were acting belligerently by deploying troops to the Middle East and that the "bayonets of US and British troops" swept aside the United Nations and heightened the risk of war.[63] In his responses, issued July 22 and July 25, Ike declared that "the establishment and maintenance of a just peace is the dominant influence in American policy,"[64] and that the deployment of American troops in Lebanon was a result of "the instability of peace and security…due to the jeopardy in which small nations are placed."[65] The United States, inveighed Eisenhower, was on the side of peace—a "real peace," a "just peace," not merely the absence of conflict, and that pursuit meant supporting small nations like Lebanon. Thus it was America that sought to "genuinely promote the cause of peace and justice," and the Soviets were the ones truly endangering the world with their calls for revolution. "The real danger of war would come if one small nation after another were to be engulfed by expansionist and aggressive forces supported by the Soviet Union," Ike wrote in his letter, stressing that "Such processes cannot be reconciled with a peaceful world or with the ideals of the United Nations."[66] Again Ike presented America as working in concert with the United Nations to accomplish the work of peace—a peace defined in American terms. The transcendent value of a "just" peace, first invoked in reference to the Middle East by Eisenhower in his Suez Crisis address, now provided a warrant for American intervention in Lebanon. This peace/aggression binary, like the other ideals expressed in Manichean terms in Ike's rhetoric, worked to situate the conflict in Lebanon as occurring on a transcendent plane that justified Operation Blue Bat.

An Enduring Legacy: Effects and Implications of Operation Blue Bat

To review: Eisenhower's rhetoric was intended to justify the American intervention in Lebanon in terms of both legitimacy and necessity so as to limit the political damage Operation Blue Bat was expected to cause. In response to this situation, Ike's rhetoric of July 15, 1958, exhibited four powerful strategies designed to convince his audience that there was a need for American troops and that the United States was morally and legally justified in responding to Chamoun's request for aid: Ike's rhetoric worked to (1) establish Eisenhower as the appropriate authority to decide whether intervention was necessary, (2) conflate the Soviets with the threat from the UAR-sponsored Arab nationalist movement, (3) portray Lebanon's request for aid as appropriate and the United States as the proper party to respond to such an appeal, and (4) elevate the conflict in Lebanon to the transcendent plane of ideals upon which the Cold War was rhetorically fought. These strategies revisited many of the arguments Eisenhower had made over the course of his administration regarding America's role in the Middle East, and he adapted and reconstituted these arguments into a form that authorized his policy decision to intervene. In a way more commonly ascribed to other Cold War presidents, Eisenhower's rhetoric was both principled (Lebanon's right to independence could not be ignored) and pragmatic (it was expedient to send troops so as to not create misgivings in the minds of other US allies).[67]

How then should Eisenhower's rhetoric in this episode be understood? First, as with all instances of presidential rhetoric, the immediate context must be privileged in any discussion of implications or effect. In that regard, it is difficult to

argue that, at least domestically, Eisenhower's rhetoric was anything less than successful. The landings and subsequent stationing of troops throughout Lebanon, while leading to a few tense encounters with the Lebanese military, went according to plan. Only one American life was lost because of hostile fire during the occupation, and the final US soldiers withdrew on October 25.[68] And although Eisenhower suffered the lowest approval ratings of his presidency during 1958, his ratings gradually improved after March and Operation Blue Bat did not significantly harm Ike politically.[69] Interestingly, a pamphlet produced by the United States Information Agency (USIA) instructing US travelers on how to answer questions about their country while abroad saw fit to include an answer for the question "Wasn't the U.S. guilty of aggression in sending its troops into Lebanon?"[70] The inclusion of this question in the document is telling, for it demonstrates that Americans were perceived by the government to be accepting of Operation Blue Bat while foreigners were not. It is likely that such a perception was not far from the truth, meaning Ike's rhetoric seems to have been at least somewhat effective in limiting the political fallout of the intervention.

Second, Eisenhower's rhetoric surrounding the Lebanon intervention can be seen as a species of imperialist rhetoric (or at least a successor to the imperialist rhetoric of the British). Ike's description of Lebanon as a country buffeted by "civil strife" and whose economy had lapsed into a virtual "standstill" also worked to portray the coastal nation as a hotbed of volatility. As noted earlier, one of the major rationales for the Eisenhower Doctrine was for the United States to fill the supposed regional power vacuum in order to prevent such instability, which could

lead to Communist rule. In that sense, Ike's speech can be understood as a kind of imperialist rhetoric: disorder was unacceptable, therefore we will establish order. As Jeff Bass wrote of Edmund Burke, "he was following an organizational strategy based upon the classical rationale for empire, that of establishing order in regions beset by chaos."[71] Such a characterization would appear to fit Eisenhower as well.

Although the American presence in Lebanon (and the Middle East at large) differed greatly from that of the British in 1781 India, Eisenhower's rhetoric nevertheless hit notes that echoed not only the era of imperialism, but also the Truman Doctrine. As with Truman, disorder and the potentially calamitous consequences it would bring were unacceptable to Ike because such conditions were the seedbed of communism. The difference between the two men, however, was the context: because of the shifting political realities on the ground direct American action was now required to establish order. The fact that Britain was finished as the regional hegemon, combined with the rhetoric of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Suez, worked to transform what had been a case for increased foreign aid into an argument that justified American intervention.

Third, Eisenhower's rhetoric surrounding Operation Blue Bat and the occupation of Lebanon can be viewed, from our present vantage, as having set the foundation for future American interventions abroad. As mentioned previously, Eisenhower's rationale for sending troops to Lebanon—so as to communicate to American allies that the United States keeps its commitments—would be repeated by Lyndon Johnson and later Richard Nixon[72] in their treatments of Vietnam. Furthermore, it is worth noting the obvious fact that the intervention in Lebanon,

while coming after the Korean War, still occurred fairly early in the Cold War. Because of its chronological primacy, then, Eisenhower's rhetoric played an important role in establishing the norms of argument and evidence used by future presidents pursuing their own "limited" interventions abroad. Elements of Ike's rhetoric were adapted and used by presidents throughout the Cold War, from Johnson's use of threat conflation in the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic[73] to Reagan's address after the attack on American troops in Lebanon (again) on October 27, 1983.[74] Other elements of Eisenhower's rhetoric, such as the move to elevate conflict to the ground of ideals or the argument that the United States can accomplish the mission of the United Nations, can be seen in the rhetoric of George W. Bush or other presidents who have managed conflict in the Middle East.[75]

Overall, Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon—along with the rhetoric that justified it—is notable for the precedent it set. Executive decision-making, employing US troops as peacekeepers and not to win a war, using rhetoric to transform a regional or national crisis into a conflict of ideals—these descriptive features tend to reappear whenever American presidents wish to send troops on limited missions abroad, and to some degree these cases can all trace their origin to Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon. As David E. Proctor argues, Operation Blue Bat constituted a new form of engagement he calls "the rescue mission" which "is distinct from declared wars and extended police actions because Americans are not asked to sacrifice economically or socially for this form of military operation."[76] Militarily it was also unique: at a loss for how to describe the Marines' experience on

the first day of the intervention, a Pentagon spokesperson described Operation Blue Bat as "not war, but like war."[77] The struggle of officials to define or label the intervention testifies to the importance of this episode for foreign policy rhetoric, particularly given the proliferation of such "rescue missions" in American foreign affairs in the years since Eisenhower.

Perhaps most importantly, the intervention in Lebanon neatly merged many of the features of Eisenhower's rhetoric regarding the Middle East into one policy decision and discourse. It is one thing to articulate a new path, purpose, or policy for a country's foreign policy, but quite another to act upon that new identity in a militarily significant way. America's role as the regional hegemon was no longer a merely rhetorical reality; in Lebanon, Ike's rhetoric was consummated in the material world—the Eisenhower Doctrine was no longer an abstraction, but applied. In the process, the rhetorical transformation of America's relationship to the Middle East that had begun under Eisenhower was now complete. There was no going back.

Conclusion

Instrumental uses of rhetoric have constitutive consequences. In this chapter I have shown how the rhetoric that Eisenhower used to accomplish various purposes in the Middle East collectively worked to constrain the rhetorical and policy choices available to him when confronted by a new problem in the region: Lebanon. Viewed in light of Zarefsky's definition of presidential rhetoric, Eisenhower's continued redefinition of the Middle East as it pertained to American political reality worked to material effect, namely, Operation Blue Bat. Stated

otherwise, Ike was a victim of his own words—compelled by the unpalatable constraints of the situation, many of which were creations of his prior rhetoric, he chose intervention over inaction and thereby manifested physically the redefinition of America's stake in the Middle East that occurred rhetorically during his presidency. Although the occupation was short-lived—most American troops were in Lebanon for less than three months—the impact this episode had on American policy and rhetoric was not. By successfully employing troops on a peacekeeping mission to a small, faraway country, Eisenhower created the template his successors would use to argue for future deployments in the Middle East and around the world. Because "limited" American interventions abroad and the arguments used for doing so show no sign of ceasing—least of all places in the Middle East—we still, in a sense, inhabit the Eisenhower era today.

Notes

1 Oral history interview with Dwight Eisenhower conducted by Ed Edwin, OH-11, page 53, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

2 Dwight Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), 270.

3 Gamal Abdul Nasser, quoted by Miles Copeland in *The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), 214-218, and Roby C. Barrett in *The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 348.

4 Seeking to circumvent congressional reluctance to impose sanctions on Israel, which Eisenhower and Dulles attributed to the influence of the Zionist lobby in Washington, Eisenhower went before the public on February 20 and argued that Israel threatened not only international order, but the very mission of the United Nations:

"Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agreed that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order.

If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization and our best hope of establishing world order. The United Nations must not fall. I believe that in the interests of peace the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions."

See US State Department, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents*, 1957, 923-28.

5 See Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 48-67; James Lunt, *Hussein of Jordan: Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1989), 36-43; Nigel Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 61-64.

6 US Embassy, Damascus, to Department of State, tel #2779, May 17 1957, Record Group 59, 783.00/5-1757, National Archives in College Park, Maryland.

7 Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004): 205.

8 The assassination of Nasib al-Matni, publisher and owner of the *Telegraph*, is observed by many as the event which officially sparked the Revolt of the Pashas, as the insurgency against Chamoun's rule became known. See Tabitha Petron, *The Struggle Over Lebanon* (New York: The Monthly Review Press, 1987), 50-55.

9 "Discussion at the 358th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, March 13, 1958," in folder "358th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 13, 1958," Box 9, NSC Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

10 For an account of this exchange, see George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 57-61.

11 Memorandum of conversation, Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and congressional leaders, July 14, 1958, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960*, 11:218-25.

12 Memorandum of conversation, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, May 13, 1958, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960*, 11:41-42; "Discussion at the 370th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 26, 1958," in folder "370th Meeting of the National Security Council, June 26, 1958," Box 9, NSC Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Memorandum of conversation, John Foster Dulles, Hammarskjold, and Henry Cabot Lodge, July 7, 1958, in folder Memos of Conversation – General – A Through D (3), Box 1, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

13 "Discussion at the 369th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 19, 1958," in folder "369th Meeting of the National Security Council, June 19, 1958," Box 9, NSC Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

14 Quoted by Scot Macdonald in *Rolling the Iron Dice: Historical Analogies and Decisions to Use Military Force in Regional Contingencies* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2000), 166-167.

15 John Foster Dulles, May 20 Press Conference, Quoted by John Donovan in *U.S. & Soviet Policy in the Middle East: 1957-1966* (New York: Facts on File, 1974), 102.

16 Dulles and Eisenhower quoted by Yaqub in *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 215.

17 John Foster Dulles' Remarks at Cabinet Friday, July 18, 1958, in folder Cabinet Meeting of July 18, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, Dwight Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

18 Eisenhower wrote the in 1945 that "In this war, which was Total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a special and effective weapon…. Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of dignity in our military arsenal." Quoted by Kenneth Osgood in *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 49.

19 Douglass Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 20 (1996): 53.

20 Memorandum of conversation, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, July 14, 1958, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960*, 11:214.

21 So invested in Chamoun was the United States, in fact, that the CIA helped rig the 1957 elections which put him in power. Wilbur Eveland, a CIA operative and confidant of Chamoun, has described in detail how American money helped propel Chamoun to victory. For more information, see Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand, America's Failure in the Middle East* (New York: WW Norton Co, 1980) and David Nason Wilson, "The Eisenhower Doctrine and its Implementation In Lebanon—1958," (Master's Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, 2003), 25-27.

22 John Foster Dulles' Remarks at Cabinet Friday, July 18, 1958, in folder Cabinet Meeting of July 18, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, Dwight Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

23 Quoted by Yaqub in *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 223.

24 Martin J. Medhurst, "Rhetorical Leadership and the Presidency: A Situational Taxonomy," in *The Values of Presidential Leadership*, eds. Terry L. Price and J. Thomas Wren (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 60.

25 While this concept has been articulated by numerous presidents, Benjamin Harrison said that exact phrase in his address "The Development of the National Constitution" at Stanford University. See Benjamin Harrison, *Views of an Ex-President* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bowen-Merrill Company, 1901), 29.

26 Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles also hedged on American military superiority preventing the Soviets from escalating the conflict. During the July 18 cabinet meeting both acknowledged that their actions in Lebanon could lead to a global war with the Soviet Union, to which they argued that "the United States is now in a very strong position, perhaps stronger than in years to come when Russia has operational missiles." If there was to be a fight over the Middle East, so to speak, better to have it now than later. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, in folder Cabinet Meeting of July 18, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, Dwight Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

27 In fact, Macmillan did his best to convince Eisenhower to send troops to Amman as well. In trying to get Ike to deploy troops to Jordan and Lebanon, Macmillan hoped to broaden the American mission to such a degree that offensive action against Nasser or the new leaders of Iraq might be contemplated. As Macmillan said in a phone conversation in the late afternoon of July 14, 1958, "I think we have got to see it together, dear friend. There is no good in being in that a place and sitting there a few months and the whole rest being in flames. As soon as we start we have to face it—we have probably got to do a lot of things." Eisenhower, citing the need for congressional approval for any larger action than Operation Blue Bat, steadfastly refused to get sucked in to a larger mission. See Report of Telephone Call Between The President And Prime Minister Macmillan, in folder Mid East July 1958(8), Box 40, International Series, Dwight Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

28 Numerous scholars, not all of them hostile to Eisenhower, have used this term to describe Eisenhower's actions in Lebanon. While I could not find a specific example of Khrushchev or Nasser using this phrase, they very clearly incorporated the theme of American imperialism in Lebanon into their propaganda programs. Ironically, Ike was on record as repudiating "good old fashioned gunboat diplomacy" during the Suez Crisis. See Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower in War and Peace* (New York: Random House), xiii; for authors' associations of "gunboat diplomacy" with Eisenhower, see Elizabeth Nathan Saunders *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 86; Duane Robert Worley, *Shaping U.S. Military Forces: Revolution Or Relevance in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2006), 168; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier and President* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 469; James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 423; and Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 350.

29 Letter from Mrs. John Beardsley, in folder 122 EE (6), Box 884, General Files Series, Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

30 Memorandum of conversation, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, May 13, 1958, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960*, 11:46-48.

31 "Timetable of events of week of July 14-19 in connection with Mid East," in folder Mid East July 1958(7), Box 40, International Series, Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

32 Richard A. Cherwitz and Kenneth S. Zagacki, "Consummatory Versus Justificatory Crisis Rhetoric," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 50 (1986): 316.

33 The idea of America responding in retaliation to an attack on the homeland, its embassies, or other interests is included in their definition and therefore not perfectly applicable to Eisenhower's rhetoric; justificatory rhetoric for them takes place in a situation in which "presidential discourse was from the beginning part of a larger, overt military retaliation taken by the government." Cherwitz and Zagacki, "Consummatory Versus Justificatory Crisis Rhetoric," 308.

34 Implicit in my argument is Lloyd Bitzer's definition of what constitutes a "rhetorical" audience or situation. The international community and the American public, more than any other audience (including Congress), were the parties being hailed who were capable of acting in such a way as to positively modify the rhetorical exigence. See Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 1-14.

35 The same document describes the address to the public as being done to communicate "to people on necessity of action." "Timetable of events of week of July 14-19 in connection with Mid East," in folder Mid East July 1958(7), Box 40, International Series, Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

36 Jason A. Edwards, Joseph M. Valenzano, III, and Karla Stevenson, "The Peacekeeping Mission: Bringing Stability to a Chaotic Scene," *Communication Quarterly* (2011): 339.

37 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, in folder Cabinet Meeting of July 18, 1958, Box 11, Cabinet Series, Dwight Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

38 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Deeds Done in Words* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1990), 107.

39 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress on the Sending of United States Forces to Lebanon," July 15, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11132.

40 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress," *The American Presidency Project.*

41 I have used two sources for this address: Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Lebanese Statement," in folder Lebanese Statement, July 15, 1958 [inc. edited draft], Box 26, Speech Series, Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Statement by the President following the Landing of United States Marines at Beirut," July 15, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11133.

42 Considering, for instance, that Nasser himself cracked down heavily on Communist influence within the borders of Egypt and Syria, and that Lebanon was a US ally, there is very little evidence to suggest Communist influence in Lebanon was a significant political threat to either the regime or its nationalist opponents. In fact, Nasser viciously persecuted communism within the United Arab Republic's borders, and upon the union of Syria and Egypt forced the Syrian Communist Party to dissolve.

43 Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism*, 225.

44 To get a sense of how Eisenhower worded the address: up to this point in the speech, Eisenhower had used "we" fourteen times, and the only prior usage of "I" was in the sentence "I should now like to take a few minutes to explain the situation in Lebanon."

45 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Lebanese Statement," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

46 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress," *The American Presidency Project.*

47 Robert L. Ivie and Oscar Giner, "Hunting the Devil: Democracy's Rhetorical Impulse to War," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37 (2007): 581.

48 Robert L. Ivie, "Images of Savagery in American Justifications for War," *Communication Monographs* 47 (1980): 287.

49 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Lebanese Statement," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

50 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress," *The American Presidency Project.*

51 Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 340

52 Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," 342.

53 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress," *The American Presidency Project.*

54 "President Eisenhower's Speech on the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine), 1957." Council on Foreign Relations. 2015. Accessed November 19, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/president-eisenhowers-speech-us-role-middle-east-eisenhower-doctrine-1957/p24130.

55 Kundai Chirindo and Ryan Neville-Shepard, "Obama's 'New Beginning'" US Foreign Policy and Comic Exceptionalism," *Argumentation and Advocacy* (2015): 221.

56 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Lebanese Statement," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

57 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Lebanese Statement," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

58 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress," *The American Presidency Project.*

59 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Special Message to the Congress," *The American Presidency Project.*

60 Ira Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 11.

61 Message to the United States Forces in Lebanon and the Mediterranean Area, in folder "Message to Troops 7/19/58," Box 26, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight Eisenhower Library. For an online transcript of the address as it was given, see Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Message to the United States Forces in Lebanon and the Mediterranean Area.," July 19, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11136.

62 See "Text of Khrushchev Message on Summit Parley." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 20, 1958, http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/114438785?accountid=7014 (accessed January 31, 2016); "Special to The New York Times." (1958, Jul 23). Text of Eisenhower's reply to Khrushchev on summit talk. *New York Times* (1923-Current File) Retrieved from http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/114440827?accountid=7014; "Special to The New,York Times." 1958. Eisenhower's letter to Khrushchev about summit talk. *New York Times* (1923-Current file), Jul 26, 1958. http://ezproxy.baylor.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/114430012?accountid=7014 (accessed January 31, 2016).

63 Quoted by Carol R. Saivetz in "The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1956-1958," in *A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958*, ed. William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 239.

64 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.," July 22, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11137

65 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.," July 25, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11139

66 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R.," July 22, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11137

67 Travis J. Cram identifies this combination of idealism and pragmatism in Reagan's rhetoric, writing that "The central implication is that principle and pragmatism (at least for Reagan) are not necessarily opposite modes or rhetorical impulses, but instead can additively work together to ground a president's symbolic worldview." Such a statement, I hold, could also be applied to Eisenhower in this rhetorical instance. See Travis J. Cram, "'Peace, Yes, but World Freedom as well': Principle, Pragmatism, and the End of the Cold War," *Western Journal of Communication* 79 (2015):367-386.

68 Roger J. Spiller, "'Not War but Like War': American Intervention in Lebanon," *Leavenworth Papers* 3 (1981): 1.

69 "Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends." Gallup.com. Accessed February 1, 2016. http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx.

70 Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 247.

71 Jeff D. Bass, "The Perversion of Empire: Edmund Burke and the Nature of Imperial Responsibility," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 81 (1995): 211.

72 See Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's *The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014).

73 See Lyndon B. Johnson: "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican Republic.," May 2, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26932 and Jeff D. Bass, "The Appeal to Efficiency as Narrative Closure: Lyndon Johnson and the Dominican Crisis, 1965," *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 50 (1985): 103-120.

74 While this was a complicated rhetorical situation, elements of threat conflation, destabilization, and other rhetorical features of Ike's rhetoric can be seen in Reagan's speech of October 27. See Ronald Reagan: "Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada," October 27, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40696; David S. Birdsell, "Ronald Reagan on Lebanon and Grenada: Flexibility and Interpretation in the Application of Kenneth Burke's Pentad," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 267-279; David C. Klope "Defusing a Foreign Policy Crisis: Myth and Victimage in Reagan's 1983 Lebanon/Grenada Address," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 50 (1986): 336-349.

75 These themes can be seen most clearly in Bush's March 17, 2003 address to the nation regarding Iraq. See George W. Bush: "Address to the Nation on Iraq," March 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63713

76 David E. Proctor, "The Rescue Mission: Assigning Guilt to a Chaotic Scene," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 51 (1987): 246.

77 Jack Raymond, "U.S. Forces Move Back Marines: Navy, Air and Army Units Affected," *New York Times,* July 16, 1958, front page.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

On August 13, 1958, Eisenhower went before the United Nations General Assembly and spoke the first time since his famous "Atoms for Peace" address. Like that earlier speech, Eisenhower framed his subject matter under the rubric of a "universal" security concern. Unlike "Atoms for Peace," however, Eisenhower devoted nearly all of his speech to issues concerning the Middle East.[1] Speaking to the danger of "ballistic blackmail," Eisenhower pronounced,

> I recall the moments of clear danger we have faced since the end of the Second World War—Iran, Greece and Turkey, the Berlin blockade, Korea, the Straits of Taiwan.
>
> A common principle guided the position of the United States on all of these occasions. That principle was that aggression, direct or indirect, must be checked before it gathered sufficient momentum to destroy us all—aggressor and defender alike.
>
> It was this principle that was applied once again when the urgent appeals of the governments of Lebanon and Jordan were answered.[2]

Ike went on to declare that the United States had "no other purpose whatsoever" than to "prevent that crime" of allowing Lebanon and Jordan to fall to external aggression, and the rest of the speech was devoted to Eisenhower's proposed solutions for the Arab world's economic, technical, political, and security shortcomings.

While a noteworthy speech in its own right—Ike did not address the UN General Assembly every day, after all—this address is all the more striking for the dramatic transformation in America's relationship to the Middle East that it

signifies. Having come into office talking about the vague need to "win friends" in the "Mid East"[3] and downplaying his administration's covert role in shaping the region, Eisenhower now devoted an entire speech before the UN General Assembly to the problems of the Middle East. Eisenhower's UN address thus symbolizes his presidency as a whole; few actions could more clearly show just how far American economic, political, and rhetorical investment in the Middle East had come under Ike. In short, under Eisenhower presidential discourse concerning the Middle East was utterly transformed.

Of course, Eisenhower did not set out to transform the way in which Americans viewed the Middle East. In each of the cases analyzed in this work, his rhetoric was clearly purposed to accomplish whatever instrumental need was demanded by the situation, not to change or question the fundamental nature of American engagement in the Middle East. Yet it is hard not to be impressed by the rhetorical distance traveled between his campaign rhetoric and the speech he gave at the United Nations. If there is one lesson to draw from this thesis, it is that instrumental rhetoric can have powerful constitutive consequences. By "constitutive" I do not mean that Eisenhower's rhetoric functioned to call forth his audience into being in the way Maurice Charland describes or that his words interpellated his audience into a newly created subject position (although Ike's Middle East rhetoric does have important implications for American identity).[4] Rather, I mean "constitutive" in the sense that James Farr used the term when he states that "Political concepts…*constitute*, and so make possible, the beliefs of political actors."[5] As Farr goes on to say,

> To the extent that our concepts constitute the political world, we can say that *conceptual change* attends any *reconstitution* of the political world. In short, our concepts, beliefs, and practices go together and change together…. It is as if new worlds are being announced.[6]

Eisenhower oversaw such a conceptual change in America's treatment of the Middle East. For American policymakers—particularly those involved in intelligence and defense planning—the region had taken priority almost immediately following World War II. Yet this shift in concern was not, as has been shown in this study, reflected in the presidential rhetoric of Harry Truman. Like many other aspects of American political life, over the course of Ike's presidency he rhetorically reconstituted what the Middle East meant in the context of American politics and foreign policy. This rhetoric, in turn, then made possible (even imperative) certain policy decisions regarding the Middle East, exemplified by the intervention in Lebanon. Under Eisenhower, the Middle East as a concept in American politics was dramatically transformed, and this process was deeply rhetorical. Ultimately, Ike's discourse, created new "conditions of possibility" regarding the region, thus laying the groundwork for the rhetoric and policy of future presidents.[7] In that sense, Eisenhower's reconstitution of the Middle East within presidential rhetoric still impacts us today.

This study is not meant to be an exhaustive or comprehensive study of Eisenhower's presidential rhetoric regarding the Middle East. Such a feat would, minimally, need also to address the alliance politics of the Baghdad Pact; the Eisenhower administration's reactions to the various political crises of 1957-1960 in Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Iran; Ike's Middle East rhetoric after the death of Foster Dulles; and the relationships among Eisenhower and the sons of Abdul Aziz

ibn Saud. It would as well need to provide a fuller treatment of Eisenhower's 1952 campaign rhetoric, his relationship with Israel, the above UN General Assembly speech, and his utterances surrounding energy, foreign aid, and humanitarianism than is offered here. Rather than seeking to accomplish such a feat, the aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate the changing ways in which Eisenhower defined the Middle East to the American people and, to a lesser extent, Congress.

As such, this study has sought to establish that the Eisenhower presidency enacted a rhetorical revolution regarding America's relationship to the Middle East. Driven by the exigencies of the Cold War and the overarching strategy of containment, Eisenhower at first sought to maintain continuity with previous presidential rhetoric regarding the region, as can be seen in the rhetoric of misdirection surrounding Operation Ajax. It was in consideration of these same concerns that Ike then broke from this rhetorical strategy and articulated a uniquely American responsibility for the Middle East's security and well-being in the Suez Crisis speech. This address in turn laid the groundwork for the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was applied to material effect in Lebanon. By 1958, as can be seen in Ike's message to the UN General Assembly, the rhetorical transformation of America's relationship to the Middle East was complete. The way presidents speak about the region was permanently altered, and if presidential rhetoric truly does "define political reality," then this change constitutes a major rhetorical and political development indeed.[8]

While there are certainly a number of perspectives from which to view this study, I believe the findings of this thesis can especially inform future examinations

of discourses concerning the Cold War, Middle East studies, and the field of presidential rhetoric. It is my hope that the work offered here may be used as a starting point for other scholars who wish to investigate Ike's Middle East rhetoric and that it might promote interdisciplinary collaboration among these various fields. Viewed as a whole, Eisenhower's rhetoric regarding the Middle East carries manifold implications, of which I will elaborate upon two.

First, Eisenhower's rhetoric resembles British imperial rhetoric regarding the Middle East in several ways. To take a specific example, there are clear similarities between Eisenhower's Suez Crisis speech and Eden's first conference speech as leader of the Conservative Party. Eden also confessed worry that "the Middle Eastern situation is serious and could be dangerous," noting that they "have worked for a long time past by all manner of methods to try to bring about a reduction of tension in that part of the world."[9] Like Eisenhower, Eden justified his nation's actions by asserting that they were in the interests of peace. He also seemingly anticipated Eisenhower in his description of the long-term difficulty of achieving such a harmonious state: "We must not be surprised at setbacks. They are inevitable….The processes of diplomacy are slow but behind all this repetition of public and private argument, conciliation may grow and the power of peace prevail." Although Eden, Churchill, and countless other British statesmen historically used the language of national interest to justify their imperial presence in the Middle East, by the 1950s their tone had softened considerably.[10] Eden's Middle East rhetoric in 1955 was not quite so different from Ike's in 1956, and when considering the various *topoi* typical of imperialist rhetoric—disorder vs. order, national

interests described as universal values, and the language of paternal responsibility—it becomes difficult not to see traces of imperialism in Ike's rhetoric.

Second, Eisenhower's later rhetoric, particularly the major premise that it is America's responsibility to maintain order in the Middle East, helped establish a new norm in presidential rhetoric that has lasted to this day. From the Camp David Accords to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, from Hezbollah to the Islamic State, American presidents post-Ike have consistently spoken of the Middle East as an area of American interest worthy of immense investment of resources. While obviously not the only presidency influencing modern American presidential rhetoric on the Middle East, the utterances of the Eisenhower administration worked to authorize an expansion of the United States' direct engagement with the Middle East unlike any other. Subsequent presidents have built upon this authorization and adopted his fundamental premise—that America has an essential, leading, and unique role to play in guiding the region.[11]

More than anything, this study complicates simple narratives surrounding Eisenhower, the Cold War, and American imperialism or Orientalism in the Middle East. Ike's rhetoric transformed the way the Middle East is configured in presidential rhetoric and thereby it has influenced depictions of the region in American media, politics, and culture. If, as Douglass Little contends, "Few parts of the world have become as deeply embedded in the U.S. popular imagination as the Middle East," then it is worth studying how these conceptual formations came to be.[12] Rhetorical criticism offers a uniquely powerful tool to investigate such matters, and it is my hope that the analysis provided in this study provides an

impetus for future students of rhetoric to conduct similar inquiries. More than the Eisenhower Doctrine, it was the Eisenhower Era which fundamentally altered the way in which presents speak about the Middle East—and thereby laid the groundwork for all that has, and is still, to come. The current time is one in which commentators openly speculate if the age of American dominance in the Middle East is over.[13] Perhaps by revisiting the question of how it began, we can rediscover what that truly means.

Notes

1 For a transcript of the "Atoms for Peace" speech, see "Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace," Speech Text." Voices of Democracy. Accessed February 08, 2016. http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/.

2 Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address to the Third Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.", August 13, 1958. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11171.

3 Transcript of the June 24, 1952 Press Conference held at the Brown Palace Hotel in Denver, Colorado, in folder "June 4, 1952 to July 11, 1952 (3), Box 1, Speech Series, Eisenhower Papers as President, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

4 Maurice Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the *Peuple Quebecois*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 73 (1987): 133-150.

5 James Farr, "Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation," in *Conceptual Change and the Constitution*, ed. Terence Ball and J.A. Pocock (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988): 18.

6 Farr, "Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation," 21.

7 See James Jasinki's summation of Farr's work in relation to other formulations of constitutive rhetoric. James Jasinki, *Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies* (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), 106.

8 David Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34 (2004): 611.

9 Anthony Eden, "Leader's Speech, 1955," May 26, 1955. British Political Speech. http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=105

10 Indeed, the transformation in Eden's rhetoric alone is striking, seen most notably in comparing his 1955 speech with his 1946 address before Parliament discussing the British stake in Egypt. For the latter, see Anthony Eden, *Freedom and Order: Selected Speeches 1939-1946* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 398-405.

11 For examples of post-Eisenhower presidential rhetoric embracing this premise, see: **John F. Kennedy**, "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," May 25, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8151 and John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 14, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9138), **Lyndon B. Johnson**: "Remarks Broadcast on the 30th Anniversary of V-E Day.," May 7, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26947 and Lyndon B. Johnson: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 17, 1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28738**, Richard Nixon**: "The President's News Conference," May 8, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2496 and Richard Nixon: "Remarks to Reporters Announcing Acceptance by Middle East Nations of United States Cease-Fire Proposal," July 31, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2604, **Gerald R. Ford**: "Remarks of Welcome to President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt.," October 27, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=5341, **Jimmy Carter**: "The President's News Conference," December 30, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7075 and Jimmy Carter: "Middle East Arms Sales Letter to Members of Congress. ," May 12, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30788, **Ronald Reagan**: "Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Middle East Issues ," October 12, 1981. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44366 and Ronald Reagan: "Statement on the Situation in Lebanon ," February 7, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39433, **George Bush**: "The President's News Conference," August 8, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18751 and George Bush: "Remarks on the Persian Gulf Conflict," February 22, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19326), **William J. Clinton**: "Interview With Larry King," June 5, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51450 and William J. Clinton: "The President's Radio Address," September 23, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51901. The presidencies of George W. Bush and Barrack Obama, with their attendant ground conflicts in Iraq and expanded airstrike/drone-strike campaigns, have not repudiated Eisenhower's logic either although the "War on Terror" and its offspring possess unique rhetorical warrants in their own right.

12 Douglass Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Presss, 2002), 9.

13 In fact, the November/December 2015 issue of *Foreign Affairs* was dedicated to questioning America's role in the Middle East. See Gideon Rose, "The Post-American Middle East: What's Inside," *Foreign Affairs,* November/December 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-10-20/post-american-middle-east

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Collected Speeches and Letters

The following speeches and letters constitute the major documents referenced in the course of the preceding study. All sources have been taken from the University of California's "The American Presidency Project" website unless otherwise noted; where possible the texts have been cross-referenced with the manuscripts from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas. Grammatical mistakes and other errors have been preserved in their database form. Formatting of the speeches and letters has been preserved in database form, respectively. The speeches and letters compiled are organized in chronological order. References to the individual sources for the speeches and letters can be found in the footnotes.

MESSAGE FROM MOHAMMAD MOSSADEGH TO DWIGHT EISENHOWER[1]

Mohammad Mossadegh

January 7, 1953

MR. PRESIDENT ELECT: I take this opportunity to convey to you the cordial congratulations of the Iranian people on your election to the high office of President of the United States and to wish you every success in the carrying out of the important tasks which that office imposes.

I dislike taking up with you the problems of my country even before you assume office. I do so partly because of their urgency and partly because I have reason to believe that they have already been presented to you by those who may not share my concern for the future of Iran and its people.

It is my hope that the new administration which you head will obtain at the outset a true understanding of the significance of the vital struggle in which the Iranian people have been engaging and assist in removing the obstacles which are preventing them from realizing their aspirations for the attainment of … [omitted] life as a politically and economically independent nation. For almost two years the Iranian people have suffered acute distress and much misery merely because a company inspired by covetousness and a desire for profit supported by the British Government has been endeavoring to prevent them from obtaining their natural and elementary rights.

I am happy to say that during this struggle so injurious to the people of Iran the American people on many occasions have demonstrated their sympathy for the Iranian nation and an understanding of its problems. I personally witnessed many manifestations of this sympathy and understanding when I was in the United States. Unfortunately the government of the United States, while on occasions displaying friendship for Iran has pursued what appears to the Iranian people to be a policy of supporting the British Government and the former company. In this struggle, it has taken the side of the British Government against that of Iran in international assemblies. It has given financial aid to the British government while withholding it from Iran and it seems to us it has given at least some degree of support to the endeavors of the British to strangle Iran with a financial and economic blockade.

It is not my desire that the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom should be strained because of differences with regard to Iran. I doubt however whether in this day and age a great nation which has such an exalted moral standing in the world can afford to support the internationally immoral policy of a friend and ally merely in order not to disturb good relations with that friend and ally. The Iranian people merely desire to lead their own lives in their own way. They wish to maintain friendly relations with all other peoples. The former company which for years was engaged in exploiting their oil resources, unfortunately persisted in interfering in the internal life of the country.

The Iranian people finally became convinced that so long as this company continued to operate within Iran its systemic interference in Iranian internal life would

continue. The Iranian people therefore had no choice other than to exercise their sovereign rights by nationalizing their oil and terminating the activities of the former company in Iran. The Iranian Government made it clear at the time of nationalization that it was willing to pay fair compensation to the former company due consideration being given to such claims and counterclaims as Iran might have against the former company. The former company instead of entering into negotiations with Iran for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation due took steps with the support of the British government to create an economic and financial blockade of Iran with the purpose of forcing the Iranian people again to submit to the will of the former company and to abandon their right to exploit and utilize their own natural resources.

It is my sincere hope that when the new Administration of which you are to be the head will come into power in the United States it will give most careful consideration to the Iranian case so that Iran would be able to attain to its just aspirations in a manner which will strengthen the cause of world peace and will renew confidence in the determination of the United States to support with all its power and prestige the principles of the charter of the United Nations.

Please accept the assurances of my high esteem.

DR. MOHAMMAD MOSSADEGH

EISENHOWER'S REPLY TO MOSSADEGH[2]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

January 10, 1953

HIS EXCELLENCY DR. MOHAMMAD MOSSADEGH: Please accept my thanks for your kind greetings and felicitations. Likewise I am happy to have a summary of your views on your country's situation and I shall study these views with care and with sympathetic concern. I hope you will accept my assurances that I have in no way compromised our position of impartiality in this matter and that no individual has attempted to prejudice me in this matter. This leads me to observe that I hope our own future relationships will be characterized by confidence and trust inspired by frankness and friendliness. I shall be delighted to receive either personally and directly or through established diplomatic channels at any time a communication regarding your views on any subject in which we may have a common interest.

With renewed thanks for the kindly courtesy of your message and with expression of my continued esteem.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

MOSSADEGH'S SECOND MESSAGE TO EISENHOWER[3]

Mohammad Mossadegh

May 28, 1953

Dear Mr. President:

In the kind reply which you sent to my message of last January you suggested that I might inform you direct or through diplomatic channels of any views that may be of mutual interest.

In that message I had briefly referred to the hardships and privations which the Iranian people had undergone during the last two years in their efforts to attain their aspirations and also to the difficulties which the British Government has created for Iran in its support of the illogical claims of an imperialistic company.

During the few months that have elapsed since the date of that message the Iranian people have been suffering financial hardships and struggling with political intrigues carried on by the former Oil Company and the British Government. For instance, the purchasers of Iranian oil have been dragged from one court to another, and all means of propaganda and diplomacy have been employed in order to place illegal obstacles in the way of the sale of Iranian oil. Although the Italian and Japanese courts have declared Iranian oil to be free and unencumbered, the British have not as yet abandoned their unjust and unprincipled activities.

Although it was hoped that during Your Excellency's administration attention of a more sympathetic character would be devoted to the Iranian situation,

unfortunately no change seems thus far to have taken place in the position of the American Government.

In the message which the Secretary of State sent me from Karachi, he expressed regret that the efforts of the United States to contribute to the solution of the problem of compensation had thus far been unsuccessful. It should be recalled that the Iranian Government was prepared to pay the value of the former Company's properties in Iran in such amount as might be determined by the International Court of Justice. It was also prepared to accept the jurisdiction of the said court with regard to the amount of compensation provided the British Government would state the amount of its claim in advance and that claim would be within the bounds of reason. Obviously the Iranian Government also had certain claims against the former Oil Company and the British Government which would have been presented at the time of the hearing of the case.

The British Government, hoping to regain its old position, has in effect ignored all of these proposals.

As a result of actions taken by the former Company and the British Government, the Iranian nation is now facing great economic and political difficulties. There can be serious consequences, from an international viewpoint as well, if this situation is permitted to continue. If prompt and effective aid is not given this country now, any steps that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for the negligence of today might well be too late.

We are of course grateful for the aid heretofore granted Iran by the Government of the United States. This aid has not, however, been sufficient to solve the problems of Iran and to ensure world peace which is the aim and ideal of the noble people and of the Government of the United States.

The standard of living of the Iranian people has been very, low as a result of century-old imperialistic policies, and it will be impossible to raise it without extensive programs of development and rehabilitation. Unfortunately the aid heretofore granted has been in principle primarily of a technical nature, and even in this respect the assistance needed has not at times been accorded. For example, the Export-Import Bank which was to have advanced Iran twenty-five million dollars for use in the sphere of agriculture did not do so because of unwarranted outside interference.

The Iranian nation hopes that with the help and assistance of the American Government the obstacles placed in the way of sale of Iranian oil can be removed, and that if the American Government is not able to effect a removal of such obstacles, it can render effective economic assistance of the Presidents to enable Iran to utilize her other resources. This country has natural resources other than oil. The exploitation of these resources would solve the present difficulties of the country. This, however, is impossible without economic aid.

In conclusion, I invite Your Excellency's sympathetic and responsive attention to the present dangerous situation of Iran, and I trust that you will ascribe to all the points contained in this message the importance due them.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

DR. M. MOSSADEGH

EISENHOWER'S FINAL REPLY TO PREMIER MOSSADEGH[4]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

June 29, 1953

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of May 28 in which you described the present difficult situation in Iran and expressed the hope that the United States might be able to assist Iran in overcoming some of its difficulties. In writing my reply which has been delayed until I could have an opportunity to consult with Mr. Dulles and Ambassador Henderson, I am motivated by the same spirit of friendly frankness as that which I find reflected in your letter.

The Government and people of the United States historically have cherished and still have deep feelings of friendliness for Iran and the Iranian people. They sincerely hope that Iran will be able to maintain its independence and that the Iranian people will be successful in realizing their national aspirations and in developing a contented and free nation which will contribute to world prosperity and peace.

It was primarily because of that hope that the United States Government during the last two years has made earnest efforts to assist in eliminating certain differences between Iran and the United Kingdom which have arisen as a result of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. It has been the belief of the United States that the reaching of an agreement in the matter of compensation would strengthen confidence throughout the world in the determination of Iran fully to adhere to the

principles which render possible a harmonious community of free nations; that it would contribute to the strengthening of the international credit standing of Iran; and that it would lead to the solution of some of the financial and economic problems at present facing Iran.

The failure of Iran and of the United Kingdom to reach an agreement with regard to compensation has handicapped the Government of the United States in its efforts to help Iran. There is a strong feeling in the United States, even among American citizens most sympathetic to Iran and friendly to the Iranian people, that it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil and oil products if a reasonable agreement were reached with regard to compensation whereby the large-scale marketing of Iranian oil would be resumed. Similarly, many American citizens would be deeply opposed to the purchase by the United States Government of Iranian oil in the absence of an oil settlement.

There is also considerable sentiment in the United States to the effect that a settlement based on the payment of compensation merely for losses of the physical assets of a firm which has been nationalized would not be what might be called a reasonable settlement and that an agreement to such a settlement might tend to weaken mutual trust between free nations engaged in friendly economic intercourse. Furthermore, many of my countrymen who have kept themselves informed regarding developments in this unfortunate dispute believe that, in view

of the emotions which have been aroused both in Iran and the United Kingdom, efforts to determine by direct negotiation the amount of compensation due are more likely to increase friction than to promote understanding. They continue to adhere to the opinion that the most practicable and the fairest means of settling the question of compensation would be for that question to be referred to some neutral international body which could consider on the basis of merit all claims and counter-claims.

I fully understand that the Government of Iran must determine for itself which foreign and domestic policies are likely to be most advantageous to Iran and to the Iranian people. In what I have written, I am not trying to advise the Iranian Government on its best interests. I am merely trying to explain why, in the circumstances, the Government of the United States is not presently in a position to extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian oil.

In case Iran should so desire, the United States Government hopes to be able to continue to extend technical assistance and military aid on a basis comparable to that given during the past year.

I note the concern reflected in your letter at the present dangerous situation in Iran and sincerely hope that before it is too late, the Government of Iran will take such steps as are in its power to prevent a further deterioration of that situation.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

JOHN FOSTER DULLES'S REPORT ON TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST[5]

John Foster Dulles

June 1, 1953

About three weeks ago, the Director of Mutual Security, Mr. Harold Stassen, and I and our associates set out, at President Eisenhower's request, on a trip to twelve countries which lie between the Mediterranean area in Europe and China in Asia. I shall give you our country-by-country impressions and then our general conclusions.

First, I want to say that everywhere we were very well received. That was encouraging, for several of the countries feel that United States policies have been harmful and even antagonistic to them and the Communists have vigorously exploited this feeling. They staged some hostile demonstrations against us, but these were inconsequential. The Governments received us with warm hospitality, and as we drove through the streets, the people almost everywhere greeted us with friendly smiles, with applause. The political leaders talked intimately with us and we gained new friendships and new understanding which will stand us in good stead for the future. Also in each of the capitals I spoke to all of the United States Foreign Service personnel. They are a fine body of men and women of whom we can be proud.

It's high time that the United States paid more attention to the Near East and South Asia and which, until our trip. [,] to [no] United States Secretary of State has

ever before visited. Out [Our] post-war attention has been given primarily to Western Europe. That area, of course, is important, very important; but it is not all-important.

Surprising Shock

It came as a surprising shock to most of us when 450,000,000 Chinese, whom we had counted as friends, fell under Communist domination. There could be equally dangerous developments in the Near East and South Asia. The situation calls for urgent concern.

This area we visited contains one-fourth of the world's population and it represents about one-half of all the people who are still free of Communist domination.

The Near East possesses great strategic importance, as a bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa. The present masters of the Kremlin following the lead of past military conquerors, covet this position. In 1940 the Soviet leaders specified, in secret negotiations they were carrying on with the Nazis, that Soviet "territorial aspirations they said center in the direction of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf."

This area contains vital resources—oil, manganese, chrome, mica and other metals. About 60 per cent of all the proven oil reserves of the world are in this Near East area.

Most important of all, the Near East is the source of three great religions—the Jewish, the Christian, the Moslem religions—which have for centuries exerted an immense influence throughout the world. Surely we cannot ignore the fate of the peoples who first perceived and then passed on to us the great spiritual truths from which our own society derives its inner strength.

Our first stop was in Egypt. There we had three days in which to get acquainted with General Naguib. He is a popular hero, and I could readily see why. He and his associates are determined to provide Egypt with a vigorous Government which will truly serve the people. Also, they seek to end the stationing of British troops and the exercise of British authority at the Suez Canal base.

Now, before we arrived in Egypt, a tense situation had developed between the British and the Egyptian Governments. Conversations between these two Governments looking to an orderly withdrawal of British troops had been suspended and there was grave danger that hostilities would actually break out.

Talks with Naguib

We discussed the situation with General Naguib. The heart of the trouble is not so much the presence of British troops, for both sides now agreed that they should be withdrawn, but the problem is the subsequent authority over and management of this gigantic base, its air strips, and its depots of supplies. It takes experienced administrative personnel, technical people, to keep this base in operating efficiency, and it is the problem of the provision of this technical personnel which is causing the present difficulty. This matter has an importance

which goes far beyond Egypt, for the base serves all the Near East, and indeed Western security.

I am convinced that there is nothing irreconcilable between this international concern in the base and Egyptian sovereignty. We asked, with some success, that there be a further time in which to find a peaceful solution and the United States is prepared to help in any desired way.

Egypt today is standing at the threshold of what can be a great new future. If only this Suez problem can be satisfactorily solved, I am confident that Egypt can find the means to develop its land and lift up its people, and add a bright new chapter to its glorious past.

After Egypt we went on to Israel. There we were impressed by the vision and supporting energy with which the peoples are building their new nation. Inspired by a great faith, they are doing an impressive work of creation. They face hard internal problems, which I believe they can solve. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, and other Israeli officials asserted convincingly their desire to live at peace with their Arab neighbors.

Jerusalem is divided into armed camps split between Israel and the Arab nation of Jordan. The atmosphere there is heavy with hate. As I gazed on the Mount of Olives, I felt anew that Jerusalem is, above all, the holy place of the Christian, Moslem and Jewish faiths. That's been repeatedly emphasized by the United Nations, and that fact does not necessarily exclude some political status in Jerusalem

for Israel and Jordan. But the world religious community has claims in Jerusalem which take precedence over the political claims of any particular state.

Now closely huddled around Israel are most of the over 800,000 Arab refugees, who fled from Palestine as the Israelis took over. They mostly exist in makeshift camps, with few facilities either for health, work or recreation. Within these camps the inmates rot away, spiritually and physically. Even the grim reaper offers no solution, for as the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate.

Some of these refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by Israel. Most, however, could more readily be integrated into the lives of the neighboring Arab communities. This, however, awaits on irrigation projects, which would permit more soil to be cultivated.

Throughout the area the cry everywhere is water, water for irrigation. And United Nations contributions and other funds which are available to help refugees, we feel, and Mr. Stassen and I, as we came back, that they can well be spent in large part upon a coordinated use of the rivers which run these Arab countries and Israel and which could create more soil which could be cultivated.

These irrigation needs became most vivid as we motored from Jerusalem to Amman, the capital of Jordan. That road goes through the Dead Sea area, a scene of desolation with no sign of life other than the tens of thousands of refugees who survive precariously on parched land largely by United Nations doles. Later on, as

we flew north, we observed the Yarmak [sic] River water, which could perhaps be diverted so as to return some of this vast desert area into fertile land.

At Amman, we dined with the charming and able new King Hussein and members of the Government. They are preoccupied with this problem of refugees and of relations with Israel. The inflow of refugees has almost doubled the entire population of Jordan, and the long armistice line with Israel gives rise to frequent and dangerous shooting episodes.

From Jordan we went to Syria and there we were impressed by General Shisheikly. He is eager to develop the resources of his country, which are substantial. In that way the living standards of the Syrian people could be raised and this, in turn, would enable them to receive more refugees into a land which relatively is sparsely populated.

By Motor to Beirut

From Damascus, the capital of Syria, we motored to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. That road took us over a mountain range, with refreshing snow in sharp contrast to the heat of the desert plains.

You may recall that Beirut is the home of the American University, which has educated many of the Arab leaders of today. President [Camille] Chamoun of Lebanon talked to us of his high hopes for his country and he pointed out the role which it might play, representing as it does uniquely a meeting of the East and the West.

Leaving Lebanon for Iraq, we flew over the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys. This is the site of the Garden of Eden, and under its new ruler, King Faisal—who, you may remember, visited the United States last summer—the Government of Iraq is beginning to develop these ancient valleys and restore their former productivity. The revenues from the oil production of Iraq are being largely directed to this and to other constructive purposes. Iraq can be, and it desires to be, the granary for much of this part of the world.

In Saudi Arabia we were received by King Ibn Saud, one of the great Near Eastern figures of this century, conspicuous in his dignity and his singleness of purpose. He is a good friend of the United States, as he has shown it by deeds. Our United States policy will be to reciprocate that friendship. In Saudi Arabia, Americans and Arabs are working together in good fellowship in the vast oil fields of the country. It's a good relationship.

We left the Arab area to go on first to India and then to Pakistan. These two nations, although they've been independent nations for less than six years, already play an influential part in world affairs.

In India I met again with Mr. Nehru, one of the great leaders of our time. We had long conversations together in the intimacy of his home. His calm demeanor and his lofty idealism greatly impressed me. We reviewed together the international problems which concern both of our countries. We talked about the problem of the Korean armistice. We talked about the danger in Indo-China and Southeast Asia generally. I have to say we didn't always agree, but we did clear up

many misunderstandings, and I felt that we ended with respect for the integrity of our respective purposes. India, I may say, is now supporting the United Nations Command position in relation to the armistice in Korea.

Five-Year Indian Plan

Mr. Stassen and I also, when in India, obtained a clearer view of the Government of India's five-year program to improve the welfare of the Indian people.

India is the largest self-governing nation that there is. Also it has 2,000 miles of common boundary with Communist China, and there is occurring between these two countries, the self-governing and the Communist country, a competition as to whether ways of freedom or police state methods can better achieve social progress. This competition directly affects the 800,000,000 people of these two countries, and in the long run, the outcome will affect all humanity, including ourselves. Our interest in the outcome fully justifies continuing, on a modest scale, some technical assistance and some external resources which will enable India to go ahead with its five-year plan.

Pakistan is the largest of the Moslem nations and occupies a high position in the Moslem world. The strong spiritual faith and the martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against communism.

The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, whom we recently knew here as Ambassador to Washington, is energetically leading the new Government. We met

with a feeling of warm friendship on the part of the people of Pakistan toward the United States.

A grave and immediate problem in Pakistan is the shortage of wheat. Without large imports, widespread famine conditions will ensue. Last year we helped India in a similar emergency. I believe that prompt United States wheat assistance to Pakistan is essential.

When we think in the connection about United States aid, we can't also but think how wasteful it is that these countries should use their strength and effort which involve quarreling with each other, and diverting their strength for possible use against each other.

That thought applies to the dispute between India and Pakistan about Kashmir. It's my impression from my conversations with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that this controversy could be settled. Surely, it needs to be settled. And we tried, tactfully but firmly, to make clear that the United States, as a friend of both countries, hopes for an accord which would make our economic aid more fruitful.

Talk with Envoy to Iran

It was not possible to include Iran in our schedule. However, we did arrange that our Ambassador to Iran should come to Karachi, the capital of Pakistan, to meet us. Iran is now preoccupied with its oil dispute with Great Britain. But still the people and the Government do not want this quarrel to expose them to Communist

subversion. They have not forgotten that they were occupied by the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1946.

It's our policy on the part of the United States to avoid any unwanted interference in the oil dispute, but we can usefully continue technical aid and some assistance to this agricultural nation of Iran, and in that way perhaps prevent an economic collapse which would play into the hands of predatory forces.

After Pakistan, we went to Turkey and Greece. Here are two countries which have clearly demonstrated their intent to stand steadfast against Communist aggression and internal subversion. Despite their heavy commitments to NATO, both of these countries have contributed valiantly to our United Nations efforts in Korea.

We, in turn, plan to continue help to Greece and Turkey so that they can grow stronger. They are valiant in spirit and they hold a strategic position in Europe and in Asia which enables them to help us. While I was in Greece I dined with the King and Queen and I passed on to this charming couple President Eisenhower's invitation to them to come to visit us next fall.

Our last stop before returning to the United States was Libya, the newest member of the family of nations. This country is located in a key spot on the Mediterranean. It has recently become, by United Nations action, an independent nation. Libya is cooperating with United States and with Great Britain in strengthening its own defenses and those of the Mediterranean area. Now let me turn to conclusions.

[1]

The first is this: We found that most of the peoples of the Near East and South Asia are deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They are suspicious of the colonial powers and we of the United States, too, are suspect, because, they reason, our NATO alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies.

I'm convinced that United States policy has become unnecessarily ambiguous in this matter. The leaders of the countries I visited fully recognize it would be a disaster if there were any break between the United States and Great Britain and France. They don't want this to happen. However, without breaking out from the framework of Western unity, we can pursue our traditional dedication to political liberty. And the reality is that the Western powers will gain, rather than lose, form an orderly development of self-government.

I emphasize, however, the word "orderly." Let none forget that the Kremlin uses extreme nationalism to bait the trap by which it hopes to captures the dependent peoples.

[2]

Now, the second place: The peoples of the Near East and Asia demand better standards of living, and the day is past when their aspirations can be ignored. The task is one primarily for the Governments and the peoples themselves, and in some cases they can use their available resources, such as oil revenues, to better

advantage. There are, however, ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowledge about transport, communications, and fertilization and the use of water for irrigation. Mr. Stassen and I feel that money wisely spent in this area under the Mutual Security Program will give the American people a good return in terms of better understanding and cooperation.

[3]

Now, in the third place: The United States should seek to allay the deep resentment against it that has resulted from the creation of Israel. In the past we had good relations with the Arab peoples. American educational institutions there had built up feeling of goodwill, and also American business men had won a good reputation in this area. There was mutual confidence to mutual advantage.

Today the Arab peoples are afraid the United States will back the new state of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful of Zionism than they are of communism and they fear the United States, lest we become the backer of expansionist Zionism.

And on the other hand, the Israeli fear that ultimately the Arabs may try to push them in the sea.

In an effort to calm these contradictory fears the United States joined with France and Britain in a declaration of May 25, 1950, which stated that "the three Governments, should they find that any of these states of the Near East was

preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations." That declaration, when it was made in 1950, did not serve to reassure the Arabs. It must be made clear that the present United States Administration stands fully behind that declaration. We cannot afford to be distrusted by millions who should be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further swell the ranks of the Communist dictators.

And the leaders of Israel themselves agreed with us that United States policies should be impartial so as to win not only the respect and regard of the Israeli but also of the Arab peoples. We shall seek such policies.

[4]

Now, in the fourth place, there is need for peace in the Near East. Today there is only an uneasy military armistice between Israel and the Arab states, while economic warfare is being waged by the Arab states against Israel, in retaliation for what they believe to be Israeli encroachments. The area is enfeebled by fear and by wasteful measures that are inspired by fear and hatred.

Israel should become a part of the Near East community and cease to look upon itself, or be looked upon by others, as alien to this community. This is possible. To achieve it will require concessions on the part of both sides. But the gains to both will far outweigh the concessions required to win those gains.

The parties concerned have the primary responsibility of bringing peace to the area, but the United States will not hesitate by every appropriate means to use its influence to bring a step-by-step reduction of tensions in the area and the conclusion of ultimate peace.

[5]

Now, we think about a Middle East defense organization. It's been much talked about, but I think that is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel and with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near, and in general, the northern tier of countries have an awareness of the danger.

There is in the area generally a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and a sense of common peril.

While awaiting the creation of a formal security association, the United States, I am convinced, can usefully help to strengthen the inter-related defenses of these countries if they want strength, not against each other or against the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.

[6]

Now, in conclusion, let me recall that the primary purpose of our trip was to show friendliness and to develop understanding. These people we visited are all proud peoples who have a great tradition and, I believe, a great future. We in the United States are better off if we respect and honor them, and learn the thoughts and aspirations which move them. It profits nothing merely to be critical of others.

President Eisenhower's Administration plans to make friendship—not fault-finding—the basis of its foreign policy. President Eisenhower brought with him from Europe an unprecedented measure of understanding and personal friendships. Before he was inaugurated, he went to Korea. Twice since inauguration, Mr. Stassen and I have been to Europe. Now we have been to the Near East and South Asia. Later this month, the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. [John Moors] Cabot, will go to South America.

Thus your Government is establishing the world-wide relationships and gathering the information which will enable us better to serve you, the American people.

TELEVISION ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST[6]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

October 31, 1956

My Fellow Americans:

Tonight I report to you as your President.

We all realize that the full and free debate of a political campaign surrounds us. But the events and issues I wish to place before you this evening have no connection whatsoever with matters of partisanship. They are concerns of every American-his present and his future.

I wish, therefore, to give you a report of essential facts so that you--whether belonging to either one of our two great parties, or to neither--may give thoughtful and informed consideration to this swiftly changing world scene.

The changes of which I speak have come in two areas of the world--Eastern Europe and the Mid-East.

I.

In Eastern Europe there is the dawning of a new day. It has not been short or easy in coming.

After World War II, the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the nations of Eastern Europe, governments of Soviet choice--servants of Moscow.

It has been consistent United States policy--without regard to political party--to seek to end this situation. We have sought to fulfill the wartime pledge of the United Nations that these countries, over-run by wartime armies, would once again know sovereignty and self-government.

We could not, of course, carry out this policy by resort to force. Such force would have been contrary both to the best interests of the Eastern European peoples and to the abiding principles of the United Nations. But we did help to keep alive the hope of these peoples for freedom.

Beyond this, they needed from us no education in the worth of national independence and personal liberty--for, at the time of the American Revolution, it was many of them who came to our land to aid our cause. Now, recently the pressure of the will of these peoples for national independence has become more and more insistent.

A few days ago, the people of Poland--with their proud and deathless devotion to freedom--moved to secure a peaceful transition to a new government. And this government, it seems, will strive genuinely to serve the Polish people.

And, more recently, all the world has been watching dramatic events in Hungary where this brave people, as so often in the past, have offered their very lives for independence from foreign masters. Today, it appears, a new Hungary is rising from

this struggle, a Hungary which we hope from our hearts will know full and free nationhood.

We have rejoiced in all these historic events.

Only yesterday the Soviet Union issued an important statement on its relations with all the countries of Eastern Europe. This statement recognized the need for review of Soviet policies, and the amendment of these policies to meet the demands of the people for greater national independence and personal freedom. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to consider the withdrawal of Soviet "advisers"--who have been, as you know, the effective ruling force in Soviet occupied countries--and also to consider withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Hungary and Rumania.

We cannot yet know if these avowed purposes will be truly carried out.

But two things are clear.

First, the fervor and the sacrifice of the peoples of these countries, in the name of freedom, have themselves brought real promise that the light of liberty soon will shine again in this darkness.

And second, if the Soviet Union indeed faithfully acts upon its announced intention, the world will witness the greatest forward stride toward justice, trust and understanding among nations in our generation.

These are the facts. How has your government responded to them?

The United States has made clear its readiness to assist economically the new and independent governments of these countries. We have already--some days since--been in contact with the new Government of Poland on this matter. We have also publicly declared that we do not demand of these governments their adoption of any particular form of society as a condition upon our economic assistance. Our one concern is that they be free--for their sake, and for freedom's sake.

We have also--with respect to the Soviet Union--sought clearly to remove any false fears that we would look upon new governments in these Eastern European countries as potential military allies. We have no such ulterior purpose. We see these peoples as friends, and we wish simply that they be friends who are free.

II.

I now turn to that other part of the world where, at this moment, the situation is somber. It is not a situation that calls for extravagant fear or hysteria. But it invites our most serious concern.

I speak, of course, of the Middle East. This ancient crossroads of the world was, as we all know, an area long subject to colonial rule. This rule ended after World War II, when all countries there won full independence. Out of the Palestinian mandated territory was born the new State of Israel.

These historic changes could not, however, instantly banish animosities born of the ages. Israel and her Arab neighbors soon found themselves at war with one another.

And the Arab nations showed continuing anger toward their former colonial rulers, notably France and Great Britain.

The United States--through all the years since the close of World War II--has labored tirelessly to bring peace and stability to this area.

We have considered it a basic matter of United States policy to support the new State of Israel and--at the same time--to strengthen our bonds both with Israel and with the Arab countries. But, unfortunately through all these years, passion in the area threatened to prevail over peaceful purposes, and in one form or another, there has been almost continuous fighting.

This situation recently was aggravated by Egyptian policy including rearmament with Communist weapons. We felt this to be a misguided policy on the part of the Government of Egypt. The State of Israel, at the same time, felt increasing anxiety for its safety. And Great Britain and France feared more and more that Egyptian policies threatened their "life line" of the Suez Canal.

These matters came to a crisis on July 26th of this year, when the Egyptian Government seized the Universal Suez Canal Company. For ninety years--ever since the inauguration of the Canal--that Company has operated the Canal, largely under British and French technical supervision.

Now there were some among our allies who urged an immediate reaction to this event by use of force. We insistently urged otherwise, and our wish prevailed--through a long succession of conferences and negotiations for weeks--even months--

with participation by the United Nations. And there, in the United Nations, only a short while ago, on the basis of agreed principles, it seemed that an acceptable accord was within our reach.

But the direct relations of Egypt with both Israel and France kept worsening to a point at which first Israel--then France-and Great Britain also--determined that, in their judgment, there could be no protection of their vital interests without resort to force.

Upon this decision, events followed swiftly. On Sunday the Israeli Government ordered total mobilization. On Monday, their armed forces penetrated deeply into Egypt and to the vicinity of the Suez Canal, nearly one hundred miles away. And on Tuesday, the British and French Governments delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to Israel and Egypt--now followed up by armed attack against Egypt.

The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance.

As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is likewise our right--if our judgment so dictates--to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes.

To say this--in this particular instance--is in no way to minimize our friendship with these nations--nor our determination to maintain those friendships.

And we are fully aware of the grave anxieties of Israel, of Britain and of France. We know that they have been subjected to grave and repeated provocations.

The present fact, nonetheless, seems clear: the action taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed. And, beyond this, we are forced to doubt that resort to force and war will for long serve the permanent interest of the attacking nations.

Now--we must look to the future.

In the circumstances I have described, there will be no United States involvement in these present hostilities. I therefore have no plan to call the Congress in Special Session. Of course, we shall continue to keep in contact with Congressional leaders of both parties.

I assure you, your government will remain alert to every possibility of this situation, and keep in close contact and coordination with the Legislative Branch of this government.

At the same time it is--and it will remain--the dedicated purpose of your government to do all in its power to localize the fighting and to end the conflict.

We took our first measure in this action yesterday. We went to the United Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to their own land and that hostilities in the area be brought to a close. This proposal was not adopted--because it was vetoed by Great Britain and by France.

The processes of the United Nations, however, are not exhausted. It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before the United Nations General Assembly. There-with no veto operating--the opinion of the world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just end to this tormenting problem. In the past the United Nations has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed. We believe it can and that it will do so again.

My fellow citizens, as I review the march of world events in recent years, I am ever more deeply convinced that the processes of the United Nations represent the soundest hope for peace in the world. For this very reason, I believe that the processes of the United Nations need further to be developed and strengthened. I speak particularly of increasing its ability to secure justice under international law.

In all the recent troubles in the Middle East, there have indeed been injustices suffered by all nations involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of injustice--war--is the remedy for these wrongs.

There can be no peace--without law. And there can be no law--if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us--and another for our friends.

The society of nations has been slow in developing means to apply this truth.

But the passionate longing for peace--on the part of all peoples of the earth--compels us to speed our search for new and more effective instruments of justice.

The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It means the acceptance of law, and the fostering of justice, in all the world.

To our principles guiding us in this quest we must stand fast. In so doing we can honor the hopes of all men for a world in which peace will truly and justly reign.

I thank you, and goodnight.

SPECIAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON THE SENDING OF UNITED STATES FORCES TO LEBANON[7]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 15, 1958

To the Congress of the United States:

On July 14, 1958, I received an urgent request from the President of the Republic of Lebanon that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon. President Chamoun stated that without an immediate showing of United States support, the government of Lebanon would be unable to survive. This request by President Chamoun was made with the concurrence of all the members of the Lebanese cabinet. I have replied that we would do this and a contingent of United States Marines has now arrived in Lebanon. This initial dispatch of troops will be augmented as required. U. S. forces will be withdrawn as rapidly as circumstances permit.

Simultaneously, I requested that an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council be held on July 15, 1958. At that meeting, the Permanent Representative of the United States reported to the Council the action which this Government has taken. He also expressed the hope that the United Nations could soon take further effective measures to meet more fully the situation in Lebanon. We will continue to support the United Nations to this end.

United States forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace.

About two months ago a violent insurrection broke out in Lebanon, particularly along the border with Syria which, with Egypt, forms the United Arab Republic. This revolt was encouraged and strongly backed by the official Cairo, Damascus, and Soviet radios which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic language. The insurrection was further supported by sizable amounts of arms, ammunition and money and by personnel infiltrated from Syria to fight against the lawful authorities. The avowed purpose of these activities was to overthrow the legally constituted government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic.

Lebanon referred this situation to the United Nations Security Council. In view of the international implications of what was occurring in Lebanon, the Security Council on June 11, 1958 decided to send observers into Lebanon for the purpose of insuring that further outside assistance to the insurrection would cease. The Secretary General of the United Nations subsequently undertook a mission to the area to reinforce the work of the observers.

It was our belief that the efforts of the Secretary General and of the United Nations observers were helpful in reducing further aid in terms of personnel and military equipment from across the frontiers of Lebanon. There was a basis for hope that the

situation might be moving toward a peaceful solution, consonant with the continuing integrity of Lebanon, and that the aspect of indirect aggression from without was being brought under control.

The situation was radically changed, however, on July 14, when there was a violent outbreak in Baghdad, in nearby Iraq. Elements in Iraq strongly sympathetic to the United Arab Republic seem to have murdered or driven from office individuals comprising the lawful government of that country. We do not yet know in detail to what extent they have succeeded. We do have reliable information that important Iraqi leaders have been murdered.

We share with the Government of Lebanon the view that these events in Iraq demonstrate a ruthlessness of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon cannot combat without further evidence of support from other friendly nations.

After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safeguard American citizens in Lebanon of whom there are about 2,500 Pending the taking of adequate measures by the United Nations, the United States will be acting pursuant to what the United Nations Charter recognizes is an inherent right--the right of all nations to work together and to seek help when necessary to preserve their independence. I repeat that we wish to withdraw our forces as soon as the

United Nations has taken further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence.

It is clear that the events which have been occurring in Lebanon represent indirect aggression from without, and that such aggression endangers the independence and integrity of Lebanon.

It is recognized that the step now being taken may have serious consequences. I have, however, come to the considered and sober conclusion that despite the risks involved this action is required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.

Our Government has acted in response to an appeal for help from a small and peaceful nation which has long had ties of closest friendship with the United States. Readiness to help a friend in need is an admirable characteristic of the American people, and I am, in this message, informing the Congress of the reasons why I believe that the United States could not in honor stand idly by in this hour of Lebanon's grave peril. As we act at the request of a friendly government to help it preserve its independence and to preserve law and order which will protect American lives, we are acting to reaffirm and strengthen principles upon which the safety and security of the United States depend.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING THE LANDING OF UNITED STATES MARINES AT BEIRUT[8]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 15, 1958

YESTERDAY was a day of grave developments in the Middle East. In Iraq a highly organized military blow struck down the duly constituted government and attempted to put in its place a committee of Army officers. The attack was conducted with great brutality. Many of the leading personalities were beaten to death or hanged and their bodies dragged through the streets.

At about the same time there was discovered a highly organized plot to overthrow the lawful government of Jordan.

Warned and alarmed by these developments, President Chamoun of Lebanon sent me an urgent plea that the United States station some military units in Lebanon to evidence our concern for the independence of Lebanon, that little country, which itself has for about two months been subjected to civil strife. This has been actively fomented by Soviet and Cairo broadcasts and abetted and aided by substantial amounts of arms, money and personnel infiltrated into Lebanon across the Syrian border.

President Chamoun stated that without an immediate show of United States support, the Government of Lebanon would be unable to survive against the forces which had been set loose in the area.

The plea of President Chamoun was supported by the unanimous action of the Lebanese Cabinet.

After giving this plea earnest thought and after taking advice from leaders of both the Executive and Congressional branches of the government, I decided to comply with the plea of the Government of Lebanon. A few hours ago a battalion of United States Marines landed and took up stations in and about the city of Beirut.

The mission of these forces is to protect American lives--there are about 2500 Americans in Lebanon--and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon to preserve its territorial integrity and political independence.

The United States does not, of course, intend to replace the United Nations which has a primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. We reacted as we did within a matter of hours because the situation was such that only prompt action would suffice. We have, however, with equal promptness moved in the United Nations. This morning there was held at our request an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. At this meeting we reported the action which we had taken. We stated the reasons therefor. We expressed the hope that the United Nations would itself take measures which would be adequate to preserve the independence of Lebanon and permit of the early withdrawal of the United States forces.

I should like now to take a few minutes to explain the situation in Lebanon.

Lebanon is a small country, a little less than the size of Connecticut, with a population of about one and one half million. It has always had close and friendly relations with the United States. Many of you no doubt have heard of the American University at Beirut which has a distinguished record. Lebanon has been a prosperous, peaceful country, thriving on trade largely with the West. A little over a year ago there were general elections, held in an atmosphere of total calm, which resulted in the establishment, by an overwhelming popular vote, of the present Parliament for a period of four years. The term of the President, however, is of a different duration and would normally expire next September. The President, Mr. Chamoun, has made clear that he does not seek reelection.

When the attacks on the Government of Lebanon began to occur, it took the matter to the United Nations Security Council, pointing out that Lebanon was the victim of indirect aggression from without. As a result, the Security Council sent observers to Lebanon in the hope of thereby insuring that hostile intervention would cease. Secretary General Hammarskjold undertook a mission to the area to reinforce the work of the observers.

We believe that his efforts and those of the United Nations observers were helpful. They could not eliminate arms or ammunition or remove persons already sent into Lebanon. But we believe they did reduce such aid from across the border. It seemed, last week, that the situation was moving toward a peaceful solution which would preserve the integrity of Lebanon, and end indirect aggression from without.

Those hopes were, however, dashed by the events of yesterday in Iraq and Jordan. These events demonstrate a scope of aggressive purpose which tiny Lebanon could not combat without further evidence of support. That is why Lebanon's request for troops from the United States was made. That is why we have responded to that request.

Some will ask, does the stationing of some United States troops in Lebanon involve any interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon? The clear answer is "no."

First of all we have acted at the urgent plea of the Government of Lebanon, a government which has been freely elected by the people only a little over a year ago. It is entitled, as are we, to join in measures of collective security for self-defense. Such action, the United Nations Charter recognizes, is an "inherent right."

In the second place what we now see in the Middle East is the same pattern of conquest with which we became familiar during the period of 1945 to 1950. This involves taking over a nation by means of indirect aggression; that is, under the cover of a fomented civil strife the purpose is to put into domestic control those whose real loyalty is to the aggressor.

It was by such means that the Communists attempted to take over Greece in 1947. That effort was thwarted by the Truman Doctrine.

It was by such means that the Communists took over Czechoslovakia in 1948.

It was by such means that the Communists took over the mainland of China in 1949.

It was by such means that the Communists attempted to take over Korea and Indo China, beginning in 1950.

You will remember at the time of the Korean war that the Soviet Government claimed that this was merely a civil war, because the only attack was by North Koreans upon South Koreans. But all the world knew that the North Koreans were armed, equipped and directed from without for the purpose of aggression.

This means of conquest was denounced by the United Nations General Assembly when it adopted in November 1950 its Resolution entitled, "Peace through Deeds." It thereby called upon every nation to refrain from "fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign power" and denounced such action as "the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world."

We had hoped that these threats to the peace and to the independence and integrity of small nations had come to an end. Unhappily, now they reappear. Lebanon was selected to become a victim.

Last year, the Congress of the United States joined with the President to declare that "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."

I believe that the presence of the United States forces now being sent to Lebanon will have a stabilizing effect which will preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It will also afford an increased measure of security to the thousands of Americans who reside in Lebanon.

We know that stability and well-being cannot be achieved purely by military measures. The economy of Lebanon has been gravely strained by civil strife. Foreign trade and tourist traffic have almost come to a standstill. The United States stands ready, under its Mutual Security Program, to cooperate with the Government of Lebanon to find ways to restore its shattered economy. Thus we shall help to bring back to Lebanon a peace which is not merely the absence of fighting but the well-being of the people.

I am well aware of the fact that landing of United States troops in Lebanon could have some serious consequences. That is why this step was taken only after the most serious consideration and broad consultation. I have, however, come to the sober and clear conclusion that the action taken was essential to the welfare of the United States. It was required to support the principles of justice and international law upon which peace and a stable international order depend.

That, and that alone, is the purpose of the United States. We are not actuated by any hope of material gain or by any emotional hostility against any person or any government. Our dedication is to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the preservation of the independence of every state. That is the basic pledge of the United Nations Charter.

Yet indirect aggression and violence are being promoted in the Near East in clear violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

There can be no peace in the world unless there is fuller dedication to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter. If ever the United States fails to support

these principles the result would be to open the flood gates to direct and indirect aggression throughout the world.

In the 1930's the members of the League of Nations became indifferent to direct and indirect aggression in Europe, Asia and Africa. The result was to strengthen and stimulate aggressive forces that made World War II inevitable.

The United States is determined that that history shall not now be repeated. We are hopeful that the action which we are taking will both preserve the independence of Lebanon and check international violations which, if they succeeded, would endanger world peace.

We hope that this result will quickly be attained and that our forces can be promptly withdrawn. We must, however, be prepared to meet the situation, whatever be the consequences. We can do so, confident that we strive for a world in which nations, be they great or be they small, can preserve their independence. We are striving for an ideal which is close to the heart of every American and for which in the past many Americans have laid down their lives.

To serve these ideals is also to serve the cause of peace, security and well-being, not only for us, but for all men everywhere.

MESSAGE TO THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN LEBANON AND THE MEDITTERANEAN AREA[9]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 19, 1958

THIS IS the President.

I am talking to you from my office in the White House.

I want to speak personally to the officers and men of our forces-Marines, Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen--who are now in Lebanon, on the Mediterranean Sea, or in the skies over that area.

You are in Lebanon because the United States has responded to an urgent request from Lebanon, a friendly country, for help in preserving its cherished independence which has been gravely threatened. Lebanon is a free nation--properly proud of its history and its traditions. The Lebanese people--like us--want only to live in peace and in freedom. They do not want to impose their will on any other people; they do not want to conquer or enslave any other nation.

But unfortunately their hopes and aspirations to remain free are now threatened. A large part of that threat comes from outside forces which have sent men and munitions into Lebanon to help in destroying its democratic government, based upon free popular elections.

Lebanon had no recourse but to appeal for assistance. Their President, with the unanimous approval of the Cabinet, asked me to help them maintain their independence. After careful consideration and consultation with the leaders of our Congress, I decided that the appeal for help had to be honored--that unless Lebanon received help, pending necessary enlarged United Nations support which could not be immediately furnished, it would cease to exist as a free and independent country. You are helping the Lebanese people to remain free.

You are there at their invitation--as friends--to preserve for them the same freedoms that we have here at home.

As your first elements were landing on the beaches of Lebanon, your government was taking action in the United Nations in an attempt to get increased United Nations effort to help the Lebanon Republic to protect its freedom. We have not yet succeeded in this attempt, but we will persevere.

As soon as the independence and integrity of Lebanon are secure, then you and your comrades will be withdrawn immediately from the country.

While you are in Lebanon, each of you is a personal representative of the United States--a symbol of the national aspirations for freedom for all people.

While on this duty you may be assailed by propaganda whipped up by skillful and ambitious men. There may be deliberate attempts to involve you as units--or individually--in incidents which will be greatly exaggerated by these propagandists to suit their own purposes.

Through it all, just remember you are representing the United States of America--that you are true to her ideals in helping a people to keep their freedom. We have no hostile intent toward any people anywhere in the world.

It will be a trying time for all of you. I know that.

But I also know that you are American servicemen, trained to do your duty to your country.

Right now, the performance of that duty is the greatest contribution you can make to the peace of the world--the saving of the freedom of a small and friendly country.

Through me our people here at home thank you. God bless you all!

MESSAGE FROM NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV TO DWIGHT EISENHOWER[10]

Nikita Khrushchev

July 19, 1958

Mr. President: The course of recent events testifies that we are passing through one of the most fateful moments of history, that the world is on the brink of catastrophe. Anxiety affects mankind in all continents, the popular masses are stirred, realizing that the war conflagration, wherever it may start, may spread throughout the world.

As allies in past battle we know, although to a different extent, what blood and [one word indistinct] of the last war look like. We realize the horrors which a new war explosion may bring to humanity, and we have no moral right to play with fire in the powder magazine into which the arms race has turned the world.

(At present) the armed intervention started by the U.S.A. in the Lebanon and subsequently by Britain in Jordan and threats of intervention over Iraq and all countries of the Arab world may lead to extremely dangerous and unforeseen results, causing a chain reaction which it will already be impossible to stop.

Stress on Reason

We are addressing you not from an attitude of intimidation but from an attitude of reason. If one were to talk of intimidation, this is being zealously indulged in by irresponsible military leaders in the U.S.A. such as the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

(Two words indistinct) he makes such provocative speeches that if he were the citizen of a country in which war propaganda is forbidden, he would be tried according to law or, after a medical examination, he would be consigned to a lunatic asylum, because statements of this kind can be made only by a criminal, or a man who has lost his reason.

The laurels of the commander of the Fleet have made the Defense Secretary lose sleep. We know that the U.S.A has atomic bombs, we know that you have an Air Force and a Navy, but you well know that the U.S.S.R. also has atom and hydrogen bombs, an air force and a navy and ballistic rockets of all types, including intercontinental ones.

However, we consider that at this fateful hour it would be wiser not to bring the heated atmosphere to a boiling point, seeing that it is already sufficiently permeated with inflammable material. The leaders of the states must seek a solution, not by recourse to the inflaming of war passions, but to reason and calm, so as to exclude war and insure peace throughout the world.

What the U.S.A. and Great Britain trying to achieve by landing their troops in Lebanon and Jordan? You explain military intervention in the Lebanon by the request of President Chamoun for support against aggression. However, an internal struggle is going on in the Lebanon and events in this country prior to the landing of U.S. troops can in no way be brought under the formula of either direct or indirect aggression by other states. This has been confirmed by the observers of the U.N.

and its Secretary General. An internal struggle was taking place there, and you yourself have confirmed this.

Internal Affairs

The principle of non-interference by one state in an internal struggle in another state is a universally recognized norm of international law. It is not for me to tell you that the American people and their Government at one time came forward in the most categorical manner against foreign interference in the U.S.A. in the struggle between the South and the North. I need not say that in Lebanon's case the appeal of the Lebanese President to the U.S.A. has not been supported by the Parliament of that country, while the Chairman of Parliament has made a resolute protest against U.S. armed intervention. Therefore, the "invitation" sent by Chamoun has not constitutional validity.

The same situation arose in Jordan also, where British troops have been introduced not to defend the interests of the people and the country, but to save the King's throne.

The rulers of Lebanon and Jordan, having lost the support of their countries and their peoples, and not relying on their army, which refuses to support an anti-national regime, have decided to shelter in the shadow of Anglo-American guns, to rely on the forces of interventionists.

However, history knows no case of thrones and governments being supported by bayonets, especially foreign ones. The twentieth century leaves no room for any illusions on this account.

The military invasion of the Lebanon and Jordan by the U.S.A. and Great Britain has been undertaken at the request of irresponsible rulers who do not have the support of their peoples and who are acting against the will of the people. And yet an appeal of this kind has proved sufficient for U.S. and British troops to be introduced into the Lebanon and Jordan, and all this is being done circumventing the U.N. which was informed only afterward of this aggressive action.

It is also alleged that U.S. and British troops have invaded the Lebanon and Jordan in order to defend the lives and property of U.S. and British citizens. However, this is a very old trick of the colonizers, and it will deceive no one, all the more so because, as everyone knows, no damage had been inflicted on any foreigner, including Americans and British, either in the Lebanon or in Jordan, and they were threatened by no danger.

You, Mr. President of the U.S.A., frequently come forward publicly in support of the U.N.; but by their actions in the Lebanon and Jordan Governments of the U.S.A. and Britain are inflicting a grievous blow at this international organization.

At this moment which is so fateful in the lives of the peoples, the U.N. has in fact been pushed aside by the bayonets of U.S. and British troops. The aggressors are now playing with fire. It is always easier to start a conflagration than to put it

out, but once it has already been started, it is better to extinguish the flames at the very start rather than when the blaze has spread to neighboring houses.

Moscow's Concern

The most correct solution in present conditions would be only one measure—the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops from the Near and Middle East and the granting to the peoples of the countries of this area the possibility of deciding their own fate for themselves. At this grim historic moment, when one cannot procrastinate a minute longer, the U.S.S.R., which invariably comes forward in favor of peace throughout the world, against war, and for peaceful coexistence, cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in the Near and Middle East in the immediate vicinity of its frontiers. The U.S.S.R. cannot stand aside when the question is being decided as to whether war or peace shall prevail.

For this reason the Government of the U.S.S.R. proposes immediately to convene a conference of heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain, France and India, with the participation of the Secretary General of the U.N., in order to take without delay measures for stopping the military conflict which has started. We propose to meet on any day and at any time, and the sooner the better.

You understand full well that history has not left us much time to avert war, to avert the destruction of many millions of people, to avert the annihilation of tremendous material and cultural values.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. has set forth sufficiently clearly in its statements its point of view as regards the solution by peaceful means of the urgent problems of the Near East and Middle East.

The U.S.S.R. considers that one can and must find a solution which would correspond with the vital interests of the peoples of the Near and Middle East, insure the observance of their sovereign rights, at the same time taking into account the interests of all states connected with the countries of this area.

The Governments of the Western powers say that they are interested in the utilization of oil and other raw material supplies of this area of the globe, but the peoples and countries of this area do not deny such a possibility to the Western powers.

Suggestion on Arms Limit

They demand only one thing—that this matter should be solved on the basis of equal rights and mutual interests, which is the most sensible one. The Soviet Government considers that a conference of the heads of governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain, France and India could also consider the question of the cessation of supplies of arms to countries of the Near and Middle East, as had also been previously proposed by the U.S.S.R.

We deem it essential that the conference of the heads of governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Britain, France and India should work out concrete recommendations for the cessation of the military conflict in the Near and Middle

East and submit these recommendations to the Security Council, and that this should consider them with the participation of representatives of Arab countries.

The question of the date and venue of the conference cannot be an obstacle. The Soviet Government is ready for any venue, including Washington, should Geneva or some other capital of a neutral country prove for some reason unsuitable for the Western powers.

The most important thing is not to procrastinate, not to waste previous time in vain, because the guns are already starting to fire. We propose to meet at Geneva on 22d July.

The convening of a conference of the heads of the great powers for settling the military conflict which has started in the Near and Middle East would be the wisest act in present conditions for the Governments of our countries.

Security for People

It would represent an invaluable contribution to the task of strengthening peace and the security of the people. It would furnish incontrovertible testimony to the fact that the cause of a peaceful, not military solution of problems can and must triumph throughout the world.

The cessation of aggression in the Near and Middle East would be ardently welcomed by the peoples of all the countries, regardless of color of the skin, religion or political views.

In conclusion, I would like especially to emphasize that on your Government, on you personally, Mr. President, now depends the solution of the question of how the conflict which has arisen in the area of the Near and Middle East is to be settled—by war or by peace.

The Soviet Government expects that the Government of the U.S.A. and you, Mr. President, will understand correctly this appeal of the Soviet Government and that it will meet with a positive response on your part with readiness resolutely to turn the course of events from the path of war to that of peace.

I have at the same time approached on the foregoing question the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan; the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of France, M. de Gaulle, and the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru.

With respect,

KHRUSHCHEV

Moscow, 19th July, 1958

EISENHOWER'S RESPONSE TO NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER OF JULY 19[11]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 22, 1958

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your communication of July 19.

May I assure you that the establishment and maintenance of a just peace is the dominant influence in American policy. I cannot agree that the United States has acted in Lebanon in a manner calculated to disturb the peace. Rather it is motivated by the purpose of helping stop acts of violence, fomented from without, designed to destroy the genuine independence and integrity of that small nation. Such a process, if unchecked, would have grave implications for all small nations everywhere.

The manner in which you have chosen to express yourself is hardly calculated to promote the atmosphere of calm reasonableness which, you correctly say, should replace the presently overheated atmosphere.

I am not aware of any factual basis for your extravagantly expressed fear of the danger of general war.

What has happened in regard to Lebanon is this:

On Monday, July 14, the lawful Government of Iraq was violently overthrown. On the same day a comparable plot against the Kingdom of Jordan was discovered and barely thwarted. The Government of Lebanon, which had already for some months

been subjected to indirect aggression from without, appealed to the United States for instant assistance. In the light of the developments in neighboring Iraq and Jordan, it felt that nothing less than immediate help would make it possible to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. The United States responded to this appeal. We knew that the plea was based upon solid facts that showed that Lebanon was gravely menaced.

Surely, it is not "aggression" thus to help a small nation maintain its independence.

You speak of "armed conflict in the Near or Middle East". There has been the bloody coup in Iraq, the plot to assassinate those who compose the Government of Jordan, and the civil strife in Lebanon fomented from without. Otherwise, I know of no "armed conflict". Unless those of aggressive disposition are far gone in folly, they would not start war because Lebanon, with a population of about 1 S million, is helped to maintain its integrity and independence. The real danger of war would come if one small nation after another were to be engulfed by expansionist and aggressive forces supported by the Soviet Union.

We do not want to see a repetition of the progressive destruction of the independence of small nations which occurred during the 1930's and which led to the Second World War. To be acquiescent in aggression, be it direct or indirect, is not the road to peace.

This does not mean that the United States is dedicated to a perpetuation of the status quo in the Arab world. The United States recognizes and sympathizes with the yearning of the Arab peoples for a greater nationalistic unity. for example, the

United States promptly recognized the United Arab Republic, bringing together Egypt and Syria, as soon as it was apparent that the change was accepted by the people concerned and after the new government had undertaken to meet the normally applied international standards.

But it is one thing to change the international status quo by orderly and peaceful processes, and another thing to change it by indirect aggression. Such processes cannot be reconciled with a peaceful world or with the ideals of the United Nations which recognizes the equal rights of nations large and small and the dignity and worth of the human person.

The action of the United States in relation to Lebanon was fully in accord with the accepted principles of international law and with the Charter of the United Nations. The Government of Lebanon was one which had been chosen by freely held, peaceful, nationwide elections only a little over a year ago. The appeal to the United States was made by the President of Lebanon with the full approval of the Cabinet. When last week the Soviet Union introduced in the United Nations Security Council a Resolution condemning our action in Lebanon, that Resolution received only one vote--that of the Soviet Union itself. I also note that efforts were made within the Security Council to provide Lebanon with increased protection from the United Nations so as to preserve its integrity and independence, thus permitting United States forces promptly to be withdrawn. There were two such proposals, each defeated by the one vetoing vote of the Soviet Union.

How does the Soviet Union reconcile its allegation that United States forces in Lebanon endanger world peace with the veto of these two proposals?

Am I to conclude, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Union seeks by imputing to others war motives and itself boasting of its nuclear and ballistic missile power, to divert attention from the steady erosion of the independence of small nations? Are we, as civilized peoples, to accept the increasing use of violence, murder and terrorism as instruments of international policy? If so, this constitutes the real danger to peace. The United States will steadfastly oppose that danger and seek to strengthen the established processes of international law and order.

The Soviet Union, by its constant abuse of its veto power in the Security Council--its veto of today was the 85th--would tear down, and not strengthen, the orderly processes which the nations have established for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Your present proposal seems further calculated to derogate from the authority and prestige of the United Nations. What you propose amounts in effect to five nations, without sanction of the United Nations and without conformity with its Charter, reaching what you call recommendations" regarding the Near and Middle East which would then be submitted to the United Nations Security Council. But in reality such so-called "recommendations" would be decisions and the process would in effect make the United Nations into a "rubber stamp" for a few great powers.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, when procedures are sought to be improvised to meet what is alleged to be a situation of great urgency, this can scarcely be expected to

save time. It raises a whole series of new problems which must be considered by the various nations that might consult together, and by others which might feel that they were improperly omitted and which are deeply concerned with the Near and Middle East.

If, indeed, the Soviet Union seriously believes that there is an imminent threat to world peace, it is bound by the United Nations Charter to take the matter to the Security Council. By Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Soviet Union, with other members of the United Nations, has conferred on the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," and all the members have agreed that, in these matters, it "acts on their behalf." It is also agreed that that Council has the responsibility to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace" and to "decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security." Surely this solemn undertaking ought to be respected.

The Security Council is already dealing with certain phases of the problem alluded to by your note. If you or we believe that other aspects of this problem or other problems should be urgently dealt with in the interest of peace, then it lies open to any of us to enlarge the scope of the Security Council consideration. furthermore, under the Charter, members of government, including Heads of Government and foreign Ministers, may represent a member nation at the Security Council. If such a meeting were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure.

I do not, of course, exclude the discussion, outside the United Nations, of world or regional problems, not posing alleged imminent threats to the peace. I cannot but deplore the persistent refusal of your Government for so many months to agree to the adequate preparation of a "summit" meeting at which we could exchange considered views on the great problems which confront the world. The Ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom and the United States were negotiating at Moscow with your Foreign Minister to develop a list of topics which might lend themselves to considered and useful discussion at a summit meeting. These negotiations were broken off by your Government on June 16th.

In conclusion, I venture to express in most earnest terms my hope that the Soviet Government will unite with us for real peace. The longing of mankind for peace is too precious to be used for ulterior purposes. I hope that ways can be found to act for peace in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. All the world, I believe, knows that peace with justice is the dedication of the American nation. We have in the past sacrificed greatly for that devotion. We have loyally complied with the pledge we made, by the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, to renounce any aggrandizement for ourselves. Just as we shall resist any efforts to use love of peace to mask aggression, so we shall equally never fail to take any step, at any sacrifice, which will genuinely promote the cause of peace and justice in the world.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

SECOND MESSAGE FROM NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV TO DWIGHT EISENHOWER[12]

Nikita Khrushchev

July 23, 1958

Mr. President:

I have received your reply to my letter dated July 19. I have also received replies from Mr. Nehru and Mr. Macmillan and M. de Gaulle to my letter of July 19.

At present we do not wish to discuss the reasons that created the tension and danger to peace in both the Near and Middle East. The views of the Soviet Government on all these matters were summed up in my letter of July 19.

I would only like to reject strongly the allegations in your letter that the Soviet Union supports the forces of expansion and aggression in the world. Now, particularly after the armed intervention of the United States in Lebanon and Britain in Jordan, no one should have any doubt, if they ever had any, as to who is, in fact, following a policy of expansionism and aggression, who is threatening peace and the security of the peoples.

World Conflict Possible

The Soviet Government considers the threat to world peace at present has reached a dangerous level, so much so that no time should be lost in arguing. This cannot but delay the time of reaching agreement and the adoption of all possible and immediate steps to prevent the outbreak of a world conflict.

We cannot afford to belittle the danger of this dispute because there are certain forces that wish to widen the area of aggression, and are planning a military attack on Iraq.

In an attempt to avoid the possibility of world conflict, we proposed a conference of the heads of the Soviet, United States, British, French and Indian Governments, to be attended by the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Hammarskjold.

We wish to point out with satisfaction that the proposal of the Soviet Government, concerning the conference of the heads of the governments, found a positive echo among you.

Mr. Macmillan, the head of the British Government; de Gaulle, the head of the French Government, and Nehru, the head of the Indian Government, expressed a desire for such a summit conference. We thank them for it.

We fully agree to the considerations expressed by Mr. Macmillan in connection with the holding of a summit conference within the framework of the United Nations Security Council. In its letter dated July 19, the Soviet Government pointed out that the United Nations Security Council should not be ignored.

Speed Held Essential

And, as it is necessary to take speedy measures for the protection of world peace, we regard the way in which the meeting of the heads of the governments takes place as not being at the present moment of decisive importance.

What is important is that this meeting should be held as soon as possible so that solutions that would help to protect and strengthen peace may be discussed in a speedy manner, with a view to establishing security in the Near and Middle East area and reducing world tension.

We also agree to the approach to the work of this special session of the Security Council as suggested by Mr. Macmillan. We also agree that the participants in this special session of the Security Council may not submit any resolutions that are not connected with previous agreements and the aim of the session is to reach agreement and not to record differences through voting.

The Soviet Government also thinks that the heads of government should be able to conduct joint consultative talks in an unofficial manner so that constructive resolutions might be adopted swiftly in the interest of protecting and strengthening peace.

The Security Council should discuss the very important questions of the protection of peace and security, and no current ordinary issues. Therefore, we consider that, in this case, it would be useful that India should take part in the work of the Security Council. India is a large, well-known Asian country, known by all the peoples of the world as a state struggling for the strengthening of peace.

Indian Participation Urged

The participation of India in the work of the Security Council would be, in fact, very useful, even more useful than the participation of one of the so-called

permanent members, who in fact does not represent anyone. We consider it essential that the representative of India, in the person of Nehru, having consented to take part in a summit conference, should participate in the Security Council meeting.

Mr. President, you said in your letter that if all wished to hold a special meeting of the Security Council the United States would join in the measure to be agreed upon.

So far as the Soviet Union is concerned it would be represented by its Premier. It is natural that the Governments of the Arab countries concerned should participate in the discussion of the issues in the Security Council jointly with the heads of the Governments of the above-mentioned five states.

The Soviet Government wishes to know, as quickly as possible, the opinion of the United States Government regarding the date of the proposed meeting of the Security Council.

For our part, we may suggest that the Security Council should begin its work in New York on July 28.

KHRUSHCHEV

Moscow, July 23, 1958

EISENHOWER'S RESPONSE TO NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER OF JULY 23[13]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

July 25, 1958

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have studied your letter of July 23. I find in it apparent misunderstandings of the views expressed in my letter of July 22, which I would request you to read again more carefully.

I then said that if, despite the facts established in the recent meetings of the Security Council, your Government still desires to allege that the situation in Lebanon constitutes an imminent danger to peace in the Middle East, the proper forum for appropriate discussion is the United Nations Security Council. I am glad that you now recognize the responsibility of the United Nations and have withdrawn your original proposal which would have gravely undermined the prestige and authority of the United Nations.

My letter pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations authorizes members of government, and that of course includes Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, to represent a member nation at the Security Council and that if such a meeting were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure. It is, of course, not yet certain that such a meeting is in fact "generally desired," although that may prove to be the case.

You now make specific suggestions dealing with the composition of the Security Council and the conditions under which nations other than members of the Council may participate in discussions of the Council. My letter to you of July 22 urged that one of the advantages of proceedings in the Security Council is that there are established rules on these matters and it is accordingly not necessary to rely on improvising. I pointed out that when rules of this kind are sought to be improvised, there is raised a whole series of new problems, notably as to the participation and non-participation of various states. The United States will adhere, in these respects, to the Charter, which lays down the conditions under which nations which are not members of the Council may participate in the discussions of the Council.

As to the agenda, we agree that it should be limited to a discussion of the problems of the Middle East, including the causes of those problems. I would, however, be lacking in candor if I did not make clear that to put peace and security on a more stable basis in the Middle East requires far more than merely a consideration of Lebanon and Jordan. These situations are but isolated manifestations of far broader problems. In my opinion the instability of peace and security is in large measure due to the jeopardy in which small nations are placed. It would be the purpose of the United States to deal with the specific incidents you raise within that broad context. To do otherwise would be to be blind to the teaching of history.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that World War II was brought about by a series of acts of direct and indirect aggression against small nations. In March 1939 the then head of the Soviet Communist Party pointed out that the failure of non-aggressive

nations, among which he named Britain and France, to check direct or indirect aggression against small countries meant "giving free rein to war and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war." That forecast unhappily proved true.

You will also recall the 1950 "Peace through Deeds" Resolution of the General Assembly which condemns the "fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign power" as among "the gravest of all crimes."

It is my earnest hope that through the United Nations Security Council steps can be taken in regard to the Middle East which, by making peace more secure there, will help promote it elsewhere.

In conclusion, I suggest that the Permanent Representatives of the members of the United Nations Security Council in New York should exchange views, under arrangements made by the Secretary General, to ascertain that a meeting of the kind and under conditions I suggest is generally acceptable. If so they should also agree upon a date which would be generally satisfactory. The date of July 28 would be too early for us.

I am today authorizing our own Permanent Representative to act in this sense.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

ADDRESS TO THE THIRD SPECIAL EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS[14]

Dwight D. Eisenhower

August 13, 1958

IT HAS BEEN almost five years since I had the honor of addressing this Assembly. I then spoke of atomic power and urged that we should find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man should not be dedicated to his death but consecrated to his life. Since then great strides have been taken in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Tragically little has been done to eliminate the use of atomic and nuclear power for weapons purposes. That is a danger.

That danger in turn gives rise to another danger--the danger that nations under aggressive leadership will seek to exploit man's horror of war by confronting the nations, particularly small nations, with an apparent choice between supine surrender, or war.

This tactic reappeared during the recent Near East crisis. Some might call it "ballistic blackmail."

In most communities it is illegal to cry "fire" in a crowded assembly. Should it not be considered serious international misconduct to manufacture a general war scare in an effort to achieve local political aims?

Pressures such as these will never be successfully practiced against America, but they do create dangers which could affect each and every one of us. That is why I have asked for the privilege of again addressing you.

The immediate reason is two small countries--Lebanon and Jordan. The cause is one of universal concern.

The lawful and freely elected Government of Lebanon, feeling itself endangered by civil strife fomented from without, sent the United States a desperate call for instant help. We responded to that call.

On the basis of that response an effort has been made to create a war hysteria. The impression is sought to be created that if small nations are assisted in their desire to survive, that endangers the peace.

This is truly an "upside down" portrayal. If it is made an international crime to help a small nation maintain its independence, then indeed the possibilities of conquest are unlimited. We will have nullified the provision of our Charter which recognizes the inherent right of collective self-defense. We will have let loose forces that could generate great disasters.

The United Nations has, of course, a primary responsibility to maintain not only international peace but also "security." That is an important fact. But we must not evade a second fact, namely, that in the circumstances of the world since 1945, the United Nations has sometimes been blocked in its attempt to fulfill that function.

Respect for the liberty and freedom of all nations has always been a guiding principle of the United States. This respect has been consistently demonstrated by our unswerving adherence to the principles of the Charter, particularly in its opposition to aggression, direct or indirect. Sometimes we have made that demonstration in terms of collective measures called for by the United Nations. Sometimes we have done so pursuant to what the Charter calls "the inherent right of collective self-defense."

I recall the moments of clear danger we have faced since the end of the Second World War--Iran, Greece and Turkey, the Berlin blockade, Korea, the Straits of Taiwan.

A common principle guided the position of the United States on all of these occasions. That principle was that aggression, direct or indirect, must be checked before it gathered sufficient momentum to destroy us all--aggressor and defender alike.

It was this principle that was applied once again when the urgent appeals of the governments of Lebanon and Jordan were answered.

I would be less than candid if I did not tell you that the United States reserves, within the spirit of the Charter, the right to answer the legitimate appeal of any nation, particularly small nations.

I doubt that a single free government in all the world would willingly forego the right to ask for help if its sovereignty were imperiled.

But I must again emphasize that the United States seeks always to keep within the spirit of the Charter.

Thus when President Truman responded in 1947 to the urgent plea of Greece, the United States stipulated that our assistance would be withdrawn whenever the United Nations felt that its action could take the place of ours.

Similarly, when the United States responded to the urgent plea of Lebanon, we went at once to the Security Council and sought United Nations assistance for Lebanon so as to permit the withdrawal of United States forces.

United Nations action would have been taken, the United States forces already withdrawn, had it not been that two resolutions, one proposed by the United States, the other proposed by the Government of Japan, failed to pass because of one negative vote--a veto.

But nothing that I have said is to be construed as indicating that I regard the status quo as sacrosanct. Change is indeed the law of life and progress. But when change reflects the will of the people, then change can and should be brought about in peaceful ways.

In this context the United States respects the right of every Arab nation of the Near East to live in freedom without domination from any source, far of near.

In the same context, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations places on all of us certain solemn obligations. Without respect for each other's sovereignty and the exercise of great care in the means by which new patterns of international life

are achieved, the projection of the peaceful vision of the Charter would become a mockery.

II.

Let me turn now specifically to the problem of Lebanon.

When the United States military assistance began moving into Lebanon, I reported to the American people that we had immediately reacted to the plea of Lebanon because the situation was such that only prompt action would suffice.

I repeat to you the solemn pledge I then made: our assistance to Lebanon has but one single purpose--that is the purpose of the Charter and of such historic resolutions of the United Nations as the "Essentials for Peace" Resolution of 1949 and the "Peace through Deeds" Resolution of 1950. These denounce, as a form of aggression and as an international crime, the fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign power.

We want to prevent that crime--or at least prevent its having fatal consequences. We have no other purpose whatsoever.

The United States troops will be totally withdrawn whenever this is requested by the duly constituted government of Lebanon or whenever, through action by the United Nations or otherwise, Lebanon is no longer exposed to the original danger.

It is my earnest hope that this Assembly, free of the veto, will consider how it can assure the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon, so that the political destiny of the Lebanese people will continue to lie in their own hands.

The United States Delegation will support measures to this end.

III.

Another urgent problem is Jordan.

If we do not act promptly in Jordan a further dangerous crisis may result, for the method of indirect aggression discernible in Jordan may lead to conflicts endangering the peace.

We must recognize that peace in this area is fragile, and we must also recognize that the end of peace in Jordan could have consequences of a far-reaching nature. The United Nations has a particular responsibility in this matter, since it sponsored the Palestine Armistice Agreements upon which peace in the area rests and since it also sponsors the care of the Palestine refugees.

I hope this Assembly will be able to give expression to the interest of the United Nations in preserving the peace in Jordan.

IV.

There is another matter which this Assembly should face in seeking to promote stability in the Near East. That is the question of inflammatory propaganda. The United Nations Assembly has on three occasions-in 1947, 1949 and 1950--passed resolutions designed to stop the projecting of irresponsible broadcasts from one nation into the homes of citizens of other nations, thereby "fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State." We all know that these resolutions have recently been violated in many directions in the Near East.

If we, the United States, have been at fault we stand ready to be corrected.

I believe that this Assembly should reaffirm its enunciated policy and should consider means for monitoring the radio broadcasts directed across national frontiers in the troubled Near East area and for examining complaints from these nations which consider their national security jeopardized by external propaganda.

V.

The countries of this area should also be freed from armed pressure and infiltration coming across their borders. When such interference threatens they should be able to get from the United Nations prompt and effective action to help safeguard their independence. This requires that adequate machinery be available to make the United Nations presence manifest in the area of trouble.

Therefore I believe this Assembly should take action looking toward the creation of a standby United Nations Peace force. The need for such a force in being is clearly demonstrated by recent events involving imminent danger to the integrity of two of our members.

I understand that this general subject is to be discussed at the 13th General Assembly and that our distinguished Secretary-General has taken an initiative in this matter. Recent events clearly demonstrate that this is a matter for urgent and positive action.

VI.

I have proposed four areas of action for the consideration of the Assembly-in respect to Lebanon, Jordan, subversive propaganda and a standby United Nations force. These measures, basically, are designed to do one thing: to preserve the right of a nation and its people to determine their own destiny, consistent with the obligation to respect the rights of others.

This clearly applies to the great surge of Arab nationalism.

Let me state the position of my country unmistakably. The peoples of the Arab nations of the Near East clearly possess the right of determining and expressing their own destiny. Other nations should not interfere so long as this expression is found in ways compatible with international peace and security.

However, here as in other areas we have an opportunity to share in a great international task. That is the task of assisting the peoples of that area, under programs which they may desire, to make further progress toward the goals of human welfare they have set. Only on the basis of progressing economies can truly independent governments sustain themselves.

This is a real challenge to the Arab people and to us all.

To help the Arab countries fulfill these aspirations, here is what I propose:

First--that consultations be immediately undertaken by the Secretary-general with the Arab nations of the Near East to ascertain whether an agreement can be reached to establish an Arab development institution on a regional basis.

Second--that these consultations consider the composition and the possible functions of a regional Arab development institution, whose task would be to accelerate progress in such fields as industry, agriculture, water supply, health and education.

Third--other nations and private organizations which might be prepared to support this institution should also be consulted at an appropriate time.

Should the Arab States agree on the usefulness of such a soundly organized regional institution, and should they be prepared to support it with their own resources, the United States would also be prepared to support it.

The institution would be set up to provide loans to the Arab States as well as the technical assistance required in the formulation of development projects.

The institution should be governed by the Arab States themselves. This proposal for a regional Arab development institution can, I believe, be realized on a basis which would attract international capital, both public and private.

I also believe that the best and quickest way to achieve the most desirable result would be for the Secretary-General to make two parallel approaches. first, to consult with the Arab States of the Near East to determine an area of agreement. Then to invite the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has vast experience in this field, to make available its facilities for the planning of the organizational and operating techniques needed to establish the institution on a progressive course.

I hope it is clear that I am not suggesting a position of leadership for my own country in the work of creating such an institution. If this institution is to be a success, the function of leadership must belong to the Arab States themselves.

I would hope that high on the agenda of this institution would be action to meet one of the major challenges of the Near East, the great common shortage--water.

Much scientific and engineering work is already under way in the field of water development. for instance, atomic isotopes now permit us to chart the course of the great underground rivers. And new horizons are opening in the desalting of water. The ancient problem of water is on the threshold of solution. Energy, determination and science will carry it over that threshold.

Another great challenge facing the area is disease.

Already there is substantial effort among the peoples and governments of the Near East to conquer disease and disability. But much more remains to be done.

The United States is prepared to join with other governments and the World Health Organization in an all-out, joint attack on preventable disease in the Near East.

But to see the desert blossom again and preventable disease conquered is only a first step. As I look into the future I see the emergence of modern Arab States that would bring to this century contributions surpassing those we cannot forget from the past. We remember that Western arithmetic and algebra owe much to Arabic mathematicians and that much of the foundation of the world's medical science and

astronomy was laid by Arab scholars. Above all, we remember that three of the world's great religions were born in the Near East.

But a true Arab renaissance can only develop in a healthy human setting. Material progress should not be an overriding objective in itself; but it is an important condition for achieving higher human, cultural and spiritual objectives.

But I repeat, if this vision of the modern Arab community is to come to life, the goals must be Arab goals.

VII.

With the assistance of the United Nations, the countries of the Near East now have a unique opportunity to advance, in freedom, their security and their political and economic interests. If a plan for peace of the kind I am proposing can be carded forward, in a few short years we may be able to look back on the Lebanon and Jordan crises as the beginning of a great new era of Arab history.

But there is an important consideration which must remain in mind today and in the future.

If there is an end to external interference in the internal affairs of the Arab States of the Near East--

If an adequate United Nations Peace force is in existence ready for call by countries fearful for their security: --

If a regional development institution exists and is at work on the basic projects and programs designed to lift the living standards of the area, supported by friendly aid from abroad and governed by the Arab States themselves:--

Then with this good prospect, and indeed as a necessary condition for its fulfillment, I hope and believe that the nations of the area, intellectually and emotionally, will no longer feel the need to seek national security through spiralling military buildups which lead not only to economic impotence but to war.

Perhaps the nations involved in the 1948 hostilities may, as a first step, wish to call for a United Nations study of the flow of heavy armaments to those nations. My country would be glad to support the establishment of an appropriate United Nations body to examine this problem. This body would discus it individually with these countries and see what arms control arrangements could be worked out under which the security of all these nations could be maintained more effectively than under a continued wasteful, dangerous competition in armaments. I recognize that any such arrangements must reflect these countries' own views.

VIII.

I have tried to present to you the framework of a plan for peace in the Near East which would provide a setting of political order responsive to the rights of the people in each nation; which would avoid the dangers of a regional arms race; which would permit the peoples of the Near East to devote their energies wholeheartedly to the tasks of development and human progress in the widest sense.

It is important that the six elements of this program be viewed as a whole. They are:

(1) United Nations concern for Lebanon.

(2) United Nations measures to preserve peace in Jordan.

(3) An end to the fomenting from without of civil strife.

(4) A United Nations Peace force.

(5) A regional economic development plan to assist and accelerate improvement in the living standards of the people in these Arab nations.

(6) Steps to avoid a new arms race spiral in the area.

To have solidity, the different elements of this plan for peace and progress should be considered and acted on together, as integral elements of a single concerted effort.

Therefore, I hope that this Assembly will seek simultaneously to set in motion measures that would create a climate of security in the Near East consonant with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and at the same time create the framework for a common effort to raise the standard of living of the Arab peoples.

IX.

But the peoples of the Near East are not alone in their ambition for independence and development. We are living in a time when the whole world has become alive to the possibilities for modernizing their societies.

The American government has been steadily enlarging its allocations to foreign economic development in response to these worldwide hopes. We have joined in partnership with such groupings as the Organization of American States and the Colombo Plan; and we are working on methods to strengthen these regional arrangements. for example, in the case of the Organization of American States, we are consulting with our sister republics of this hemisphere to strengthen its role in economic development. And the government of the United States has not been alone in supporting development efforts. The British Commonwealth, the countries of Western Europe, and Japan have all made significant contributions.

But in many parts of the world both geography and wise economic planning favor national rather than regional development programs. The United States will, of course, continue its firm support of such national programs. Only where the desire for a regional approach is clearly manifested and where the advantage of regional over national is evident will the United States change to regional methods.

The United States is proud of the scope and variety of its development activities throughout the world. Those who know our history will realize that this is no sudden, new policy of my government. Ever since its birth, the United States has gladly shared its wealth with others. This it has done without thought of conquest or economic domination. After victory in two world wars and the expenditure of vast treasure there is no world map, either geographic or economic, on which anyone can find that the force of American arms or the power of the American Treasury has

absorbed any foreign land or political or economic system. As we cherish our freedom, we believe in freedom for others.

X.

The things I have talked about today are real and await our grasp. Within the Near East and within this Assembly are the forces of good sense, restraint, and wisdom to make, with time and patience, a framework of political order and of peace in that region.

But we also know that all these possibilities are shadowed, all our hopes are dimmed, by the fact of the arms race in nuclear weapons--a contest which drains off our best talents and vast resources, straining the nerves of all our peoples.

As I look out on this Assembly, with so many of you representing new nations, one thought above all impresses me.

The world that is being remade on our planet is going to be a world of many mature nations. As one after another of these new nations moves through the difficult transition to modernization and learns the methods of growth, from this travail new levels of prosperity and productivity will emerge.

This world of individual nations is not going to be controlled by any one power or group of powers. This world is not going to be committed to any one ideology.

Please believe me when I say that the dream of world domination by one power or of world conformity is an impossible dream.

The nature of today's weapons, the nature of modern communications, and the widening circle of new nations make it plain that we must, in the end, be a world community of open societies.

And the concept of the open society is the ultimate key to a system of arms control we can all trust.

We must, then, seek with new vigor, new initiative, the path to a peace based on the effective control of armaments, on economic advancement and on the freedom of all peoples to be ruled by governments of their choice. Only thus can we exercise the full capacity God has given us to enrich the lives of the individual human beings who are our ultimate concern, our responsibility and our strength.

In this memorable task there lies enough work and enough reward to satisfy the energies and ambitions of all leaders, everywhere.

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