

AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL APPRAISAL OF THE
WRITINGS OF NICOLAS M. ZERNOV

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF ARTS

BY

ROBY C. BARRETT

WACO, TEXAS
AUGUST 1976

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iv
ABSTRACT.....	v
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO NICOLAS M. ZERNOV.....	1
II. KIEVAN RUSSIA.....	17
III. MOSCOW THE THIRD ROME.....	39
IV. THE RISE OF THE PETERSBURG EMPIRE.....	85
V. THE SLAVOPHILES AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY RENAISSANCE.....	144
VI. CONCLUSION: ZERNOV AND THE RUSSIAN PROTEST TRADITION.....	183
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	201

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to my wife whose support and perseverance made this thesis possible. In addition to her, Nicolas M. Zernov, Wallace L. Daniel, Ralph L. Lynn, and J. Leo Garrett contributed invaluable aid and criticism to this project. Dr. Zernov graciously supplied research materials and allowed me to interview him. The interview proved critical to the final organization of the thesis. Dr. Daniel provided his patient direction, criticism, and hours of consultation. The comments of Dr. Lynn and Dr. Garrett helped me stylistically and substantively to improve the final product. To all of these people, I offer my heartfelt thanks for their indispensable aid.

ABSTRACT

AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL APPRAISAL OF THE
WRITINGS OF NICOLAS M. ZERNOV

Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this study is to place the writings of Nicolas M. Zernov in their proper relationship to Russian historical and protest literature, and to provide a synthesis of Zernov's numerous publications that deal with Russian history. With the exception of the family chronicle, no work on Zernov has been published, and the chronicle does not include an analysis of his writings or the place of those writings in any Russian literary tradition.

Procedure: The author examined all of the available references, both primary and secondary, which pertained to Zernov and Russian historiography. The references included Zernov's writings, both articles and books, and an interview with Zernov at Oxford in March, 1975. The works on Russian historiography came primarily from the Staatsbibliothek, the library of the Seminar fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, the library of the Seminar fuer Slavische Philologie, and the Universitaetsbibliothek Muenchen, all of which are located in Munich, West Germany. Other libraries used included those at Baylor University, Southern Methodist University, and the University of Texas at Austin. The private collections

of Dr. Wallace Daniel and myself were also researched.

Findings: Zernov's approach to Russian history has been basically different from that of other Russian historians. For him, the historical narrative was the medium through which he presented a moral approach to politics and social relationships. Using the social and political institutions of Kiev as the ideal, Zernov compared and criticized the subsequent periods of Russian history. Zernov's descriptions reflected his consistent criticism of Western secularism and his belief in the spiritual mission of Russian Orthodoxy. Such pronouncements place Zernov squarely within the protest tradition of Russian literature.

Conclusion: Zernov's writings represented a marriage of the political traditions of Western democratic liberalism and the spiritualism of the Slavophiles and Russian Orthodoxy. Zernov gave a moral and ethical interpretation of the political and social institutions of Russian history. He called for the union of Russian Orthodox spirituality and morality and the democratic political institutions of the West.

CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO NICOLAS M. ZERNOV

Nicolas M. Zernov, now in his late seventies, has been a leader in the Russian emigre movement since he and his family left Russia in 1921. Although he is not primarily an historian, his studies of Eastern Orthodoxy in general and the role of the church in Russian history have won for him a Spalding Lectureship at Oxford University.

Despite the forty or more titles in his bibliography, his mature thesis or synthetic view is nowhere clearly delineated; but the diligent reader finds this mature thesis evident enough in the totality.

For Zernov, the history of Russia is outlined in the four great religious surges in the life of the nation. The first of these began with the conversion of Kiev. The second is identified with the city of Moscow and the figure of St. Sergius of Radonezh. The third is identified with the Old Believer movement of the seventeenth century. The fourth may be dated from 1825 to 1917. The body of this study of Zernov's work is divided into four chapters corresponding with these movements in religion.¹

¹Interview with Nicolas M. Zernov, Oxford University, Oxford, England, 7 March 1975.

Nicolas Zernov was born in Moscow on October 9, 1898.² The recently published Zernov family chronicle provides insights into the early influences on his life. It portrayed a close-knit family, one whose members had deep affection for each other. The Zernov family, as described by its members, valued learning and enlightenment and maintained its close ties with the church and traditional Russian culture.³

In addition to instilling Russian religious traditions, Zernov's family influenced his political outlook. As a professional man and a member of the middle class, his father had much in common with those who sought liberalization in Russia along constitutional lines. Though he was not a revolutionary, Zernov's father was a member of the Constitutional Democratic party (Kadets) and played a limited role in the movement for the creation of a democratic constitutional monarchy. Thus Nicolas Zernov's support for political democracy had its roots in the political traditions and opinions of his own family in general, and his father in particular.⁴

The next critical period of Zernov's life came when he entered the Polivanova gymnasium in Moscow in 1911. In the gymnasium, the young Nicolas himself encountered

²Nicolas M. Zernov, Na perelome: tri pokolenia odnoi Moskovskoi semi (Paris: YMCA Press, 1970), p. 10.

³Zernov, Na perelome, pp. 54-79.

⁴Ibid., p. 54.

directly the political and social issues of early twentieth century Russia. For the first time, he confronted a world and ideas outside his family environment. His years there also coincided with the First World War and the coming of the Russian Revolution. In writing about the gymnasium, Zernov emphasized chiefly his interest in the ideas and aims of the intelligentsia and the profound respect that he developed for the philosopher, V. S. Solov'ev (1853-1900).⁵ In 1917, he completed his studies at the gymnasium and received permission to study medicine at the University of Moscow.

The Russian Revolution ended Zernov's plans for a medical career and brought a four-year period of turmoil for the Zernov family. With the October Revolution and the occupation of Moscow by the Bolsheviks, the first question for the family became "What are we to do?"⁶ In the family chronicle Zernov argued that his father and liberal friends failed to understand the nature of the Bolsheviks and their rule. They failed to comprehend the permanence of their rule and the ferocity with which they would hold power. Both shocked the Zernovs and forced them to consider leaving Moscow. The author described the winter of bitter cold, searches, arrests, and commissar rule in a city whose majority population had fled to the South.⁷ In November 1917, these

⁵Ibid., p. 240.

⁶Ibid., p. 266.

⁷Ibid., p. 268.

economic and political conditions finally required them to move farther south. They spent the winter of 1917-1918 in their house in Essentukah located in the western Caucasus. For several months, in 1919, Nicolas Zernov served with the white army in the Kiev area of the Ukraine.⁸ While serving in the army, his attraction and interest in religion and Christian revelation grew. He stated that through the church he came to know a new world of brotherhood and love.⁹ In 1921, the entire family was reunited but had to flee even farther south to Tiflis and then to Batum. Finally, the Bolshevik consolidation of power forced them to leave Russia. Because his father had played an active role in the Kadet party and continued to oppose the Bolsheviks, they received considerable aid from the British, who arranged their transportation from Batum on the Black Sea coast to Constantinople. On March 2, 1921, the Zernovs arrived in Constantinople and began their life in exile.¹⁰

The years of revolution and civil war, 1917-1921, set the stage for Zernov's career as a writer and churchman. From the confusion and dislocation came the questions that Zernov devoted his life to answering. They were questions about Russia, the people, their religion, and their relationship to the state. For his answers, Zernov searched Russia's

⁸Ibid., p. 335.

⁹Ibid., p. 350.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 437.

past in an effort to discover the causes and meaning of the Revolution. In addition to the queries raised by the second Time of Troubles (as Zernov called the Civil War), he also had his first personal contact with the English, who came to occupy a place of high esteem in Zernov's mind.¹¹ In 1921 Zernov arrived in Constantinople with two new acquisitions: a sense of loss which spawned questions about Russia and admiration for the English. As a result of his experiences among the emigres in Constantinople, Zernov gave up medicine and embarked on an active, leading role in the Russian emigre movement in the West. Zernov's new career sprang from two sources, the role of the church in Russian emigre life in Constantinople and the influence of Bishop Benjamin Sevastopolskii. The six Russian churches in Constantinople provided more than spiritual consolation for the uprooted. They constituted social and cultural centers around which the Russians could maintain their identity.¹² In fact, the church was the only Russian institution with sufficient mobility to follow them into exile. Therefore, it was hardly surprising that Zernov should see the church as the preserver of Russian culture not only in his immediate situation but also through all of Russian history. In addition to the role of the church, Zernov praised the part that individual churchmen played in it. In Constantinople

¹¹Nicholas M. Zernov, The Russians and Their Church (London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1968), p. 152.

¹²Zernov, Na perelome, pp. 426-455.

during those years, Bishop Sevastopolskii provided the dynamic leadership that the church needed to survive and exerted a great intellectual influence on Zernov.¹³ The author's descriptions reflected his admiration for the bishop and glowed with hero worship. Sevastopolskii was a talented man who did everything from writing poetry to the difficult task of reorganizing the exiled church.¹⁴ In the Church Council of July 22, 1921, Bishop Sevastopolskii gave the Russian emigre community and the church in exile a new sense of direction, and his influence brought Nicolas Zernov into an active role in organizing and maintaining emigre groups in various parts of Europe.¹⁵

His personal encounter with the West became the second contributory element to the new direction that Zernov's life took in Constantinople. Bishop Sevastopolskii and church life were specific influences which were easily identified; his emergence into a foreign culture and its effects were perhaps more subtle, but no less important. Long isolated from other countries, the Russian emigres were forced either to continue their rejection of Western religion because of theological differences or to attempt to find some common ground. Faced with this dilemma, Zernov found his answer through the writings of A. S. Khomiakov

¹³Ibid., p. 459.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 456.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 459.

(1804-1861) and V. S. Solov'ev, both of whom preached the superiority of Orthodoxy but also called for the unification of all Christian movements.¹⁶ The ecumenical movement was Zernov's solution, a reconciliation between Russian Orthodoxy and all Christians everywhere.

Following his stay in Constantinople, Zernov lived, worked, and studied in several western European countries with various religious student movements. Late in 1921, the family moved to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, where several of the children, including Nicolas, entered the university. Belgrade, at the time, had a huge Russian emigre population (thirty-thousand); the city had displaced Constantinople as the center of exile activity, and Zernov was caught up in its social and religious life.¹⁷ The Russians in Belgrade constituted a distinct culture apart from their surroundings. They had their own churches, schools, bookstores, newspapers, and social organizations. There were one thousand Russian students at the university, and with the church as the nucleus they maintained their Russian identity.¹⁸ Zernov compared the Russian emigre experience in the West to the dispersion of the Jews in Europe; both settled together and established

¹⁶Nicolas M. Zernov, The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), p. 251.

¹⁷Nicolas M. Zernov, Za rubeshom: Belgrad, Parizh, Okhsford khronika semi Zernovikh (Paris: YMCA Press, 1973), p. 15.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 16.

semiautonomous communities.¹⁹ As a result of his participation in church affairs, missionary work, and councils, Zernov called his Belgrade experience the foundation of his ecumenical work in the church. He participated actively in the Council at Karlovtsi in 1921 as he would in later councils.²⁰ The church in exile governed itself through representative means, and the various church councils served this purpose. Zernov's participation in these councils during his early exile years laid the seeds for his later literary arguments, that the most efficient form of church government lay in democratic representative means. Throughout his literary career he repeatedly returned to the argument that church government should be democratic and that the laity constituted the historical backbone of Russian Orthodoxy.²¹ This conviction arose from Zernov's own experience. The emigres streaming from Russia brought a leaderless church with them, and it fell to the laity to reorganize the church and Russian life in general. The use of democratic church councils became the only feasible approach to the laity's new responsibilities.

In Belgrade between 1921 and 1925, Zernov participated

¹⁹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 170.

²⁰ Zernov, Za rubeshom, p. 17.

²¹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 166.

in the organization of Russian student groups. One of these, the Russian Student Christian Movement (R.S.Kh.D.), took him to Paris in 1925 and employed him as secretary for four years.²² During that time he met and married Militza V. Lavrova, a Russian emigre from Tiflis. While in Paris, Zernov established contacts with Christian student organizations throughout the world and strengthened already existing ties.²³ In 1929, he left Paris and moved to Oxford, England, where he founded and edited Vestnik, a publication of the R.S.Kh.D. in Britain. He also completed work on his doctor of philosophy degree at Oxford University in 1932. His activities in England as lecturer for the Fellowship of St. Albans and St. Sergius and later as the Spalding Lecturer in Eastern Orthodox Culture (1947-1966) resulted in the writings on Eastern Orthodoxy which this essay investigates.²⁴ Zernov's life in England constituted a literary period into which he poured his experiences and convictions about Russian history and the place of Russian religion in it.

From an historical point of view, Nicolas Zernov's writings, although profoundly influenced by the times in which the author lived and his own personal experiences, failed to find wide acceptability among the historians of the West. They have most often labeled him a Slavophile whose entire

²²Zernov, Za rubeshom, p. 131.

²³Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 278.

²⁴Zernov, Za rubeshom, p. 358.

outlook on history was tainted by a narrow messianism.²⁵

To a certain degree, their assumptions have been correct.

²⁵Zernov agreed that he has inherited the Slavophile tradition, meaning that of A. S. Khomiakov and K. S. Aksakov with its ideal of "sobornost" or Christian spiritual unity. He carefully differentiated between the true Slavophiles and a later group, Panslavists like N. I. Danilevskii (1822-1885) and M. N. Katkov (1820-1887). Zernov stated that the views held by the latter group "had little in common with the teaching of the founders of the movement." Three Russian Prophets (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1973), p. 55. Other works on the Slavophiles agreed in part with Zernov's assessment. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky defined Slavophiles as "a group of nineteenth century Russian intellectuals who were drawn together by common beliefs, attitudes, and aspirations in such fundamental issues as religion, philosophy, and the problem of Russia and the West." Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 28. He further stated that the idea of 'sobornost' best defined the spirit of communality between these thinkers. *Ibid.*, p. 9. (Peter K. Christoff defined 'sobornost' in the Slavophile as "a union in love of all individual members, of all existing communes, of the communes of all ages, and of the visible and invisible church." An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism, 2 vols. [S Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1961], 1:137.) In discussing the origins of Slavophilism, Riasanovsky contended that the German thought of Schelling and Hegel deeply influenced the early Slavophiles. Russia and the West, p. 31.

In discussing the relationship between Slavophilism and Panslavism, Michael B. Petrovich disagreed with Zernov's view. He argued that "Russian Panslavism was the practical extension of the Slavophile idea in the field of Russian political and cultural relations with other Slavs." Petrovich defined Panslavism as "the historic tendency of the Slavic peoples to manifest in some tangible way, whether cultural or political, their consciousness of ethnic kinship." His work illuminated the strain of Panslavism that existed in Russia during the 1850's and 1860's. The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 32, ix.

Zernov's writings have reflected a faith in the mission of Russian Orthodoxy; he has attacked the intrusion of Westernism into Russia, whether in the guise of the Petrine reforms or nineteenth-century liberalism. Perhaps the difference in his approach to Russian history appears most readily by comparing his emphasis on matters of the spirit in history to the histories of three western-educated secular-oriented nineteenth century Russian historians: S. M. Solov'ev (1820-1879), V. O. Kliuchevskii (1841-1911), and E. E. Coliubinskii (1834-1912).

The spirit of the Russian nation formed the foundation of Zernov's history. Religion constituted the driving force behind the spirit, and the people retained and protected the religion. While Zernov exalted the Russian people's role as central to Russian history, he did so because he believed that they represented the corporate spirit of Russian religion moving through history. Through them the church became the center of Russian life. It was not an institution but rather a living body. Herein lay the resiliency of Russian Orthodoxy. Because the spirit and faith of the people constituted the church and not an institutional hierarchy, it survived tragedy after tragedy and retained the ability to regenerate itself. Perhaps Zernov's interpretation may best be described as religious populism, the belief that the spirituality of the Russian people represented the driving force behind the Russian nation.

The views held by S. M. Solov'ev stood in stark contrast to Zernov's interpretation of Russian history.²⁶ Like Zernov, Solov'ev reflected his background and experiences, but they were those of the academicians of late nineteenth century Russia. Solov'ev emphasized the role of the state in history and exalted the rulers of Russia. He argued that Peter the Great by force of will dragged Russia into the European world.²⁷ In his view, Peter was the greatest ruler

²⁶S. M. Solov'ev was born in Moscow in 1820. In 1838, he entered the University of Moscow and studied history under M. P. Pogodin (1800-1875) and T. M. Granovskii (1813-1855). Later, he studied in Berlin, Paris, and Prague. His most important work was Istoriia Rossii, a history of Russia from earliest times to the eighteenth century. Anatole G. Mazour, An Outline of Modern Russian Historiography (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1939), p. 36. In addition, N. L. Rubenshtein cited the twin influences of rational scientific historical writing which Solov'ev acquired in the West and the Slavophilistic history of N. M. Karamzin (1766-1826) which exalted Russian messianism. Russkaia istoriografiia (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1941), p. 314. For supplementary historiographical information see: V. I. Astakhov, Kurs lektsii po Russkoi istoriografii do konca XIX veka (Kharkov: Izd. Kharkovskogo ordena Tsygovogo krasnogo znamenii gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1956); P. N. Tretiakova and A. L. Mongaita, Ocherki istorii SSSR, 16 vols. (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1961), 7:126-144; Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, Die Historische Rechtsschule Russlands (Giessen; Wilhelm Schmitz Verlag, 1962); and D. I. Bagalii, Russkaia istoriografiia (Kharkov: Tipo-litografiia, 1911).

²⁷In his work, Grothusen criticized the statist interpretation of Russian history: "As in the case of Hegel, Solov'ev viewed the people within the context of the state. The differences between an historical and a non-historical people depended entirely upon the criteria of the existence of a state. To the contrary, it arises that a state without people is unthinkable, certainly not inverted, a people without a state." He argued further that "the great man is a monument of the people but the more meaningful the people the greater their historical personalities." Die Historische Rechtsschule Russlands, pp. 59, 61.

in the history of Russia; he alone created the Russian state.²⁸ Solov'ev's "statist" history and praise of Peter I stemmed from two sources. First, he saw Russia and himself as products of Peter I. To him, the very existence of the university where he lectured was inconceivable without the Petrine reforms. The entire world of ideas that surrounded him came from the great Westernizer's programs. Second, Hegelian political theory deeply influenced Solov'ev. Hegel viewed the Prussian state as man's highest accomplishment and the ultimate civilizing institution. Solov'ev modified Hegel and placed his theory into a Russian context. The Russian state became for Solov'ev the ultimate. As he wrote, "the state is the necessary form for a people, who are mindless without a state."²⁹ He relegated the people to an insignificant position; the history of Russia was the history of the Petrine state.

²⁸S. M. Solov'ev, Istorija Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, 16 vols. (Moscow: Izd. Akademii nauk, 1961), 6, 7, 8, and 9. These volumes dominated Solov'ev's work. He believed that Peter's reign, which these volumes describe, signaled a new, better period in Russian history and that Peter himself represented the ultimate ruler.

Solov'ev also had definite opinions on Peter's handling of religious questions. He believed that Peter attempted to meet the problems of the raskolniki (Old Believers), the Catholics, and the Protestants in Russia. In particular he stated that Peter sensitively approached the Old Believers in an attempt to reconcile them to his new Russia and that they met his efforts with their unmitigated hostility. Ibid., 3:597.

²⁹Joseph L. Black, "The 'Statist School' Interpretation of Russian History: A Reappraisal of Genetic Origins," Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas 21 (1973):518.

Among the historians of late nineteenth-century Russia, populist history eclipsed the statist approach, and V. O. Kliuchevskii, Solov'ev's student, dominated the populist school.³⁰ Kliuchevskii, like Zernov, argued that the people were the most important element in Russian history, with one important difference. Kliuchevskii emphasized the significance of economic contributions, and Zernov spiritual.³¹ Throughout his massive Kurs Russkoi istorii, Kliuchevskii focused on the economic development of the nation. In the Kievan period, he noted that the growth of trade and cities produced the need for the political structure that emerged in the form of the Kievan state.³² Under Mongol rule the shattered economy brought about the rise of many centers of political power, and the northward population shift also moved Russia's center of productivity.³³ During the Muscovite period acquisition of land and control of the peasants on those lands brought more power into the hands of the grand

³⁰V. O. Kliuchevskii was born in 1841. He completed his historical studies under S. M. Solov'ev at the University of Moscow. After Solov'ev's retirement, Kliuchevskii occupied the chair for Russian history at the University of Moscow until 1908. He died in 1911. His most important work was Kurs Russkoi istorii (1903), a populist history of the Russian nation. K. V. Ostrovitianov, Istoriia akademii nauk SSSR, 2 vols. (Moscow: Izd. akademiia nauk, 1958), 1:435. For additional historiographical sources, see footnote number 34 and V. A. Aleksandrey and A. A. Zimin, "Predislovie," V. O. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, 8 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izd., 1958), 1:5-12.

³¹Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 3: Kurs, p. 23.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 136. See also, p. 147.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 272.

princes and allowed Moscow to emerge as the dominant power among the varied Russian states.³⁴ He continued the economic theme in his discussion of the imperial period. He interpreted the events of Imperial Russia in light of its social and economic requirements. He related the Petrine reforms to the need for readjustment in economic, social, and administrative alignments, efforts no different in Russia from those of any other European country of the time.³⁵

The third historian, E. E. Goliubinskii, wrote the most definitive history of the Russian church, Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi.³⁶ In contrast to Zernov, Goliubinskii studied the church from a purely institutional point of view. In Goliubinskii's writings, the Russian church served as the tool of the state, which it used to bring about the westernization of Russia. By accepting Orthodox Christianity (988), Vladimir (979-1015) intended to make Russia "not only Christian but also European."³⁷ Vladimir's actions began the europeanization of Russia, and the adoption and furthering of a European religion played a significant part in the

³⁴Ibid., pp. 113-115.

³⁵Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 4: Kurs, p. 49.

³⁶K. V. Ostrovitianov described E. E. Goliubinskii as an ordinary academician who taught at the University of Moscow from 1882 until 1903. He died in Moscow in 1912. Istoriia akademii nauk, 2:724. Ostrovitianov ignored Goliubinskii's Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi (1905), the most definitive work on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church.

³⁷E. E. Goliubinskii, Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi, 2 vols. (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1905), 1:179.

attainment of this goal. Goliubinskii contended that Vladimir made westernization a policy of the Russian state and basic to Russian tradition, religious and otherwise. Therefore, rulers like Peter the Great merely fulfilled this tradition.³⁸ While Zernov attributed the major role in religion to the people, Goliubinskii believed that the pretensions resulted from the people's inability to recognize that they were racially, religiously, and culturally European.³⁹

The differences between the approach of Zernov to Russian history and that of the other historians were enormous. He emphasized elements throughout his writings that contrasted sharply with those emphasized by Solov'ev, Kliuchevskii, and Goliubinskii. It was those elements that ran through his history of Russian religion, namely, the belief in religious Orthodox faith; the argument that the people were the depository of that faith; the belief that Russian society functions best with a free and independent church and democratic political institutions; and a faith in the mission of Russian Orthodoxy as the unifying force in a world of Christian brotherhood.

³⁸Ibid., 1:701.

³⁹Ibid., 1:839.

CHAPTER II

KIEVAN RUSSIA

To Nicolas Zernov, the Kievan period (800-1237) represented the "most glorious" in Russian history.⁴⁰ In his examination of Kiev Rus, he contended that the union of Eastern Orthodoxy and the Russian people produced a society and culture that approached the divine ideal more closely than any other in Russia's experience. This investigation of Kiev will attempt to discuss four aspects of Zernov's interpretation. The first deals with his view of pre-Christian Slavic society, and those characteristics that allowed the Russians to convert easily to Orthodoxy.⁴¹ The

⁴⁰Interview with Nicolas M. Zernov, Oxford, England, 7 March 1975.

⁴¹Zernov devoted his writings to the religious consciousness of the Russians and made only passing comments about the Kievan state, whose origins have been the center of a long-standing controversy.

S. M. Solov'ev rejected the notion that Norman traders established the first Russian state (eighth and ninth centuries). He argued that the Normans entered Russia for trade, and failed to produce the institutional and dynastic trappings of a state. He held that the Russian state evolved from the Slavic family unit, to clans, to a race, to a nation, and then to a state (seventh century). *Istoriia Rossii*, 1:53-66. In contrast, M. N. Pokrovskii (1868-1928), an early Soviet historian, stated that the Northmen laid the basis for the political union that became the early Kievan state. *History of Russia from Earliest Times to the Rise of Commercial Capitalism*, trans. J. D. Clarkson (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), p. 2. Michael T. Florinskii supported the Norman thesis, in so far as stating that they founded the Riurik dynasty, but he added that "there is no evidence that they left any particular imprint upon the

second aspect necessitates a brief examination Eastern Orthodoxy and the missionary efforts among the Slavs including the conversion of Russia. Third, Zernov's assertion that Russia's conversion had a profound effect on Kievan rulers and political practices must be studied. This section includes Zernov's characterizations of each of the grand princes and the results of their individual conversions to Christianity. Finally, the fourth and most important segment illuminates the place that Kievan Rus occupies in Zernov's interpretation of subsequent periods of Russian history. Kiev represented the foundation on which Zernov constructed his entire interpretation of Russia's past.⁴²

I

In his study of early Russian history, Zernov argued that Kiev attained a degree of political, religious, and social sophistication and sensitivity that was exceptional in pagan societies. He contended that the high level of development among the pagan Russians allowed them readily

political and social structure of the country." The Slavs assimilated the Normans into their culture and institutional forms. Russia: a History and Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), 1:9.

⁴²In contrast to Zernov's contention that Kiev represented the standard by which to judge Russian history, S. M. Solov'ev argued that Russian history had one dominating figure, Peter I. To Solov'ev, one had to judge Russian history in light of the Petrine Revolution of the eighteenth century. Istoriia Rossii, 14:337. Solov'ev shared this contention with V. O. Kliuchevskii, who stated that the whole question of the meaning of Russian history revolves around "the deed of Peter and the relation of his new reformed Russia to the old." Sochineniia, vol 4: Kurs, p. 201.

to accept and absorb the treasures of Eastern Orthodoxy and to transform them into an even higher, more spiritually potent form. Then, how did Zernov describe the early Russians and their lives?

In his study of religion, the author contended that the Russians, although they were not Christian, possessed a highly developed "pagan" religion.⁴³ Naturally, the forms of their pagan religion differed from Orthodoxy, but nevertheless the early Russians attempted spiritual explanations of their existence. Russian religion consisted in worshipping "divine power revealing itself through the various manifestations of nature."⁴⁴ In nature, the wind, the sun, the earth, and such occurrences as thunderstorms provided the special "vehicles"

⁴³The Kadet historian, P. N. Miliukov (1859-1943), doubted the assertions made by the Slavophiles (and Zernov also) that the Russian character included the Christian attributes and that Russia needed only the ritual and institutional framework of the Christian church. He contended that Orthodoxy represented a higher cultural and religious form than that which existed in Russia and that "it [Orthodoxy] suffered from the primitiveness of this [the Russian] mentality." Outlines of Russian Culture, vol 1: Religion and the Church in Russia (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1942), p. 2.

While not making any unusual claims about Slavic character, Nikolai Andreyev supported Zernov's argument that pre-Christian Russia had a highly developed culture. He wrote, "Christianity in Russia was not transplanted into a uncultured soil, into a wild desert, but into a powerful community which . . . had its own customs, art, and religion." "Pagan and Christian Elements in Old Russia," Slavic Review 21 (March, 1962):18. See also G. P. Fedotov who recognized the existence of primitive religions in Russia. He presented them in two parts: the 'Mother Earth' cult, which worshipped the various manifestations of nature, and the 'rod' cult, the members of which worshipped their ancestors and family ties. The Russian Religious Mind: Tenth to Thirteenth Century (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), 1:12, 15.

⁴⁴Nicolas M. Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 8.

for the divine. Ancestor worship and communion with the dead exemplified Russian spiritual sensitivity. Russians also believed in the existence of malignant and benevolent spirits that inhabited the earth.⁴⁵ In the following statement, Zernov described this relationship between God as revealed in nature and the Russians:

The Russian plain is both severe and gentle; it is hospitable, yet full of concealed dangers; its rivers are friendly and welcoming, but its marshes and forests are threatening and forbidding; it knows how to attach man to the soil and yet constantly reminds him of eternity and heaven.⁴⁶

The personification of nature and its oneness with God became an essential part of the Russian people's conception of religion. This mystical quality in their pagan religion allowed the Russians readily to adopt Christianity.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 16.

⁴⁷ S. F. Platonov emphasized the changes that Christianity wrought in Russia. In contrast to Zernov's argument about its easy acceptance, he stated that paganism remained strong and that the acceptance of Christianity brought with it fundamental changes. He wrote, "Thus there came into Russia, together with the new religions, new authorities, new education, new ideas of justice, new land owners, and new forms of land ownership. The Church became the channel through which Byzantine influence flowed into Russia." History of Russia, trans. Emanuel Aronsberg (Bloomington: University Prints, 1964), p. 37. See also George Vernadsky who argued that Russia's conversion progressed gradually. From the time of Olga (d. 962), Christianity had been making inroads into Slavic society. These Christian advances were strong enough by the 980s to stifle a revival of paganism. Thus, in Vernadsky's view, Vladimir merely adopted the most potent religious form that was present in Russia. A History of Russia,

In political organization, Zernov believed that Kiev Rus was democratic. He saw the independent trading cities and the role of elected councils as the basis for the democracy. He argued that the princes "were primarily the military defenders of their cities, and also the supreme judges, but the regular administration of a city was in the hands of the local Councils elected by the people's Assembly."⁴⁸

vol. 2: Kievan Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 60.

E. E. Goliubinskii's interpretation also differed with Zernov's contention that Russia's conversion under Vladimir came easily because of the high degree of pagan religious development. He argued that the Russians were hostile to Christianity and only accepted it after the Kievan princes forced it on them. In discussing the regency of Olga (945-962), Goliubinskii stated that she failed to convert Russia to Christianity because of the people's outlook and attachment to paganism. She feared that conversion might lead to civil war. Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi, 1:79.

⁴⁸ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 14.

Jerome Blum stated that Kievan Russia comprised a "extremely loose federation of nearly autonomous city-states" ruled by princes whom the populace from time to time deposed. In addition to his comments on the political organization, Blum argued that in the agrarian sector, family and then later territorial communes, dominated the land. In his view, the territorial commune, which dated to early Kiev (8th century), constituted an open individualistic society. Blum wrote that each peasant lived in a private dwelling, owned his tools, land, and produce, and maintained his own economy; in addition, he shared communal lands and responsibilities with his fellow peasants. Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 14, 25.

Vernadsky stated that the prince's responsibilities lay chiefly as the supreme judge and as the military head of government. This interpretation agreed with that of Zernov. In Vernadsky's view, the "people's assembly," to which Zernov attributed a significant governmental role, represented the city-dwellers only. This body (veche) acted on matters of local importance, though the veche of Kiev could and did influence the prince's policy. The author asserted that the veche made no attempt to organize itself into a representative body for the entire nation, but remained the representatives of the city. Kievan Russia, pp. 178, 187.

In addition, "Russian life during the Kiev period was centered in towns, inhabited by enterprising and freedom-loving citizens, who were jealous of their traditional liberties, and any prince who infringed these was in danger of being expelled from his seat by the populace."⁴⁹ Zernov thus characterized Kiev, economically, as an urban oriented society based on trade.⁵⁰ Through commercial intercourse with other countries, Russians became familiar with foreign people and cultures. Yet great distances separated the Russians from those countries and protected them from the decadent aspects of the cultures beyond Russian borders.⁵¹

Zernov displayed mixed emotions about the effects of local democracy and autonomy on Kievan politics. He referred to moral unity in the form of the prince, but argued that this authority depended too heavily on the personal abilities of the Grand Prince.⁵² Here, Zernov touched upon the classic problem of liberal democracy, namely, where did individual freedom end and social responsibility begin? He believed that the state should have the force and political power necessary to punish offenders against society. In the case of Kiev, freedom to the point of anarchy produced civil war and invited domination by outside forces. In

⁴⁹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 14.

⁵⁰ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 18.

⁵¹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 14.

⁵² Ibid.

politics, Kiev Rus had many weaknesses.⁵³

II

"The Russian interpretation of Byzantine Christianity is . . . the true creative source of Russian culture, which owes to it most of its specific characteristics."⁵⁴ Why did the author believe that Orthodoxy influenced Russia so profoundly? The threefold answer encompassed tradition, language, and worship. These characteristics of Orthodoxy complimented those of pre-Christian Kievan society to produce the unique culture of Kiev.⁵⁵

Traditionally, the Eastern Orthodox Church has always claimed precedence over Rome. Zernov also believed in Orthodoxy's superiority. Although at the time of Russia's conversion (989) the Eastern Church had passed the zenith of its spiritual power, he believed that Orthodoxy represented the best existing example of genuine Christianity. From his perspective, a "direct and uninterrupted line of development" linked the Byzantine Church to the church of the apostles and the great ecumenical councils.⁵⁶ "In addition it [the

⁵³Nicolas M. Zernov, Eastern Christendom (New York: Putnam Company, 1961), p. 114.

⁵⁴Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 18.

⁵⁵Goliubinskii held that this Russian idea of a unique religious tradition resulted from the ignorance of the people. He stated that they had an inaccurate perception of themselves and did not recognize that they and their religion were both Greek and Western. Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi, 1:319.

⁵⁶Zernov wrote that the Byzantine Church had declined because of pressures on the Empire. "The political decline of

Eastern Orthodox Church] possessed an intimate knowledge of classical civilization, and it incorporated into its ritual and customs much of the wisdom and experience of the ancient Oriental world."⁵⁷ Zernov's claims of a superior tradition in the Eastern Church were vital to his later claims that Russian Orthodoxy occupied a chosen position among other religions.⁵⁸

Language was another element that specially suited Orthodoxy to the Russians. The missionaries converted the Russians in the vernacular. Saints Cyril (d. 869) and Methodius (d. 885), both fluent in the spoken language of the Slavs, invented an alphabet and translated the Bible into the language of the Slavs. In 863, when departing

the Empire, the increasing hostility between Eastern and Western Christians, the conquest by the Moslems of the centres of ancient civilization in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine -- all these factors unfavorably affected the life of the Byzantine Church." Three Russian Prophets, p. 19.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Goliubinskii asserted that the Russians illegitimately claimed a superior tradition as early as the thirteenth century, when the name of Constantinople was changed to Byzantium and many Russians refused to recognize it as the seat of Orthodox Christianity. Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi, 1:319.

In discussing the origins of the idea of Russian superiority, S. F. Platonov (1860-1933) stated that its origins dated to the Florentine Union, 1439, and the sequence of events that followed it, the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and the creation of a Patriarch of Moscow in 1539. These events led to the rise of the idea of the Third Rome, a statement of Muscovite religious and cultural superiority. Lektsii po Russkoi istorii (Petrograd: Senatskaia tipografiia, 1917), p. 396.

from Constantinople for Moravia and missionary work there, they took with them a Slavonic translation of the Bible.⁵⁹ This enabled the Russians to take an active and immediate part in the Orthodox religion. The people attained a spiritual unity with their church rather than becoming subjects of a Latin-speaking clergy, as in the Roman Church. Zernov suggested that the strong connection between Latin and Roman political institutions caused the Western church to become as much a secular power as a spiritual one. In contrast, the language barrier did not exist in Russia, and the church became the religious expression of the people. The church and the people were one.⁶⁰

Not only did the common language of clergy and people become an asset, but the translation itself represented a miracle to Zernov that enhanced the religion and gave additional meaning to it.⁶¹ The use of Slavonic resulted in translations that more vividly transmitted the meaning of the Greek terms. Zernov listed the following examples: "to be baptized" became "to take the cross"; "Orthodoxy" became "right glory"; and "Catholic church" became "the congregation of the Lord."⁶² Zernov exalted this very lack

⁵⁹Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 91.

⁶⁰Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 22.

⁶¹See also James H. Billington's citations of differences between the original Greek and the Slavic translation. The traditional greeting, "Happy Easter," became in Slavic "Christ is risen." The Icon and the Axe: an Interpretive History of Russian Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 19.

⁶²Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 22.

of a literal interpretation because the Slavonic better demonstrated the essence of the terms.⁶³

The Byzantine form of worship also best suited the Russians. Once again Zernov contrasted Byzantium with Rome:

The Byzantine tradition of Christianity is not so institutional as the Western. It pays less attention to discipline and order but exults in the beauty of worship and emphasizes divine mercy and forgiveness.⁶⁴

To illustrate these differences, Zernov referred to the story about Vladimir's envoys to other countries who reported that the celebration of the Holy Eucharist in St. Sophia's at Constantinople was so impressive that they did not know whether they were in heaven or on earth.⁶⁵ Although the historical accuracy of the episode is doubtful, it spoke directly to the Russian sensitivity to beauty. Worship and artistic perfection thus became primary concerns.⁶⁶ In Zernov's opinion, no other religion could match Orthodoxy's beauty and worship.

In Zernov's writings, the voluntary way in which Russia voluntarily absorbed Christianity under Vladimir represented the most important aspect of Orthodoxy's impact upon Russia.⁶⁷ The peaceful acceptance of Christianity

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 7.

⁶⁵ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 18.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Nicolas M. Zernov, Vselenskaia tserkov' i Russkoe pravoslavie (Paris: YMCA Press, 1952), p. 100.

Albert M. Ammann viewed the conversion of Vladimir

allowed the whole nation to become Christian and profoundly influenced Zernov's interpretation of Kiev. Orthodoxy's voluntary dissemination from the upper classes to the people made the church Russian, eliminating the stigma of an outside institution.⁶⁸ The author gave few specifics but followed logically the view that Kiev was an open society in which the princes were anything but absolute. In such a community, Christianization by edict was impossible; it had to be voluntary.⁶⁹

III

After examining Zernov's view of Orthodoxy and pagan Kiev, this essay will now concern itself with the product of their union, Christian Kiev. In Zernov's writings, the nature of Kievan society had a simple and direct focal point: "The entire culture of Russia during the Kievan period of its

and the subsequent conversion of Russia as a political practicality. He implied that except for the political considerations any religion would have been acceptable to the Slavs if the power of the prince were behind it. Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte (Wien: Thomas Morus Presse, 1950), p. 17. In his interpretation, Goliubinskii stated that in 990, after returning to Kiev from Constantinople, Vladimir ordered the pagan gods destroyed and all the inhabitants of Kiev and the other cities under his control baptized. Baptism was mandatory. Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi, 1:182. Platonov qualified the generalization made by Goliubinskii and stated that in some areas force was necessary to implement the conversion. He cited Novgorod as an example of this. History of Russia, p. 36.

⁶⁸ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 23.

⁶⁹ In contradiction to Zernov, Nikolai Andreyev stated that the pagan elements remained strong in Russia and that the prince used his power to suppress them. He wrote, "Not surprisingly, there was considerable resistance to the new faith in some districts right up to the twelfth century [the rising of the volkhvy (pagan priest) and other incidents]." "Pagan and Christian Elements in Old Russia," p. 18.

history . . . was inspired and guided by the Orthodox Church."⁷⁰ He held that Kiev was a Christian culture in both form and substance. The Kiev that Zernov described produced three elements that distinguished it from other societies: respect for individual rights, art and architecture, and most important, the art of ritual living.⁷¹

Zernov argued that Christianity brought with it a new understanding of human dignity in Russian society and that Vladimir constituted the best example of this humanism. At the outset, it is necessary to understand that Zernov felt justified in using Vladimir's example to make generalizations about all of Kievan society. To Zernov, Vladimir symbolized Kievan Russia and reflected its society. The moral authority of the prince was such that the people and the lesser princes followed his lead and example.⁷² Therefore, an appreciation of the change that Christianity wrought in Vladimir leads to an understanding of the change wrought in Kiev.⁷³ Thus the author addressed himself to the question: How did Russia's newly discovered humanism reveal itself in the person of Vladimir?

⁷⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 19.

⁷¹ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 37.

⁷² Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 9.

⁷³ Nicolas M. Zernov, "Vladimir and the Origin of the Russian Church," Slavonic and Eastern European Review 28 (November 1949):132. Vernadsky agreed with Zernov concerning the change that Christianity wrought in Vladimir. Vladimir took the new religion seriously and immediately set out to build churches, educate the young, and establish charities. His banquets became expressions of brotherly love and Christian concern. The Russian people were impressed to the point that they named him the "bright sun." Kievan Russia, p. 73.

Zernov cited a radical change in the grand prince's behavior as evidence of his conversion to Orthodoxy. In describing Vladimir before his conversion, Zernov stated that "this bellicose Prince had little idea of restraint or self-control. He was bold in battle, fond of food and drink, had several wives and a large number of children."⁷⁴ The behavior of this same prince after his baptism offered a sharp contrast.

He opened his gates to the hungry and the afflicted. He built homes for the aged and for invalids. Especially striking was his attitude to criminals: this man, who had previously shed blood liberally in fierce battles, realized the sacredness of each human life, and his first impulse was to abolish capital punishment.⁷⁵

The author stated that Vladimir abandoned this course of action after several Greek bishops voiced their opposition. Zernov stated that they were used to the Byzantine methods of torture, mutilation, and execution and that they convinced a reluctant Vladimir that such methods were necessary to maintain order.⁷⁶

The actions of several Christian leaders, who came to prominence after the death of Vladimir, demonstrated the strength of Christianity in Kiev Rus. Vladimir's sons, Boris and Gleb, were canonized. When their father died, civil war broke out, and to prevent bloodshed both refused to use their armies against their brother Sviatopolk, who murdered them both. Zernov wrote that their murders "so deeply stirred the

⁷⁴Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 9.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

nation that Sviatopolk had to flee from the country and perished in exile."⁷⁷ Another remarkable figure, St. Theodosius (1074 d.) gave his rich inheritance to the poor, and founded a monastery in some caves near Kiev. He sought to identify himself with the poor and humble just as Christ had done.⁷⁸ Vladimir Monomakh (1125 d.) carried on the Christian spirit. Zernov called him a "peacemaker" among his fellow Russian princes but a great warrior in his struggles against foreign enemies.⁷⁹ Vladimir Monomakh's "Charge to My Children" best expressed the spirit of the rulers of Kiev. In it the prince admonished his children to do good, feed the poor, protect the weak, remember that life is precious and the soul sacred, lead a morally upright life, and seek knowledge.⁸⁰

⁷⁷Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 113.

Billington argued that Boris and Gleb accepted death gladly in the wars that followed the death of Vladimir so that they might redeem the people through their Christ-like suffering. The Icon and the Axe, p. 8.

Fedotov viewed the deaths of Boris and Gleb in a totally different light from the views of Zernov and Billington. He stated that "Boris and Gleb were not martyrs for the faith," but had merely died in the turmoil of a feudal struggle for power. Sviatopolk, who murdered them, had the example of his father, Vladimir, to follow because Vladimir had come to power in just such a manner. The martyrdom of the two princes was highly irregular from a Greek point of view, and Fedotov argued that it resulted from a totally Russian approach to the incident. Writers of the time incorporated the story into a "legend." "In a truly artistic way, the legend develops the dramatic action and elaborates the lyric prayers sometimes in the style of popular lament." Thus, the deaths of Boris and Gleb became the symbol for calls to end the feudal strife in Kiev. Boris's death became a Christian self-sacrifice in the face of evil, a display of other worldliness. The Russian Religious Mind, 1:371.

⁷⁸Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 113.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 12.

This document expressed the spirit of Kievan Rus and attested to its Christian culture. Zernov called it an expression of the "ideals universally shared by Russian Christians."⁸¹

Although he did not elaborate, Zernov stated that the sentiments expressed by Monomakh constituted the axioms on which Russian culture was founded.

In addition to the great rulers of Kiev, Zernov exalted the church life. He saw it as an unique part of Kievan culture. In describing the church he portrayed it as the center of everyday village life. The church, he wrote, was for the Russians a university, theatre, concert-hall, and picture gallery. While the people were the center of the church, the laity played the most prominent role in the worship. The clergy never dominated the parishioners. The people shared the church offices and participated actively in the services. In short, they made Orthodoxy their own personal faith rather than an institutionalized form governed by the clergy. Russian Orthodoxy was unique because the people made it the center of their lives and because it became, in Zernov's words, "a unique training ground . . . which enlightened their hearts and minds and introduced them to the mystery of Divine Redemption."⁸² Zernov believed that the church teachings created in the people a keener sense of justice, sensitivity to the unfortunates, and awareness of the necessity of forgiveness.⁸³

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid., p. 17

⁸³Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 38.

The society of Orthodox Kiev produced a superior art and architecture that Zernov attributed directly to the union of the Russian people and the Orthodox religion. Because they lacked scholarly skills and the legal institutions of the West, the Russians understood Christianity in a different way. Beauty and artistic perfection became central to them, and Zernov held that "the profoundest revelations of Russian thought in the Middle Ages are found in the colors of the ikons, not in books." The Russian people were more familiar with "music, architecture and painting, carving and embroidery" as a media than with "discourse and debate."⁸⁴ Worship in Russia comprised an aesthetic undertaking concerned with visual images and artistic perfection, and through this unusual experience, Zernov believed that the Russian people achieved a special relationship with the divine.⁸⁵

To Zernov, the "ritual art of living" was Kiev's greatest contribution to Russian life. By this, he meant a unity in the rhythm of national life and yet freedom and spontaneity in spiritual matters. The Russian solution to man's eternal problem of existence thus occurred at two levels,

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 21.

⁸⁵Fedotov agreed with Zernov stating that beauty and art played a vital role in Russian Christianity. He wrote, "There is no doubt that the Russians are and always were gifted for the arts, although in different epochs different arts arose to the top in the national esteem. Thus in ancient Russia poetry and music at least secular poetry and music, were thwarted by ecclesiastical condemnation. The pictorial art, however, was not only protected, but created by the Church, at least in its higher forms." The Russian Religious Mind, 1:371.

the concrete and the spiritual. Zernov's definition of ritual living was latent with mysticism:

This was the Russian ideal expressed by the word sobornost -- the togetherness or oneness of life, unrestricted by any legal or intellectual barriers, but obeying the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and therefore enjoying unity in complete freedom.⁸⁶

The attainment of oneness with the material world and freedom of the spirit, distinguished the Russian religious experience from that of other peoples. The harmony of Russian life did not result from a national or legal conception of the state but rather stemmed from the common way of life that the people and the ruler followed. They did everything together, observed the same customs, fasted and feasted together, enjoyed the same art and architecture, and listened to the same music. In Zernov's view, they acquired this unity because they all believed the same truth. From this perspective, the ritual art of living was central to the Russian church which, in turn was central to Russian life.⁸⁷

IV

Pagan Russian culture, Eastern Orthodoxy, and the culture of Christian Kiev were all vital parts of Zernov's writings on the Kievan period of Russian history. After examination of these elements it is necessary to evaluate his interpretation as a whole. The preceding pages des-

⁸⁶ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 38.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

cribed the content of Zernov's writings. The next few attempt to deal with questions that they raise. Does one get a glimpse of Zernov's view of history through his analysis of Kiev? Are there themes present here that will mark his later writings? Why does he single out Kiev as the foundation for Russian culture? Is his interpretation of Kiev different from other Orthodox points of view?

Zernov's Christian view of history was observable from the outset. It constituted a simple straightforward belief in God's presence in the world and in his active participation in the affairs of men. He recorded the struggle between good and evil in Russia's past and implanted in his writings moral judgments about people, societies, and their actions. Basic to these judgments stood Zernov's interpretation of Kiev. The themes that were central to the author's life, faith, and work emerged in his discussion of Kiev. Russian Orthodoxy, as the author viewed it, took shape in Kiev. It was here that Russia acquired a uniquely Christian culture.

The most important themes in Zernov's interpretation of Kiev dealt with the relationship between man and God. The author believed that God approached man through nature. Russia's primitive pagan religion manifested this divine but natural approach to man. In Zernov's view, the Russians were aware of a supernatural presence in nature and acknowledged this presence through their Mother Earth religion. God reached out to man and made him conscious of a reality beyond himself and his material surroundings. To Zernov, this con-

sciousness gave the Russians a sensitivity to the divine and prepared the way for the Christianization of Russia. Orthodoxy merely provided a fuller revelation, the completion of the natural. Zernov often used analogies between nature and Orthodoxy to illustrate their parallels. For example, he compared the end of winter and the coming of spring to the resurrection and transfiguration following the crucifixion.⁸⁸ This symbolism surrounding nature and God became inseparable in his writings and permeated his discussion of each period of Russian history. The peasantry through its contact with the soil and nature maintained communication with God and thus became a depository for the Christian spirit which underlay all Russian history. For that reason, Zernov exalted the peasantry as the true source of Russian religious vitality.

The relationship between God and man also took the form of an individual relationship. Zernov believed that God approached individuals for special tasks. This theme recurred consistently after its introduction in the Kievan period. In Kiev, Zernov believed, Vladimir Monomakh was the best example of God's acting through individuals. The author called Monomakh the "most outstanding ruler of the Kiev period of Russian history."⁸⁹ Zernov saw the prince as wise,

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 16.

⁸⁹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 11.

generous, courageous, merciful, and educated, and he held that the prince represented an extension of the people and their traditions.⁹⁰

The author's characterization of Monomakh vividly illustrated the importance that he attached to the individual in Russian history. Special insights enabled Monomakh to become a moral leader and Christian ruler. In other periods of Russian history, Zernov singled out extraordinary individuals for their contributions. He emphasized the moral instead of the political or military authority of the leaders. Zernov accented the close relationship between certain individuals and God and contended that these individuals exerted a powerful moral influence on the rulers and the societies in which they lived. In every period of Russian history, the author exalted certain individuals that he thought exemplified the best in Russian Christian culture. He made them a basic theme of his writings.

Because of the importance that Zernov placed on spiritual matters and because he believed that Kiev was a spiritually oriented society, Kiev became the basis for his writings. Christians who sought the Christian ideal governed Kiev. Local autonomy, free cities, contact with the land, and Christian rulers who based their power on moral persuasion rather than force typified Kievan society. Life in Kiev Rus centered on the church and worship comprised the most important

⁹⁰ Ibid.

aspect of that life. Zernov believed that Kiev Rus represented what a society should be. It was the model with which he compared Muscovite, Imperial, and Soviet Russia. Kiev was Zernov's absolute. It was a God-centered, church-oriented society, the supreme good against which he compared the mundane corrupt societies that later emerged in Russia. In the Kievan experience, the Russian, through his contact with the soil and Orthodoxy, became conscious of the divine. To Zernov, this direct contact between the people and God provided and will provide the means of survival for Christianity in Russia.

Because Zernov saw Kiev as the root of Russian Orthodoxy, he differed with historians who held either Muscovy or Petersburg as the Orthodox ideal. This conflict of opinion resulted from different conceptualizations of the relationship between church and state. Zernov supported the decentralized society of Kiev, while at the same time he argued that the church should be a separate force in society. He believed that the church ought to act as a moral force separate from the state. Should the state or ruler dominate the church, it could no longer act as a moral force. This view of church and state stood apart from the Muscovite tradition which witnessed a close alliance between them. In the Muscovite tradition, the strong centralized state played a central role as the protector of the church. The Kievan tradition contrasted more sharply with the Petersburg tradition of church subservience to the state. In the

Petersburg period the church was a creature of the state. The author made his preferences quite plain, the open spirit of Kiev and the independence and moral power of the people's church represented the highest form of Russian Christian development.

CHAPTER III

MOSCOW THE THIRD ROME

If Zernov thought that Kievan Russia society attained a certain unmatched spiritual ideal, he also believed that, in the Muscovite period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, the Russians attained national self-realization with some strengthening of its social and religious mission.

Two circumstances enabled Muscovite society to place this formalized political structure upon the Kievan foundation in spite of the Mongol domination. The first of these was the development of a new national consciousness; the second was the perseverance taught by the spiritual leaders.

I

In 1237 Kiev disappeared in a Mongol tidal wave. For all practical purposes, the Russian state ceased to exist and a period of extreme hardship ensued. Mongol domination lasted for more than two hundred years, but in the fifteenth century the Russians arose, throwing off the yoke and banishing their former rulers. How did the Russians maintain their national identity for those centuries and then find the strength to expel the Mongols? Zernov addressed these questions in his discussion of the origins of Muscovite Russia.

In 1223 Genghis Khan, at the head of his magnificent cavalry, crushed a coalition of Kievan princes on the steppes, and then the Mongols suddenly disappeared. They left the Russians "in complete bewilderment." The Russians had no idea as to where the invaders had come from or disappeared.⁹¹ A short period of peace followed and then in 1237 the Mongols reappeared. Batu, with an army of 400,000 horsemen, overwhelmed the independent Russian princes and totally devastated the country. By 1240 Kiev had become a part of the Khan's empire.⁹²

In their assault on Russia, the Mongols directed their campaign not only at the armed forces of the Russian princes but also at the civilian population. Killing, burning, and enslaving, they attempted to destroy the entire Russian population.⁹³ The Mongols, apparently an invincible force, sought to erase Russia and all things Russian from the face of the earth. Zernov formed an analogy between the invincibility of the Mongols and of the Soviet government. The triumph of the Russians over the Mongols forecast their ability to triumph eventually over the Communists. Russian perseverance under the Mongol yoke displayed a peculiar ability to regenerate the national spirit, even under the most repressive political systems. Two factors enabled Russia

⁹¹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 20.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid., p. 21.

to survive the Mongols: geography and the Mongol administrative practices. Unfavorable geography prevented the Mongol cavalry from operating effectively in certain areas of Russia. As a result, the Mongols spared Galicia and Volynia in the southwest, Novgorod and Pskov in the north, and the forested areas of the northeast. From these areas emerged Russia's "physical revival."⁹⁴ In addition, the Mongols themselves enabled Russia to return to a degree of physical prosperity. The Mongol administration wanted to profit from its new lands and so it allowed the Russians to rebuild. It reinstated the House of Riurik to collect taxes from the people and to maintain order. The Mongol administrators closely watched and supervised the restored princes. This practice served as insurance against the accumulation of too much power or independence among the surviving princes, but at the same time Mongol policy brought economic recovery at the price of subservience to the Mongols. The return of prosperity threatened the culture and national consciousness of Russia. The danger of assimilation into a Tatar world was real. The Russian people had two choices, slavery or death, and either meant the destruction of their culture.

Zernov believed that the Russian Orthodox Church preserved Russian culture during the Mongol period. Through some of its "outstanding representatives," it provided a

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 22.

spiritual revival. Prince Alexander Nevskii (1263 d.) figured prominently in this rejuvenation. Nevskii's life constituted the initial phase of the Russian revival that culminated in the expulsion of the Mongols and the rise of Muscovy as a power in Eastern Europe. In 1231 Nevskii became the prince of Novgorod. His selection as prince resulted largely from the intrigues of his father, Iaroslav (1246 d.), the Grand Prince of Kiev. In the thirteenth century, Novgorod was a great trading city which in many ways resembled the Hanseatic cities of a later age. Ruled by wealthy merchants, it invited princes of Kiev to become military governors. The tenure of the invited princes depended almost entirely on the merchants, who reserved the right to expel any governor with whom they were dissatisfied. The merchants were independent and the young Prince Nevskii knew that his new post was a precarious one.

Within a short time, the Mongol invasion complicated Nevskii's position. Novgorod's geographical location spared it from Mongol destruction. It became the most powerful and prominent center of Russian culture to survive the invasion. As a result, the burden of preserving and reconstructing Russian culture fell on the city and its prince.⁹⁵ Nevskii's already difficult position worsened after the Mongol attack. Russia's neighbors to the west attempted to expand at the expense of their now prostrated Slavic rival. The rulers

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 23.

of the Teutonic Knights and of Sweden saw the Mongol disaster as an excellent opportunity to occupy Pskov and Novgorod and to eradicate Orthodoxy and replace it with Catholicism. In Zernov's opinion, the western invasion had greater importance than the Mongol because the Swedes and knights wanted permanent control of Russia rather than mere tribute as in the case of the Mongols. The fear of "German domination" reappeared in following chapters.⁹⁶

Nevskii's defeat of the Knights and the Swedes prevented the Germanization of Russia and in Zernov's view, his actions displayed beyond doubt his divine selection for his task of leadership.⁹⁷ Nevskii had a special relationship with God. The prince was a man of "deep faith" who believed that "God rules the nations and that nothing happens against

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 24.

⁹⁷ In discussing Alexander Nevskii's victories over Western invaders, Vernadsky argued that Russia would have expelled the Mongols much earlier had they not been threatened simultaneously by the West. The Russian princes had two choices: they could enlist Western support (In the case of Prince Daniel, this failed.) or they could follow Nevskii's example and accept the Mongol administration. By doing so, Nevskii freed himself to deal with the West. In 1240, he defeated the Swedes at the mouth of the Neva, and then in 1242, he destroyed the German invasion on Lake Piepus. Kievan Russia, p. 17. Billington pointed out that the Muscovite Russians have traditionally linked the "lives of saints and sacred chronicles" to "the religious truth of Orthodoxy." Alexander Nevskii was an example of this practice. Because of his victory over the Teutonic Knights, Nevskii became an "Old Testament figure", saving Russia from infidels. The Icon and the Axe, p. 54. Prince Alexander Nevskii took part in an attempt, similar to that of Prince Daniel, to gain Western support against the Mongols. He carried on an extensive correspondence with Innocent III, the Catholic Pope. This occurred in 1248 six years after Nevskii's defeat of the Teutonic Knights, and the rapprochement failed. Ammann, Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, pp. 54-55.

His will."⁹⁸ This belief which Zernov attributed to Nevskii comprised his own view of man, God, and history.⁹⁹ The prince's policy of appeasement with respect to the Mongols demonstrated his farsightedness:

His firm faith in God, the Ruler over all nations, gave him confidence in the remote yet certain victory of the Christians over their heathen oppressors. He stood far above his generation, and his gaze could penetrate into that distant future when once more Orthodox Russia would be master of the great Eurasian plain.¹⁰⁰

The eulogy delivered by Metropolitan Cyril described Nevskii as "the Sun of Russia", and indicated the esteem and reverence in which the prince was held.¹⁰¹

In addition to Prince Nevskii, certain other figures also represented the Russian Orthodox tradition during the Mongol period. Three metropolitans, Cyril, Peter, and Aleksei, made significant contributions to the prospects for a Russian national revival. Zernov characterized Cyril (1242-1281) as the most outstanding of Nevskii's contemporaries. The patriarch of Constantinople appointed Cyril to the metropolitanate of Russia because no Greek prelate was willing to go into a Mongol-dominated area. After his appointment, Cyril spent his time rebuilding the churches

⁹⁸Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 24.

⁹⁹Interview with Nicolas M. Zernov, Oxford, England, 7 March 1975.

¹⁰⁰Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 27.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, p. 26.

and reviving the national spirit. He accomplished these things because the Mongols respected and protected all the ministers of religion. This development emphasized once again the idea that the Mongol conquest threatened Russia less than the encroachments of the West. Monetary gain interested the Mongols whereas the westerners wanted possession of the Russian body, mind, and spirit. Despite the potential for political power, Cyril chose to shun it and offered his support to the worthy princes instead. This policy resulted in "friendship and mutual trust between the leaders of Church and State."¹⁰² The rulers violated that trust in the Possessor-Nonpossessor controversy of the Muscovite period.

Peter, another metropolitan of Russia (1308-1326), also figured prominently in Russia's spiritual revival. Peter's significance lay as much in the fact that he established Moscow as the ecclesiastical and political center of Russia as it did in his efforts to revive the national spirit: "The walls and the cathedrals of the Kremlin built by him [Peter] became the sacred scroll on which the history of the nation was to be inscribed by all succeeding generations."¹⁰³ Peter helped to make Moscow the center of Russia, a symbol of national strength and unity.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 35.

Aleksei, metropolitan of Moscow (1353-1378), also made a unique contribution to Russian Church traditions. He became the first member of the church hierarchy to take an active part in state affairs. He was the regent of a minor prince and conducted Russian affairs of state. He maintained Russia's traditional policy of "submission to the East, and stubborn resistance to the West."¹⁰⁴ It was Aleksei who defeated the Lithuanian attempts to bring Northeast Russia under their domination. At the same time, he strengthened Moscow's control over rival Russian cities and, as regent, set a precedent for later clerics and the Russian Church having an active voice in the affairs of state. From the time of Aleksei, the exact role of the church in politics remained undecided; only, in the eighteenth century did Peter the Great settle the dispute.

II

To Zernov, St. Sergius of Radonezh (1392 d.), a contemporary of Metropolitan Aleksei, represented the most important figure in the Muscovite revival in Russia.¹⁰⁵ Sergius embodied the Russian ideal and tradition of unity in freedom, expressed by the word sobornost'. Sergius linked the Russia of Kiev and that of Moscow. He transmitted the

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁰⁵ St. Sergius was one of the few churchmen of the Russian Middle Ages to have a biographer. While he was abbot at the monastery of the Holy Trinity, Epiphanius, a monk, wrote his biography. Zernov commented that the book lacks insight into the "spirit of Sergius." Nicolas M. Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia (London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1939), p. 4.

Christian values and aspirations of Kiev, "the guiding light in the life of the Russian people," into the Muscovite Empire. In Muscovy, he reenforced the desire of the Russian people to establish "a geniune Christian order" in Russia.¹⁰⁶

Sergius's life began around the year 1314 in Rostov.¹⁰⁷ At the beginning of the fourteenth century, Russia lay helpless under the Tartar yoke with the constant spectre of a Mongol invasion looming in the distance. In addition to the fear and brutality associated with Mongol rule, cultural isolation from Europe aggravated the national spiritual crisis, and left the Russians with only the Christian link to their past.¹⁰⁸ Surrounded by instability and even forced to abandon their home in Rostov, Sergius's parents, like many in Russia, clung to the identity and security offered by the church. Originally Sergius's parents belonged to the lower nobility, but they lost their position when civil strife in Rostov forced them to move to Radonezh near Moscow where they became peasants.¹⁰⁹ Sergius came to know "all the sorrows

¹⁰⁶ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 30.

¹⁰⁷ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 38.

Billington agreed with Zernov's evaluation of Sergius. He stated that Sergius was the central figure in the fourteenth century monastic revival and unification of Russia. His account of Sergius's influence also included a detailed explanation of the "new" monastic tradition that Sergius introduced in Russia. Sergius reflected the Byzantine mystical movement known as "Hesychasm." They believed that through a process of inner purification man could come into contact with the "energy" of God. The Icon and the Axe, pp. 50-53.

¹⁰⁸ Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia, p. 11.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

and joys of the peasant's lot"; he became the peasant saint of Russia.¹¹⁰

Zernov's account of the dedication of Sergius's life to the church epitomized the picture of St. Sergius as a remarkable holy man. Sergius had a learning disability which hindered Sergius in his attempts to become literate.¹¹¹ One day as a child he encountered a wandering monk who blessed him and gave him a piece of Eucharist bread which caused the learning deficiency to disappear. After the miracle Sergius dedicated his life to the church.¹¹² He received a church education. As Zernov wrote, "his only sources of instruction were the Slavonic Bible and the Services of the Orthodox Church."¹¹³ Sergius, as with his fellow Russians, came to view the church as the center of national life. In Russia, at this time, worship stood in the place of science and other cultural outlets: "all that the nation possessed which was creative in thought or art found its expression in worship of the Church."¹¹⁴ With this heritage, education, and experience, neither Sergius's orientation in religious life nor the new direction that his life took at age twenty was surprising.

¹¹⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 38.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia, p. 14.

¹¹³ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 38.

¹¹⁴ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 31.

At that time, Sergius and his brother, Stephan, entered the dense forest surrounding Radonezh, built a chapel, dedicating it to the Holy Trinity.¹¹⁵ The weaker of the two, Stephan returned to town and entered a regular monastery. Sergius remained alone and acquired through privation the self-discipline that enabled him to serve God and the Russian nation.¹¹⁶ Zernov paralleled the saint's life with that of Russia. He stated that peace and oneness with nature gave Sergius the strength to survive a long period of suffering and, like Russia, to emerge purified and triumphant.¹¹⁷ Sergius's strength lay in the fact that "he had trusted God to save him."¹¹⁸

Predictably, this hermit outside Radonezh attracted much attention and other cells sprang up around him. Sergius never solicited the newcomers, but neither did he refuse fellowship. As time passed, a community of monks, that now included his brother, grew around Sergius. In addition, he became a highly respected figure in the church and well-known to Alexis, the metropolitan of Moscow. At the metropolitan's insistence, Sergius established a monastery, the Holy Trinity. After its establishment, a controversy occurred between Sergius and the more conservative monks led by Stephan over the type of monasticism that should be practiced. Sergius,

¹¹⁵ Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia, p. 22.

¹¹⁶ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 39.

¹¹⁷ Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia, p. 24.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

with the support of the patriarch of Constantinople and Metropolitan Aleksei, sought to introduce a communal arrangement at the monastery. Sergius's proposal represented a higher form of monasticism, but rather than initiating a dispute with his brother, Sergius retired from the fellowship. He preferred to yield rather than compromise his principles.¹¹⁹ At the place of his new retreat, Sergius was soon joined by several of the monks from Holy Trinity. The remaining monks at Holy Trinity requested that the metropolitan order Sergius to return and take up his old position as abbot, and the metropolitan complied. Sergius returned without recrimination or rebuke.¹²⁰ Again, Zernov used an event in the life of Sergius as an analogy to an event in Russian history. He compared the abbot's retirement from the monastery with the church in Russia during the seventeenth century. The church in Russia departed rather than fight in a compromising way.¹²¹

After his reinstatement, Sergius carried out his duties at the monastery and aided the rulers of both church and state in Russia. The abbot maintained his piety and received a divine visitation six months before his death. In it, "he saw the Holy City, Mary, Peter, and John."¹²² To Zernov, the visitation constituted more evidence of Sergius's special relationship with God. Sergius was "a living example

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 34.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 114.

¹²²Ibid., p. 60.

of that divine Unity in Freedom which is the essence of the Christian revelation of the nature of God."¹²³ Sergius symbolized the life of the Russian Church, exemplified by long-suffering, darkness, reform, and finally triumph.¹²⁴

Not only was Sergius significant as a holy man and mystic, but also in politics. The relationship between the church and state in fourteenth century Russia roughly corresponded to that of any medieval society. The lines between church and state, between cleric and prince, were obscure and often nonexistent. Metropolitan Aleksei, a cleric, had become head of both church and state. Where other churchmen before him had refused a role in temporal politics, he undertook a career in secular government by acting as regent. Like Aleksei, Sergius also had political responsibilities.¹²⁵

Sergius's fame for piety and the "power of healing" attracted many people both great and small to him. Stories of his powers became so widespread that Sergius soon became a central figure in Russia.¹²⁶ Not only Metropolitan Aleksei

¹²³Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 43.

¹²⁴Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia, p. 114.

¹²⁵In criticizing Solzhenitsyn, Marc Raeff compared him to St. Sergius. He argued that both Sergius and Solzhenitsyn attempted to withdraw from the world of practical politics. Solzhenitsyn's thought "is a return to a more ancient tradition in Russian political thought: power is sin; it must be abandoned and renounced." Raeff identified this tradition with Sergius. "Iz pod glyb and the History of Russian Social Thought," The Russian Review 34 (October 1975):486.

¹²⁶Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia, p. 38.

and the patriarch of Constantinople but also the princes of Moscow knew of Sergius's devotion and work at Holy Trinity. He stood as a symbol of piety to the Russian peasants and an adviser to the state on matters of political importance.¹²⁷

Several factors determined the nature of his advice, his desire to see Russia free and his wish to remain faithful to her Christian tradition.¹²⁸ At two different times, Sergius offered political advice that was critical to the survival of the Russian nation. First, Sergius's counsel averted a civil war. The feuding princes of Moscow and Rostov endangered the drive toward national unity and Russian freedom; therefore, Metropolitan Aleksei, acting as regent, requested Sergius to mediate the dispute. Although the saint detested the "deceit of the world," he worked in it, and his settlement of the dispute "united the Russia that would throw out the Mongols."¹²⁹ Second, an external crisis followed the threatened civil war. Because of "the wise and firm rule of Aleksei [Metropolitan]," Prince Dmitrii of Moscow became the most powerful Russian prince, so powerful that he began to ignore Mongol dictates and pursue an independent policy. The Mongols tolerated the changes until Dmitrii began the construction of a forbidden stone wall around his capital. The Mongols did not tolerate this and, with the aid

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 39.

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 41.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 48.

of the Christian West, approached Russia to subjugate her.¹³⁰

Although Dmitrii was a great leader in his own right, he turned to Sergius for advice and counsel.¹³¹ In their first meeting which took place after the Russian victory over the Mongol vanguard in 1378, Sergius gave the prince specific political and military instructions. Normally a passive person, Sergius became assertive. "Confronted with supreme danger, he did not evade its challenge. He gave his blessing to Dmitrii and, promising him victory, urged the Prince to meet the attack of the enemy in the open steppes of the south."¹³² Taking Sergius's advice, Dmitrii took command of the assembled princes and displayed faith and determination in leading the Russian forces to victory at Kulikova in 1380. Zernov compared the great victory to Poitiers in 732 and gave credit for the victory to Sergius's influence: "St. Sergius performed a miracle with the Russians: he changed a defeated people into the builders of a great Empire."¹³³

Sergius represented more than a man who acted in and influenced both church and state; he became a symbol of Russian Orthodox life. He personified the Christian triumph over evil in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church and the

¹³⁰Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 40.

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Ibid., p. 41.

¹³³Ibid., p. 42.

Russian peasantry. Sergius's triumph over the forces of "disintegration" came from three factors: self-control, absence of fear, and an irresistible personality. Sergius's ascetic endeavors and faith provided him with the discipline to become successful.¹³⁴ His stalwart faith in the Holy Trinity allowed him to escape the "moral and intellectual disintegration" that threatened Russia and made him a prophet of the Christian victory.¹³⁵ Sergius symbolized the individual Christian's victory in its darkest hour.¹³⁶

To Zernov, Sergius also symbolized the collective victory of the community of Christianity. He epitomized the perseverance and resiliency of the church in times of trouble. The spirit of Sergius became engrained in the Russian nation to the extent that the people later hoped through Communism to achieve what Sergius had taught. As Zernov wrote, "communism in Russia is . . . an attempt to take a short cut and to achieve by means of violence and slaughter that ideal of genuine community which St. Sergius obtained through self-discipline and liberation from the passions."¹³⁷ Sergius was "the true representative of Russia's past and the great prophet of her future."¹³⁸

¹³⁴Zernov, St. Sergius Builder of Russia, p. 82.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹³⁷Nicolas M. Zernov, "St. Sergius of Radonezh and the Future of Russian Christianity," Church Quarterly Review 127 (January 1940):310.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, 313.

Sergius became the "true representative" because he symbolized the peasantry, and approached faith and religion with an agrarian mentality. His contact with the land and nature provided him with special insights into the spiritual relationship between man and God. His mentality exalted the common man and made him the most important element in society. Basic to his agrarian mentality was the idea that the collective wisdom of the uneducated peasants far outweighed that of their masters, or the idea that the simple life constituted the good life. Zernov saw Sergius as a Moses leading Russia out of bondage and into a new age in which the autocrats of Moscow failed to achieve Sergius's ideals in their "broadest sense" but did gain Russian freedom from foreign domination.¹³⁹

III

In his interpretation of the era from the death of St. Sergius to the Mongols's expulsion, Zernov described the peaceful colonization of Russia by churchmen and peasants.¹⁴⁰ Led by the disciples of Sergius, the Russian people, who previously confined themselves to the cultivated river valleys, spread into the forests and marshes of the north and east. Instead of soldiers and merchants providing

¹³⁹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 93.

¹⁴⁰ The migration of peasants from the south shifted the population center of Russia northward. Moscow became the center of Great Russia and of European Russia. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Moscow developed to the point that it began to rival Novgorod as the most powerful city in the north. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 2: Kurs, pp. 10-11.

the pioneer impetus, the monks followed by peasants spread the "light of Christianity" and founded a "mighty Empire" on the Russian plain.¹⁴¹

The immediate disciples of Sergius founded over fifty new monasteries during his lifetime and fifty more after his death. St. Abraham of Galich, St. Sylvester of Obnorsk, and St. Svva of Storozhev figured prominently in this movement. Although "they went out in search of places for undisturbed prayer and quiet labour," they unintentionally spread the boundaries of the Russian state.¹⁴² These monasteries represented the spirit of Sergius, a willingness to leave civilization and to live communally in the wilderness. Other churchmen soon followed the founding monks, and the religious communities in the forests began to grow.¹⁴³

Peasants also followed the churchmen into the forests. These "devout" peasants formed settlements near the cloisters. The inaccessibility of the forests gave the peasants a new-found freedom. Here, they escaped both the Mongols and the Russian princes. The monks seeking spiritual solitude and the peasants searching for freedom from oppression populated vast areas of northern Russia. The ever alert princes observed the migration and used it as an opportunity, first

¹⁴¹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 44.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 45.

to extend their jurisdiction into the forested areas, and, second, to occupy the lands vacated by the peasants. The taking of the uninhabited land by the Moscow princes resulted in a "new and stronger State," which could liberate and defend Russia, but one, which without the great migration, would have never acquired the necessary strength.¹⁴⁴

IV

The spiritual and national revival of Russia and the expansion of Muscovite power during the period of colonization prefaced the rise of Muscovy as an empire during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Muscovite national consciousness was best expressed in the idea of the Third Rome. The idea captured the spirit of Muscovy and gave expression to its new-found political and religious vitality. In this doctrine, theology and politics were inseparable because the Russians borrowed their conception of church and state relations from the Byzantines; therefore, church history corresponded to the political history of the empire. According to Zernov, "the history of the church can be divided into periods according to the special qualities of the capitals of the empire."¹⁴⁵ Thus, the first Rome, which brought "unity, order, and discipline" into church life, collapsed in 476, because it had failed God. The second Rome contributed theological "discussion and definition"

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Nicolas M. Zernov, "Moscow the Third Rome: From Kiev to Moscow," Church Quarterly Review 120 (July 1935):294.

but also succumbed to heresy and fell in 1453.¹⁴⁶ After the fall of Constantinople and the destruction of the Eastern Empire, Moscow became the last protector of Christianity.¹⁴⁷

Circumstances surrounding the rise of Moscow provided the political atmosphere that fostered the doctrine of the Third Rome. The problem of defense brought about social, economic, and political changes in Muscovy. From the reign of Vasilii I (1389-1425) through the reign of Ivan III (1462-1505), the Russian people changed their attitude toward the governments of the grand princes. To rid themselves of the oppressive Mongols, they displayed a hitherto absent willingness to sacrifice their own personal freedoms for Russia's liberation. The domains of the highly independent princes slowly disappeared, absorbed by the Muscovite grand prince. With these lands went also the independence and self-government practiced by the people.¹⁴⁸ Although the Russian people valued their "individual freedom," they realized that only a monarchy styled on the pattern of the Mongol Empire could protect Russia from foreign encroachments.¹⁴⁹ Despite the externally oppressive structure, the

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Nicolas M. Zernov, The Christian East (Delhi: Indian Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1956), p. 123.

¹⁴⁸Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 24.

¹⁴⁹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 46. Michael Prawdin agreed with Zernov's contention that Muscovite political and administrative institutions originated

"people were inwardly free" because the "inspiration [for the political system] came from the Christian Church, with its belief in freedom and in the value of each person."¹⁵⁰ They sacrificed outer freedom for political stability.

A similar loss of freedom occurred in the social and economic spheres. The rulers of Muscovy eventually formalized the social and economic restrictions into the institution of serfdom.¹⁵¹ Serfdom provided economic security and stability;

with the Mongols. From the Mongols the Muscovite princes borrowed the idea of empire and military organization. The princes of Russia did not throw off the Mongol influence; to the contrary, they totally and deliberately accepted their "Tartar heritage." Ivan III was the first to assume the role of a Khan of the Golden Horde, and the rulers after him followed his example. When Ivan IV broke the power of the boiars, he acted in the manner of a Mongol Khan. In summary, Prawdin stated, "The rule of the Golden Horde over the "Russian fief" lasted for more than two centuries, and in the course of this period Russia was, except for religion, thoroughly permeated by Mongolian influences. These two centuries of Mongolian rule stamped Russia with an ineffaceable die, and determined her destinies down to the time of Peter the Great." The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy, trans. Eden Paul (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), pp. 512-518.

¹⁵⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 46.

¹⁵¹ Until the fifteenth century, serfdom did not exist in Russia, although the princes had made efforts to limit the peasant's freedom of movement. From the thirteenth century, a paradoxical situation existed. The peasants because of their military and economic value were in high demand, and the princes enticed peasants to leave neighboring princes and move to their lands. By the mid-thirteenth century, the princes began to enter agreements with their neighbors. These pacts promised "not to entice peasants from one another's land by offering more attractive terms of tenure or subsidies, nor to take them by force, nor to give refuge to peasants who had fled to escape contractual obligations or who were fugitives from justice." These agreements represented attempts by the princes to protect themselves, and were not aimed at the peasants who remained free to come and go. Only in the late fifteenth century did limitation on the peasants themselves appear, but even as late as 1497, Ivan III confirmed the right of free peasants to move after giving notice to the landlord. Blum, Lord and Peasant, pp. 106-113.

it accomplished this by attaching the peasants to the soil.¹⁵² Serfdom prevented the continuing migration of peasants to the north and strengthened the power of the monarchy and nobility. As an institution, serfdom best represented the duality in Russian life created by the rise of Moscow; Russia had ceased to be the eager pupil of Byzantium and became instead the center for a new civilization, which was "Christian by faith but Asiatic in policy and manners."¹⁵³

The rulers of this period were cunning and "thrifty landlords" who were ever mindful of their material wealth and opportunities to expand it. The princes of Moscow "had nothing of the spirit of bravery and military adventure" and "little sense of honour." In short, they were pragmatists who served the Mongols until they had acquired the strength to expel them and proclaim themselves the "successors of the Byzantine Emperors." Despite their negative characteristics, the princes possessed some redeeming qualities. They were "devoutly Orthodox," and accepted the authority of the church without question; but most important, these rulers, Vasili I, Vasili II, and Ivan III, "shared with the rest of the nation the conviction of the sacred mission assigned to Russia by God" to free Russia and protect Orthodoxy.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 46

¹⁵³Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 31.

¹⁵⁴Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 48.

During the reign of Ivan III, Russia fully triumphed over her enemies. Russia solved her problem of national defense. Ivan III accomplished three Russian political objectives: he halted the eastward expansion of Lithuania and recovered certain lands that they had occupied; he repudiated Mongol rule and took for himself the title of tsar; and he made Moscow the absolute ruler of Russia by subjugating Novgorod.¹⁵⁵ In the nine-year struggle between the two cities, Moscow triumphed and abolished Novgorod's "self-government and ancient liberties" and dispersed the leading citizens.¹⁵⁶

Having secured control of Russia, the grand prince of Moscow attempted to define his place in the life of the nation. After their victories, the tsars declared themselves to be the "legitimate heirs of the Byzantine Emperors."¹⁵⁷ The doctrine of the Third Rome became a vital part of later Russian nationalism. While many historians have argued that the theory expressed the new-found nationalism and confidence of the Russians, Zernov stated that the new national spirit resulted from Moscow's special role as the protector of Christendom. Thus, the author's writings on Muscovite Russia were as much theological in tone as historical.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁵⁷ Zernov, The Christian East, p. 123.

The events of the fifteenth century, supported by biblical prophecies, gave the Russians a feeling of religious superiority.¹⁵⁸ The Russians, believing Latin Christians to be heretics, saw the Council of Florence (1439) as Eastern Orthodoxy's acceptance of Latin Christianity.¹⁵⁹ The Russian

¹⁵⁸ Zernov cited the Prophet Daniel and his reference to the four Empires. The Russians assumed that Moscow was the third and that the Kingdom of God was the fourth. The Russians and Their Church, p. 50.

¹⁵⁹ The Council of Florence, 1439, represented the most visible part of an ecclesiastical struggle in both Eastern and Western Europe. In the West, Pope Eugene IV and John VIII, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, saw the reconciliation between the Eastern Roman Empire and the West as an opportunity to enhance their personal power in the struggle against each other. The one who arranged a rapprochement with East would gain an immense amount of prestige in the eyes of the Christian West, therefore, both sought to arrange a meeting with the Eastern Orthodox representatives. Eugene was successful and excluded John from the Council in 1439. On the other side, the Eastern clerics sought Western aid for Constantinople's crumbling position vis a vis the Turks. The agreement reached in 1439 gained nothing in the way of military aid for the Eastern Empire, but it accomplished two things: in the West, it solidified the Pope's position in his struggle against the Emperor and in the East, it split the Russian and Eastern Churches. The Russians absolutely rejected the idea of reconciliation. Ammann, Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, pp. 138-143.

By rejecting the "Greek sellout" of Orthodoxy, Vasilii II distinguished himself in two ways. First, he left the impression that the Grand Prince of Moscow had saved Orthodoxy in Russia, and second, that Russia was the only true Orthodox country in the world. Thus, the Grand Prince elevated himself to the position of religious leader and protector of the true faith. Michael Cherniavsky, "Reception of the Council of Florence in Russia," Church History 24 (December 1955):352, 359. This rejection also laid the groundwork for the doctrine of the Third Rome proclaimed under Vasilii III by Monk Philotheos. Michael Cherniavsky, "Holy Russia: a study in the history of an idea," The American Historical Review 63 (April 1958):619.

Zernov stated that the Christian West had so indelibly stamped the impression of heresy on itself that Russian acceptance of the reconciliation was unthinkable. The Russians remembered through tale and chronicle the Western invasions

Church resoundingly rejected the rapprochement between Catholicism and Orthodoxy and viewed the fall of Constantinople as God's retribution for Eastern Orthodoxy's acceptance of heresy. In addition, Constantinople's fall in 1453 coincided with two other events that influenced the Russians' conception of themselves. First, Ivan III married Sophia Palaeologos, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor in 1479; second, the Mongols retreated from Russia in 1480. These events caused Russian political and religious leaders to declare that Moscow had replaced Constantinople as the center of Christianity; Moscow had become the Third Rome.¹⁶⁰

For the Easterns, the fall of Constantinople and the captivity of all other Eastern Christian nations was a world-wide catastrophe, which might result in the complete defeat of the catholic [Orthodox] church if Russia did not step forward at the last moment and save the situation.¹⁶¹

Thus, the religious messianism of the doctrine of the Third Rome became a very real part of the Muscovite political out-

of Russia and the Crusaders's sack of Constantinople in 1204. They viewed neither as Christian acts of good faith. Moscow the Third Rome (London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1937), pp. 33-34.

For more information on the Council of Florence and its aftermath see the pro-Eastern Orthodox interpretation, I. N. Ostroumoff, The History of the Council of Florence, trans. Basil Popoff (Boston: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1971).

¹⁶⁰ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 36.

¹⁶¹ Zernov, "From Kiev to Moscow," 295.

look.¹⁶²

The Third Rome represented the outward political manifestation of the Muscovite religious ideal whereas the "ritual art of living" defined the nature of internal social and political relationships. Church-state relations, the social system, and political structure functioned in terms of Muscovite "ritual living." The term described a way of life centered around religion and faith, one that exhibited other worldliness, a transcendental relationship with God that permitted Russia to exist on two levels, the concrete and the apocalyptic.

In politics, the duality of approach meant that man existed on two levels. "[A]lthough the political system of Moscow was despotic, the people were yet free," Zernov wrote that they were free in an ultimate sense; they were free before God.¹⁶³ As a result, the temporal lack of political

¹⁶²Nicolas M. Zernov, Orthodox Encounter (London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1961), p. 48.

The idea of the Third Rome expressed the popular optimism in the new Muscovite state. Moscow had triumphed over her rivals, the Mongols and Novogorod, and the people interpreted this success as a divine omen. As a result of the optimism, the Russians constructed an elaborate mythology around Moscow. The mythology included the belief that Russia had received her religious mission directly from the apostles; thus, the political vitality of Moscow found expression in messianic religious language. The Tsar became more than a temporal ruler; under the Third Rome, he became the spiritual and religious leader of Russia. Platonov, Lektsii po Russkoi istorii, pp. 171-173. P. N. Miliukov argued that the first source of Muscovite culture was religion. The church represented the central institution in Russian society, and so long as the church remained true to this Muscovite theocratic conception of church and state, it retained the loyalty of the Russian people. Rubenshtein, Russkaia istoriografiia, p. 521.

¹⁶³Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 33.

and economic freedom failed to sap the vitality of the peasantry and the nation. The Russians were continually mindful that the tsar only ruled in this world and that in the next all persons would stand as equals in judgment.¹⁶⁴ The tsar appeared in the role of the father of the family of man and "a fellow sinner."¹⁶⁵

The church constituted the center of Muscovite life. Free expression, denied the Russians in the political realm, found a place in the church. Worship in daily life, in art, and in architecture best expressed ritual living and the culture of Muscovy. The Russian peasant considered himself Orthodox first and Russian second. The daily routine of life followed the pattern of the Sermon on the Mount, and the church art and architecture of the period expressed this high aspiration.¹⁶⁶ The art of Moscow was religious and presented the desire of the redeemed to extend the realm of the Holy Spirit and to accelerate the process of transfiguration in the material world.¹⁶⁷ In architecture, the churches symbolized the coming transfiguration of man and earth. The cupolas represented earth "wrapped in prayer," reaching to the cross.¹⁶⁸ Muscovite artists attempted to bring God to man through their work.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 36.

Church and state in Muscovy also acquired a new significance and presented new problems. As noted above the Tsar represented the "first Adam a symbol of man and his inherent weaknesses. In contrast, the Patriarch . . . represented . . . 'the Saviour of the World,' the second Adam, who took the form of a slave and as a humble, suffering servant redeemed the first Adam from his state of degradation, and showed him the way to Heaven."¹⁶⁹ The subordinate position of the tsar in relation to the patriarch implied temporal subserviance to the spiritual office, the ideal relationship between church and state. The state bowed to the church and honored its authority. The patriarch stood above the tsar just as the church and Orthodoxy stood at the head of Muscovite culture and society.

In Zernov's interpretation, the culture of Moscow, dominated by the church, resulted from the spiritual revival initiated by St. Sergius. The idea of a community of believers, of social relations "based on faith in God and mutual trust between men" originated with St. Sergius and received its highest expression in Muscovy. Sergius was the "true founder of the cultural order known by the name of Orthodox Russia."¹⁷⁰ Although opposed to the political order of Moscow, he demonstrated to the people that their national unity depended "neither on the compulsion exercised by the

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., p. 30.

ruler nor on the legal system imposed upon them, but rests on their willing obedience to the same rhythm of life."¹⁷¹

The Muscovites had other achievements in the area of political relations. Local self-government spread and a national consultative assembly arose. The mir, the skhod, and the national assemblies developed as organs of public expression and influence, and in later times they saved Russia from anarchy and destruction.¹⁷² Zernov never clarified his interpretation of the relationship between these popular political institutions and the Oriental, despotic political system of Moscow. His praise of developing self-government conflicted with his earlier statements about the end of local autonomy and centralization under the tsar; to some degree, the following statement explained the paradox:

It did not matter whether they had or had not political rights and economic freedom; they all as Christians could hear the voice of God and act according to His commandments. This philosophy of life explains why the Russian peasants even during their serfdom were able to preserve their sense of human dignity, and to keep intact the tradition of self-government in their rural communities in spite of centuries of oppression and social degradation.¹⁷³

In matters of the spirit and political tradition, the peasants preserved the true tradition of Russia. In religion, this constituted Orthodoxy and in politics, local democratic autonomy.

¹⁷¹Ibid.

¹⁷²The skhod was a democratic autonomous Cossack community. Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 33.

In the narrative of political events surrounding church-state relations, two paramount occurrences emerged during the sixteenth century: the Possessor-Nonpossessor controversy and the excesses of Ivan IV. The Possessor-Nonpossessor controversy, a power struggle between promonastic and antimonastic forces, constituted the beginning of the end for the national spiritual life and the traditions begun by St. Sergius. The resolution and aftermath of this controversy destroyed the balance in Russian life and the terror of Ivan IV's reign evidenced this destruction. In particular, the struggle between St. Phillip and Ivan IV underscored Russia's departure from Sergian ideals and set the stage for the seventeenth-century triumph of Westernism in Russian life.

The degeneration of Russia began in the sixteenth century. "[T]he political victory of the Possessors over the Non-possessors" was "mostly" responsible for "the shortcomings of the Moscow Tsardom."¹⁷⁴ The controversy, which spanned the reign of Ivan III and carried into the reign of Vasili III and Ivan IV, resulted from the collision of two rival church factions. Both factions represented a legitimate part of Russian religious tradition. The leadership of the contesting factions fell primarily on two men, Joseph of Volotsk (1439-1515) and Nil of Sorsk (1433-1509). They represented the Possessor and Nonpossessor parties, respectively.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 40-41.

The Possessor group emphasized the institutional aspect of church-state relations. They had a "deep insight into the corporate nature of the Church" but they "failed to appreciate the personal relationship between God and the individual soul."¹⁷⁵ The Possessors or Josephites concerned themselves with the "perfection of corporate worship" and "believed in the unquestionable superiority of Russian culture."¹⁷⁶ In their desire to see Russia "living and acting as one worshipping community," they strongly supported the autocracy. In doing so the Josephians also protected their landholding, serf-owning monastical interests. They saw no irregularity in monastic property; to the contrary they argued that property and serf labor provided "the material conditions necessary for their charitable works and for the undisturbed conduct of the services."¹⁷⁷

Its [Josephite party] ideal was a well-ordered monastic life centered round worship, and it tried to shape every Russian home according to this pattern putting the father of the family into the place of the Abbott, and endowing him with an absolute power over his wife, children, servants, and serfs.¹⁷⁸

In like manner, the tsar symbolized the father of the nation. The Josephians "preached the doctrine that the tsars ought to be loved and obeyed as fathers were obeyed by their

¹⁷⁵Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 43.

¹⁷⁶Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 41.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁷⁸Priest Silvester, "one of the most brilliant and influential representatives of the party [Josephite]," expressed this in a sixteenth century book, the Domostroi. Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 43.

children"¹⁷⁹ Failure to obey, in the Possessors' view, required punishment meted out by the tsar and supported by the church. Order maintained through a close alliance between church and state obsessed the Possessors. The opposition or Nonpossessor party argued against landholding and use of serf labor by the monasteries. "St. Nil held that the monk could not possess wealth either individually or collectively; he must live on the fruits of his own labour."¹⁸⁰ In response to the argument of the Possessors that they used their wealth for the poor, the Nonpossessors replied that philanthropy was the duty of the laity and that "the monks ought to help others through their counsel and prayers rather than by alms-giving."¹⁸¹ They also opposed the Josephians' use of compulsion in religious affairs. Zernov believed that the followers of Nil were "new Testament Christians": "To them Christianity was the religion of love and freedom" as compared to an Old Testament religion of the law.¹⁸² The Nonpossessors were "genuine mystics" who had little interest in mundane affairs such as politics.¹⁸³ They symbolized the freedom of the individual, whereas the

¹⁷⁹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 54.

¹⁸⁰ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 41

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

Josephians demanded conformity in religious practices.¹⁸⁴ Despite their differences, "the two parties supplemented one another and helped the Russian Church to keep the proper balance between the corporate and individual aspects of its life."¹⁸⁵

In the sixteenth century, the Judaizers, a group of trans-Volga religious sectarians, sparked a conflict between the Possessors and Nonpossessors which ultimately destroyed the balance in the Russian Church tradition.¹⁸⁶ Joseph and his followers demanded that the ruler stamp them out. The Possessors viewed them as enemies of God and the state and thus demanded that secular authorities punish them. St. Nil objected to this policy. He argued that "it was the duty of the Church to pray for the conversion of heretics" but not to use force to suppress them.¹⁸⁷ Because of the heated debate, compromise became impossible. The Possessors and tsar aligned closely, and the Nonpossessors argued against this alignment. The future of Russian church-state relations

¹⁸⁴ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 42.

¹⁸⁵ Nicolas M. Zernov, "Moscow the Third Rome: The Triumph of Moscow," Church Quarterly Review 21 (January, 1936):256.

¹⁸⁶ The "judaizer" heresy arose in Novogorod in 1470. Pro-Lithuanian elements of the population had summoned Prince Mikhail Olel'kovich from Kiev to protect their interests against the pro-Muscovite faction in the city. With Olel'kovich came Skharia, a Jew from Kiev, who immediately began to convert Christians to Judaism. The sect spread, and by the 1490's, the Tsar had become a party to attempt to eradicate the heresy. J. L. I. Fennell, "The Attitude of the Josephians and the Trans-Volga Elders to the Heresy of the Judaizers," The Slavonic and Eastern European Review 29 (June 1951):490-491.

¹⁸⁷ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 39.

was at issue.

The controversy came to a head during the reign of Vasilii III (1505-1533) and the events surrounding his divorce. The Possessor party triumphed over the Nonpossessors because they were willing to grant the divorce that the tsar desired.¹⁸⁸ Vasilii's first wife was barren and he, desiring a second marriage, petitioned the metropolitan of Moscow for a divorce. Metropolitan Varlaam, a supporter of the Nonpossessor party, refused. He declared "that the divorce was unjustified, since there was no offense on the part of the

¹⁸⁸ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 43.

According to many historians, the controversy between the Possessors and Nonpossessors centered on the reign of Ivan III and the Church Councils of 1503 and 1505. The controversy represented more than a dispute over the state's right to punish religious offenders--at heart, it involved the basic political and economic foundations of Muscovite Russia. As J. L. I. Fennell wrote, "above all the Josephians must have sensed that that form of government which it was so much in their interest to defend was imperilled by the heretics, whose interests were so closely linked with those of the boyar faction." "The Josephians and the Trans-Volga Elder," 508. In agreement with Fennell, Solov'ev stated that Nil Sorskii and the Nonpossessor party represented the interests of the boiars. Through the Nonpossessor demands that the Possessors give up their lands and wealth, the boiars attempted to gain control of church lands, and enhance their power at the expense of the monarchy. Political and economic power motivated the controversy. Istoriia Rossii, 1:197. Goliubinskii concurred arguing that the Nonpossessor theological position was alien to Russian religious tradition. The Nonpossessors failed to understand Russia in light of her Greek religious heritage. He suspected that mundane political motives stood behind Sorskii's agitation. Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi, 2:624-633.

Kliuchevskii believed that Ivan III, desiring control of church lands and wealth but wanting above all to prevent boiar acquisition of those assets, took the safest course and ruled against the Nonpossessors in return for a Josephite pledge of subserviance and support in the crown's struggle against the boiar faction. Ivan III followed the politically expedient route at the Church Councils. Sochineniia, vol. 2: Kurs, pp. 298-303.

wife."¹⁸⁹ Placing the interests of the nation ahead of Vasilii's wife, the Possessors countered Varlaam's decree. Through their leader Daniel, they communicated their willingness to accede to the tsar's wishes and grant the separation. In 1522 Vasilii made Daniel metropolitan of Moscow, and within the year, the new metropolitan dissolved the tsar's first marriage and remarried him.¹⁹⁰ According to Zernov, this "was an important service to the dynasty, and it had to be rewarded, so [Vasilii], though reluctantly, sided with the Josephians in the internal struggle of the Church."¹⁹¹ The political intervention of the tsar gave excessive influence and power to those of the Possessor outlook. Russian culture, after the Possessor victory, "became excessively ritualistic, stagnant intellectually, and too ready to sacrifice an individual for the sake of the community."¹⁹² Russia paid for its strong communal sense in the evasion of personal responsibility, in a lack of leaders with strong moral character, and in the dearth of great religious "personalities."¹⁹³ The Possessor victory exalted the state over morality and humanity. "Cruelty and crime, if committed, not by the individual, but by the collective body, were excused."¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁹Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 45.

¹⁹⁰Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 54.

¹⁹¹Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 45.

¹⁹²Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 43.

¹⁹³Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

This inhumanity resulted from the Mongol yoke which "had left a deep trace on Russian mentality." "The Tsars, . . . were treated, in Oriental fashion, as persons responsible only to God."¹⁹⁵ Under Vasilii III, Muscovite power increased through close cooperation between church and state, but the tsar violated the church's "freedom" and caused the deterioration of church-state relations, a deterioration in which "the nation was brought to the verge of collapse."¹⁹⁶

VI

The marriage of Vasilii III and his second wife produced a son, Ivan IV. During the last years of Vasilii's reign, the Josephians openly persecuted the Nonpossessors. Persecution intensified when the young Ivan came to the throne. Zernov divided Ivan IV's reign into three parts: his minority rule (1533-1547); his successful period (1547-1560); and the years of insanity (1560-1584).¹⁹⁷ Ivan's early years were unhappy and disturbing. Mistreated by family and courtiers alike, Ivan grew up "embittered and revengeful."¹⁹⁸ Excitable and intelligent, Ivan was also insecure, paranoid, and cruel. His Possessor education instilled a firm belief in the supreme power of the tsar and in his place as the divinely appointed head of the nation, a position

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

¹⁹⁶Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 55.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

which he defended eloquently in his correspondence with Alexander Kurbskii.¹⁹⁹ Ivan IV became the "first autocrat on the throne of Moscow, and the Russians learned under him all the advantages and disadvantages of having a single ruler."²⁰⁰ At thirteen, Ivan ended his minority in a palace coup that deposed Prince Andrei Shuiskii, the powerful regent. Once in power, "[t]hings moved from bad to worse" in Russia because of Ivan's "insane cruelty."²⁰¹

In 1547, Ivan's personality changed. A great fire destroyed Moscow, and Ivan believed that the conflagration with its death and destruction, represented "divine punishment inflicted upon him." According to Zernov, "it was a

¹⁹⁹ In 1564, Prince A. M. Kurbskii, a general in the service of Ivan IV, defected to the Polish-Lithuanian forces in Western Russia. Following his defection, he wrote a series of letters to the Tsar. In them, he defended his actions and accused Ivan of betraying the trust of the Russian people. These letters "gave the most complete summation of the "conflict between the autocratic ideals of the Muscovite Grand Princes and the Muscovite state in the sixteenth century." J. L. I. Fennell provided notes on and a translation of this correspondence. The Correspondence between Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia, 1564-1569 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p. ix.

Cherniavsky pointed out that Kurbskii first used the title of "holy Russia" against the Tsar because Ivan had used the title of "Holy Tsar" to justify his most murderous actions. Kurbskii believed that the national good stood above the will of the Tsar. If the two conflicted, then 'Holy Russia' took precedent. "Holy Russia," 622.

For additional sources on Ivan IV and the political and social developments of his reign see: S. O. Shmidt, Stanovlenie Rossiiskovo samoderzhavstva: issledovanie sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii vremeni Ivana Groznova (Moskva: Izd. Mysl', 1973); V.O. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 2: Kurs, pp. 187-398; and Michael Cherniavsky, "Ivan the Terrible as a Renaissance Prince," Slavic Review 27 (June 1968): 195-211.

²⁰⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 56.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

moment in his life when he sincerely desired to amend his evil ways."²⁰² At the same time, the young Tsar came under the influence of Father Sylvester, a priest from freedom-loving Novgorod. This priest guided the tsar for twelve years (1547-1559), and although these years witnessed the final destruction of the Nonpossessor party, Ivan, under Sylvester's influence, instituted some much needed reforms in Russia.

Sylvester himself was a devout mystic who believed in humanitarianism. Because of the value he placed on his fellow man, he freed his serfs. In Zernov's opinion, Sylvester made Russian success in foreign and domestic policy possible under Ivan. In the domestic sphere Sylvester introduced self-government and placed the collection of taxes and the administration of justice in the hands of elected representatives.²⁰³ He convened a national assembly and sponsored the new legal code that it approved. Under his influence the Church Councils of 1547, 1549, and 1551 affirmed the superiority of Russian Orthodoxy over other religious traditions; and in the realm of foreign achievements Russia and Ivan IV reached their "most spectacular" level under Sylvester's tutelage. In 1552, the Russian army reduced the Mongol stronghold of Kazan and forced the khan to recognize Russian sovereignty in the area. This victory

²⁰²Ibid.

²⁰³Ibid., p. 57.

opened Asia to Russia and Russian Christianity; and to symbolize Russia's new mission in Asia, Ivan erected St. Basil's Cathedral in Moscow. The architecture represented "that unique fusion of Oriental and Christian elements which "became" the distinctive feature of Russian culture."²⁰⁴ Other great victories at Astrakhan and in the Baltic followed, but Kazan remained the symbol of Russia's triumph and Sylvester's influence.²⁰⁵ In 1559 Ivan removed Sylvester from power and banished him from Moscow because he had disagreed over proposed internal policies. Russia suffered the consequences of Sylvester's dismissal.²⁰⁶

The banishment of the priest and the death in 1560 of Ivan's "much-loved wife" Anastasia Romanov, released "the dark passions and lusts of his early years."²⁰⁷ Ivan "lost his mental balance"; "he became a victim of fears and suspicions."²⁰⁸ After 1560 the position of civil and military officials became more and more precarious; Ivan exiled and executed many of the ablest. This activity reached a frenzy in 1564 and culminated with "a social revolution which in many features resembled the totalitarianism of the twentieth century."²⁰⁹ Ivan aimed his social revolution at the upper

²⁰⁴Ibid., pp. 58-59.

²⁰⁵Ibid., p. 58.

²⁰⁶Ibid., p. 60.

²⁰⁷Ibid.

²⁰⁸Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 47.

²⁰⁹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 60.

classes, but his purges also caught many law-abiding people. In order to destroy the nobility, with whom he contested for power, Ivan cultivated and used two weapons with expertise. First, Ivan used his talents as a rabble-rouser. "[W]ith the skill of a born demagogue," Zernov wrote, he tried to enlist the moral support of the lower classes by affirming that his victims were . . . the nobility who abused their privileges and wealth and therefore deserved punishment."²¹⁰ Second, Ivan institutionalized the revolution by organizing the oprichnina. The oprichnina consisted of those areas in which the nobility was strongest. There, a special group, the oprichniki, administered the tsar's justice. An oath bound the oprichniki to the tsar. Race, religion, and social origin had nothing to do with their selection; one requirement existed, loyalty to the tsar. Through these servants Ivan conducted his revolution and annihilated the old boiar nobility.²¹¹

Although Russia lacked any organized resistance to Ivan's policy, some churchmen did raise a cry of protest. St. Phillip, metropolitan of Moscow (1566-1568), was the most prominent of these. Summoned to the capital in 1565, Phillip took the metropolitan's chair offered him by Ivan. Phillip's predecessor had clashed with the Tsar over the oprichnina, and Ivan expelled him. As a condition for his

²¹⁰Ibid., p. 61.

²¹¹Ibid.

promotion, Phillip recognized the role of the oprichnina in Russian society, but he also reserved the right to intervene on behalf of the victims. According to Zernov, "Phillip had no illusions about his ultimate fate; he interpreted his elevation to the Metropolitan seat as a call to martyrdom."²¹² After providing a short respite from the horrors of the terror, the metropolitan unable to keep silent publicly rebuked Ivan, and admonished him to stop the senseless slaughter.²¹³ Phillip became the tsar's next victim. First, Ivan, through torture and imprisonment, eliminated the metropolitan's friends, and then, he finally executed Phillip himself. He died a martyr defending "Christian mercy."²¹⁴

The events of the last years of Ivan IV's reign negated all the earlier accomplishments and virtually destroyed Russia in the process. The social revolution sapped the country's strength and caused several major political and diplomatic reverses. In 1571 the Mongols invaded Russia and sacked Moscow, with the exception of the Kremlin. In 1582 Poland humiliated Russia by recapturing

²¹²Ibid., p. 62.

²¹³Phillip's admonishment of Ivan IV: "We are offering here the pure bloodless sacrifice for the salvation of men, but outside this holy temple the blood of Christians is being shed and innocent people are being killed. Hast thou, Sire, forgotten that thou, too, art dust and needest forgiveness of thy sins? Forgive and thou shalt be forgiven, for only if we forgive our subordinates shall we escape divine condemnation. Thou hast deeply studied the Holy Scriptures and why have thou not followed their council? He who does not love his neighbor is not of God." Ibid.

²¹⁴Ibid., p. 63.

much of the Russian territory that Ivan had liberated earlier. In 1583 the Swedes occupied all of Baltic Russia and forced the tsar to recognize their conquests in a treaty. In addition to these foreign setbacks, Ivan's insanity progressed to the point that in 1581, in a rage, he killed his oldest and ablest son and left his "simpleton son," Fedor, his heir.²¹⁵ In 1584 Ivan died a broken man "exhausted both mentally and physically."²¹⁶

The reign of Ivan IV was one of the most important in Russian history. It set a pattern and prepared the way for the future. The "campaign of terror" did not result from a lack of courage on the part of the Russian people to stand up to the tyrant; those same Russians had conquered Siberia, defeated foreign foes, and dramatically reformed both church and state. The reason for the terror Zernov stated, "has to be sought in the peculiar attitude to the Tsars commonly held by the Russians."²¹⁷ Russian political institutions had failed to keep pace with the physical changes in the country. Both tsar and people retained a static conception of themselves, one as the prince of a small estate and the other as the loyal servant bound to the prince. In Russian thinking the state continued to be the private domain of the tsar, and a resident in that domain subjected

²¹⁵Ibid.

²¹⁶Ibid.

²¹⁷Ibid., p. 64.

himself to the ruler's whims. This view left the people without political recourse; they could not oppose the tsar, God's anointed, even if the tsar were mad. Despite his excesses, Ivan was their Christian ruler and realized his accountability only before God for his actions. He was "Orthodox" but politically he imitated the only empire that he knew, the Mongol. To Zernov, "Ivan was the first Russian revolutionary. He inspired and carried through that special type of revolution directed by the head of the State which has since become a characteristic feature of Russian history."²¹⁸ According to Zernov, Ivan laid the groundwork for Peter I's reforms and the Red Terror of the Stalinists; he shaped the method of political change for four hundred years of Russian history.²¹⁹

Fedor, who was twenty-seven at the time of Ivan's death, lacked both physical and mental strength. Foreign envoys described him as a total idiot and predicted that his reign would end in disaster. Physically, Fedor was "[s]mall in stature, shy and retiring, with a vague smile always playing over his pale face," hardly the portrait of an absolute despot.²²⁰ Zernov stated that "his [Fedor's] short reign was, unexpectedly, one of the happiest and the most successful in Russian history."²²¹ Three elements

²¹⁸Ibid., p. 65.

²¹⁹Ibid., p. 66.

²²⁰Ibid., p. 67.

²²¹Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 48.

contributed to this success: the end of the social revolution which brought internal peace; Russian expansion and recovery of lands lost to Sweden; and the elevation of the metropolitanate of Moscow to the status of a patriarchate.²²²

The relationship between Fedor and the Russian people accounted for his successes. As Zernov wrote, "the Russians were convinced that God would show His mercy to the nation which obeyed its helpless Sovereign. They rejoiced to think that their country was so trusted by God that He had committed to Theodore's [Fedor's] feeble but gentle hands the destiny of millions of Russian people."²²³ The Russian people knew and appreciated the fact that their tsar was morally upright and deeply religious. The Russians saw Fedor as a "fool in Christ." In explanation Zernov stated, "they [fools in Christ] seem to be the most useless members of human society, yet they perform a significant service: they demonstrate that God is stronger than man, and that a helpless and despised human being, if he trusts in divine love and protection, can achieve greater things than a clever but self-centered person."²²⁴ In Fedor's particular case, "God crowned his reign with peace, put down his enemies beneath his feet and granted good and restful times, because of his salutary works."²²⁵ His spirituality enabled Moscow to

²²²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 67.

²²³Ibid., p. 69

²²⁴Ibid., p. 68.

²²⁵Ibid., p. 69.

acquire a patriarchate in 1589 and thus "completed the edifice of the Moscow Tsardom."²²⁶

In discussing the Russian's acquisition of the patriarch's seat, Zernov never mentioned Boris Godunov, to whom many historians credited this development. Instead the acquisition became a Russian success. The Russians maneuvered the establishment of a patriarchate through a difficult and intricate diplomatic situation. The Russians acquired the consent of all the Eastern prelates and enticed the Patriarch of Constantinople to consent to its establishment.²²⁷ In reality Boris Godunov arranged the religious coup, but he symbolized a later age of Russian decline and failure. In 1598 Fedor died, and a time of anarchy and foreign invasion severely shook the Muscovite Tsardom.

In Zernov's interpretation, the Muscovite period represented a paradox. On the one hand, Russia, under the inspiration and leadership of St. Sergius and the grand princes of Moscow, asserted its power and won its independence from the Mongols; on the other hand, the autocrats of Muscovy, by meddling in the Possessor and Nonpossessor dispute, destroyed the integrity and independence of the Russian Orthodox Church. Zernov believed that this destruction resulted in the social, economic, and political collapse

²²⁶Ibid., p. 72.

²²⁷Ibid.

in Russia known as the Time of Troubles. This period lasting from 1598 to 1613 ended the dominance of Moscow and set the stage for the rise of Imperial Russia.

CHAPTER IV

THE RISE OF THE PETERSBURG EMPIRE

The third religious renaissance described in Zernov's writings represented a significant attempt on the part of certain Russian churchmen to restore or maintain the traditions of Muscovite Orthodoxy in Russia. The Old Believer movement spearheaded this attempt to preserve tradition and to revitalize the sagging spiritual life of the nation. Much like the Nonpossessors, the Old Believers tried to reassert the role of the individual in matters of the spirit and to rejuvenate the spiritual relationship that had provided the foundation for Orthodox Russian culture. Zernov argued that the Old Believers tried to perpetuate the Muscovite Tsardom but failed in the face of four cataclysmic events that reordered the relationships between the individual, the church, and the state. These events were the Time of Troubles (1598-1613), the church schism (1653-1667), the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725), and the rulers of the eighteenth century (1725-1801).²²⁸ Peter's destruction of the Old Believer movement signaled the final triumph of the secular, europeanized Petersburg Empire and paved the way for the German rulers of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century.²²⁹

²²⁸Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 53.

²²⁹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 125.

I

The Time of Troubles lasted from 1598 to 1613. A series of struggles for the Russian throne with intermittent foreign intervention characterized the entire period.²³⁰ In 1598 Fedor I died and Boris Godunov replaced him and ruled until 1605. Zernov's interpretation of Godunov's reign echoed that of other historians in its narrative, but he provided his own unique explanations of certain events.

The lack of leadership that followed Fedor's death pushed the church to the front of national politics and left the Patriarch, Job, with the responsibility of holding the

²³⁰ Zernov's division of the Time of Troubles into three distinct parts corresponded exactly to S. F. Platonov's interpretation. Platonov contended that the period from 1598 until 1601 represented the time of dynastic confusion in which the Godunov family struggled, in succession, against the Romanovs, the False Dimitrii, and finally, Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii. Shuiskii's victory in the "dynastic struggle" opened the "social struggle," 1606-1610. Class antagonisms, the serfs against the boiars, whom Shuiskii represented, motivated the second struggle and resulted in the turmoil that invited Polish and Swedish intervention. The "struggle for national liberation" began in 1611 with Tsar Vasilii's failure (because of class animosity) to expel the Poles from Moscow. In 1612, the Iaroslav provisional government, a middle-class organization, "by inspiration and by force," united the national forces, restored the tsar's authority, and unified the national government enabling it to expel the Poles and reassert Russian nationalism. The Time of Troubles: a Historical Study of the Internal Crisis and Social Struggle in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Muscovy, trans. John T. Alexander (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1970), pp. 43-44.

nation together.²³¹ He convened a national assembly for the purpose of selecting a new tsar. In the assembly, Job himself nominated Boris Godunov for the throne, a nomination that received the unanimous support of all the delegates. According to Zernov, Godunov at first refused the throne, but later consented "under the threat of ecclesiastical punishment."²³²

In his writings, Zernov compared and contrasted the reign of Boris with that of Fedor. Boris had all the talents of a great ruler and Fedor had none, but "his rule [Boris's] constituted one long series of disasters."²³³ In another passage he wrote that "it was Boris who was the complete failure, and [Fedor] the success."²³⁴ Although Zernov admitted

²³¹The Time of Troubles magnified the importance of the patriarch in Russian society because he provided the chief visible support for Christian society. Michael T. Cherniavsky, Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 64. Platonov's interpretation of Patriarch Job's (Iov) role in calling the zemskii sobor and as the provisional head of state appeared to be the source from which Zernov's interpretation came. The Time of Troubles, p. 60. Kliuchevskii also viewed as vital the patriarch's role in providing stability and continuity after the death of Tsar Fedor. He was also instrumental in the calling of the zemskii sobor and the nomination of Boris Godunov as Tsar. Sochineniia, vol. 3: Kurs, pp. 22-23. Godunov had been instrumental in acquiring a patriarch's throne for Russia in 1589 and in Job's appointment to the newly created seat. In return, Job orchestrated Boris's election by the zemskii sobor in 1598. Ammann, Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, pp. 233-239.

²³²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 74.

²³³*Ibid.*, p. 75.

²³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 74.

that Boris's reign suffered from problems, the great famine of 1601-1603, and the rise of the false Dimitrii, he believed that Boris failed primarily because the people mistrusted him. They saw him as a self-seeking opportunist with a Mongol disposition, who lacked the legitimacy that Fedor had possessed.²³⁵ The Russian nation tolerated the terror of Ivan IV because the people knew that he was their tormented but Orthodox tsar and that his "instances of repentance constituted a moral link between him and the other Christians of Russia."²³⁶ In contrast, a "lust for power" motivated Boris and threatened the "bond of moral solidarity" that held the country together.²³⁷ As a result, the people rejected him and he fell from power.

The Russian people's distrust of Boris aggravated the economic situation and added credence to the claims of Gregory Otrepiev that he was Dimitrii, the brother of Ivan IV, who had escaped his assassins in 1591.²³⁸ According to Zernov,

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 75. Michael Cherniavsky cited the opinions of Ivan Timofeev, a cleric writing under Michael Romanov (1597-1645). Timofeev approached Godunov's problem of legitimacy and argued that because he was a "false" tsar his actions, no matter how well intentioned, could only be human. A true tsar merged with his office and became an exalted mystical head of the Russian nation, a God-anointed and God-guided figure. A lawful action when performed by a tsar became unlawful when performed by another person. Godunov was not of the royal family; therefore, the people ultimately rejected him. Tsar and People, p. 56.

²³⁶ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 76.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 77.

²³⁸ While the pretender was not a danger in his own right, he became the vehicle for "borderland" element's expression of dissatisfaction with Muscovite administration and their own economic problems. Platonov, Time of Troubles, p. 71.

the Russian people saw the reappearance of this supposedly murdered prince as divine punishment of Boris for his amorality and ambition.²³⁹ Boris reacted with a reign of terror modeled on those of Ivan IV but without success, and in 1605 Godunov died from exhaustion. Zernov summed up his defeat in this statement:

He [Boris Godunov] was defeated, however, not by the Pretender and those of his enemies who engineered the plot, but by the Russian people themselves, who were resolutely opposed to that aggressive and amoral individualism of which Boris was such a brilliant and accomplished exponent.²⁴⁰

Godunov's death ended the first phase of the Troubles and set the stage for the second. A few months after his death the first false Dmitrii triumphantly entered Moscow greeted by large enthusiastic crowds. The people of Russia believed that they had witnessed the restoration of the house of Riurik. Dmitrii ruled for eleven months during which time the Westerners, Poles, and Lithuanians in his entourage began to irritate the Russians. Most important, the boiars resented the high-handed methods of the crude imposter. They quickly organized a plot, assassinated him, and ridded Moscow of the intruders.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Ivan Timofeev believed that Boris was responsible for the murders of Dimitrii, Ivan IV, and Fedor I, and interpreted Boris's later misfortunes as God's judgment. Cherniavsky argued that one must consider Timofeev's views as post-facto justifications for his belief that Boris was a "false Tsar." Tsar and People, p. 55. In contrast to Timofeev and Zernov, Platonov stated that Godunov did not murder Dimitrii. Dimitrii died of self-inflicted knife wounds resulting from an epileptic seizure. Time of Troubles, pp. 56-57.

²⁴⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 77.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

In the place of the false Dmitrii, the boiars proclaimed their leader Vasilii Shuiskii as tsar. To Zernov, this coup represented an attempt by "leading Moscow families to establish a rule of aristocracy" after the Western fashion. It failed. The Russian people, in Zernov's opinion, refused to allow one group to establish a privileged position at the expense of the others. One class had nominated the tsar and the people rejected the arrangement. Once again Russia became embroiled in a civil war.²⁴²

The revolt against Shuiskii gave rise to a second pretender to the Russian throne, a second false Dmitrii. He established a base near Moscow and operated against the tsar. Foreign intervention, Cossack uprisings, and peasant revolts further complicated Shuiskii's problems. The fall of Smolensk to the Poles and Novgorod to the Swedes prompted Shuiskii to abdicate. In his place the boiars elected Wladyslaw, a son of the King of Poland, as tsar and opened the gates of Moscow to Polish occupation troops.²⁴³

Zernov described the period of foreign domination as a time of "complete moral collapse." It represented a time in which only the church and the faithful stood between the foreigners and the eradication of the Russian nation.²⁴⁴

²⁴²Ibid.

²⁴³Ibid., p. 78.

²⁴⁴Ibid.

Under the leadership of Patriarch Germogen, the church inspired the nation to resist and ultimately rekindled in the Russians the spirit necessary to eject the invaders.

Germogen, who was elected patriarch in 1606, provided the pillar of stability around which Russia regrouped.

"For six stormy years he stood firm as a rock amidst the general confusion, treachery and anarchy of his time."²⁴⁵

The old patriarch appealed to the Russians' sense of duty to their country and after Vasilii's abdication in 1610, he became the prime symbol of national unity. His influence and resistance brought repeated Polish attempts to silence him, and it finally led to his starvation at the hands of the invaders. According to Zernov, the Poles' rash elimination of the bishop netted them nothing because his example of fortitude inspired others.²⁴⁶

Zernov used the Holy Trinity Monastery, founded by St. Sergius of Radonezh, to illustrate another aspect of the Orthodox Church's resistance of the foreign invasion. He wrote that "it had always been a centre of religious and national unity for Russian people, but in the 'Time of Troubles' it rose to the position of an impregnable stronghold of Russia's independence."²⁴⁷ The monks converted the monastery into a fortress and withstood a sixteen-month siege in which a

²⁴⁵Ibid.

²⁴⁶Ibid.

²⁴⁷Ibid.

thirty-thousand man Polish army failed to reduce it and retired. This success brought a wave of patriotism from the people, one which lacked direction and purpose.

Kuzma Minin (Kusma Minin-Sukhoruk in Zernov) gave direction to the popular fervor and organized Russian efforts to expel the Poles and quell the Cossacks. Zernov described Minin as a butcher in Nizhni-Novgorod who had received a visitation from St. Sergius. This transformed him into the organizer of a Russian liberation army.²⁴⁸ He first appealed to his own parish for help and finally to the entire city which became through his efforts "the center of a national revival."²⁴⁹ Other cities followed Nizhni-Novgorod's example, and soon a large army came into being led by Prince Dmitrii Mihailovich Pozharskii, the owner of an estate near Suzdal where he resided while recovering from wounds suffered in the battle against the Poles at Moscow in 1611. He was one of the most talented military leaders of his time.²⁵⁰ In November 1611, the army, led by Pozharskii and organized by Minin, began its liberation of Russia.

²⁴⁸Kliuchevskii also credited Minin with a major role in organizing the army that liberated Russia. He stated that Minin's cooperation with Prince Dimitrii Mihailovich Pozharskii represented the union of aristocratic and middle-class townspeople's efforts to rid Russia of the invaders. Sochineniia, vol. 3: Kurs, p. 60. Platonov's description of Minin, as a person, differed from that of Zernov. He stated that Minin was a trader by profession and that his influence resulted from his position on the communal council which he persuaded to support his anti-Polish campaign. The Time of Troubles, p. 146.

²⁴⁹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 79.

²⁵⁰Platonov, The Time of Troubles, p. 147.

They first cleared the Upper Volga of roving invaders, a task which they accomplished by 1612. Then they marched on occupied Moscow, where the Poles put up a "desperate fight" but finally surrendered. The Russians immediately scheduled a national assembly in 1613 and elected Michael Romanov as tsar. This act signaled the end of the Time of Troubles, and once again Zernov attributed the Russian victory to Orthodoxy:

The speed with which the Russians were able to recover from their mortal illness was a proof of the health of the national organism. The success of a man like Minin . . . was due to the presence of a large number of sound Christians in all sections of society.²⁵¹

Zernov drew several provocative conclusions from the Time of Troubles. His view on the role of the church was clearly stated but he also spoke of the "inner structure of Russian life" that those years illuminated. In his view, this "inner structure" demonstrated that "Russians . . . are always at their best when they act under their own elected leaders and live in self-governing communities."²⁵² Despite this obvious statement in favor of political democracy and local autonomy, Zernov denied that a political system supplied the cohesion with which Russia defeated the Poles. On the contrary, he argued the unity of Russia and its victory stemmed from religion and the awakening of its "Christian conscience."²⁵³

²⁵¹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 80.

²⁵²Ibid., p. 81.

²⁵³Ibid.

II

At the end of the Time of Troubles and the accession of Michael Romanov, Russia entered what Zernov described as a period of "excessive conservatism." This "conservatism" constituted a natural reaction against the chaos of the Troubles, but for both Russian church and state it had ominous overtones. The defects of the old order remained uncorrected; oppression of the peasantry continued; the tsar, although elected, saw himself as the heir of Ivan IV and acted like an autocrat; and, the church sought security in the Josephian heritage of the past rather than looking to the future.²⁵⁴ The church schism or raskol resulted from this reactionary policy. On the surface, the two opposing sides in the schism differed over the unique nature of Russian Orthodoxy, but at heart they disagreed on the nature of church-state relations. The ensuing struggle shook Russia to her foundations.

While the raskol served as a favorite subject for historical investigation, Zernov presented his own interpretation of the ecclesiastical controversy that shattered Russian society. His opinions were unique because he reversed the generally accepted interpretation that represented the Nikonian party as the reform element and the Old Believers as the reactionary conservative group. Like Fedotov, Zernov

²⁵⁴Ibid., p. 93. Fedotov stated that the "Josephites worked to reinforce the autocracy and voluntarily placed their monasteries and the whole Russian Church under its protection." The Russian Religious Mind, 2:377.

argued that the Old Believers sought to free the Russian church and to revitalize the decaying national spirit, both of which had suffered under the authoritarian Josephite tradition.²⁵⁵

Zernov saw the origin of the raskol in two factors, political and religious. First, he believed that Patriarch Philaret Romanov utilized a reactionary policy in his administration of church and state and aggravated the strained relationship between church and state in Russia. Second, in 1619, Philaret took the title of "Great Lord" and linked the political and religious institutions so closely that disturbances in one area had serious consequences for the other.

Philaret, from the beginning of his tenure as patriarch in 1619, ruled jointly with his son, Michael. In fact, the patriarch dominated his son and controlled the affairs of state. Instead of becoming an advisor, the patriarch became the secular ruler, who "obstinately looked backward" to the autocrats of Old Russia. Zernov suggested that the backward-looking policies of Philaret resulted from the patriarch's close connections with Boris Godunov and his style of rule.²⁵⁶ As a result of this policy, the church completely lost its identity and the spirit of the nation suffered.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵Ibid., 392.

²⁵⁶Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 94.

²⁵⁷Ibid.

Foreign churchmen, coming from national traditions alien to the Russian, contributed the second element that led to the raskol. Oppressed by the Moslems, Swedes, Poles, and Germans, the Orthodox fled to Russia for protection. They brought religious customs and practices that differed from the Muscovite and argued that the Muscovite practices resulted from poor scholarship and ignorance. This conflict permeated the relations between the Greeks and the Russians in particular. Both became aware of their divergent traditions and asserted the superiority of their own particular practices.²⁵⁸ Lack of scholarship in Russia horrified the Greeks, and the Russians in turn recoiled at the thought of altering their traditions to conform with the Greek. While the specific differences involved the wording of certain Slavonic texts, whether to make the sign of the cross with two fingers (Russian) or with three (Greek), and whether the twofold (Russian) or threefold (Greek) hallelujah was correct, the religious question raised threatened the traditional Russian belief in Moscow as the Third Rome.²⁵⁹ The Russians believed that if the seat of true Christianity in Moscow fell to heresy, the world would end, and with it, man's possibility for salvation.²⁶⁰ Zernov disputed the

²⁵⁸ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 57.

²⁵⁹ Billington, The Icon and the Axe, pp. 137-138.

²⁶⁰ Michael Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion," Slavic Review 25 (March 1966):10.

authenticity of the Greek changes. He argued that the ritual of the Russian texts and practices at the time of the schism corresponded to the Byzantine customs of the eleventh century and that the Greeks had changed their customs under Western influence.²⁶¹ Mutual distrust grew until two churches, the Russian and the Greek, emerged on Russian soil. Perhaps, as Zernov stated, the conflict was inevitable "so long as Russian and Greek each believed in his own ecclesiastical primacy."²⁶² In the mid-seventeenth century, the conflict between these two traditions intensified, and the raskol developed.²⁶³

²⁶¹Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 146.

²⁶²Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 60.

²⁶³Numerous sources on the raskol exist, but the foremost is Michael Cherniavsky's "Old Believers and the New Religion. He argued that the raskol constituted a social and political struggle couched in theological terms. Power was the key. "The Old Believers . . . represented the aspiration of the Russian masses. The new dispensation, the good life here on earth, offered them nothing; it was a caricature of the old salvation." The Old Believers struggled against the rising secular state. Ibid., p. 39. Miliukov contended that the schism represented the break between the intellectuals and the masses. He saw it as a religious controversy that widened into a social split over the correcting of the Russian religious texts and practices. Outlines of Russian Culture, vol. 1: Religion and the Church, pp. 38-39. He also stated that "the theocratic foundation of the Russian autocracy . . . became . . . enfeebled by the apostasy of the Tsars." In the view of the Old Believers, the Tsar's acceptance of the Greek religious customs destroyed pure Orthodoxy in Russia and the idea of the Orthodox Tsar. The new national state separated itself from the "old national creed" and became the servant of Satan. Russia and Its Crisis (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 127-128. Solov'ev criticized the Old Believers (raskolniki) because they insisted on maintaining the old idea of the Muscovite Tsar, and refused to adopt the Western culture that had entered Russia. He viewed the raskol as a reaction against Westernization. Istorii Rossii, 7:171, 173. Platonov asserted that the raskol resulted directly from atti-

The rise of the various reforming groups, in particular the Old Believers, brought new vitality into the life of the Russian church and nation during the mid-seventeenth century. Reacting to Western influences, to what they believed were degenerate practices during the Time of Troubles, and to the reactionary policies pursued by Philaret, the Old Believers attempted to reform and revitalize the Russian spirit. They had absolute faith in the mission given to Muscovite Russia and stated in the theory of the Third Rome, namely that Russia had "to reveal to the world the truth of Orthodoxy."²⁶⁴ As Zernov explained, "[t]he Russians felt superior to other nations because in the most important sphere of life, in Christian faith and worship, they believed that they alone held, in its purity, the truth lost or perverted by the rest of Christendom."²⁶⁵ The rise of this reforming element with-

tudes arising out of the idea of the Third Rome. Acceptance of the Greek reforms threatened the Old Believers's conception of Moscow as the seat of true Christianity. Lektsii po Russkoi istorii, p. 171. Other interpretations of the raskol may be found in: Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 3: Kurs, pp. 300-333; Florinsky, Russia: a History and an Interpretation, 1:272-303; Ammann, Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, pp. 258-295; and Billington, The Icon and the Axe, pp. 121-162.

²⁶⁴Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 95.

²⁶⁵Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 45.

Arnold Toynbee stated that the Russian sense of superiority and mission reflected its Byzantine heritage. He explained the traditional Byzantine attitude toward the West in the following: "When Byzantium and the West are at odds, Byzantium is always right and the West is always wrong." The theory of the Third Rome merely transferred this attitude to Moscow and the Russians. (The Greeks became tainted with the West in 1439 at the Council of Florence). Civilization on Trial and the World and the West (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 153-155.

Robert O. Crummey viewed the liturgical forms as the

in the Russian church and the ascension of Aleksei I (r. 1645-1676) to the throne promised to rejuvenate not only the religious, but also the political and social, aspects of national life. Zernov argued that the seventeenth century promised a renaissance of unprecedented magnitude. Instead the century ended in disaster. The tsar aligned himself with the Greek conservative elements, and together they attempted to force the Russians to give up their claims to religious superiority. The schism, which separated an influential group of churchmen from the institutional church, resulted in the subjugation of the church to the state. In Zernov's view, "[t]his meant a breakdown of the Moscow culture, and the moral bankruptcy of the party of the Possessors which had been dominant for more than two hundred years."²⁶⁶ Zernov's sympathies obviously lay with the Old Believer party. They represented the traditional Russian Orthodoxy of the

"crux of the matter" (the raskol). The Old Believers believed that the Russian Church "was the sole guardian of true Christianity," and because they associated the forms with the content, they argued that Nikon's liturgical reform destroyed the true faith and "led Russia into apostasy." Nikon, in reverse, contended that improper Russian practices had led the Church astray and that he, through the reforms, had restored true Orthodoxy in Russia. As Crummey wrote, "the defense of the old ritual became the defense of Russia's history." For the Old Believers all of Russian history centered on the idea of the Third Rome and to destroy that idea was to destroy Russia's identity. The Old Believers & the World of Antichrist: The Vyg Community and the Russian State, 1694-1855 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), pp. 5, 13.

²⁶⁶Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 45.

Third Rome. They wanted to revitalize the Russian sense of mission which Russia had lacked since the time of Ivan III, Vasili III, and Ivan IV. Russia needed to reassert her superiority over the West and the Greeks. Under the leadership of Nikon (1605-1681), the new patriarch, the Greek party enacted controversial changes in the church ritual, symbols, and liturgy.²⁶⁷ They condemned the traditional Russian usage of the two-fingered cross and the Russian twofold hallelujah. Nikon changed the Slavonic spelling of Jesus, the address in the Lord's Prayer from "Our Father" to "Our God," the "kindom has no end" to "shall have no end," "Christ sitting" at the right hand of God to "Christ was seated," and "true and life giving Holy Spirit" to the "life giving Holy Spirit." These changes caused the Old Believers to lament, "give us back our Christ."²⁶⁸

The tsar provided the last chapter in the drama. He transformed the ecclesiastical dispute into a major national crisis by placing the power of the state behind the Nikonian reforms. Aleksei intervened in this church matter which Zernov believed could have been settled by the church itself; Nikon and Alexis thus employed the coercive power of the state in an attempt to obtain conformity in a spiritual matter. They also sided with an elite and against the religion practiced by the majority of the Russian people.

²⁶⁷Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 95.

²⁶⁸Billington, The Icon and the Axe, pp. 137-138.

In order to understand Zernov's interpretation of the Schism, it is necessary first to examine the Old Believer party. He described the Old Believers as zealots who wanted to purify and regenerate Russian life.²⁶⁹ This group, comprised primarily of married clergy, wanted to revitalize Russia's position as the bastion of "true Christianity."²⁷⁰ The call for revival received an immediate response. With the revival came a call for social reform, "court injustice was boldly rebuked, and the remnants of paganism and popular superstitions vigorously suppressed." The young priests often came under attack from the "greedy provincial governors" or "ignorant populace," but the revival continued.²⁷¹ As it spread, the influence of the reform party grew. One of the reform group's leading members, Stefan of Vonifat'ev, became the confessor to Tsar Alexis, and in 1652 on the death of Patriarch Joseph, the reformers expected Stefan to take the patriarch's place.²⁷² He did not.

Aleksei instead appointed Nikon, metropolitan of Novgorod, to the vacant seat. Born in 1605 of poor peasant stock, Nikon received all his training and education in a monastical school. By age twenty, Nikon became an impressive speaker and a devout scholarly churchmen. In addition to his

²⁶⁹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 95.

²⁷⁰ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 62.

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁷² Nicolas M. Zernov, "Moscow the Third Rome: the fall of Moscow," Church Quarterly Review 122 (July 1936):265.

learning, Nikon possessed a personal magnetism. He was very handsome, artistic, and even majestic on official occasions. Aleksei met Nikon in 1646, and the country priest so deeply impressed the tsar that Aleksei appointed Nikon head of the Novospasskii Monastery near Moscow. In 1649 Aleksei promoted him to metropolitan of Novgorod, and in 1652 named him patriarch.

An advocate of the Greek changes in ritual and a firm believer in the Possessor tradition, Nikon made every effort to enhance the power of the patriarch's office before taking it. When first offered the position, he refused. Later he accepted but only after wringing from the tsar and the nobility a personal oath of loyalty to himself. The leaders of both church and state promised "to keep unchanged the commandments of Christ's Holy Gospels and the Canons of the Holy Apostles and the Holy Fathers, and to obey the Patriarch as their chief Pastor and supreme Father."²⁷³ Zernov believed that the oath gave Nikon a free hand to institute his Greek changes. Nikon had two goals. He wanted the Russian church to conform with the usages and liturgy practiced under the other four Eastern Orthodox patriarchs, and he attempted to make the patriarch of Moscow both the political and religious head of Russia.²⁷⁴ Upon taking office, he immediately initiated his reform projects which precipitated a cultural and religious crisis.

²⁷³Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 97.

²⁷⁴Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 64.

In 1653, Nikon changed the Russian practices so that they conformed to the Greek. Many church leaders protested this, including Avvakum of Nizhni-Novgorod (1619-1982), one of the leaders of the Old Believers.²⁷⁵ Nikon did not tolerate their opposition. He was God's anointed patriarch, and to defy him was to defy God. His intolerant attitude reflected his adherence to the authoritarian principles of the Josephite school.²⁷⁶ The Old Believers refused to submit, contending that acceptance of the Greek usages would signify their acceptance of the primacy of Constantinople over Moscow.²⁷⁷ The questions of ritual and of the primacy of Moscow were indivisible and constituted the most important questions of the period.

Zernov argued that historians have traditionally misunderstood the nature or the fundamental issue in the seventeenth-century schism. He criticized those who argued that the raskol occurred as a result of the "ignorance and narrow-mindedness" of the clergy and of the laity's opposition

²⁷⁵Ibid.

The exact nature of Avvakum's leadership role among the Old Believers is difficult to discern. Ammann described him as the instigator of the raskol. Abriss der Ostslawisehen Kirchengeschichte, pp. 262-279.

Billington stated that Avvakum shared the leadership with Ivan Neronov, also of Nizhni-Novogorod. Avvakum was better known because his autobiography provided the best written expression of the Old Believer position. The Icon and the Axe, p. 156.

²⁷⁶Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 66

²⁷⁷Ibid.

to Nikon's "minor" reforms in the ceremony and texts.²⁷⁸ To Zernov, the reforms were anything but trivial. He argued instead that they involved the very essence of Russian Orthodoxy; the reforms represented an attack on the Russian leadership of Orthodox Christianity.²⁷⁹ It constituted an attack on the pillar of the Russian nation, the doctrine of the Third Rome.

During the first years of the dispute Nikon acted as a typical "wilful Josephian prelate."²⁸⁰ Tsar Aleksei, preoccupied with the Polish war, allowed Nikon to rule as he saw fit. Thus, Nikon, like Philaret before him, took the title, "Great Lord," and became ruler of both church and state. His rapid rise to power had given him a self-assurance untempered by misfortune. He set out immediately on a campaign to standardize the Russian and other Eastern Orthodox traditions in an effort to unite the Orthodox Christians of all lands in a campaign against the Moslems

²⁷⁸Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 97. Kliuchevskii, Solov'ev, Billington, Florinsky, Cherniavsky, Crummey, and Miliukov recognized the relationship between the changes in the liturgy and the Old Believers's belief that Russian Orthodoxy had refuted the Apostolic tradition. The question, which has dubious validity, is: Was the entanglement of substance and form in the Russian Orthodox Church the result of ignorance or were the people correct in seeing form and substance as one in the same? Zernov was actually unclear, but if one assumed that his answer to the above question disagreed with that of the above listed historians, then in his view, the people correctly associated form and substance as one in the same.

Goliubinskii provided a blunt statement of the general historical consensus when he wrote that most internal religious problems that afflicted Russia resulted from the inability of the people to distinguish between the outward forms and the substance of the religion. Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi, 1:319.

²⁷⁹Ibid., p. 98.

²⁸⁰Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 68.

and against the West. Aleksei and Nikon tried to solidify the Orthodox faith around a Russian core in order to meet the religious and national threats posed by the Catholic Poles, the Protestant German and Swedes, and the Mohammedan Turks.²⁸¹ Nikon recognized his inability to change the Greek Orthodox traditions, since he had no real power over them. Therefore, he decided to bring the Russian into line with the Greek teaching. He did head both church and state in Russia.

Nikon ordered the Russian usages changed to the Greek, and for five years (1653-1658) the controversy raged. On one side, Nikon marshaled the powers of both church and state against the parish priests of the Old Believer movement. Zernov stated that the methods utilized by Nikon in dealing with the Old Believers demonstrated his failure to understand either the issue or the people involved. Neither exile nor the knout shook the faith of the Old Believers; unfrocked and dispersed they still presented a real threat to the patriarch.²⁸² When a military expedition captured and tortured Avvakum, he asked for God's help but never for the mercy of men.²⁸³ Others of the Old Believers preferred selfimmolation to acknowledging the heretical Nikonian changes in the liturgy. They painted both Nikon and Aleksei as the Antichrist or the beast of the Antichrist.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 146.

²⁸²Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 69.

²⁸³Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 137.

²⁸⁴Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion," pp. 21, 28.

Nikon's efforts and terror failed to break the faith of the Old Believers.

On the other side, arrayed against Nikon and the state stood the parish priests of the Old Belief or, as they called themselves, the "True Believers."²⁸⁵ They had the metal of prophets and martyrs and would not yield under pressure, or torture. Nikon's intensified persecution of the Old Believers netted him nothing; Avvakum and his followers merely denounced the patriarch in bolder terms. They called him a "false shepherd" and exhorted all Christians to oppose him. Nikon's high-handed methods won for him the eternal enmity of the Old Believers, but, in addition, they alienated some of the leading boiars and finally the tsar himself.²⁸⁶

In Zernov's opinion, Nikon's five-year unrestrained rule in Moscow merely whetted his appetite for power, an appetite that proved to be his undoing. Nikon sought to solidify and institutionalize his place as the ruler of Russia. He failed to perceive his own political dependence on the goodwill of the tsar. Thus, in 1657, when Tsar Aleksei returned from the successful completion of the Polish war, Nikon attempted to use the tsar's personal devotion to him to extract from Aleksei acknowledgment of the superiority

²⁸⁵ Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 157.

²⁸⁶ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 102.

of the spiritual office of the patriarch over the secular office of the tsar.²⁸⁷ Aware of the discontent in the capital and the general animosity between Nikon and the people, Aleksei cooled his relationship with the patriarch.²⁸⁸ He publicly complained against the tsar and announced that he intended to leave Moscow unless Aleksei bowed to the patriarch.²⁸⁹ Instead, Aleksei sent two emissaries to assure Nikon of his friendship. Insulted, Nikon rejected them and retired to a monastery where he remained for eight years. He would neither resign nor resume his official duties.²⁹⁰ During these years, Aleksei arranged a permanent settlement of all the problems that surrounded the unhappy patriarch. In 1666, the tsar stood ready to formalize his solution.

Zernov saw the Great Church Council of 1666-1667 as one of the most important events in Russian history. It paralleled the Council of 1505 in importance.²⁹¹ Aleksei assembled a council comprised of pliable patriarchs and churchmen from the Greek tradition to add legitimacy to his solution. Zernov described the work of the council as a "major disaster" for the Russian Church.²⁹² The gathering

²⁸⁷ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 71

²⁸⁸ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 102.

²⁸⁹ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 71

²⁹⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 103.

²⁹¹ The Church Council of 1505 established the dominance of the Possessor tradition over that of the Nonpossessor.

²⁹² Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 150.

wrecked the "hopes, beliefs, and ideals" that had provided the driving force behind the nation.²⁹³ The disaster had three parts. First, it turned the temporary protest against Nikon's policy into a permanent schism by anathematizing those who refused to accept the Greek ritual and liturgy.²⁹⁴ Second, despite his haughtiness and errors, Nikon staunchly defended the independence of the church, even after he fell from power.²⁹⁵ Last, Aleksei forced the council to renounce the decisions of the Church Council of 1551 which had declared the Russian Orthodox tradition superior to the others. The Russians had to admit that errors had crept into the Russian tradition, the most serious of which involved the relationship between church and state. Aleksei forced the churchmen to acknowledge that Nikon's conception of an independent church and clergy lay contrary to traditions of the Orthodox Church.²⁹⁶ Both Nikon and the Old Believers rejected the outcome of the council, but to no avail.²⁹⁷ Aleksei and the state had triumphed over the once independent church.

Although Nikon outraged the Old Believers, his fall shifted the dissenters' hatred to Tsar Aleksei and the state. Although still a religious dispute, the raskol acquired political overtones as the schismatics began to focus their

²⁹³ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 103.

²⁹⁴ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 73.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 74.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 104.

animosity on the state and its head, whether Aleksei, Fedor II, or Peter I. In the eyes of the Old Believers, each of the tsars represented in one form or another the Antichrist.²⁹⁸ They associated each of the tsars with the destruction of the theocratic foundations of Muscovite culture and with the increasing westernization of Russia, which they detested. From the early 1670's, the Russian government began to treat the Old Believers as political offenders. The resistance of the Solovetskii Monastery on an island in the Arctic Ocean and the revolt of the Don Cossacks led by Stepan Razin in southern Russia caused this shift in policy. Aleksei interpreted both as Old Believer defiance of the government. Although the connection between the Solovetskii resistance and the Razin revolt remained unsupportable, a definite link existed between the Old Believers and the revolt of the streltsy in 1682, when an Old Believer, Nikita Dobrynin, drew up and presented the streltsyie complaints to the Regent Sophia. After 1682 every major revolt, the streltsy again in 1698, the Cossack revolts of the early eighteenth century, and Pugachev's revolt against Catherine, rebelled under the banner of the Old Belief.²⁹⁹ In 1684, it became a crime punishable by death to profess the Old Belief. Thus Peter I, reared in an atmosphere in which the Old Belief and political opposition to

²⁹⁸Florinsky, Russia: a History and an Interpretation, 1:294.

²⁹⁹Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion," pp. 18-19.

the crown were synonymous, equated the Old Belief with treason and violently suppressed the schismatics.³⁰⁰

From the first conflicts between Nikon and Avvakum, the ecclesiastical dispute of the 1650s and 1660s grew into a mass political movement by the 1680s. The movement used the Old Russian religious symbols to express their social and political disaffection with the new Russia that Peter I symbolized.³⁰¹

III

In Zernov's view, Peter the Great destroyed any remnants of the Muscovite Tsardom that had escaped his father Aleksei. The church, although demoralized and to a large degree stripped of influence, remained the primary source of resistance in Russia to the government's program of secularization. Peter quickly recognized this and systematically deprived the church of its identity and power. Peter sought to institutionalize the gains made by the monarchy in subjugating the Russian state to its will. Thus, Old Muscovite institutions and relationships had to be revolutionized to enhance the power of the ruler. Such institutions as the streltsy and the church stood as potential Muscovite checks on Peter's planned westernization of Russia, and he either destroyed or placed them totally under his

³⁰⁰ Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 4: Kurs, pp. 217-218.

³⁰¹ Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion", p. 18.

control.³⁰² Peter's obsession, an overpowering desire to see Russia become a part of Europe, dictated that he make the Russian church a creature of the state, lacking the means either to oppose or to criticize him.

Zernov prefaced his interpretation of the Petrine reforms with a short study of some of the religious disputes in the Russian Orthodox Church prior to Peter's reign. The disputes centered on the teachings of Peter Mogila (1682-d.) and Simeon Polotskii (d. 1680), both of whom came from a latinized Ukrainian segment of the Orthodox Church and were quite influential. Polotskii became the tutor to Tsar Aleksei's children. According to Zernov, the Ukrainian cleric possessed a "superficial mind," although his manner and varied knowledge impressed many Russians.³⁰³ In addition to the latinized clergymen, Prince Vasilii Golitsyn proposed the acceptance of certain Western ideas and improvements in the army and government administration.³⁰⁴ Their western ideas came under immediate attack from the old boiar families and the patriarch of Moscow, Joakim (1674-1690). The boiars and the patriarch, supported by two Greek scholars, Ioanikius and Sophronius Lichudis, who had received their educations at Venice and Padua, triumphed over the conservative westernizers at the Church Council of 1690. The

³⁰²Nicolas M. Zernov, "Peter the Great and the Establishment of the Russian Church," Church Quarterly Review 125 (January 1938):268.

³⁰³Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 154.

³⁰⁴Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 117.

Council condemned the Western ideas and purged certain latinized prayer books.³⁰⁵ Despite their victory the conservative group had little to celebrate because in 1689 Peter I became the new tsar of Russia and he was not a gradual reformer. Golitsyn and Polotskii sought slowly to make Russia a part of Europe whereas Peter brought Russia into the European mainstream with a single violent stroke.³⁰⁶ As Solov'ev wrote, "like France, Russia had an eighteenth century revolution, but in Russia, it was brought about by one tremendous figure, by one man, Peter I."³⁰⁷

Zernov's account of Peter's early life paralleled Kliuchevskii's.³⁰⁸ Peter acquired many of his revolutionary tendencies as a small boy. Peter was the son of Aleksei I's second wife, Nataliia Naryshkin. In 1676 when Peter was four years of age, his father died and left the throne to the sickly Fedor II, who died after only six years of rule. Fedor's death opened a controversy over who should become the new tsar, Peter or his half-brother Ivan, the son of Aleksei's first wife, Maria Miloslavskii. Ivan was a poor choice; slow-witted and physically unfit, he could never match the energy and intelligence of his rival.³⁰⁹ In the

³⁰⁵Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 155.

³⁰⁶Ibid.

³⁰⁷Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii, 14:341.

³⁰⁸Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 4: Kurs, pp. 5-13.

³⁰⁹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, pp. 118-120.

early struggle for the Russian throne, the Naryshkins managed a victory and placed Peter on the throne. Their short-lived success had near fatal consequences for the young Peter. The Miloslavskii, backed by the streltsy, staged a counter-coup and crushed the Naryshkins. Many of Peter's family and closest associates were slain in his presence. As a result, Peter came to hate the streltsy, and in later years the streltsy would pay dearly for their involvement in another attempted palace coup. The immediate results of the Miloslavskii counter-coup were twofold. First, in May, 1682, the Miloslavskii established a dual monarchy, Peter and Ivan V, with Sophia as regent (1682-1689). Sophia quickly banished Peter and his mother from Moscow to Preobrazhenskii, an estate nearby, and ruled Russia through the weakling, Ivan. It was apparent to everyone, including the young Peter, that his position and life were precarious. Only he stood between Sophia and her total domination of the throne, and Peter had seen Sophia's willingness in the 1682 coup to protect her interests with bloodshed.³¹⁰ The anxiety in which Peter lived from 1682 until 1689 left him with a nervous disorder that manifested itself in his incessant activity and seeming boundless energy. The author insinuated that this disorder accounted for the reckless method in which Peter pursued his reforms.³¹¹ Peter's isolation from Moscow further laid the

³¹⁰ Ibid., p. 119.

³¹¹ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 78.

foundation for the revolutionary aspect of his personality. Peter's exile cut him off from the normal education received by a young tsar. He learned nothing of Muscovite obligations between the people and tsar, the traditions of the Moscow Tsardom, or Christian morality. He led a free life; he formed his own military units made up of boys his own age; and he received his education in military tactics and weapons, in mathematics, and in shipbuilding and carpentry from Timmerman, a Dutch soldier of fortune.³¹² In short, the technological superiority of the West captivated the young tsar's mind and gave it an utterly practical bent. Fascinated by the military and realizing that only through military prowess could Russia become the equal of her European contemporaries, Peter soon found that in the German settlement of Moscow he could acquire the knowledge he desired.³¹³ Peter came to reflect the outlook of the German settlement in other matters. He absorbed the pragmatism of the West in dealing with problems, a rationalistic approach in which the ends justified the means. He came to view institutions and traditions in much the same light as objects; when a certain fortification cannon failed to perform properly, Peter discarded it.³¹⁴ As Zernov wrote, "Peter grew up as a wild plant having no roots in the traditions of Russian culture."³¹⁵

³¹²Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 4: Kurs, p. 16.

³¹³John B. Wolf, The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1951), p. 150.

³¹⁴Kliuchevskii, Sochinennia, vol. 4: Kurs, p. 17.

³¹⁵Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 119.

In fact, Peter associated Muscovite tradition with Sophia, the streltsy, and the murder of his family in the 1682 coup.³¹⁶ Thus, once in power, Peter felt no sympathy in his destruction of the institutions and customs of Moscow. For late seventeenth-century Russia, Peter's education, attitudes, and approach to problems were all revolutionary. They were basically the products of westerners living in Russia.³¹⁷

In 1689 Sophia and her favorite, Prince Vasilii Golitsyn, suffered several severe defeats at the hands of the Crimean Tartars. With her power threatened, Sophia wished to rid the opposition of any rallying point, and Peter and his conniving mother represented the strongest. Therefore, Sophia organized a fresh outbreak of the streltsy, but it failed, and the Miloslavskiis fell from influence. The Naryshkins gained power, confined Sophia to a convent, and secured Peter's place on the Russian throne. Peter's mother, Natalia, ruled Russia for five years until her death in 1694. At that point, Peter took personal charge of the government.

³¹⁶Ibid.

³¹⁷The historiographical problem of Peter the Great dominates Russian history. What was his place? Was he a revolutionary or merely a reformer? Marc Raeff has collected a series of articles that argue that question of Peter I in Russian history. On the one side stood Platonov and to some extent Kliuchevskii, both arguing that Peter was a man of his times not a revolutionary; on the other side, stood Miliukov Solov'ev, and Zernov who contended that Peter broke with the past and instituted revolutionary changes in Russian society. See also Marc Raeff, ed., Peter the Great: Reformer or Revolutionary? (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1963).

Once in control of the government, Peter initiated his vigorous drive for westernization and modernization of Russia. The military and administrative aspects of the state received his active attention. In 1697 he journeyed to the West in an attempt to acquire firsthand knowledge of military affairs and shipbuilding. While Peter was in Western Europe, Sophia took advantage of the discontent aroused by Peter's reforms in Russia and incited her old accomplices, the streltsy, to revolt. For the streltsy and the Miloslavskiis, this particular rebellion was most unfortunate. Peter, who was in Vienna at the time, quickly raised a regiment of mercenaries and returned to Moscow. He made short and bloody work of the attempted coup. He disbanded the streltsy and systematically punished, with exile, knout, and axe, those who had participated in the revolt.³¹⁸

Zernov believed that the events surrounding Peter's return and suppression of the streltsy in 1698 alienated the Russian masses from the state. In Muscovite Russia the person of the tsar had been the focus of the theocratically oriented aspirations of the Russian people. As Michael Cherniavsky pointed out, the Muscovite idea of the "most gentle Tsar" allowed the tsar, because of his personal piety, to act on behalf of Christ in matters of both church and state. Zernov similarly claimed that "[i]n spite of the failures and sins of individuals, the Moscow rulers

³¹⁸ Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 4: Kurs, p. 27.

aspired to the ideals of holiness, humility and forgiveness" which characterized a Christian ruler. Peter destroyed the conception of a "Christian Sovereign," and with its destruction he severed the theocratic link between the tsar and the Russian people.³¹⁹

Zernov made only general comments about the specific actions of Peter which alienated those who held to the old Muscovite traditions. He mentioned Peter's personal torture and execution of members of the streltsy and the tsar's preference for foreigners and the life of the foreign quarter of Moscow, but Zernov offered few specifics. In contrast, P. N. Miliukov gave a detailed account of Peter's return, which, like Zernov's, underlined the traumatic effect Peter had on the Muscovites. Peter, clean shaven and wearing Western style clothing, returned to Moscow but did not go to the Kremlin for worship, as had been the custom of the Muscovite tsars; instead, he visited his mistress, Anna Mons, in the German suburb and spent the night drinking with Francis LeFort, a Swiss confidant. Early the next morning, Peter greeted his leading boiars by cutting off their beards, something that Patriarch Hadrian had recently declared a mortal sin. Five days later on New Year's Day, Peter neglected the Kremlin service, where the patriarch blessed the tsar and the tsar received the peoples greetings; he preferred feasting in the German quarter and cutting more

³¹⁹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 121.

boiar beards for entertainment. After New Year's, the tsar began the investigations into the streltsy revolt and alternated torture and executions with feasts.³²⁰

Peter's abandonment of tradition horrified the Russians, who believed that Peter had accepted the heretical foreigners, imported their alien culture, defiled Russian traditions, and destroyed the historical foundations of the Russian nation.³²¹

Peter's departure from tradition generated varying degrees of opposition to his policies, but the strongest and most consistent came from the church. Zernov contended that the church constituted the center for the nation's expression of "disapproval" of Peter's reforms and personal life.³²² Peter, realizing this, sought to make the church an instrument under his control. In his subjugation of the church Peter had three distinct motives. First, the church stood as an obstruction to westernization, but perhaps more important in Peter's mind, the Russian church represented an alternative symbol of authority.³²³ The patriarchate, created

³²⁰Miliukov, Outlines, vol. 1: Religion and the Church, pp. 44-45.

³²¹Miliukov's account of Peter's return included the prophecy by the Old Believers that on New Year's Day, 1699, the Antichrist would appear. They believed that Peter fulfilled this prophecy. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³²²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 119.

³²³Zernov, "Establishment of the Russian Church," p. 269.

in 1589, had served Russia well as a symbol of national identity during the Time of Troubles. It stood and confronted the Polish invaders, even during the chaotic power-struggles between the boiars. Then, in 1613, the newly elected tsar, Michael Romanov, deferred matters of state to his father, Philaret the patriarch, who in 1619, took the title, "Great Lord" Velikii gosudar, and further enhanced the national stature of the patriarch and the church. Finally, under Aleksei I, Nikon ruled Russia, while the tsar pursued the Polish wars.³²⁴ Thus, Russia had a seventeenth-century tradition of patriarchal rule, and Peter had no desire to allow theologically minded Russia to retain the alternate symbol of authority.

Second, Peter wanted to use the church as a tool in his westernizing programs, but to do so, the church had to become a creature of the tsar and his state. To accomplish this, Peter systematically promoted the clergy who aided him and persecuted those who opposed him.³²⁵ Preoccupied with the Swedes and Poles, Peter had no time to restructure the church administration. Therefore, he appointed to new offices those of the lower clergy who either supported his reforms or were at least neutral. He intentionally by-passed the old high clergy because they formed the strongest opposition to his reforms.³²⁶

³²⁴Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, p. 64-65.

³²⁵Zernov, "Establishment of the Russian Church," p. 268.

³²⁶Igor Smolitsch, Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, 1700-1917 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964), p. 65.

Third, Peter, like the Muscovite tsars before him, coveted the vast wealth of the church. The churchmen not only owned vast amounts of land but also escaped all taxation, and during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries their holdings had dramatically increased.³²⁷ Peter needed new revenues; at Narva the Swedes had destroyed the Russian army and captured most of its material. The tsar set out at once to reorganize and re-equip his army, but such a reorganization required money which the old Muscovite system of taxation could not provide. Thus, in 1701, Peter initiated a series of financial reforms, one of which taxed the heretofore untaxed or votchina monastical estates through a secular agency, the Monastical Office (Monastirskii prikaz).³²⁸ Zernov stated that Peter, with his military mind, saw the monasteries as "a class which deprived the army of soldiers and the state of taxpayers, and supported the spirit of opposition among the people."³²⁹ Because of this, Peter launched what Zernov described as a "systemic war" against the monasteries. He referred of course to the prikaz. This represented another example of

³²⁷ Blum described some of the larger monasteries and their holdings: in 1600, Trinity-St. Sergius possessed 550,000 acres with an annual income of 100,000 rubles; in 1591, St. Joseph's of Volokolamsk owned 71,693; in 1678, St. Sergius had 16,813 peasant homesteads; St. Cyril's 5430; and St. Saviour's of Iaroslav 3879. These figures represented only a fraction of the church's total wealth, which by Peter's reign had increased. Lord and Peasant, pp. 188-190.

³²⁸ Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia, vol. 4: Kurs, pp. 133-134.

³²⁹ Zernov, "The Establishment of the Russian Church," p. 269.

Petrine pragmatism. From Peter's point of view, the monks constituted a totally "unproductive element" in Russian society; they hindered the army, the bureaucracy, and the western reforms. Peter saw no value in spirituality or asceticism.³³⁰

In addition to the practical motivations for Peter's church policy, Zernov also touched upon certain historical trends that affected Peter's general approach to religious matters. He argued that Peter was the first eighteenth-century absolutist ruler of Russia; "he [Peter] recognised no authority higher than his own will."³³¹ Certainly an element of Enlightenment thought existed in Peter's attitudes. He believed that man had emerged from "the dark wilderness of the past into the bright, ordered world of the eighteenth century."³³² Peter sought to make Russia a part of that world. Peter himself symbolized the change in attitudes. He rejected the semi-religious title of "Tsar" and took the Western title of "Emperor." Zernov interpreted this as Peter's movement away from the idea of a God-anointed ruler or divine right monarchy and toward the eighteenth-century notion of enlightened absolutism in which the ruler became the first servant of the

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Carl. l. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), p. 118.

state.³³³ As Zernov wrote, "[Peter] became the Emperor of Russia whose primary duty was to maintain the honour and glory of the New Empire."³³⁴ Zernov argued that Peter's reforms and attacks against the church did not represent an atheistic struggle against religion per se. Instead, it was symptomatic of the change that had occurred in the nature of the Russian monarchy. Russia was no longer a paternal autocracy with its religious overtones; on the contrary, it was a secular absolutist state.³³⁵

³³³Among historians, considerable disagreement exists over "absolutism" and "enlightened despotism" and Peter I's historical place relative to those terms. Leonard Krieger declared that the term "enlightened despotism" attempted to denote a difference between the "absolutism" of the early eighteenth century, and that of the later eighteenth century, when rulers recognized the existence of a contractual relationship between the ruler and the ruled. He stated that the contractual relationship had become a tradition under the rulers early in the century and thus, the "enlightened" rulers of the later period merely recognized openly a relationship that already existed. To Krieger, apparent differences between Peter I and Catherine II were the differences between a ruler establishing a new order and a ruler in an established order. According to Krieger, both Peter and Catherine displayed the Enlightenment tenet of pragmatism in their approaches to social and political problems, and as a result, they should be considered a part of the same absolutist tradition. Kings and Philosophers, 1689-1789 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 242-244, 202. In support of this interpretation of "absolutism," Max Beloff stated that the "Age of Absolutism" in Russia began with Peter's personal rule in 1689 and extended through Paul I's reign (d. 1801). He cautioned the reader against "over-emphasizing" either the superficiality of Petrine reform or Catherine's "intellectual dalliance with the philosophes." The Age of Absolutism (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1941), p. 133.

³³⁴Zernov, "The Establishment of the Russian Church," p. 267.

³³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 268.

Zernov believed that Peter's contact with the West not only influenced his desire for reform but in the area of church reform also dictated the exact nature of the new institutions. In 1700 Peter skillfully avoided the appointment of a new patriarch and made one of his favorites, Stefan Iavorskii, "guardian" of the vacant throne.³³⁶ Zernov correctly contended that Iavorskii, who was Jesuit-educated, supported Petrine westernization of the church, but he failed to mention that Peter and his new "guardian" soon parted ways over the matter of power. Iavorskii was a "Papist" and held to the doctrine of papal supremacy over temporal rulers.³³⁷ Peter had no intention of ridding himself of a patriarch and gaining a pope. As Iavorskii's influence waned, the fortunes of a new western-educated cleric, Feofan Prokopovich, rose. Prokopovich's education had been Protestant, although he had later converted to Orthodoxy. Zernov described him as "an able but ambitious and unscrupulous man, who was ready to sell the freedom of the Church for Court favours."³³⁸

Peter soon recognized Prokopovich's talents and the utility of his Protestant conception of church-state relations. According to Zernov, Peter had been impressed with Lutheranism and the German state's control of it.³³⁹ He admired Luther

³³⁶Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 81.

³³⁷Smolitsch, Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, p. 78.

³³⁸Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 122.

³³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 121.

and thus sought a Lutheran solution to his problems with the Russian Church in the Ecclesiastical Regulation of 1721.³⁴⁰ Peter needed a theory of church and state that allowed him alone to stand as "a Christian ruler and a protector of Orthodox faith."³⁴¹ The Ecclesiastical Regulation which Prokopovich presented to Peter in 1721 gave Peter the instrument through which he justified his rule and completely placed the church under secular control.

Zernov termed the document itself an "odd piece of legislation," borrowed from Lutheranism.³⁴² It abolished the patriarchate and replaced it with a college of bishops, the Holy Synod, which Zernov believed represented an intensification of westernization in religion.³⁴³ The

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 123.

³⁴¹ Smolitsch, Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, p. 119.

³⁴² Smolitsch stated that the Regulation represented a total break with Russia's religious heritage. The Holy Synod, in particular, bore the distinct mark of Estonian and Livonian Lutheran institutions; it was also remarkably similar to the Church Regulation sponsored by Charles XII in Sweden in 1696. In conclusion, the author agreed with and quoted P. N. Verchovskoi's assessment of the reform: "The Holy Synod, in the conception of Peter and Prokopovich, was nothing other than a church general organization of the German-Swedish type and the Church Regulation an open copy of the Protestant Church Regulations." Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, pp. 118-120

Eugene Schuyler emphasized the active role of Peter I in the formulation of the church reforms. Although Prokopovich wrote the Ecclesiastical Regulation, Peter reviewed each article and rewrote several of them; he borrowed from his knowledge of the Protestant church government in Sweden and Germany, and applied it in Russia. Peter the Great: Emperor of Russia, a Historical Biography, 2 vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), 1:395-396.

³⁴³ Nicolas M. Zernov, "Reforma Russkoi tserkvi i dorevoliutsionnyi episkopat," Put' 45 (1934):5.

Regulation also created the office of procurator of the Holy Synod which oversaw the synod's work. The secular official had to give his final approval to any ecclesiastical considerations or rulings by the synod.³⁴⁴ Through the synod and procurator, Peter acquired control of the church; he appointed bishops to the synod and military officers as procurators. Zernov detested the fact that Peter usually appointed a military officer who understood nothing of Russian religious tradition. The church soon found itself under the direct control of a soldier who reflected the German military mentality of his emperor.³⁴⁵ The first procurator, I. V. Boltin (1721-1725), had only one credential which qualified him to oversee the church administration; he was thoroughly loyal to Peter.³⁴⁶ Subsequent procurators conducted themselves more and more as bureaucratic government officials, and the church administration, as the eighteenth century progressed, increasingly resembled that of any other government department.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁴ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 123.

³⁴⁵ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 83.

³⁴⁶ Smolitsch, Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, p. 130.

³⁴⁷ In spite of the fact that Feofan Prokopovich remained as archbishop of Novogorod and never became the President of the Holy Synod, Feofan maintained his position as the arbiter of church policy and the influential advisor to Peter I. His Protestant influence continued under Catherine I (1725-1727), but under Peter II (1727-1730), he fell from power. Ammann, Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, pp. 390-392.

In his interpretation of Peter's reign, Zernov argued that the plight of the Russian Church resulted from the gradual modification of Russian political institutions to resemble those of the West.³⁴⁸ Under Peter I, this westernization process became the official policy of the government, and by 1725, Petrine policy had fundamentally altered the relationship between church and state. Losing all independence, the church became a creature of the state.³⁴⁹ As Zernov wrote, "as long as the bureaucratic Empire of St. Petersburg could last, the Russian Church had to occupy in the life of the nation the place appointed it by Peter the Great."³⁵⁰ The author's choice of words, "could last," was significant. It implied his belief that without the free and independent voice of the church in Russian affairs the days of the Petersburg monarchy were numbered.

One might well ask, how did Peter accomplish this feat and avoid the outbreak of popular resistance? In answer, Zernov said that he left untouched the doctrines and the worship services and had reformed only the administration. He deprived the church of its spiritual independence, an intangible loss around which the people could not be rallied. Although no organized resistance appeared,

³⁴⁸Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 84.

³⁴⁹Interview with Nicolas M. Zernov, Oxford, England, 7 March 1975.

³⁵⁰Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 84.

Peter became widely known as the "Antichrist" and a symbol of evil for the Old Believers who had first opposed his father, Aleksei. But the triumph of Peter and his westernization cost the Russian nation the loyalty of her people.³⁵¹ Zernov concluded, "the old Russia was not destroyed but lay under the outershell of foreign culture."³⁵²

IV

Zernov's description of Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries culminated in his scathing criticism of the Petersburg Empire. The repeated shocks of the Time of Troubles and the raskol, coupled with Petrine reforms, destroyed the Muscovite tradition and resurrected in its place a new imperial Russia which the new capital of St. Petersburg symbolized.³⁵³ Zernov echoed both Slavophile teachings and the feelings of many of Peter's Russian contemporaries in his vehement attacks on St. Petersburg. The city symbolized everything in post-Petrine Russia that was alien to Muscovite tradition. Peter's Russian opposition associated the new capital with the service state, the problems of succession to the throne, and most of all, the hated foreign bureaucrats and imperial advisors.³⁵⁴ Zernov believed that Peter had created a new nation, one fundamentally different from the

³⁵¹Ibid., p. 93.

³⁵²Ibid., p. 94.

³⁵³Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 125.

³⁵⁴Hans Rogger, National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 8-9.

Russia of Kiev or Moscow. In the new Russia the nobility's acceptance of Western culture and customs separated them from the masses, the Russian peasants.³⁵⁵ The contrasts between the cities of Petersburg and Moscow symbolized this dichotomy in Russian society. Moscow, located in the heart of the nation with its ancient Kremlin and the uniquely Russian St. Basil's Cathedral, represented the Old Russia; Petersburg, on the periphery with its Western architecture and culture represented the new Russia.³⁵⁶

Zernov provided a totally negative interpretation of imperial policy during the first half of the eighteenth century. He closely identified the westernized nobility with the city in which they lived, St. Petersburg. The rulers were largely German or heavily influenced by Prussian militarism and advisors. They, their entourages, and the city from which they ruled represented to the masses everything strange and alien to Russian tradition. Their outlook reflected their petty German origins in which the latest vogue in European fashion and culture found acceptance. The peasants saw their rulers, "[d]ressed in comic, pompous French costumes or Prussian uniforms," as "strange, shadowy figures."³⁵⁷ In addition to

³⁵⁵ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 125.

³⁵⁶ Rogger, National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia, pp. 13-15.

³⁵⁷ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 125.

foreign influences, many Russians also saw St. Petersburg as the seat of corruption in public and private affairs.³⁵⁸ In Zernov's opinion, "they [the rulers] were in most cases the pathetic victims of their abysmal ignorance, moral corruption and complete isolation from the rest of the country."³⁵⁹ The atmosphere of St. Petersburg prevented the Emperors and Empresses from understanding the most fundamental aspirations of the Russian people, and allowed the rulers to lead "an artificial existence in an artificial city."³⁶⁰

In his writings, Zernov sketched the lives of the leading rulers but almost ignored those who ruled from 1725 until 1741. He implied that they were unworthy of comment. These rulers included Catherine I (1725-1727), Peter II (1727-1730), Anna I (1730-1740), and Ivan VI (1740-1741).³⁶¹

³⁵⁸ Rogger, National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia, p. 9.

³⁵⁹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 125.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Smolitsch offered a detailed account of church policy under those rulers, who followed Peter I. Catherine I maintained his policies in ecclesiastical matters and in politics. She also retained many of Peter's advisors including Prokopoivch. In contrast, Peter II rejected the Western turn, and with the help of the conservative "old Russian" church party, attempted to undo Peter I's reforms. Anna I, a protestant, converted to Orthodoxy, but reversed the trends begun against the Protestant influences in Russia under Peter II. She had been the wife of Frederick, Duke of Courland, and had lived under the influence of German Lutheranism for 20 years. Prince Dimitrii Golitsyn dominated her reign and stood as the power behind the throne. After Anna, the reign of Ivan VI lacked any defined policy: it was too short. Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, pp. 138-139.

Zernov offered the following assessment of those reigns: "the Russian throne became a playground for intriguing courtiers, foreign diplomats and officers of the Guards."³⁶² The government by incompetent foreigners during the eighteenth century left women and children on the Russian throne who had no "moral" or "legal right" to the crown.³⁶³

Elizabeth I (1741-1761) was the only ruler of this era who commanded any attention from Zernov. The daughter of Peter the Great, Elizabeth was the most sincerely Orthodox ruler that Russia had since Aleksei I; but, in Zernov's interpretation, she became the ruler who "completed the disservice to her nation begun by her father."³⁶⁴ He referred to the destruction of the line of succession to the throne.³⁶⁵ In 1718 Peter had his son Aleksei Petrovich killed. The tsaravich opposed his father's westernization of Russia, and Peter did not want his reforms undone. In the imperial ukaz that followed Aleksei's death, Peter established the right of the emperor to leave the throne to anyone that he

³⁶² Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 125.

³⁶³ Zernov, Eastern Christendom, p. 160.

³⁶⁴ Historians agree on the nature of Elizabeth I's policies; they were conservative. Because of her sincere faith, Elizabeth had no trouble in convincing the people of her Orthodox beliefs. One of the most conservative churchmen of her time, Arsenii Maseevich, Metropolitan of Rostov, heralded her as the "Protectoress of the Church." Smolitsch, Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, p. 139. Ammann, who presented an excellent outline of Elizabeth's reign, also cited her Orthodox faith. In addition, he mentioned that Elizabeth, much to the approval of the anti-Petrine elements in Russian society, spent much of her time in Moscow rather than in St. Petersburg. Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, pp. 396-402.

³⁶⁵ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 126.

chose.³⁶⁶ Elizabeth exercised that right and handed the Russian crown over to her totally Germanized nephew, Peter III, or as he preferred to be called, the Duke of Holstin.³⁶⁷

Around this admittedly bizarre ruler, Peter III, Zernov built his most critical appraisal of the Russian emperors. Peter ruled for only six months, and yet Zernov argued that he managed to set the pattern of rule for the next century. Zernov believed that Peter III was insane and genetically passed on this insanity to Paul I, Alexander I, and Nicolas I. Thus, Peter III's "peculiar psychology" afflicted the Romanov house and Russia as late as the mid-nineteenth century.³⁶⁸ Insanity manifested itself most blatantly in the fascination that the military held for each of these emperors. It was Prussian and essentially foreign to the traditions of Russia and the aspirations of her people.³⁶⁹

In addition to discussing Peter III's madness, Zernov stressed an important social development that occurred during his rule, the abolition of the nobility's service obligation. From the time of Peter I, both the nobility and the peasantry had service obligations to the state. One tilled the land, while the other served in the military and governmental bureaucracy. The hard labor and sacrifice imposed upon both elements of society gave them a commonalty of

³⁶⁶Ibid., p. 125.

³⁶⁷Ibid., p. 126.

³⁶⁸Ibid.

³⁶⁹Ibid.

experience; together they bore the burden of Peter I's westernization of Russia. Peter III's abolition of the gentry's obligation destroyed any mutuality of experience between the peasantry and the nobility. To Zernov, the abolition of service obligations transformed the nobility into a parasitic class of "idlers," nonproducers, who lived off the labors of others.³⁷⁰ The more "conscientious" of the nobility recognized the injustice that the social system imposed upon the serfs and reacted by accepting and spreading the extreme revolutionary opinions coming from Western Europe in the nineteenth century.³⁷¹ A very real connection existed between the service gentry created by Peter the Great and the radical intelligentsia of the nineteenth century: the intelligentsia were the sons of Peter's service class, who had inherited their father's predilection for absolutes and the Decembrist tradition of action. In the eighteenth century, the gentry had acted on behalf of the emperors to make Russia a modern state. They believed that they, through reform, could create the "City of God" on earth. Their utopian aims spilled over into the age of revolution. The next generation picked them up and applied them in a more egalitarian manner. Alienated from both state and people, the nineteenth century revolutionaries turned their efforts

³⁷⁰Ibid.

³⁷¹Ibid.

toward the reconstruction of reality, a reality in which their utopian ideas would be the basis for the social and political structure.³⁷² In Zernov's view, Peter III laid the foundations for the Russian revolutionary movement.

In listing the demented rulers of Russia during the eighteenth century, Zernov omitted Catherine. Whatever else one might say about Catherine, she was not mad. He called Catherine "a German princess," a "murderess," an "usurper," and a "skeptic," questioned her morals, and criticized virtually every aspect of her reign.³⁷³ Zernov accused her of ordering the murder of her husband, Peter III, in order to gain the crown for herself.³⁷⁴ He emphasized five aspects of her reign in his writings: the importation of Western culture, her handling of church affairs, Pugachev's revolt, the incorporation of the Crimea, and the partition of Poland.

³⁷² Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: the Eighteenth Century Nobility (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1966), pp. 166-171.

³⁷³ Zernov, Eastern Christendom, pp. 160-162.

³⁷⁴ Although Catherine appreciated Peter III's elimination, she probably did not order his execution. Zoe' Oldenbourg argued that although Catherine had planned to rid herself of Peter, the assassins's timing was poor, because Peter's death followed too closely on the heels of the coup that had placed Catherine in power. Before she ordered his execution, Catherine had wanted to consolidate her rule. Catherine the Great, trans. Anne Carter (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), pp. 220-227. Florinsky stated that "the assassination (of Peter III), if not directly instigated by Catherine, had her approval." Russia: a History and an Interpretation, 1:502.

Perhaps more than any other ruler, Catherine II and her importation of Western culture became synonymous with the capital, St. Petersburg. Under Catherine the city became a source of national pride. The gentry, freed from their service obligations, participated actively in the society that during the time of Peter had been the private preserve of a limited group of foreigners. The gentry accepted wholeheartedly the Western culture offered them by Catherine. They dressed European, thought European, had German tutors, and spoke only French, thereby completely separating themselves from the peasantry.³⁷⁵ Zernov admitted that St. Petersburg flowered during her reign; its culture rivaled that of any other city in Europe. But in human terms Russia paid dearly for its "window on the West." Exploitation of the peasantry through the expansion of serfdom made the culture of Petersburg possible. Catherine believed that the first obligation of the peasantry was to provide the labor to make her life the most splendid in Europe.³⁷⁶

Zernov sharply criticized Catherine's policy toward the peasantry in Russia. Catherine spread "slavery," meaning serfdom, into areas of the Empire where it had never existed and limited the few freedoms that the serfs possessed.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁵ Rogger, National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia, pp. 42-44.

³⁷⁶ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 127.

³⁷⁷ Nicolas M. Zernov, Russkoe religioznoe vozroshdenie XX veka (Paris: YMCA Press, 1974), p. 25.

In her ukaz of 1764 she prohibited the movement of peasants without the consent of their masters, and in her ukaz of 1783, she bound the heretofore free peasants of the Ukraine to the nobleman on whose land they live.³⁷⁸ According to Zernov, Catherine lacked the slightest understanding for the peasant; she thought slavery "a reasonable price to be paid by the Russians for the glitter of her court and the European prestige of the monarch."³⁷⁹ Her attitude resulted in massive unrest among the serfs, which culminated in Pugachev's revolt (1773-1775). Emil Pugachev was a Don Cossack who organized a peasant army and revolted against the Imperial government. His followers demanded the abolition of serfdom, the massacre of the aristocracy, and a return to icons, ritual, and texts of the Old Belief.³⁸⁰ His army came primarily from the Volga regions, the Urals, and Siberia and caused the Empire to totter on the brink of disaster for two years.³⁸¹ As Zernov stated, "they almost succeeded in overthrowing the rule of the foreign Empire."³⁸² The Russian people occupied the position of those conquered by a foreign power and attempted to free themselves from alien domination.

³⁷⁸Blum, Lord and Peasant, pp. 417-418.

³⁷⁹Zernov, Russkoe religioznoe vozroshdenie, p. 25.

³⁸⁰Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion," p. 20.

³⁸¹G. D. Kapustina, ed., Krestlianskaia voina 1773-1775 gg. v. Rossii (Moscow: Izd. nauk, 1973), p. 5.

³⁸²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 127.

In church affairs, Catherine completed the ecclesiastical program of secular control begun by Peter I. Under Catherine, the church suffered horribly. Sharing the views of the French Encyclopedists, she believed that religion was "a survival of barbarism."³⁸³ She appointed atheistic procurators, closed the monasteries, confiscated their property, and dismissed or imprisoned any of the clergy who opposed her.³⁸⁴

Zernov also dealt with Catherine's accomplishments in foreign affairs. The one major event during her reign for which Zernov had no criticism was the incorporation of the Crimea into Russia in 1783. Once Catherine's armies reduced this last Tartar stronghold, Russia's frontier to the south became safe, large amounts of fertile land lay open for exploitation, and the nation had a new outlet on the Black Sea. In this act Catherine pursued a traditional Russian policy because she freed Orthodox Christians from their ancient Tartar enemies.³⁸⁵

To Zernov, the partition of Poland represented another

³⁸³ Smolitsch provided an excellent study of Catherine's personal religious outlook. He argued that for the Empress, religion and politics stood separately, but in her role as Empress, religion was a game played to insure her political success. Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, pp. 249-250.

³⁸⁴ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 132. Zernov's accusations referred to the appointments of I. I. Melissino (1763-1768), P. P. Chebishev (1768-1774), and S. V. Akchurin (1774-1786) as procurators, the ukaz of 1764 which confiscated monastic lands, and the imprisonment and death of Metropolitan Arsenii, who had opposed secularization of the church administration. Smolitsch, Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, pp. 704, 348, 269.

³⁸⁵ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 128.

matter. He called it a "fatal blunder." He saw the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795 as mistakes for two reasons. The partitions incorporated into the Empire the Poles and a large Jewish population; both had their own particular heritages which were totally alien from those of the Russians. Once in the Empire, both groups served as a source of severe internal problems. In addition, the partitions signaled the end of Russia's role as the "friend and Protector of the Slavonic peoples" trying to escape either the German or Moslem yoke. Zernov believed that the Polish affair exemplified "how alien the rulers of the St. Petersburg State were to the true interests and aspirations of the Russian people."³⁸⁶

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

In his study of the Polish partitions, Zernov did not mention that Frederick the Great instigated the first partition and that Catherine participated in order to protect Russia's interests in Eastern Poland. Most of the population of Eastern Poland were Orthodox, living under a Catholic aristocracy. As Krieger wrote, Frederick II had "the most to gain in Poland," and urged the entire plan upon Austria and Russia. Kings and Philosophers, p. 273.

Kliuchevskii also believed that Frederick II took advantage of the international situation and arranged the partition of Poland. Kliuchevskii argued that Catherine had nothing to gain from the partition. She had placed her favorite, Stanislas Poniatoskii, on the Polish throne in 1764, and through him and her bribes to the nobility, controlled Polish policy. In 1772, Frederick realized that with France on the verge of war with England and Russia embroiled in a Turkish war, he could unilaterally propose a solution to the "Polish question." Socineniia, vol. 5: Kurs, pp. 42-43, 56-59.

In conclusion, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Russia represented a period of transition. Russia evolved from a theocratic paternalistic autocracy into a modern westernized secular state. This transition occurred in three stages: the Time of Troubles, the raskol, and the Petrine Revolution. Zernov discussed each stage, but reflecting a strong Slavophile influence, concentrated his writings on the figure of Peter the Great. Peter has been the central problem of Russian history. Such historians as Solov'ev, Kliuchevskii, and Goliubinskii have stated that Peter the Great and his legacy divided Russian history and raised questions about the relationships between the state and social institutions that are the essence of that history. The problem of Petrine Russia also sparked a controversy among intellectuals that ran the length of the nineteenth century and involved two groups, the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. The latter group profoundly influenced Zernov. They vehemently criticized Petrine innovations and idealized the society and state of Muscovite Russia. One of the leading members of the Slavophile movement, K. S. Aksakov, made the generally accepted judgment of the Western state introduced by Peter. He saw it as inhumane and founded on the principles of "force, slavery, and hostility."³⁸⁷ Zernov agreed with Aksakov. He believed that the Petersburg

³⁸⁷ Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, p. 180.

Empire maintained itself through internal coercion and external military force. In economics, the westernized aristocracy with the collusion of the emperor enslaved the peasants and lived off of the fruits of serfdom. In the nation, the coercion and slavery produced a chasm of hostility between the Russian masses and their rulers, hostility that eventually led to the Revolution.

Zernov's interpretations closely paralleled those of the Slavophiles with the exception of their respective opinions on political institutions. Zernov favored a democratic representative form of government in Russia, and the Slavophiles echoed the sentiments of Aksakov, who wrote that "the Russian people [do] not aspire to political power, [do] not want political rights."³⁸⁸ The Slavophiles idealized the Muscovite autocracy; Zernov saw it as a necessary evil, but only if no representative alternatives existed. This difference between Zernov and the Slavophiles was more apparent than real. Both the Slavophiles and Zernov reacted against the Western thought of their times and their own social background. German Romanticism, especially Hegelianism, influenced the Slavophiles; therefore, they exalted the role of the autocrat as the protector of society. The Slavophiles also came from the aristocracy, and thus they firmly believed in the special role of the elite in guiding Russian society. In contrast, Zernov represented the Russian middle-class and their social and political attitudes. He reflected their political liberalism, and

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 180.

the upper-middle-class liberalism of his own family in his exaltation of the representative governments of the seventeenth century. Specifically, he hailed the work of the zemskiie sobory and the middle-class Iaroslav association's role in restoration of Russian nationalism and the expulsion of the Poles from Moscow during the Time of Troubles. Zernov believed that "the Russians . . . are always at their best when they act under their own elected leaders and live in self-governing communities."³⁸⁹

The later period in which Zernov wrote resulted in another difference between the Slavophiles and him. Unlike the Slavophiles who wrote during the reign of Nicholas I, Zernov, in the twentieth century connected the policies of Peter I through Catherine with the rulers of the nineteenth century and blurred the distinction between eighteenth and nineteenth century rulers. The Slavophiles recognized the existence of the schism in Russian society but, unlike Zernov, could not see its conclusion in the revolution of the twentieth century.

Using the figures of Paul I, Alexander I, and Nicholas I, Zernov connected the eighteenth-century policies of Peter I and Catherine II with the rise of the revolutionary movement. Zernov described Paul I, Alexander I, and Nicholas I as Prussian in mentality. He referred to their beliefs in a disciplined society and their fascination

³⁸⁹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 81.

with the military.³⁹⁰ As he wrote, "he [Alexander] was the

³⁹⁰In Zernov's view, two major events illustrated the failure of Alexander I and Nicolas I to either heal the breach between the classes or to embark on an imaginative course of modernization in Russia. Under Alexander, it was the war against Napoleon. Zernov believed that Napoleon attacked Russia hoping to enlist the oppressed serfs as allies. The peasants fooled the French and fought them. They fought for two things: the serfs wanted to expel the foreigners and they also sought to gain their own freedom after proving their patriotism to the tsar. After the defeat of the French, Alexander I reversed the previous promises that he had made about freeing the serfs and liberalizing Russia. He reverted to a totally reactionary policy. Ibid. p. 132.

Allen McConnell argued that Alexander feared revolution and supported Metternich's reestablishment of the old order in Europe, but at the same time, he never lost his desire to reform. He supported liberalization outside of Russia, but the Napoleonic experience prevented him from liberalizing internally. Only during the last four years of his reign did he revert to outright oppression. Tsar Alexander I: Paternalistic Reformer (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970), pp. 148-149.

To Zernov, the Decembrist Revolt of 1825 illustrated the failure of Nicholas I. Upon the death of Alexander I, the guards regiments in Petersburg revolted and demanded a constitution. Instead of seeking a compromise solution and granting liberties to the aristocracy, Nicholas I ordered loyal troops to disburse the agitators with grape-shot. The revolt was crushed and Nicholas himself led the inquisition and purge that followed. Zernov characterized Nicholas as the "very personification of reaction." Russians and Their Church, p. 131.

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky pointed out that the policy of "Official Nationality," meaning "orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality," dominated both the internal and foreign policy of Nicholas I's reign. It represented the most extreme reactionary doctrine in Europe. Nicholas used this doctrine and every tool at his disposal to protect Europe and Russia from any revolutionary ferment, real or imagined. As the author pointed out, Nicholas believed that he acted within the tradition set forth by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, and the Slavophiles, who so vigorously opposed Nicholas, also came to associate the state in which they lived with that state created by Peter I. As Riasanovsky wrote, "the autocratic empire of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander I, and Nicolas I possessed certain special characteristics which were emphasized time and again by the ideologists of the state." Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 51, 266-267, 117.

same petty tyrant and narrow Prussian disciplinarian as Peter III and Paul I had been before him." Nicholas "was at home only on the parade-ground, where he could admire the Prussian drill of his soldiers."³⁹¹ In the area of domestic policy, both, to Zernov, were unmitigated failures. Alexander toyed with plans to liberalize Russia but in the end failed to act because he distrusted the people and feared the ideas spawned by the French Revolution. Nicholas I represented "the very personification of reaction."³⁹² He feared the educated and the uneducated and suppressed new ideas presented by either the Westernizers or the Slavophiles.³⁹³ Under these two rulers, Russian society became more and more divided. The frictions generated by the Petrine reforms and the policies pursued by Catherine II intensified and left the Russian nation split from within. Russian unity was superficial and held together only by the coercive power of the tsars. They opposed the cries for westernization, meaning nineteenth-century political liberalization and a return to Muscovite spirituality. Because of the reactionary tsarist policy, Russia failed its two greatest tests, the need to industrialize and the need to abolish serfdom.

³⁹¹Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 130.

³⁹²Ibid.

³⁹³Nicolas M. Zernov, "Angliiskii bogoslov v Rossii imperatora Nidolaia pervago," Put', 57 (1938):59.

These failures resulted in the turmoil and confusion of the late nineteenth century and the destruction of the Petersburg Empire in the twentieth. The Petrine state had from its inception ignored the wishes of the Russian people. Force ruled Russia until 1917 when the peasants revolted and destroyed Peter's alien state.

CHAPTER V

THE SLAVOPHILES AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY RENAISSANCE

In Zernov's writings the fourth and last Russian religious revival occurred in the early twentieth century. He termed it the "Twentieth Century Renaissance." This specifically referred to the attempts to reform and revitalize Russian Orthodoxy in the period between the Revolution of 1905 and the Bolshevik October Revolution in 1917. The key to this movement lay in the nineteenth century intelligentsia which helped to push the monarchy to the brink of destruction. The events of 1917 represented "[t]he victory of the Russian intelligentsia over the St. Petersburg Empire," but the very revolution that the intelligentsia instigated brought the intelligentsia's destruction at the hands of the Communists.³⁹⁴

In addition to the radical intelligentsia, the Slavophile movement contributed to nineteenth-century Russian social and political ferment. Both movements were inspired by German romanticism and idealism and both emerged during the reign of Nicholas I.³⁹⁵ The two movements soon diverged when the intelligentsia began to follow

³⁹⁴ Nicolas M. Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 1.

³⁹⁵ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 55.

the materialistic socialist thought of Western Europe while the Slavophiles continued to cling to the indigenous ideas and to work for reform without revolution. Thus, in Zernov's view, the Slavophiles established the basis for the twentieth century revival of Russian Orthodoxy.

The paramount question in this period concerned the survival of Orthodoxy. How did the Christian faith survive in Russia? What made the Slavophile tradition more resilient than that of the westernized socialists? And, how did religion in Russia fare under the Soviets?

I

The political conditions of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Russia comprise the background against which the rise of the Slavophiles and the intelligentsia must be understood. Building on the theme of alienation, Zernov argued that nineteenth century Russia became ripe for a revolt against her Romanov rulers who were alien to Russia and Russian ideals and whose policies strained the social fabric of the nation. Nicholas I exemplified this alienation between ruler and ruled. Nicholas inherited the strain of military madness that Peter III had left to the Russian royal family.³⁹⁶ A total autocrat, he relied on the German nobility of the Baltic states for advice because he mistrusted the Russian

³⁹⁶ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 130

nobility.³⁹⁷ He was not a Russian nationalist but represented another in the eighteenth-century line of foreigners on the Russian throne. Nicholas's "official nationality" with its three-pronged foundation of "autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality" lacked substance.³⁹⁸ "Official nationality" merely excused the suppression of new ideas or the opening of society. Even the church found itself under attack for promoting or allowing the rise of new religious thought.³⁹⁹ Nicholas did not confine his reactionary madness to Russia: "[w]ith the obstinacy of a born autocrat, he suppressed freedom of thought and speech in his own country and tried to check by force of arms all liberal and national movements in Europe."⁴⁰⁰ The story of Nicholas's telling his guests to saddle their horses because the French had declared another Republic

³⁹⁷ Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 12.

³⁹⁸ Zernov rejected the idea that the system imposed by Nicholas was Russian nationalism. This is backed up by the following quotation: "If we consider the matter thoroughly, then, in justice, we must be called not Russians, but Petrovians . . . Everything: glory, power, prosperity, and enlightenment, we owe to the Romanov family; . . . Russia should be called Petrovia, and Petrovians; or the empire should be named Romanovia, and we--Romanovites." This was the statement of Count E. Kankrin, the minister of finance who was also German by origin. Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality, p. 139.

³⁹⁹ Nicholas M. Zernov, "Angliiskii Bogoslov," p. 59.

⁴⁰⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 131.

(1848) became famous.⁴⁰¹ Despite his reputation as an iron-fisted ruler, Nicholas I was indecisive. The tsar toyed with the idea of modernizing Russia, first, by emancipating the serfs, and second, by industrializing. He failed to act decisively, thereby alienating the intellectual elite from the government. Without the intellectuals' support the transformation of Russia's eighteenth century social and economic system into a modern nineteenth-century one became impossible.⁴⁰² The former constituted a closed social order dominated by the nobility, while the latter represented a liberalizing society, such as England's.

The elite, whom Nicholas I alienated, composed the most progressive element in Russian society. Although the solutions that different elitist groups offered for Russia's ills varied, they held two views in common: serfdom was an inhumane injustice, and the regimented Prussian type autocracy violated human dignity and stifled any form of progress.⁴⁰³ With these shared beliefs, the proposed nature of the reforms, Western or traditional Russian, further divided the educated elite into two distinct groups, the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. The Westernizers, as their name suggested, believed that Russia's future lay with the West. They contended that the Western

⁴⁰¹Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality, p. 247.

⁴⁰²Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 13.

⁴⁰³Ibid.

pattern of social progress, if followed closely by Russia, would insure her success.⁴⁰⁴ From the Westernizers emerged the intelligentsia and the radical revolutionary tradition in Russia. The Slavophiles also opposed the Prussian style autocracy. They, too, sought reform. In contrast to the Westernizers's faith in an imported solution for Russia's social and economic problems, the Slavophiles believed that the answer would come from a revival of Christian spirit in Russia and a return to the traditions of theocratic Muscovy.

Nicholas I treated both groups with hostility. He not only opposed the European liberalism of the Westernizers but also the spiritualistic Orthodox solutions proposed by the Slavophiles. The solution both factions offered failed to fit the Nicholian model. The government managed to check all cries for reform until the Crimean War (1854-1855) revealed the "bankrupt character" of Nicholas's rule. The army collapsed; the ministries were inept; the economy floundered; and industry was underdeveloped. With this strain, "the Empire began to crack."⁴⁰⁵ By the end of Nicholas I's reign, it was too late to save the empire because a profound change, which will be discussed later, had already occurred in the nature of the intelligentsia. Because of this change, Alexander II and his

⁴⁰⁴Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵Ibid., p. 14.

emancipation of the serfs coupled with planned industrialization came too late. The reforming tsar himself died at the hands of an assassin, a member of a sect within the intelligentsia. The assassination appeared a paradox. The intelligentsia of the 1840s would have welcomed the emancipation, but it had undergone a metamorphosis; it had become the radical force that ultimately destroyed the Petersburg empire.

In his search for the origins of the intelligentsia, Zernov fastened upon the Masonic movements of the eighteenth century.⁴⁰⁶ In the reign of Catherine II occurred the first verbalization of the widening chasm between the rulers and the ruled of Russia. A. M. Radishchev (1749-1802), in his A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, attacked the serf system and the role of the nobility in it. Although Radishchev did not belong to the Freemasons, Freemasons mounted a similar protest against serfdom. This protest centered around the figure of N. I. Novikov (1774-1818) expressed the conviction that serfdom harmed Russia and had to be eradicated if Russia was to achieve her full

⁴⁰⁶ Zernov argued that the intelligentsia struggled and fought against the injustice of the Petersburg monarchy and its lack of Christian responsibility toward the people of the nation. His argument that the origins of the intelligentsia lay in the Masonic movement are largely substantiated by Raeff's argument that the origins of the intelligentsia lay in the eighteenth-century service in Freemasonry. Marc Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia, p. 163.

potential.⁴⁰⁷ Although hardly revolutionary, such persons as Radishchev and Novikov symbolized the growing social consciousness among the educated in Russia. Despite the divergent views on society held by Freemasons and the more conservative reform-minded nobility, serfdom and its attendant horrors provided a common cause around which the dissidents rallied.

As already noted, early nineteenth-century Russia produced two movements that desired reform but disagreed over the form that the reform should take. The Westernizers wanted liberal reform on the French model and the Slavophiles or "nationalists" according to Zernov sought to resurrect the social principles of Muscovy.⁴⁰⁸ The primary differences between the two groups remained obscure until 1836. In that year, P. Ia. Chaadaev defined the position of the westernized intelligentsia and set it apart from that of the Slavophiles. In his "Philosophical Letters," published in the Moscow Telescope, Chaadaev proclaimed that until Russia became European, she would never achieve her potential status as a great world power.⁴⁰⁹ From the publication of these letters, the division between the two groups became apparent. The intelligentsia acquired a characteristic of

⁴⁰⁷ Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 11.

⁴⁰⁸ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 37.

⁴⁰⁹ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 55.

its own--it became a secular "religious order," founded by three men, V. G. Belinskii (1811-1848), A. I. Herzen (1812-1870), and M. M. Bakunin (1814-1876).⁴¹⁰

Spurred by Chaadaev's "Letters," each of these men made contributions to the intelligentsia's thought and shaped to a significant degree the direction of the reform and revolutionary movements in Russia. Belinskii's thought and writings broke with accepted Russian Orthodox tradition. At one time fanatically Orthodox, Belinskii rejected Christianity and substituted for it an equally fanatical and absolute faith in Western socialism. The messianic nature of his ideas remained unaltered, but instead of the kingdom of God he now sought a secular "Kingdom of Righteousness."⁴¹¹ He represented the transition in thought from German idealism and Christianity, ideas alien to eighteenth-century rationalism, and to "atheistic materialism," the origins of which lay in the exaltation of reason in the tradition of the Enlightenment.⁴¹²

Herzen, Belinskii's contemporary, made the element of violence acceptable among members of the intelligentsia. As Zernov explained, Herzen saw himself in the Decembrist tradition, in which the idea of force paralleled that of social reform.⁴¹³ In addition, he became one of the first

⁴¹⁰Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 3.

⁴¹¹Ibid., p. 20.

⁴¹²Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 55.

⁴¹³Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 3.

persons to take the ideas of the Western socialists and place them in a Russian context. He argued that the peasant commune constituted the best institution for the social transformation of Russia.⁴¹⁴ To Herzen, Russia represented "the advanced guard on the road to integral socialism."⁴¹⁵ Throughout his life, he campaigned against the Empire and gained a reputation as an uncompromising crusader, but his ability for self-criticism alienated many in the movement and prevented his acquiring a position of leadership.⁴¹⁶

Mikhail Bakunin combined the most radical sentiments of Belinskii and Herzen.⁴¹⁷ He borrowed Belinskii's absolute faith in socialism and Herzen's Decembrist propensity for action. He also shared with Herzen the belief in the uniqueness of the peasant commune and its future role in bringing socialism to Russia. This volatile combination of revolutionary socialism and violence produced in Bakunin the fervent desire for "peace, unity and freedom."⁴¹⁸ It also

⁴¹⁴Stuart R. Tompkins, The Russian Intelligentsia: Makers of the Revolutionary State (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), p. 56.

⁴¹⁵Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance.

⁴¹⁶Ibid.

⁴¹⁷For additional biographical information on Bakunin see: Max Nomad, Apostles of Revolution (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1939) and E. H. Carr, Michael Bakunin (New York: Alfred Knopf & Co., 1961).

⁴¹⁸Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 21.

created an overwhelming desire to annihilate the old order, and as a result, he devoted all of his intellect and energies to revolutionary activities. Although his anarchism and erratic actions prevented his leading the revolutionary party in Russia, he exerted a considerable influence over the left-wing of the intelligentsia. A "dynamic," "despotic figure" Bakunin became the link between the writers and thinkers of the 1830s and the 1840s, and the violent left-wing radicals of the 1860s.⁴¹⁹

At mid-century, the intelligentsia changed in composition and methods. During the first half of the century, the educated came predominantly from the landed gentry, and their reform sentiment was conservative. They recognized that their position in society depended on the survival of the monarchy, and although they realized its shortcomings, they sought to reform the government rather than destroy it.⁴²⁰ Under Nicholas I, reformers found themselves in a situation in which they could not effect changes. Conscious of the injustices of serfdom and autocratic rule, they were nevertheless tied to it, and neither could nor would destroy it. In the second half of the nineteenth century the situation changed.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

II

The assassination of Alexander II symbolized the altered nature of the intelligentsia. After witnessing the disaster of the Crimean War, Alexander II introduced badly needed forms.⁴²¹ According to Zernov, Alexander's solutions might have sufficed forty years before, but in 1861 only the rapid and total transformation of Russia could have satisfied the radical intelligentsia.⁴²² His death opened a battle between the intelligentsia and the crown that continued through the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II.⁴²³ In spite of attempts by extreme nationalists and Panslavists to unite Russia, the battle raged, and in the end the Empire tottered and fell.⁴²⁴

After 1860 the intelligentsia and the Western ideas that it borrowed became more extreme. The shift in the intelligentsia paralleled another in Russian society, namely, that away from religion by dissenters of lower classes. Many in the lower middle and professional classes, realizing that the church had become the tool of the oppressive tsars, turned their backs on religion and replaced their faith in spiritualism with a faith in materialism. Their transformation into a revolutionary body closely

⁴²¹Blum, Lord and Peasant, pp. 578-580.

⁴²²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church.

⁴²³Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 15.

⁴²⁴Zernov, The Russians and Their Church.

resembled the earlier change among members of the aristocracy who joined the intelligentsia of the 1840s. The lower middle-class and the aristocratic elements of an earlier generation had not lost their messianism; they had merely shifted it from the next world to the one in which they lived.⁴²⁵

The new radical intelligentsia were the sons of petty bureaucrats, the rural clergy, and liberated serfs. Without the restraint of aristocratic birth, their exposure to revolutionary socialist ideas produced a totally negative attitude toward the Petersburg Empire. For these revolutionaries, Western thought became a tool with which they combated social and political evil.⁴²⁶ They saw only one way to a new and better world, and it began with the destruction of the monarchy. This "single-mindedness" accounted for their success. They shut out dissent: "Those who belonged to it did not question their fundamental convictions. They argued only about tactics and means, not about aims and principles."⁴²⁷ According to Zernov, five men, N. G. Chernyshevskii (1822-1889), N. A. Dobroliubov (1836-1861), D. I. Pisarev (1840-1868), P. L. Lavrov (1823-1900), and N. K. Mikhailovskii (1843-1904), "formulated the outlook of the [radical] intelligentsia, coined its ideology and traced its programme of action."⁴²⁸

⁴²⁵Zernov, "The Establishment of the Russian Church," p. 56.

⁴²⁶Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 16.

⁴²⁷Ibid., p. 18.

⁴²⁸Ibid., p. 21.

Chernyshevskii and Dobroliubov, two former theology students, discarded their religious faith and turned to Feuerbach and English utilitarianism and a total rejection of the past. Both served as editors for the radical journal, The Contemporary.⁴²⁹ Chernyshevskii's greatest work, What Is To Be Done? became the "Holy Scripture" of the student radicals. The hero of Chernyshevskii's novel resembled a secular monk. For moral training, the hero "slept upon a hard board studded with nails" and worked for justice and his fellowman, and against the evil government and society that denied people their rights.⁴³⁰ Both Chernyshevskii and Dobroliukov supported sexual equality, sanctification of natural science, and economic determinism. They went to extremes, with free-love, communal living, and outlandish dress.⁴³¹ Using these tactics, they visibly displayed their contempt for tradition and the conventions and ideas of the preceding generation of the intelligentsia.⁴³²

⁴²⁹Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 386.

Ludwig Feuerbach was a nineteenth-century German critic of religion. He argued that all of existence was relative to the individual's perception of it and that the accuracy of the individual view could only be judged by the degree of success attained by actions based upon them. Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1940), p. 126.

⁴³⁰Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 22.

⁴³¹Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 386.

⁴³²Billington explained that I. S. Turgenev's Fathers and Sons, published in 1862 and available from The New American Press, developed this theme of conflict between the generations. The novel contained all of the recriminations and generalizations flung by the "fathers," the intelligentsia of the 30's and 40's, at the "sons," the intelligentsia of the 60's. Chernyshevskii's and Dobroliubov's expulsion of the older generation from the staff of The Contemporary exemplified the hostility between

Pisarev also reflected the "student mentality," as Zernov described it, but he represented the most extreme element in the intelligentsia. Labelled "a consistent nihilist," Pisarev attempted to "reduce every kind of human activity to a biological function."⁴³³ His more extreme radicalism manifested itself in his reception of Turgenev's Fathers and Sons. Chernyshevskii viewed Bazarov, the nihilist in the novel, as a "caricature," but Pisarev saw him as the model for the "new men of the sixties."⁴³⁴ He willingly sacrificed political expediency on the altar of theoretical purity and orthodoxy.⁴³⁵ Although these men died young, their ideas had a tremendous impact upon the intellectual leaders of the late nineteenth century.⁴³⁶

The "populists," Lavrov and Mikhailovskii, also influenced the intelligentsia. According to Zernov, they combined positivism and political idealism and held that "self-denying service to the poor and underprivileged" was the moral responsibility of the educated.⁴³⁷ Borrowed from the teachings of Auguste Comte, "[t]heir unquestioning faith

the generations. The Icon and the Axe, p. 387.

⁴³³Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 23.

⁴³⁴Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 387.

⁴³⁵Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 23.

⁴³⁶*Ibid.*

⁴³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 24.

in an illimitable material and moral progress was accompanied by a call to self-sacrifice for the common good which alone made life worth living."⁴³⁸ Lavrov's Historical Letters, 1870, argued for the special role of the critically thinking individual in instituting social change.⁴³⁹ He, like Mikhailovskii, had absolute faith in science's ability to resolve human problems and found Comte's "appeal for a new aristocracy of talent" appealing. It was a necessary aristocracy that accelerated and guided society's transformation.⁴⁴⁰

Mikhailovskii's writings interested Zernov even more than those of Lavrov; because the former's writings attempted to deal with the peasant question. In the 1870s he added a uniquely Russian touch to his beliefs in positivism and socialism; "[h]e believed that the Russian peasant community contained the seeds of the ideal classless order of the future."⁴⁴¹ Thus, it became the duty of the educated in Russia to integrate themselves into rural life and there find the "inspiration and strength" to reform Russia.⁴⁴² It was also imperative that the peasants become revolutionary

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Billington, The Icon and the Axe, pp. 389-390.

⁴⁴¹ Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 24.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

in order to escape from the yoke of their oppressors. Mikhailovskii's writings and thought strongly influenced the 1874 movement to the people. In it, nearly four thousand students left their studies, donned peasant shirts, and went out into the countryside. They had various motives: some wanted only to help the peasants; others preached passive resistance to tsarist officials; and still others attempted to foment a revolution.⁴⁴³

The entire question of the peasant rejection of the 1874 movement interested Zernov. The intelligentsia did not understand the peasants or peasant life. The populists sermonized against the abuses of the peasantry by the Westernized aristocracy; they called for the peasants to resist the Petersburg Empire and to establish in its place socialist peasant communities based on positivistic atheistic materialism. Their attack on Orthodoxy represented their gravest error. First, "[a]theism and materialism were . . . the creed of the westernized classes" whom the peasants had long despised.⁴⁴⁴ The populists did not recognize that the very elements and characteristics of Russian peasant life resulted from the "cohesion and moral integrity" provided by the Russian Orthodox faith. The peasantry sensed this connection, and ignored the atheistic appeals of the students.⁴⁴⁵ The students attempted to mold the peasantry

⁴⁴³Ibid., p. 26.

⁴⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 26-27.

⁴⁴⁵Ibid., p. 26.

into a replica of themselves, a group "suspended between the old Muscovite culture and the civilization of the Empire, foreigners to both."⁴⁴⁶ Unable to enlist the peasantry in their revolutionary cause, the radicals realized that they had to work for revolution in another manner. In the theories of S. G. Nechaev (1847-1882) and P. S. Tkachev (1844-1885), the role of the revolutionary elite emerged. Only through a tight-knit totally disciplined party could revolution occur. Party members had to be totally dedicated to the revolutionary ideal and submissive to their leaders. The thought of these men with its emphasis on the professional revolutionary bridged the gap between the "men of the 60's" and the Marxist-Leninist party of the early twentieth century.⁴⁴⁷

The intelligentsia destroyed the Empire but in turn succumbed to the violent forces that followed the Empire's collapse. In the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the westernized conservatives, who supported the tsarist government, clashed with the radical Westernizers, made up of the liberals and revolutionaries. The liberal faction of the radical group triumphed, but its victory was a temporary one. After their 1917 victory, the liberals instituted an open democratic government "modelled

⁴⁴⁶Ibid. Turgenev's The Virgin Soil was based on the movement to the people of 1874. It was written in 1877.

⁴⁴⁷Ibid., p. 28.

upon the best European pattern." As in the Time of Troubles, when the peasants overthrew the boiar dominated Shiuskii government, so in 1917, they arose in "passionate revolt" against the Western political order dominated by the wealthy.⁴⁴⁸ The peasants, not the Communists, destroyed the Provisional Government. The Communist revolt was incidental to the real revolt--that of the peasantry against the Western political system.⁴⁴⁹ The peasant revolt, although immediately successful, lacked leadership and direction; the Communists under Lenin and Trotsky stepped into the vacuum and provided both. Thus, according to Zernov, unusual circumstances resulted in a temporary alliance between the diametrically opposed movements of the Communists and the peasantry. The Communists hoped to found a new communal order based on science and rationalism. The peasantry wished to return to the old communal order of Muscovy based on spiritualism and Orthodox Christianity.⁴⁵⁰

III

After the study of the development of the intelligentsia from its origins in the eighteenth-century nobility, this narrative must return to the reign of Nicholas I and

⁴⁴⁸Zernov continually argued that the Russian people would not tolerate a government that represented the narrow interests of one class. He used this theme in his interpretation of the Time of Troubles and the October Revolution of 1917, but he made no real attempt to explain this view in relation to the domination of the government by the nobility in the eighteenth century.

⁴⁴⁹Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 97.

⁴⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 98.

trace the development of the Slavophile movement which paralleled that of the intelligentsia. The Slavophiles also remained outside the Imperial tradition and criticized it. Two distinct forms of Slavophilism emerged. The first was true Slavophilism, which was an intelligent Christian approach not only to the problems of Russia but also to those of mankind in general. The "original Slavophiles" were a close group of friends with similar social and intellectual interests. All came from the landed gentry and were well educated; many of their number had studied in Western Europe. Despite their inherent conservatism, they constituted a dangerous social element in the eyes of the court and received the constant attention of the secret police. Their Western educations, however, gained them nothing in the way of acceptance among the intelligentsia. They were isolated, "[b]ut undismayed by this general opposition, . . . they continued to preach their doctrine, proclaiming their belief in the vigour and originality of Russian culture, and putting their trust in the truth of Christian teaching as revealed by the Orthodox Church."⁴⁵¹ From this movement emerged a twentieth-century revival in religion in Russia. The Slavophiles' spirit, unlike that of the materialistic socialists, did not perish in the holocaust of 1917, but survived the Revolution and Stalin.

⁴⁵¹Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 55.

It lasted because it represented the indestructable divine element in man that makes him aspire to transcendental meaning in life. In the opinion of Zernov, the lives and writings of three men, A. S. Khomiakov (1804-1860), F. M. Dostoevskii (1821-1881), and V. S. Solov'ev (1853-1900) best exemplified the spirit of the Slavophiles.⁴⁵²

The Slavophiles, like the intelligentsia, grew out of the influences of the Freemasons during the reign of Catherine II, who emphasized the "inner essence of man," and "the awakening of the heart," and the German idealists, Schelling, Schiller, Fichte, and Hegel.⁴⁵³ In stark contrast to the Westernized intelligentsia, the Slavophiles rejected Westernism as a solution for Russia's problem and exalted in its place the Russian Orthodox traditions of Old Muscovy. More than anything else, Moscow was their symbol, and St. Petersburg and its founder's tradition their enemy. They were above all free thinkers who detested the repression that Nicholas I's "official nationality" represented. In their view, Nicholas I and his attraction to militarism and force in domestic affairs reflected his Prussian

⁴⁵²Zernov stated that the super-nationalism of such men as Nicholas Danilevskii and Michael Katkov did not represent the true spirit of Slavophilism in spite of the fact that they called themselves Slavophiles. Zernov contended that their Pan-Slavism had little if anything in common with the beliefs of the original Slavophiles like Aleksei Khomiakov. Ibid.

⁴⁵³Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 12-13.

orientation and the influence of the Petrine tradition. He, like Peter the Great, attempted to impose institutional and social relationships on Russia that were alien to national tradition.⁴⁵⁴ The Slavophiles whom Zernov described as "national radicals" rejected any solution for Russian social and political problems that lay outside the Russian Orthodox tradition.⁴⁵⁵

A. S. Khomiakov was the founder and leading spokesman of the Slavophile movement.⁴⁵⁶ He believed that the only true church was the Russian Orthodox and that the Western Church's separation from it was tragic.⁴⁵⁷ Through his brilliant oratory and theological writings, Khomiakov warned the Russians of the coming crisis in Western civilization.⁴⁵⁸ A contemporary of Pushkin, Gogol, and Lermontov, Khomiakov also possessed great literary skill in addition to a western education and a knowledge of several foreign languages.⁴⁵⁹ Yet he rejected the philosophical tenets

⁴⁵⁴Ibid., p. 39.

⁴⁵⁵Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 97.

⁴⁵⁶Zernov was not alone in his high opinion of Khomiakov's theoretical work on Russian religion and culture. Riasanovsky also recognized the significance of his contributions, but he stated that their thought roughly paralleled the romantic movement in the West. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 403.

⁴⁵⁷Nicolas M. Zernov, The Orthodox Encounter, p. 143.

⁴⁵⁸Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 141.

⁴⁵⁹Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 46.

of the West and became the founder and central figure in a movement that exalted Russian Christianity as the salvation for mankind.⁴⁶⁰ As Zernov wrote:

In the middle of the nineteenth century, when belief in progress, science and individualism was universal, he had the foresight and courage to preach the approaching doom of an order based on the self-reliance of man and overconfident trust in the power of human reason.⁴⁶¹

Although his pronouncements were "prophetic," Khomiakov's audiences remained small because of the hostility of the intelligentsia who had absolute faith in Western ideas and of the repression of Nicholas I's government.

Khomiakov's primary objection to the West stemmed from its emphasis on political unity. The Slavophiles argued that the Roman church inherited the tradition of deification of political society. From Khomiakov's point of view, deification of politics constituted a profound tragedy because Westerners began to see the church only in political terms, as a state. Like all states, it sponsored intolerance, compulsion, aggression, and militarism (in the form of a crusade).⁴⁶² Khomiakov believed that this policy alienated the Western Church from the other Christian traditions. Protestantism merely added more aggravation

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 49. See also, Anatole G. Mazour, The First Russian Revolution, 1825 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1937), p. 272.

⁴⁶¹ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 140

⁴⁶² Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 65.

to the problems caused by Catholicism. The Protestants carried papal individualism, the setting of man above the community, one step further by declaring the individualism of every believer. With this pronouncement, they completely destroyed the church's unity. Every Protestant became his own pope.⁴⁶³ Khomiakov answered the problems created by Western Christianity in a book, The Church Is One. Here, he argued that the church constituted an organic unity. He defined the church "not as a multitude of persons in the separate individuality, but as a unity of the grace of God living in a multitude of rational creatures submitting themselves willingly to grace."⁴⁶⁴ Khomiakov believed that communal fellowship had been best preserved in the Russian experience, through the influence of the Orthodox Church and through the sense of humility and brotherhood that the Russian peasant possessed.⁴⁶⁵

The writings of the Slavophiles represented to Zernov the seeds of a Russian religious revival. Khomiakov called the Russian nation to assume its responsibility as the leader of Christendom and indicted the West for its divisive bickerings. He crusaded against the entrance of

⁴⁶³ Ibid., p. 67.

⁴⁶⁴ Zernov, The Reintegration of the Church (London: Student Christian Movement Press, Ltd., 1952), p. 18.

⁴⁶⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., S. V. "Khomiakov, Alexei," by Nicolas M. Zernov.

Western culture into Russia and called for the awakening of Russian national pride and Russia's historical religious mission. He was not alone in his efforts.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Slavophile movement took an alien turn. M. N. Katkov (1820-1887), N. N. Strakhov (1828-1896), and N. Ia. Danilevskii (1822-1885) assumed leadership and "began to preach an aggressive nationalism under the name of Slavophilism."⁴⁶⁶ Although those who called themselves Slavophiles abandoned Khomiakov's idealism, his idea's found roots elsewhere. His thought deeply influenced Feodor Dostoevskii and Vladimir Solov'ev.⁴⁶⁷

Dostoevskii, whom Zernov called the "greatest of all Russian writers," came from the traditions of Imperial Russia. He was Lithuanian by heritage, and military discipline governed his family. His father was such a repressive individual that his serfs eventually murdered him. As soon as Feodor was of age, he entered the military, where he began to write and became popular in the literary circles of the capital, only to fall out of favor with the critics. At the same time, the inflammatory nature of his writings resulted in a court martial and expulsion from the army. His further literary and political exploits resulted in a four-year sentence to Siberia, and only in 1859 did he

⁴⁶⁶ Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 55.

⁴⁶⁷ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 140.

return to European Russia and begin to rebuild his literary reputation. Between 1859 and 1865, he published a magazine and wrote several novels. By 1865, he became so unpopular with the government and his debts mounted to the point that he was forced to live abroad in order to escape imprisonment. During this last period of his life, he produced his greatest novels, Crime and Punishment, The Idiot, The Possessed, and The Brothers Karamazov. These Zernov believed echoed the prophecies of Khomiakov.⁴⁶⁸

Dostoevskii argued that man contained the secret to the universe and as a result "could not be explained in purely human terms."⁴⁶⁹ Man stood as a "microcosm" of existence, a revelation of the chaos within the individual and in the external environment in which he lived.⁴⁷⁰ The world and man constituted a contesting ground between the good and evil inherent in both. To Dostoevskii, man was everything: good and evil; moral and immoral; cruel and compassionate; intelligent and stupid. "They [men] stand on the edge of a precipice of crime and degradation, and yet they long for goodness and truth."⁴⁷¹ His interpretation of man represented a firm rejection of the premises of Western rationalism. He demanded that society recognize that man was not a rational creature capable of achieving

⁴⁶⁸Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, pp. 82-86.

⁴⁶⁹Ibid., p. 88.

⁴⁷⁰Ibid., p. 93.

⁴⁷¹Ibid., p. 87.

"a higher stage" of development through environmental influences. Split by the good and evil existing simultaneously within, man found himself engulfed in a never ending struggle. Dostoevskii believed that only through God could the struggle end and the schism in the individual be healed.⁴⁷²

This theme of schism also permeated his views on man and society. He admonished the Russian nation to reconcile itself with Christianity because only Christianity held the power to unify mankind in a just society.⁴⁷³ Time and again, his heroes found hope and meaning in the Russian religious tradition. In the "Atheist," Dostoevskii's hero moved from atheism to Slavophilism, to Westernism, to Catholicism, and finally found salvation in "the Russian soil, the Russian Saviour, and the Russian God."⁴⁷⁴ This Russian solution attracted Zernov also: "He [Dostoevskii] ascribed the gifts possessed by the Russian people, not to their superior natural qualities, which he denied, but to their personal meeting with Christ, which transformed and elevated the whole nation."⁴⁷⁵ This meeting created in Russia a system of Christian socialism. For Dostoevskii, "[t]he only true progress [for Russia and man] was in the

⁴⁷²Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁷³Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 18.

⁴⁷⁴Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 418.

⁴⁷⁵Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 103.

experience of a new life in Christ."⁴⁷⁶ He argued that the Russian people carried within themselves a unique knowledge of Christianity and that through love and suffering the "Russian idea" of a universal reconciliation among men would occur.⁴⁷⁷ Dostoevskii's conversion to Christianity brought him this reconciliation on an individual level, and according to Zernov, sparked his greatness. From Christianity, he gained deep insight into the nature of man and the spiritual struggle in man's soul. His writing formed scathing rebuke of the "quack doctors" and "false prophets" with their superficial socialist and liberal cures for the ills afflicting man and society.⁴⁷⁸

Dostoevskii was not alone in his views on Russia and the West; V. S. Solov'ev, in his brilliant essays, made similar pronouncements. Born in Moscow in 1853, he was the son of S. M. Solov'ev, the great nineteenth-century Russian historian. During his school years and until 1881, he associated with the Slavophiles. After 1881, which marked the deaths of both Dostoevskii and Alexander II, Solov'ev identified himself with an effort to reunite the church. In Zernov's view, Solov'ev's work represented the natural culmination of the ideas of Khomiakov and Dostoevskii,

⁴⁷⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 387.

⁴⁷⁸Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 115.

the idea that a man could only find peace through Christianity in one body--the united church. Solov'ev argued that "[p]erfect unity and holiness is in God; divisions and sin in the worldly humanity; union and consecration in the Church . . . but in order to unite and consecrate, the Church itself must be one and holy."⁴⁷⁹ The Christian vision of these three men, because of its transcendental nature, allowed Russian religion to survive the holocaust that destroyed their contemporary rivals, the intelligentsia. Zernov's position was clear. Members of the intelligentsia and its varying outgrowths, liberalism and socialism, depended on man to save himself. They believed that man had the capability to solve his problems and bring heaven to earth. With their materialistic approach to human problems they ignored, discounted, or denied the element of spirit in the man and the world, and as a result the October Revolution destroyed their material world, and they disappeared without a trace. In contrast, the much maligned, isolated thinkers and writers, of whom Khomiakov, Dostoevskii, and Solov'ev were the most prominent, tapped the perennial source of Russian culture, its religion. They managed to restate Russia's mission to unite Christendom and to provide the foundation for a Russian religious revival that would survive the Revolution that destroyed the western ideologies. Their solution was spiritual, and, therefore, it lasted.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁹Ibid., p. 140.

⁴⁸⁰Ibid., p. 147.

IV

While the Slavophiles and the intelligentsia offered their various solutions to Russia's predicament, the institutional church entered a critical stage of development. Since Peter the Great, the church had been a powerless body totally dependent on the state. Its condition resulted directly from the political policies pursued by the rulers of Russia for two hundred years. Separated from the people and ruled by reliable government bureaucrats, the church lacked popular support and decayed spiritually. One man, K. P. Pobedonostsev (1828-1907), symbolized the depressing condition of the late nineteenth-century Russian Orthodox Church.

From 1880 until 1905, Pobedonostsev ruled the Russian church as procurator. "Ironrule" described his policy. He was the tutor of Alexander III, and although he was devoutly religious, he was also excessively conservative. Zernov believed that his disposition stemmed from a deep-seated cynicism: "Pobedonostsev seems to have believed that evil was stronger than good, and that discord and disunity could always prevail over constructive forces."⁴⁸¹ He viewed disunity and evil as synonymous and thus answered dissent with repression and censorship. He used legal and extra-legal means to maintain his power. For example, he systematically transferred bishops. This prevented the bishops

⁴⁸¹Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 65.

from developing a close contact with the people and left them totally dependent on the procurator for their position. He also effectively silenced all dissent within the church and convinced the people that the clergy at large supported his policies. Both of these practices violated cannon law, but that had no effect on Pobedonostsev.⁴⁸²

Under Pobedonostsev, the condition of the clergy as a whole deteriorated. Church schools, created on the scholastic models of the eighteenth century, "poisoned" many of their pupils against religion. As Zernov pointed out, "some of the most ardent revolutionaries came from the ranks of the seminarists."⁴⁸³ The parish clergy had an unattractive, poverty stricken life. They lacked any authority and found themselves at the mercy of every petty official or magistrate. The bishops were little better off. Their subsidies were meager, and they were denied any voice in the life of the nation.⁴⁸⁴ Such was the appalling condition of the church in 1905.

In spite of the humiliating position in which the church found itself, a new awakening began in reaction to

⁴⁸²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 144. For more on Zernov's views of the Russian Episcopate after the time of Peter I see, Nicolas M. Zernov, "The Russian Episcopate and Church Reforms." Church Quarterly Review 121 (April 1934):80-97.

⁴⁸³Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 145.

⁴⁸⁴Ibid., p. 146.

Pobedonostsev. In opposition to the opportunists, a new breed of parish priest emerged. Enlightened and scholarly, these men attempted to restore the community of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian people. They demanded a restoration of church self-government and of the patriarchate.⁴⁸⁵ Zernov compared their emergence in the Russian church to a Russian river frozen on the surface during the winter and bursting forth in the spring to reclaim its freedom.⁴⁸⁶ The church echoed with the cries for the convocation of a general council, the first since Peter I.⁴⁸⁷

In 1905 both the Russian Church and state were shaken by the catastrophic Russo-Japanese War. Reform became unavoidable. Bishop Antonin of Narva stated the mood of the time within the church: "'The gates are thrown open, the procession of the nation's representatives is approaching the palace of the State . . . ; with fear and anxiety, the Orthodox wait to see whether the Apostle Paul will come forth once again chained to the arm of a Roman centurion.'"⁴⁸⁸ In 1905 Pobedonostsev fell from power, and an imperial decree granted religious freedom to all groups.⁴⁸⁹ In addition, the government promised a new

⁴⁸⁵Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 62.

⁴⁸⁶Ibid., p. 61.

⁴⁸⁷Ibid., p. 62.

⁴⁸⁸Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 151.

⁴⁸⁹Zernov insinuated that Pobedonostsev lost his position as a direct result of the liberalization policy after the 1905 Revolution, however; he was not forced out but resigned in protest of the reforms in general and the law granting religious toleration in particular. Ammann, Abriss der

council and constitution for the Orthodox Church. The church formed a commission to prepare for the coming reform council but to no avail; a new church council was never convened.⁴⁹⁰ Having weathered the immediate crisis of 1905, Nicholas II, within two years, reinstituted his authoritarian policies. These halted the movement toward ecclesiastical independence and returned the church to its mute status. In Zernov's words, "[t]o the end the Monarchy remained suspicious of the Church and unwilling to release it from its servitude to the state."⁴⁹¹

The figure of Rasputin symbolized the condition of the Empire during its last years. Rasputin in no way represented the Orthodox Church; "Rasputin was neither priest, nor monk."⁴⁹² The Empress believed that he was the spokesman for the peasantry, and his elevation represented a feeble attempt by the rulers of the Empire to restore their contact with the nation. Zernov, while admitting Rasputin's mystical but demonic powers, stated that he dragged the Empire with him in his fall.⁴⁹³

The Empire fell because the bureaucratic Petersburg

Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte, p. 569.

⁴⁹⁰ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 151.

⁴⁹¹ Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 84.

⁴⁹² Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 151.

⁴⁹³ Ibid., p. 152.

monarchy lost contact with the people. It lost the communal spirit of the Russian nation; therefore, in 1917 the first revolution of the westernized intelligentsia destroyed the monarchy and inaugurated a period of freedom in Russian life.⁴⁹⁴ After the monarchy fell, the long awaited church council met and "restored the proper constitution of the church, one which allowed the lay members a voice in its government."⁴⁹⁵ The action of the 1917 Council prepared Russian Christianity to "weather the storm of persecution" that broke after October, 1917, in Moscow and Petrograd.⁴⁹⁶

Zernov equated the period in Russian history from 1917 to 1919 with the Time of Troubles, 1598-1613. Much like Godunov's reign, the Western liberal government had no authority. In addition, foreign invaders entered Russia just as they had three hundred years before. During the crisis, areas free from serfdom prior to 1861 maintained their social stability, while the upper classes, as in 1598, once again failed to direct the nation. The situation in the early seventeenth century had been saved "through the free co-operation of local self-governing communities," a process that began in 1917 but failed to mature in the face of the Communist Revolution.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁴ Zernov, "St. Sergius of Radonezh," p. 310.

⁴⁹⁵ Nicholas M. Zernov, Church of the Eastern Christians (London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1942), p. 20.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁷ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 153.

The second revolution of 1917 wiped out the independent peasant communities and the church's new found freedom. For the first time in its history, the church had a "proper" ecclesiastical organization and for the first time in 200 years, a Patriarch; yet, in a matter of months, it vanished, destroyed by the new wave of revolution. The church now confronted an enemy that sought its total destruction.

Depending on the particular source, Zernov interpreted the Bolshevik Revolution in several different ways but always with one central theme, rejection of the West. He described the Revolution as a revolt of the peasants against the ruling Westernized liberal classes.⁴⁹⁸ In another source, its totalitarianism represented a reaction against Western individualism and materialism.⁴⁹⁹ In still another, it became an attempt to regain through violence the sense of community lost under the Westernized Petersburg Empire.⁵⁰⁰ The Russian people rejected the West, and the Communists under Lenin and Trotskii merely took advantage of the peasants' leaderless situation.

Communism survived in Russia only because the people failed to see the reality behind the theoretical facade. In

⁴⁹⁸ Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 98.

⁴⁹⁹ Zernov, Church of the Eastern Christians, p. 107.

⁵⁰⁰ Zernov, "Sergius of Radonezh," p. 310.

theory, when the element of atheism was discounted, the traditional Russian ideals of brotherhood of man, peace, and sanctity of the individual within the community, appeared very similar to the Communist theory. The people did not understand that the Communists and the church would inevitably come into conflict: hence, many supported the Bolsheviks.⁵⁰¹ With the passage of time, the basic differences materialized for all to see.

The conflict between the church and the Communists occurred in four stages. The first period covered the years of the Civil War, 1918 to 1922. This was a time of relative freedom for the church. There was little systematic persecution of the church, primarily because Lenin believed that without the state's economic support the church would soon collapse.⁵⁰² If collapse did not occur, Lenin intended to confiscate church property and initiate a propaganda campaign. The church frustrated all Bolshevik efforts with its new found vitality. Stripped of its less devout members, the church under the leadership of Patriarch Tikhon regained much of its strength, but the church leaders badly underestimated their opponents.⁵⁰³

At the end of the Civil War in 1922, the Communists came to understand the potential strength of the church and

⁵⁰¹Interview with Nicolas M. Zernov, Oxford, England. 7 March 1975.

⁵⁰²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 161.

⁵⁰³Ibid.

altered their method of attack on it. Unable to destroy it by economic pressure, the Soviet government attempted to weaken the church by schism. Their plan was simple. They arrested the church leaders, including the patriarch, and appointed in their place persons described by Zernov as "collaborators" at the head of the "Living Church." The Communists declared that the patriarch was deposed, and to foster the outward signs of legitimacy, allowed the "Living Church" to convene three church councils, in 1922, 1923, and 1926.⁵⁰⁴ Initially, this government move spread dissension and confusion among the church members, but Tikhon's emergence from prison restored the lost unity, despite his voiced support of the Soviet government. In 1925, Patriarch Tikhon died, and the Communists, taking a page from Peter the Great, did not replace him.⁵⁰⁵ In this second historical period, the church realized that the Communist government was a well-established reality and that the church must learn to live in a hostile climate. On the other hand, the Soviets understood that neither divisions, economic pressures, nor executions could destroy Orthodoxy in Russia.⁵⁰⁶

In 1929, Stalin opened and set the tone of the third period with new laws covering religion. Religious propaganda

⁵⁰⁴ Zernov, Russian Religious Renaissance, p. 203.

⁵⁰⁵ Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 164.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 163.

became an offense against the state, as did philanthropy and educational activity. According to Zernov, this new law symbolized the crisis in confidence among the Bolshevik hierarchy. Initially, the Bolsheviks had believed that open debate between atheism and religion would see the defeat of the latter, but after eleven years of failure they resorted to open repression and persecution.⁵⁰⁷ They also launched a program of terror against the staunchest supporters of Orthodoxy, the peasants. The year 1929 marked the end of the uneasy truce between the Communists and the Russian nation. The Soviets, to protect themselves against a second "peasant revolution," inaugurated a program of suppression and agricultural collectivization in which peasants died by the millions. These programs, Zernov argued, were the culmination of the Westernization begun by Peter the Great.⁵⁰⁸ Stalinism appeared to represent the final triumph of the West over Russia and over the Orthodox Church.⁵⁰⁹

⁵⁰⁷Ibid., p. 165.

⁵⁰⁸Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome, p. 98.

⁵⁰⁹In his writings that date from the 1930s, Zernov, although optimistic about the survival of Christianity in Russia, knew little about the conditions inside the new Soviet state. This lack of information is reflected in his statement of the condition of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1935. Zernov gave only the pre-World War I membership figures for the Russian Church because actual 1935 numbers were unknown. Nicolas M. Zernov, "Some Figures Illustrating the Present State of the Eastern Orthodox Church," Church Quarterly Review, 122 (January 1935):277.

Despite the Stalinist campaign to destroy the church, it survived and rose in defense of Holy Russia during World War II. In 1943 with the very existence of Slavic civilization hanging in the balance, Stalin allowed the church to reemerge and to elect a new patriarch. Patriarch Sergius immediately reorganized the clergy, filled empty positions within the church, and entered the campaign against the German invaders. This entire change of fortune resulted from the spiritual strength of the Russian church and the initial inability of the Soviets sufficiently to motivate the Russian nation to defeat the Germans.⁵¹⁰

In his writings Zernov did not pursue the plight of the church past the rebirth that occurred during World War II. He insinuated that the rebirth was a permanent fixture, a position with which many historians agree.⁵¹¹ The tenacity and resiliency of the Russian Church resulted from its main strength, the people. The church depended on the laity rather than the clergy for propagation of the faith. In Zernov's opinion, this had been and continued to be the historically documented strength of Russian

⁵¹⁰Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 166.

⁵¹¹Zernov's position on the condition of the post-World War II Church in Russia is identical with that held by Riasanovsky in A History of Russia, p. 641.

Orthodoxy:

In spite of the destruction of the ecclesiastical administration and the cessation of all organised instruction, parents, and still more, grandparents, continued to teach their children and grandchildren religion, as they have done throughout all the centuries of Russian history.⁵¹²

To Zernov, the eternal message of the Russian Orthodox Church has survived because of the never dying faith of the Russian people.

⁵¹²Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 166.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: ZERNOV AND THE RUSSIAN PROTEST TRADITION

Zernov's writings on Russian history and culture presented more than the views of an isolated emigre churchman or those of a narrow religiously oriented segment of the Russian emigre movement. Zernov lies in the mainstream of a three hundred-year tradition of protest in Russian literature. Since the reign of Tsar Aleksei, a small but influential group of protesters has directed criticism at the Western ideologies which have crept into Russia and left her culturally divided. In each generation since 1667, Russian literary figures and churchmen criticized the political and social structure of the Russian state. Because the public institutions of Russia were closed to them, they expressed themselves through literature, some of which ranks as the greatest in the world. Although a part of the protest, Zernov also contributed something unique to the protest tradition. Unlike the writers and churchmen of the past who saw Russia from a narrow social, religious, or economic perspective, Zernov approached Russia from an historical and political point of view. His

writings reflected each of the criticisms levelled at Russian society since Aleksei I and provided a synthesis of the ideas of those who protested the evolutionary growth of Western institutions in Russia. But most important, these writings formed a bridge between the spiritualism of the Russian protest and the need to relate this protest to concrete political forms.⁵¹³

For an understanding of his contribution, the origins of the protest tradition must be remembered. They lay in the seventeenth-century Russian experience.⁵¹⁴ The leaders of the Old Believers first associated Westernization in Russia with what they believed represented evil and inhumanity. Avvakum sermonized against the Western

⁵¹³The introduction to this essay demonstrated that Zernov, while describing historical events, used an approach completely alien to that of the secular historians. His spiritual interpretation of Russia's past became the antithesis of those secular views offered by Solov'ev, Kliuchevskii, and Goliubinskii; having established this difference, the writer must use the conclusion to place Zernov's writings and ideas within the proper Russian tradition of writing. His writings are part of the protest tradition of Russian literature. His opinions and interpretations of historical events have much more in common with the ideas of the Old Believers, the Slavophiles, and the great names of Russian literature such as Dostoevskii and Tolstoi, than with that of the historians, although he used historical events to express his religious and cultural opinions.

⁵¹⁴Zernov traced the protest tradition in Russia to the fifteenth century and the Possessor-Nonpossessor controversy, but this dispute lacked the anti-Western element that was present in the protests after the seventeenth century; therefore, it has not been included in the discussion of the "protest tradition." The Russians and Their Church, pp. 44-45.

influences that had dimmed "the first light of truth," Christianity.⁵¹⁵ Avvakum and his followers centered their arguments on theological statements, but in seventeenth-century Russia theological arguments and statements helped to define the social and political relationships. The tsar was a religious and a temporal ruler. Thus, the conflict between Avvakum and Aleksei I became social and political. The Old Believers rejected the new secular state because its materialism offered them nothing; they defended the Muscovite theocracy because it had promised them salvation and given them meaning in life. The westernized Russia replaced God with Peter I, and the Old Believers would not tolerate the new symbol.⁵¹⁶ Peter was the secular state, and the Old Believers revolted against it.

In the eighteenth century, G. S. Skovoroda (1722-1794) carried on the protest tradition. While not as political as the Old Believers, Skovoroda rejected the world of the Enlightenment, shunned Petersburg society, and spent much of his life as a travelling philosopher in the Ukraine.⁵¹⁷ The problems of man and being dominated his writings. He

⁵¹⁵Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 157.

⁵¹⁶Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion," pp. 38-39.

⁵¹⁷V. V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, trans. George L. Kline, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 1:13-14.

based his theories on the Bible and held firmly to Christian metaphysics, but at the same time he injected freethinking and rationalism into his outlook.⁵¹⁸ Although he was Western-educated, Skovoroda's Christian approach to man and his condition stood in direct contrast to the Enlightenment. He turned from the world which he loathed and sought "the spark of God's truth" within man.⁵¹⁹ For his epitaph he wrote, "the world hunted me but it did not catch me."⁵²⁰ Both the Old Believers and Skovoroda possessed another worldliness that became a part of Russian protest. The Old Believers, to protect their faith and humanity, bitterly opposed the Petersburg monarchy and escaped into the theology of apocalypse. They hoped to preserve their spirituality in the face of Russia's Western secular turn.⁵²¹ Skovoroda, displeased with the Russia around him, opted out of the culture of the secular Enlightenment and spent his life wandering in search of truth. He professed that only through a spiritual relationship with Christ could man achieve peace and unity with nature.⁵²² Both men, Avvakum and

⁵¹⁸Ibid., pp. 68-69.

⁵¹⁹Billington, The Icon and the Axe, p. 239.

⁵²⁰James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin, Russian Philosophy vol. 1: The Beginnings of Russian Philosophy, the Slavophiles, The Westernizers (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), p. 15.

⁵²¹Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion," p. 39.

⁵²²Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, 1:68.

Skovoroda, had attempted to recover their humanity which the bureaucratic secularized world of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Russia threatened.

In nineteenth-century Russia, the protest against the West centered on literature. Protest infected the aristocracy and professional classes, from whose ranks came some of the greatest names in Russian literature: L. N. Tolstoi; the Slavophiles, A. S. Khomiakov, K. N. Aksakov, and I. N. Aksakov; F. M. Dostoevskii; and V. S. Solov'ev. Tolstoi revolted against the "artificial Russia" of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In his novels, he mocked the self-deception of men, their desire to ignore what they actually were, and their ability to believe illusions about themselves.⁵²³ Tolstoi, like Skovoroda, renounced materialism. He moved to the Caucasus and then to Iasnaia Poliana and led a life in which he sought to reclaim his unity with nature and God. He modeled his life on that of the early Russian saints and martyrs and rejected the sterile, passive existence of the Russian aristocracy.⁵²⁴ Tolstoi sensed the dichotomy of Russian society, the alienation between the people and the social

⁵²³Walter Kaufmann, ed., Religion from Tolstoy to Camus (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1961), p. 3.

⁵²⁴Maurice Baring, Landmarks in Russian Literature (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960), p. 59.

system imposed by the upper classes. He portrayed the aristocracy's way of life as a shallow sham in which their ideas and actions were totally divorced from the historical reality of Russia and the peasant masses. He, like the Old Believers and Skovoroda, sought meaning not in the man-made world of secularized Russia, but in mysticism and a life close to the soil.

Zernov's writings reflected many of the basic premises from which each of these men, Avvakum, Skovoroda, and Tolstoi, criticized Russia. They were estranged from Russian political institutions and society, which they believed were essentially non-Russian. This estrangement motivated them to attack and withdraw from the societies in which they lived. Zernov's interpretations of Russian history agreed with each of them. He echoed Avvakum's denouncement of Russia's abandonment of her religious traditions and agreed with the archpriest's arguments that secularization destroyed the foundations of Russian society by reordering the relationship between tsar and people. Skovoroda paralleled the figure of St. Sergius in his reaction to the world. Zernov praised in St. Sergius many of Skovoroda's attributes: denial of materialism, humanistic teachings, and a personal identification with the peasantry. The figure of Tolstoi coincided with Zernov's

belief in a higher reality. After witnessing the alienation and the inhumanity wrought by the Petersburg state through the institution of serfdom, Tolstoi defended the cause of the people. He believed that only through Christ and a return to the land could the Russian nobility regain its unity with the peasantry and thus heal the schism in Russian society. Zernov made the same argument.

In the nineteenth century, the tradition of protest against Petrine Russia became more political. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the spokesmen for protest withdrew from the world and totally immersed themselves in spirituality. They had sought to escape the world through mysticism, but the nineteenth century witnessed the decline of those desiring withdrawal and the rise of those seeking spirituality, but in the context of the everyday life of the nation. The Slavophiles began the application of moral and spiritual principles to the political sphere, but as aristocrats, they idealized the paternalistic system of Muscovy and saw it as the ideal model for nineteenth-century Russia. They protested against the proposed liberalization of Russia because, they argued, it was a continuation of the decadent policies begun by Peter I. This autocratic monarchist sentiment contrasted sharply with Zernov's later democratic views.

In his own study of Slavophilism, Zernov examined its contributions. A. S. Khomiakov's doctrine of sobornost became the backbone of the Slavophile movement and ideology.⁵²⁵ The doctrine emphasized the organic unity which manifested itself among people through the Christian church:

"A man who wants to develop his latent creative forces must first sacrifice the selfish side of his personality and thus penetrate into the mystery of common life. He must be united with it by the ties of a living organic fellowship."⁵²⁶

Khomiakov rebuffed persons who argued the liberal individualism of the West. Repeatedly he attacked individualism: "[t]he loneliness of man is the cause of his impotence"; "[a] self-centered individual is powerless"; and "[a] single intellect segregated from living contact with others is barren."⁵²⁷ A social order based on individualism was man-made, and Khomiakov insisted that man would never find fulfillment in such a society. The realization of human dignity came only through the Church, "a free union, permeated with brotherly love for others, in the name of Christ."⁵²⁸

In addition to the religious justifications for his

⁵²⁵Edie, Russian Philosophy, 1:215.

⁵²⁶Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 59.

⁵²⁷Ibid., pp. 58-59.

⁵²⁸Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, 1:189.

political views, the German romantics also played a role in forming Khomiakov's outlook. Hegel significantly influenced him. In Hegel, the same anti-individualistic elements existed. Exaltation of the individual was injurious to nationalism, the value of which transcended the individual. To Hegel, the summit of the national state lay in the monarchy.⁵²⁹ Khomiakov transferred these views on the state, nationalism, and individuality to a Russian context. As he wrote, "'history is summoning Russia to the forefront of the universal enlightenment; and this is her historic right, as a consequence of the diversity and richness of her principles.'"⁵³⁰ Khomiakov saw the task of Russian Orthodoxy and the Russians as the liberation of mankind from its one-sided secular individualistic development under the influence of the West.⁵³¹

I. S. Aksakov's writings provided deeper insight into Slavophile political views.⁵³² In a speech shortly after the assassination of Alexander II, Aksakov proclaimed the Slavophile ideal of "democratic autocracy."⁵³³ Hegel

⁵²⁹ George H. Sabine and Thomas L. Thorson, A History of Political Theory (Hinsdale: Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 590-593.

⁵³⁰ Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, 1:203.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Hegel exalted the Prussian state and the monarch as the head of that state. Mazour, Russian Historiography, p. 36.

⁵³³ Ivan S. Aksakov, "A Slavophile Statement," Readings in Russian Civilization, vol. 2: Imperial Russia, 1700-1917, Thomas Riha, ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 378.

idealized the Prussian monarch as the head of the nation and the supreme figure in the maintenance of nationality and culture. Aksakov described the emperor in the same terms: "the first man of his country"; "that single, vital man"; and "the very essence, the whole image, the whole strength and power of Russia."⁵³⁴ Those who had killed the tsar represented the extreme but logical expression of the westernization introduced by Peter I. Westernism represented a disease that threatened to bring a social revolution. To Aksakov, the constitutionalism of the West promised nothing because Russia already possessed the greatest "elective element" in Europe. Russian political institutions were free and based on "moral truth." He wrote, "There was no antagonism between our Emperor and the people, as our [Russian] superior power has been voluntarily recognized by the whole country."⁵³⁵ He ended by stating that the Old Muscovite conception of unity based on the tenets of "love, confidence, and union of souls" would be restored between the tsar and people.⁵³⁶

In this idealization of the Muscovite autocracy, the Slavophiles displayed the political innocence that became their trademark. Unable to participate actively in the political life of Russia, they lacked practical

⁵³⁴Ibid., p. 379.

⁵³⁵Ibid., p. 381.

⁵³⁶Ibid., p. 382.

political experience. Their theological bent also perpetuated their dislike for the politics of compromise and class interests. The Slavophiles dealt with absolutes in religion and in politics, and because absolutes have existed only in the realm of theory, the Slavophiles created for themselves a just Christian society in Russia's past. It was a theoretical ideal centered on the theocratic nature of the Muscovite state and the messianic doctrine of the Third Rome. They saw Muscovy as a society ruled by a God-appointed ruler who had direct communion with the divine. Their ideal, the God-ordained autocrat, ruled because the people recognized that he was God's servant. The masses had voluntarily yielded themselves to his will. Just as the Slavophiles needed an absolute political good, they also needed an absolute evil. Being a part of the Old Believer tradition, they assailed Peter I and his pagan Westernism as the root of Russian difficulties. They rejected Western innovations as unnatural and contrary to Russian tradition. In theology and philosophy, the Slavophiles made sophisticated arguments about man, God, and society, but in politics, they offered simplistic generalizations. The suffocation and isolation of their political development deprived the Slavophiles of the political sophistication necessary to understand that the ideal society never existed in Russia, and that political

liberalism sought to guarantee those basic human and spiritual rights of which Russia had traditionally been deprived.

In the late nineteenth century, V. S. Solov'ev's writings also reflected a shallow approach to politics. He introduced and emphasized the collectivity of mankind. As he wrote, "All human elements form an integral organism, which is at the same time universal and individual--a pan-human organism."⁵³⁷ The inclusion of this universal element constituted a step away from the narrow Slavic views of the Slavophiles and a step toward the ecumenism of Zernov, but Solov'ev retained the belief that the Russian nation would initiate a worldwide free theocracy.⁵³⁸ In his view, Western political efforts had but two goals: "to organize humanity outside of the unconditional religious sphere, [and] to establish itself and make itself comfortable in the realm of the temporal, finite interests."⁵³⁹ Solov'ev believed that society rested on either God or man. From the Russians, the West could learn that a society founded on eternal principles was preferable to one based on popular will.⁵⁴⁰ Popular will or socialism rested on three principles, liberty, equality, and brotherhood, which in a temporal setting were unattainable. All these worthy goals were obtainable only in the spiritual, only in a

⁵³⁷Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, 2:513.

⁵³⁸N. O. Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Union Ltd., 1952), p. 115.

⁵³⁹V. S. Solov'ev, Lectures on Godmanhood (London: Dennis Dobson Ltd., Publishers, 1948), p. 68.

⁵⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 69.

society following God's will.⁵⁴¹ Russia's mission was not worldly but rather the unification of all mankind in a Christian brotherhood.⁵⁴²

Unlike the Slavophiles and even Solov'ev, Zernov developed sophistication in political matters and an awareness of the functioning of political institutions within society. His awareness resulted from a combination of factors, especially the expressions of his upper middle-class background. While the Slavophiles came from the politically sterile aristocracy of the early nineteenth century, Zernov's family participated in the most powerful liberal movement of twentieth-century Russia. He grew up with the slogans, ideas, and political programs of revolutionary Russia and then lived in exile in the political democracies of the West. Zernov and politics were not strangers, and the influence of the Slavophiles and of Solov'ev did not negate his political background. Prominent in the emigre Russian Orthodox Church, Zernov brought with him an ever expanding wealth of political knowledge and experience.

His political views reflected those of the Russian middle-class, the reformers who wanted to liberalize and democratize Russia into a constitutional monarchy on the

⁵⁴¹Ibid.

⁵⁴²Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy, p. 132.

English model. Zernov had no intellectual attachment to autocratic government. He believed that democratic governments best suited Russia. His writings made this clear: the town councils of Kiev, the village communes of Muscovy, the zemskii sobors, and the middle-class Iaroslav government of the Time of Troubles represented Russian government at its best. The emphasis on democracy was especially pronounced in his writings after 1950. He modified the Slavophile view of "autocratic democracy" and instead stated that governments ideally ruled with the advice and consent of the governed.⁵⁴³

Some of Zernov's publications drew more heavily on the Slavophiles than others. Moscow the Third Rome and St. Sergius, Builder of Russia, written in the 1930's, closely paralleled the Slavophile writings on politics. He wrote these books within a few years of his arrival in England and within ten years of his departure from Russia; thus, he had not come to terms with the permanence of his exile. His writings of the period became extremely antiliberal and supported a theory of politics very similar to the Slavophile doctrine of "democratic autocracy."

Several factors precipitated this rejection of the liberal political beliefs of his father. Disillusionment was the primary one. Reared on the promises of

⁵⁴³Zernov, The Russians and Their Church, p. 14.

a bright new political day in Russia with hopes for a responsible reform government, Zernov witnessed at a young and impressionable age the total failure of Western liberalism in Russia. The Bolshevik victory forced the Zernovs to flee Russia and to sever their roots with the past. It was only natural that Zernov disillusioned and countryless should turn to the church and spiritualism in much the same manner that the Old Believers, Skovoroda, Tolstoi, and the Slavophiles had done. They were intelligent sensitive men who detested the condition of Russia but lacked any real means for expression or for positive action to bring about change. The institutions of society were closed to them. Such was also Zernov's condition; he borrowed the symbols of the Slavophiles, "Muscovy," "the Third Rome," and "democratic autocracy," and attempted to explain Russia's twentieth-century condition.

In addition, Zernov did not actively participate in Western society. The Russian emigres constituted an autonomous group living in various Balkan and West European countries. They believed that the crisis of the West during the 1920s and 1930s resulted from Western materialism and also from liberal political institutions which fostered social conflicts and disintegration. The twenty years following Zernov's exile represented a time of reaction against his politically liberal heritage and a turn toward Russia's past for an answer. Cherniavsky's statement about

the Old Believers certainly described Zernov during the 1920s and 1930s: "rejecting the new salvation which offered them no salvation they lived in a state of permanent apocalypse."⁵⁴⁴

By the end of the Second World War, Zernov's political views, expressed in his writings, underwent a transition. This transition made him unique among the writers of the three hundred-year tradition of protest in Russia. While the other writers, from Avvakum through the Slavophiles, retained their political provincialism and simplistic views on politics, Zernov began to display a political sophistication heretofore unseen in the protest tradition.

While continuing his criticism of Western materialism and the spiritual decay, Zernov altered his opinions on liberal democracy. Gradually, he came to believe that the vehicle for transmitting divine authority in the politics of a nation was the people rather than the tsar. The people had direct communion with nature and God. He inverted the political theory of the Slavophiles who had viewed society as paternal in organization with the tsar as the medium of divine direction in Russia. He rejected the notion that Christian responsibility in politics or matters of the spirit lay more heavily on one individual than on another. While he agreed with the Slavophiles and the protest tradition on the need for a spiritual revival and on the belief that only a Christian society could produce justice, he also radically departed from them in identifying the source

⁵⁴⁴Cherniavsky, "Old Believers and the New Religion,"

of that revival. He democratized the protest tradition.

In the twentieth-century context, the experience of Alexander Solzhenitsyn provided an example of the difference between Zernov's political outlook and that of the Russian protest tradition. Like Zernov, Solzhenitsyn accused the rulers of Russia from the time of Aleksei of forsaking the theological foundations of the Russian nation. The process robbed the Russian people "of all human dignity."⁵⁴⁵ He spoke of the "soulless reforms of Nikon" and Peter I's "extirpation and suppression of the Russian national spirit."⁵⁴⁶ The Bolshevik policies completed the destruction begun by Peter and Nikon. Such an interpretation paralleled those of the Old Believers, the Slavophiles, and Zernov in its focus on Peter as the source of Russia's spiritual crisis. But Solzhenitsyn's political outlook differed drastically from Zernov's. As Marc Raeff explained, Solzhenitsyn renounced all power as evil. Obsessed by the need for spiritual revival in Russia, he totally neglected to approach the problem of political alternatives for a restructured society.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Repentance and Self-Limitation," From under the Rubble (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1974), p. 116.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ Marc Raeff, "Iz pod glyb and the History of Russian Social Thought," The Russian Review, (October 1975): 486-487.

Focusing on the individual and his role in Russia, Solzhenitsyn made only passing references to politics. He attacked democracy in the West and alluded to the dangers of unlimited freedom of debate, political instability, and the inability to deal swiftly with the enemies of society such as terrorists. He spoke of the crisis of the West and added that "it ill becomes us to see our country's only way out in the Western parliamentary system."⁵⁴⁸

Zernov's writings reflected a political knowledge uncommon among the protesters' tradition. He attempted to synthesize the spiritualism and mysticism of the Russian dissenters and the liberal democratic traditions of the West. He represented a marriage of the two traditions of Westernization and Russian spiritualism. In his historical writings, he accepted neither a purely Russian nor a Western solution for Russia's problems; instead, he sought a moderate ground between both of the traditions.

⁵⁴⁸Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "As Breathing and Consciousness Return," From under the Rubble, p. 22.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary References

- Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed. S. v. "Khomiakov, Alexei," by Nicolas M. Zernov.
- Zernov, Nicolas M. "Angliiskii bogoslov v Rossii Imperatora Nikolaia Pervago." Put' 57 (1938):58-83.
- _____. "Anglikanskiia rykoposheniia i pravoslavnaia tserkov'." Put' 59 (1939):57-73.
- _____. "Antony, Metropolitan of Kiev." Slavonic and Eastern European Review 15 (April 1937):703-704.
- _____. "The Christian Church of the East." International Review of Missions 23 (October 1934):539-546.
- _____. The Christian East: The Eastern Orthodox Church and Eastern Christianity. Delhi: Indian Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1956.
- _____. "Christianity in India and the Eastern Orthodox Church." International Review of Missions 43 (October 1954):390-396.
- _____. The Church of the Eastern Christians. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1942.
- _____. Eastern Christendom. New York: Putnam Company, 1961.
- _____. The Ecumenical Church and Russian Orthodoxy. Paris: YMCA Press, 1952.
- _____. "Eusebius and the Paschal Controversy at the End of the Second Century." Church Quarterly Review 116 (April 1933):24-41.
- _____. "Iz glubiny." Novyi zhurnal 88 (1967):240-250.
- _____. "Metropolitan Platon." Slavonic and Eastern European Review 13 (January 1935):431-433.

- _____. Moscow, the Third Rome. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1938.
- _____. "Moscow the Third Rome: the Fall of Moscow, 1596-1721." Church Quarterly Review 122 (July 1936): 257-282.
- _____. "Moscow the Third Rome: the Rise of Moscow, 988-1480." Church Quarterly Review 120 (July 1935): 277-295.
- _____. "Moscow the Third Rome: the Triumph of Moscow, 1480-1589." Church Quarterly Review 121 (January 1936): 245-267.
- _____. Na perelome: tri pokoleniia odnoi Moskovskoi semi. Paris: YMCA Press, 1970.
- _____. Orthodox Encounter. London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1961.
- _____. Oxford University, Oxford, England. Interview, 7 March 1975.
- _____. "Peter the Great and the Establishment of the Russian Church." Church Quarterly Review 125 (January 1938): 265-293.
- _____. "Reforma Russkoi tserkvi i dorevoliutsionnyi episkopat." Put' 45 (1934): 3-15.
- _____. The Reintegration of the Church. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1952.
- _____. "The Russian Episcopate and Church Reforms." Church Quarterly Review 118 (April 1934): 80-97.
- _____. The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963.
- _____. The Russians and Their Church. London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1968.
- _____. Russkoe religioznoe vozrozhdenie xx veka. Paris: YMCA Press, 1974.
- _____. St. Sergius, Builder of Russia. London: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge, 1939.
- _____. "St. Sergius of Radonezh and the Future of Russian Christianity." Church Quarterly Review 129 (January 1940): 296-313.

- _____. "Saint Stephan and the Roman Community at the Time of the Baptismal Controversy." Church Quarterly Review 117 (January 1934):304-336.
- _____. "Some Figures Illustrating the Present State of the Eastern Orthodox Church." Church Quarterly Review 119 (January 1935):272-279.
- _____. Three Russian Prophets. Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1973.
- _____. "Vladimir and the Origin of the Russian Church." Slavonic and Eastern European Review 28 (November 1949):123-138.
- _____. Vselenskaia tserkov' i Russkoe pravoslavie. Paris: YMCA Press, 1952.
- _____. "Usemirnii c'egg' Khristianskoi mologeshi." Put' 61 (1939):22-25.
- _____. "The Western Dispersion of the American Church." Church Quarterly Review 128 (July 1939):251-266.
- _____. Za rubeshom: Belgrad, Parizh, Okhsford khronika semi Zernovikh. Paris: YMCA Press, 1973.

Secondary References

- Aksakov, I. S. "A Slavophile Statement." In Readings in Russian Civilization. Vol. 2: Imperial Russia, 1700-1917, pp. 378-382. Edited by Thomas Riha. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- Ammann, Albert M. Abriss der Ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte. Wien: Thomas Morus Presse, 1950.
- Andreyev, Nikolai. "Pagan and Christian Elements in Old Russia." Slavic Review 21 (March 1962):16-23.
- Astakhov, V. I. Kurs lektsii po Russkoi istoriografii do konsta XIX veka. Kharkov: Izd. Kharkovskovo ordena trydovogo krasnogo znameni gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1956.
- Bagalii, D. I. Russkaia istoriografiia. Kharkov: Tipolitografiia, 1911.
- Baring, Maurice. Landmarks in Russian Literature. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960.
- Becker, Carl L. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932.

- Beloff, Max. The Age of Absolutism. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1941.
- Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: an Interpretive History of Russian Culture. New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
- Black, Joseph L. "The 'Statist School' Interpretation of Russian History: A Reappraisal of Genetic Origins." Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas 21 (1973): 509-530.
- Blum, Jerome. Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Carr, Edward H. Michael Bakunin. New York: Alfred Knopf & Company, 1961.
- Cherniavsky, Michael T. "Holy Russia: a Study in the History of an Idea." The American Historical Review 63 (April 1958): 617-637.
- _____. "Ivan the Terrible as a Renaissance Prince." Slavic Review 27 (June 1968):195-211.
- _____. "Old Believers and the New Religion." Slavic Review 25 (March 1966):1-39.
- _____. "Reception of the Council of Florence in Russia." Church History 24 (December 1955):347-359.
- _____. Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths. New York: Random House, 1969.
- Christoff, Peter K. An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism. 2 vols. 'S Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1961.
- Crummey, Robert O. The Old Believers & the World of Anti-christ: The Vyg Community and the Russian State, 1694-1855. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.
- Edie, James M., Scanlan, James P., and Zeldin, Mary-Barbara. Russian Philosophy. Vol. 1: The Beginnings of Russian Philosophy, the Slavophiles, the Westernizers. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965.
- Fedotov, George P. The Russian Religious Mind. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946.

- Fennell, J. L. I. "The Attitude of the Josephians and the Trans-Volga Elders to the Heresy of the Judaizers." The Slavonic and Eastern European Review 29 (June 1951):486-509.
- _____. The Correspondence between Prince A. M. Kurbsky and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia, 1564-1569. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955.
- Florinsky, Michael T. Russia: a History and an Interpretation. 2 vols. New York: MacMillan Co., 1960.
- Fuhrmann, Joseph T. Essays on Russian Intellectual History. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971.
- Goliubinskii, E. E. Istoriia Russkoi tserkvi. 2 vols. Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1905.
- Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev. Die Historische Rechtsschule Russlands. Giessen: Wilhelm Schmitz Verlag, 1962.
- Kapustina, G. D., Ed. Krest'ianskaia voina 1773-1775 gg. v. Rossii. Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1973.
- Kaufmann, Walter, Ed. Religion from Tolstoy to Camus. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1961.
- Kliuchevskii, V. O. Sochineniia. 8 vols. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izd., 1958.
- Krieger, Leonard. Kings and Philosophers, 1689-1789. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1970.
- Lossky, N. O. History of Russian Philosophy. London: George Allen and Union Ltd., 1952.
- McConnell, Allen. Tsar Alexander I; Paternalistic Reformer. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970.
- Mazour, Anatole G. The First Russian Revolution, 1825. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937.
- _____. An Outline of Modern Russian Historiography. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1939.
- Miliukov, P. N. Outlines of Russian Culture. Vol. 1: Religion and the Church in Russia. New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1942.
- _____. Russia and Its Crisis. New York: Collier Books, 1962.
- Oldenbourg, Zoe'. Catherine the Great. Translated by Anne Carter, New York: Random House, Inc., 1965.

- Ostroumoff, I. N. The History of the Council of Florence. Translated by Basil Popoff. Boston: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1971.
- Ostrovitianov, K. V. Istoriia akademii nauk SSSR. 2 vols. Moscow: Izd. akademii nauk, 1958.
- Petrovich, Michael B. The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.
- Platonov, S. F. History of Russia. Translated by Emanuel Aronsberg. Bloomington, Ind.: University Prints and Reprints, 1964.
- _____. Lektsii po Russkoi istorii. Petrograd: Senatskaia tipografiia, 1917.
- _____. The Time of Troubles: a Historical Study of the Internal Crisis and Social Struggle in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Muscovy. Translated by John T. Alexander. Lawrence: The University of Kansas, 1970.
- Pokrovskii, M. N. History of Russia from Earliest Times to the Rise of Commercial Capitalism. Translated by J. D. Clarkson. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966.
- Prawdin, Michael. The Mongol Empire: Its Rise and Legacy. Translated by Eden Paul. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956.
- Radishchev, Aleksander N. A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958.
- Raeff, Marc. "Iz pod glyb and the History of Russia." The Russian Review 34 (October 1975):476-488.
- _____. Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia; the Eighteenth Century Nobility. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966.
- _____. Ed. Peter the Great: Reformer as Revolutionary. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1963.
- Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. A History of Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- _____. Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia. 1825-1855. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- _____. Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.

- Rogger, Hans. National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Rubinshtein, N. L. Russkaia istoriografiia. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1941.
- Sabine, George H., and Thorson, Thomas L. A History of Political Theory. Hinsdale, Calif.: Dryden Press, 1973.
- Schuyler, Eugene. Peter the Great: Emperor of Russia, a Historical Biography. 2 vols. New York: Russell & Russell, 1967.
- Shmidt, S. O. Stanovlenie Rossiiskovo samodershavstva: issledovanie sotsial'no politicheskoi istorii vremeni Ivana Groznovo. Moscow: Izd. Mysl', 1973.
- Smolitsch, Igor. Geschichte der Russischen Kirche, 1700-1917. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1964.
- Solov'ev, S. M. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen. 16 vols. Moscow: Izd. Akademiia Nauk, 1961.
- Solov'ev, V. S. Lectures on Godmanhood. London: Dennis Dobson Ltd., Publishers, 1948.
- _____. Russia and the Universal Church. London: The Centenary Press, 1948.
- Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. "Communism: a Legacy of Terror." Speech AFL-CIO. New York City, New York, 9 July 1975. Pp. 25-35.
- _____. The First Circle. New York: Bantam Books, 1969.
- _____. From under the Rubble. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1974.
- Tompkins, Stuart R. The Russian Intelligentsia; Makers of the Revolution. Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1957.
- Toynbee, Arnold. Civilization on Trial and the World and the West. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958.
- Tretiakova, P. N., and Mongaita, A. L. Ocherki istorii SSSR. 16 vols. Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1961.
- Turgenev, I. S. Fathers and Sons. New York: The New American Library, 1970.

- _____. The Virgin Soil. New York: The New American Library, 1972.
- Vernadsky, George. A History of Russia. Vol. 2: Kievan Russia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948.
- Wilson, Edmund. To the Finland Station. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1940.
- Wolf, John B. The Emergence of the Great Powers, 1685-1715. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1951.
- Zenkovsky, V. V. A History of Russian Philosophy. Translated by George L. Kline. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953.