ABSTRACT

A Comprehensive Understanding of Racial Attitudes for Muslims among Whites

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How do white racial attitudes shape anti-Muslim opinion in a racially diversifying American society where many whites are anxious about their race's self-interest? Using ANES 2016, this study examines if the white anxiety informs anti-Muslim opinion independently to ethnocultural prejudice. Based on different statistical methodologies, findings illustrate that white anxiety independently predicts anti-Muslim sentiment, yet a lack of white anxiety does not result in warmness or even acceptance of Muslims. However, both pro- and anti-Muslim attitudes are significantly predicted by ethnocultural prejudice. It indicates that many whites do not need to embrace that whites are ethnoculturally superior to Muslims: they can also perceive Muslims as threat to the group self-interest. Last, this study implies that social scientists should adopt a new theoretical paradigm to understand interracial relationships between white Americans and non-white immigrants in the contemporary America.

A Comprehensive Understanding of Racial Attitudes for Muslims Among Whites

by

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A Thesis

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DEDICATION

To my parents and grandparents in China. Thank you for your faith in me.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Researchers find that white Americans' racial attitudes inform their anti-immigration ideology and behaviors (Brader, Valentino, Jardina, and Ryan 2010). Conventional wisdom of White Studies contends that whites view non-white immigrants as ethnocultural inferiors, and the sense of white superiority is a main product of the lasting white supremacy in the current American society (eg. Doane and Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Bonilla-Silva 2015). However, recent studies on the rising white identity politics in the twenty-first century map out a new direction to reconsider whites' racial attitudes to non-white immigrants. Since the influx of non-European immigrants after the Immigration Reform in 1965, the American society has been becoming racially, ethnically, and culturally pluralistic, which shakes the established white dominance. As a result, an increasing group of whites, who do not necessarily hold ideologies of white supremacy, are anti-immigrant because they are anxious about the declining racial status, powers, and interests of their race in the changing American racial landscape (Kaufmann 2018; Jardina 2019).

With data drawn from ANES 2012 and 2016, Jardina (2019) finds that the white anxiety is significantly linked with antipathic views for Muslims (81). It is not intuitive, however, to understand why and how whites view Muslims as challengers to white self-interest and dominance. In fact, American Muslims are a racially and ethnically fragmented group who are constituting barely over one percent of the American

population (Pew 2007, 2017). A possible explanation is that the aversion to Muslims is driven by whites' ethnocultural prejudice in different ways (Shortle and Gaddie 2015; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019; Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018). According to many scholars on whiteness (Delgado and Stefancic 1997; Doane 1997), in anti-immigration politics, white supremacy reveals as an ethnoculturally discriminatory ideology that America should be a racially and culturally homogeneous whitened nation promoting Anglo-Protestant norms and values that are superior to other groups' (Sidanius, Feschbach, Levin, and Pratto 1997; Smith 1997). Because whites with high racial anxiety are also strongly identified with American nationality (Jardina 2019), it seems that the white anxiety linked with anti-Muslim sentiments is only a mask for whites' ethnocultural prejudice against Muslims.

Accordingly, one can hypothesize that the ethnocultural prejudice explains the effect of white anxiety on anti-Muslim sentiments. However, scholars have never tested the assumption empirically. The intellectual ignorance is because of the difficulty to isolate white anxiety in interracial relationships from whites' prejudice against ethnocultural outgroups like Muslims with pollster data. Using the 2016 American National Election Studies Time Series (ANES 2016), this study seeks to fill the gap by examining key implications of the assumption with diverse statistic tools. I use feeling thermometer to Muslims to measure anti-Muslims opinion. In related literature on intergroup relationships, feeling thermometer is a widely used item to represent public evaluation for a given social group, public figure, and issue since the 1964 ANES survey (Zaller 1992; Lavrakas 2008). Because respondents are asked to provide immediate and general evaluation (Weisberg and Rusk 1970), political psychologists sometimes use it as

a proxy for ingroup favoritism, one group's generic ethnocentric sentiment, or prejudice to certain outgroups (Banks 2016; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013; Perez 2014).

Results in this thesis challenge the conventional wisdom of white studies. First, white anxiety remains a powerful predictor of anti-Muslim sentiments in certain conditions with ethnocultural prejudice and other relevant confounders included. Second, both the size and the strength of the effect of white anxiety reduce dramatically with the perception of Muslims becoming warm, while the connection between the ethnocultural prejudice and anti-Muslim sentiments keeps being relatively persistent: only the correlation size declines moderately as favoritism to Muslims increases. Taken together, I contend that the patterns whites' anti-Muslim opinion is more complicated than the existing literature assumes.

In what follows, I first discuss how the literature on whites' racial attitudes associated with anti-immigration opinion contributes to the understanding of anti-Muslim opinion. Building on the discussion I operationalize three hypotheses in the section. Next, I consider possible statistical methods to test the assumptions. Henceforth I introduce my data of analysis and then report results of relevant statistical tests with the referred methods. I conclude by elaborating strengths and limitations of this study, and how this study contributes to the future scholarship on white Americans' attitudes in anti-immigration politics.

CHAPTER TWO

Theoretical Background

American Muslim community has become a new otherized immigrant group in the post-9/11 America (Bonikowski 2008; Gorski 2019). Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner (2009), for example, contend that ethnocentric prejudices against racial/religious and cultural/behavior others have been powerful predicators for anti-Muslim attitude among "mainstream Americans" (848) who are, in their case, white Americans. Therefore, the association between whites' racial attitudes and anti-Muslim sentiments should be studied.

Muslims as Outsiders

The otherization of Muslims consists of two parts. First is the alienation of Muslims that Muslims are perceived as a new and yet acculturated immigrant group (outsiders) in contemporary public discourse (Skerry 2011). Two reasons lead to the outsider perception. First, intergroup and interpersonal interactions between whites and Muslims are rare. For example, according to a nationally representative survey in 2015, 62 percent of Americans reported that they seldomly or never interacted with Muslims (Jones and Cox 2015). So white Americans may see Muslims as strangers in the U.S. because the mainstream media says so, which are under the influence of a network of anti-Muslim organizations and public figures (Bail 2014). Second, recent Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries monopolize the representation of Muslim Americans in the American public (Williams 2011). Though the history of Muslims in

the America can be traced back to the colonial period (GhaneaBassiri 2010; Haddad 1993), post-1965 immigrants are the dominant group in the contemporary Muslim American community. They not only constitute more than half of today's Muslim American population (Pew 2017), but also control most influential organizations representing Muslims in America, such as Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). The organizations intentionally and unintentionally frame Muslims' public image as Middle Easterner immigrants (Ahmed 2011).

Muslims as Ethnocultural Inferiors

The second part of the Muslim otherization is that Muslims are viewed as non-white "inferiors" to white Americans. Established scholarship on Islamophobia in the post-9/11 suggests that the antipathy to Muslims reflects a sense of white superiority because the Muslim identity has been racialized in the American public (eg. Jamal 2009). Selod (2014), for example, interviewed 48 Muslim Americans who had experiences of being discriminated because of their Muslim identity and found that like Asian Americans, the American public "has racialized several [Muslim] ethnicities into one larger [Muslim] race" (2). Recent studies on today's Muslim resentments also support the racialization thesis.

However, the sense of Muslim inferiority is based not on biological traits such as skin-colors (Middle Eastern Muslims are still registered as whites because of their light skin tone for instance) but on negative stereotypes against Muslims. An obvious stereotype is that Muslims are at least sympathizers for terrorism so that they are hostile to America's national security and public safety (Davis 2006; Huddy, Feldman, Taber,

and Lahav 2005; Sides and Gross 2013). Labeling Muslims with violence and political disloyalty contributes to framing Muslims as racial inferiors. Love (2017), for example, contends that "the term 'terrorism' has been deployed in ways that reinforce the racial stereotype that Middle Easterners are somehow predisposed to commit political violence" (108).

In addition, past studies argue that the sense of Muslim inferiority is historically shaped by an inegalitarian tradition that embodies colonialism and orientalism, which stereotypes Muslims and other non-European nationals as ethnocultural secondaries to the western civilization (Esposito and Kalin 2011; Said 1979). The ethnocultural prejudice has been influencing mainstream Americans' nativist attitudes since the inception of the American nation. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political elites justified their opposition to immigration with an ideology that "America was by rights a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation in which true Americans were native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors" (3). It is obvious that the ethnocultural prejudice was against non-white as well as white immigrants who were not from Protestant nations in northern Europe (Bonikowski 2008). However, the prejudice now targets on non-white immigrants only because European ethnic minorities such as German and Italian Americans have been racially integrated and acculturated in today's white, English speaking, and middle-class America (Jacobson 1999). But the prejudice of cultural inferiority against non-whites still shapes racial and ethnic relationships in the post-civil rights America (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Kinder and Sear 1981; Levin and Sidanius 1999; Portes and Zhou 1993). For example, recent works in sociology of religion (Whitehead et al. 2018; Whitehead and Perry, 2020) indicate that Islamophobia is

significantly linked with a Christian nationalist belief that the American nation should be a whitened Protestant nation. Taken together, one can expect that anti-Muslim whites hold strong prejudice regarding the American nation's ethnocultural purity. Therefore, I propose my first hypothesis for empirical test as below.

Hypothesis 1: Ethnocultural prejudice is positively associated with anti-Muslim attitudes.

White Anxiety?

Little discussed is that whether the ethnocultural prejudice theory keeps its explanatory power to understand interracial relationships in today's America, which reshapes America's racial structure and interracial dynamics inevitably. For decades, public opinion scholars assume that "whites' whiteness is usually likely to be no more noteworthy to them than is breathing the air around them" (Sears and Savalei 2006: 901) because their group interests and status were never threatened. Nevertheless, the unchallenged white dominance was an old story. Not only whites are no longer numeric majorities in many states but also their social and political influences are waning as the American nation is becoming more and more racially and culturally segmented (Jones 2016).

One consequence of the racially diversifying America is that many whites now perform strong racial anxiety overtly, thinking that their race is becoming a marginalized group (Jardina 2019). The anxiety has also produced many significant political outcomes. For instance, related studies interpret the massive white support for Donald Trump's presidential election in 2016, marked by his anti-immigrant rhetoric, as a main political

achievement of the rising sense of status and economic insecurity among whites (Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius 2019; Kaufmann 2018; Jardina 2019).

The rising anxiety among whites is different to their ethnocultural prejudices theoretically and practically. Put differently, a white can dislike non-white immigrants without viewing them ethnoculturally secondary. As said, the ethnocultural belief is significantly shaping whites' attitudes to non-white immigrant groups like Muslims in today's public opinion. If the association between white anxiety and anti-Muslim sentiments are still explained by ethnocultural prejudice among whites, one may argue that America's racial stratification between whites and non-whites remains to be the only social force that informs whites' intergroup relationship with Muslims even when white dominance is declining elsewhere. If not, scholars should consider more factors that are relevant with whites' anti-Muslim sentiments. Since no scholarship has examined whether white anxiety affects anti-Muslim prejudice independently to ethnocultural prejudice, I assume no existence of the independence for the sake of expediency in empirical analysis. Accordingly, I propose another two hypotheses as below.

Hypothesis 2: White anxiety is positively associated with anti-Muslim attitudes;

Hypothesis 3: The association between white anxiety and anti-Muslim attitudes ceases to be significant when controlling ethnocultural prejudice.

Other Confounding Factors

Other confounding effects should also be considered. I choose age, formal education, partisan affiliation, and religious belonging as four possible confounders. First, age is a good indicator for the salience of racial identity and consciousness, both of which are intertwined with white anxiety, because group identification is positively associated

with the longevity of group membership (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).

In general, high white identifiers are in average older than low white identifiers (Jardina 2019). While the predicting power of age for anti-Muslim opinion is not consistent across studies (see footnote 7 in Lajevardi and Abrajano 2019), I include age for the sake of caution. Second, high education is positively associated with high levels of intellectual sophistication, social and cultural capitals, and toleration and open-mindedness (Bobo and Licari 1989). So, people with more education are less likely to hold strong group anxiety and prejudice toward outgroups than the less educated. Third, party identification also influences individuals' racial attitudes. Not only racial prejudice is positively correlated with political conservatism (Sears 1988), but also white conservatives are more likely to be anti-Muslim than others in the context of political polarization (Kalkan 2019). Last, evangelical belonging can be relevant as well because empirical research also shows that white evangelicals are more likely to be hard-core Christian nationalists (Whitehead et al. 2018).

CHAPTER THREE

Methodologies of Analysis

To test the three hypotheses using pollster data, one needs to select appropriate

methods to separate, examine, and compare effects of white anxiety and ethnocultural

prejudice on anti-Muslim sentiments. Accordingly, conventional wisdom in social

sciences applies multiple regression to examine partial effects of independent variables.

The methodology consists of at least two steps. The first step is to test correlation

between key independent variables (IVs). If some of them are highly correlated

(Pearson's r > 0.7), which may lead to high multicollinearity (Garson 2012), one may

want to consider replacing one or many variables with better substitutes or choosing

regularized regression models with unbiasedness of model estimates sacrificed

(Magidson 2013) to overcome the multicollinearity problem. If all indicators are lowly or

moderately correlated, the second step is to build a multiple regression model including

all key and covariate variables so that one can accurately calculate conditional effects of

individual key variables than bivariate methods. Accordingly, if the estimated coefficient

of an indicator ceases to be significant when including another indicator whose

coefficient estimate remains significant, one can argue that the effect of the former on the

dependent variable (DV) is not independent to that of the latter. On the contrary, if the

effect of the former is independently significant as the latter is included, one can

furthermore compare partial effects of the two indicators using diverse methods such as

relative importance (Silber, Rosenhaum, and Ross 1995). Last, non-linearity such as interaction should also be examined to check non-linearity between IVs.

In sociology and political science, default modeling algorithms are either Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Maximum Likelihood (ML). I start with OLS in this study because OLS estimate should be Best Linear Unbiased Estimate (BLUE) when the DV is continuous. However, it also means that OLS has many rigorous assumptions to inspect. Besides multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity and high leverage points are two problems that may cause inaccurate estimate for statistical significance (Wooldridge 2010), which will reduce the generalization capability of analysis results in social science. One can diagnose the problems with related tests on residuals of OLS. Polarized distribution of DV, namely that DV is asymmetrically or unevenly distributed around certain values, is one common cause for the two problems. Therefore, social scientists who use pollster data to understand the contemporary American society should be careful because aggregating political and ideological polarization has divided today's public opinion (eg. Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).

To deal with polarized data, one way is to transform key variables (Fox 2015). While the transformation solves problems such as high skewness, it changes substantial meanings that original variables were designed to represent. Therefore, choosing different models without manipulation of variables should be a better option. Because OLS assumes that conditional distribution of DV on IVs should be normally distributed asymptotically, one can apply models with ML algorithms that release the assumption such as quantile regression if the DV is continuous (Davino, Furno, and Vistocco 2013; Gruber 2013). Because quantile regression makes no prior assumption for DV's

distribution, researchers can select certain percentile (or quantile) points for regression. In addition, resampling techniques such as bootstrapping can be adopted in order to have accurate estimation for coefficient estimates' standard errors (Fox 2015).

However, both OLS and quantile regression share one limitation that they assume no cluster effect in the sample of analysis, which can be another possible reason that causes data polarizing. Assuming data are generated by relationships between DV and IVs, based on which we construct models, social scientists can use regression models to estimate the relationships confidently. But what if the seemingly polarized distribution is a mixture of multiple normal distributions whose means are high leverage points respectively? That is, a given sample manifests different relationships between DV and IVs? If so, locally based models are more preferred. Scholars sometimes utilize flexible modeling methods such as local polynomial models and General Additive Models (GAMs) to allow locality in modeling (Wood 2017). However, these methods can also lead to two major problems besides overfitting (eg. Fan and Gijbels 1996). First, it is hard to interpret their analysis results in a linear way because non-linearity (sometimes of high degrees) is allowed (imagine the difficulty to interpret coefficients of cubic or quartic terms). Second, these methods still fail to explain cluster effect, namely why different associations between DV and IVs are not homogeneous. While traditional cluster methods such as latent class analysis (LCA) and K-means clustering (eg. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Edgell et al. 2019) are powerful to explain the in-sample heterogeneity, they shed little lights on associations between DV and IVs like regression analysis. Taken together, one needs a statistic tool that is not only capable to take both cluster analysis and regression into account, but also interpretable to general audience in social sciences.

Finite Mixture Model (FMM), which is sufficiently discussed and well-established in statistics, sociology, and political science literatures (eg. Gordon and Smith 2004; Grün and Leisch 2007, 2008; Fruhwirth-Schnatter 2007), fits the two purposes well. First, FMM assumes that in a given sample every individual observation is consistent with one of many models that describe different associative relationships between DV and IVs. Second, FMM allows one to construct multiple linear regression models assuming that each model is locally based and explains variation among observations within the corresponding cluster only (Arminger and Stein 1997; Imai and Tingley 2012).

Taken together, this study proposes to examine the three hypotheses with all discussed relevant methods to have a comprehensive and accurate understanding of relationships between the white anxiety, ethnocultural prejudice, and anti-Muslim opinion.

CHAPTER FOUR

Data and Measures

Samples for analysis in this study is drawn from the ANES 2016. To date it is the

only publicly accessible dataset including good measures for both white anxiety and

ethnocultural prejudice. The ANES 2016 is a nationally representative panel dataset

including a probability sample which was randomly taken from voting age American

citizens in 2016. The dataset was released in May 2017 and collected in two waves: pre-

election and post-election. Overall the sample includes 3649 who finished both pre-

election and post-election surveys. Because my targeted population is non-Hispanic and

non-Muslim white Americans and certain items for analysis are only available in the

post-election wave, I draw a subsample accordingly that reduces the sample size to 2627

including non-Hispanic non-Muslim white respondents only. At last, because the missing

data points only constitute less than five percent of the whole sample for analysis, I

choose the listwise-deletion method to handle the missing data in order to reduce the

computational burden that imputation methods generate while little estimation accuracy

is sacrificed (Allison 2001; Schafer 1997). Finally, my sample for analysis includes 2498

observations.

Dependent Variable (DV)

Following Kalkan et al. (2009) and Jardina (2019), I choose feeling thermometer

to Muslims as the dependent variable. In the ANES 2016, respondents were asked "How

do you rate Muslims" on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means very cold feeling, 50

represents neutral attitudes, and 100 denotes very warm feeling. Although the measurement is ordinal by nature, I treat it as a continuous variable in following analyses for the sake of calculation expediency.

<p style="text-align:center">Independent Variables (IVs)</p>

The first independent variable is white anxiety. Jardina (2019) contends that one needs to take salience of white identity, white pride, and white perceptions of threat (58-60) into account. With ANES 2016 data, she proposes a scale including three items available for white respondents only. The three items ask white respondents about strength of white identity, attitudes to that "whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites", and conceived likelihoods that whites receive discrimination on labor market. I expand the scale by including three more items. Two items ask whether whites are peaceful and hardworking. And the third item asks whether whites receive a lot discrimination in today's America in general. I propose to include the three items because they also measure white pride and the perception of threat when we focus on white respondents only. In addition, I reversely code all items and generate a white anxiety scale by taking the mean of the z-scores after the standardization of all items. On the scale, higher a score represents stronger white racial anxiety. Last, the Cronbach-α is 0.66.[1]

The second key IV is ethnocultural prejudice. I build an ethnocultural prejudice scale with six items. The first four items measure different parts of the ethnocultural

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[1] I also conduct a factor analysis with the iterated principal-factor (IPF) method for the scale to check the construct validity: results are presented in Table A1. In each scale, only one factor explains a super majority of total variance: only factor 1 is with an eigenvalue above 1 (1.71) and it explains 66.5 % of total variance among all six items. Both tables are available in the Appendix.

belief, asking respondents how important they think whether "to be truly American" one needs "to have been born in U.S.", "to have American Ancestry", "to speak English", and "to follow America's customs/traditions". I also include one item regarding salience of American identity and one about cultural hostility to immigrant, asking respondents whether "America's culture is generally harmed by immigrants". Last, I code all items reversely and generate a standardized index with a 0.81 Cronbach-α and higher score on the scale refers to stronger ethnocultural prejudice.[2]

Confounders

I use age, education, strength of Republican affiliation, and born-again Protestant identity as control variables. In addition, I rescale the four variables to have meaning zeros. First, age is mean-centered. Second, I recode education by collapsing "2-year college" and "some college" to some college and rescale the range from 1 to 5 to 0 to 4. Third, for the Republican identification, I rescale the range from 1 to 7 to -3 to 3 where -3 means "Strong Democrat", 0 denotes "Independent", and "3" represents "Strong Republican". Last, I generate a dummy variable to measure born-again Protestant identity if respondents report born-again identity and belonging to the Protestant religion as well. Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics.[3]

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[2] Factor analysis with the IPF method is also conducted and only one factor stands out that explains 82.2% of the total variance across the six items. Results are presented in Table A2. Both tables are available in the Appendix.

[3] I also present a correlation matrix of Pearson's coefficients among all items for the white anxiety scale and the ethnocultural prejudice scale in Table A.3 in the Appendix. It is interesting to see that white identity is more associated with ethnocultural prejudice items than other white anxiety items on average. And I will discuss its implication in the conclusion and discussion sect.

Table 4.1

Descriptive Statistics

Variables	ANES 2016			
	Mean/Percent	SD	Min. – Max.	N
Feeling Thermometer for Muslims	52.99	25.37	0-100	2584
White Racial Anxiety Index	0.00	0.61	-1.93-1.98	2608
Salience of White Identity	2.64	1.34	1-5	2582
Whites Should Work Together	2.55	1.16	1-5	2569
Whites Can't Get Job Because of Minorites	2.97	1.35	1-5	2559
Whites are Hardworking	4.96	1.21	1-7	2583
Whites are Peaceful	4.81	1.22	1-7	2576
Whites are Discriminated	2.95	0.95	1-5	2548
Ethnocultural National Anxiety Index	0.00	0.72	-2.05-1.33	2621
Salience of American Identity	3.04	1.10	1-5	2606
To be Born in U.S.	2.57	1.05	1-4	2611
To Have American Ancestry	2.24	1.00	1-4	2613
To Speak English	3.48	0.76	1-4	2618
To Follow American Customs/Traditions	3.05	0.87	1-4	2613
Immigrants harm American Culture	2.41	1.16	1-5	2609
Covariates				
Age[1]	51.19	17.65	18-90	2569
Education	2.34	1.10	0-4	2611
Republican Identification (Republican ID)	0.19	2.14	-3-3	2617
Born-Again Christian	31.14%	-	0/1	2627

Notes: 1. Age in this table is not mean-centered yet so it starts from 18.

CHAPTER FIVE

Results

Preliminary Tests

Before regression analysis, I conduct relevant preliminary tests to examine

bivariate associations between key variables regarding their unconditional distribution

properties and correlations in between. Figure 1 includes three histogram plots,

straightforwardly visualizing distributions of the DV and the two key IVs. Two things are

worth noting. First is that despite there is no obvious skewness in the distribution of the

DV, a lot of observations are clustered around certain values of theoretical importance,

such as 0, 50, and 100. It suggests that there will be several high leverage points that may

cause biased estimation. Second is that while majority of the sample are of high

ethnocultural prejudice (53% of observations are of prejudice scores bigger than 0), less

than the majority of the sample are of high white anxiety (48% are of scores bigger than

0). I also conduct Pearson correlation analysis between the two IVs and results suggest

that while the correlation is positive and significant statistically, the size of the correlation

is not of a very high degree (Pearson's $r = 0.57$).[4]

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[4] I also conduct two more Pearson correlation analyses to examine correlations between
ethnocultural anxiety and feeling thermometers to Muslims and between white anxiety and feeling
thermometers. The Pearson's r for the former is -0.51 and that for the latter is -0.37. Both correlations are
statistically significant.

Histogram Plots for Key Variables

Figure 5.1. Histogram Plots for Key Variables

OLS Results

Table 5.1 presents the OLS results. I construct five models, four are additive and one with interaction. Model 1 is the bottom-line model with control variables only. Model 2, 3, and 4 tests *hypothesis* 1, 2, 3 and model 5 is for interaction. First, although all covariates' coefficient estimates of Model 1 are significant, only those of Republican identification and education remain to be significant when ethnocultural prejudice is included in Model 3, 4 and 5.

Table 5.1.

OLS Regression Results (N=2498)

Variables	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
White Anxiety			-9.8756***	-3.4359**	-3.1584***
			(0.7982)	(0.8544)	(0.8075)
Ethnocultural Prejudice		-14.1248***		-12.6907***	-13.0206***
		(0.6900)		(0.7749)	(0.7807)
Anxiety* Prejudice					-2.8513**
					(0.9126)
Republican ID	-4.0751***	-2.4733***	-3.3044***	-2.3678***	-2.4337***
	(0.2219)	(0.2197)	(0.2242)	(0.2206)	(0.2212)
Born again	-2.999**	-1.1852	-2.1063*	-1.0586	-1.0006
	(1.0350)	(0.9619)	(1.0007)	(0.9595)	(0.9580)
Age	-0.1045***	-0.0333	-0.0550*	-0.0233	-0.0270
	(0.0262)	(0.0245)	(0.0257)	(0.0245)	(0.0245)
Education	4.0441***	1.2903**	2.9935***	1.2044**	1.2034**
	(0.4227)	(0.4136)	(0.4191)	(0.4130)	(0.4123)
Intercept	45.2990***	50.8180***	47.2779***	50.9461***	51.6523***
	(1.16424)	(1.1406)	(1.1415)	(1.1077)	(1.1286)
Adjusted R^2	0.1806	0.2982	0.2277	0.3025	0.3049

Notes: 1. Age is mean-centered;
* $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.

Results in Model 2 and 3 support *hypothesis 1* and *2* respectively, while the adjusted R-square score of Model 2 is obviously bigger than that of Model 1, which suggests that the former explains more variance of the DV than the latter does. Because the two models are not nested, I cannot conduct F-test to test their goodness of fit. Therefore, following Clarke (2003), I compare their likelihoods to check which model is of better fit and the result prefers Model 2 which is of significantly bigger value of logged likelihood than Model 3.[5]

However, results in Model 4 does not support *hypothesis* 3. After ethnocultural prejudice is controlled, the estimated effect of white anxiety is still statistically significant

[5] Log-likelihood for Model 2 is-11178 and that of Model 3 is -11298.

(p-value < 0.001). In addition, both variables pass the multicollinearity test with Variance Inflation Factors smaller than 2 (1.52 for white anxiety and 1.73 for ethnocultural prejudice). I also test if the ratio of relative importances of the two key IVs, namely how much of the explained variance for which each variable is responsible, is significantly deviant from 1 that means two variables are equally important in the model. The test results show that as ethnocultural prejudice explains significantly more variance of the DV than white anxiety does (about 4.35 times), white anxiety is still responsible for approximately 17.7% of total explained variance of DV.

Findings from Model 4 suggest that both key IVs are independently associated with DV that one's effect cannot be reduced to another's. Therefore, it is precautious and necessary to examine if the two IVs have a joint effect on the DV. Model 5 includes the corresponding interaction term. The results suggest that there exists a significant interaction effect that the conditional effect of white anxiety on predicting negative perception of Muslims increases with growing ethnocultural prejudice, and vice versa.

Figure 5.2 visualizes the conditional effect of one key IV at the other. The left side plot shows the conditional effect of white anxiety on DV at ethnocultural prejudice and the right side one presents that of ethnocultural prejudice at white anxiety. It is interesting to find that while the visualization straightforwardly illustrates the mutual reinforcing relationship between the two variables, the conditional effect of white anxiety ceases to be significantly deviant from zero when ethnocultural prejudice is about halfway between 0 and -1. Besides, because the histogram of ethnocultural prejudice at the bottom of the left side plot suggests that there are many observations whose ethnocultural prejudice scores are in between 0 and -1.5, one cannot argue that the

disappeared significance stems from insufficient statistical power due to a small number of observations. It suggests that white anxiety is not always significantly associated with the DV, especially when expected means of the DV is bigger than 50.[6] That is to say, hypothesis 3 is conditionally supported. Therefore, it is necessary to ask when and why, on which OLS regression cannot provide us more insights.

Figure 5.2. Conditional Effects in the Interaction Model (M5 in Table 5.1)

In addition, OLS estimates are biased and inaccurate. Figure A.1 in the Appendix presents relevant tests based on residuals of Model 5 and suggests that while the residuals are randomly distributed in general according to the Quantile-Quantile plot on the top right in Figure 1A, other three plots show that assumptions of zero covariance between residuals and predicted values of DV (as left side plots show) and of no influential point are violated

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[6] For example, if we select ethnocultural prejudice score equals -0.5 so the estimated perception for Muslim will be 51.65+(-13.02*-0.5)=58.16.

(see plot at bottom right). One cannot conclude whether the interaction effect honestly reflects the relationship between white anxiety and ethnocultural prejudice or it is a result of mistaken modeling. Therefore, to have unbiased estimation, one needs to apply different methodologies.

<div align="center">Quantile Regression Results</div>

The interaction model results suggest that the marginal effect of white identity seems to be correlated with the predicted value of dependent variable. Therefore, I choose quantile regression that allows me to examine where the hypothesis 3 shall be supported. I select five quantiles on the DV: 5th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile, and 95th percentile representing extremely dislike Muslims, moderately dislike Muslims, relatively tolerant to Muslims, moderately like Muslims, and extremely like Muslims respectively. Table 5.2 presents the quantile regression results, which find similar patterns as Model 5 in Table 5.1 suggests. First, white anxiety's effect ceases to be significant when DV is at 75th and 95th percentiles. Second, while ethnocultural prejudice's effect remains significant across different quantiles, its size drops substantially when quantiles of DV increase. Third, comparing Model 4 in Table 5.1 with the quantile regression results in Table 5.2, one can find that OLS results resembles the median regression's ($\tau = 0.5$) results more than results at other points.

Table 5.2.

Quantile Regression for Additive Models

Variables	τ =0.05 Coef.(S.E.)	τ =0.25 Coef.(S.E.)	τ =0.5 Coef.(S.E.)	τ =0.75 Coef.(S.E.)	τ =0.95 Coef.(S.E.)	OLS (M4) Coef.(S.E.)
White Anxiety	-4.5727**	-6.2128***	-3.1050**	-1.3147	0.8336	-3.4359**
	(1.8926)	(1.2705)	(1.0297)	(1.1848)	(1.5445)	(0.8544)
Ethnocultural Prejudice	-14.4704***	-12.4810***	-11.6318***	-13.5237***	-10.0385***	-12.6907***
	(1.8626)	(1.5089)	(0.8785)	(0.9597)	(1.5794)	(0.7749)
Republican ID	-2.6769***	-2.2066***	-2.4880***	-2.7207***	-1.4488***	-2.3678***
	(0.5279)	(0.3778)	(0.2183)	(0.3145)	(0.4268)	(0.2206)
Born Again	-1.0290	-1.4598	-1.0390	-0.3966	-0.7474	-1.1852
	(2.0642)	(1.6701)	(0.8781)	(1.4256)	(1.7468)	(0.9619)
Age[1]	0.0154	0.0139	-0.0153	-0.0313	-0.1371**	-0.0333
	(0.0463)	(0.0409)	(0.0282)	(0.0324)	(0.0468)	(0.0245)
Education	2.2756**	1.7553**	1.1300*	0.5726	1.0192	1.2903**
	(0.8616)	(0.6786)	(0.4580)	(0.5550)	(0.7857)	(0.4137)
Intercept	12.4429***	36.2933***	52.2546***	66.1928***	85.0820***	50.8180***
	(2.4486)	(1.8081)	(1.1693)	(1.4528)	(2.4384)	(1.1106)

Notes: 1. Age is mean-centered;
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

In addition, Figure 5.3 visualizes more information comparing quantile regression coefficient estimates of independent and control variables with OLS results. I run regression at every 1 percentile from 1 to 99 percentage. Y-axis represents coefficient estimates for individual IV and X-axis represents for estimated percentile of DV. Dotted black lines represent quantile regression coefficients that each black dot denotes one percentile, gray areas are corresponding 95% confident intervals, horizontal black hard lines refer to value zero, and red hard and dashed lines present OLS estimates and their 95% CIs respectively. Findings based on this figure are twofold. First, both white anxiety and ethnocultural prejudice are not consistently associated with DV when the percentile of DV changes. And the many quantile regression estimates are significantly deviant from those of OLS. It suggests that the independence of the association between white anxiety and anti-Muslim opinion controlling ethnocultural prejudice is conditional upon

the strength of anti-Muslim feeling. In general, there are two patterns of association between white anxiety and whites' attitudes to Muslims: one is when whites hold negative and tolerant views for Muslims, and another is when whites hold positive views. Second, all covariates are also not consistently associated with DV except born-again identity. Furthermore, the inconsistent effects on covariates suggests that whites hold different views to Muslims are also demographically heterogeneous. So, one can assume that the demographic difference may further illustrate why hypothesis *3* is conditionally supported.

Figure 5.3. Quantile Regression Results Comparing with OLS Estimates (Number of Bootstrapping = 1000)

Finite Mixture Model Results

The quantile regression analysis suggests that whites are divided in two groups according to the dissimilar association patterns between white anxiety and perception to Muslims. Table 5.3 shows the FMM results. First, intercept estimates for group 1 and group 2 represent estimated means of DV for the corresponding groups. Second, FMM results echo with results of both OLS and quantile regression. One can see a clear intergroup divergence on association patterns between group 1 and group 2. For group 1, both white anxiety and ethnocultural prejudice are significantly associated with the feeling thermometers to Muslims while only the effect of ethnocultural prejudice is significant for group 2. Furthermore, the FMM estimates the size of group 2 is substantially bigger than that of group 1 (1804/694≈2.60 times).[1] It suggests that majority of white Americans behave as the hypothesis 3 expects.

Table 5.3.

FMM Results for Group 1 and Group 2

Variables	Group 1 (N=694)		Group 2 (N=1804)	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
White Anxiety	-8.4633***	1.6858	1.9488	1.4184
Ethnocultural Prejudice	-15.5611***	1.7474	-10.8062***	1.1708
Controls				
Age[1]	0.0074	0.0504	-0.0775*	0.0339
Education	2.5480*	0.9939	0.2982	0.6135
Republican Identification	-2.8077***	0.4877	-2.1389***	0.3079
Born-Again Christian	-2.2135	1.8825	0.4331	1.2665
Intercept	36.2344***	3.4184	60.7227***	1.6111

Notes: 1. Age is mean-centered;
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001;

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[1] Following, I use flexmix package in R

Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics for the two groups. As quantile regression results suggest, the two groups should be demographically heterogeneous. In general, whites in group 1 are of stronger Republican identity, less formal education, and more likely to be evangelicals although evangelical identity is insignificantly associated with anti-Muslim sentiments across models and methodologies. And whites in group 2 are of stronger Democratic identity, more educated, and less likely to be evangelicals. In addition, one can also see that group 1 and group 2 are significantly deviant from each other in terms of their average attitudes to Muslims, white anxiety, and ethnocultural prejudice.

Table 5.4

Descriptive Statistics for Group 1 and Group 2

Variables	Group 1 (N=694)			Group 2 (N=1804)			
	Mean/%	S.D.	Range	Mean/%	S.D.	Range	
Feeling Thermometer to Muslims	25.00	19.77	0-100	63.95	17.90	30-100	***
White Anxiety (z-score)	0.20	0.61	-1.93-1.98	-0.09	0.60	-1.79-1.72	***
Ethnocultural Prejudice (z-score)	0.16	0.69	-2.05-1.33	-0.07	0.72	-2.05-1.33	***
Age[1]	-0.54	17.61	-33.19-38.81	-0.04	17.59	-33.19-38.81	
Education	2.17	1.07	0-4	2.42	1.10	0-4	***
Republican Identification	0.52	2.09	-3-3	0.06	2.16	-3-3	***
Born-Again Christian	36%	-	0/1	29%	-	0-1	-

Notes: 1. Age is mean-centered;
Two way t-test: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

However, it does not mean that group 2 is avoid of anti-Muslim sentiments. Figure 5.4 provides a more straightforward way to visualize how the groups are different to each other on key variables. First, both group 1 and 2 contain considerable numbers of anti-Muslim whites. But the pro-Muslim population in group 1 is almost absent Second,

group 2 is not asymmetrically whites of little racial anxiety and ethnocultural prejudice.

In fact, there are many group 2 members moderately dislike Muslims.

Figure 5.4. Histogram Plots for Group 1 and Group 2

CHAPTER SIX

Discussion

To sum up, this study examines three related hypotheses that differentiate the effect of white anxiety on anti-Muslim opinion from that of ethnocultural prejudice with multiple statistical methodologies. Analysis results illustrate a more complicated story regarding the association between white racial attitudes and their Muslim opinion than the established white studies and Islamophobia literature contends. While the results support the first two hypotheses across different models and methods, the third hypothesis that white anxiety does not independently predict anti-Muslim opinion controlling ethnocultural prejudice is conditionally supported. The interaction model (Model 5) in Table 5.1, quantile regression models in Table 5.2, and FMM model in Table 5.3 suggest a similar pattern that while white anxiety partially explains why some whites dislike Muslims, the explanatory power disappears (becomes positive though not significant) among whites who report favoritism to Muslims.

Although this study does not reject the hypothesis 3 that ethnocultural prejudice is relatively consistent in predicting anti-Muslim opinion among whites, which implies that the existing white supremacy still has impact on average whites' outgroup attitudes, the unexpected independent effect of white anxiety illustrates that being anti-Muslim is not always about racism, as the scholarship on the white identity politics has been arguing (Kaufmann 2018; Jardina 2019). As a social group, whites do have their legitimate group interests and status to concern about, realistic and symbolic. While white anxiety may

contribute to desires and behaviors to maintain the existing racial system, because the American society is becoming increasingly racially fragmented and multicultural, racist prejudice is not enough to explain intergroup tensions and conflicts between whites and non-whites. Therefore, one contribution of this study is to provide a more comprehensive as well as accurate understanding on intergroup relationships between whites and Muslims in the current American context.

Another contribution is methodological. I use multiple regression models to examine partial effect of white anxiety on anti-Muslim sentiments. This study fixes the generalization problem of using polarized pollster data with conventional methodology such as OLS. Considering the persistent ideological polarization of public opinion in the United States, this study implies that social scientists should utilize diverse statistical tools to analyze mass opinion in order to have more accurate estimation.

According to the social identity theory, ingroup pride does not necessarily lead to outgroup degradation (Allport 1954; Brewer 1999) whereas ingroups have a sociopsychological predisposition to see the ingroup membership promoting their self-esteem and sense of security more than outgroup identities (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Therefore, dynamics driving white racial attitudes are complicated. First, diverse intergroup relationships between whites and non-whites may cause that white ingroups hold dissimilar attitudes to different outgroups. On the one hand, intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) suggests that when two groups are in a positive relationship of reciprocity or of collaboration, increased frequency of intergroup and interpersonal contacts and familiarity significantly reduce negative perceptions mutually. On the other hand, when ingroups perceive they are threatened by

or in conflict with certain outgroups, ingroup favoritism will translate to outgroup dislike (Brewer 1999; Sherif 1966). Second, white individuals' self-interests (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), concerns for social problems (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007; Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan 2016), and psychological traits and predispositions (eg. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Kinder and Kam 2010; Kam and Kinder 2012) can also shape whites' attitudes to non-whites in different ways.

Although whites dislike Muslims for different reasons, this study does not challenge a common sense that Muslim hate is driven by strong racial anxiety and ethnocultural prejudice while Muslim love is a different story according to Table 5.3. However, when one tries to understand why whites are tolerant to Muslims, the analysis results become anti-intuitive if the person follows the conventional wisdom. On the one hand, group 1 contains a considerable number of white respondents who either moderately dislike or tolerate Muslims (39.7% of group 1's feeling thermometer scores range between 25 and 50). According to group 1 results in Table 5.3, being expected to be tolerant to Muslims (DV = 50) a white should score either -1.63 on the white anxiety scale or -0.88 on the ethnocultural prejudice scale. That is, a tolerant Muslim white in group 1 should hold either relative strong disapproval of white anxiety or moderately rejection of ethnocultural prejudice.

On the other hand, in group 2, I find the opposite pattern on understanding differences between whites who are tolerant to Muslims and those who moderately like Muslims (DV is between 50 and 75). According to the regression results for group 2 in Table 5.3, the average feeling toward Muslims represents moderate Muslim love

(intercept estimate ≈ 60.72). To be a tolerant Muslim white in group 2 one needs to score about 1 on the ethnocultural prejudice scale. As Figure 4 shows, about 39 percent of observations in group 2 are of ethnocultural prejudice scores between 0 and 1. Taken together, not only would it be ironic to claim that this subgroup of pro-Muslim whites are racists, but also one can find that being tolerant to Muslims does not necessarily means that a white is anti-racist or of low racial anxiety.

The difficulty to interpret tolerance to Muslims among white Americans implies that social scientists may need to adopt a new theoretical paradigm to understand the role of white racial attitudes in anti-Muslim and perhaps anti-immigration politics. The increasing racial and cultural diversity in today's America polarizes the white Americans deeply. Although according to Table 5.4, the polarization seems to exist between less-educated and evangelical Republicans (group 1) and better-educated and secular Independents and Democrats (group 2). However, this study suggests that whites are also polarized by their racial attitudes, namely, whether non-white immigrants threaten whites' racial self-interests. While majority of white do not think so, many whites will argue otherwise. The rising ideology that whites should have legitimate group interests demands white studies scholars to reconsider their prediction for racial relationships in future that in a racially egalitarian society, intergroup conflicts between whites and non-whites should not exist (for example, see Chapter 9 in Bonilla-Silva 2011). However, the prediction may be factually incorrect. According to social identity theory (Tajfel 1978), *homo socius* have psychological needs to form groups and prefer ingroups to outgroups. Accordingly, interracial tensions and conflicts between whites and non-whites will be unavoidable even in a multicultural and multiracial society so long as race is

sociologically meaningful. Accordinly, the new paradigm also provides an updated perspective to reexamine the established scholarship in sociology and political science on intergroup dynamics (eg. DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Orr and Huber 2019).

Limitations of this study are threefold, which are up to future studies to address. First, in the theoretical background section, I propose a causal argument that ethnocultural prejudice structurally reflects the American racial hierarchy. However, I do not test the argument because the sample I use is cross-sectional so that I cannot make strong causation claim due to the omission of causal time-order. Furthermore, using public opinion data one cannot directly measure and examine social structure factors because in theory these factors should be fixated. That is to say, these factors should not be constructed as "variables" but "constants". Therefore, the construct validity of ethnocultural prejudice in this study is not perfect.

Second, this study does not take overt racism against Muslims into account, which is another important form of whites' racial attitude in the anti-Muslim politics. Scholars find not only that the dislike to Muslims resembles old-fashion Jim Crow racial resentment to blacks (Calfano and Lajevardi 2019; Lajevardi 2017), but also that whites perform stronger anti-Muslim antipathy than other minority groups (Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Lajevardi 2020). However, because ANES data have not included items for Muslim resentment, I cannot conduct relevant analysis.

Second, perceiving Muslims as a group of violence should also trigger whites rational concern for their race's safety in the American nation although this perception is certainly illusional. Even so, this study does not include items that directly ask if whites'

respondents think Muslims are violent threat to their group and the American nation. The only relevant items in ANES 2016 ask respondents how they think Muslims are violent/peaceful in general. However, since the items are marked as "Muslim stereotype" in the ANES codebook, it is hard to tell whether they represent prejudice against Muslims, just a perception of realistic threat to Muslims, or both. Therefore, I do not include the items. As a result, I cannot examine to what extent perceiving Muslims as realistic threat explains white anxiety in predicting anti-Muslim opinion.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Table A.1

Factor Analysis Table for White Anxiety Items Using ANES 2016 (N=2478)

Items	Loadings					
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Factor 6
Salience of White Identity	0.4062	0.0355	-0.2646	0.0519	0.0027	-
Whites Should Work Together	0.5722	0.2364	-0.1739	-0.0558	0.0064	-
Whites Can't Get Job Because of Minorites	0.6697	0.3466	0.0568	0.0214	-0.0114	-
Whites are Hardworking	0.5686	-0.4500	0.2571	-0.0417	-0.0057	-
Whites are Peaceful	0.5713	-0.4251	0.1067	0.0352	0.0063	-
Whites are Discriminated	0.3538	0.3304	0.2648	0.0004	0.0073	-
Eigenvalues	1.7158	0.6696	0.1856	0.0092	0.0003	-0.0002
Proportion of Total Variance	0.6650	0.2595	0.0719	0.0036	0.0001	-0.0001
Total Variance						1.00

Table A.2

Factor Analysis Table for Ethnocultural Prejudice Items Using ANES 2016 (N=2587)

Variables	Loadings					
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	Factor6
Salience of American Identity	0.4409	0.233	0.139	0.0891	-0.0144	-
To be Born in U.S.	0.7795	-0.3252	0.1221	-0.0081	0.025	-
To Have American Ancestry	0.7831	-0.3572	-0.0546	-0.018	-0.0506	-
To Speak English	0.6618	0.3055	0.0288	-0.0988	0.0322	-
To Follow American Customs/Traditions	0.7290	0.3415	-0.0748	0.008	-0.042	-
Immigrants harm American Culture	0.5963	-0.0346	-0.1311	0.0682	0.0601	-
Eigenvalues	2.7401	0.4988	0.0608	0.0228	0.0098	-0.0002
Proportion of Total Variance	0.8223	0.1497	0.0183	0.0068	0.0029	-0.0001
Total Variance			1.00			

Table A.3

Correlation Matrix (Pearson's r)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
White Anxiety												
1.Salience of White Identity	-											
2.Whites Work Together	0.28^2	-										
3.Whites Can't Get Job	0.28^2	0.45^2	-									
4.Whites are Hardworking	0.20^2	0.22^2	0.23^2	-								
5.Whites are Peaceful	0.18^2	0.21^2	0.24^2	0.50^2	-							
6.Whites are Discriminated	0.09^2	0.23^2	0.36^2	0.05^1	0.07^2	-						
Ethnocultural Prejudice												
7.American Identity	0.38^2	0.23^2	0.29^2	0.18^2	0.19^2	0.11^2	-					
8.Born in U.S.	0.29^2	0.23^2	0.36^2	0.11^2	0.11^2	0.18^2	0.26^2	-				
9.American Ancestry	0.30^2	0.24^3	0.38^2	0.12^2	0.12^2	0.20^2	0.23^2	0.70^2	-			
10.Speak English	0.20^2	0.23^2	0.35^2	0.15^2	0.20^2	0.17^2	0.32^2	0.40^2	0.38^2	-		
11.Follow Traditions	0.23^2	0.25^2	0.38^2	0.14^2	0.25^2	0.22^2	0.34^2	0.43^2	0.44^2	0.55^2	-	
12.Immigrants harm Culture	0.23^2	0.22^2	0.43^2	0.11^2	0.17^2	0.24^2	0.19^2	0.41^2	0.45^2	0.33^2	0.38^2	-

Notes: 1. p<.01; 2. p<.001;

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Table A.4

FMM with Fixed Effects

	Group 1 (N=843)		Group 2 (N=1655)	
Key Variables	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
White Anxiety	-8.8634***	1.6121	1.9569	1.4798
Ethnocultural Prejudice	-15.7949***	1.6029	-10.4307***	1.1446
Intercept	38.8687***	2.7243	59.6148***	1.3430
Fixed Effects	Coef.	S.E.		
Age[1]	-0.04829*	0.0237		
Education	1.1222**	0.3952		
Republican Identification	-2.3435***	0.2131		
Born-Again Christian	-0.6446	0.9308		

Notes: 1. Age is mean-centered;
*$p<.05$, **$p<.01$, ***$p<.001$;

Table A.5

FMM with Concomitant Model

	Group 1 (N=1431)		Group 2 (N=1067)	
Key Variables	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
White Anxiety	1.6052	1.3588	-9.7804	1.5704
Ethnocultural Prejudice	-13.3680***	0.9881	-13.8690***	1.1708
Intercept	62.7779***	1.0161	41.1968***	2.1981
Concomitant Model	Coef.	O.R.	S.E.	
Age[1]	-0.0030	0.9970	0.0052	
Education	-0.2510**	0.7781	0.0952	
Republican Identification	0.4577***	1.5805	0.0641	
Born-Again Christian	0.2463	1.2793	0.1992	
Intercept	0.0297	-	0.3906	

Notes: 1. Age is mean-centered;
*$p<.05$, **$p<.01$, ***$p<.001$;

Figure A.1. Residual Test Results for Model 5 in Table 2

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