ABSTRACT

Knowing the Transcendent: Analogous Properties and Speaking About God

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In this dissertation I defend an account of analogous predication that resolves a tension within classical theism between divine transcendence and knowledge of God. In chapter one I explain the tension and sketch a theory of meaning. On the one hand, if God is truly transcendent, then it seems that creatures cannot tell us anything about God. On the other hand, if we are really able to attain demonstrated, true knowledge of God from creatures, then it seems God is not truly transcendent. In chapters two and three I defend an account of analogous properties and conditions preventing univocity and equivocity in terms of Lewisian naturalness and through interacting with Aquinas. I argue in chapter two that any property possessed across primary ontological categories or ways of being is an analogous or merely disjunctive property. In chapter four I identify two kinds of analogous unity that prevent a non-univocal property from being a merely disjunctive property. In chapter four I survey varieties of analogous unity through discussion with historical treatments of analogy, focusing on the non-univocal resemblance, proportional unity. Finally, in chapter five, I bring the previous chapters to bear on the original tension of the dissertation. First I argue that analogous properties are able to ground meaning in such a way that demonstrations that provide us with positive

knowledge of God do not equivocate. Second I argue that analogous properties also preserve a robust account of divine transcendence.

Knowing the Transcendent: Analogous Properties and Speaking About God

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The Central Project

A number of difficulties and tensions within classical theism have been explored as analytic philosophers have attempted to explain, critique, and defend standard doctrines of classical theism. Although medieval philosophy and theology are sometimes treated as monolithic, medievalists are all too aware of the diversity of views.[1] Yet the disagreement, and especially famous disagreements, can blind us to deep agreement, especially deep agreement relative to us. Such is the case with the Thomist-Scotist divide on analogy and univocity, or so I argue. Instead of a narrative about two thinkers attempting to synthesize an Aristotelian scientific structure with our natural knowledge of God, hoping to maintain positive knowledge of God in light of apophatic theology, and preserve a robust account of divine transcendence, the standard narrative sketches Aquinas's analogical account and contrasts Scotus's univocal account. By emphasizing and building on the commonalities of the history, this dissertation offers an account of our natural knowledge of God that is influenced by both Aquinas and Scotus.

Despite the continuity, Scotus offered a number of objections to then standard accounts of analogy. One of Scotus's governing concerns was the preservation of the scientific character of our natural knowledge of God. Of course, "scientific" is used here in its Aristotelian sense of being structured around a subject matter and rigorously argued

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[1] See Robert Pasnau's recent *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) for an enlightening survey of the diversity of views within philosophy of nature and metaphysics in the late medieval Aristotelian tradition.

instead of its now ordinary sense concerning modern, empirical methods. Although the exact requirements for something to be an Aristotelian science were themselves a matter of dispute, one constant was that the demonstrations within the science needed to be valid. A paradigm case Aristotelian syllogism is composed of three statements and three terms with each term being used exactly twice. Two of the terms, the major and the minor, are united in the conclusion through the middle term. For example:

> All dogs are canines.
> All canines are mammals.
> So, all dogs are mammals.

One way a syllogism goes wrong is by having more than three terms. Such a syllogism commits the four-term fallacy or fallacy of equivocation because one (or more) of the terms actually has two meanings, thus undermining the connection. For example:

> All barky things are dogs.
> Some trees are barky things.
> So, some trees are dogs.

The dogwood family notwithstanding, the argument has clearly gone wrong. The problem is that "barky" has two meanings. Aquinas offers a theistic example when discussing equivocation:

> Whatever is in potentiality is brought to (*reducitur*) actuality by a being in
>   act (*ens actu*).
> All things are brought into (*educantur*) being by God.
> Therefore, God is a being in act (*ens actu*).[2]

One of Scotu's objections is that analogous accounts of our knowledge of God commit the fallacy of equivocation. So, on this account of analogy, terms said of God and creatures

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[2] *De Potentia* 7.7. Quotes from *De Potentia* from *On the Power of God*. Translated by Laurence Shapcote and Dominicans of the English Province. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004. Latin is from *Quaestiones Disputatae, Volumen II*. Editio IX revisa. Marietti Editori Ltd., 1953.

cannot mean the same thing, "being in act" then means different things in the first premise and the conclusion.

Scotus's objection gains traction on one natural way of describing the difference among univocal, equivocal, and analogous terms. In each case we are talking about the same word being used in different instances. Univocal terms have exactly the same meaning, as "bird" does when predicated of goldfinches and mockingbirds. Equivocal terms have completely different meanings, as "pen" does when predicated of writing instruments and animal enclosures. Between univocity and equivocity, analogous terms have similar or related meanings as "health" does when predicated of an animal and a diet. In order to be valid, each term of a syllogism must have the same meaning in both of its uses. Equivocal terms clearly fail to have the same meaning, but analogous terms have *somewhat* different meanings or different, but related meanings. Some difference in meaning, though, still seems to cause problems for validity. For example:

> All healthy things are living things.
> Sushi is a healthy thing.
> So, sushi is a living thing.

Trading on the difference of meaning of "healthy" predicated of animals and diets, the argument has an absurd conclusion due to equivocation. So, Scotus argues, analogy cannot preserve the scientific character of our knowledge of God because it undermines the validity of an argument. In this dissertation, I defend an account of analogy in light of Scotus's criticism.

Accounts of analogy that run afoul of validity do so for a good reason: they are attempts at preserving divine transcendence. According to classical theism, including Aquinas and Scotus, God is *not* like anything else. Attaining positive knowledge of God is a real problem because God is not only outside of our normal cognitive experience but

categorically beyond anything we do experience. Being good Aristotelians, Aquinas and Scotus both thought that our knowledge begins in sense experience and only moves beyond it by reflection, insight, and argument. Thus, our knowledge of God is dependent on our knowledge of things very different from God. The problem is that this makes it seem unlikely that a term coined and used for everyday experience can have exactly the same meaning when predicated of God. As one friend put it, "good" "just can't mean the same thing" when it is predicated finite, created things and their infinite creator. In other words, if scientific knowledge of God requires such sameness of meaning, then it seems scientific knowledge of God undermines divine transcendence.

We thus arrive at the tension within classical theism motivating this project. Two tenets of classical theism, scientific knowledge of God and divine transcendence, do not easily exist in harmony, and we see this in certain reactions to Aquinas and Scotus. Aquinas, it is usually acknowledged, succeeds in preserving divine transcendence, but is sometimes taken to fail to preserve positive knowledge of God. Analogy, if it is truly not univocity, reduces to complete apophaticism, or so it is argued, and God is then unknown.[3] Scotus, on the other hand, is usually recognized to have preserved our scientific knowledge of God, at least structurally, but is often taken to have undermined divine transcendence in the process. Having made God just the biggest member in the group of beings, Scotus plays a key role, at least one narrative claims, in the downfall of Western thought.[4]

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[3] I discuss this in chapter five.

[4] The narrative of radical orthodoxy identifies Scotus as the turning point. For example, after arguing that Scotus "elevates being (*ens*) to a higher station over God, so that being could be distributed to both God and His creatures," Phillip Blond comments, "This univocity of God and creatures therefore marks the time when theology itself became idolatrous." ("Introduction" in *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology*, edited by Phillip Blond (New York: Routledge, 1998), 6.) Bradley Gregory explains

While this dissertation is not primarily historical, i.e., my primary goal is not to figure out what Aquinas and Scotus thought, I do rely on both thinkers and make some interpretive claims. On my view, Aquinas and Scotus are much closer than normally thought, and I think my account of our natural knowledge of God is in continuity with their accounts even if not exactly a Thomist or Scotist account. Applying a distinction Bernard Lonergan employs between "Thomist" and "Thomistic," I claim that my account is Thomistic and compatible with Scotus, if not exactly Scotistic. "I wish to employ the distinction where 'Thomist' means 'of St. Thomas' and 'Thomistic' means 'of his school.'"[5] My account does not rise or fall with its compatibility with Aquinas or Scotus, but in the last chapter I argue for its compatibility with plausible readings of both.

Since my project is not primarily historical, I am especially responsible for my point of departure. Although I am operating within the constraints of classical theism and a generally Aristotelian cognitive framework, I could begin my inquiry in a number of places. My concern with the fallacy of equivocation has pushed me to start with language. Specifically, I start by examining the phenomena of meaning variance. What causes a word to mean different things at different times? Clearly this issue is central for understanding whether a word means the same thing in both its uses in an argument. After describing the phenomena of meaning variance, I develop an account of its causes,

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the next part of the narrative, "[The univocity of being] would prove to be the first step toward the eventual domestication of God's transcendence, a process in which the seventeenth-century revolutions in philosophy and science would participate—not so much by way of dramatic departures as by improvising new parts on a state that had been unexpectedly transformed by the doctrinal disagreements among Christians in the Reformation era." (*The Unintended Reformation* (Cambridge: MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 37-8). For an in depth critique of radical orthodox claims about Scotus, see Richard Cross, "Where the Angels Fear to Tread: Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy," *Antonianum* 76:1 (2001) p. 7-41.

[5] Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2* (University of Toronto Press, 2005), 153n5.

what I call "meaning makers." I end the chapter by providing a brief overview of the rest of the dissertation.

<div align="center">The Phenomena of Meaning Variance</div>

The same word often means different things; this is clear. Sometimes a word changes its meaning slowly over time, sometimes a subculture appropriates a word by changing its meaning, sometimes a person uses a word in a new way to communicate something new, and sometimes a word just has different meanings. Meaning variance is clearly common, but it is potentially ubiquitous: no word is safe. A feature of language users is their creativity, something recognized by linguists as central to language.

> The breadth and diversity of human thought and experience place great demands on language. Because there are always new things to say, new experiences to report, and new challenges to confront, language has to be creative, giving us the freedom to produce and understand new words and sentences as the need arises.[6]

Such needs are the occasion for the creative varying of a word's, any word's, meaning.

David Braine makes human creativity in language use one of the touchstones of his philosophy of language. Placing himself in the Aristotelian tradition, Braine stresses language as committed utterance and thus a human act. Human creativity contributes two aspects to Braine's account. On the one hand, we spontaneously produce unique sentences to express meaning. Even if limited to quite simple sentences, e.g., "If Socrates lived today, he would be an Olympic curling champion," it is easy to produce a sentence that has probably never been uttered before and will (hopefully) not be uttered again. Braine argues that such sentences are the spontaneous productions of our intellects. Our ability to produce new sentences shows one aspect of the fluidity of human language.

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[6] William O'Grady, John Archibald, and Francis Katamba. *Contemporary Linguistics*, 2nd edition (New York: Pearson, 2011), 3.

On the other hand, we can also creatively give words new meanings that are perfectly clear in ordinary communication without special explanation. Braine is not referring to the stipulated meanings of neologisms of which we philosophers are so fond. Instead, Braine notes that words can be used in a new, but related way within natural discourse. For example, if a sports commentator says the following during a football game, "The halfback draw is Iowa State's jab this season," he uses an extended meaning of "jab" since the halfback draw is surely not a straight, non-power punch. But the commentator's meaning is clear, even to those who have never heard jab used in this way: Iowa State is using the halfback draw to set the pace of the match, measure their opponent, and set up bigger plays (or power punches if the commentator continues the comparison). Examples like this show that standard meanings of words can be creatively extended to express related meanings without hindering communication.

All of this leads to the potential ubiquity of meaning variance. Any word can be creatively extended to have a variant meaning. While explaining various senses of "contact" or "touch" (*haphē*)," Aristotle notes that "touch," "just as every other name is meant in various ways."[7] Joseph Owens, commenting on this passage, explains:

> This statement seems intended in its literal sense. Even words like 'eye' and 'finger,' which are generally used univocally, can also be employed equivocally, as when they are further applied to a dead eye or a dead finger. There is probably no word that cannot be used metaphorically. The natural analogies run through every category of being, and so can presumably be derived to every word. Aristotle seems content to let language and concepts mirror the equivocity found in things.[8]

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[7] Quoted in Joseph Owens, *Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951), 126; 322b29-32.

[8] Ibid.

Owens's comment gets at the reason for the potential ubiquity of meaning variance hinted at above: language is used to communicate about the world and our experience, which are incredibly complex and diverse.

The potential ubiquity and importance of analogy is further supported by metaphor theory. At its most general description, a linguistic metaphor is "a shift, a carrying over of a word from its normal use to a new one."[9] Metaphor theory has shifted to favoring the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor over recent decades:

> While it seems clear that metaphor, traditionally understood as a comparison between two dissimilar things, must at some level involve some sort of cognitive processing, the most striking message from [Contemporary Theory of Metaphor] theorists was that metaphors are primarily cognitive, and only secondarily linguistic. Far from being idiosyncratic tokens of linguistic creativity used in political speeches and poems, the metaphoric expressions we utter are claimed to be a necessary result of our natural tendency to think metaphorically.[10]

Metaphor, most generally, on the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, "is a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system."[11] On this understanding of metaphor, meaning variance arises, at least in part, as we extend a concept and then word from one domain to another. Metaphor theorists conclude that metaphor is indispensable to both language and thought.[12]

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[9] I.A. Richards, quoted in *Metaphor* by Denis Donoghue, (Harvard University Press, 2014), 1.

[10] Tay, Dennis. *Metaphor in Language, Cognition, and Communication, Volume 1: A Descriptive and Prescriptive Analysis* (Amsterdam, NLD: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013), 1. For a survey of the different versions of Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, see, "Recent Developments in Metaphor Theory: Are the New Views Rival Ones?" by Zoltán Kövecses in *Metaphor and Metonymy Revisited, Beyond the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor: Recent Developments and Applications*, edited by Francisco Gonzàlvez-Garcia, et al (Amsterdam, NLD: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013), 11-25.

[11] G. Lakoff. "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought, 2nd Edition* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 203 (202-251). Quoted in Zoltan book in previous note, page 1.

[12] Tay, Dennis. *Metaphor in Language, Cognition, and Communication, Volume 1: A Descriptive and Prescriptive Analysis* (Amsterdam, NLD: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013), 2.

Metaphor theory emphasizes the foundational role of metaphor in the beginnings of our thinking about the world, but analogy is also key to extending the boundaries of our knowledge. In *By Parallel Reasoning*, Paul F. A. Bartha defends the following thesis, "good analogical arguments are an important means of establishing the plausibility of scientific hypotheses."[13] For example, James Clerk Maxwell's discovery of displacement current around 1860 was achieved by "modeling electromagnetic phenomena with a mechanical configuration of rotating vortices and idle wheels."[14] Extending terms and concepts common in mechanics to magnetism involves extending the meaning of those terms. Some scientists recognize the role of analogous reasoning in scientific discovery. For example, Priestly, who did pioneering work on electricity and chemistry, including the discovery of oxygen, explains "analogy is our best guide in all philosophical investigations and all discoveries, which were not made by mere accident, have been made by the help of it."[15] So, analogy is also central to our scientific reasoning. Similarly, Sarah Mattice has recently argued in *Metaphor and Metaphilosophy* that metaphor "is a necessary part of how we think, and we cannot understand what philosophy is without it."[16] So, meaning variance is potentially ubiquitous, begins at the core of our cognizing and speaking about the world, and is crucial in extending our understanding of the world. Even if the above claims about meaning variance end up being too strong, the phenomena of meaning variance is common and is deeply embedded in human communication.

[13] Bartha, Paul F. A., *By Parallel Reasoning* (Oxford University Press, 2010), ix.

[14] Ibid., 2. Bartha further discusses nature of Maxwell's analogous reasoning later, 212-22.

[15] Quoted in Bartha, 2.

[16] Mattice, Sarah A. *Metaphor and Metaphilosophy: Philosophy as Combat, Play, and Aesthetic Experience* (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Lexington Books, 2014), 2.

Before turning to meaning makers, I need to explain further about the account of language defended by Braine as it is used to understand meaning variance. In his recent book, *Language & Human Understanding*, David Braine develops an account of language that integrates work in philosophy of language, linguistics, and psychology of language. Here I explain two key aspects of Braine's view to provide a general picture of his project with an eye to what I use in my account. First, as mentioned, Braine focuses on committed utterance as the primary instance of speech. Second, I explain Braine's distinction between *parole* and *langue* meaning.

Instead of completed and fixed written communication, Braine thinks the paradigm case of communication happens in the dynamism and complexity of committed utterance. As Aristotle and Aquinas thought, Braine argues that meaning is primarily communicated in spoken sentences.[17] The primacy of the spoken, complete utterance involves the following two things for Braine. First, the part-whole relationship between the bits of the sentence and the sentence as a whole is more like an Aristotelian substance and its parts than an artifact and its parts. The meaning of the sentence, which precedes the sentence in some way, unites the parts of the sentence. Second, the complexity of real life enters into the meaning of the sentence. What are often called pragmatics – those non-linguistic components of communication – are not separated from the meaning of the sentence but are part of what constitutes it. Paradigm cases of communication are not static or context free words but the dynamism and spontaneity of the spoken word in concrete circumstances. Of course, the written word has these features we well, but

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[17] See the early chapters of *Aristotle: On Interpretation*, *Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan*, translated by Jean T. Oesterle (Marquette University Press, 1962).

focusing on committed utterance connects language to human acts, which helps put these features of language into their proper relief.

The second aspect central to Braine's view of language builds on an Aristotelian distinction between types of potentiality.[18] Peter Adamson helpfully explains the distinction between first and second potentiality this way:

> Aristotle thus distinguishes between what he calls "first potentiality" and what he calls "second potentiality." First potentiality is the ability to gain an ability; second potentiality is the ability you actually have. The insight here is that second potentiality is itself a kind of actuality, even though it isn't necessarily active at any given moment.[19]

One with second potentiality, or some actual ability, has a further, second, actuality when he exercises the ability. For example, humans have certain capacities that ground the first potentialities for various abilities like boxing or communicating. In the sense of first potentiality, it is true to say that I can box despite lacking the skills of a boxer. Unlike me, Gennady Golovkin has developed the skills to be a boxer and it is thus true to say that he can box as a second potentiality. Finally, when Golovkin is actually defending his belts, he has the second actuality of boxing.

Uniting this Aristotelian distinction with Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole*, Braine clarifies two ways to think about language.[20] Braine distinguishes the ability – the disposition or second potentiality – to speak a language or language possession, what he calls "*langue*," and the actual speaking of the language – the activity or second actuality – what he calls "*parole*." As Braine summarizes his account of the distinction:

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[18] 412a-b, 417b-418a.

[19] Adamson, Peter. *Classical Philosophy: History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 252. Adamson is explicating *De Anima*, (412a, 417-418a).

[20] W. Terrence Gordon, "*Langue* and *Parole*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Saussure* edited by Carol Sanders (Cambridge University Press, 20014), 76-87.

Language presents itself to us under two aspects, *parole*, or speech, and *langue*, the communal resources on which speech depends—*langue* being exercised and exhibited in *parole*, not as a separate object of study. In my presentation I use the terms *langue* and *parole* to enshrine the logical distinction between *langue* as the object of the shared practical knowledge of a language implicit in communal language-possession and *parole* as its realization in language-use and in the active understanding which users of that language have of what they say or hear, write, or read in their acts of speaking, hearing, writing, or reading in that language.[21]

Making this common sense distinction explicit affects how one analyzes language.

The first consequence of the distinction between *langue* and *parole* is a distinction between the *langue* meanings of a word and the *parole* meaning of a word. When someone says, "Sandy is an excellent counterpuncher" one might ask what "counterpuncher" means. Such a question of meaning, though, could have two senses. The *langue* meaning answer comes at the level of language possession and is the various lexical meanings catalogued for such a word in ordinary usage. In other words, the *langue* meaning or meanings are the standard meaning or set of meanings the word has in the language. "Counterpuncher" has the primary dictionary entry, "a boxer whose style is characterized by countering after an opponent's punch is thrown" and the derivative "a return blow, *esp.* one that exploits a momentary lack of defence."[22] Many other words have a large variety of *langue* meanings – "sap," for example, has at least four widely different *langue* meanings, some of which have distinct, extended uses as derivative verb forms.

After answering the question of *langue* meaning, "What does this word mean?" with the standard meanings a word has in ordinary use, one might expect a follow-up

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[21] Braine, *Language & Human Understanding*, 7.

[22] "Counterpuncher, n.". OED Online. March 2016. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/242520?redirectedFrom=counterpuncher (accessed April 15, 2016).

question of *parole* meaning, "Yes, but what does it mean *here*?" *Langue* meaning then is less determinate than *parole* meaning. The further question of *parole* meaning is not only due to ambiguity between *langue* meanings, but it can also further specify or extend a *langue* meaning in *parole* use. In short, the fact that one knows the *langue* meaning(s) of some word does not guarantee that one understands the meaning of that word in each use.

Parole meaning is the meaning of the word as a part of a complete utterance. Compared to the *langue* meaning, it is further determined by at least three things. First, the rest of the sentence of which it is a part affects the meaning. Although "sap" has both *langue* meanings, "the fluid, chiefly water with dissolved sugars and mineral salts, that circulates in the vascular system of a plant" and "a foolish and gullible person," "sap" in "I'm making Maple syrup from that tree's sap" clearly has the former as its *parole* meaning. In other words, the other elements of the sentence narrow down which *langue* meaning is the one in use.

Second, the broader conversational or textual context of a sentence can determine the *parole* meaning. For example, imagine "Shane is an excellent counterpuncher" is declared in a discussion about Shane's abilities as a political strategist. "Counterpuncher" here clearly does not have its primary meaning, since Shane does not practice the sweet science. Instead, the context determines that the derivative meaning is being used to mean that Shane exploits the weaknesses in the defense of her political opponents.

Third, what is sometimes called "pragmatics" plays a part in the *parole* meaning of the sentence. These non-linguistic factors are integrated into our normal communication. A tone, a look, the wider conversation, or setting of a conversation, among other pragmatic factors, all play a role in the meaning of a sentence. For example, if I comment on a boxer's excellent defense while miming getting punched repeatedly, it will be clear

that my comment is sarcastic and does not have its decontextualized sentence meaning.[23] So, the rest of the sentence, context, and pragmatics need to be considered when determining the *parole* meaning of a word in an utterance. With this background, I now turn to the meaning makers.

Meaning Makers

One might begin looking for causes of meaning in any number of ways. Since I am working within a generally Aristotelian framework, I consider the Aristotelian semantic triangle as developed by Aquinas. I then consider the meaning makers that Aquinas and Braine have identified as important. My explanation of Aquinas's philosophy of language is framed around John O'Callaghan's account of signification developed in *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn*.[24] Medievals did not talk about meaning the same way we do, but were instead concerned with signification. A sign, i.e., that which signifies, is something that points to or indicates something else and can be of two types. An artificial sign points to something else by convention. For example, a red octagon with the word "Stop" on it is, by convention, a sign that one must stop her car at an intersection. Aristotle and Aquinas thought that words, which they thought of primarily as the sounds we put together and secondarily as the marks we put together, are artificial signs. In contrast, a natural sign is a sign that points to something else by nature and not by convention. For example, smoke is, by nature, a sign of fire. Aquinas and Aristotle thought that certain "passions of the soul" or concepts are natural signs of things

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[23] Braine argues against the sharp distinction between pragmatics and sentence meaning, which is sometimes made. Instead, he places pragmatics under semantics, helping determine the *parole* meaning of a sentence. (Braine, *Language & Human Understanding*, 25ff)

[24] John O'Callaghan, *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).

outside of the mind. It is these three things – words as conventional signs, concepts as natural signs, and things – that are the vertices of the Aristotelian semantic triangle, with the connecting lines each being a distinct relation. Aquinas builds on Aristotle's account. The three vertices are similar: *nomen* or *voce* – the word, a *ratio* – the concept, and a *res* – the referent. After briefly considering each vertex, I turn to the relations among them.

I being with the word vertex. The semantic triangle is primarily intended as an analysis of words with referents in the categories. In other words, it is not meant as an analysis of what the medievals called "syncategorematic" terms like "a," "for," or "however." Instead, it is intended as an analysis of words like "Humans," "long," "tan," "runs," "round," and "scarves." Whether a word is spoken or written, it is conventionally connected to both concepts and things, which are the other vertices of the semantic triangle.

The concept plays an important role in the meaning of a word. According to Richard Cross, "The sense of a term is a concept" in medieval accounts.[25] Harm Goris makes a similar point when he explains that the meaning of a term is its "conceptual content (*ratio*)."[26] Although the full meaning of a word (the *parole* meaning) in actual use involves more than a concept, the signified concept is central to a word's meaning. O'Callaghan argues that it is not the concept as entity in the individual's mind that is a part of the semantic triangle but instead the content or "intelligible characteristic" of the concept.[27] For Aquinas, concepts just are that content, as existing in the mind of the

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[25] Richard Cross, "'Where Angels Fear to Tread': Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy," *Antonianum* 76 (2001), 12.

[26] Harm Goris, *Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will* (Leuven: Peeters, 1996), 20.

[27] O'Callaghan, *Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn*, 26-8.

knower.[28] As an intelligibility existing in the mind, the concept has a likeness to that intelligibility elsewhere, which produces the similitude discussed below.

The third vertex of the semantic triangle is the *res* or extra mental thing. I will primarily call this vertex "referent" which captures the point well but is less cumbersome. In paradigm cases the referent is a thing outside of the mind, but the account is easily extended to referents in the mind like concepts. In short, the referent is the entity or entities being talked about. With these brief descriptions, I now explain the relationship between each pair of vertices.

Figure 1.1 represents O'Callaghan's account of the Thomistic semantic triangle. *Concept signification* is a merely conventional relationship that connects a word to a concept. The conventional relationship is formed by what the medievals called the "imposition" of the word, where the word is connected to the referent by being "imposed" on it. Although the beginnings are merely conventional, the

Figure 1.1. Semantic Triangle

word itself then comes to have a certain history and character by being part of human history that provides stability beyond choice. The key is that concept signification is accidental and is not due to any intrinsic likeness or causal relation between the word and the concept.

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[28] Cf. Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (University of Toronto Press, 2005).

Similitude is a natural relation of likeness that the concept has to the thing.[29] This likeness is due to the formal similarity between the content of the concept and the referent or part of the referent. Depending on the *relata* – the referent and the concept – the nature of the similitude relationship will vary. In some cases, the likeness is a kind of formal identity. For example, the concept 'dog' has a kind of formal identity with its referents – the formal structure that exists as the essence of a dog is the formal structure that exists as the content of the concept. In other cases, the two cases are less similar, sometimes due to our mode of knowing. The concept 'humanity,' for example, is further abstracted from things than 'human' or 'dog' and thus doesn't formally resemble some extramental thing as well as they do. Instead, 'humanity' has a likeness to a certain aspect of human beings, without having a similitude to their whole concrete nature.[30] The details of the similitude relationship between a concept and that of which it is a natural sign are contested, but what is important for us here is not: the concept is a natural sign of a thing due to a likeness between them.[31]

Referent signification is a relation between a word and some extra mental thing or *res*. The "means" of referent signification is taken from concept signification and similitude. So, the referent is signified by means of the concept connected to the word by concept signification. The how or manner of signifying (*modus significandi*) of the signification is

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[29] I am talking about normal, successful communication. On this account, cases of fictional or nonexistent referents are usually explained through the referent being a being of reason or as being false because the similitude fails. But such cases are difficult ones for any philosophy of language and the generality of my meaning makers account allows for a variety of explanations.

[30] For example, see Aquinas, *Being and Essence*, chapter 1.

[31] Jeffrey Brower and Susan Brower-Toland. "Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality," *Philosophical Review* 2008 Volume 117, Number 2: 193-243. [doi: 10.1215/00318108-2007-036].

determined by the nature of the similitude relation between the concept and the thing.[32]

In referent signification, we have an artificial sign, the word, that points to some thing in a manner determined by the relation of likeness between the natural sign of the signified concept and the thing.

From the Aristotelian account, I take two meaning makers: the signified concept and the referent.[33] Before considering these meaning makers in more detail, it is important to note a difference between medieval discussions of signification and recent discussions of meaning. Giorgio Pini cautions readers of Scotus:

> In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding, it must be noted that Scotus's doctrine of univocity, even in a purely theological context, presupposes the Aristotelian doctrine of signification according to which a term signifies a mental concept, which in turn represents a thing. This notion of signification should not be confused with the contemporary

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[32] O'Callaghan argues that referent signification is not merely a conjunction of concept signification and similitude. Instead, the semantic triangle is an irreducibly triadic relationship. Referent signification is a function of the other two relations, but is not merely their conjunction.

[33] Ross considers both of these weaknesses of the classical view. In *Portraying Analogy*, the most recent systematic treatment of the analogy phenomenon, Ross builds on Aristotle and Aquinas, but rejects key assumptions in their philosophy of language:

> [The classical writers] appealed to the ontology of the things referred to, and the heart of their account was an attempt to connect features of the *world* (similarity of things) with features of *words* (similarity of meaning) by hypotheses concerning the way in which *concepts* are formed (similarity of concepts). The classical theorists did not discuss the factors that determine *which* sense (or meaning) of a merely equivocal word ('pen') belongs to a given occurrence. That is because they considered linguistic meaning to be in the *mind* and to be the result of abstraction and not to be *inherent* in the written and spoken words.
> My general picture is different. Meaning is inherently in the sentences just as law-like regularity is in nature. *Grasping* the meaning is a mental or a quasi-mental phenomenon; *having meaning* is an inherent property of well-formed and acceptable expressions. Writing and speech are not encodings of one another or of something in the mind. Words are not signs of meanings (e.g. ideas), they *mean* (contrastively symbolize and combinatorially have expressive possibilities, actuality and limitations). (22-23)

Although I follow the classical writers further than Ross and reject Ross's semi-reification of words – he often talks as if words have their meaning apart from their conventional and social use – Ross's identification and description of the phenomena is robust and useful. Unfortunately, Ross does not argue explicitly the assumptions he finds problematic in *Portraying Analogy*. Instead, the explanatory power of his simpler view is supposed to show the classical assumptions to be superfluous. Similarly, I do not address his positive view explicitly and let my examples that the referent and signified concept do affect meaning show something more than the intrinsic properties of words is needed.

> notion of the meaning of a term. Whereas meaning is a linguistic entity that can be described as the entry of a dictionary, the signification of a term in an Aristotelian context is a psychological entity, i.e. a concept present in the mind, which can be developed into a definition capturing the essence of an extra mental thing. This amounts to a big difference between the contemporary linguistic approach to definitions and the medieval one. Whereas a linguistic meaning defines a term, an Aristotelian definition capturing the essence defines an extra mental thing.[34]

Pini notes the difference between the Aristotelian and contemporary approaches. The initial problem for classical theism was framed in terms of meaning, taking the linguistic approach described by Pini. While different, the Aristotelian and linguistic definitions are related. In the final chapter, I propose that linguistic definitions can be expressions of signified concepts, but for now, I simply note that the medieval definitions are factors in linguistic meaning.

The Aristotelian accounts of language we have seen in Aquinas and Braine provide three meaning makers: the signified concept, the referent, and the wider context. I now consider each in turn by offering some examples of how they affect meaning and comparing them to similar views. After considering the meaning makers, I discuss how they relate to each other and offer some methodological comments.

Although concepts are psychological or mental entities, they are closely related to the meanings of terms. Meanings are at least partially linguistic expressions of the content of a concept. The *langue* meaning especially seems to be a linguistic account of a concept. And because the *parole* meaning of a word is clearly partly determined by which *langue* meaning is signified, the signified concept affects the *parole* meaning. So, "Chad has a good view" could mean "Chad has a nice vista" or "Chad has a plausible position." The

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[34] Giorgio Pini, "Univocity in Scotus's *Quaestiones Super Metaphysicam*: The Solution to a Riddle," *Medioevo* 30 (2005), 6.

key difference is the concept signified by "view." In other words, the intended meaning of "view" might be the only difference between the sentences. Imagine Chad is looking down from Notre Dame while explaining the standard view of why gargoyles decorate it, thereby preventing the context from determining meaning. The signified concept then determines "view" to mean different things. Of course, pragmatics (being in a conversation about different positions on policy questions) or further sentence elements ("from his house" being added to the sentence) will often be required to erase the ambiguity. Yet, concept signification can be one cause of meaning variance.

Although the signified concept is a meaning maker on my account and this involves intention to some degree, my account is not an intentionalist account. On a strictly intentionalist account, the meaning of a word just is what one intended to mean by it. The philosophy of language literature has made two things clear.[35] First, something like intention plays some role in meaning. Without intention, some of our intuitions about authorial intent as clarifying meaning and ability avoiding strange circumstances are not captured. Second, intention is not the whole story about what makes meaning. The *langue* meanings of words and communication norms limit what any given sentence can reasonably mean, no matter what the author intends. On my account, concept signification is a conventional relationship between the word and a concept. Although the connection is accidental, it is socially established and proficient language users recognize a word's limitations in expressing a certain range of meanings. Thus, the limited objectivity of concept signification prevents the problems caused by intentionalism's subjectivity.

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[35] For a brief overview of intentionalist or ideational theories of meaning, see William Lycan, *Philosophy of Language*, 2nd Edition (Routledge, 2008), chapter 5.

Although concept signification is a meaning maker, meaning is not reducible to the signified concept.[36] Summary statements like Cross's above, "The sense of a term is a concept," imply that signification is adequate to provide the meaning, but Braine's distinction between *langue* meaning and *parole* meaning helps us see that more than a signified concept is needed for *parole* meaning. Although signification is closely related to the various *langue* meanings of the word, the full expressed or *parole* meaning of the use is not captured without considering both the referent and the wider context to which I turn to now.

The referent also plays a part in causing meaning variance. George Mavrodes argues that the referent affects the meaning of a word from the following example: The person St. Francis loved best is intelligent.[37] The sentence refers to either St. Francis's mother or to God, and "intelligent" will change its meaning in the two cases. Thus, the referent affects the meaning of the sentence. He argues for this by *reductio*. If the meaning of "intelligent" doesn't change because of the referent, then problems like the following syllogism will occur:

> 'The person St. Francis loved best is intelligent; St. Francis loved God best; therefore God is intelligent', has a conclusion where 'intelligent' differs in meaning from its use in 'St. Francis' mother was intelligent' but where the difference of meaning is not accounted for by anything.[38]

Mavrodes takes it as a given that "intelligent" differs in meaning in the two uses, but such an assumption is reasonable, especially if we are considering the *parole* meaning.

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[36] Or at least significant argument is needed to show how other apparent factors are reducible to the signified concept.

[37] George Mavrodes, "On Ross's Theory of Analogy," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67: 20 (1970), 747-755. I'm actually using Ross's summary of Mavrodes example here which uses the predicate "is intelligent" instead of "is wise." Reference is in following note.

[38] James F. Ross, *Portraying Analogy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 26.

A second example also shows that referents affect meaning. Consider the following three sentences:

i. "Fido is not human."
ii. "Bernard Hopkins is not human."
iii. "Hannibal Lecter is not human."

In (i), "not human" has its normal sense. Fido, a dog, is not of the human species. In the other cases though, the referents *are* human, which means "not human" must have a different meaning. The referent of (ii), Bernard Hopkins, is a 49-year-old boxer still competing against the best in the sport.[39] In this case, "not human" means something like "beyond normal human limitations." The referent of (iii), is a cannibalistic sociopath, and "not human" means something like "subhuman" or "below normal human norms." The differences between the referents accounts, at least in part, for the differences in meaning across the three cases.

The referent being a meaning maker does not make this a reference theory of meaning in which the meaning of a sentence or word just is the reference. Instead, the referent is part of the explanation for why the term or sentence means what it does. This meaning maker shares some of the intuitive appeal of truth conditional theories of meaning insofar the relation between the sentence and the world is part of the story of why the sentence means what it does, but it is not merely a truth conditional theory of meaning in that the other meaning makers are also part of the story.[40] Whatever the exact story (or stories) of how referents affect meaning turns out to be, referents are often

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[39] At the time of writing, Hopkins held one of the light heavyweight (175 lbs.) championship belts.

[40] For a discussion of truth conditional accounts of meaning see William Lycan, *Philosophy of Language*, 2nd Edition (Routledge, 2008), chapters 8-10.

considered part of how we understand what a sentence means. For example, David Lewis argues that referents play a key role in understanding what a sentence means:

> I would instead propose that the saving constraint concerns the referent - not the referrer, and not the causal channels between the two. It takes two to make a reference, and we will not find the constraint if we look for it always on the wrong side of the relationship. Reference consists in part of what we do in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in eligibility of the referent. And this eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties.[41]

The referent is thus thought to play a role in meaning on a number of different views. After considering the final meaning maker, I discuss a couple of examples where the meaning makers interact in different ways to cause meaning.

One common criticism of the classical semantic triangle is that it ignores context. Whether or not such a criticism is justified, I here explicitly add context to the causes of meaning. The wide context of a word involves two things: the nearby context and pragmatics. The nearby context of a word begins with the rest of the sentence the word is in and extends to surrounding sentences. Other parts of the sentence or the sentence as a whole affect the meaning of a word. For example, "Carolyn plays the piano, but Carolyn never plays the piano." Although "plays" is ambiguous between the activity of hitting keys and the ability to hit the keys in a musical way, the sentence as a whole determines the meaning of both instances of "plays" in the sentence. It could work in the other direction too, "Carrol always plays the piano despite the fact that he can't play the piano." So, sometimes the parts of a sentence contribute to the meaning of a sentence as a whole to affect the *parole* meaning of a word. Sometimes, especially in the case of a subordinate

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[41] David Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1983), 343-377. Kris McDaniel follows Lewis here: "No one should think that fit with use is the only, or even the most important, factor in determining what our words mean. A second factor is how natural the candidate meanings are. This second factor can trump fit with use." ("Ways of Being" in *Metametaphysics* (Oxford University Press, 2009), 310).

clause, part of the sentence will specify which *langue* meaning is being used. For example, "Chelsey plays the violin, although she rarely has the time these days."

The surrounding context of communication can affect meaning as well. For example, an important component affecting meaning is whether a sentence is situated within the context of an organized body of knowledge and therefore a set of views and arguments. For example, if someone says, "Light is a wave" in a scientifically informed context, she does not mean that light is a wave like all the other waves. Instead, she means that light exhibits wave-like behavior. Similarly, if certain metaphysical dependence relations have recently been defended, they might play a role in the meaning of subsequent statements.

The wider context also includes the pragmatics of the utterance, which affects the meaning of the words. "Pragmatics" refers to the non-linguistic factors in meaning. "Caryn is a real night-owl" accompanied by a sarcastic tone alters "real night-owl" to mean the opposite of what it normally would mean. Even without a sarcastic town, a conversational setting, which includes Caryn falling asleep before dusk, would cause a similar change in meaning to the sentence. It is clear that pragmatics affect the *parole* meaning of words. Braine argues that pragmatics and context are not "special features" that sometimes affect communication. Instead, he concludes, "All use of language involves some dependence on context, and there is no nice 'special-feature-free' area within which semantics is tidy, and therefore no neat division between semantics and pragmatics."[42] Whether Braine is correct that pragmatics and semantics cannot be neatly divided in theory, he is correct that no such neat division exists in practice.

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[42] Braine, *Language & Human Understanding*, 23.

I have argued that the signified concept, referent, and wider context are all causes of meaning, but I do not offer any kind of general principles for determining the *parole* meaning of a sentence from the meaning makers. The reason is that I agree with Braine that the communication achieved by expressing meaning in sentences is an achievement of human understanding and creativity that cannot be reduced to a set of rules and procedures. This Wittgensteinian view is at the heart of Braine's project:

> The insight fleshed out in this book is an insight into what is involved in linguistic understanding—an understanding which cannot be mechanically simulated because, as later chapters show, it is not formalizable in any relevant way.[43]

Although my account of analogy does not depend on this insight, my approach to analogy is more particularist than methodist. In other words, I generally take things on a case by case basis instead of spelling out procedures and principles for understanding analogy.

In method, I am once again following Aristotle. As Joseph Owens explains:

> Aristotle nowhere gives a complete list of all these types [of equivocals]. Nor does he keep their treatment separate. He takes his examples indiscriminately from one class or another, as occasion suggests. As the divisions are not made on any systematic basis, there is no reason for believing that the ones mentioned are exhaustive. The Stagirite's procedure seems to consist in looking at things actually denominated by the same name, and then discovering whether they are expressed univocally or equivocally. Otherwise the question seems to have no interest for him. He does not suggest limiting a term to one exact meaning and keeping it always fixed in this precise sense. Rather, he is content to use the same terms univocally or equivocally, as the things being treated demand.[44]

Similarly, I develop my account with an aim to preserving the fluidity and richness of our language. Analogy is not something ideally eliminated from language because the

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[43] Ibid., 72.

[44] Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, 126.

varieties of difference and resemblance are part of the world and our experience of it. Instead, a fuller account of analogy helps us be clear on the types of unity analogous terms have and how we should understand them.

These methodological comments are not intended to suggest that the account of meaning makers and their interaction cannot be further specified. I offer a pluralistic account of meaning-makers, but my account does not hinge on the three being irreducible. Maybe the referent is really reducible to the signified concept. I also don't offer any kind of mechanical procedure for determining meaning from meaning makers. In fact, in different cases, one meaning maker will direct another. Two examples from poetry help show that concept, referent, and context interplay in a variety of ways.

Meaning makers jointly affect meaning as well, and sometimes it is not obvious or important to say which meaning maker is affecting what. But it is clear that multiple meaning makers are affecting the meaning. For example, take the following poem by Kay Ryan, "Paired Things":

> 1 Who, who had only seen wings,
> could extrapolate the
> skinny sticks of things
> birds use for land,
> 5 the backward way they bend,
> the silly way they stand?
> And who, only studying
> bird tracks in the sand,
> could think those little forks
> 10 had decamped on the wind?
> So many paired things seem odd.
> Who ever would have dreamed
> the broad winged raven of despair
> would quit the air and go
> 15 bandy-legged upon the ground,
> a common crow?[45]

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[45] Kay Ryan, *The Best of It*, 79.

If the poem only went through line 11, it would seem to be a straightforward nature poem about the strange combinations of qualities of birds. Lines 12-16 are also about birds, but something shifts. Ryan is now talking about something bigger and deeper. The clue is that Ryan talks about one thing that is both the "raven of despair" and a "common crow." But these are different species of birds. As Dana Gioia notes, "'Paired Things' also hovers, as so many Ryan poems do, on the edge of allegory. The central images become emblematic of a larger truth, but they slip away before the interpretation becomes fixed."[46]

Although not explicitly stated, the clue in the later lines shifts the referent beyond birds, which shifts the meaning of the entire poem. One plausible reading is that Ryan is also talking about humans: we are capable of transcending nature to some degree and yet move through nature so clumsily; at moments we are noble creatures capable of profound despair and yet must also fulfill all the mundane and common tasks of daily life. The new and ambiguous referent of the final lines changes the meaning of the entire poem. Here, the wider context expands the apparent referent of the earlier lines and opens them up to a new range of meanings. The wider context and referent, then, jointly affect the meaning of the seemingly straightforward lines of the poem much the way a surprising ending changes how one understands an entire narrative.

Sometimes the intended referent determines the meaning despite the apparent context. To avoid the true subject of his love being discovered, Dante used contextual misdirection in a sonnet about Beatrice. Although his friends knew he was in love, they were mistaken about whom he loved. Encouraging their mistake, Dante had passed the supposedly beloved lady some verses. When the lady left their city, he took the

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46 Dana Gioia. "Discovering Kay Ryan," *The Dark Horse* 7: Winter (1998-99).

opportunity to write a poem that appeared to be about said lady but was actually about Beatrice. He analyzes the poem:

> There are two principal parts in this sonnet. In the first part my intent is to call upon Love's faithful through the words of the prophet Jeremiah, 'All ye who pass by, behold and see if there be any sorrow like unto my sorrow', and to beg that they deign to hear me. In the second part I tell of the position in which Love had placed me, with a meaning other than that expressed in the beginning and ending of the sonnet, and I tell what I have lost. The second part begins: 'Love, surely not'.[47]

Apart from Dante's expressed intent for the meaning of the middle part of the poem, one would not expect the meaning to vary. Of course the poets cannot always be trusted to comprehend the meaning of their work, but here Dante seems reliable. Here the referent and signified concept by Dante vary, without indication, through the poem. It is reasonable to think the meaning changed with them, showing the meaning makers at work.

In this section I have argued for three meaning makers – the signified concept, the referent, and the wide context. These three factors affect the meaning of a word in various and complicated ways, and due to these factors the same word will often have different meanings in different uses. In the next section, I explain some indicators of when such meaning variance has occurred.

Indicators of Meaning Variance

Although the above conditions are causes of meaning variance, we are often clued into meaning variance through other indicators. Ross and Braine both offer reasons to think that a word is not used univocally in different cases. Ross delineates fifteen indicators of meaning variance that he finds in Aristotle's *Topics*. These indicators are not

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[47] Dante Alighieri, *Vita Nuova*, translated by Mark Musa (Oxford University Press, 1992), 12.

intended to be sufficient conditions, but guides. I summarize most of these into the following four types of indicators:

1. Words have different sets of synonyms or antonyms. Although synonyms and antonyms for non-univocal uses may overlap, if some words are only synonyms or antonyms of one of the uses, then the words are not used univocally. Ross provides "fine" as an example when predicated of a painting and a house. An antonym of the latter is "ramshackle," which would not be an antonym of the former.[48]

2. Words have different contextual definitions. Two instances of a word, occurring in different contexts, sometimes will have different contextual definitions. If that is the case, or the contextual definition of a word in the contextual definitions is different, then meaning of the two instances is different.

3. The words have different sets of or a different number of intermediates. Ross offers the example of "black" and "white" as used of colors and as used of people. As used of colors there are a great number of intermediaries as compared to the few intermediaries between "black" and "white" as used of people. Just as the number of intermediaries indicates difference in meaning, so does what the intermediaries are.

4. Ross names one indicator, "Generic opposition of the realms of applicability."[49] If a word is used in two generically different areas – across different high-level categories – then there is reason to think the word has different meanings in the two cases. For example, "his handwriting was unintelligible" and "his published work was unintelligible." Ross argues that the category-indeterminate term "unintelligible" is determined to varied meanings when determined to the different categories.[50]

Ross uses these tests to find cases of meaning variance.

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[48] Ross, *Portraying Analogy*, 40.

[49] Ibid., 46.

[50] Ross, "Analogy and the Resolution of Some Cognitivity Problems," *Journal of Philosophy* 67:20 (1970), 738. In his reply, Mavrodes fairly critiques Ross's account for not explaining what counts as a category. I will consider his critique in chapter two.

Braine also offers some indicators of meaning variance: different sets of implications and different types of justification.[51] First, Braine claims that the same word having different sets of implications across uses shows that the word has different meanings. Second, when the nature of the justification for a word's correct use varies greatly across uses, then the word is used differently in the cases. This latter test is often an indicator that the referent is affecting the meaning of the word. Again, these are intended to be guides that clue us into meaning variance instead of sufficient conditions or explanations of meaning variance.

The Rest of the Dissertation

Over the next three chapters, I develop an account of analogous properties and consider how this affects meaning in the final chapter. In this chapter I have focused on meaning variance. Analogous meanings are neither the same as univocal meanings, utterly different as equivocal meanings. Instead, analogous meanings are similar; there is ordered or related variance within the meanings. If the meaning makers are the causes of meaning variance, then explaining the ordered variance requires appeal to the meaning makers.

In the next chapter, I reapproach the question of analogy through recent work in metaphysics by developing an account of univocal, equivocal, and analogous properties in light of varying degrees of natural unity. Properties, in recent philosophical discussion, are closely related to and sometimes confusingly undistinguished from predicates. In the most straightforward cases, predicates are predicated of subjects in light of some property the subject possesses. David Lewis explains the use of "property," "Language offers us several

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[51] Braine, *Language & Human Understanding*, 127.

more or less interchangeable words: 'universal'; 'property', 'quality', 'attribute', 'feature', and 'characteristic'; 'type', 'kind', and 'sort'; and perhaps others."[52] Similarly, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry "Properties" states: "Properties (also called 'attributes,' 'qualities,' 'features,' 'characteristics,' 'types') are those entities that can be predicated of things or, in other words, attributed to them."[53]

As we will see, deeming an entity a property is not the same as recognizing it as a "real thing." For example, the property *being a unicorn* is an entity capable of being predicated of things, but not a property any actual thing has. In another way, a property can be gerrymandered in such a way, e.g., *being a horse or being a horned animal*, that it isn't real in the way other properties, e.g., *being a horse*, are real. So, there is a variety of real and not real properties.

Connecting this to my account of meaning makers, properties might seem to connect to only the referent meaning maker. Properties, e.g., *being human* or *being a duck*, clearly are potential referents, which explains their connection to predicates. Yet, properties are also related to the signified concept meaning maker. For example, gerrymandered properties might be concepts instead of things in the world. On a metaphysic like Aquinas's, for example, many of our concepts, e.g., 'humanity,' don't pick out some part of a thing, but are abstractions from things. On such an account, less real properties will probably be understood as concepts instead of things. So, depending on the ontic status one gives various properties, some might be more like concepts than extramental things. In other words, the metaphysical indeterminacy of properties makes

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[52] Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," 344.

[53] Francesco Orilia and Chris Swoyer, "Properties", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/properties/>.

them analyzable in terms of either the referent meaning maker, signified concept meaning maker, or both.

So, in chapters two and three I defend an account of analogous properties. In chapter two I explain what an analogous property is through recent work in metaphysics and defend two sufficient conditions for a property to not be univocal. In chapter three I argue that non-univocal properties might have two types of unity to make them analogous properties instead of merely disjunctive properties. In chapter four, I consider the various types of analogous unity in more detail by examining accounts of each. In the fifth and final chapter, I bring all of this to bear on the question of the dissertation: how can we have scientific knowledge of a transcendent God?

Before turning to these chapters, I offer one final qualification of my project. In this dissertation I defend an account of analogy that, I claim, allows for valid demonstrations regarding God's existence and nature while preserving divine transcendence. In other words, some analogous properties found in created things could be predicable of God even though God is transcendent. I am *not* offering a defense of any theistic argument for God's existence or any particular set of divine attributes. So, I explain how analogous predicates can be predicated of God, but I do not defend which predicates can be predicated of God. In the course of the dissertation, I provide a number of examples of analogous predicates and divine attributes, but my account does not require that any particular predicate is predicable of God.

CHAPTER TWO

Univocal and Non-Univocal Properties

Introduction

In the context of discussing divine simplicity, Alexander Pruss claims that properties as well as predicates can be understood as univocal, equivocal, and analogous, "Moreover, while the concepts *univocal*, *equivocal* and *analogical* in the first instance apply to predicates, they also make sense in the case of properties."[1] Providing a suggestive sketch of of what this means, Pruss explains that a property P is had univocally by x and y provided that x and y possess P in the same way. He goes on:

> In such a case, x's having P and y's having P are relevantly the same kind of thing. We can say that a property P is had equivocally by x and y provided that there is no relevant similarity between x's having P and y's having P.... However, when there is a relevant similarity between x's having P and y's having P, the similarity being relevant at least in the sense that it is on account of this similarity that x and y both have the shared property P, we can say that we have a case of analogy.[2]

In this chapter, I develop Pruss's sketch in two ways. First, I follow Kris McDaniel and offer an account of analogous properties in terms of naturalness.[3] Second, I survey a number of reasons to think properties are not univocal and defend the following thesis:

> *Non-univocal property thesis*: If a property is possessed across ontological categories or modes of being, then the property is either analogous or merely disjunctive.

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[1]Alexander Pruss, "On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity," in *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion*, Volume 1, edited by J. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 156.

[2] Ibid.

[3] I prefer "analogous" but treat it as interchangeable with "analogical."

In order to do this, I first sketch the metaphysical landscape in which I am working. After providing the backdrop of naturalness, I explain where univocal, analogous, and merely disjunctive properties fall on the naturalness spectrum. With their location on the naturalness spectrum carved out, I turn to reasons to think a property is analogous or merely disjunctive instead of univocal. I explain Kris McDaniel's reasons for thinking a feature is not perfectly natural, Aquinas's reasons for thinking predication is not univocal, and then defend my non-univocal property thesis.

Non-Univocal Features

Recent metaphysicians have returned to a Platonic metaphor to describe the goals of their theories. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates offers the following process of division and generalization, "That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver."[4] Plato's insight is that reality has a structure by which our ideas are measured. A good concept or theory distinguishes where there is distinction and orders where there is structure. For a time, it was out of fashion to be a realist about such structure and order where it went beyond empirical observation. Modality re-entered metaphysical discussions as a type of objective ontic structure, but it became clear that reality has joints beyond the modal.

In his survey of recent metaphysical history, Ted Sider explains how David Lewis and David Armstrong encouraged a richer ontology by moving the discussion beyond modality.[5] Armstrong's ideas of genuine and intrinsic feature understood in terms of universals and Lewis's idea of graded natural properties provided conceptual tools to

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[4] *Phaedrus*, 265e.

[5] Theodore Sider, *Writing the Book of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-8.

explain distinction between things. Sider explains why this was important, "What distinguishes Armstrong and Lewis is that they regard the distinction as objective."[6] Recent attempts to get at objective distinctions and structure have added fundamentality and the grounding relation to the conceptual tools.[7] I develop my account of univocal, analogous, and merely disjunctive features primarily in terms of Lewis's naturalness.

Sider provides a helpful example to explain what is meant by "carving at the joints." Figure 2.1 can be divided up a number of ways.[8] We naturally divide the

Figure 2.1. Grey and striped

rectangle in half by our concepts of 'grey' and 'striped.' Yet imagine a language community that, for whatever reason, divides the rectangle in half by the dotted line instead. They call the top half "greyped" and the bottom half "strey" and have no concepts that divide as our 'grey' or 'striped' do. Our concepts and predicates divide the rectangle along more natural joints than theirs, and thereby get at a more fundamental

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[6] Ibid., 5.

[7] See *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*, edited by David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), for a sampling work done in this area.

[8] Adapted from Sider, *Writing the Book of the World*, 2. Jonathan Jacobs adapts Sider's rectangle in another way in "The Ineffable, Inconceivable, and Incomprehensible God: Fundamentality and Apophatic Theology," in *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 6*, edited by Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 161.

structure. In our world, the concept of 'metallic' probably carves at a more natural joint than 'chair,' and 'iron' at a more natural joint than either. Lewis's idea of naturalness has provided the space for philosophers to again consider the analogy of being.

Kris McDaniel approaches the analogy of being through the distinction between natural properties and merely disjunctive properties. I follow McDaniel and locate analogous properties as somewhere between the perfectly natural and merely disjunctive. After expanding on Lewis's account of naturalness, I distinguish univocal and analogous features and locate them on the naturalness spectrum. Naturalness is, on Lewis's account, a feature of properties of which there are two common conceptions.[9] On one conception, properties are abundant, with a property for every set. "The abundant properties may be as extrinsic, as gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive, as you please."[10] If we are with Plato and interested in carving reality at the joints, abundant properties, Lewis explains, "carve reality at the joints – and everywhere else as well."[11] On the other conception, properties are sparse.[12] Lewis explains the sparse properties:

> The sharing of them makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to characterise things completely and without redundancy.[13]

My account does not depend on one of these views of properties being correct.

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[9] David Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1983), 346.

[10] David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 59.

[11] Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," 346.

[12] The name no doubt taken from Armstrong's conditions for universals. Lewis's language changes somewhat between the article and the later book. In the article, "properties" just refers to the abundant properties in contrast to universals, which are Armstrong's sparse universals. (343-47) In the book, he construes it differently. We have two conceptions of properties, as abundant or sparse. (59ff)

[13] Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 60.

Naturalness is a graded concept.[14] Let us begin with the superlative form: perfect naturalness. Perfectly natural properties are those that carve reality exactly at the joints, "things are objectively similar or dissimilar to each other in virtue of the distribution of the perfectly natural properties (and relations)."[15] In other words, the sparse conception of properties is a conception of the perfectly natural properties. *Being an electron*, for example, is a good candidate for a perfectly natural property. The abundant conception of properties fills out the naturalness spectrum. At the end opposite of perfectly natural properties are merely disjunctive properties. For example, *being an electron or a left hook* is artificial and gerrymandered, having no natural unity. The more natural *being an electron* and *being a left hook* do not have the kind of unity that makes their disjunction more than arbitrary.[16] I follow McDaniel in locating analogous properties somewhere between these two extremes. See Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2. Naturalness spectrum

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[14] "Probably it would be best to say that the distinction between natural properties and others admits of degree. Some few properties are *perfectly* natural. Others, even though they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least somewhat natural in a derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated chains of definability from the perfectly natural properties." Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 61. Cf., Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals."

[15] McDaniel, "A Return to the Analogy of Being," 690.

[16] McDaniel's definition of merely disjunctive property is different than this, but undermines some graded notions of naturalness. I thus depart from his view here, as both he and I treat naturalness as graded. "The notion of a merely disjunctive property is intimately connected with Lewis's notion of naturalness. P is a mere disjunction of Q and R only if (i) necessarily, something has P if and only if it has either Q or R, and (ii) P is less natural than both Q and R." "A Return to the Analogy of Being," 690.

There are properties besides analogous properties that are neither perfectly natural nor merely disjunctive. For example, *being a tree* is a natural property but less natural than *being a southern live oak*. Although the former picks out a feature that is joint carving, it does not carve as precisely as the latter, probably due to its generality. Following the metaphor, one might think that more natural properties allow one to carve with a sharper tool. Yet, it is clear that *being a tree* is not a merely disjunctive property. Moreover, *being a tree* is a univocal property. That is, each instance of *being a tree* has the same likeness to each other instance of *being a tree*. Or, as Pruss explained, a property P is had univocally by x and y if they both possess P in the same way.[17] If a property is univocal across two instances, then, that in virtue of which it is exemplified is the same in both cases. So, perfectly natural properties are always univocal properties, but univocal properties are not always perfectly natural properties. For example, *being metallic* and *being bronze* are both univocal properties, but the latter is more natural. As this example and the oak example above show, genera and species are related as the less natural to more natural. In medieval terms, a species will be more natural (and perfectly natural in the case of the lowest species) than its genus or difference.

In contrast, two instances of a merely disjunctive property might share no likeness and have no unity. For example, *being an electron or being a left hook* can be possessed in virtue of an electron in one instance and a left hook in another. Thus, there is not unity or likeness between that in virtue of which the property is possessed. Pruss makes the point in a similar way, "We can say that a property P is had equivocally by x and y provided

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[17] Alexander Pruss, "On Two Problems of Divine Simplicity," 156.

that there is no relevant similarity between x's having P and y's having P."[18] Analogous

properties fall between univocal and merely disjunctive properties on the naturalness

spectrum.

In his paper, "A Return to the Analogy of Being," Kris McDaniel approaches the

analogy of properties and terms through the conceptions of the perfectly natural and

merely disjunctive. He explains:

> Analogous features are something akin to disjunctive properties, but they
> aren't merely disjunctive. Analogous features enjoy a kind of unity that
> merely disjunctive features lack: they are, to put it in medieval terms,
> *unified by analogy*. Unfortunately, I don't think that I can give a criterion for
> when a feature is an analogous feature as opposed to a merely disjunctive
> feature.[19]

So far, we have the following two conditions of analogous features:

> i. If a property is analogous, then it is not univocal.
> ii. If a property is analogous, then it has analogous unity.

These could be united for the following unenlightening definition: An analogous property

is a property that has merely analogous unity. Analogous properties begin where univocal

properties leave off and extend down the naturalness spectrum to the merely disjunctive

border. The next two chapters develop the varieties of analogous unity. Such unity fails to

achieve univocal unity, but remains natural in contrast to merely disjunctive unity.

Figure 2.3 represents this spectrum.

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Kris McDaniel, "A Return to the Analogy of Being," 696.

Figure 2.3. Naturalness spectrum with analogy spectrum

Before turning to reasons to think a property is analogous or merely disjunctive, a note on the difference between equivocal terms and merely disjunctive properties is needed. Univocal properties and univocal terms or predicates have in common that there is a single ground or meaning, respectively. Analogous properties and terms have in common that there are similar grounds and meaning. Although merely disjunctive properties and equivocal terms have in common that the diverse grounds or meanings are both unnaturally united, predicates expressing merely disjunctive properties need not be equivocal. The predicate 'is an owl or a ping-pong ball' expresses a merely disjunctive property but is univocal in its meaning. For this reason, I restrict "merely disjunctive" to the metaphysical and "equivocal" to the semantic. With this clarification, I have provided an initial sketch of the the univocal, analogous, merely disjunctive, and equivocal territory.

Of course, identifying ranges and boundaries on the naturalness spectrum is different than giving reasons to think some properties are neither univocal nor merely disjunctive. In the next section of this chapter, I explain and defend various reasons for a property not being univocal. I begin by explaining McDaniel's two criteria for a feature not being a perfectly natural property. Then, I survey the various reasons Aquinas offers against univocity. Finally, I defend my non-univocal property thesis.

After discussing two ways in which properties fail to be perfectly natural, McDaniel summarizes two lessons to be drawn from the discussion. I will quote his summary and then unpack it and discuss his arguments. The summary:

> First, if a relatively topic-neutral feature is systematically variably polyadic, prima facie, the feature is probably not perfectly natural. Second, if the principles governing the topic-neutral feature differ systematically from one ontological category to the next, then prima facie the feature is probably not perfectly natural. In either case, insofar as we hold that there is any unity to the feature at all, we will be under significant pressure to hold that the feature is analogous. If the feature in question is of philosophical interest, it is probably analogous.[20]

A *topic-neutral* feature "can apply to objects from any ontological category."[21] McDaniel offers the clear example of self-identity. Abstract and concrete objects are both self-identical. A topic-neutral property is *systematically variably polyadic* if it is fully saturated by a different number of things when exemplified in different ontological categories. In other words, to be a property in one ontological category involves a different number of things than it does in another category. McDaniel offers his view of parthood, which is highly topic-neutral, as an example of a feature that is systematically variably polyadic. "Since material objects persist by enduring, they successively occupy distinct regions of spacetime. Since a material object can gain or lose parts, material objects have parts relative to regions of spacetime."[22] Unlike material objects, regions of spacetime do not have parts relative to other regions, but have parts simpliciter. Whether or not one accepts this view of parthood, the point is that on this view it is variably polyadic — the

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[20] Ibid., 701.

[21] Ibid., 695.

[22] Ibid., 698.

number and nature of relata in the relation vary – and it is systematically so – the relata are consistent in each of the different realms, e.g., material objects, spacetime regions.

McDaniel claims that a topic-neutral property being systematically variably polyadic is evidence that the feature is not perfectly natural. The reason: "Being systematically variably polyadic is an ugly way for a putatively perfectly natural relation to behave."[23] The idea is that when a feature consistently acts one way within one ontological category and another way in another category, it is more reasonable to think these topic-specific features are more natural than the topic-neutral feature. In other words, we expect the unity enjoyed by a perfectly natural property to provide a kind of uniformity in its behavior. So, systematically polyadic features are not perfectly natural features.

McDaniel adds the idea of a feature being *systematically variably axiomatic* for his second criterion:

> Let us say that the "logic" of a feature consists in those necessary truths stateable using only some term, such as a predicate or a name, standing for the feature along with purely logical vocabulary. The principles constituting the logic of a feature are principles that *govern* that feature: they apply to all possible situations in which that feature is exemplified, but explicitly mention no other qualitative features obtaining in that situation. Let us say that a feature is systematically variably axiomatic just in case the principles governing the feature differ systematically from one ontological category to the next.[24]

If a feature is systematically variably polyadic, it will also be systematically variably axiomatic. But a uniformly polyadic feature can also be systematically variably axiomatic. Again, consider parthood. The parthood relation is two-place for both regions of space-time and facts. Yet, McDaniel argues, principles of classical mereology, i.e., unrestricted

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[23] Ibid., 699.

[24] Ibid.

summation, extensionality, and transitivity, govern how parthood applies to regions of space-time but not facts. The governing principles of parthood then vary depending on ontological category. "The 'logic' of parthood is most naturally expressed as a disjunctive list of two disjoint axiom systems, each such that the variables are restricted to objects of the relevant kinds."[25]

By the second criterion, we can conclude that systematically variable axiomatic features are not highly natural. Undergirding both criteria is the expectation of uniformity of perfectly natural features. "The driving intuition is that highly natural features enjoy a kind of unity across their instances."[26] In other words, being systematically variable in these ways exposes the division and discord within the feature, i.e., its lack of unity. So, if features are systematically variable in either of these ways, there is reason to think that they are not perfectly natural or even have a low degree of naturalness. On my spectrum, then, they are also non-univocal. The same lack of unity and uniformity that indicates the features are not highly natural indicates that they are not univocal. Remember, univocal properties have the same character across each instance, but systematically variable features do not have this uniformity. Systematically variable features are, then, non-univocal features.

McDaniel's two criteria help clarify the difference between univocal properties and analogous and merely disjunctive properties. The former have a kind of unity that manifests itself in uniformity across instances. The *being a reptile* of a blue racer is possessed in the same way as that of a Texas spiny lizard. *Being a reptile* does not systematically change its behavior across instances in such a way to reveal its lack of unity the way

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[25] Ibid., 700.

[26] Ibid.

McDaniel's parthood relation does. Lack of such unity reveals non-univocity. I now turn to Aquinas's arguments against univocal predication.

<div align="center">*Aquinas's Arguments Against Univocity*</div>

Aquinas's objections to univocity generally occur in the context of considering how we can talk about God. In this section, I survey and categorize his main reasons against univocity. When it comes time to consider how predications about God work – which notably happens after Aquinas thinks he has both proven God's existence and shown God to have a variety of positive and negative attributes, i.e., has already made many predications about God – Aquinas has a standard procedure. Predication (or our knowledge) about God can be of three types: univocal, equivocal, or analogous. That is, terms predicated of God can either have the same meaning, utterly different meanings, or similar meanings to what they mean when predicated of creatures. Aquinas argues against univocity and equivocity and then concludes that predication about God is analogous. He then offers a brief account of analogous predication.

In this section, I survey Aquinas's arguments that terms predicated of God and creatures are not univocal. Unfortunately, and as has been well-noted, Aquinas never provides a systematic treatise on analogy.[27] Because of this, I merely offer a survey of the reasons Aquinas offers in each of his major treatments of analogy – *Summa Theologiae* I.12-13; *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.30-35; *De Potentia* 7.7; *De Veritate* 2.11 – instead of a synthesis.[28]

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[27] For example, in *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, George P. Klubertanz explains, "On the strictly textual side the problem is not only difficult but tantalizing. St. Thomas speaks of analogy in almost every one of his works, in a variety of contexts, yet he nowhere gives a thorough *ex professo* treatment of the problem." (Loyola University Press, 1960), 3.

[28] What counts as a major treatment is up for debate. Texts from *De Principiis Naturae* and *Scripta super libros Sententiarum* could reasonably be added. The secondary literature of analogy in Aquinas is extensive. Although Joshua Hochschild's *The Semantics of Analogy* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University

Attempts at synthesizing these texts are fraught with interpretive difficulties, but the variety of arguments Aquinas offers against univocity and equivocity provide us with a sketch of what he thinks causes meaning variance and what prevents that variety from being equivocal.

Aquinas's arguments against univocity reveal the tight connection Aquinas envisions between meaning and being.[29] As we will see, Aquinas's reasons against univocal predication are predominately metaphysical. The strategy in Aquinas's arguments against both univocal and equivocal predication of God and creatures is to explain something that the univocal or equivocal views entail and then argue against it. In general, the univocal view is that terms predicated of God and creatures mean the same thing in both cases. So, if there is meaning variance between such cases, then the univocal view is not true in those cases. Aquinas thinks that the univocal view requires at least

Press, 2010) is on Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogia*, it provides a helpful survey of readings of Aquinas in the introduction and chapter one. John F. Wippel also provides a helpful survey of texts in chapters three and thirteen of *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Wasthington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000). Other important texts on Aquinas's account of analogy, without any attempt to be exhaustive, include: George P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960); Gregory P. Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), Part Two; Rudi Te Velde, *Aquinas on God: The 'Divine Science' of the Summa Theologiae* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), Chapters three and four; James F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence* (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Company, 1949); Gerald B. Phelan, *St. Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1948); Steven A. Long, *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011); Ralph McInerny, *Aquinas & Analogy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996); Roger M. White, *Talking about God: The Concept of Analogy and the Problem of Religious Language* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006); Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis: Metaphysics, Origianl Structure and Universal Rhythm*. Translated by John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014); Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*. Translated by E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2004); Battista Mondin, *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962).

[29] Although McInerny is right that Aquinas avoids a Platonic error by recognizing the difference between things as they are in the world and things as they are known, he limits analogy to the logical or semantic realm. (Ralph McInerny, *Aquinas & Analogy* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996) For a helpful critique of McInerny's view, see Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician," in *Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 81-95.

three, related things of the subjects of the univocal predication: they have equality of power, community of form, and the same mode of existence. Note that Aquinas is appealing to the referents of the terms to determine whether the term means the same thing in each case. I will look at each requirement in turn.

First, Aquinas thinks the subjects of univocal predication must have equality of power. One of the ways Aquinas divides causality is according to univocal, equivocal, and analogous causes.[30] Univocal causes produce an effect of equal nature like a father and his daughter, equivocal causes share no likeness to their effects like the sun and sublunary bodies (the medievals thought the sun is a cause of life, for instance), and analogous causes produce similar effects that are not equal in nature to their cause. As Aquinas says in *De Potentia*, "Every effect of an univocal agent is adequate to the agent's power."[31] But it is impossible for a finite effect to be equal to an infinite agent's power. "Wherefore it is impossible for a creature to receive a likeness to God univocally." He doesn't restate the conclusion before starting the next argument, but it is the thesis that begins the article, "It is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and a creature."

So, Aquinas thinks that the univocal view requires the subjects of univocal predication have a univocal likeness that requires they have equality of power. Initially then, the referents of univocal predications must equally have some property or feature. If some property – say, wisdom – is possessed by two differing beings, but unequally, then "wisdom" predicated of both beings is not predicated univocally. Of course, Aquinas has in mind differences in kind like the wisdom of a scientist and the wisdom of the angel

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[30] E.g., *Super Scriptum Sententias* I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 2.

[31] *De Potentia*, 7.7.

Gabriel instead of the slight variance in wisdom between two excellent therapists. This first condition is clarified and expanded on by the next two arguments.

Second, Aquinas thinks that the univocal view requires community of form. Here Aquinas is expanding on the way a "univocal likeness" is required for univocal predication. In *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.32 he argues that a univocal effect must "receive a form specifically the same," with "specifically" here being the idea of a species or kind.[32] In *De Veritate* 2.11 Aquinas claims that in univocal predication, the nature signified is common to the referents or subjects of predication.[33] In this way, from the point of view of the nature signified, the subjects of the predication are equal. So, if "wisdom," for example, is predicated of God and creatures univocally, then the nature that is signified is found commonly in both.

 Aquinas makes the point a different way later in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. If something is predicated univocally, then, he argues, it is predicated as a genus, species, difference, accident, or property.[34] These are ways that a nature is had in common. Dogs and cats share the generic nature 'animal,' Fido and Benji share the species 'canine' and whatever difference is added to 'animal' to make for 'dogness.' Both also share the accident 'man's best friend' and the property (a necessary accident) 'superior to cats.' In other words, the same feature is found in both referents; it is possessed in virtue of a common ground in each case.

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[32] *Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God*. Translation and Introduction by Anton C. Pegis. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). Latin for *Summa Contra Gentiles* is taken from Marietti edition.

[33] *Truth*. Translated by Robert W Mulligan, James V McGlynn, and Robert William Schmidt. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994. Latin for *De Veritate* are from Leonine edition.

[34] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I.32.4.

But God does not share anything like this with creatures. Aquinas denies that God is in any genus or that he shares properties in this way with creatures. He is clear that no created form "measures up (*non perveniunt*)" to God "for the things that God has made receive in a divided and particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way."[35] So, because the referents differ so drastically, the term predicated of both of them cannot be univocal.

Third, Aquinas argues that the univocal view requires that the properties predicated univocally be found in their subjects "according to the same mode of being."[36] In other words, the form that is signified in both subjects must be found according to the same mode of being if the predication is to be univocal. Aquinas provides us with two examples of different modes of existence precluding univocal predication. First there is the difference between intentional or mental existence and natural or extra-mental existence as seen in the difference between the form of the house as known to the builder and the form of the house once it is built. The form of house is signified in both cases, but not univocally because the form has different modes of being in the two cases: immaterial in the mind of the builder and materially in its natural being. Similarly, Aquinas explains that "being" is not predicated of substance and accident univocally because of their different modes of being because "substance is a being subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else."[37]

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[35] Ibid., I.32.

[36] *De Potentia*, 7.7.

[37] Ibid.

Similarly, God's mode of being prevents God and creatures from being the subjects of univocal predication. Aquinas makes his point from a *per imbossibile* counterfactual:

> Hence, granted the impossibility that goodness in God and in the creature be of the same kind (*eiusdem rationis*), nevertheless "good" would not be predicated of God univocally: since that which in God is immaterial and simple, is in the creature material and manifold.[38]

If it were somehow the case that what made God and creature good was the same thing, e.g., even if there was community of form, "good" would still not be predicated univocally of them. The reason is that it would be found in different types of being. So, according to Aquinas, the diversity in mode of being between God and creatures prevents univocal predication.

In addition to primarily metaphysical reasons against the univocity view, Aquinas also offers two objections with logical-semantic aspects. The first is the final argument Aquinas offers against the univocity view in *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.32. Here Aquinas provides a sufficient reason for predication not being univocal: "What is predicated of some things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated univocally." He offers a *reductio* to defend this. When two things are predicated according to priority and posteriority, the prior is included in the definition of the posterior. For example, substance is included in the definition of accident "according as an accident is a being." So, when "being" is predicated of accident, substance is part of its meaning. To be an accident is to be something to which being is due as inhering in a substance.[39] In the two

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Etienne Gilson, "Quasi Definitio Substantiae" in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, edited by A. Maurer et al.* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieaval Studies, 1974). Also see John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), part two.

cases, "being" signifies different, but related concepts. It must, because if "being" is predicated univocally of substance and accident, then, Aquinas argues, "to inhere in a substance" is also applied to substance, which is absurd. So, predication according to priority and posteriority cannot be univocal.

Aquinas continues, "Now, nothing is predicated of God and creatures as though they were in the same order, but, rather, according to priority and posteriority."[40] Aquinas's reason here is that God possesses all perfections essentially and creatures possess them by participation: God *is* being and goodness; Plato *has* being and goodness. Thus, like it was absurd to predicate "being" univocally of substance and accident, is it is absurd to predicate anything univocally of God and creatures. Aquinas's argument then has two stages, appealing to two different meaning makers. First, predications according to priority and posteriority are not univocal because different concepts are signified. Second, predications of God and creatures are always according to priority and posteriority because the referents possess the feature in virtue of diverse and related entities.

In the *Summa Theologiæ* 13.5, in which Aquinas considers whether anything is predicated univocally of God and creatures, he offers only one argument against the univocity view. Aquinas begins by making the distinctions between types of causes that we saw above, explaining that perfections that are found simply in God are found divided and multiplied in creatures. So, when a word signifying a perfection, say "wise," is predicated of God and creatures, we mean to signify different things. When predicating perfections of God, we do not signify anything distinct from the divine essence, power or existence. But when predicating perfections of creatures, we do signify something distinct,

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[40] *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.32

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e.g. "wisdom" predicated of Plato signifies a perfection of Plato's mind and does not signify his essence, power, or existence. Moreover, a perfection predicated of creatures:

> in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case with God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name.[41]

So, Aquinas concludes, terms are "not applied in the same way" to God and creatures.[42] In summary, Aquinas argues from the differences of the referents signified to the differences in the signification, which prevent univocal predication. Thus, no names are predicated univocally of God and creatures.

Each time Aquinas concludes that nothing is univocally predicated of God and creatures he next considers whether such predication is equivocal. Now that there is meaning variance between a word predicated of both God and creatures, he examines whether the meanings are more than nominally united. I explain these arguments in the next chapter. For now, I note the continuity between McDaniel's and Aquinas's arguments against univocity. Aquinas's arguments against univocity build on the basic intuition that McDaniel appeals to: properties possessed in very different ways fail to have univocal unity. McDaniel focuses on systematic variability and Aquinas's focuses on metaphysical distance. In the next section, I build on these arguments to defend the non-univocal property thesis.

Crossing Categories and Degrees Of Being

In this section I offer an argument for the non-univocal property thesis and then offer examples to further explain and support the thesis. The last two sections on

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[41] *Summa Theologiae* I.13.5. Quotations from the *Summa Theologiæ* are taken from the Dominican Fathers translation. Latin is from the Editiones Paulinae (1962).

[42] Ibid.

McDaniel's and Aquinas's arguments against univocal properties gave us a number of reasons to think that there are some non-univocal properties due to differences in virtue of which the properties are possessed. I now build on these reasons to support the non-univocal property thesis. My argument:

1. Some differences between the grounds of possessing a property, *P*, preclude *P* from being univocal.

2. If any differences between the grounds of possessing some property, *P*, preclude *P* from being univocal, then differences in primary ontological category or mode of being between the grounds of possessing *P* preclude *P* from being univocal.

3. So, differences in primary ontological category or mode of being between the grounds of possessing *P* preclude *P* from being univocal.

The conclusion of the argument is equivalent to the non-univocal property thesis:

> *Non-univocal property thesis*: If a property is possessed across ontological categories or modes of being, then the property is either analogous or merely disjunctive.

After a clarifying word on the thesis, I consider the premises.

I formulate the non-univocal property thesis with a disjunctive antecedent. Although this does not entail anything about the relation between primary ontological categories and ways of being, I want to comment on why I treat both. Analogy is most at home in pluralistic ontologies. If the deeper structure of reality reveals that things are pretty much the same – imagine your favorite monism – there will not be analogous properties of vital philosophical importance. Analogous terms and properties might still remain, but they wouldn't disclose philosophically important features about the world. As I understand them, primary ontological categories and ways of being are both ways of conceptualizing pluralistic metaphysics.[43] They are formulations of the distinctions and

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[43] Using the language of types and modes instead of categories and ways, Brower notes that each can be understood in terms of the other. But he does think one is preferable: "For given the correspondence

deep structuring of things. As the discussion continues amongst metaphysicians, we will see which is more adequate as a theory, but for our purposes both work well.

Let us now consider the premises of the argument. McDaniel's and Aquinas's arguments above support the first premise. McDaniel's conditions for a property not being highly natural relied on an intuition about the unity of highly natural properties. Aquinas explained the unity requirement of highly natural or univocal properties in terms of community of form within the same mode of being. For both thinkers, univocal properties have a degree of unity that prevents certain behaviors and ontological distance. In other words, they gave us a number of reasons to think that diversity of grounds for possession of some property can preclude the property from being univocal.

My argument for the second premise is from the nature of difference and the theoretical function of ontological categories and modes or ways of being. Difference and distinction are all around us, but one of the amazing things about reality and our minds is that varieties of likeness and connection between things are discoverable. Properties like *being a mammal* or *being honest* that are exemplified by many allow us to sort reality into different sets according to real connections. The difference between some differences, say *being a German Shepherd* and *being an Alaskan Husky*, are slight, while others, say, *being an angel* and *being an electron* are ontologically significant. If ontological difference between its possessors can prevent a property from being univocal as just defended, then the greater the ontological distance between its possessors the more likely the property will be non-univocal. Ultimate ontological differences − the widest ontological distance between

between types and modes, both divisions can be understood in either way. Indeed, given the explanatory priority of modes, I think it is clear that, for Aquinas, both divisions should be understood primarily in terms of modes." (Jeffrey Brower, *Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 47)

things – are what primary ontological categories and ways of being are intended to explicate. So, if any differences prevent univocity, then difference in ontological categories or ways of being prevents univocity.

Primary ontological categories and modes of being carve reality at its most fundamental, categorical joints. I'm going to focus on ontological categories, but the point can easily be made in terms of ways of being. Two primary ontological categories have the least in common of any two categories. One way of distinguishing non-univocal properties from univocal properties is that non-univocal properties just do not have enough unity to be univocal properties. Gerrymandered merely disjunctive properties lack the likeness or connectedness across their instances to be natural properties. Similarly, analogous properties have natural unity, but that in virtue of which they are exemplified is too diverse to be univocal. Premise one tells us that some properties have possessors too ontologically diverse for the property to be univocal. The greatest possible ontological diversity is between primary ontological categories. So, if some properties are exemplified across primary ontological categories, then those properties must be analogous *if any are*. The reason: that in virtue of which the property is exemplified in the two cases is as different as can be, and such difference prevents, if anything does, univocal unity.

To avoid misunderstanding, I do not think that such ontological distance is a necessary condition for non-univocal properties, but, as Aristotle explains:

> We should train ourselves most of all in things whose genera are very far apart, for then we shall be more easily able to perceive at a glance likenesses in the other cases.[44]

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[44] Aristotle, *Selected Works*, third edition, translated by Hippocrates Apostle and Lloyd Gerson (Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic Press, 1991), 108a12-14.

Properties in very distant categories, moreover, are often philosophically interesting. As we will see in the fourth chapter, though, people working on analogy, especially Aristotle, found it in many places where ultimate differences were not involved. One could add McDaniel's and Aquinas's other principles as sufficient conditions for differentiating univocal from non-univocal features, but the non-univocal property thesis is sufficient for my project since created things and God are in different categories or ways of being according to classical theism.

My procedure in the next sections is to treat ontological categories and modes of being independently. In each case I first sketch an account of categories or modes of being from recent literature and then offer examples of properties being possessed in more than one category or mode of being. Through the examples, I explain how such diverse instancing violates the intuition about highly natural or univocal properties.

Ontological Categories

In an article on analogy, James F. Ross argues that a word cannot be univocal if it applies to or is found in different categories.[45] George Mavrodes critiques Ross's argument because it fails to offer any account of what a category is. In this section, I sketch an account of ontological categories in recent literature and note some ways in which they are identified. With a sufficiently rigorous account of categories to rebut Mavrodes's objection, I offer examples from different metaphysics of cross-categorical instancing that exclude univocity.

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[45] James Ross, "Analogy and the Resolution of Some Cognitivity Problems," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67: 20, October 1970, 725-746. In his later book, Ross changes his mind on this, but not because of Mavrodes's objection. Instead, Ross moves away from explanations of meaning variance in terms of referent. He considers such metaphysical explanations one of the deep errors of the classical account. J.F. Ross, *Portraying Analogy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 119-120.

In his reply to Ross, Mavrodes critiques Ross for not providing any guidance as to when categorical shifts cause meaning variance. He argues that at least some cross-categorical predication does not cause meaning variance. For example, when 'is kind' is predicated of a human in the different categories of man and woman, it doesn't seem to change its meaning. He concludes:

> These observations do not, of course, tend to show that the sorts of analogical meaning derivation that Ross discussed do not occur. What they tend to show, rather, is that they do not occur for every predicate and for every change in the categorical environment. It would be a useful part of a new theory of analogy if it were to provide us with some means of determining when such a shift has taken place. And it would be a useful application of such a theory if it could provide us with a solid reason for thinking either that the predicate 'is wise' has, or that it does not have, the same sense when applied to God as when applied to Socrates.[46]

Mavrodes is right that Ross does not offer criteria to distinguish when a categorical division in the relevant sense has been crossed in the article to which he is replying.

In light of this concern, I sketch an account of ontological categories through the work of Peter van Inwagen and E.J. Lowe. I leave the semantic concern to later chapters and focus on the underlying metaphysical unity of properties. In general, on my account an ontological category is a highly natural or nearly fundamental class that divides being at some of its most general joints. The upshot of the survey is that there are rigorous accounts available for answering Mavrodes's concern. Although I favor a more pluralistic account like Aquinas's, my criteria for analogous properties is applicable if there is more than one ontological category. I begin with van Inwagen's general account of an ontological category and develop some of the details through Lowe's and Aquinas's (as presented by Brower) accounts.

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[46] George Mavrodes, "On Ross's Theory of Analogy," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67: 20, October 1970, 752-3.

An ontological category, according to Peter van Inwagen, is a type of natural class. He offers the following principle of division, "For any class, if its boundary marks a real division among things, then either that class or its complement is a natural class – but not necessarily both."[47] We determine whether a class is a natural one by whether "its membership exhibits a high degree of internal unity."[48] He then provides the following definitions for types of natural classes:

> *x* is a large natural class $=_{df}$ *x* is a natural class whose membership comprises a really significant proportion of things that there are.

> *x* is a high natural class $=_{df}$ *x* is a natural class that is a proper subclass of no natural class.[49]

A natural class is a primary ontological category if there are large natural classes and it is a high natural class.[50] Finally, van Inwagen adds that primary ontological categories must be "modally robust."[51] Although they need not be necessary, they should also not be radically contingent, existing in only a few possible worlds. "The primary ontological categories are the highest links in the great chains of classification – the great chains of nonarbitrary classification, of not-merely-a-matter-of-convention classification."[52] Van Inwagen has provided us with an initial account of primary ontological categories, but I turn to Lowe for means to identify them.

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[47] Peter van Inwagen, *Existence: Essays in Ontology* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 187.

[48] Ibid., 189.

[49] Ibid., 193.

[50] Ibid., 194.

[51] Ibid., 196-7.

[52] Ibid., 194.

E.J. Lowe offers conditions by which to identify the highest level or fundamental ontological categories in *The Four-Category Ontology*. According to Lowe:

> What does it mean to describe a certain ontological category as being 'fundamental'? Just this, I suggest: that the existence and identity conditions of entities belonging to that category cannot be exhaustively specified in terms of ontological dependency relations between those entities and entities belonging to other categories.[53]

So, an ontological category is fundamental if it has unique dependency and identity conditions. That is, these conditions cannot be fully specified in terms of other ontological categories. Lowe offers an example. Imagine an ontology where particulars are wholly constituted from coinstantiated universals.[54] In this ontology, particulars cannot be a fundamental category because particulars are entirely dependent on universals.[55] So, Lowe's criterion provides a way to determine which categories are primary ontological categories.

Van Inwagen and Lowe provide the means of identifying primary ontological categories. So, I consider Mavrodes's concern answered. On Ross's view, any categorical shift undermines univocity. Although shifts across non-primary categories might prevent univocity, I only claim that shifts across primary categories is a sufficient condition for non-univocity. If a feature is found in more than one primary ontological category, then it

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[53] E.J. Lowe, *The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 8.

[54] Ibid.

[55] The medievals had other criteria for establishing a more identifiably Aristotelian set of categories. Aquinas, for example, argued from the varieties of per se predication. Rejecting that linguistic or logical distinctions were sufficient to show metaphysical distinctions, Scotus objects to Aquinas's mode of derivation in a number of ways. In *On Determining What There Is* (Piscataway, NJ: Ontos Verlag, 2010), Paul Symington brings some of the medieval criteria to bear on the current debate in aid of Lowe. He argues that an analysis of the varieties of per se predication also support Lowe's four category ontology. Without getting into the details, Symington, after replying to Scotus's concerns, argues that four basic categories are identified by examining two types of per se predication (134-9). The point here is that there are a variety of ways to plausibly defend fundamental or at least high-level ontological categories.

is not univocal. Univocal features are unified in a way that prevents them being so different as to be found in different primary ontological categories. Examples will manifest the intuition at work here.

First, take an ontology with properties and concrete objects as the fundamental categories. The feature or property *being* or *existing* is exemplified by both concrete objects and abstracta. Some have thought that "being" is said in many ways, and in this ontology there must be at least two. Abstract and concrete objects both exist. Yet, the feature exemplified by things that differ so widely as to have causal powers in the case of concrete objects and not have causal powers in the case of abstract objects is not a highly natural feature. The having of *existing* for an abstract entity is very different than the having of *existing* of a concrete object. In each case, *existing as a property* or *existing as a concrete object* is more natural than just *existing*, which shows that the latter is not perfectly natural. Moreover, lacking the unity to be found in only one fundamental category pushes a feature toward the merely disjunctive end of the naturalness spectrum and prevents it from being a univocal feature.

Being or existence is also an analogous feature in some ontologies according to McDaniel's criteria of systematic variability. He notes that on a Platonic account, one might think that properties are universals that lack a place and particulars those things somehow bound up with space and time. The primary notion of the latter would be existence at a place, time, or both, McDaniel argues. On this notion, existence or being is at least two-placed, the thing and the spatial or temporal location.[56] The notion of being

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[56] One might object to McDaniel's account of existence, of course, but the example illustrates systematic variability. McDaniel offers debates in persistence where being is often considered relative to a time or place and a view considered by Jonathan Barnes according to which "exists" means "is somewhere" in relation to material objects as examples of polyadic views of existence. ("A Return to the Analogy of Being," 701-4)

of universals would be subsistence, which is one-placed. Thus, being turns out to be systematically variably polyadic, which is one of McDaniel's criteria for a feature being analogous. Moreover, the two notions of being are more natural or fundamental than the general notion of being, another mark of analogy.

Second, take an ontology in which substances and accidents are fundamental categories. Substances have a kind of completeness that allows them to subsist. Accidents exist by inhering in substances. Yet, *being good* is a feature of both substances and accidents. For example, a person can be good and her courage can be good. In these cases, that in virtue of which the feature *being good* is exemplified is categorically different. On the one hand, *being good* is possessed by a substance. On the other hand, *being good* is possessed by an accident. Being possessed by fundamentally different beings undermines the uniformity required for a univocal property. What it means to have goodness in each case is too different to be univocal because of the kind of entity having the goodness.[57]

In this section I have offered examples in defense and clarification of a sufficient condition for a property being non-univocal, i.e., its being possessed in more than one primary ontological category. Mavrodes rightly noted that a theory of analogy should offer some guidance as to when meaning variance occurs due to categorical shifts. Although I have not argued that my condition for non-univocal properties causes any semantic shift, I have provided the ontological background for some guidance as to what types of categorical diversity preclude metaphysical univocity. I now turn to the second component of the non-univocal property thesis.

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[57] Pruss helpfully points out that goodness is also variable: "Goodness is also variably polyadic. Mother Teresa was good, while Saul Kripke was good *at philosophy*."

Ways of Being

In this section I do with ways of being what I did with ontological categories in the last section.[58] I first explain what counts as a way of being, working from McDaniel's recent account. Then, I look at examples from various metaphysics to show that features instanced across modes of being are not univocal. Kris McDaniel has recently defended an account of ways of being ontology. Translating Heidegger into analytic metaphysics, McDaniel argues that ways of being should be understood through restricted quantifiers. According to Heidegger and most recent metaphysicians, there is a generic sense of "being," and McDaniel thinks this is adequately captured by the unrestricted existential quantifier. But, according to Heidegger (and many others), there are also ways of being that the unrestricted quantifier leaves undifferentiated. Two theses are central to McDaniel's account:

1. Ways of being are captured by restricted quantifiers.

2. These restricted quantifiers are at least as natural or fundamental as the universal quantifier.[59]

I will explain each of these in turn.

Why think restricted quantification is the way to capture ways of being? Why not add a predicate for each way of being? McDaniel explains:

> Just as being is not a being—and in fact talk about being or existence can
> be represented by way of the unrestricted existential quantifier—so too no

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[58] I treat talk of ways, degrees, modes, or types of being as equivalent.

[59] Explained in somewhat different terms, "There are different kinds of existence if there are possible meanings for semantically primitive restricted quantifiers such that (i) each restricted quantifier has a non-empty domain that is properly included in the domain of the unrestricted quantifier, (ii) none of these domains overlap, and (iii) each meaning is at least as natural as the meaning of the unrestricted quantifier." ("Ways of Being," 312) McDaniel considers two other ways of maintaining that there are ways of being. First, if one thinks universal quantification is problematic, she could still maintain ways of being by considering the content of different sets. Second, one could reject (ii) and think that the domain of the possible and the concrete ways of being overlap. (Ibid, 312-314)

kind of being is a being, and so too talk about kinds of being is best represented by special restricted existential quantifiers, not by predicates.[60]

In other words, making existence or being into a predicate might imply it is just like other properties. Restricted quantifiers do no such thing, and instead just range over some subset of beings. More is going to be required to make the further meaning of each restricted quantifier intelligible, e.g., how does *existenz* differ from subsistence, but such is the case for any representation in a formal system.

McDaniel, as he explicates Heidegger, actually defends a stronger version of the second thesis for most of his paper:

2*. Restricted quantifiers are more natural or fundamental than the universal quantifier.

As explained above, on Lewis's metaphor for naturalness, this means that the restricted quantifiers carve at the joints better than the universal quantifier. Why think this besides Heidegger saying so? McDaniel motivates the thesis by drawing a parallel between mere disjunction and mere restriction. Remember, a mere disjunction fails to carve at the joints. Similarly, a mere restriction fails to carve at the joints. Consider McDaniel's example of a mere restriction of *being an electron*, *being an electron near a bachelor*. "This is a mere restriction of being an electron because being an electron near a bachelor partitions the class of electrons into gerrymandered, arbitrary, or merely disjunctively unified subclasses."[61] So, if a restriction partitions a class into natural subclasses it is not a mere restriction.

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[60] McDaniel, "Ways of Being," 302.

[61] Ibid., 307.

Restricted quantifiers for ways of being plausibly restrict the universal class of beings into natural subclasses. McDaniel makes the case in one way by explaining that he is not entirely happy with thinking about the quantifiers as restrictions:

> If a speaker has grasped and internalized the meaning of exactly one of these semantically primitive quantifiers (and had no other quantifier in her language), this speaker would not be in a position to say or even to believe that there is anything more than what is ranged over by that quantifier.[62]

McDaniel, following Heidegger, argues that each of the primitive quantifiers is complete. In other words, the restricted quantifiers do not semantically include the universal quantifier as mere restrictions do, e.g., electron near a bachelor. Beyond the semantic independence, though, are the metaphysical arguments for distinct ways of being. Heidegger has his arguments and others have theirs.

On this view, being or existence is again non-univocal since it is found in each mode of being. The ways of being are fundamental differences, and to be found in more than one of them shows lack of univocal unity. Of course, being is not a property in any standard sense on this view, but the criterion is easily modified to accommodate. The restricted quantifiers represent something in common between things that have *existenz* or subsistence and the unrestricted quantifier represents something common between both kinds of being. That common feature – even if it is not a property in a standard sense – that is represented by the restricted and unrestricted quantifiers can be treated as a property for the purposes of the non-univocal property thesis. Or, one could revise the thesis into a non-univocal *feature* thesis to avoid McDaniel's worry about *being* being a property. In any case, the thesis can be applied to ways of being.

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[62] Ibid., 303.

Ways of being can be used to understand non-Heideggerian ontologies as well. Jeffrey Brower has recently used McDaniel's account of ways of being to understand Aquinas's metaphysics. [63] Putting together Aquinas's account of the traditional Aristotelian categories with another division of modes of being, Brower proposes 14 fundamental ways of being. His helpful chart, Figure 2.4, shows the various ways of being.[64] The boxes on the far right plus substantial form are the ten standard Aristotelian categories, and the boxes with dashed boundaries are fundamental. Substance, accidental form, and being are all features whose instances are more fundamental, e.g., created substance and God are more fundamental than substance.


Figure 2.4. Modes of being

[63] Brower, *Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World, ch. 2*.

[64] Slightly modified from Ibid., 47.

So, on the ways of being criterion, substance, accidental form, and being are all non-univocal features. Moreover, because substance and accidental form are themselves types of being, a non-univocal feature can have non-univocal features as instances.[65] So, on at least two ontologies, *being* is a non-univocal feature given my criterion. The non-univocal property thesis operates on the same intuition here as it did above: univocal properties or features have a kind of unity that cannot be found across fundamentally different ways of being. So, any natural property or feature that is possessed across fundamentally different ways of being must be analogous. In the next chapter I begin examining the various types of analogous unity, but first I consider potential counterexamples to the non-univocal property thesis.

Problem Cases: Self-Identity and Negative Properties

In the remainder of this chapter I defend my thesis from potential counterexamples: self-identity and negative properties. I consider self-identity first. Each thing in each category or way of being is self-identical, but self-identity seems obviously univocal. So, *being self-identical* seems to be a feature that meets the non-univocal thesis criterion and is still univocal. In fact, McDaniel treats the univocity of self-identity as obvious:

> Propositions are self-identical, as are mountains and moles. The identity predicate is used univocally in these contexts, and the identity relation invoked is the same in each case. Things are self-identical in the same way; identity is not "said in many ways."[66]

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[65] Because Brower thinks having instances that are more fundamental is sufficient for a feature to be analogous, he explains this phenomena in the following way: "we can see that Aquinas allows for nested hierarchies of analogous types." (46)

[66] McDaniel, "Ways of Being," 296.

But, propositions, moles, and, adding to McDaniel's list, God and courage, are in different primary ontological categories and/or have different ways of being. So, on my criteria self-identity must be analogous, but it sure seems univocal. If I wish to maintain the non-univocal feature thesis, I must either bite the bullet and accept that self-identity is in fact an analogous feature or explain why it is an acceptable exception to the criteria. I take the former route.

To begin, it must be noted that McDaniel's statement of self-identity's univocity moves from predicate to property. Some of the force of his claim comes from the apparent semantic univocity of the predicate 'is self-identical.' I have not claimed that if a property or feature is analogous then the predicate or term expressing or signifying it must be analogous. In other words, it is possible on my view so far that a property is analogous and the predicate expressing it is not said in many ways. Allowing this asymmetry weakens the evidence of semantic univocity for metaphysical univocity. I leave aside the question of the semantic univocity until chapter five, and argue that self-identity is metaphysically analogous.

McDaniel defends the metaphysical univocity of self-identity by claiming that "things are self-identical in the same way." But this is just what I have been arguing against in the preceding sections concerning properties or features that are found in different primary ontological categories or ways of being. If two things in different primary ontological categories both have some property, *P*, then, in virtue of being in different primary ontological categories, they do not have that property in the same way. Abstract and concrete entities do not have any properties in the same way because they are such diverse types of things. So, on any pluralistic metaphysics, *being self-identical*, is an analogous property.

Negative properties pose a similar problem. In a three category ontology including substances, accidents, and relations, *is not a relation* seems univocal when possessed by substances and accidents. Alexander Pruss motivates the objection with the following argument: If "is F" is univocal, so is "is not F." As long as there are three primary ontological categories, then, for any univocal F, either "is F" or "is not F" (or both) is a counterexample to the non-univocal property thesis. For now, I make no claim about the univocity of the predicates, but am concerned with the properties they express. Are negative properties expressed by apparently univocal predicates also univocal, even when possessed across primary categories?

It might seem that *is not a relation* is grounded by the same feature of both substances and accidents: their lack of relationality. Without taking a strong stance on the ontology of negative properties, I offer two types of response. First, as argued in reply to the objection from self-identity, the arguments in favor of the non-univocal property thesis provide reason to not put too much weight on our intuitions concerning the univocity of negative properties. In other words, I bite the bullet and accept the consequences of my arguments above despite them being somewhat counterintuitive. Second, and in support of the first, it is plausible that a lack is never the fundamental ground of a property. Or, to state it positively, lacks are further grounded or explained by a positive feature. For example, the explanation for why both substances and accidents lack relationality is their character as substances and accidents. On this view, then, that in virtue of which substances and accidents possess *is not a relation* is not univocal, since it is their substantiality and accidentality, which are categorically diverse. Of course this is just a sketch, but it provides further reason to think that some apparently univocal negative properties are analogous.

In short, if my arguments above are correct, then even seemingly univocal properties like self-identity and negative properties are actually analogous due to their being possessed in virtue of diverse entities. How this affects univocity of meanings is considered in chapter five. Having defended the non-univocal property thesis, I now explain why some non-univocal properties are analogous instead of merely disjunctive.

CHAPTER THREE

Not Mere Disjunction

Introduction

Having argued that certain properties are not univocal in the last chapter, I now argue that some of those properties are also not merely disjunctive. In other words, although they do not have highly natural unity, they do have some natural unity. I begin this chapter by surveying Aquinas's arguments that certain terms are not equivocal. In the second part of the chapter, I build on some of Aquinas's reasons and develop two types of non-univocal unity.

Aquinas

After arguing that univocal predication of God and creatures is impossible, Aquinas considers whether such predication must then be equivocal. Although there is reason to doubt that the authors Aquinas associates with the equivocal viewpoint, e.g., Maimonides, actually held such a radical view, the view is a clear contender in the conceptual space of the way predication about God might work.[1] On this view, the term predicated of creatures and the term predicated of God are only related by chance. The only kind of unity of meaning between such words is like the unity between the "pen" that refers to a writing instrument and the "pen" that refers to the enclosure around pigs, i.e.,

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[1] In her dissertation, *A Contemporary Defense of Thomas Aquinas' Theory of Analogy* (UMI Number 3135944, 2003) Jennifer Hart Weed argues, building on recent Maimonides scholarship, that Maimonides held a less radical view than Aquinas ascribes to him. After considering two of Aquinas's objections to the equivocal view as objections to Maimonides, Weed concludes that "Maimonides' approach is not as radically negative as described by Thomas Aquinas" and that although Maimonides's approach results in silence about God to some extent, it is not "to the the extent that Aquinas claims." (81)

they are expressed with the same word. If the equivocity view is true, then discourse about God and creatures will be much like the Colorado cowboy and the East Coast lady discussing eating oysters in Baxter Black's poem "The Oyster."[2] Although the same term is used about God and creatures and different regional delicacies, there is really only miscommunication happening because of meaning variance.

Aquinas offers three types of argument against the view that whatever terms we predicate of God are equivocals. In each case, Aquinas's argument strategy is a simple *modus tollens*. The major premise is a conditional with something that would be true if the equivocity view is true and the minor premise is a denial of the consequent. In this section, I follow Aquinas's text in *De Potentia* and explain the four arguments against equivocity that it presents as representative of the variety of reasons Aquinas offers.[3] The following is the full text of Aquinas's objections to the equivocity view in *De Potentia* 7.7 (numbering and naming are mine):

> Others, however, took a different view, and held that nothing is predicated of God and a creature by analogy but by pure equivocation. This is the opinion of Rabbi Moses, as appears from his writings.
>
> [1. *Ordered predication argument*] This opinion, however, is false, because in all purely equivocal terms which the Philosopher calls equivocal by chance, a term is predicated of a thing without any respect to something else: whereas all things predicated of God and creatures are predicated of God with a certain respect to creatures or vice versa, and this is clearly admitted in all the aforesaid explanations of the divine names. Wherefore, they cannot be pure equivocations.
>
> [2. *Knowledge argument*] Again, since all our knowledge of God is taken from creatures, if the agreement were purely nominal, we should know nothing

[2] Baxter Black, "The Oyster" in *Texas Monthly*, April, 2002. http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/the-oyster/, accessed 03.22.2016.

[3] Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*. Translated by E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2004) helpfully categorizes Aquinas's arguments against equivocity into ten categories in his second appendix. (178-9) Although useful, one might reasonably divide the variety of arguments Aquinas gives in different ways.

about God except empty expressions to which nothing corresponds in reality.

[3. *Demonstration argument*] Moreover, it would follow that all the proofs advanced about God by philosophers are sophisms: for instance, if one were to argue that whatever is in potentiality is reduced to actuality by something actual and that therefore God is actual being, since all things are brought into being by him, there will be a fallacy of equivocation; and similarly in all other arguments.

[4. *Effects resemble their cause argument*] And again the effect must in some way be like its cause, wherefore nothing is predicated equivocally of cause and effect; for instance, healthy of medicine and an animal.

Aquinas begins with a semantic objection, then offers two logical/epistemological objections, and ends with a metaphysical objection. I consider each of these types of reasons to understand what factors Aquinas considers relevant to whether a term has merely nominal unity or something more.

Logical and Epistemological Objections

Aquinas thinks the equivocity view entails a number of false things. First, and most clearly, the equivocity view entails that we do not have positive knowledge of God and that our demonstrations about God's existence and attributes must fail. In the text above, Aquinas offers both the knowledge and demonstration arguments in this category. In general, the majority of Aquinas's arguments against the equivocity view are from our knowledge and demonstrations about God. In the later *Summa Theologiæ*, Aquinas offers only this argument against equivocity in the crucial section on univocity and equivocity in the question on naming God.

The logical-epistemological arguments against the equivocity view are of two types. The first concern our knowledge of God. That is, if the equivocity view is true, then we would not have the kind of knowledge or understanding of God that we in fact have.

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The second type of argument concerns our means to such knowledge. Aquinas thinks that we have sound demonstrations of God's existence and nature that move from effect to cause or creatures to creator. But, if the equivocity view is true, syllogistic movement from creatures to God would fail in an especially clear way; it would cause a fallacy of equivocation. This problem of demonstration is one of Scotus's objections to analogy and a primary concern of this dissertation. In order to understand Aquinas on this point, I look carefully at both types of arguments, explicating them in terms of similar arguments offered elsewhere.

Demonstration Argument. As we will see in chapter five, Aquinas's reasoning here is similar to one line of argument Scotus offers against analogical predication. We have demonstrations about God's existence and nature from what God has caused. So, the terms we predicate of both God and creatures must have the kind of unity that can sustain a valid syllogism. But if equivocity is true, then such terms cannot sustain a syllogism and cause a fallacy of equivocation because the equivocal term will always be used in two different and unrelated ways. Ashworth explains a standard medieval example, "The bishops [*episcoi*] are priests, these asses are the bishop's [*episcopi*]; therefore these asses are priests," which arises because "*episcopi*" can be genitive singular or nominative plural.[4] To avoid such a fallacy, Aquinas argues that terms predicated of God and creatures are not equivocal.

In the *De Potentia* text above, Aquinas offers a helpful example of an argument that will be fallacious if the equivocity view is true:

1. Whatever is in potentiality is brought to (*reducitur*) actuality by a being in act (*ens actu*).

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[4] E.J. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation," *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1) (1992), 106.

2. All things are brought into (*educantur*) being by God.

3. Therefore, God is a being in act (*ens actu*).

Although the syllogism appears to be valid, if *ens actu* in the major premise and the conclusion is equivocal, then we have a fallacy of equivocation. In that case we have "*ens actu₁*" and "*ens actu₂*," which have the same name only by chance. In addition to undermining demonstrations about God's existence and nature, the equivocity view also undermines knowledge of God.

Knowledge Argument. Aquinas makes a similar point with the knowledge argument but without reference to demonstration. Instead, he notes that because our knowledge of God is dependent on our knowledge of creatures, if the equivocity view is true then we only have "empty expressions" about God. But, as he argues in *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.33.6, we understand something from predications about God. The equivocity view, in other words, would reduce all of our predications about God to mere words that really tell us nothing about God. We do, contrary to the equivocity view, have positive knowledge of God, and thus the equivocity view must be false. Moreover, if the equivocity view is true, then no terms would apply to God more than others, which is false.[5]

Both the demonstration argument and the knowledge argument appeal to unity in meaning between the two uses. If the meaning of the term is wholly different, demonstrations fail and knowledge of God is not possible. Here we have two *reductio* arguments to show that meaning variance cannot be wholly different. The next arguments begin to provide an explanation of the unity that remains between the referents.

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[5] *De Veritate*, 2.11.

Aquinas offers metaphysical objections to the equivocity view as well. Although it is less apparent how these objections undermine the equivocity view, they provide a clue as to how Aquinas thinks of the relation between predication, meaning, and metaphysics. The effects resemble their cause argument relies on a tight relationship between predication and metaphysics. I first explain the argument and its assumptions; then I explain other metaphysical objections Aquinas offers to the equivocity view. The argument begins with what would be a metaphysical commonplace for Aquinas − an effect must in some way be like its cause (*aliqualiter simile causae*). This claim is a result of both the Aristotelian influence − act produces act or a cause cannot give what it does not have − and his NeoPlatonic participation metaphysics. From this he concludes that nothing is predicated purely equivocally of cause and effect. This inference requires a fairly straightforward relationship between metaphysics and predication.

In *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.32 and *De Veritate* 2.11[6] Aquinas argues from the similarity of things to God to deny the equivocity view. The former begins by identifying a consequence of equivocity, "Furthermore, where there is pure equivocation, there is no likeness in things themselves; there is only the unity of a name." With this claim Aquinas reveals that the equivocity view is not only about predication, but is also about the subjects of the predication or referents. According to Aquinas's interpretation, pure equivocation does not only require that the terms do not have related meanings, but that the referents are not related. Not just any relation undermines equivocity though, since

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[6] Although the *De Veritate* text also appeals to the likeness of creatures to God, but there uses it as the means for our knowledge of God and God's knowledge of us.

Maimonides's causal relation is not enough for Aquinas.[7] Maimonides, according to Aquinas, thinks we call God wise because God causes wisdom instead of any intrinsic attribute of God. Instead, Aquinas appeals to the likeness of things to God: "there is a certain mode of likeness of things to God." Such likeness, Aquinas thinks, shows that there is more than the unity of a name between the things.

In *Super Scriptum Sententias* I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 2, Aquinas argues that God is not an equivocal cause. Although he is not here discussing predication, we have seen that he thinks the nature of the predication mirrors the referents. After arguing that God does not cause univocally, Aquinas gives the following argument:

> Not equivocally, since effect and cause in a way agree in name and character, albeit with respect to prior and posterior, just as God by His wisdom makes us wise, yet such that our wisdom always falls short of the character of his wisdom, just as an accident falls short of the character of a being as it is in substance.[8]

Here we see that the agreement between God and creatures is not only in name, but also in *ratio*. So, the likeness in character (*ratione*) between God and creatures prevents God being an equivocal cause. The next argument shows that the priority and posteriority of the agreement in name and character provide the point of departure for a similar argument from Aquinas that the equivocity view is false.

Semantic-Logical Objections

Finally, I consider the ordered predication argument offered against the equivocity view in *De Potentia* 7.7. If the equivocity view is true, Aquinas explains, then a

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[7] For an account of analogous predication that relies solely on grounding meaning in what I call "causal unity," Aquinas's arguments against equivocity are problematic.

[8] *Thomas Aquinas's Earliest Treatment of the Divine Essence: Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, Book I, Distinction 8*. Translated by E. M Macierowski. Binghamton, NY: Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies and Institute for Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University (State University of New York), 1998.

term is predicated of a thing without any respect to something else. He explains the claim

further in *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.33, "In equivocals by chance there is no order or

reference of one to another, but it is entirely accidental that one name is applied to

diverse things: the application of the name to one of them does not signify that it has an

order to the other." In other words, equivocal predication requires that there is not an

ordering between the subjects of the predication signified by the different uses. But, there

is just such an ordering when predicating terms of God and creatures.

Aquinas describes the ordering slightly differently in the two texts:

> *De Potentia* 7.7: all things predicated of God and creatures are predicated of God
> with a certain respect to creatures or vice versa, and this is clearly admitted in
> all the aforesaid explanations of the divine names.

> *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.33: but this is not the situation with names said of God and
> creatures, since we note in the community of such names the order of cause
> and effect, as is clear from what we have said.

Two things are worth noting in these texts. First, predication of God and creatures cannot

be equivocal because such terms predicate of one with reference to the other. In *De

Potentia*, Aquinas says this reference can go either way, and in *Summa Contra Gentiles* he says

that the predicate is common because of the order of cause and effect.

Second, Aquinas notes in both cases that the ordering within the names is clear

from what has been said already. As explained, Aquinas's treatments of the nature of how

we predicate terms of God and creatures comes after he has argued for God's existence

and a variety of attributes. Aquinas thinks these arguments make clear that the causal

ordering he argues for is such an ordering and provides a context for the predications.

Moreover, Aquinas thinks the order is found "in the community of such names" because

he thinks the order between the referents finds its way into the meanings of the word.

Such order is precisely what the equivocity view does not allow.

So, for the above reasons, Aquinas thinks the equivocity view is false. Due to the likeness of things to God, the cause and effect relationship between them, and the ordered predication that gives rise to them, predications of God and creatures is not equivocal. Thus, Aquinas concludes in *De Veritate* 2.11, predication of God and creatures is "neither wholly univocal, nor purely equivocal" (*nec omnino univoce nec pure aequivoce*). Yet, there is a range between wholly univocal and purely equivocal. In the next section, I develop an account of two types of natural unity some non-univocal features have.

Non-Univocal, Natural Unity

Above I have argued that when a property meets certain conditions it is not a univocal property. The feature is then either analogous or merely disjunctive. In this section I defend the following thesis:

> *Analogous property thesis*: If the instances of a non-univocal property are united by (i) causality or (ii) non-univocal likeness, then the property is analogous (and not merely disjunctive).

McDaniel comments that he does not have a criterion to determine whether a non-natural feature is merely disjunctive or analogous.[9] Instead, his argument strategy is to identify things that seem neither perfectly natural nor merely disjunctive and call their unity analogous. I hope to clarify the varieties of such unity. Taking my cue from Aquinas's arguments above, I identify two types of unity that a non-univocal feature might have: causal unity and non-univocal likeness. I offer an initial characterization and defense of the unity of these features here, and then clarify them through conversation with some of the history of categorizing analogy in the next chapter.

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[9] McDaniel, "A Return to the Analogy of Being," 696.

Before turning to the unities, I need to make two clarifications. First, these unities are not mutually exclusive. In other words, a feature can be united by causality and non-univocal likeness,. Second, I am not claiming that this is an exhaustive list of types of analogous unity. The next chapter will discuss some other types of analogy, but I focus on these two. So, although I am not providing criteria that exhaust the analogous space of the naturalness spectrum, I characterize some of that space.

Causal Unity

Analogous features have a unity beyond merely disjunctive unity. Understanding causality in its varied ancient and medieval sense, one way of being so united is through causal unity. Recall Aquinas's argument in *De Potentia* 7.7:

> [*4. Effects resemble their cause argument*] And again the effect must in some way be like its cause, wherefore nothing is predicated equivocally of cause and effect; for instance, healthy of medicine and an animal.

The argument hints at both types of analogous unity, but let's look at the example and see how it is united. The property *being healthy* is exemplified by Jacob, Jacob's diet, Jacob's medicine, and Jacob's complexion. Jacob's health is the *being healthy* that the others are causally related to, or what I call the focal instance. When related to meaning, the one in the set the others all refer to is usually called the "focal case," I use "focal instance" to distinguish the metaphysical order from the semantic. The other instances of *being healthy* are related to the focal instance either by causing it or by being caused by it in certain ways. Jacob's diet and Jacob's medicine are both healthy because they cause Jacob's health. The medicine causes Jacob's health by eliminating impediments to Jacob's health, e.g., diseases. The diet causes Jacob's health by giving him the nutrition he needs to remain healthy. On the other end, Jacob's complexion is caused by Jacob's health and is

an indication of it. The Aristotelian tradition calls such indicating effects "natural signs," like smoke of fire. With this general description of the phenomena, I now offer a more rigorous analysis.

Let's start by asking about boundary cases: Are some causally united features univocal or merely disjunctive? On the one hand, it is surely true that some univocal features have causal unity. For example, my property of *being a human* is causally united to my daughter's property of *being a human*. Yet, the causal unity is not what grounds the univocal unity of the feature. Instead, the single likeness that is shared by humans grounds the univocal unity of the feature. In this way, being causally united is accidental to the univocal unity of the feature. Just as my humanity and my daughter's humanity can also have disjunctive unity without having *merely* disjunctive unity, there can be causal unity without being *merely* causal unity. If a feature is univocal, then, it might have causal unity but it will not be merely causally united.

On the other hand, merely disjunctive features are not generally or interestingly causally united. One reason such properties lack causal unity is that were they causally united they would not be *merely* disjunctively united. But there are two reasons they are only not *generally* causally united. First is that at a certain causal distance, one thing can be part of the causal story of another without being causally united to it in the relevant sense. For example, a friend recently noted I was responsible for his discomfort due to his wife's illness since I set them up. But I was only able to set them up because I met her at Baylor, and I am at Baylor as graduate student in the Ph.D. program. So, my *being a graduate student* and my friend's *being in pain* are causally united, but together have little more unity than a merely disjunctive feature. The intuition is that such causal unity is hardly natural because each causal connection is accidental. So, causal distance in the form of a number

of partial or accidental causes removed can keep a causally united feature from having analogous unity.

Second, if one is a pluralist about causality as the medievals were, causal unity is subject to the variety of causality. John Haldane has recently argued for extending the types of causality beyond even the Aristotelian four to include privative, social, and creative causes (among other suggestions).[10] If something like this is right, then one thing could be a part of another's relatively nearby causal story through multiple privative causes. Haldane offers the following example from a medieval rhyme:

> For want of a nail, the shoe was lost:
> For want of the shoe, the horse was lost;
> For want of the horse, the rider was lost;
> For want of the rider, the battle was lost;
> For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost,
> And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.[11]

So, the horseshoe's *lacking a nail* and the kingdom's *being conquered* are causally united. Yet, the unity is much less natural than the unity of *being healthy* without being quite merely disjunctive.

The conclusion to draw from these types of causal distance is that causal unity is extended on the naturalness spectrum. Some causally united features, like *being healthy*, are more natural than other causally united features, like my *being a graduate student* and my friend's *being in pain*. Implicit in the examples is that the more natural features tend to be

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[10] John Haldane's recent trilogy of articles on causality defend a pluralist view. All three are in *Analysis*: "Privative Causality," 67:3 (July, 2007), 180-6; "Gravitas, Moral Efficacy and Social Causes," 68:1 (Jan, 2008), 34-9; "Identifying Privative Causes," 71:4 (Oct, 2011), 611-619. A brief argument from Haldane for pluralism regarding causality with a focus on privative causality, "If we suppose that the idea of causal explanation is prior to that of a cause, which derives from it, then we may say that there are as many categories of types of basic cause as there are categories of types of basic causal explanation. Assuming that privative explanations are indeed basic, and that some at least are true, then there are privative causes. Even if the idea of cause is the prior one, however, the existence of true privative explanations may point to the existence of privative causality." John Haldane, "Privative Causality," 181.

[11] Haldane, "Privative Causality," 180.

generalizable. The *being healthy* of medicine and not just the *being healthy* of Jacob's medicine is causally united with the *being healthy* of living organisms and not just individuals. In contrast, although certainly causally united often in other ways, the type of causal unity found in the above example between *being a graduate student* and *being in pain* is not generalizable. Their causal unity is only due to the accidents of circumstances. I am after the philosophically interesting type of causally united features, which fall on the more natural side of the spectrum. When I speak of causally united analogous features, these are what I have in mind.

Since merely noting that two features are part of the same causal story is insufficient to identify analogous features, I need an account of when to think that causally united features are analogous features. I now offer two guides. If a feature meets either of these conditions, then it probably has the kind of causal unity that we are interested in. The first criterion:

> If a non-univocal feature is causally united and has a single predicate (in ordinary language), then it is an analogous feature.

Why think *being healthy* is an analogous feature and *lacking a nail or being conquered* is not? Each instance of *being healthy* is referred to by a single predicate in ordinary language, "is healthy," and the other is not. Of course, we can make up a predicate "is lacking a nail or is being conquered," but the lack of such a predicate in natural language is some evidence that the property it expresses is not a natural property.

This criterion relies on the truth of some form of reference magnetism, the view that the predicates of natural language tend to identify metaphysical joints.[12] In other

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[12] Barry Miller, *Fullness of Being: A New Paradigm for Existence* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2012) makes an even stronger claim than reference magnetism: "This is simply the claim that the categories of the things we talk about are to be determined by the linguistic categories of the language we

words, if ordinary language offers no ontological guidance, then the criterion should not

be relied on. Take a weak form of reference magnetism: a predicate in natural language is

evidence of a natural property. The feature need not be perfectly natural or even

univocal. In cases where causal unity and single predicates coincide, there is good reason

to think there is an analogous feature. So, if a non-univocal feature is causally related and

a single predicate in ordinary language refers to the various instances, then the feature is

analogous.

The second criterion is also semantic:

If the causal unity of property is found in the meaning (or meanings) of the
predicate that expresses the property, then the property is analogous.

This criterion is clearly met by the "is healthy" example. The focal meaning of "is

healthy" refers to the health of some organism and signifies a concept like 'functioning

well.' Another case of the predicate "is healthy" refers to a set of edibles and signifies the

concept 'is productive of the health of the organism' with the organism being the one or

type referred to in the focal case. Yet another case of the predicate "is healthy" refers to

the complexion of the organism and signifies a concept 'is indicative of health in the

organism' with the organism being the one or type referred to in the focal case. The

causal unity of the non-univocal feature *being healthy* is, then, part of the semantic structure

of the predicate "is healthy."

The first criterion relies on a reference magnetism like intuition, but this criterion

relies on another intuition (although it would also be bolstered if reference magnetism is

true). Instead, the idea is that not only is there a single predicate, but that the predicate's

various meanings actually manifest the causal relations between the instances of the

employ to speak about them. In other words, the way in which the world is sliced up mirrors the way in
which our language is sliced up by logical analysis." (67-68)

feature it refers to. So, the mere fact of a single predicate existing is not doing the work, but that the causal unity was significant enough to work its way into language. Such causal unity is analogous.

I now look closely at an example of a non-univocal feature that is united by analogy in some ontologies: being. Consider *being* in a metaphysic like Aquinas's. In this metaphysic, God, created substances, and accidents are three ways or modes of being.[13] As ways of *being*, each clearly has being, and therefore being is found across degrees of being. The instances of this feature are clearly causally united. Substances depend for their being on the conserving causality of God, and only exist by participation in the divine being. Accidents depend for their being on substances, for an accident exists as inhering in a substance. One predicate is used to pick out this feature across instances. Moreover, the predicate manifests some of the causal structure of the feature by signifying different concepts. Although "has being" might not signify different concepts when predicated of God and created substances,[14] it does plausibly signify different concepts when predicated of created substances and accidents. Part of what is signified by "is being" when predicated of accident is the concept 'inhering in a substance.' Thus, the second criteria for analogy of attribution is also partially met; some of the causal unity of the instances of the feature is manifested in the predicate.

In the next chapter, I examine how Aristotle, Aquinas, and Cajetan understand causal unity. Their accounts and examples flesh out the skeleton sketched here. Now I turn to non-univocal resemblance.

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[13] On Brower's reading, *being an accident* is an analogous feature with more fundamental modes "beneath" it. See figure 2.4.

[14] In the next chapter I argue that the wider context plays a role in whether or not different concepts are signified.

Non-Univocal Resemblance or Likeness

Univocal unity is often understood as a kind of resemblance or likeness that unites a feature. Sharing in the sparse, natural properties makes for "qualitative similarity."[15] Less natural features can also be united by likeness. In this section, I offer an initial characterization of this type of unity that will be further clarified in the next chapter.

As we saw above, Aquinas argued that there must be some likeness between God and creatures because effects must be like their cause. Yet, we see this likeness is not univocal, because God is greater than us and thus, for example, "our wisdom always falls short of the character of his wisdom."[16] The likeness thus falls short of univocal likeness, but it remains a likeness. So Aquinas marks off a likeness that is not univocal.

An example of non-univocal likeness is the feature *being good*. A good painting, a good person, and a good plan all have the feature *being good*. Each of these instances is plausibly in a different category or way of being: paintings are artifacts, persons are substances, and plans are mental entities. So, *being good* is not a univocal feature. Neither is it merely disjunctive. There is a likeness between these cases in virtue of which they have the feature *being good*, which an essentialist might characterize as "fulfilling its nature." But that in virtue of which each thing is good is quite different. These cases are not causally united, but neither are they merely equivocal. Instead, there is a likeness between them. To deny any likeness is to claim that *being good* is a merely disjunctive feature.

Like causal unity, a single predicate referring to the various instances of a feature united by non-univocal likeness is evidence of the unity of that feature. Unlike causal unity, there is no order between the references for the predicate to reflect. The nature of

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[15] Lewis, *Plurality of Worlds*, 60.

[16] *Super Scriptum Sententias* I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 2.

non-univocal resemblance will be a focus of the next chapter. By engaging the accounts of Aquinas, Cajetan, Wittgenstein, and Simon, I aim to clarify why non-univocal likeness is not univocal and how it is still likeness. With this initial sketch of analogous unity, I now turn to developing the varieties of analogous unity in more detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Analogous Unities

Introduction

In chapter one, I discussed the phenomena of meaning variance in relation to three causes of meaning. In chapters two and three, I examined the conditions for properties, potential causes of meaning, to be analogous instead of univocal or merely disjunctive. In this chapter, I survey various accounts of the different types of analogous unities. Some authors focus on the analogy of words, others the analogy of concepts, others the analogy between things, and some consider the interrelation of these. The solution to the dilemma stated in chapter one will require some account of the relation between different semantic, conceptual, and metaphysical orders, but I mostly leave this until the next chapter. For now, I explain the various accounts on their own terms or in terms of properties, which I take to be easily translatable into various conceptual and metaphysical accounts of analogy.

$$\text{equivocals} \begin{cases} \text{by chance} \\ \text{by reference} \\ \text{analogy} \end{cases}$$

Figure 4.1. Equivocals

In his excellent survey of Aristotle on equivocity, Joseph Owens makes the division in Figure 4.1. "Equivocal" is then equivocal. Excluding equivocal by chance, I focus on the phenomena examined by Aristotle under the other two headings. His "equivocal by reference" is my causal unity, and his "analogy" is my non-univocal resemblance, and I consider them in that order. Because of its importance in the next chapter, I spend a lot of time on proportional unity.

Aristotle

One type of equivocation, for Aristotle, is what he calls *pros hen* equivocation. Pros hen equivocation is not equivocation by chance because it is unified by reference to one. Famously, Aristotle appeals to this kind of equivocation when talking about being. He explains pros hen equivocation by using the standard examples of "medical" and "health":

> It seems to be expressed in the way just mentioned like the 'medical' and 'healthy;' for each of these also we express in various senses. Everything is expressed in this way by some kind of reference, in the one case to medical science, in the other to health, in others to something else, but each group in reference to one identical thing. For a treatise and a knife are called 'medical' because the former proceeds from medical science, while the latter is useful to it. And things are called 'healthy' in a similar manner; one thing because it is a sign of health, the other because productive of it. The same way holds also in the other cases.[1]

Joseph Owens explains an important aspect of *pros hen* equivocation, "The nature expressed in each case is found in only *one* of the instances. All the others have different natures, but with a reference to the nature of the primary instance."[2] The case in which the nature is found is usually called the "focal case" and other cases have reference to it in some way.[3] Cajetan especially picks up on the nature not being found in any but the focal case, as we will see shortly. This passage shows that Aristotle considers a number of

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[1] Quoted in Joseph Owens, *Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, 118-9; 1060b36-1061a7.

[2] Ibid., 119.

[3] G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in some Earlier Works of Aristotle" in *Logic and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, edited by Martha Nussbaum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 180-199.

relations that the non-focal cases can have to the focal case for pros hen equivocation. Aquinas develops on two patterns, which I explain in the next section.

Aquinas

In *De Veritate*, Aquinas explains that "two kinds of community can be noted in analogy."[4] In both cases, Aquinas explains the kind of relation the community has with a quantitative example and then offers examples of analogical predication based on these types of community. The first is analogy of proportion, which involves an "agreement between two things with a determinate distance or relation." To clarify what he means by determinate distance or relation he notes the proportion that 2 has to 1. Two is the double of one, and this kind of proportion can be the foundation for analogical predication. Note, Aquinas is here talking about a proportion and not a proportionality, which will be considered later in this chapter. He offers two examples: "being" predicated of substance and accident, and "healthy" predicated of urine and animal. In each case, the subjects of predication have a determinate relation to each other. In his later writings, Aquinas considers analogical predication of God and creatures to be this sort of predication. The order here is according to a proportion as it is in the *De Veritate* passage.

He uses two examples in the three later analogy passages - *De Potentia* 7.7, *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.34, and *Summa Theologiae* I.13.6 – "healthy" predicated of things in relation to an animal and "being" predicated of substance and accidents. In each of these texts, Aquinas distinguishes between two types of predication: many-to-one – predicated of two (or more) with respect to a third; one-to-another – predicated of two because of a

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[4] *De Veritate*, 2.11.

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relationship between the two. Depending on the subjects, "healthy" and "being" are used as examples of both kinds of analogy of proportion, as Figure 4.2 makes clear:

Many-to-one
- "being" predicated of quantity and quality with respect to substance
  (*De Potentia* 7.7)
- "healthy" predicated of medicine, food, and urine in relation to animal
  (*Summa Contra Gentiles* I.34)
- "healthy" predicated of medicine, food, and urine in relation to a body
  (*Summa Theologiae* 1.13.5)

One-to-another
- "being" predicated of substance and quantity
  (*De Potentia* 7.7)
- "being" predicated of substance and accident
  (*Summa Contra Gentiles* I.34)
- "healthy" predicated of medicine and animal
  (*Summa Theologiae* 1.13.5)

Figure 4.2. Ordered predication in Aquinas

In each text, one-to-another analogy is the type that Aquinas thinks applies to predication of God and creatures. The definition of "healthy" as applied to the secondary subjects, e.g., accidents, medicine, or urine, includes a reference to the primary subject, e.g., substance, animal, or body. Aquinas expands on the mechanics of such predication.

In *Summa Contra Gentiles* I.34, Aquinas explains that the focal case enters into the definition of the other cases. The focal case, though, can be either prior or posterior in being to those things referred to it. In the case of "being" predicated of substance and accident, substance is prior to accident in both orders. "Thus, substance is prior to accident both in nature, in so far as substance is the cause of accident, and in knowledge, in so far as substance is included in the definition of accident." But in the case of "healthy" being predicated of an animal and a health-giving thing, the order of naming

and being are reversed. "Thus, the power to heal, which is found in all health-giving things, is by nature prior to health that is in the animal, as a cause is prior to an effect; but because we know this healing power through an effect, we likewise name it from its effect." The focal case, whether prior in being or not, enters into the meaning of the term when predicated of the non-focal cases. Priority or posteriority in naming, then, does not entail priority or posteriority in being. It is worth noting that definitions for Aquinas, following Aristotle, are more metaphysical than linguistic. Remember, a name is often said to signify a definition, which can be a concept, thing, or thing through that concept. Aquinas thinks priority and posteriority like that explained above sometimes works its way into the meaning of the name, but how exactly this works out is complicated. In his systematic treatment of analogy, Cajetan offers a more sustained treatment of this kind of analogous unity.

Cajetan: Analogy of Attribution

Cajetan standardizes the conversation of divisions of analogy after Aquinas, and Aristotelian *pros hen* equivocation becomes analogy of attribution. The following is Cajetan's general explanation of analogy of attribution:

> They are analogous according to attribution, whose name is common, but the *ratio* according to that name is the same according to a term, and diverse according to relations to that.[5]

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[5] Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, translated by Joshua P. Hochschild in the appendix to his dissertation, "The Semantics of Analogy according to Thomas De Vio Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogia*," (Notre Dame University, 2001), 8. Quotations from the *De Nominum Analogia* are from Hochschild's translation unless otherwise noted, although I sometimes leave out Hochschild's bracketed additions. References are to the marginal numbering in the critical edition, which is maintained by Hochschild and the published translation, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, translated by Edward A Bushinski (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1953). Latin in the text is my addition from the Latin which accompanies Hochschild's translation.

Like Aquinas, Cajetan thinks a causal analysis of the relations between the focal case and non-focal cases is appropriate, "This type of analogy can come about in four ways, according to the four genera of causes."[6]

Cajetan clarifies the nature of this diversity in the first condition he gives for analogy of attribution:

> This analogy is according to extrinsic denomination only; so that only the first of the analogates is formally such, while the rest are denominated such extrinsically.[7]

The key concept here is 'extrinsic denomination.'[8] That a term denominates extrinsically is central to Cajetan's accounts of analogy of attribution. 'Extrinsic denomination' is a technical term for Cajetan, which Joshua Hochschild analyzes in the following way:

> A term P denominates some thing x extrinsically iff for the form signified by P, F_1, to be actual in x is for some other form, F_2, consignified by P, to be actual in something other than x insofar as x is P.[9]

"Healthy" as predicated of medicine is a clear example of extrinsic denomination. The form that "healthy" signifies in medicine is *cause of health*. For *cause of health* to be actual in medicine is for the form of *health*, which is also signified (consignified) by "healthy," to be actual in an animal, insofar as medicine is the cause of health. Such denomination is named "extrinsic" because medicine is named from a relation to a form it does not possess.

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[6] Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 9.

[7] Ibid., 10.

[8] Subsequent properties of analogy of attribution follow from it extrinsically denominating, Cf. Cajetan Ch. 2; Hochschild, *Semantics of Analogy* 110-18. From these subsequent characteristics, "it follows that analogy of attribution will behave in most respects like equivocation, even in causing the fallacy of equivocation." (Hochschild, *Semantics of Analogy*, 118)

[9] Joshua P. Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 97. I modified the formula to distinguish the distinct forms grounding the property.

Cajetan thinks, then, that when a predicate is predicated due to causal unity, it is extrinsically denominated in all but the focal case. On this view, analogy of attribution strictly excludes proportional unity, which is due to intrinsic likeness. In cases in which there is both causal and proportional unity, the *real* unity is analogy of proportional unity and causal unity provides an ordering but is *not*, strictly speaking, united by analogy of attribution. In the account of causal unity below, I do not consider this extrinsic aspect to be essential. Yet, I do recognize the lack of intrinsicality of causal unity through thesis 3 below, which explains that causal unity does not entail any intrinsic likeness amongst those things that exemplify the feature. [10]

Causal Unity

Before summarizing causal unity, I need to examine an assumption I have made. Aquinas and Cajetan understand reference-to-one equivocity along causal lines as I have, but is this correct? Maybe reference-to-one equivocity is also united through other relations besides causal relations. White makes this point in the following way:

> In a large number of cases, however, the relation between the primary application of the word and the secondary applications cannot be seen in causal terms at all–no matter how broadly we construe the notion of causality. I believe the insistence on the part of Thomist theologians on interpreting the analogy of attribution in causal terms seriously distorts the discussion here.[11]

Unfortunately, White neglects to offer any of the problem cases. Yet, we can supply one related to the term "medical." Imagine the rich blue color of some scrubs became the

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[10] Anderson argues that intrinsic analogy of attribution is impossible, but his arguments seem to depend on Cajetan's analysis of the nature of analogy of attribution. James Anderson. *The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence* (B. Herder Book Co., 1949), 113ff.

[11] White, *Talking About God*, 75

rigid standard for all health professionals to wear.[12] It wouldn't be surprising if after some time it became referred to as "medical blue." "Medical" in this case is clearly a case of analogy of attribution, but is the color causally united with the focal instance of medical? White is probably right that "medical blue" is not the efficient, formal, final, or material cause or proper effect of the focal case of medical. So, in this way the semantic phenomena of analogy of attribution and metaphysical phenomena of causal unity sometimes come apart. Yet, the predicate, I think, still has some causal unity underlying it in this case.

Let's return to "is healthy." A complexion is considered healthy because it is causally united to the focal instance of health as an effect. Of course, lots of things are effects of health, but a complexion gets united under the same predicate because it is a *sign* of health. Similarly, medical blue is a sign of medical, but not because it is a natural effect. Instead, the color blue and the medical are connected by convention. Thus, the causal connection is less natural than that between a complexion and health. Remember, though, causal unity is on a spectrum. It could be that the unity of *being medical* is now just disjunctive because convention has entered into it, but it might also be considered somewhat natural. My goal is not to decide such cases or make a general rule by which to decide them. The point instead is that while causal unity and reference to one equivocation are not exactly the same, even cases that might not seem amenable to causal analysis often have something like causal unity. With this qualification, I offer my summary of causal unity.

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[12] Interestingly, the color I'm identifying is very close to royal blue, which is probably so named by something similar to the scenario I'm going to describe.

The following theses are intended to be summaries of what has been explained and points of reference for what causal unity is. They are not intended to be jointly exhaustive statements that reveal the nature of causal unity. The first thesis:

> Thesis 1: An analogous property is causally united if all instances either are the focal instance or are causally related to the focal instance.

As noted in the last chapter, there are many causally united features without a single predicate that refers to them. This is partly due to the failure of language to perfectly capture every unity and partly due to some causal connections not being generalizable in the right kind of way to earn a predicate.

> Thesis 2 gets at the semantic side of causal unities that do have a single predicate:

> Thesis 2: The focal instance is often found in the meaning of the predicate when predicated of non-focal instances.

Yet, in general, thesis 2 captures an important aspect of how causal unity relates to meaning in cases when it is recognized in language. As discussed in the last chapter, the semantic structure of a predicate's meaning sometimes mirrors the causal structure of the property that predicate expresses.

The third thesis concerns whether or not the property is intrinsic to each thing of which it is predicated:

> Thesis 3: Causal unity does not entail or exclude that that in virtue of which causally unified features are possessed are also unified by resemblance.

This clarifies my account in relation to Cajetan. As we saw, Aristotle recognizes that there is something extrinsic about causally unified properties in non-focal cases in that the thing signified in the focal case is only signified indirectly or through some relation in the non-focal cases. In Cajetan, this "extrinsic denomination" becomes an essential feature of analogy of attribution. In other words, analogy of attribution is always, strictly speaking,

merely analogy of attribution. Causal unity, on my account, does not have this feature essentially. Instead, I recognize the extrinsic aspect of causal unity by noting that it does not entail any kind of resemblance between cases. In other words, to argue from causal unity to any kind of non-univocal (or univocal) resemblance, one would need additional premises. I now consider various types of non-univocal resemblances.

Non-Univocal Likenesses: Proportionality

Aristotle was a keen observer of non-univocal likenesses. In fact, he thinks recognizing such likenesses is a feature of a good mind: "It is a trait of a well-directed mind to perceive resemblances even between things that are remote."[13] Perceiving such resemblances can be difficult, for as Cajetan explains, non-univocal likeness can appear to be merely disjunctive compared to univocal likeness and univocal compared to merely disjunctive unity. In this section, I develop accounts of three types of non-univocal likeness: proportionality, family resemblance, and metaphor.

"Proportionality," "analogy of proportionality," or "analogy of proper proportionality," as it is variously called, is the type of analogous unity that Aristotle referred to by the term "analogy" (*analogia*). The term was originally used in a mathematical context as a way of comparing relative magnitudes. The Pythagorean discovery of incommensurable magnitudes required comparison of magnitudes that are not straightforwardly reducible to one measure.[14] A proportionality, A : B :: C : D, identified the relation between two ratios. Plato and Aristotle both recognized that the simple mathematical formula could be unlocked and extended beyond the realm of

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[13] Rhet. III, 1412a9-17, quoted in White, *Talking about God*, 56-7.

[14] White explains that this began with the Pythagorean discovery of incommensurable magnitudes and was then codified into standard geometry in book V of Euclid. (White, *Talking about God*, chapter 1)

magnitudes.[15] What does this mean? Through a proportionality we are able to recognize some similarity or likeness between two (or four) things, but because of their dissimilarity we aren't recognizing something common in the way of univocal likeness.

> It is precisely with this possibility of establishing analogical relations between heterogeneous elements that we see how it is that analogy enables us to make comparisons between entities that are "remote"—things that are so different in kind or category that straightforward comparisons are impossible.[16]

As Kris McDaniel notes, "It is good to have a rich diet of examples."[17] So, before turning to Aquinas's and Cajetan's accounts of analogy, I examine a number of examples from Aristotle.[18] I begin with less philosophical examples to elucidate the non-univocal likeness of proportionality and then turn to philosophical applications of proportionality, focusing on justice and metaphysics. Through interaction with each thinker, I develop an account of proportional unity.

Roger White helpfully surveys Aristotle's many applications of analogy and explains that "the concept of analogy plays a crucial role in Aristotle's biology."[19] When Aristotle compares animals, he explains that some differ by more or less and others can only be related by analogy. Differing feathers of various birds, for example, are related by

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[15] "It is in the work of Aristotle that the full potential of extending analogy beyond its mathematical basis becomes apparent. Although Plato had recognized the importance of analogy in human thought, Aristotle's writings show us the wide range of the fruitful employment of the concept." (White, *Talking about God*, 27)

[16] White, *Talking About God*, 18.

[17] McDaniel, "Return to Analogy of Being," 697.

[18] Not all of these examples satisfy the criteria in my non-univocal property thesis, which is a sufficient instead of a necessary condition for a property not being highly natural.

[19] White, *Talking About God*, 31.

more or less because we can directly compare them due to their similar structure and function. Other parts, Aristotle explains, can only be compared by analogy:

> Once again, we may have to do with animals whose parts are neither identical in form nor yet identical apart from differing by the more or the less: but they are the same only by analogy, as, for instance, bone is only analogous to fish-bone, nail to hoof, hand to claw, and scale to feather; for what the feather is in a bird, the scale is in a fish.[20]

Aristotle explains the unity between a bird's feather and fish's scale due to their proportionality, feather : bird :: scale : fish. Although feathers and scales are morphologically very different, they are *proportionally* similar. The likeness shared by feathers and scales is not a univocal likeness, i.e., it doesn't carve reality exactly at the joints. But their unity isn't merely disjunctive either; it is proportional.

Aristotle also talks about definition by analogy and a common analogous nature.[21] In *Posterior Analytics,* Aristotle discusses various ways of forming definitions. After examining ways of identifying univocal likenesses, Aristotle explains one might also need to find analogous likenesses:

> Yet a further method of selection is by analogy: for we cannot find a single identical name to give to a squid's pounce, a fish's spine, and an animal's bone, although these too possess common properties as if there were a single osseous nature.[22]

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[20] Aristotle, *History of Animals*, I 486b18-22. Quoted in White, *Talking About God*, 31. Aristotle also examines an elephant's trunk by analogy with hands at length in *Parts of Animals*, 658b 27- 659a37 and types of eyes in *Parts of Animals*, II 657b 30 - 658a10.

[21] Aristotle distinguishes between dichotomous division and unity by analogy in *Parts of Animals*, 642b5 - 644a10.

[22] *Posterior Analytics*, 98a20-24. Quoted in White, *Talking About God*, 55.

Aristotle recognizes that although there is no univocal likeness between the pounce, spine, and bone, there is a proportional one. Pounce[23] : squid :: spine : fish :: bone : animal. The similarity, because it is grounded in remote types of living things, is not univocal.

In *Topics*, Aristotle offers a series of guides for a word having multiple senses, i.e., being equivocal.[24] After explaining that words said of things across categories are equivocal (which includes analogy and pros hen equivocation), Aristotle notes that likeness across categories remains:

> Likeness should be examined among things which come under different genera, and as follows: (a) "A is to B, as C is to D," e.g., "knowledge is to the known, as sensation is to the sensible"; "A is in B, as C is in D," e.g., "vision exists in the eye, as intellect exists in the soul" and "calm exists in the sea, as stillness exists in air." We should train ourselves most of all in things whose genera are very far apart, for then we shall be more easily able to perceive at a glance likenesses in the other cases.[25]

This passage makes it clear that Aristotle has moved beyond the merely mathematical conception of analogy. Proportional likeness is found in different ways – "is to" and "is in" – between things. He also adds three further examples to our catalogue:

- knowledge : known :: sensation : sensible
- vision : eye :: intellect : soul
- calm : sea :: stillness : air

At this point, proportional unity is a non-univocal likeness between things too remote from each other to have univocal likeness. In the preceding, I argued that being in different ontological categories or modes of being is sufficient for two features being too remote to be univocal, but Aristotle includes cases within categories or degrees of being.

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[23] What Aristotle calls a "pounce" seems to be what biologists call a "pen" or "gladius," which is a squid's feather shaped endoskeleton.

[24] *Topics*, I, 106a - 107b. Some of Ross's summaries of these guides are mentioned in chapter one.

[25] *Selected Works*, 109; 108a 8-14.

Aristotle identifies a number of philosophical cases of analogy as well. In *Metaphysics* he says, "For there is analogy between all the categories of being—as straight is in length, so is flatness in breadth, perhaps odd is in number, and white in colour."[26] Applying this, he discusses the proportional unity of elements, causes, principles, and other things:

> The truth is, as we said that in one way thing have the same elements, in another, not. E.g., the elements of sensible bodies are, say, (1) as form, the hot, and in another way, the cold as its privation; as matter, that which directly, and of its own nature, is potentially hot or cold. And not only are these substances, but so (2) are the compounds of which they are principles, and (3) any unity which is generated from hot and cold, e.g., flesh or bone: for the product of hot and cold must be different from them. These things, then, have the same elements and principles, although specifically different things have specifically different elements; but we cannot say that all things have the same elements in this way, but only by analogy: i.e. one might say that there are three principles, form privation and matter. But each of these is different for each category of thing: e.g., in colour, they are white, black and surface, or, again in night and day, they are light, darkness and the air. And since it isn't only things that are inherent in an object which are its causes, but there are external causes as well, e.g. the moving cause, "principle" and "element" are not identical: but they are both causes. Principles are divided into these two kinds, and what moves or stops a thing is a kind of principle and substance. Thus, by analogy there are three elements and four causes or principles; but they are different in different cases, and the proximate moving cause is different in different cases. Health, disease, body, and the moving cause is the art of medicine. Form, a sort of disorder, bricks, and the moving cause is the art of building.[27]

Cases of form, privation, or matter in different categories are not univocally similar, but by analogy we can see the unity between them. Thus, counting proportional unities across categories, "there are three elements and four causes or principles." Aristotle here reasons as I have over the last couple of chapters: There can't be a univocal likeness between the categories due to metaphysical distance, but there can still be likeness.

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[26] *Metaphysics* XIV 1093b 18-21. Quoted in White, *Talking About God*, 49.

[27] *Ibid.*, XII 1070b 11-29. Quoted in White, *Talking About God*, 49.

The last example I offer from Aristotle is from his moral philosophy: justice. White explains, "The problem Aristotle addresses throughout the discussion of justice is: if we think of justice as involving a form of fairness or equality, how can we make sense of establishing equality between two incommensurable entities?" [28] Needing to put incommensurables on one measure arises in at least two ways relating to justice. First, criminal justice requires putting a variety of crimes on one measure of penalties and punishments. For example, armed robbery and kidnapping are both violent crimes but violate the victim in different ways. Determining how each crime is to be punished requires they are put on a spectrum, but the different and complicated nature of each crime means this can't be done through any simple algorithm. In other words, there is no number of crime units that each crime causes that is converted into punishment units to see what punishment is fitting.

Second, the exchange of goods and services requires an analogous unity. For example, what is the measure by which editing a book is exchanged with a mint condition Sega Dreamcast? White explains:

> This would be simple and straightforward if the notion of "cost" were simple and straightforward. We should then be able to explain the analogical equality of products as the arithmetical equality of costs to the producers.[29]

Of course the cost of an item is determined for us in the market, but the market is no guarantor of justice. He continues:

> The trouble we encounter at this point is not simply that we arrive at a complicated account of "cost," but that the elements that enter into our calculations appear almost as difficult to compare as the original goods that we were seeking to balance. Do we pay more, or less, for something

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[28] White, *Talking About God*, 42.

[29] Ibid., 43.

that requires great skill than one that requires hard work? If the costs can themselves be incommensurable, then, following Aristotle's line of argument, making the costs to the two producers of the goods equal can only mean making them analogically equal.[30]

So, Aristotle concludes, "Justice is therefore a sort of analogy. For analogy is not only a property of arithmetical quantity, but of quantity in general, analogy being equality of ratios, involving four terms."[31] Unfortunately, Aristotle does not develop the details of how to build the proportionalities in order to get clear on the analogous unities involved. Yet his suggestive account identifies a place where we naturally find unity between remote things.

Although my account of proportional analogous unity does not depend on any particular example of Aristotle, the many examples are intended to elucidate proportional unity, which is weaker than the exact likeness of univocal unity. Due to the distance between the things compared, Aristotle argues, the likeness between proportionally analogous features is "stretched" and no longer univocal. We have seen Aquinas offer similar arguments against univocity. Sometimes he explains the analogous unity as proportionality.

Aquinas

The role of analogy of proportionality in Aquinas is one of the watershed issues amongst his interpreters. On the one hand, there are readers who think that analogy of proportionality is not only the real Thomist account of analogy, but is also the key to

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[30] Ibid.

[31] *Nicomachean Ethics*, V 1131a 30-33. Quoted in White, *Talking About God*, 42.

understanding metaphysics.[32] On the other hand, some readers think Aquinas's talk of analogy of proportionality was an early misstep that he corrected in later accounts.[33] Although analogy of proportionality figures centrally in my account and I'm claiming my account is Thomistic, I am not entering into the above interpretive debate. Instead, I look at what Aquinas does say (whether or not it is his final word) about proportionality and Joshua Hochschild's recent work on Aquinas and proportionality. Aquinas considers proportionality in a number of places.[34] In this section, I briefly examine his treatment in *De Veritate* 2.11 and *Nicomachean Ethics* I.7 to see how he explains it, what examples he gives, and then turn to Hochschild's summary.

After Aquinas concludes that names are not predicated of God univocally or equivocally in *De Veritate* 2.11, he explains that "two kinds of community can be noted in analogy." The first is causal unity or analogy of attribution. He then describes the other type of analogy, which is "an agreement of proportionality":

> Again, the agreement is occasionally noted between two things which have a proportion between them, but rather between two related proportions– for example, six has something in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two... Sometimes, however, a thing is predicated analogously according to the second type of agreement, as when sight is predicated of bodily sight and of the intellect because understanding is in the mind and sight is in the eye.

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[32] For example, Gerald Phelan, "The only analogy which is adequate as a metaphysical principle is the analogy of proportionality property so called… The analogy of proper proportionality alone accounts for the diversity of beings and their unity in being." *St Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1978), 38.

[33] For example, Bernard Montagnes summarizes Klubertanz, "From Klubertanz's research it is clear that the analogy of proportionality, on which the disciples of Cajetan exclusively focused appeared at a definite point in Thomas's career and then disappeared. The analogy of proportionality would thus be a provisional solution, later abandoned in favor of another explanation." *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2004), 8.

[34] See George Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas and Analogy*, for an in depth and chronological survey of the various expressions Aquinas uses when discussing analogy.

After distinguishing these two types of analogy, Aquinas argues that terms cannot be predicated of God and creatures by analogy of attribution because it requires "some definite relation between the things having something in common." But "no creature has such a relation to God that it could determine the divine perfection." Analogy of proportionality, however, requires no such definite relation between the analogates. Thus, as long as a term does not signify some feature that has a limitation or defect that would preclude it being predicated of God, predicates can be predicated of God and creatures by analogy of proportionality. These features include "all attributes which include no defect nor depend on matter for their act of existence, for example, being, the good, and similar things."

In *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* I.7, Aquinas offers a similar description of analogy of proportionality, distinguishing it first from two kinds of causal unity. He then considers proportional unity and argues that Aristotle's preference is for "good" to be predicated in this way. "Likewise all things are called good by analogy or the same proportion just as sight is the good of the body and intellect is the good of the soul. He prefers this third way because it is understood according to goodness inherent in things." Aquinas does not spell out precisely the details of this proportionality, but doing so will help us get clearer on what he means.

The feature *being good* is an example of a proportionately united non-univocal feature. The various instances of *being good* are referred to by the predicate "is good" and include the following: a sharp knife, the virtue of temperance, a loyal dog, an effective plan, a healthy tree, an even tan, and the angel Gabriel. Notice first that these instances are found across primary ontological categories and modes of being in a Thomistic metaphysic. Temperance is an accident that is moral in character, a dog is a living

material substance, a tan is a different type of accident, a knife is an artifact, a plan is a mental entity, a tree is a material substance, and the angel Gabriel is an immaterial substance. So, *being good* is clearly a non-univocal property.

The instances of *being good* are not merely disjunctive though because they are proportionately united. Let's start with the straightforward examples: sharpness : knife :: loyalty : dog :: effectiveness : plan :: health : tree :: evenness : tan. For each pair, the first thing perfects the second according to the kind of thing it is. What about the virtue of temperance and the angel Gabriel? Temperance is good because it makes its possessor good. So we can add "temperance : human being" to the list. "Good" is predicated of the angel Gabriel because he has that which perfects him. Assuming charity is that which perfects the angels, then the proportion "charity : Gabriel" is the last item of our list. We see then that there is not one univocal, natural feature *being good* but an analogous feature that is exemplified in each case in virtue of very different natural features. We also see that proportionately analogous predicates are predicated of both sides of the proportions. The property, *being good*, is thus proportionally united as Aquinas suggested.

In his excellent article on analogy of proportionality in Aquinas, Joshua Hochschild abstracts from the textual details and offers six theses about the nature of proportionality.[35] Let's begin with the following four (using Hochschild's numbering):

1. Four-term proportionality is a way of describing a relation of likeness that need not involve a common quality or form shared by the relata.

2. Applying a common name to proportionally similar things always involves, in the order of imposition, attribution or reference to one.

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[35] Joshua Hochschild, "Proportionality and Divine Naming: Did St. Thomas Change his Mind about Analogy," *The Thomist* 77 (2013), 531-58.

3. Discerning a formal relationship of proportional likeness between two things does not address the metaphysical question of whether those two things are causally related.

5. Proportionality does not rule out a direct or causal relation between the two proportionally related things.[36]

The first thesis notes that a proportionality need not pick out a highly natural or univocal property or feature. The second thesis notes something analogy of proportionality has in common with analogy of attribution: the common predicate given to the analogues is extended from one to others. In other words, the use of a word must start somewhere. From there it is extended to wider meanings for various reasons. The third and fifth theses note that a feature being unified by analogy of proportionality neither entails the various instances are causally united nor that they are not causally united. Proportional unity and causal unity are distinct unities that neither entail nor exclude each other. We have seen these theses implicit in the above texts of Aquinas. Hochschild's other two theses require more explanation.

In the section on causal unity, I explained that Aquinas distinguishes between one to another analogy and many to one analogy. Some interpreters have argued that one to another analogy is causally united analogy and excludes the analogues being proportionately united. Hochschild's sixth thesis rejects this reading of Aquinas:

6. Identifying an instance of analogy as "one to another" neither entails a causal connection between analogates, nor rules out a proportional relationship between analogates.

Whether or not one to another analogy does entail a causal connection, what is important for our purposes is that the version of analogy that Aquinas favors in predications about God and creatures in his later works does not exclude a proportional likeness.

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[36] Ibid., 545-550.

The fourth thesis concerns the relationship between an intrinsic connection between two things and intrinsic denomination. Something is denominated intrinsically if it is named from a feature it possesses. In causal unity, for example, the focal instance is intrinsically denominated and the other instances are extrinsically denominated.

> 4. We must not confuse the metaphysical issue of an intrinsic connection between two things, and the semantic issue of the intrinsic denomination of something.

Building on the earlier theses about the independence between proportional and causal unity, this last thesis adds that intrinsic denomination does not entail intrinsic connection. In other words, two things being intrinsically denominated by the same predicate does not tell us whether they are intrinsically connected beyond that resemblance.

Aquinas then expands on Aristotle in the following two directions. First, proportional unity is due to an intrinsic likeness between two things even if there is no perfectly natural feature they share. Second, proportional likeness does not entail or exclude causal unity or priority and posteriority between the analogates. Thus, evidence for one unity is not evidence for the other, and further argument is needed to establish such a connection. Cajetan further clarifies proportional unity.

Cajetan

Cajetan is the key interpreter of Aquinas who thinks analogy of proportionality is the key type of analogy.[37] In *De Nominum Analogia*, Cajetan provides a systematic account of analogy and argues that analogy of proportionality is the key to understanding analogous unity. Like others, Cajetan appeals to the unity of proportionality in his

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[37] Although Hochschild has persuasively argued in *The Semantics of Analogy* that reading Cajetan's *De Nominum Analogia* as merely an interpretation of Aquinas is a mistake. Instead, Cajetan is presenting a systematic account of the *semantics* of analogy that he thinks is true to Aquinas.

account, but he provides a more rigorous account of the semantics involved in light of Scotistic objections through an application and extension of the classical semantic triangle. When a term is proportionally analogous, Cajetan explains, the concepts and referents involved require a more complex story. The word, term, or predicate does not simply refer to one thing through one concept. Instead, it refers to a set of things through an imperfect concept. I first consider the referent vertex of the triangle.

> Cajetan explains a central difference between univocation and analogy:

> Whence between univocation and analogy is this difference, that the things founding univocation are like themselves in such a way that the foundation of similitude (*fundamentum similitudinis*) in one is of wholly the same *ratio* as the foundation of similitude in the other; so that the *ratio* of one contains in itself nothing that the *ratio* of the other does not contain. And because of this the foundation of univocal similitude in both extremes is equally abstracted from those extremes.[38]

The foundation of similitude here is that in virtue of which the property is exemplified. For example, *being an animal* is exemplified in a sugar glider and moose in virtue of the sensitive nature of each. The univocal property carves at the same joint in each instance. The notion or concept is natural enough to refer to the same bit in each referent.

> Contrasting with this, Cajetan turns to analogy:

> But the things founding analogy, are similar in such a way that the foundation of similitude in one is different simpliciter from its foundation in the other; so that the ratio of one does not contain what the ratio of the other contains. And because of this, the foundation of analogical similitude in neither of the extremes can be abstracted from them; but they remain distinct foundations, nevertheless similar according to proportion. Therefore they are called proportionally or analogically the same.[39]

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[38] Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 33.

[39] Ibid.

In cases of proportional analogy, the foundation or that in virtue of which the analogous feature is exemplified is not univocally identical. To use Cajetan's example of the term "being," "substance, quantity, quality, etc., because they do not have in their quiddities something abstractable" in the way univocal predicates are abstracted.[40] *Being* does not carve exactly at the joints; its foundations only have proportional unity.

Proportional unity also has consequences for concept formation on Cajetan's account. The paradigm case of abstraction is for univocal features. The intellect "pulls out" the intelligibility that gets at each instance of the univocal feature equally. The concept 'animal,' for example, corresponds to each of its instances "perfectly and adequately."[41] In contrast, "But with the analogue and the analogates as such, there are necessarily many concepts perfectly representing them, and one concept which imperfectly represents them."[42] Cajetan is a little unclear whether the imperfect analogous concept is a distinct concept or whether it is just a way of considering each of the perfect concepts.[43] Regardless, the imperfect concept is a "confused" concept because it confuses the differences of the perfect concepts to reveal the proportional unity.[44]

> But because joining them proportionally, and signifying them as proportionally the same, it offers them to be considered as the same. By sort of hiding the diversity inseparably annexed, it both unites by identity of proportion, and confounds somehow the diversity of *rationes*. And thus, there occurs not only the confusion of significations in the word, but the confusion of the concepts or *rationes* in their proportional identity; but thus however not so much the concepts, as their diversity, is confounded.[45]

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[40] Ibid., 34.

[41] Ibid., 38.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Hochschild has a helpful discussion of this in *Semantics of Analogy*, 146-8.

[44] Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 57.

[45] Ibid., 56-7.

The differences in the perfect concepts undergo a kind of blurring effect in order to see the analogously common proportionality.

The strange character of the imperfect concept – the unity and diversity within it – is due to the nature of proportional identity. Cajetan recognizes both that the meaning of the analogous term or predicate involves something neither perfectly natural nor merely disjunctive:

> However it is manifestly clear from the aforesaid, that the analogue says and predicates, not a disjunct concept, nor one precise concept unequally participated, nor a concept one by order, but a concept one by proportion.[46]

Cajetan here distinguishes proportional unity from equivocity and other claimed "analogies." By noting it does not predicate a disjunct concept, Cajetan places proportional unity on the naturalness spectrum. Moreover, he locates it between univocal unity and causal unity:

> For the *rationes* of the analogates according to the analogous name are somehow means between the analogue according to attribution, and the univocal. For in the analogue according to attribution, the first defines the rest. But in the univocal neither defines the other, but the definition of one is the complete definition of the other and vice versa. However in the analogue neither defines the other, but the definition of one is proportionally the definition of the other. And we always speak of the ratio according to the common name. For example, in the definition of heart, insofar as it is the principle of the animal, is not posited foundation insofar as it is the principle of the house, nor conversely; but the ratio of principle is proportionally the same for both.[47]

In the case of causal unity, the unity of the concept or feature is due to reference to the focal case. So, the concept applies differently and the feature is exemplified in virtue of different entities. In the case of univocation, the unity is due to a generic or specific

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[46] Ibid., 71.

[47] Ibid., 77.

likeness. A univocal concept applies equally in each case or the feature is exemplified in virtue of the same entity. Proportional unity is different. Like univocation, the concept applies to all, but, like causal unity, it applies differently because the feature is exemplified in virtue of different entities. So, Cajetan concludes, proportional unity is between univocal unity and causal unity.

One might wonder whether proportional unity could be distilled down to some univocal (or, as he says, "absolute") unity. Cajetan replies:

> And consequently unity by proportion is not unified simply, but retains distinction; it is and is called one, just insofar as it is not divided by dissimilar proportions. Whence, just as there is not some other reason why proportional unity is not one absolutely, except that this is its formal ratio, so another reason is not to be asked, why from things proportionally similar one thing cannot be abstracted. This therefore is indeed, because proportional similitude includes such diversity in its ratio. And it happens that those seeking more ask that which does not fall under question, as to ask why man is rational animal, etc.[48]

Proportional unity, Cajetan explains, is not reducible to other kinds of unity. Throughout *De Nominum Analogia*, Cajetan stresses that proportional unity is another type of unity that needs to be marked off from univocal unity. It is not analyzable in terms of mere disjunction or univocity. Instead, it must be investigated on its own terms.

Aristotle and Aquinas have already explained that proportional unity is a non-univocal likeness existing between remote things that does not entail or exclude causal unity. Building on the idea of the diverse foundations of proportional features, Cajetan explains that analogous concepts differ from univocal concepts. In doing so, Cajetan recognizes that proportional unity is less natural than univocal unity. Moreover, Cajetan argues that proportional unity is a primitive type of unity. Although analogous features are less natural than univocal features, proportional unity is not reducible to univocity.

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[48] Ibid., 49.

In his excellent essay, "On Order in Analogical Sets," Yves Simon helpfully describes proportional unity.[49] Early in the essay, Simon cautions against a common mistake concerning proportional unity:

> In the beginner's understanding, to say that a term is not purely equivocal but analogical is the same to say that, in spite of all, the meanings do have in common some feature, albeit a very thin one, which survives the differences and makes it possible for a term, whose unity is but one of analogy, to play the role of syllogistic term.[50]

But Simon, in agreement with Cajetan, stresses that "the diversity of meanings provides irreducible in every analogical set."[51] If diversity is irreducible, then how does an analogical set differ from a mere collection? Here Simon is approaching the same space Cajetan and I have approached from a somewhat different direction and adds emphasis to what distinguishes proportional unity.

Surveying the "methods of unity" in univocity and the various kinds of analogy, Simon explains that proportionality and univocity have abstraction in common:

> In proper proportionality, the method of unity is abstraction indeed, but it is an abstraction by way of confusion. It is an incomplete, weak, partial abstraction that does not go so far as to drive the differences into a state of potentiality. An analogical set is made of meanings that remain actually diverse; accordingly, an analogue is a set rather than a universal. But inasmuch as the set is said to be analogical by proper proportionality, its unity is traced to an operation of the mind.[52]

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[49] Yves Simon, "Order in Analogical Sets," in *Philosopher at Work: Essays by Yves R. Simon*, ed. Anthony O. Simon (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999): 135-171 [reprinted from New Scholasticism 34 (1960): 1-42].

[50] Ibid., 139.

[51] Ibid., 141.

[52] Ibid.

Simon here follows Cajetan by describing the abstraction of proportional unity as an abstraction by way of confusion. When univocals are abstracted, all differences are left behind and all diversifying elements are only potential additions, i.e., driven into a state of potentiality. Diversity remains within proportional unities, and thus the abstraction is not perfect. Recognizing the root of this difference, Simon explains that that proportional unity is "traced to an operation of the mind" and thereby notes that proportional unity is less natural than univocal unity.

The standard way of signifying a proportionality, $a : b :: c : d$, helps reveal the diversity that cannot be removed from the unity. Although the unity is expressed with the double colon, it is expressed with reference to the two proportions and their relata, or "extremes" as Cajetan called them. In other words, you cannot see the unity without also seeing the diversity. Simon explains this as both asserting and negating, or saying "yes" and saying "no," to the common ground, which is the proportional likeness. Univocal proportionalities like $2 : 4 :: 3 : 6$ can be adequately understood through a univocal relation, e.g., *half*. In such cases the common ground is simply asserted. But in analogously proportional predicates like "is good," the predication is more complicated. "Because this abstraction is incomplete, and the unity that it brings about relative, attributing the name of the set to each of its members will always be accompanied by the restricting clause: in its own way."[53]

In this way, Simon proposes a way of identifying whether a concept is univocal or analogous:

> And thus we can now express with more precision than in the foregoing
> the criterion by which, in difficult cases, it can be decided whether a
> concept is univocal or analogical. This decision is safely obtained if only

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[53] Ibid.

we answer the question, "where do the 'yes' and the 'no' belong?" If in the common ground (for example, being as divided into substance and accident, or life as divided by the ways of self-motion and those of motionless activity, or evils as divided into physical and moral, or relation as divided in predicamental and transcendental), then the common ground is analogical. If in differences added to the common ground and specificative of its potency, the common ground is univocal and its character of community is unqualified.[54]

Simon thus explains that the unity of proportionality is qualified, for it cannot prescind from diversity. The expression here seems strange. If the proportionality expresses the likeness, why would we say "no" to it? But Simon uses the strangeness to capture the strangeness of proportional unity, which is *not* univocal likeness. Like univocity, the predicate that expresses an analogous set is properly predicated of each member of the set without reference to any other. Unlike univocity, the predicate is properly predicated of each member with some qualification. In other words, it is perfectly correct to call any number of things "good," but it is also necessary to recognize that "good" applies to each thing a little differently. With Simon's emphases in place, I can now briefly restate the view of proportional unity developed through engaging Aristotle, Aquinas, Cajetan, and Simon.

Proportional Unity

For the sake of clarity and brevity, I am going to present an account of proportional unity in four theses. A word of disclaimer is necessary before offering the theses though. The theses are not intended to stand alone, but are intended to be read in the context of the above discussion. As one of the theses will mention, it is important to remember that proportional unity is a distinctive kind of a unity that is not reducible to other types of unity. Like other primitive concepts, one must get to it through examples

[54] Ibid., 155.

and reflection. The goal, then, has been to mark off proportional unity through presentation of examples and reflecting on the kind of unity they have. These theses are to serve as touchstones for proportional unity rather than a definition.

The first thesis gets at the heart of proportionality:

Thesis 1: A proportionally analogous property is a property that is united by a non-univocal resemblance between two (or more) proportions.

The Pythagoreans identified the need for an incommensurable magnitude, which Aristotle and others expanded to explain the unity we see between remote things. For clarity, recall that every property is not necessarily a "real property" and could be a being of reason on some metaphysics. Instead, this thesis notes that there is a kind of resemblance or likeness between proportions that is not univocal. Some likenesses between proportions are univocal, e.g., 2 : 4 :: 3 : 6, but some are not, e.g., temperance : human :: effective : plan. The latter are proportionally united. Proportional unity is analogous because it is less natural than univocal unity.

Thesis 2: Unlike univocal unity, proportionally united features retain, in some way, the differences of that in virtue of which they are exemplified.

The above showed the difficulty of describing this difference-in-unity. The incommensurability that occasioned the idea of analogy remains central to proportionality. Due to the remoteness of that which exemplifies analogous features, an exact likeness or resemblance is not found. In other words, the diversity of the proportionally united property's grounds partly determine its character. Instead, we have a likeness with a residue of difference. This thesis guards against what Simon calls the beginner's mistake of thinking a univocal unity really underlies proportional unity. The difference cannot be removed from the resemblance, and this can make proportional unity appear to be merely disjunctive. Thesis 3 serves as a corrective to this appearance:

Thesis 3: Unlike merely disjunctive unity, proportionally united properties have natural unity.

Theses 2 and 3 secure proportional unity's place between being univocal and being merely disjunctive.

Thesis 4: Proportional unity is neutral towards causal unity, i.e., it neither entails nor excludes it.

Finally, summarizing some of Hochschild's theses, thesis 4 clarifies proportional unity's relation to causal unity. Although proportional unity is the only non-univocal resemblance I appeal to regarding our scientific knowledge of God, it is worth briefly discussing two other types of apparently non-univocal resemblance for purposes of clarification by comparison and completeness.

Other Analogous Unities: Family Resemblance and Metaphor

Causal and proportional unities are not the only kind of analogous unities. Additionally, family resemblance and metaphor are plausibly analogous unities. Because in this project I am ultimately concerned with an account of analogy that can account for two constraints of classical theism, i.e., rigorous, argumentative knowledge of God and divine transcendence, I focus on proportional unity. Family resemblance and metaphor just aren't the kinds of unities that can handle the kind of rigorous argumentation I am interested in examining. Yet, in the interest of thoroughness, I briefly describe them here.

Family resemblance is famously appealed to by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* when trying to explain the unity our idea of 'games':[55]

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[55] Although we discuss this unity in terms of family resemblance because of Wittgenstein, it seems to have been described, in more abstract terms, much earlier by Avicenna. See Daniel De Haan's paper, "The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being in Avicenna's *Metaphysics of the Healing*," *Review of Metaphysics* 69:2, 261-286.

67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. –And I shall say: 'games' forms a family.[56]

In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstien "seeks to replace this notion of *essence* with the more flexible idea of *family resemblances*."[57] In order to do this, Wittgenstein tries to identify a unity that is non-univocal:

> We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term 'game' to the various games; whereas games form a family the members of which have family likenesses. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way of walking; and these likenesses overlap.[58]

Whether or not one agrees that "game" is actually unified by family resemblance, the idea here is clear enough. A feature is unified by family resemblance if it is exemplified by a set of more natural features that overlap in various ways across its instances. So, *being a game*, on Wittgenstein's view is not exemplified in virtue of any one univocal feature, but by one or another (or one set or another) of more natural features, e.g., *being a competition, being rule governed, being artificial*, etc. In this way, properties united by family resemblance are like causally and proportionally united features.

Despite the similarity, family resemblance is not a good candidate for our purposes. In order to be useful in the kind of rigorous argumentation Aquinas and Scotus are concerned about, we need a feature more unified than one unified by family resemblance. Family unity is a unity that can be discovered amongst a set, but not one that can helpfully extend our knowledge beyond that set by argument. In proportional

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[56] *Philosophical Investigations*, 67.

[57] Ray Monk, *Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 338.

[58] Quoted in Monk, Ibid.

unity, for example, there is a non-univocal likeness between each of the things proportionally united. But between any two members of a set united by family resemblance, there might not be a resemblance. Consider a large family with a clear resemblance that has much to do with a distinctive nose, fair hair, ruddy complexion and unpleasant disposition. One member, Sandy, received the family hair and complexion but avoided the nose and unpleasant disposition. She is clearly one of the clan. Another member, John, has brunette hair and a dark complexion, but is also clearly one of the family because of his nose and extra unpleasant disposition. John and Sandy do not share any of the features that place them in their family, but both belong at the reunion. Because such cases are easily produced when the non-univocal likeness is family resemblance, a stronger or more natural unity is needed to support the demands of a syllogism.

Metaphor is similarly located too near merely disjunctive on the naturalness scale to be a good candidate for my project. Unlike family resemblance, metaphor received attention from Aquinas and Cajetan. In order to show how they situated it in relation to proportional unity, I explain their account here. Unfortunately, their explanation of metaphor as a kind of extrinsic proportional unity leaves a lot of room for clarification. But, like them, I do not pursue such clarification beyond some comments from Braine noting the importance of metaphor, because metaphor is not a good candidate for my project.

As we have seen, Aquinas's normal strategy is to argue that God-talk is not univocal, then not equivocal, and thus analogical. In the transition between considering equivocity and analogy, Aquinas often offers a word distinguishing the type of analogical predication he is after from metaphor. Yet, metaphor is also a kind of predication that sits

between univocity and pure equivocity. In *De Veritate* 2.11, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of analogy of proportionality: one in which the proportion of one analogate implies something impossible in the other analogate, one in which it doesn't. The latter is the analogy of proportionality discussed above. The former, called "analogy of improper proportionality" by Thomistic commentators,[59] is a kind of metaphor.

> Sometimes the name implies something belonging to the thing primarily designated which cannot be common to God and creatures even in the manner described above. This would be true, for example, of anything predicated of God metaphorically, as when God is called lion, sun, and the like, because their definition includes matter which cannot be attributed to God.

Aquinas also considers metaphor in other passages.

In the *Summa Theologiae* I.13.6, Aquinas considers "smiling fields" as an example of how metaphorical predication works:

> For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his.

So, although God is not a lion in any literal sense, the strength of a lion does have a similarity to God's strength. In this, metaphor is unlike equivocation by chance. Yet, it differs from analogy of proportionality because it implies something impossible in God, e.g., that God has paws.

Cajetan expands somewhat on Aquinas by offering the following division in analogy of proportionality:

> However this mode of analogy is made in two ways: namely metaphorically and properly. Metaphorically when that common name has one formal ratio absolutely, which is saved in one of the analogates, and is said of the others by metaphor—as "smiling" has one ratio in itself,

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[59] E.g., Ralph McInerny, *Analogy & Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 22-4.

but is an analogue, metaphorically, of a true smile and a blooming field, or a good fortune; these indeed we signify to have themselves in some way as a smiling man. And this kind of analogy is plentiful in Sacred Scripture, teaching notions of God metaphorically.[60]

He goes on to explain that proper proportionality occurs when "that name common to both of the analogates is said without metaphor."[61] Cajetan's definition has been justly criticized as unenlightening.

White sympathetically comments on Cajetan's distinction between proper proportionality and metaphor:

> Differentiating the two cases is, however, quite a subtle business. Cajetan for example, struggles to clarify the distinction, calling the metaphorical case, "the analogy of improper proportionality" and the other case, "the analogy of proper proportionality." However, his account seems to be circular, explaining what is meant by "improper" in terms of metaphor, and vice versa.[62]

Despite the apparent circularity problem, White also notes that Cajetan helpfully compares metaphor to analogy of attribution.[63] Like analogy of attribution, metaphors include reference to one. In cases of causal unity, non-focal instances are united by their causal relation to the focal instance. In metaphorical unity, the metaphorical extension is united through an "extrinsic" likeness to the non-metaphorical case. So, like causal unity, metaphorical unity has directionality. Ross notes this feature of metaphor as well.

Simple metaphor, according to Ross, is a kind of analogy of proportionality, but is also "asymmetrical."[64] He provides the following examples: "sow" predicated with seeds

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[60] Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia*, 25.

[61] Ibid., 26.

[62] White, *Talking About God*, 69.

[63] Ibid., *God*, 69n31.

[64] Ross, *Portraying Analogy*, 7.

and dissension as objects, "creep" predicated as an activity of a child and disease, and "flow" predicated as an activity of water and a conversation. The asymmetry is seen in meaning-related substitutions. Although Ross explains that "no single statement can convey this asymmetry until one sees it mapped out with examples," he offers the following brief summary: "certain meaning-related words substitutable for the non-metaphorical occurrence are not substitutable for the metaphorical occurrence."[65]

Metaphorical unity is, on these descriptions, less natural than proper proportionality. Although I treat this as a distinct type of unity, it might be more accurate to treat the proper and improper proportionality as two ends of a sub spectrum within the naturalness spectrum. The difficulty in drawing a clear line between the two might be due to the difference being a gradient of naturalness instead of a clear difference in kind. On this view, cases of proper proportionality would be toward the natural end of the spectrum and cases of improper proportionality would be toward the merely disjunctive end. This would make sense of the difficulty of distinguishing them and cases in which it is unclear whether the proportionality is proper or improper. Despite the difficulties of defining metaphor, Braine notes its importance.

Sometimes a word or expression is used in a secondary and derived meaning based on some similarity without preserving literal truth. Braine explains, "Thus only sounds are literally loud, but metaphorically many things are described as loud because they attract attention and jar upon the sensibility (so we speak of certain clothes or colors of clothes as loud)."[66] Although metaphor was often neglected by the Aristotelian tradition in natural theology, which was more concerned with related meanings in

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[65] Ibid.

[66] Braine, *Language & Human Understanding*, 127.

scientific contexts, Braine argues that metaphor is "indispensable" in areas central to rigorous thought. Braine identifies descriptions of our cognitive and conative states and the "linguistically universal tendency to extend the use of words for possibility from stating what nature leaves or makes possible to what the laws and reasons motivating our action allow us to do, and further to what our present knowledge and the evidence we have allow us to think" as two areas where metaphor is indispensable.[67]

Other recent work has also argued for the importance of metaphor in our understanding of the world as noted in chapter one. Despite its importance, metaphor is not suited to the types of rigorous argument I am concerned with and will thus not be further developed here. Thus, both family resemblance and metaphor have claim to being analogous unites, but their nature prevents them from being considered further.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have considered four types of analogous unities. Figure 4.3 represents one way that these unities might be found on the naturalness spectrum, although one could divide the non-univocal unities differently. At this point, I take it that the examples and descriptions have sufficiently marked off proportional unity as a distinct kind of likeness that is not univocal, merely disjunctive, or another lesser type of likeness like family resemblance or metaphor. In the next chapter, I argue that proportional unity provides the key for preserving both scientific knowledge of God and divine transcendence.

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[67] Ibid., 128.

Figure 4.3. Complete naturalness spectrum

CHAPTER FIVE

Analogy, Argument, and Transcendence

Introduction

In the tradition of classical theism, any account of how our language applies (or

doesn't apply) to God must satisfy two constraints. On the one hand, some terms or

predicates applied to both God and creatures must be able to function in an argument

without causing a fallacy of equivocation. The terms must have sufficient unity, then, to

sustain a demonstration that ends in knowledge of God. I call this the *knowledge constraint*.

On the other hand, I call the following the *transcendence constraint*: God transcends all other

beings. God is not the biggest member of the set of beings, but is in a class of one. These

constraints are in tension. Analogous predication has been criticized for violating both

constraints. Calling it "the Catholic doctrine of analogy" Robert Masson summarizes two

lines of criticism:

> On the one hand is the concern that *analogia entis* by way of the *via
> eminentiae* and *via negationis* defines God as "possessing to the nth degree the
> world's excellences and as lacking all its deficiencies" and thus fails to
> protect the difference between God and the world. Interpreted this way,
> the doctrine suggests that God, although greater and higher than every
> other being, is nevertheless different from other beings only by degree–in
> the vernacular, God is the first, biggest, and most powerful thing around.
> On the other hand, as Jüngel argues in *God as the Mystery of the World*, a
> more careful reading of the Catholic position would emphasize that the
> point of its metaphysical analogies is to indicate the always greater
> dissimilarity between God and any analogous statement about God. But
> then, he argues, such language can do no more than "make expressible in
> speech the unknowable God in his unknowability."[1]

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[1] Robert Masson, *Without Metaphor, No Saving God* (Walpole, MA: Peeters Publishers, 2014), 152-3.

In other words, analogy violates one constraint or the other. Of course, as G.K. Chesterton pointed out, if a man is called both too short and too tall, he might just be the right size.[2] I argue that my account of analogy is the right size. I first explain how I preserve the knowledge constraint and then the transcendence constraint.

Preserving the Knowledge Constraint

In this section, I argue that the account of analogy explained above preserves the knowledge constraint of classical theism. I first expand on what is included in the knowledge constraint for Aquinas and Scotus. Next, I explain some versions of Scotus's argument that univocity is necessary to avoid equivocation and preserve our knowledge of God. I then explain how analogy answers such objections by first trying to show that Scotus and Cajetan seem to have more in common than often thought and finally give my view of how analogy doesn't cause a fallacy of equivocation.

The Knowledge Constraint

As mentioned, the knowledge constraint of classical theism requires that we have demonstrated, positive knowledge of God's existence and nature. In order to understand the constraint as Aquinas and Scotus did, I here briefly sketch the Aristotelian empiricism, account of demonstration, and provide examples of positive knowledge (in contrast to negative knowledge) of God that both accepted. Of course, here as elsewhere, Aquinas and Scotus are not in perfect agreement, but their agreement is significant and my point of departure for understanding this constraint.

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[2] G.K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy* in Collected Works of G.K. Chesterton, Vol. 1 (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press), 294-5.

According to the Aristotelian tradition that both Aquinas and Scotus made their own, all knowledge begins in the senses.[3] Through our senses we take in the world and discover the unity and diversity of things. We can then reason beyond what we have sensed through the likenesses and differences we have discovered in experience. In this way, all knowledge remains grounded in our experience and is conditioned by it. Natural knowledge of God, then, is obtained as the conclusion of an argument from created things. In his famous five ways, Aquinas follows a number of causal series back to the First.[4] In his *De Primo Principio*, Scotus follows the series of efficient, final, and extrinsic formal causality and argues that all three series originate in the same First Being. Scotus explains that this mode of learning about God is tied to our state as wayfarers (*viatores*). In the next life, the blessed have immediate, intuitive knowledge of God, but such knowledge is not available to us in this life. Instead, cognition in this life originates in sense perception. For both thinkers, the adoption of an Aristotelian paradigm regarding knowledge is the flip side of their rejection of illumination theories of knowledge, which were common at the time.

We are able to attain natural knowledge of God because we are able to reason. Aquinas and Scotus both have scientific or demonstrative reasoning in mind, which occurs through syllogisms.[5] A paradigmatic syllogism includes three statements and three terms. The statements arrange the terms in such a way that two of them, the major and the minor, are joined together through the third, the middle. A number of things have to

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[3] Alexander Hall, *Thomas Aquinas & John Duns Scotus, Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages*, ch. 1. Hall explains that both Aquinas and Scotus were developing their accounts at least partly against divine illumination accounts of natural knowledge.

[4] *Summa Theologiae*, I.2.2.

[5] See Hall, *Thomas Aquinas & John Duns Scotus, Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages*, chapters 2 and 4 for helpful surveys of Aquinas's and Scotus's account of demonstration, respectively.

go right in order for a syllogism to be successful, but the key requirement for us is that each of the three terms is used exactly twice in the syllogism and that both uses have the same meaning. If a term is used in two different ways, then the syllogism fails because there are no longer three terms being joined together in the correct way. Instead, a fourth meaning is present and undermines the connection being made. This failure is called both the four-term fallacy and fallacy of equivocation.

As explained in the first chapter, Scotus and others argue that analogous terms cause the fallacy of equivocation in demonstrations concerning God because analogous terms mean one thing when predicated of God and another when predicated of creatures. The knowledge constraint then requires a successful demonstration. One might wonder why I would take on the burden of Aristotelian demonstration when most natural theology these days is understood probabilistically. Primarily, it is because the dilemma I am concerned with in classical theism, understood through my chosen interlocutors of Aquinas and Scotus, arises partially due to an Aristotelian account of demonstration. If the original tension within classical theism could not be resolved, one might reasonably consider too stringent of requirements on arguments as the cause. But I think my solution to the dilemma below satisfies both constraints. And if my solution allows for the possibility of successful demonstration, then, *a fortiori*, it allows for the possibility of successful inductive arguments.

One further distinction between types of syllogisms is important when discussing natural theology. Aquinas distinguishes between *demonstratio propter quid* and *demonstratio quia*.[6] The former, or demonstrations from the nature of the thing, move from cause to effect through an essence. In a *demonstratio propter quid* from a cause to an effect we have

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[6] Hall, *Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages*, 42-50.

quidditative knowledge of a thing, which means we have an adequate concept of the essence of the cause. In contrast, a *demonstratio quia* works from effect to cause and shows *that* the cause exists. In cases where the effect and cause are equals – cases of univocal causality – the effect can reveal the cause's nature. But in causes of analogous causality, the inadequacy of the effects prevents the conclusion from providing quidditative knowledge of the cause. As we have seen, Aquinas and Scotus think God is an analogous cause.

Finally, the conclusions of the demonstrations must give us *positive* knowledge of God. For example, if all demonstrated knowledge of God was like the following demonstration, then we would only have knowledge of what God is not:

> All bodily things are spatial things.
> God is not a spatial thing.
> So, God is not a bodily thing.

Although all knowledge of God has a negative component according to Aquinas, some of our knowledge of God is also positive. "God is good" tells us something about God instead of just telling us what God is not like.

Sometimes Aquinas seems to reject this aspect of the knowledge constraint. For example, the preamble to *Summa Theologiae* I.3:

> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is (*quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit*), but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is (*non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit*), but rather how He is not.

Again, in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*:

> We are said to know God as unknown at the highest point of our knowledge because we find that the mind has made the greatest advance in knowledge when it knows that his essence transcends everything it can

apprehend in the present life. Thus, although what he is (*quid est*) remains unknown, that he is (*quia est*) is nonetheless known.[7]

It is well known that the *via negativa* is a touchstone of Aquinas's natural theology and sometimes seems to be the heart of it. Despite this appearance, Aquinas affirms that we have positive knowledge of God.

In reply to thinkers like Maimonides, who Aquinas read as thinking the predicate "good," when predicated of God just meant that God causes goodness, we have seen that Aquinas argues that terms like "good" and "wise" signify more than a causal relation.[8] "Therefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him."[9] Aquinas thinks we can attain knowledge of God's essence, imperfect as it is, through *quia* demonstrations that do not provide quidditative knowledge of God. After his chronological, textual study of Aquinas's denial of quidditative knowledge, John Wippel summarizes Aquinas's view:

> He has made it clear, for instance, in the *De potentia* and in the First Part of the *Summa theologiae*, that when he agrees with John Damascene that we cannot know what God is, what he is thereby excluding is comprehensive and defining knowledge of God.[10]

In order to have quidditative knowledge of God, one would need to grasp the divine essence as it is in itself, but we only have mediate knowledge of God and no medium can adequately communicate the divine nature.

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[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Faith, Reason, and Theology*, translated by Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies), 1987). *Expositio super librum Boethii*, q.1, art.2, *ad* 1.

[8] See chapter 3.

[9] *Summa Theologiae* I.13.2.

[10] Wippel, "Quidditative Knowledge of God," *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 239.

Scotus, unlike Aquinas, thinks we can have some kind of quidditative knowledge of God:[11]

> It is conceded that the wayfarer has some quidditative concept of God; this is evident, because otherwise he is not able to have any qualitative or relative concept of God. For the qualitative concept always requires something quidditative in which it inheres, but according to him [viz., Henry] a quidditative concept of God, common to God and creatures, cannot be grasped.[12]

That Scotus thinks we have positive knowledge of God is uncontroversial.

Aquinas nicely summarizes the understanding of the knowledge constraint that he and Scotus hold in common:

> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.[13]

Although there is deep agreement between the two thinkers, Scotus does object to analogous accounts of God-talk. In the next section, I consider a Scotist argument that univocity is required for us to satisfy the knowledge constraint.

Necessity of Univocity Objection

One of Scotus's driving concerns is showing that our knowledge of God meets the rigorous demands of Aristotelian demonstration. The objection we are concerned with arises from this concern: analogous terms are not able to be the middle terms of an

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[11] Although it is doubtful that Aquinas and Scotus have precisely the same view of what counts as quidditative knowledge, it is clear that both think we have *some* positive knowledge of God.

[12] Quoted in Hall, *Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus*, 92.

[13] *Summa Theologiae* I.12.12.

argument without causing a fallacy of equivocation. If a term has different meanings in its different instances in a syllogism, then the syllogism fails. But if a term has only one meaning, it is univocal. Scotus thinks univocity is required to preserve scientific knowledge of God:

> Unless 'being' implies one univocal intention, theology would simply perish. For theologians prove that the divine Word proceeds and is generated by way of intellect, and the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will. But if intellect and will were found in us and in God equivocally, there would be no evidence at all that, since a word is generated in us in such and such a fashion, it is so in God – and likewise with regard to love in us – because then intellect and will in these two cases would be of a wholly different kind (*ratio*).[14]

Scotus's argument here is similar to some of Aquinas's arguments against equivocity. If 'being' is not univocal, then we have no evidence about the processions of the Trinity. But Scotus takes it for granted that we do have such evidence. So, 'being' is univocal. Scotus offers a similar argument from demonstrations in natural theology.

If "being" (or whatever predicate we are inferring of God from creatures) is not univocal, then the demonstration is not valid. Scotus makes this argument in terms of concepts:

> Consequently, every inquiry regarding God is based upon the supposition that the intellect has the same univocal concept which it obtained from creatures. If you maintain that this is not true, but that the formal concept of what pertains to God is another notion, a disconcerting consequence ensues; namely that from the proper notion of anything found in creatures nothing at all can be inferred about God, for the notion of what is in each is wholly different. We would have no more reason to conclude that God is formally wise from the notion of wisdom derived from creatures than we would have a reason to conclude that God is formally a stone.[15]

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[14] *Lectura* 1.3.1.1-2, n. 113. Quoted in Cross, *Duns Scotus on God*, 252-3.

[15] Wolter, *Philosophical Writings*, 25.

If a word means different things in different premises, then the syllogism commits the fallacy of equivocation and nothing can be concluded about God. But we do have valid demonstrations concerning God's existence and nature. For these and other reasons, Scotus thinks univocity is necessary for scientific natural theology. Similar arguments have been offered recently in light of objections to univocity.

Defending univocity from critics, Thomas Williams offers any objector a dilemma: either univocity or unintelligibility. Williams provides the following summary of how he understands univocity:

> *Univocity*: Notwithstanding the irreducible ontological diversity between God and creatures, there are concepts under whose extension both God and creatures fall, so that the corresponding predicate expressions are used with *exactly the same sense* in predications about God as in predications about creatures. (emphasis mine)[16]

Williams's argument is clear and straightforward. If predicates are univocal between God and creatures, then we have knowledge of God. If they are not, then God is unintelligible to us. He argues for the latter in two steps. If the predicates are equivocal, then they do not make God intelligible to us. And if they are analogous? Analogy, he argues, must have a core of univocity in order to make God intelligible to us. It is worth presenting his argument in detail.

On an analogous middle way, the sense of "is wise" in "God is wise" (GW) is different but related to its sense in "Socrates is wise" (SW). Williams objects:

> We must then ask: are we able to state explicitly either (i) the sense that "wise" has in (GW) or (ii) the relation that the sense of "wise" in (GW) has to the sense it has in (SW)?[17]

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[16] Williams, "The Doctrine of Univocity is True and Salutary," 578.

[17] Ibid., 579.

If we can do neither of these, Williams thinks we are back in equivocation and thus unintelligibility. The idea is that God isn't intelligible to us if we have no idea what we mean by "wise" when we say "God is wise." If we can state the sense of "wise" through either doing (i) or (ii), then we must end in univocity to avoid an infinite regress of paraphrasing, which is just another type of unintelligibility. So, Williams concludes by offering his dilemma: either God is unintelligible to us, or we use words univocally of God and creatures. In light of these objections, I argue that analogy can preserve the knowledge constraint in two stages.

First, I till hardened ground by arguing that Scotus and the Thomistic tradition represented by Cajetan describe the strangeness of concepts applying to both God and creatures in surprisingly similar ways. I suggest that these similarities are evidence that Scotus's vicious abstraction of confused concepts and Cajetan's confused abstraction of imperfect concepts both describe the same phenomena. On the one hand, Scotus, with Ghent's equivocal account of analogy in view, emphasizes the unity of the confused concept and how it can be "univocal." On the other hand, Cajetan emphasizes the lack of univocal unity, i.e., generic or specific unity, in the real proportional unity.

Second, I build on the space carved by Scotus and Cajetan and argue that on my account analogous terms meet Scotus's definition of univocity. Remember, the problem is that analogous terms shift their meaning with their referent. So, when an analogous term refers to a creature in one premise and to God in another, the term has different meanings and thus causes a fallacy of equivocation. If some meaning variance does not occur, then we really just have univocal predication. To explain how such meaning variance is allowable without equivocation, I argue that proportionally analogous terms can be "univocalized" through a nominal definition to achieve a *langue* meaning that does

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not vary with referent. I then explain how varied *parole* meaning is not sufficient for equivocation. Finally, I look to some of Aquinas's arguments concerning the goodness of God as examples of this and explain the mechanics of such arguments on my view.

Scotus and Cajetan

In this first step of my defense of analogy, I note similarities between Scotus's and Cajetan's descriptions of concepts applied to both God and creatures. The point of noting this is to narrow the gulf between Cajetan's "analogous" concepts and Scotus's "univocal" concepts. If Scotus's account succeeds in preserving the possibility of natural theology, then an account of analogy like Cajetan's might similarly succeed. I first explain Scotus's account and then compare it with Cajetan's as explained in the last chapter. Scotus argues that a concept that applies univocally across God and creatures is a necessary condition for scientific knowledge of God. Yet Scotus recognizes that concepts with such diverse extension are unusual. In this section I explain two key aspects of Scotus's account of univocal concepts that provide interesting points of contact with Cajetan's treatment of analogous concepts. After providing some background, I explain how the set of univocal concepts that extend to both God and creatures are attained by vicious abstraction and only have a kind of confused univocity. I then note the similarities between this account and Cajetan's account discussed in the last chapter.

As recent work on Scotus has explained, Scotus came up in the Oxford school of logic in which analogy was considered a logical doctrine.[18] Scotus's innovation is a

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[18] See Steven Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns Scotus's Early Works," *Franciscan Studies*, Vol. 43 (1983), 347-395: "On the matter of univocity, however, Duns's ideas marked a radical departure from a tradition that had remained essentially unchanged for nearly a thousand years, and in a sense went back all the way to Aristotle. Here there was almost no hint of change in the decades before Duns. On the contrary, the Aristotelian notion of univocity was reaffirmed and reinforced. It was pure

development over the course of his writings, but his mature view is a logical doctrine instead of a metaphysical one.[19] In other words, the divine being and created being are analogous and 'being' is univocal. Although Scotus doesn't think terms necessarily mirrored the order of their referents, he does think things are ordered and even thinks some of those orders were analogous. In light of Henry's account of analogy, though, Scotus stressed that univocity is necessary for demonstration, from which his two conditions for univocity proceed.[20] A concept is univocal if it can be the middle term of a demonstration and ground a contradiction.[21] A univocal concept, then, is necessary for successful demonstration according to Scotus, but how does he understand such concepts?

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invention when Duns suggested that the notion of univocity might be used in a way that broke with the past. It is not new to point this out." (347)

Also see, E. J. Ashworth "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context." *Mediaeval Studies* 54, no. 1 (January 1, 1992): 94–135. doi:10.1484/J.MS.2.306394 and "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy." *Medieval Philosophy & Theology* 1 (November 22, 2007): 39–67.

[19] "This insistence on a distinction between semantics and ontology is absolutely crucial to Scotus's account of univocity, and every reliable interpreter notes it." Williams, "The Doctrine of Univocity is True and Salutary," 577. These interpreters include Stephen Dumont, "Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus" in John Marenbon (ed), *Medieval Philosophy*, The Routledge History of Philosophy Vol. 3 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 319; Peter King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," in Thomas Williams (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* (Dambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15-68; Alex Hall, "Confused Univocity?" *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics*, Vol. 7 (2007), 18-31; Giorgio Pini, "Univocity in Scotus's *Quaestiones super Metaphysicam*: The Solution to a Riddle," *Medioevo* 30, 69-110; Richard Cross, "Duns Scotus and Analogy: A Brief Note," *The Modern Schoolman*, Vol. 89, No. 3-4, July and October 2012, 147-154; and the articles by Marrone and Ashworth in the previous footnote.

[20] Alexandar Hall, *Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages: Aquinas and Scotus* (London: Continuum, 2009).

[21] Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford University Press, 1999), "These two descriptions do not sufficiently demarcate univocal concepts from analogous or equivocal ones, although of course satisfying the two descriptions will be *necessary* for univocity." (37) Cross, *Duns Scotus on God* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005) argues they are necessary and jointly sufficient. (251) Hochschild *The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010) thinks the conditions constitute the definition of univocity. (138) Dumont (1992) claims the conditions provide a "functional definition" of univocity. Thomas, "Univocity and Understanding God's Nature," *The Philosophical Assessment of Theology: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Copleston*. Edited by Copleston, Frederick C, and Gerard J Hughes (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987) thinks at least one condition is sufficient.

The first important part of the theory is that univocal concepts that extend to God and creatures have "confused univocity." After noting some apparent development from Scotus's early acceptance of the English tradition that 'being' is simply equivocal, Hall explains that Scotus considers 'being' and other concepts that extend to both God and creatures to be grasped only confusedly. "But to grasp (*cognoscere*) something confusedly is to grasp what its name says or to grasp it in general only."[22] Later Scotus explains that "to grasp God in this manner is to grasp him imperfectly."[23] These concepts are imperfect because of their generality - they fail to properly, i.e., uniquely, signify God. Yet, confused concepts are determinable in such a way that they can properly signify God or creatures, by adding either 'infinitude' or 'finitude.' We then have a complex, but proper concept of God. Yet, Hall explains, it is the generality that provides the univocity: "It is precisely because this knowledge is confused, or indeterminate, that it may be termed 'univocal.'"[24] Although all general concepts are confused in this way, concepts that apply to God and creatures are distinguished by the type and degree of abstraction required to attain them.

The second important part of the theory is the non-standard type of abstraction by which such confusedly univocal concepts are attained. Cross claims, "The key to understanding Scotus's theory is his claim that univocal concepts are vicious abstractions: they are *general* terms."[25] The more general a concept, the less neatly it picks out some one extramental thing. Thus, the abstraction of a concept becomes vicious because it abstracts

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[22] *In De anima.,* 16, n. 9. Quoted in Hall, "Confused Univocity," 21.

[23] *In De anima.,* 19, n. 22. Quoted in Hall, "Confused Univocity," 22.

[24] Hall, "Confused Univocity," 25.

[25] Cross, "Where Angels Fear to Tread: Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy," 15 (emphasis in original). See: Ord. 1.3.1.1-2, n. 57.

from the entities grounding it. In other words the less natural the concept is, the more

vicious the abstraction is. Genera and species have some extramental reality apart from

their concept,[26] but *merely* vicious abstractions do not:

> *being* is a merely vicious abstraction with no one extramental correlate. The
> point about a mere concept such as *being* is in effect that it has a greater
> degree of abstraction than a genus: not only is it a vicious abstraction, it is
> a vicious abstraction that does not correspond to any single extramental
> property.[27]

Thus, the univocal concept that is able to have both God and creatures under its

extension, Scotus thinks, is too unnatural to carve at the joints.

In reply to some of Catherine Pickstock's criticisms of Scotus, Williams notes this

aspect of univocity as well:

> But the whole point, the very core, of Scotus's separation of the semantic
> from the metaphysical is precisely the claim that our possession of a
> concept under whose extension both God and creatures fall does *not* imply
> that there is any feature at all in extramental reality that is a common
> component of both God and creatures.[28]

No common extramental entity underlies the extension of concepts of merely vicious

abstraction.

Instead of real, univocal commonality as Aquinas understands it, merely vicious

abstractions are based on similarity. Cross explains:

> If 'being' does not signify a real property of something, then the fact that
> all things, God and creatures, fall under the extension of a concept *being*
> does not result from all things sharing some extramental property. But in
> this case, the sort of commonality that Scotus has in mind is reducible to
> *similarity*: similarity (in the relevant respect) is the explanatorily basic
> feature in virtue of which the univocal term 'being' can be predicated of

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[26] Ibid., 16n26.

[27] Ibid., 16.

[28] Thomas Williams, "The Doctrine of Univocity is True and Salutary," 577.

everything there is. There is no real commonality underlying this *similarity*.[29]

Little translation is needed here to see the similarity between Scotus's account, Cajetan's and Simon's accounts as seen in the last chapter, and my account. The similarities to my account will be apparent as I explain it below, so for now let me note the similarities with Cajetan's account of analogy of proportionality.

In both Scotus's and Cajetan's accounts, the remoteness of the objects that fall under the concept prevents the concept from having a single generic or specific commonality grounding it. Instead, the concept is grounded in a non-univocal likeness. Due to the distance between the things it extends to, the concept is imperfect or confused. Moreover, we attain the concept through a kind of abstraction that is different than the abstraction by which we attain concepts of common natures. The abstraction of imperfect or confused concepts is a vicious abstraction or done by way of confusion. Imperfect or confused concepts have sufficient unity for a demonstration but are determinable and must be determined in order to properly signify anything within its extension. The accounts are not as different as one might suppose.

Due to these similarities, I suggest that Scotus and Cajetan are really offering accounts of the same phenomena in different contexts. Of course further work would need to be done to show whether the two accounts, not to mention Aquinas's account, are ultimately compatible. But I am not the only one to suggest the deep continuity between them. Prominent Scotus scholar Alan Wolter offers the following:

> Incidentally, it may be remarked in this connection that the chasm between the Angelic Doctor and the Subtle Doctor is not so unbridgeable as is commonly believed. The author is inclined to suspect that in the majority of instances Scotus does not differ so much from St. Thomas as

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[29] Cross, "Where Angels Fear to Tread," 17. (emphasis in original)

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he does from certain strains of Thomism. If the difference of terminology be taken into account, the doctrines of the two scholastics will, we believe, be found to be complementary more often than contradictory. This is true even of the doctrine of univocation, so fundamental to Scotus's metaphysics.[30]

Moreover, one portion of the Scotistic tradition thought his views were compatible with Aquinas. For example, Peter of Navarre (d. 1347) and Peter of Aquila (d. 1361) attempt to reconcile Scotus with the common opinion about analogy, which either includes Aquinas or views similar to Aquinas's.[31] My view shares with Scotus and Cajetan the above similarities.

My View

In chapters two and three I defended an account of analogous properties. Some of these properties are united by non-univocal resemblance, and the analogous properties are less natural than that in virtue of which they are possessed. Human goodness, canine goodness, and croissant goodness are each more natural than general goodness. In the last chapter and the above discussion of Scotus and Cajetan, I explained a parallel structure in accounts of analogous concepts, which are less naturally united than the things that they are abstracted from. Proportional likenesses, as Cajetan and Simon explain them, are likenesses conditioned by difference. The precise relationship between the properties and concepts will depend on one's ontology and account of cognition. For example, on a metaphysic that only allows a sparse view of properties as real, extramental entities, the analogous properties might just be concepts grounded in or abstracted from more natural diverse real entities. Or, on another metaphysic one might think analogous

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[30] Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1946), xiii.

[31] Stephen Dumont, "Transcendental Being: Scotus and Scotists," 143-4.

properties are real entities and analogous concepts simply represent them cognitively. However one works out the relation between the metaphysical and cognitive accounts, there is a clear parallel between the account given of each of proportional unity. In this section, I introduce a semantic parallel to these.

In chapter one I identified three meaning-makers or causes of meaning: referent, signified concept, and context. One might defend one of the following theses in order to move from the metaphysical and conceptual to the semantic:

Referent to term thesis: If the referent of a term or predicate is an analogous property, then the term or predicate is analogous.

Signified concept to term thesis: If the signified concept of a term or predicate is an analogous concept, then the term or predicate is analogous.

Referent and signified concept to term thesis: If the referent and signified concept of a term or predicate are analogous, then the term or predicate is analogous.

Although I am sympathetic to these theses, especially the third, I instead appeal to context as the reason to think the other meaning-makers affect the meaning in the way I describe in this section.

The wide context meaning maker includes the discourse type and setting of the term's use. The relevant context here is the development of a scientific natural theology. An enterprise like scientific natural theology does not simply accept a descriptive account of a term's meaning. Instead, part of the task of such an investigation is to figure out what how to talk more clearly about the subject of inquiry. On this view, part of what happens in a scientific account of something is improving our ability to speak about the subject more clearly and know what the words mean when used in that context. As we better understand the subject and understand our way of understanding the subject, we are better able to know what our words mean when used in the scientific discourse. Terms

that signify analogous concepts or properties, then, are analogous in such a discourse context. I conclude that there is good reason to think that when the referent or signified concept of a term or predicate used in such a scientific account is analogous the term or predicate is analogous.

As we have seen, the need for univocity can be stated in terms of meaning: A term must mean exactly the same thing in each use in a syllogism. In order to determine if a syllogism avoids equivocation, one must then simply check if any terms shift in meaning. Unfortunately, it is not obvious how to rigorously undergo such a procedure. On the one hand, to be rigorous the procedure needs to be more than simply checking with our intuitions about whether meaning variance occurred. On the other hand, we don't want to make the requirements such that the meaning becomes artificial and the texture of the natural language is lost. Below, I suggest that the meaning need not be exactly identical between uses to meet the univocity requirement. To set the stage, I consider a concern of Roger White about sameness of sense or meaning.

White considers various uses of the word "calm," "We have a calm sea, a calm sky, a calm temperament, or a period of calm following a riot."[32] White notes that the *Oxford English Dictionary* teaches that "calm" is only said literally of the weather, air, or sea. Other uses are then figurative. But such distinction is arbitrary according to White:

> The interesting point to note is that in a case like this there is no principled answer to the question "is the word 'calm' used in only one sense or in many?" That is to say, on the one hand, we could begin with a sense of the world "calm" that was restricted in its application to the weather, and then think of the word as acquiring other senses by analogical extension, but, on the other hand, we could think of the word "calm" as having only one sense, namely a sense in virtue of which it is applicable to any phenomena that satisfy the underlying analogical pattern. What this example shows is something that will recur throughout our enquiry, namely, that the

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[32] White, *Talking About God*, 60.

> question "does a word used analogically have more than one *sense*?" is an unhelpful question: our criteria for sameness or difference of sense are not sufficiently refined to answer such a question.[33]

To answer our question, then, we need some non-arbitrary – read: more than what our intuitions happen to say – criteria for sameness of meaning.

In our search for such criteria, we first need to fix the target. For example, are we counting the meaning of some term as a lexical definition, a summary paraphrase, the intended meaning of the author, the signified concept, the denotation only, the "semantic value" without pragmatics, etc.? One might side with the medievals and offer a more metaphysical approach: sameness of meaning occurs when the formally identical concept is signified by the word. Or, one might analyze it in terms of propositions: sameness of meaning occurs when the same proposition is expressed. The options are plentiful, and it is worth noting the difficulty of navigating which criteria are reasonable and how to apply them. For example, the sameness of concept or proposition approaches only push the question back to which concepts or propositions are signified or expressed. So, in order for exact identity of meaning to be a criterion for a successful syllogism, a robust account of meaning is required. In light of this, I aim to offer an account of two things in the remainder of this section. First, I identify one type of meaning that is sufficient to avoid equivocation in demonstration. Second, I argue that proportionately analogous predicates can mean the same thing in this way when predicated of God and creatures.

I begin with the distinction from David Braine made in the first chapter between *langue* and *parole*. Braine summarizes these two ways of considering language:

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[33] Ibid., 61. White proposes an alternative question: "is it the case that someone who had learnt what it meant to describe the weather as 'calm' *ipso facto* learnt what it would mean to describe the sea as 'calm'?" (Ibid) White's proposal, which I don't think is intended for empirical measure, is not obviously less problematic.

Language presents itself to us under two aspects, *parole*, or speech, and *langue*, the communal resources on which speech depends—*langue* being exercised and exhibited in *parole*, not as a separate object of study. In my presentation I use the terms *langue* and *parole* to enshrine the logical distinction between *langue* as the object of the shared practical knowledge of a language implicit in communal language-possession and *parole* as its realization in language-use and in the active understanding which users of that language have of what they say or hear, write, or read in their acts of speaking, hearing, writing, or reading in that language.[34]

Braine's distinction allows us to distinguish between two types of meaning of a word: a *langue* meaning and a *parole* meaning. *Lange* meaning is the type of meaning we typically think of when someone asks, "What does that word mean?" It is the lexical entry type of meaning of a word that we find in dictionaries. *Parole* meaning, in contrast, is a more filled out or specified meaning of a word in action. It is the kind of meaning we think of when someone asks, "What did you mean here by this word?"

Using "play" as an example, Braine further clarifies the distinction between types of meaning:

However, a linguistic word may still have several distinct, but related "focuses" of meaning. Thus, when the word "play" is used as a verb, it can be used intransitively, as when we say "the children were playing", or transitively, as of playing an instrument, or of playing a game, or of playing [performing] a theatrical drama, and derivatively of playing a part in such a drama, the drama itself being spoken of as a play—giving us five focuses of meaning for the verb "play". For the purposes of my discussion in this book I shall speak of each of these five focuses of meaning as a distinct lexical meaning or, as I will use the expression, "*langue*-meaning". By contrast, grasping the "sense" which the word expresses in the context of a particular linguistic utterance—its discourse-significance—belongs to language-use, not language-possession. Out of one focus of meaning typically spring multifarious senses, types of use, or discourse-significances—the use of a particular word in one particular focus of meaning is extended by analogy or in metaphor, giving it many senses or discourse-significances, arising informally in ways that cannot be itemized in any direction or lexicon.[35]

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[34] Braine, *Language & Human Understanding*, 7.

[35] Ibid., 74.

Although a word might have the same *langue* meaning or focus of meaning across uses, it can have different *parole* meanings. So, *langue* meaning is insufficient for univocity on Williams account of univocity as two words having "exactly the same sense," unless "sense" only includes the *langue* meaning. But it would be artificial to restrict meaning to *langue* meaning since communication relies on *parole* meaning as well.

The *parole* meaning is more specified than the *langue* meaning in two ways. First, various contextual and pragmatic factors, i.e., the wider context meaning maker, help determine which (if any) of the ordinary uses of the word are being used. Second, standard lexical meanings often take on distinct hues or inflections in their actual use. For example, we call the following two kinds of people honest: those who have deep respect for the truth and do their best to not stray from it and those who tell you what they think without softening it for your feelings. Does "honest" mean the same thing in each case? Both are uses of the dictionary definition or *langue* meaning, "free of deceit and untruthfulness; sincere," and on that measure "honest" means the same thing in both cases.[36] The *langue* meaning is easily applied and recognized in both cases, yet "honest" takes on different hues of meaning in each case as well. Imagine someone asking what was meant by "honest" in each case. A fitting answer would be some way of saying the dictionary definition above and adding a word of specification in each case, e.g., "free of deceit and deeply committed to the truth" and "free of deceit and won't even sugar coat the truth." This examples shows how *parole* meanings provide further meaning that is related to the *langue* meaning.

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[36] *New Oxford American Dictionary*, 2015.

The distinction between *langue* meaning and *parole* meaning provides a semantic parallel to the metaphysical and cognitive accounts of analogous properties and concepts explained above. When using analogous terms (remember that terms signifying analogous things and concepts are analogous in the relevant scientific context), the signified likeness can be expressed with a *langue* meaning and the differences are expressed in the various *parole* meanings. This allows us to communicate both the unity of a proportional likeness and the differences the likeness is tied to in its various instances. I propose that identity of *langue* meaning is sufficient for demonstration. The focus of meaning expressed by various uses of a term provides enough unity to avoid a fallacy of equivocation even if the *parole* meanings of that term differ.

The point could also be made the following way: a term does not equivocate across uses if the uses can be given the same definition. "Definition" here is used in the linguistic sense instead of the metaphysical sense preferred by Aristotle and Aquinas. On an Aristotelian account of language, though, these two types of definition are related. The metaphysical definition captures the essence of some entity, the content of which makes up the concept, which is communicated through linguistic expressions. It does not follow that a linguistic definition must capture any concept or thing the way the Aristotelian tradition holds "real definitions" do in order to communicate the concept.[37] Instead, we often grasp at ways of communicating difficult concepts and only succeed (if we do!) after much effort. So, a *langue* meaning can communicate a concept without having the fuller specification of *parole* meanings or the more comprehensive expression of "real definitions."

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[37] Real as opposed to nominal, see Pierre Conway, *Aristotelian Formal and Material Logic* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1995), chapters 3-4.

In summary, then, my account of analogy preserves the knowledge constraint by providing a metaphysical, cognitive, and semantic account of analogous unities which provide a unity sufficient for a demonstration without eliminating all differences. The unity and difference of the analogous terms in their *langue* and *parole* meanings mirrors the proportional likeness between things and the likeness-in-difference behavior of analogous concepts. We then have the possibility of valid demonstrations about God that would provide us with positive knowledge of God. To be clear, I have not defended that any particular analogous property, concept, or term applies to God, but have argued that the account of analogy explained thus far makes it possible for demonstrations using analogous terms in natural theology to avoid equivocation.

The above problem remains: How do we test whether two uses of a word have the same *langue* meaning? The problem is much less difficult now, because we no longer need to figure out if the two uses have *exactly the same* meaning full stop. Instead, we can simply provide a meaning that fits both uses. In the above example, "honest" means "free of deceit" in both cases and thus they have the same *langue* meaning. This can be done in two ways. First, one might just consult a dictionary as I have done and identify the standard meaning that is being used. If one holds any kind of reference magnetism, this option will be preferable because a natural predicate is more likely to capture natural features. But because philosophy often aims at clarity beyond what daily life demands, one might need to stipulate or express a non-standard meaning. Part of my account of language in the first chapter is that creative use of language is commonplace for natural language users. In fact, it is artificial for word use in a natural language to be fixed and unchanging. Thus, stipulating or adding new meanings to words is part of what it is to be

a natural language user and one would expect extended meanings in a specialized, scientific discourse.

Despite this, some stipulations can be artificial in another way: by being gerrymandered, contrived, or unnaturally fixed instead of creatively extended or clarified. Communicating about analogous likenesses requires some fluidity in language. As Joseph Owens explains Aristotle's method, meaning variance of a word encourages understanding:

> Things themselves have mutual resemblances and differences. Equivocity in language and sometimes in definition is required, if these likenesses and differences are to be faithfully mirrored. If terms were always used univocally they would mirror the differences, but not the accompanying likenesses of things. So equivocity is not treated by Aristotle as something to be excluded from terms and concepts. Rather, it is allowed to follow into them from the things.[38]

Whether an expressed *langue* meaning is problematic will have to be taken on a case by case basis.

As noted, *langue* meanings are also fitting for expressing the imperfect concepts described above. Imperfect concepts capture the unity-in-difference of proportional resemblance. *Langue* meanings express the unity while leaving space for the difference, which is expressed in the *parole* meanings across various uses. The *langue* meaning expresses what is common, and the *parole* meaning brings out the differences if there are any. Two concerns arise at this point: 1. Doesn't this account commit the "beginner's error" that Simon cautioned against? 2. The account is supposed to clarify how analogous terms work, but the account seems to offer little guidance. I'll take these in turn.

Recall the mistake that Simon attributes to beginners:

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[38] Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, 127.

> In the beginner's understanding, to say that a term is not purely equivocal but analogical is the same to say that, in spite of all, the meanings do have in common some feature, albeit a very thin one, which survives the differences and makes it possible for a term, whose unity is but one of analogy, to play the role of syllogistic term.[39]

On my account, the *langue* meaning seems to be the thin common feature. Have I committed a beginner's mistake? I hope and think that I haven't. Simon's concern is that the beginner thinks there is really a very thin univocal core meaning to the univocal terms that allows them to be used in a syllogism. My account is not that there is really univocity at the heart of the analogous terms in the sense that univocity underlies them. Instead, I have argued that a *langue* meaning can express the unity of the analogous terms and is sufficient for a demonstration. It is true that the *langue* meaning does not here express the diversity, but the term does express the diversity in its *parole* meaning. I am not abstracting a univocal likeness between the two things, but expressing the proportional likeness with a single linguistic definition.

Am I not just saying that Scotus is right then? In one sense yes. Just as Scotus thinks there must be a thin univocal concept 'being' abstracted from all beings in order to have demonstrations from finite being to infinite being, I think the imperfect concept applies equally to both God and creatures. If Scotus thinks concepts are the meanings of terms as Cross claims, then a term that signifies the proportional concept 'being' of both God and creatures is univocal. Moreover, this concept can be expressed in both uses with a single linguistic definition. The single concept and definition then let the term be adequate to function in a syllogism or support a contradiction. In this sense, my account allows analogous terms to be univocal.

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[39] Simon, "Order in Analogical Sets," 139.

The rest of the story brings out the diversity of the unity-in-diversity of proportional unity. On my account, meaning is due to more than a concept, and thus that in virtue of which an imperfect concept applies to a thing will affect the meaning of the term that signifies it. So, the meaning of "being" is affected differently by signifying 'being' as applied to *being* in God and *being* in creatures. The diversity in referent prevents 'being' and *being* from being univocal and affects at least the *parole* meaning of "being." Thus, the single *langue* meaning that "being," for example, might have in both cases of an argument does not eliminate the diversity. It is because of this meaning variance that my account is not best understood as an univocal account.

Another concern is that my account, even after all of the above, fails to offer much guidance when it comes to identifying analogous properties and terms. As I explained in the first chapter, I have not attempted to provide any type of procedure or necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying proportionally united properties. Instead, I have offered some sufficient conditions for non-univocity and described various types of analogous unity. Determining whether a property is analogous requires getting know the property, the kind of unity it has, and how it looks and behaves in its various exemplifications. Further complicating the situation: causal unity and non-univocal resemblances are found in the same properties. So, I grant that my account fails to offer such guidance, but I think it is due to the nature of the subject rather than a deficiency in the account.

Some Thomists are now surely objecting that I have granted too much to Scotus. Doesn't a single linguistic definition of an analogous term basically undermine the analogy Aquinas and Cajetan are defending? Stated otherwise, after doing all the preceding work to defend an account of analogy, haven't I basically univocalized away

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the analogy to deal with Scotus's concern? I don't think so, and in defense I examine some of Aquinas's arguments concerning the goodness of things in general and the goodness of God. Remember, Aquinas has used "good" as an example of a proportionately analogous term.[40] The arguments, I think, show that my procedure is not repugnant to analogy, at least as Aquinas understands it.

After considering the nature of sacred doctrine in the first question of the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas spends a question each on the existence of God, divine simplicity, and God's perfection or, the threefold way of causation, negation, and eminence. Straightaway after laying out this framework for the rest of his natural theology proper, Aquinas spends two questions on goodness. In the first question he considers goodness in general, and in the second question he considers the goodness of God. Focusing on two of his arguments in these questions will help us understand how Aquinas himself thought one could treat analogous terms in arguments.

In *Summa Theologiae* I.5.1, Aquinas considers whether goodness really differs from being. In this article he argues that goodness is a transcendental. It is a cross-categorical and therefore analogous feature. His argument can be formulated as follows:

1. The essence of goodness (*ratio enim boni*) is that it is in some way desirable (*aliquid sit appetibile*).
2. A thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect.
3. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual (*actu*).
4. Existence (*esse*) is that which makes all things actual.
5. So, a thing is perfect so far as it as it exists (*inquantum est ens*).
6. So, goodness and being are the same really (*idem secundum rem*).

Aquinas here unites being and goodness through a series of middle terms. The plausibility of the argument as a whole is not important for our purposes. Instead, I want to look at

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[40] Although sometimes goodness is also united by priority and posteriority of some kind, cf. *Summa Theologiae* I.5.6.*ad* 3.

how Aquinas treats goodness in the first premise. We have seen that for Aquinas "is good" and *being good* are analogous. Yet, in the first premise, Aquinas provides the *ratio* of *being good* as "is in some way desirable." Aquinas then uses this description, for transcendentals cannot be really defined, as a term in the demonstration.

Aquinas makes a similar move when he considers divine goodness. The first premise of the argument:

1. A thing is good according to its desirableness (*secundum quod est appetibile*).

Similar to what he did in the previous argument, Aquinas goes on to use *appetibile* as a middle term that connects goodness to God. "Good" is thus given a nominal definition by which it is connected to other terms. In my terms, Aquinas offers a *langue* meaning for goodness that provides sufficient unity for the demonstration despite goodness being an analogous term. Aquinas's method is not exactly as I have described.

On my account, the *langue* meaning expresses the needed unity of the term. Aquinas makes the meaning one of the premises: "The essence of goodness (*ratio enim boni*) is that it is in some way desirable (*aliquid sit appetibile*)." Building on a previous example, I might then have "The essence of honesty is being without deceit" as a premise. Whether or not the *langue* meaning needs to be made explicit in this way will again need to be determined on a case by case basis, but it only makes the unity of the term in the argument more explicit.

One also might object that Aquinas is not offering a *langue* meaning or linguistic definition of the meaning of "good." Instead, Aquinas is providing an aspect of what it means to be good or some sub-feature of goodness to unite goodness to being and God. I agree that this is what Aquinas is doing, but think it is easily translatable to my terms and is equally susceptible to Simon's "beginner's mistake" concern. As I explained, the *langue*

meaning does not comprehend or exhaustively capture the meaning of the term. Instead, it provides a sufficiently unified expression of the meaning of the term for the term to function successfully in an argument. Aquinas's arguments that goodness is coextensive with being and that God is good show that one can offer a descriptive definition of an analogous term to secure the unity needed for a syllogism. My account does not depend on Aquinas doing this, but surely his doing so is a confirmation that providing a *langue* meaning is not precluded by Aquinas's view of analogy.

Conclusion

My account rebuts objections from either univocity or analogy against the other from intuitive accounts of meaning. "The words have to mean the same thing if we are going to gain understanding" and "The words cannot mean the same thing because they apply to both God and creatures" are ambiguous because of the ambiguity of "meaning." My account of meaning, sketchy as it is, shows the complexity and difficulty of stating *exactly* what a word means in each use and should disillusion us of any simple account of meaning. Instead, it shows that the complexity of meaning can accommodate both sets of intuitions and allow analogous terms to have sufficient unity for demonstration while still having diversity of meaning.

Preserving the Transcendence Constraint

In the preceding section, I argued that my account of analogy preserves the knowledge constraint of classical theism. Yet it remains to be seen if my account can preserve the transcendence constraint, which I expand on below. Remember, the transcendence constraint requires that our knowledge is inadequate to God in some robust way due to the greatness of God. In this section, I argue that a robust account of

divine transcendence follows from the preceding. After motivating and explaining the transcendence constraint as Aquinas and Scotus understood it, I explain Jonathan Jacobs's recent account of ineffability. I then explain the account of analogy that follows from my account of analogy and defend that it satisfies the transcendence constraint.

Transcendence Constraint

The transcendence constraint of classical theism requires that God is robustly or substantively transcendent. Like the knowledge constraint, the transcendence constraint is clear in the classical theism of Aquinas and Scotus. Despite divine transcendence being a definite requirement, what precisely counts as substantive divine transcendence is not as clear. As Jonathan Jacobs notes in his recent work on divine ineffability, "You know [substantive transcendence] when you see it."[41] For Aquinas and Scotus, divine transcendence requires two, related conditions:

> *Otherness condition*: God is categorically other than created beings.

> *Inaccessibility condition*: Natural knowledge of God is always mediated; we only know God through other things.

If an account of divine transcendence satisfies these conditions, I consider it a substantive account of transcendence.

Before explaining my account of transcendence, I want to briefly explain two reasons why transcendence is so important to classical theism. First, classical theism takes the biblical account of God's otherness seriously. For example:

> Remember the former things, those of long ago;
> I am God, and there is no other;
> I am God, and there is none like me.[42]

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[41] Jacobs, "The Ineffable, Inconceivable, and Incomprehensible God," 159.

[42] Isaiah 46:9, NIV.

God, the blessed and only Ruler, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone is immortal and who lives in unapproachable light, whom no one has seen or can see.[43]

Although there is also a clear doctrine of the similarity of creation to God in Scripture, divine otherness is also maintained throughout. So, classical theists like Aquinas and Scotus hold that God is other in some robust sense.

Second, God serves as the ultimate first cause or ground of all being. Only something very different from all grounded or caused being could play such a role. So, God's being *first* requires God's being *other*. If God is not other, then the reasons that created things need a cause will apply to him as well. Thus, if God is not other, then God is not really God. For both theological and philosophical reasons, then, divine transcendence is important to classical theism.

We speak of transcendence as an attribute, but for Aquinas and Scotus, transcendence was considered a result of more fundamental attributes, simplicity and infinity, respectively. My account is neutral over such groundings of divine transcendence, and I will focus on the resulting transcendence in both thinkers instead of their account of the grounding attribute except where it is important. Aquinas's arguments against univocity in chapter two and his denial that we have quidditative knowledge of God show that he holds both of the transcendence conditions. Aquinas clearly holds a substantive account of divine transcendence, but some have questioned whether Scotus preserves the divine otherness thesis.

As we have seen, Scotus thinks univocity is required for demonstrated, positive knowledge of God. His account puts both God and creatures under the extension of the

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[43] 1 Timothy 6:15 −16, NIV.

imperfect concept 'being.' If God and creatures are both captured under the genus-like

concept of 'being,' then, it has been argued, God and creatures only differ by degree and

not by fundamental kind.[44] In other words, God has gone from being radically other to

the biggest kid on the block. The objection to Scotus moves from his account of univocity

of concepts concerning God and creatures to the lack of metaphysically fundamental

difference between them, but as Richard Cross has shown, these objections have not been

cogently made.[45] Instead, it is clear that Scotus thinks our knowledge of God fails to

penetrate the divine essence and that God is categorically other.

> Scotus offers the following helpful analogy for our knowledge of God:

> An example from sense perception makes this clear. When a ray of light
> passes through a piece of red glass, it causes red to appear on the opposite
> wall. Now the red on the wall is not a means for seeing the red of the glass
> properly, but one sees the red of the glass only in a derivative sense or
> perhaps not at all, for there is only some similarity between the red on the
> wall and that of the glass.[46]

As the red on the wall only sort-of reveals the red of the glass, creatures only sort-of reveal

the divine nature.

We have also seen that Scotus thinks we can have some kind of quidditative

knowledge of God. Our knowledge is quidditative, but it is incomplete because of divine

infinitude. For Scotus, infinitude is not merely a negative attribute, but instead we attain a

positive notion of qualitative infinity from quantitative infinity.[47] Because Scotus's derived

notion of divine infinity seems to be a difference in degree from finitude, it might seem to

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[44] See Cross, "'Where Angels Fear to Tread': Duns Scotus and Radical Orthodoxy" for criticism
of such claims from some radical orthodox authors.

[45] Cross, "Where Angels Fear to Tread."

[46] *Quodlibetal* 14.88. Quoted in Hall, 7-8.

[47] *Quodlibetal* 5. Cross explains the texts in *Duns Scotus on God*, 96-8.

violate transcendence. Hall explains Scotus's response to such a concern: "Scotus seems to respond that as concerns God and creatures this difference in degree entails a difference in kind."[48] In fact, Scotus denies any straightforward proportion between the two:

> [God's infinite being] exceeds any finite being whatsoever not in some limited degree but in a measure beyond what is either defined or can be defined... In this fashion... the infinite exceeds the finite in being beyond any relative measure or proportion that could be assigned.[49]

Scotus then thinks any perfection possessed by finite things and God is possessed in God in a non-degreed higher way.

Scotus, like Aquinas, holds both that God has a different mode of being than creatures, i.e., infinite instead of finite, and that 'being' is not a genus that both God and creatures fall under.[50] Remember Scotus thinks that the concept 'being' that has both God and creatures under its extension is a confused concept without specific or generic unity. So, Scotus clearly holds the otherness thesis. But does he hold the inaccessibility thesis?

Despite our ability to attain quidditative, natural knowledge of God, Scotus thinks our knowledge of God is limited. He explains:

> I say that God is not known naturally by anyone in the present life in a proper and particular manner; that is to say, we do not know Him in His essence itself precisely as this essence…
>
> Therefore He cannot be known naturally by any created intellect precisely as "this essence". Neither is there any essence naturally knowable to us that would suffice to reveal "this essence" as "this essence" whether by reason of a likeness of univocation or of imitation. For there is univocation

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[48] Hall, "Confused Univocity," 29.

[49] *Quodlibetal* 5, n. 9. Quoted in Hall, "Confused Univocity," 29-30.

[50] See *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, 26-8.

only where general notions are concerned. Imitation too is deficient because it is imperfect, for creatures only imperfectly imitate Him.[51]

So, we fail to know God Himself in that we fail to grasp the divine nature in its uniqueness.

Divine simplicity also affects our knowledge of God. Alexander Hall helpfully explains:

> Since God's perfections and attributes are identical with his essence, the transcendental concepts we refer to God are imperfect abstractions, artificially isolating aspects of his nature and thus reflecting the mediated quality of knowledge of God that is drawn from creatures. This may be why Scotus claims that our knowledge of God is confused, it is not inaccurate so much as delimited or incomplete. We know God possesses certain attributes and perfections just as we know that we are unable accurately to conceive how these traits inhere in an essence with which they are identical. Presumably Scotus's claim that transcendentals need to be joined with the notion of infinitude before we may refer them to God is intended to highlight the status of transcendentals as abstract or imperfect representations of God's nature, much as Aquinas's claim that theological discourse must account for God's supereminence is meant to strike a balance between the competing demands of natural knowledge of God and divine simplicity.[52]

Here we see the interrelation between the otherness and inaccessibility sides of transcendence. On the one hand, God's otherness, here understood through divine simplicity, prevents our concepts, which are abstractions from created things, from being adequate. On the other hand, our mode of cognition limits us to knowing God through created things and thus to knowing God through confused concepts. Scotus, then, maintains a version of each condition and preserves divine transcendence. I now turn to a recent account of transcendence for comparison.

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[51] Wolter, *Philosophical Writings*, 26. Cf., *Quodlibetal* 14.36, 74.

[52] Hall, *Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages*, 111.

Jacobs on Ineffability

In his recent article on ineffability, Jacobs begins by giving himself two constraints similar to my knowledge and transcendence constraints.[53] On the one hand, he is after a substantive conception of ineffability instead of a deflationary one. Although he does not define the distinction, it is clear that his account is substantive. Similarly, my transcendence constraint aims to preserve a robust account of divine transcendence. On the other hand, Jacobs wants to preserve the truth of orthodox Christian doctrines. Like my account satisfies the knowledge constraint, Jacobs only aims at consistency with the corresponding claims. Just as I do not offer a defense of the theistic proofs, Jacobs does not offer a defense of the Christian doctrines. Instead, Jacobs and I explain how our accounts allow for the possibility of doctrinal truth and demonstrated knowledge of God, respectively. Moreover, we both approach our accounts through recent discussions of fundamentality or naturalness. Despite these similarities, my account of analogy provides a more cataphatic account than Jacobs allows.

The apophatic tradition that Jacobs aligns himself with thinks God is ineffable in Himself:

> You might think, initially, that if God is ineffable, it's primarily something to do with us, our limitations, or the limitations of our language. But, at least according to one strand of thought, it is not our limitations that ground ineffability. It's not that, given our present language, or given our finite mental capacities, we cannot correctly describe God. It is, rather, God and his transcendence that grounds his ineffability.[54]

> The apophatic theologian claims that God is ineffable, incomprehensible, and inconceivable, only *as He is in Himself*, as He is intrinsically. It is

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[53] Jonathan Jacobs, "The Ineffable, Inconceivable, and Incomprehensible God: Fundamentality and Apophatic Theology," in *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 6. Edited by Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 158-176.

[54] Ibid., 165.

perfectly compatible with apophatic theology that various truths about
how God is related to his creation are effable.[55]

Ineffability is not, then, a relational attribute that says something about God as compared
to our limitations. Instead, Jacobs argues, ineffability is about God himself. Moreover,
Jacobs explains, ineffability is grounded in divine transcendence. Thus, one's account of
transcendence should affect one's account of ineffability. In other words, divine
ineffability should not outrun divine transcendence.

> With his constraints and influences set, Jacobs offers his account of ineffability:
>
> Every true proposition about how God is intrinsically is non-fundamental.
> There are no true, fundamental propositions about how God is
> intrinsically.[56]

Jacobs then argues that this satisfies both of his constraints. It is certainly substantive, and
it is also consistent with the non-fundamental truth of Christian doctrines. Although such
doctrines, e.g., "God is a Trinity," do not express fundamentally true propositions, the
propositions can be true nonetheless. Importantly, the distinction between fundamental
and non-fundamental propositions is not a way to sneak in a kind of Averroist double
truth. Instead, non-fundamentally true propositions about God truly describe God, but
they fail to get at the fundamental structure of the divine being. Non-fundamental
propositions do not carve exactly at the joints.

> Jacobs's account clearly meets the transcendence constraint because it maintains
both the otherness and inaccessibility conditions. Assuming we have cognitive access to
something through grasping propositional content about it, God Himself is clearly

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[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid. In the same place Jacobs states the thesis more formally in the following way where $\mathcal{P}$ is the set of all true propositions about how God is intrinsically and $\mathcal{F}$ is being fundamental: "Ineffability Thesis: For any proposition P in $\mathcal{P}$, not ($\mathcal{F}$(P)) and not ($\mathcal{F}$(not-P))".

inaccessible on Jacobs's view since there are no true fundamental propositions about the divine nature. Although Jacobs primarily grounds inaccessibility in God instead of our cognitive limitations, he does motivate some of his arguments through our cognitive abilities. In any case, Jacobs account satisfies the transcendence constraint, but offers an account that seems more apophatic than either Aquinas's or Scotus's account. My account is more in line with Aquinas and Scotus than Jacobs.

My Account of Transcendence

Divine transcendence, understood as a combination of the otherness and inaccessibility conditions, is preserved by the account of analogy presented so far. In this section, I explain how it meets both conditions and some further benefits of my view in conversation with Jacobs's account. I conclude the chapter, and dissertation, by explaining a final benefit of my account of analogy for our knowledge of God. Our scientific knowledge of God, I have argued, is through analogous properties (or concepts) that have been demonstrated to be possessed by (or apply to) God. My account of transcendence is a result of this view, the account of the knowledge constraint explained above, and another standard thesis of classical theism concerning divine otherness.

As we have seen, Aquinas and Scotus both think God is categorically other. God is that in which all other beings exist by participation, the First being, and not even in the same genus as other beings. Preserving this categorical difference is the otherness condition of divine transcendence, and my account of analogy satisfies it. In fact, God's being categorically other is a sufficient condition for the properties possessed by God and creatures to be analogous properties. The non-univocal, proportional likeness is diversely grounded in God and creatures and provides the unity needed for a demonstration, as I

argued in the last section. It is the non-univocity of the property or concept that preserves the categorical difference between God and creatures. So, my account of analogy preserves the otherness condition of the transcendence constraint.

The inaccessibility condition is also satisfied by my account of analogy. The inaccessibility condition requires that our knowledge of God is mediated and not direct in this life. Expanding on my account of the knowledge constraint above shows how the inaccessibility condition is satisfied. Remember, on my view demonstrations in natural theology about God's existence and nature show that God possesses analogous properties. Analogous properties are less natural than that in virtue of which they are exemplified. Take some analogous property, *being wise*, that is possessed across primary categories and ways of being in God and Socrates. As has been explained, a proportionally united analogous property is a non-univocal resemblance between more natural things that ground it, and it is not a fundamental or highly natural property of either possessor. So, knowing that a being has some analogous property is not sufficient to know its fundamental structure. In other words, if we only know God through analogous properties, then we do not know the divine nature itself.

Consider goodness. Through our experience we learn about the goodness of artifacts, plants, humans, etc. Due to certain causal or grounding principles, one might infer that goodness needs to be grounded in a First Cause. Concluding that God is good is concluding that God possesses the analogous property of goodness (however that translates into one's metaphysics). Assuming the argument is sound, we now have a true, positive statement about God without having any access to the more natural properties in virtue of which analogous goodness is exemplified by God. So, we know analogous goodness and some of the more natural types of goodness in created things. Through

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these we know that God possesses goodness, but we lack access to how or what manner God possesses it because we are unable to access the more natural features in virtue of which God possesses analogous goodness. This account preserves the inaccessibility condition since the fundamental structure of the divine nature remains outside of our grasp, despite us having true, positive knowledge of God.

With both the otherness and inaccessibility conditions satisfied, then, the transcendence constraint is preserved. My view has three further benefits. First, the account of transcendence is a consequence of how my account of analogy preserves the knowledge constraint. Preserving divine transcendence is a straightforward consequence of analogy and the common cognitive framework of Aquinas and Scotus. Although Jacobs's account of ineffability is not ad hoc in any way that is obviously problematic, it is developed to meet his constraints instead of from more systematic concerns. My account, in contrast, is an application of the metaphysics of analogous unities developed independently in the middle chapters and other standard theses of classical theism. This more ground-up account of transcendence is a benefit of my view. Second, like Jacobs's account, mine is consistent with historical accounts of transcendence, e.g., Aquinas and Scotus. Continuity with a venerable theological tradition is a clear benefit to an account of a divine attribute.

Third, my view of transcendence does not prevent us knowing the fundamental structure of the divine nature directly by grace. Inaccessibility is an effect of natural cognitive limitations. Jacobs argues that there are not true fundamental propositions about God and thus they are inaccessible even by grace. If there are no true fundamental propositions about God, then not even God knows them. My view, on the other hand, is tied to our natural cognitive path of learning about God and does not prevent God from

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illuminating us to His more natural properties. In other words, the fundamental structure of the divine nature itself is inaccessible to us because we know it through created things, but God knows it and can share that knowledge with us. Such knowledge is part of the face-to-face knowledge of God Aquinas and Scotus think will occur for the blessed in the next life. Although Jacobs's account can probably accommodate similar knowledge if it is non-propositional, ineffability not being tied to our capacities makes it unclear how such a vision could be intelligible to us at all. My view of transcendence, then, satisfies the transcendence constraint and has further benefits.

Conclusion

The dissertation began by observing a tension within classical theism between demonstrated, positive knowledge of God and divine transcendence. I have argued that the account of analogy developed in chapters two through four preserves both. In these final pages, I suggest another benefit proportional unity has regarding our understanding of God. One way of thinking about the knowledge we attain of God through rigorous demonstration is akin to Simon's beginner's error that I have discussed. On this view, one eventually removes differences between categorically different things and is left with a thin, univocal likeness. Such a highly abstracted general property of *being good*, for example, is then something that univocally applies to God but has very little content. The view defended in this dissertation is different. The analogous likeness of proportional unity is not a thin abstraction, but a rich resemblance tied to each of its instances. As Cajetan and Simon explain, proportional unities cannot be univocal because the differences of their instances always remain. In other words, if one abstracts completely from the differences, one has departed from the proportional unity. The nature of this

unity then allows us to enter more deeply into the analogous likeness through attempting to better understand its exemplifications. As we better understand *being good* in its creaturely instances, we better understand the analogous property *being good*, which means we better understand God's goodness, albeit confusedly.

Proportional likenesses do tell us something about how God fundamentally is, but they do it imperfectly. Although the proportional resemblance is an analogous feature and thus does not carve exactly at the joints, we do get something of the fundamental features because they ground the resemblance. Imagine a friend has never tasted coffee, God forbid, and wants you to describe the taste to him. You can offer some likenesses, e.g., a little bitter or various notes like berries, nuts, or chocolate. From this, the friend will have *some* idea of what coffee tastes like, but, of course, will not grasp the distinct goodness that is drinking coffee. Proportional likenesses offer us something similar. We have *some* idea of what God is like, but our understanding fails to grasp the fundamental structure of the divine nature.

An example of *being good* will also help. Imagine you live in the late 19th century, and you run into a time traveler from the present day. Unfortunately, the time traveler is obsessed with the Android vs. Apple debate concerning the best smartphone and spends her time with you trying to persuade you of the iPhone's superiority instead of answering your many questions about the future. Now, you lack the means of adequately conceptualizing what a smartphone is or what makes one good, but you do have concepts of photographs, telephones, calendars, paper, etc. Moreover, you know that artifacts are usually called "good" when they accomplish the purpose they were designed for well. So, when the time traveler tells you that an iPhone is a really good smartphone and better than Android phones, you have some understanding of what she means. Yet, you do not

grasp the more fundamental thing itself. The knowledge we attain about God through rigorous argument is similar to this. We grasp *something* of how God fundamentally is intrinsically, but only through a glass darkly.

The participation metaphysics of Aquinas and Scotus make sense of us better understanding the Creator by better understanding the created likeness of God. Each non-divine thing is an imitation of the divine and participates in the divine. The imitators share proportional likenesses with the Imitated. We rise above the created possessors to knowledge of God through demonstration and that knowledge is clarified and purified as we reflect and further synthesize our information. Yet, in order to continually inform and enrich our understanding of analogous properties like goodness, we need to better understand instances of goodness that we can directly learn about, e.g., the goodness of a German shepherd, of courage, of a family, etc. My account of divine transcendence, then, doesn't arrest development of our understanding of God. Instead, it helps us recognize the limits of our understanding and pursue further understanding with proper intellectual humility.

The ascent and descent of our minds as we learn more about God through learning more about creation becomes a dialectic. Thomas Hibbs notes this structure as a helpful way of understanding Aquinas's *Summa Contra Gentiles*:

> One useful way of reading the work is in terms of an alternating series of ascending and descending motions. The first book ascends from sense experience to God as first cause; the second book considers the coming forth of creatures from God; the third studies the imitation of, and return to, God in the natural operations of creatures; and the fourth discusses God's descent in the Incarnation and the ascent of rational creatures to the direct vision of God. The theme of ascent and descent is allied to the distinctively Platonic teaching on the relationship between image and exemplar. The prominence of the Platonic language of artist and artwork, exemplar and image, and of ascent and descent has implications for how the *Contra Gentiles* ought to be read. The ascent begins from an encounter

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with things in the world and leads to their transcendent ground. Having made the ascent, one now sees differently the things of this world. They are manifestations of their exemplar; or, as Thomas puts it, "small streams of goodness" flowing from the fount (*fons*) of all goodness (II, 2). Sensible forms are reflections of the divine wisdom; human nature is an image of God; and the relationship of God to the world is that of an artist to his artwork. The consequence for the reader is that a rectilinear and one-directional reading of the text or of things will not do; instead, lower must be reunderstood in terms of higher, part in light of whole.[57]

The structure Aquinas gives his work mirrors the structure of our scientific knowledge of God. We initially ascend from creation to creator through demonstrating that analogous goodness is found in God. Understanding that *being good*, or whichever property, is found in God as well as creatures enriches our understanding of the analogous property of *being good*, which then affects how we understand goodness in lower things as we descend back to created things. And the cycle continues as we better understand distinct instances of goodness.

Yves Simon explains that this cycle or dialectic has no end in this life:

Our thought accomplishes progress through an upward movement from the first analogate in cognition to the first analogate in being and intelligibility, followed by a downward movement from the analogate first in being and intelligibility to the analogate first in cognition, and through another movement upward and another movement downward. To these movements and to this progress there should be no end in this world. Because the absolute perfections make up analogical sets in which the order of cognition is inverse to the order of nature and intelligibility, metaphysical contemplation, if it is to achieve the excellence that it admits of, paradoxically implies a never-ending movement. Contemplation is, of itself, a motionless form of activity. But an analogue, such as being or duration or mercy, cannot be contemplated in motionless possession, as might the case with a univocal object that has been abstracted once and for all. It should be said, accordingly, that metaphysical contemplation, inasmuch as it remains subject to a law of excellence through movement, falls short of the ideal of contemplative knowledge.[58]

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[57] Thomas Hibbs, *Dialectic and Narrative: An Interpretation of the Summa Contra Gentiles* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 6-7.

[58] Simon, "On Order in Analogical Sets," 170-1.

Although this dissertation has not defended any particular set of attributes or analogous properties being possessed by God, I have defended an account of analogy, demonstration, and transcendence that lay the groundwork to explain why such a process occurs and how that process works. As we better understand the various grounds of analogous goodness, we better understand the proportional likeness, and as we better understand the proportional likeness, we better understand the Ground that we cannot directly know in this life.

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