

ABSTRACT

Tracing American Diplomacy: A Survey of Diplomatic Theory from Before and After the Cold War

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This thesis examines different writings on diplomatic theory to see how philosophical and pragmatic attitudes of diplomacy changed from before and after the Cold War. The scope of this research includes contributions from the following authors: Hans J. Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, Alexander Wendt, Henry Kissinger, Cecil Crabb, Joseph Nye, Etan Gilboa, Hussein Agha, and Paul Sharp. Morgenthau and Bull represent the American attitudes on diplomacy coming out of the second World War with close ties to traditional international relations theories. Wendt, Kissinger, and Crabb's work all come from the height of tensions in the Cold War, and the rest of the authors surveyed represent the post-Cold War era of American diplomacy. This thesis finds a clear trend in how diplomatic theory changed pragmatically and philosophically from before and after the cold war, with peaks in philosophy before and after and a peak in pragmatism during the Cold War.

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TRACING AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A SURVEY OF DIPLOMATIC THEORY
FROM BEFORE AND AFTER THE COLD WAR

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Diplomatic Theory: What It Is and Why You Should Care

From the inside of a classroom to the pages of a book, diplomacy can seem so formal, so lofty, or elite. Diplomatic *theory* can seem even more so. Yet given the invasion of Ukraine by their Russian neighbors, it seems that diplomacy might be something more fundamental than many people realize. No matter how separated the everyday person might feel from the U.S. State Department, the choices made by statesmen and stateswomen affect our lives in countless unseen ways. In a line of work so steeped in tradition, students of this craft are faced with upholding something so much larger than themselves, and the trick is in looking at diplomacy from many different perspectives. There are courses, some of which I have participated in, that can teach *how* to work in diplomacy, from speaking to writing, and as someone who has worked in the State Department, I can assure my readers that their training is top-notch. I believe, however, that the true appreciation of diplomacy comes from also understanding *why* American diplomacy works the way it does, and *why* diplomacy in general has evolved into the vast multistate network it is.

Given this, I chose to write this thesis on American diplomatic theory, specifically texts from before and after the cold war. The study and practice of diplomacy was extremely interesting to me, but I wanted to learn more about the beliefs, assumptions,

and even biases that motivate American diplomacy and the field of work that I want to join one day. This kind of reflection on a certain profession is extremely necessary in my opinion and can be extended beyond diplomacy as well. For example, an aspiring teacher can go to a university and take classes that give teachers the tools to create lesson plans, structure tests, etc. but the real trick is in passing on to these aspiring teachers *why* certain classroom structures and assignments work best. In another field, are the best engineers not the ones who can simply build things as instructed, but the ones who can understand *why* constructing an object in a certain way is preferable to another design? This kind of knowledge is irreplaceable in my opinion, especially in the field of diplomacy. The practice of diplomacy is older than most modern countries, and this history can easily be used as an excuse to limit innovation and simply accept that “it’s just how things are done.” The more we understand about *why* American diplomats acted the way that they did, the better chance that students of diplomacy have in acting with purpose, unclouded by excuses, in the best possible interest of this country.

Scope and Authors Surveyed

Within this thesis, I have chosen to study American diplomatic theory from before and after the Cold War, starting after the end of the second World War and going into the early 21st century. I chose this time period because I believe it to be somewhat of a “golden age” in Western diplomacy, specifically American, because of the many fast-paced international events that occurred. This thesis studies the trends that emerged in major diplomatic writings, and covers the following authors: Hans J. Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, Alexander Wendt, Henry Kissinger, Cecil Crabb, Joseph Nye, Etan Gilboa, Hussein Agha, and Paul Sharp. I chose these authors specifically because during my preliminary

research, their work was cited the most and seemed to be the fundamental texts on late 20th century and early 21st century diplomatic theory. I will be the first to admit that a more comprehensive review could be done that includes all writers on diplomatic theory for a better view. Given my limited time and resources as a single undergraduate student, I chose to simply analyze the fundamental texts for a more general view of American diplomatic theory.

In my search for fundamental truths and patterns in American diplomacy, it was most helpful to evaluate different theories with such disparate views by two unifying factors: their philosophical loftiness and their pragmatic applicability. Rather than speaking more broadly about these variables, I decided to quantify them on a scale of one to ten, one being the lowest possible score and ten being the highest and follow the progression of each variable from author to author on a graph. The first variable, philosophical loftiness, I chose because I was looking to see just how much each writer delved into different “why” questions. This basically translates to the amount of introspection is present in the writing and the level of reliance on philosophy from the greater international relations context. For example, authors who explore very deep into questions about truth, human existence, warfare, etc. or brought up many of these very philosophic questions are highly rated in this category.

The second variable, pragmatism, I chose because I believe that a theory is only as helpful as it can be practically applied in real situations. For example, it might be helpful for a scientist to understand *why* evolution exists, but it is not helpful for a carpenter to know why the sky is blue. In this thesis, I rated diplomatic theorists based on the relatability and applicability of their work to diplomacy in real life. This is not to say

that I am holding authors from the 1940s to the same level of desired achievement of authors from the 2020s, but rather I am measuring the ability of their theory to shape the relative diplomatic practices of their time. I also want to caution that I am not trying to measure whether or not a writer's theory is fundamentally "right" here, this variable simply measures how easily a theory could directly result in better diplomacy if put into action. If it is impractical, or impossible to put into practice, it really does not serve as much use as a theory that is able to bridge the divide between the assumptions that diplomacy is based off of and the everyday practices of American diplomats, and thus means a low score in my thesis.

In this thesis, I will walk through the basic argument of each surveyed author and evaluate it based on my two variables, philosophy, and pragmatism. For the sake of finding any chronological patterns, I will review each authors theory starting from the oldest and moving towards the most recent theorists. I have also endeavored to provide comparisons between the writers in their respective chapters, especially in how they relate to the basic assumptions of diplomacy. In my examination of several writers from before, during and after the Cold War era, I assert that American diplomatic theory branched out extensively and became more nuanced and varied yet retained many of the key philosophical understandings regarding human nature, international relationships, and what drives humans towards diplomacy. Furthermore, there is a traceable difference in the pragmatic application of theory to practice from before and after the height of the cold war compared to during that peak in tensions.

CHAPTER TWO

Morgenthau, Bull, and Realism

Realism and Human Nature

The first author under examination in this thesis is Hans Morgenthau, who is one of the most well-known of the realists to emerge after the second World War. He was a prolific writer and as his theories developed, so did the realist lens of international relations. However, in this section I will present my reader with an alternative view of Morgenthau's diplomatic theory that goes beyond the label of "realist," "idealist," or any other label. My understanding is that though Morgenthau had similar assumptions about human nature, epistemology, and morality as many other realists of the era, his understanding of diplomatic theory paved the way for much more opportunity for an international world. Next, I will turn my focus towards Hedley Bull, a writer who shared many of the same understandings as Morgenthau and explain why his view and subsequent diplomatic theory are a better fit for the "realist" label. This chapter will serve as proof that the underlying goals and philosophy of diplomacy introduces a diluted, less harsh version of realism that still allows for the accomplishment of many international, and possibly supranational dreams.

In this context, realism and idealism take their respective assumptions on human nature and morality and draw conclusions about what can and cannot be accomplished on an international stage through diplomats and executive leaders. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes the broad view of realism as "the constraints

imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government” (Korab-Karpowicz 2018). Compared to the idealistic view that there is no limit to what can be achieved by nations (and their diplomats) because human nature is not as set in stone as the realists would have one believe. On the larger scale of international political theory, the realism versus idealism debate calls upon the minds of philosophers, politicians, and theologians alike. On a smaller scale, diplomatic theory has been pulled in the two different directions as the greater sphere of international relations expands, producing realist writers like Max Weber, E.H. Carr, and Henry Kissinger, as well as Hans Morgenthau. In his article on the subject, *Tragedy, Realism, and Postmodernity*, Mark Gismondi describes these realists as being grounded in a philosophical tradition of *kulturpessimismus* as established by Nietzschean and Kantian philosophies of morality. He emphasizes in his section on Morgenthau how he views him as a “social constructivist” rather than a realist for which he is often called in diplomatic literature. In this section, Gismondi calls Morgenthau’s approach “the most self-consciously constructed” theory of his time which focused heavily on some of Nietzsche’s principles including power politics, the tragedy of reality, and the different physical and metaphysical levels of life (Gismondi 2004, 453). In this way, Gismondi supplies his readers with the philosophical context to understand Morgenthau and sets the stage for a new way of analyzing his diplomatic theory.

Morgenthau as A New Kind of Realist

Hans Morgenthau, just like all writers, is subject to different interpretations by his different readers and students. In my research of his diplomatic theory and the different analyses on his work, the most apt description of this type of diplomatic theory is a

realistic kind of hopeful. While Morgenthau shared similar beliefs to other realists, he also had lofty goals for the world and was so ingrained in the idea that life is a constant struggle between nations that we cannot one day achieve world peace without diplomacy. In this sense, the outcome of a realistic assumption shared by Morgenthau is not anarchy, confined states forever at war, but rather a dream of diplomacy done well enough to bring together states on the international stage. This synthesis of a realist understanding with an ideal dream are drawn from his work and the diplomatic analysis Morgenthau inspired.

Turning to the content of Morgenthau's work, his most famous book titled *Politics Among Nations* serves as the best sample of his diplomatic theory. In the first section on diplomacy, Morgenthau's overview claims that successful diplomacy is what makes or breaks a nation when it comes to international long-term prosperity, since "diplomacy, one might say, is the brains of national power" (Morgenthau 1948, 105). In this introductory section, Morgenthau lays out philosophical claims through metaphors such as this one, but also through a look at diplomatic history across the United States and Europe through the World Wars. He concludes that "the United States stands between the continuous high quality of British diplomacy and the traditional low quality, interrupted by short-lived triumphs, of German foreign policy" (Morgenthau 1948, 108). This introduction to his political theory thus gives his readers two main takeaways: that diplomacy is where the logistical power comes from in a given country, and that the US stood in a pivotal spot after the second World War to improve its diplomacy.

The main section on diplomacy in this book, chapter twenty-eight, outlines his view of the details and structure of Morgenthau's ideal diplomatic processes. He first gives us four different objectives that diplomacy accomplishes: knowing what a nation

has the power to do given its goals, the power and goals of other nations, any overlap between them, and a plan to accomplish the objectives given all of the above and not starting a conflict (Morgenthau 1948, 419). These four objectives at surface level offer much to understanding the practice of diplomacy, but also in the underlying theory that propels the practices. Knowing one's interests as well as the interests of other states and working to avoid conflict is one thing, but to also prescribe looking for commonalities and avoiding conflict marks a more unique take on diplomacy. In a way, this is a nod to realism but also an expansion of what can be done given this fixed nature of man.

Morgenthau looks at this plurality of nations and their individual goals and asks what they have in common and in what areas can they cooperate rather than how they can use their interests to go against the other state. This is the first instance of diplomatic theory being a toned-down version of the larger international relations theory because the underlying assumptions of diplomacy dictate a certain level of hope and desire to improve the world. Morgenthau's role as a "realist-constructivist" in this sense is the highlight of his diplomatic theory.

The other important contribution from this chapter lies in his more specific recommendations for diplomacy, namely who can practice it and how. In the section on the "decline of diplomacy," Morgenthau compares some traditional ways of practicing diplomacy to the new ways nations conduct foreign affairs and argues that there are some aspects of traditional diplomacy that would help to combat this decline in the quality of diplomacy (Morgenthau 1948, 425). Two main factors of this decline that he emphasizes drew my attention, namely his argument against the mass or public diplomacy and the private nature he believes to be paramount to conducting diplomacy effectively. He is

particularly opposed to what he calls “diplomacy by parliamentary procedures” and he writes that “a quarter of a century ago, it would have been unthinkable for the Secretary of State to absent himself from Washington for week in order to participate in person in a Pan-American conference” (Morgenthau 1948, 425-426). His argument is that the more diplomacy is opened up to different organizations and to the public, the cheaper it becomes since the true powerhouse behind diplomacy and its leaders cannot stretch itself too thin without sacrificing its quality. Instead, he prescribes diplomacy as an act just between leaders and head diplomats of nations and should not be practiced in the public eye to protect the effectiveness of the practice. This general distrust of the masses could stem from a realists understanding that by nature, men and women are imperfect.

The proceeding chapter, “The Future of Diplomacy” discusses how a state can reinvigorate its diplomatic efforts by avoiding public discussions, backing away from the urge to settle things by a majority vote, and to stop what he calls the “fragmentation” or divisiveness of international politics. Morgenthau then introduces eight diplomatic rules that he claims should replace the above list of things to avoid. These rules all of which argue for keeping power and enemies close at hand. He concludes by arguing that diplomacy has not always been successful at stopping wars when people are eager to fight, but that it has been quite successful at preventing them from happening in the first place. This is based on how humankind has been advancing, that diplomacy may not always be enough to keep the peace. Through this we finally are able to see a full view of how Morgenthau is able to take a realistic perspective of human nature as fixed and imperfect and use that to maintain and possibly improve upon the international system through diplomacy.

Another reader of Morgenthau's work, Sean Malloy, gives a more holistic understanding of Morgenthau's diplomatic and philosophic theories beyond just his major book, *Politics Among Nations*. Malloy's article, *Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau's Formulation of Realism* focuses on unpacking and tracing Hans J. Morgenthau's realistic approach to international politics throughout his career. Malloy starts off by looking at his first publications in the mid-1940s and follows his developing realism all the way up to his most famous and well-known work, *Politics Among Nations*. The author also dedicates a section of this article to explaining why some of Morgenthau's other works, such as *The Struggle for Power and Peace*, *Science: Servant or Master?* and *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*, are just as important when looking at the way Morgenthau develops his political philosophy. Malloy argues that one of the most important themes and inspirations of Morgenthau's beliefs is the idea of "truth" as being fixed just as human nature is. Towards the end of this article Malloy shifts focus briefly to discuss how Morgenthau's diplomatic theory could be explained in terms of his political realism, especially in response to the World Wars. He states that Morgenthau repeatedly asserted that diplomacy was the main way of achieving peace internationally, but his views of how diplomacy should be practiced were contrary to the way in which the field was beginning to shift (Malloy 2004).

In this article as well as the works it focuses on, a view of Morgenthau as a hybrid, "realist-constructivist" is introduced and supported by his overarching diplomatic theory. The question of can one use diplomacy to improve the world and all its nations with a fixed understanding of human nature is given an answer of yes through Morgenthau's diplomatic theory. Based on all these sources, Morgenthau believes this

can be achieved by having excellent leaders in place, maintaining a small group of well-trained diplomats to make sure those leaders stay in line, and having the public interest upheld without diluting the power of diplomacy by involving the masses directly. The culmination of this examination of Morgenthau is that when it comes to diplomatic theory, the labels commonly assigned in the larger field of international relations is dulled and mellowed by transcribing the same beliefs to the field of diplomacy that is inherently built to foster some level of cooperation.

Hedley Bull and Realism Realized

Moving to another well-known figure in diplomatic theory, Hedley Bull is another writer whose diplomatic theory is worth examining. His main work, *The Anarchial Society*, was published later in the century, yet rings true to the same philosophical understandings as Morgenthau and other realist perspectives. Bull is another author who held realistic philosophical views but is less ambitious about what we can achieve through diplomacy given these assumptions. Though he is not known for being a major realist, in an examination of his main contributions to diplomatic theory, I assert that his views merit the designation of realist more so than Morgenthau and others in the realm of diplomatic theory. Bull's chapter in *The Anarchial Society* called "Diplomacy and International Order" give the fullest account of where Bull falls on the realist-idealist philosophical spectrum this chapter of my thesis focuses on. In his chapter, Bull specifically addresses diplomacy and revolves around three main questions: what diplomacy is, how it contributes to world order, and how it is relevant now (Bull 1977, 156). This outline of diplomacy is a common way to view any theory of diplomacy, but Bull's answers to each question are unique as is his approach to diplomacy and its goals.

First, Bull observes four main things characteristics of diplomacy: it is both what foreign policy is and how it is carried out, that diplomacy can be both between states or “multilateral” to include organizations or many states, that it is practiced either out of necessity or out of tradition, and finally gives an account of the different kinds of diplomacy. (Bull 1977, 156-163). His first point regarding foreign policy is reminiscent of Morgenthau’s understanding of diplomacy as the brain for a government, as well as his point that diplomats must know their interests and power to realize them. It is also worth noting that while Bull’s second argument says diplomacy can be practiced between multiple nations at once, that the “core of traditional diplomacy has resided in the official relationships between sovereign states” and later describes this direct negotiation the “pristine form of diplomacy” (Bull 1977, 157-158). Unlike Morgenthau, Bull does not specify that the best diplomacy is practiced between closed doors and no supranational organizations should be utilized, but this does highlight the appeals of direct diplomacy.

Bull dives even deeper into his theory in his third point about tradition and necessity. This distinction is interesting in that it begs the question of which kind of motive is has more legitimacy, diplomacy practiced from tradition or diplomacy practiced as a necessity? Bull does not directly tackle this assumption, but throughout this chapter references the institutionalization of diplomacy as a common practice rather than in order to achieve some higher form of world order. However, Bull does acknowledge the international stage and diplomacy’s role in it:

But if the diplomatic institutions of today presuppose an international society, international society does not presuppose them in the same way. These diplomatic institutions developed slowly and uncertainly and have been quite different in form at different stages in the evolution of international society (Bull 1977, 161).

This detachment of diplomacy from any meaningful effects on the international world serves as an example of how Bull's realism differs from Morgenthau's. To Bull, diplomacy is simply what is done to maintain nations and the world, but there is no expectation of a furthering in our standards of living or governing in his diplomatic theory. Bull's tone is practical, rational, and above all else, realistic about the nature of mankind and what we as a species should expect on an international scale.

Finally, Bull's last of the four main points focuses on the different levels of diplomacy. He gives us a range of diplomatic officiality from diplomacy held between two governments and diplomacy between individuals and governments, to the diplomacy practiced between two individuals. Bull makes his opinion quite clear in stating that "diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by persons who are official agents" but also that "it is clear that entities other than states have standing as actors in world politics, and that they are engaged in diplomacy vis-à-vis states and one another" (Bull 1977, 157-158). This understanding is more liberal than Morgenthau prescribed in his diplomatic theory, but Bull responds to this by saying that "sometimes a political entity achieves standing in world politics because states recognise that it enjoys a position of power, or because states support its aspirations to achieve such a position of power" (Bull 1977, 158). To Bull, diplomatic abilities boil down to the power they wield, not their official standings within a government. This appeal to raw political power is characteristic of the realist school of thought within international affairs, only further confirming Bull's roots in realism.

Next, Bull goes on to discuss several underlying assumptions about diplomacy and the conditions under which diplomats can do their work, specifically in the context of

international goals and the systems in place during his era before the Cold War. These assumptions include the elite nature of a good diplomat and the presence he or she holds at all times. Bull references the writings of Callières on how diplomats should refrain from outbursts of emotion, and that “diplomatic theory presents the role of the 'ideal ambassador' in terms of adherence to canons of rationality in this sense, and the modern diplomatic tradition embodies an attempt to sustain behaviour on this model” (Bull 1977, 163). Bull also draws from Callières’ descriptions of excellent diplomats, specifically how he “noted the rarity of good negotiators, by comparison with good soldiers, and the lack of fixed rules for those in the foreign service” (Bull 1977, 162). This separation of the good from the average plays into the themes of realism in that the majority of the people will not amount to the excellence that Bull envisions in his diplomatic theory and the diplomatic traditions that came before him.

Bull then moves on to describe why diplomacy is still relevant despite arguments to the contrary. The position that diplomacy is losing relevancy as government bureaucracies expand states interact more and more directly without the need for ambassadors is made by others in his field, but Bull counters them by saying a decline in diplomacy does not mean it has not, nor cannot, make any meaningful contribution to international politics (Bull 1977, 166-167). Bull finishes this chapter by outlining the capacities in which the “new” world of diplomats can help combat this misunderstanding with increased efficiency in communication, negotiation, information, easing tensions, and by providing symbolic meaning for the world (Bull 1977, 172-177). I found his concept of diplomacy bringing symbolic meaning to the international world and “diplomatic profession itself is a custodian of the idea of international society” to be

particularly interesting in this context (Bull 1977, 177). Through this, the basic principles of realism are reflected in how Bull views a sort of international culture and how the responsibility of that culture falls not onto the masses, but onto its leaders.

Morgenthau and Bull in Context

To conclude my analysis of these two diplomatic theorists, I believe some level of review is needed for the labels assigned to both Hans Morgenthau and Hedley Bull. Morgenthau, in his high philosophic principles based in realism, gives his readers a much more optimistic view of what diplomacy can accomplish in his international world building. Diplomacy, to Morgenthau, allows us to transcend above the state of nature prescribed by a realist, and we get a glimpse into a vision for supranational goals and a greater international stage. Bull, while his diplomatic theory is just as detailed as Morgenthau's, stays closer to the constraints of a realist label. Bull gives high praise for diplomats and the work they accomplish, but there is no hint at a future in which international relations could be anything beyond what our human nature allows for in terms of world peace and international cooperation. This shows that general international relations labels, though sometimes necessary, are not as accurate when translated into the smaller field of diplomatic theory.

This brings me to my final goal of this chapter: to contextualize Morgenthau and Bull on my diplomatic theory rating scale as I introduced in the first chapter. On the one hand, there is the philosophic loftiness and the general depth of the philosophy for each of these writers. I would position Morgenthau firmly at the top of this scale in that his diplomatic theory rests on many philosophical traditions regarding truth and human nature. Bull also scores quite high in this category for his diplomatic theory, but the

assumptions he bases it from. Thus, I would rate Morgenthau a score of ten out of ten and give Bull a score of nine out of ten.

On the other hand, their respective scores for practicality and real-life application are somewhat lower. I want to state that in this I do not mean that their diplomatic theories have no applicability, I simply mean they lack specifics on the day-to-day details of diplomacy and any substantial emphasis on the events of the era. Morgenthau, despite putting forward a very well-rounded diplomatic theory, received a score of two out of ten for the lack of specifics and general pragmatism of his work. His goals were clearly in transcending the specific events of his time. Bull, though much more focused on the career and characteristic goals of a diplomat, received a score of three and a half out of ten. These values are shown in Figure 1 below. Thus, I begin exploring the major theme of my thesis with two theorists high in philosophy, yet relatively low in pragmatism. These two writers and their respective theories will continue to be compared to other scores throughout this thesis, and this scoring marks the beginning of my own research and reporting.




Figure One: Diplomatic analysis for chapter two

CHAPTER THREE

Henry Kissinger and the Nixon Administration

Kissinger's Diplomacy

In the same way that one cannot make a cake without flour, one cannot address American diplomatic theory without talking about the contributions made to the field by Dr. Henry Kissinger. While his role in international affairs has had its fair share of controversy, this chapter looks at the theory of diplomacy Kissinger develops before, during, and after his active years as Secretary of State. I will begin this analysis by looking at a few of Kissinger's more popular books about his diplomatic theory and explain how his ideas on what makes a truly great statesman upholds the basic tenants of realism in international relations while still pushing the envelope on that label. In the next section, I will examine how Kissinger's theories were developed and used by President Richard Nixon during the Cold War era. Throughout all of the excerpts in this chapter, it remains clear to me that Kissinger's theory centered on quality leadership and a keen awareness of the reality of the world make it both the most philosophically high minded and pragmatic diplomatic theory of this thesis.

Kissinger's diplomatic theory and general outlook on international relations is well defined in his book, *Diplomacy* in which he catalogues diplomatic history with special emphasis on the years in which he served as an American diplomat and statesman. For the purpose of this thesis, I will be focusing on the sections of this book on the Cold War and analyze the underlying theory Kissinger has regarding great

diplomats. There are several key aspects to Kissinger's theory, and the first I want to highlight is the way that he emphasizes democratic peace and good norms and how that clashed with Joseph Stalin's concept of *realpolitik*. According to the Britannica Encyclopedia, *realpolitik* is best described as "politics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals" and that "it is often associated with relentless, though realistic, pursuit of the national interest" (Britannica 2017). This blunt, to the point approach could not be more different from the American approach to diplomacy at the time. Kissinger is particularly critical of President Harry Truman in chapter seventeen of *Diplomacy* because of his lack of understanding of the other parties at the beginning of the Cold War. This was especially true in respect to the lack of compatibility between America, England, and the Soviet Union in diplomatic negotiations. This lack of common ground coupled with the uneasy transition from the Roosevelt style of diplomacy during World War II to the heavily American-democratic style of Truman caused a diplomatic low point in Kissinger's opinion (Kissinger 1995, 423-445). Weak leadership and general lack of awareness are the two main complaints of this chapter.

Another important part of *Diplomacy* that ties in with his disappointment in Truman is how Kissinger frames diplomatic downfalls as a failure in awareness of the reality of international, state, and even individual realities. By this I mean that Kissinger shows a clear emphasis on maintaining a reliable understanding of the attitudes and choices of other parties involved in diplomacy. The first example as previously stated is his disapproval of Truman's diplomacy, but this principle stands true when Kissinger talks about Winston Churchill as well. As Kissinger puts it, "Churchill understood Stalin's diplomatic calculations and sought to counter them by making two moves of his

own” (Kissinger 1995, 428). He goes on to explain how Truman ignored the advice of Churchill and responded clumsily to Stalin and Churchill’s efforts (Kissinger 1995, 428-430). At the heart of Kissinger’s critique is this sort of clumsiness and general lack of a grasp on reality, and Truman seems to bear the brunt of this complaint in this chapter.

Next, Kissinger puts forth as an alternative to this unawareness a sort of “Wilsonian idealism” combined with a realistic awareness of diplomatic efforts. To Kissinger, the ideal diplomat is one who is both grounded in reality yet uses that knowledge to set and achieve lofty goals in their diplomatic endeavors. This is, of course, embodied best in President Richard Nixon according to Kissinger. In chapter twenty-eight, his description of Nixon’s ideological and strategic views are much more compatible with what he calls “Wilsonian idealism” and a more realistic approach to diplomacy seen in *realpolitik* (Kissinger 1995, 704). Towards the end of this chapter, he focuses on the “triangular” relationship that Nixon established between the US, the Soviet Union, and China. Kissinger is very complimentary, though not unabashedly so, of the way that Nixon was able to take the different diplomatic strategies of the Soviets and the Chinese and work within them to establish the beginnings of *détente* (Kissinger 1995 720-732). The fact that Kissinger puts such emphasis on recognizing realities in diplomacy makes him an obvious target to be labeled a realist, but the other half of his point regarding Wilsonian idealism shows that he is not committed solely to a strict interpretation of realism as it is often used in the greater field of international relations.

The next point that Kissinger makes that I believe is worth noting is his explicit statement that US presidents who base their diplomatic choices on specific diplomatic theories are more successful than those who do not. As a diplomatic theorist himself, this

statement should come as no surprise coming from Kissinger. While this may just be a case of bias and Kissinger wanting to put his work and the work of the Nixon administration on a pedestal, I do find some logical merit in this statement. Kissinger describes how Nixon “rejected all three [previous] schools of thought and set about to establish the national interest as the basic criterion for long-range American foreign policy” through annual reports (Kissinger 1995, 771). These reports, though not written exclusively by Nixon, but by his staff and Dr. Kissinger, reaffirmed the theory his policies were based on and the connection they had to the well-being of the American people. This practice was what Kissinger called “the best road map for the foreign policy of the Nixon era” (Kissinger 1995, 771). Kissinger’s commentary throughout this chapter provides an extremely complimentary view of the practice of basing policy explicitly in theory.

The final point I want to emphasize as expressed in Kissinger’s book *Diplomacy* is his focus on not just on the overall world attitude to diplomacy, but the attitudes of countries and even individual presidents and diplomats. To Kissinger, as previously discussed, the great statesmen are those who possess a keen understanding of the reality of all pertinent situations, no matter how grand the scale. For example, the position a country has regarding climate change initiatives is just as important for the diplomat to know as the political opinions held by a senior diplomat from a rival state. In the last two chapters of *Diplomacy*, Kissinger focuses on the end of the Cold War, and highlights specific diplomatic strategies and attitudes that he believes contributed to the peace settlement. The most important points to highlight in these pages include the differences Kissinger makes about President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in how connected they

were to the spirit of their respective countries, and the desire more modern diplomats might have to establish world order in an American rather than truly international style (Kissinger 1995). The focus here on not just general state foreign policy, but the attitudes of the people who lead those states, makes for a unique perspective to diplomatic theory.

This brings me to two other books written by Dr. Kissinger entitled *White House Years* and *A World Restored*. In the third chapter of this the former volume, “Convictions of an Apprentice Statesman,” Kissinger addresses the ways in which his work as a professor of international relations and all his time spent developing diplomatic theory were quite different from the time he spent actually working in diplomacy. Theory was, for Kissinger, “the perceptions about which I had thought and written much [about] as a professor. They would soon be tested by events.” He goes on later to say that the “policymaker is then like a man on a tightrope; he can avoid a precipitous drop only by moving forward” (Kissinger 1979, 70). This unfortunate gap between theory and reality, no matter how realist the theory may be, is further supported by the events of the Nixon administration and Kissinger’s influence in Korea as discussed in the next section.

In summary, the written works of Dr. Henry Kissinger culminate in a robust diplomatic theory with a foot in both the realist and the idealist camp. Interestingly, Kissinger uses his realist sensibilities to make the logical jump to more idealist goals of world order. After reflecting on this theory, I have a good amount of respect for Kissinger in urging aspiring diplomats to above all else pay attention to their environment and develop a strong understanding of what drives states and their people in the diplomatic field. His detailed description of what makes a good statesman or diplomat is clearly based in his experiences in the field, but his theory also had a direct effect on the events

of the Cold War. Interestingly, Kissinger's view holds diplomacy as almost a vocation or a calling that very few can answer, but those who can practice diplomacy this way can become extremely influential and powerful as seen in his influence as well as President Nixon's with whom he worked very closely. In the next section, I will examine the ways in which Kissinger's diplomatic theory was put to the test during the years of the Nixon administration and how successful his theory turned out to be.

Theory Realized: Nixon and the Cold War

In this section, I will be examining some of the literature on the diplomatic strategies of the Cold War and their origins with Henry Kissinger. In their book *Nixon's Nuclear Specter*, William Burr and Jeffery P. Kimball dedicate two chapters to diplomatic strategies from 1945 to 1969. In these chapters, the authors introduce the concepts of "madman" diplomacy and brinksmanship, two tactics used by US presidents during diplomatic negotiations and general policies regarding international tensions of the time. "Madman" diplomacy and brinksmanship seem to be unique to nuclear warfare and developed out of Kissinger's theory of good leadership and awareness of reality in making a good diplomat. While the translation from theory to policy is evident, this does not mean that the US was always successful, and it is especially interesting to look at the places in which policy failed to live up to theory or theory did not translate into successful policy.

The first major concept to unpack in these chapters are what Burr and Kimball describe as the "madman" theory and how President Nixon was able to use it so efficiently. This concept is unique to the dawn of nuclear warfare when the stakes were raised to such an elevated level that world destruction was on the table. The "madman"

theory evolved from the concept of brinksmanship and its general ability to act irrationally. The way Nixon decided to deter communism in Vietnam and nuclear war in general was to act as irrationally and enraged as possible to inspire fear in the Viet-Cong leaders. The authors stress just how volatile and ready to launch nuclear weapons Nixon acted to make his enemies think he was at least partially insane and thereby forcing them to adopt a more defensive strategy (Burr and Kimball 2015a, 50-56). They then go on to highlight how this issue came at a time when there were global and national limits as to what Nixon and Kissinger could do and how that shaped the madman theory further.

It is important to unpack within this theory the use of irrationality by a rational agent. In his “madman” theory, Nixon was able to more or less convince other diplomatic parties that he was thinking irrationally and that in order to prevent mutually assured destruction, the other party had to bend to his will. This concept ties in well with the popular game, colloquially called “chicken” in which in order to achieve a rationally desired outcome, the players must act irrationally on a course that could result in loss if the other party does not give in or act like a “chicken.” The influence of this kind of irrationality or “madness” on diplomatic theory and policy was immense. The general culture of politics and the way that people viewed nuclear warfare in particular was shaped by the “performance” their leaders were able to give in convincing the enemy that they were unstable and needed to be placated at all costs (Burr and Kimball 2015a, 56-65).

These theories, however sound in theory, did not translate perfectly into reality. The “mining ruse” as Nixon’s “diplomatic strategy of simultaneously talking tough and talking peace” with North Korea is a perfect example of how even the most well thought

out intentions do not always pan out (Burr and Kimball 2015b, 131). The authors go on to describe how American forces were instructed by Nixon to intimidate the Vietnamese leadership in order to get their submission and move the communist forces to the North, with the goal of ending the war. The popular idea at the time internationally was to try and press for peace, but the Nixon administration had to reconcile this with the ways in which they were also undiplomatically wanting to seem formidable and press for the Vietnamese to be the ones to give in first (Burr and Kimball 2015b, 138-142). This chapter discusses some of the finer military strategies but ultimately shows how Nixon and Kissinger were unable to both negotiate their way to an early end to the Vietnam War and succeed in their attempts to intimidate the enemy.

With roots in psychology and game theory, the “madman” theory was both powerful and fragile, something that both Kissinger and Nixon knew. This kind of diplomacy seems to require a strong, unyielding character from the leader of a state, something that resonates strongly with Kissinger’s more general diplomatic theory. The strong, aware leader that Kissinger associates with a good statesman is also the kind of person required to pull this irrational-rational façade off. It is in this strong correlation that we see a diplomatic theory and its practical application converge.

To conclude this section, it is worth noting how messy diplomatic theory can get when it is translated into policy. Just like international relations labels of “realist” or “idealist” can often be muddled when applied to specific writers and their theories, diplomatic theory itself can become less and less apparent in the policies they inspire, no matter how hard they may try to do justice to the original theory. In the eyes of Burr and Kimball, Kissinger and Nixon acted rationally and developed a complex web of

deception in order to get their way, yet nevertheless were not fully successful in achieving victory with Korea. In the defense of Nixon and Kissinger, never has high philosophic ends and pragmatic actions been so well combined in a diplomatic theory thus far in my thesis.

Putting Kissinger and Nixon on the Graph

Upon reflection of the research of this chapter, the only action left is to put Kissinger and Nixon on my philosophic-pragmatic chart. For the sake of clarity, I will be putting Kissinger and Nixon under one category since the two are so interconnected in diplomatic theory and practice. This diplomatic era of Kissinger and Nixon is one of solid theoretical background coupled with their valiant efforts to put theory into practice result in a fascinating study of diplomatic theory. The complex and deeply philosophic theory Kissinger develops over many years in service of the US reflects many elements of realism, though even he does not fully commit to that school of thought. Furthermore, his commitment to practical application, despite its imperfections, shows Kissinger (and Nixon) have a deep desire to test their theory through policy.

First, I have awarded Kissinger and Nixon a high score on the philosophy axis. Kissinger, especially in his earlier works, demonstrates a much more realist diplomatic theory in his emphasis on worldwide contextual awareness. His recommendation that to be a great statesman, one must be both a strong leader and a wise leader who understands the reality of international relations shows he has a deep understanding of what drives people. As discussed previously, Kissinger also goes beyond the boundaries of realism and establishes his own diplomatic school of thought that combines some of the basic understandings of realism with “Wilsonian idealism” to create a completely new theory.

For these reasons, I have given Kissinger and Nixon a score of ten out of ten for philosophic loftiness.

On the other axis, the pragmatic sentiments of the Kissinger and Nixon era are formidable. Based on the reports of both Kissinger himself and the account painted by Burr and Kimball in *Nixon's Nuclear Specter*, I would assign a moderate score for pragmatism and practical application of theory. There is a clear effort as seen by the “madman” theory utilized by Nixon during the conflict with North Korea, but it must be addressed that they were not wholly successful in securing peace by following their theory. Thus, I have given Kissinger and Nixon a score of six out of ten for practical applicability. It must be noted that no other figures in this thesis have received this high a score in *both* philosophy and pragmatism, which only makes their work all the more interesting to reflect on. As we move out of the realist camp and into the world of constructivism, it is crucial to keep in mind the high levels of philosophy and practicality that Kissinger and Nixon demonstrated during the Cold War era.




Figure Two: Diplomatic analysis for chapter three

CHAPTER FOUR

A New View in Constructivism

Constructivism and Anarchy

Now, I turn my attention to a newer synthesis of older international relations theories, constructivism. This general school of thought emerged in the 1990s “as a serious challenge to the dominant realist and liberal theoretical paradigms” much later in American and world history according to Oxford Bibliographies (Cristol 2020). This reference goes on to say how the “constructivist theory emphasizes the meanings that are assigned to material objects, rather than the mere existence of the objects themselves,” and that the “belief that reality is socially constructed leads constructivists to place a greater role on norm development, identity, and ideational power than the other major theoretical paradigms” (Cristol 2020). It is also interesting to note that this site provides only a short list of writers on the subject of constructivism because this specific field is relatively new. It is, however, a generally agreed upon belief by political scientists that Alexander Wendt is one of the foremost constructivist thinkers, first publishing *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics* in 1992.

In this chapter I will examine the sections of various works that show how a specific theory of diplomacy looks when viewed from the point of view of this well-known constructivist, Alexander Wendt. Constructivists like him are said to reject the philosophical understandings of realism and idealism in their pure form regarding human nature and truth, but once again this author does not conform perfectly to labels in the

presentation of his theory. Wendt's diplomatic theory in particular raises several philosophical concerns regarding the true relationship of states. The two works of his that I felt could be connected the closest to diplomatic theory rather than just general international relations theory are *Anarchy Is What States Make of It* and *Why a World State is Inevitable*.

First, I will examine sections of Wendt's *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics* and how constructivism creates a unique diplomatic theory. He begins this article by describing his constructive viewpoint a "bridge" between the different schools of thought, namely the neorealists and liberals that is "on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests" while still recognizing some of the tenants to a realist approach (Wendt 1992, 394). He explains the basis for a constructivist approach by saying that "there is no 'logic' of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process" (Wendt 1992, 394-395). This claim sets him apart from other schools of thought in international relations and diplomacy, particularly realism, in that he claims there is no object structure or fate holding the world down to a certain way of interacting with one another as states.

Wendt then outlines how anarchy and power politics have dominated international affairs and the realist and liberal split until the eve of the constructivist theory. Wendt draws from the work of Kenneth Waltz and how he "defines anarchy as a condition of possibility for or 'permissive' cause of war [Waltz] arguing that 'wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them'" and that this sets Waltz apart from "classical realists

such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau.” This focus on anarchy is not what Wendt disagrees with, but rather he will “only dispute its explanation” (Wendt 1992, 395). His critique is that only constructivism provides an explanation for why states treat other states a certain way based on their relationships, since “anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient” to explain why some states are considered allies and others considered enemies. (Wendt 1992, 395). Wendt also emphasizes how institutions are the channel through which identities shape our international experiences, not the other way around. Institutions are not on the same level as states or statesmen, and “such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors' socialization to and participation in collective knowledge” (Wendt 1992, 399). In this, Wendt focuses in on the way that we provide meaning to international relationships and that meaning is simply reflected in institutions, whether formal like the United Nations, or informal like the “self-help” system often referenced in international relations.

The bulk of his article groups international systems into three categories Wendt attributes to Waltz: competitive, individualistic, and cooperative. Wendt goes on to explain how the different schools of thought fall into these categories and what it means for their respective foreign policies. For the competitive system, states’ gains are seen as mutually exclusive of the other and thus pits them against each other, and “collective action is nearly impossible in such a system because each actor must constantly fear being stabbed in the back” (Wendt 1992, 400). He identifies realism as relating most to this system as it rings with anarchy. In the individualistic world system, states’ welfare is independent of the relationship between said states, and generally does not negate the

possibility of collective security. This system seems most like the liberal school of international thought. Finally, the cooperative state system seems the more diplomatic and humanistic system and is a direct product of constructivist theory. To Wendt, “this is not self-help in any interesting sense, since the ‘self’ in terms of which interests are defined is the community; national interests are international interests” (Wendt 1992, 400). It is interesting to note that these categories exist on a scale from least to most peaceful, respectively, and that it is not without merit to also put them on a system of least to most diplomatically involved as the violence declines.

Wendt draws comparisons between the states with more and less chaotic versions of anarchy in their place in global affairs, pointing out that “predation” among states only further supports his claims. The strongest argument he makes out of this is that these groups emerge out of their own doing; Wendt believes that we as nations give meaning to institutions, other players, etc. and that meaning is based on communication and interaction with other world players. (Wendt 1992). He uses this understanding to formulate ideas of how to better interact with other nations on a world scale, especially when it comes to difficult economic, security, and institutions. This is best exemplified in his humorous comparison to the way that the US might respond to aliens ravaging New York versus arriving in peace. This example is used to show that the “process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a ‘social act’ and begins the process of creating intersubjective meaning” that is fundamental to the constructivist outlook (Wendt 1992, 405).

Wendt’s basis for justifying constructivism as a theory is that “people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for

them” (Wendt 1992, 396). This kind of operating based on assumptions is almost the opposite of what Kissinger argued for as analyzed in the previous chapter of this thesis. Wendt builds his theory on the interactions people (especially diplomats) have with others, while Kissinger envisioned a statesman who might transcend these interactions in a way that puts them above the international system rather than being a direct producer of it. Thus, Wendt’s influences on diplomatic theory puts constructivist diplomats on a lower, but more direct “creator” relationship with the international system, whereas Kissinger argues international meaning cannot be generated by a statesman, but it can be understood and utilized by him.

In conclusion, Wendt’s first and most widely known article explaining his theory of constructivism provides a solid framework for a translation of constructivism into a more specific diplomatic theory. Based on my assessment, Wendt does have the more specific practice of diplomacy in mind when crafting his work, however, and a constructivist approach could be applied directly one day using his work as a foundation. In this early piece of writing, on the other hand, Wendt focuses on how we as international players give meaning to institutions, other states, etc. and that meaning is based on communication and interaction with other world players. This is his philosophic and sociological basis for the constructivist school of thought, and ultimately could point towards to a greater emphasis on diplomacy to further the communication and interactions necessary for building international norms.

Wendt on a World State

Another text written by Wendt is *Why a World State is Inevitable*, which provides more detail on his constructivist theory and how it ties into a more focused theory on

diplomacy. In his general claim that a supranational state is the future of international relations, diplomacy is best interpreted as the tool by which constructivist thinking molds the world to a more unified future. This grand and hopeful vision, however, is explained by Wendt in the context of “a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence” (Wendt 2003, 491). He explains this further in the first half of this article and throughout the rest focuses on the five stages of the world he views to be inevitable based on his underlying constructivist background.

Before outlining his vision, Wendt defends his bold claim that a world government and state is the only possibility when the circumstances are understood properly. Wendt recognizes that this almost deterministic outlook on international life comes from Hegelian and Kantian influences, especially in “their emphasis on conflict as a mechanism of development but [reaches] a different conclusion” himself given his unique focus (Wendt 2003, 493). To build his defense, Wendt dives into the depths of old and new philosophies to ask “the ultimate question [of] whether different kinds of causes exist in nature” to explain his theoretical phenomena and asserts that he believes his causes to be just as valid in his theory as the causes backing old theories on a variety of subjects (Wendt 2003, 495). This certainly shows a commitment from Wendt to philosophy, but as I will discuss later does not add to his score for pragmatism very much, despite his claim that his five stages are inevitable.

Wendt then outlines the first stage after his defense, the system of states as embodied by what Wendt calls “Hobbesian” without “any mechanism to enforce cooperation among these states... and a mutual belief that they are ‘enemies’” (Wendt 2003, 517). The obvious assumption with this stage is that very little, if any, diplomatic

efforts are being made between states given this anarchial awareness. Wendt goes on to say that this “stage is unstable in the long run because it does not begin to meet needs for recognition” that the people and their states desire from an international context (Wendt 2003, 518). He then goes on to explain that the logical outcome of warring states is either one state taking complete control through conquest or an even match between states that cannot conquer the other, but neither scenario results in international stability (Wendt 2003). As anarchy evolves into total or perfectly matched power, the growing desire for international recognition pushes the world towards the second state of Wendt’s theory.

Next, Wendt describes the second stage of our transition to a world government: a society of states. In this stage, the previous anarchy has evolved into a recognition of state sovereignty and “the emergence of some solidarity among states — they see themselves as a ‘We’ bound by certain rules — that provides a resource for limited cooperation” on a global scale (Wendt 2003, 519). In this stage, it is likely that the levels of recognition that Wendt writes about leads to an increased use of diplomats and a greater appreciation for diplomacy by statesmen, now that there are recognizable states. Wendt admits states in this stage are likely “to find non-violent means to solve foreign policy problems” to avoid warfare, which sounds an awful lot like diplomacy (Wendt 2003, 519). It is important to note that in this stage Wendt says people are citizens only of their states and not recognized on the international level still. He also explains this stage in the context of democratic peace, a very general theory in international relations to describe the tendency of democracies not to wage war against other democracies (Wendt 2003). This stage, it seems, is most like where America and the world were for much of its history.

The third stage Wendt discusses next is world society. This differs in that it is more interconnected and recognizes more people and states by “creating a universal pluralistic security community, which adds the requirement of non-violent dispute resolution to the boundary conditions of the system” (Wendt 2003, 520). The reason Wendt believes this stage is also unstable is because though there are non-aggression agreements in place, there is no way to enforce it or protect against “rogue” states. This cannot be addressed fully, according to Wendt, because the world at this time lacks the enforcement power or collective security to put enough pressure on these rogue, violent states (Wendt 2003). This stage strikes me as the most familiar and probably reflects where America and the rest of the world are at currently in our history. Thus, we see a society of diplomats constantly creating new agreements and attempting to secure peace while not violating state sovereignty.

Wendt then moves to the fourth stage: collective security. This stage is the most fascinating to me because of the way Wendt frames the philosophy of collective security. In this system, states “recognize each other’s sovereignty and practice non-violent dispute resolution, but they are expected to defend each other against threats on the principle of ‘all for one, one for all’” and they adopt “a ‘Kantian culture’ of collective security or ‘friendship’” (Wendt 2003, 521). Wendt references Kant as well as other, more modern thinkers to describe this current state of affairs and the way that even at this stage, some concerns and pressures remain. He then goes on at length to describe this process from collective security to a world order, which once again draws heavily on his assumption that states and their people have a desire to be recognized on a global scale. He also claims that the “Great Powers... are arguably the greatest hurdle to world state

formation” since they are more likely to resist giving up sovereignty (Wendt 2003, 524). He ends this stage by setting up a proposition for Great Powers like the US, which he calls “hyper-powers,” by asserting that “if the choice is between a world of growing threats as a result of refusing to fully recognize Others versus a world in which their desires for recognition are satisfied, it seems clear which decision rational Great Powers should make” (Wendt 2003, 525). The fact that Wendt assumes his principle of recognition is stronger than the pulls of sovereignty and power seem to directly contradict the realist, Machiavellian idea that life is ultimately a struggle for power, and thus this creationist view brings us full circle back to the idea of constructivism as a new branch of philosophy.

Finally, Wendt concludes with the fifth state, the supranational world order unified under a single system he calls the “world state” (Wendt 2003, 525). To Wendt, in this supranational state people would give up the right to wage war as the legitimate use of force would be delegated as far upwards as humanly possible. The gain, however, is “the positive freedom of fully recognized subjectivity” with the saying “one world, one people” becoming a political reality (Wendt 2003, 525). Wendt addresses concerns that a despot could rise given the immense power of this global state, and the concern that nationalism will not stand for a world government, among other issues he believes might be brought up in conflict with his theory. He then concludes on a more realistic note that the issues states face currently, crime, poverty, pollution... even struggles for recognition, in the thick sense, would continue” (Wendt 2003, 528). His recognition that this would not be the utopian end of history exemplifies how constructivism bridges

realistic understandings about humanity with more optimistic, liberal ideas that much can be accomplished despite this.

Wendt then concludes by restating his thesis that the international world, if a constructivist outlook is allowed to be fully adopted, is destined to result in a unified system legitimized by the use of violence to gain recognition. Though he has a much wider theory that encompasses diplomacy within it, it is certainly a departure from the other literature analyzed in this thesis. Even his original article on constructivism makes fewer radical statements on the future of international affairs and diplomacy itself.

However, it is interesting to note that if this world state is to be achieved, diplomacy itself may be changed fundamentally as it would no longer be about sovereign states sending representatives to other sovereign states or organizations. Any diplomatic theory to come from this article by Wendt challenges the very assumptions of what diplomacy inherently is and its future relevance, a topic with enough debate to fill another thesis entirely. Just as I reflected on Wendt's previous article, the connections specifically to American diplomacy are thinner than previously reviewed authors in this thesis, but the implications Wendt and constructivism have on diplomatic theory are considerable and thus worthy of the reflection given in this thesis.

Wendt in Greater Context

The final task of this thesis lies in putting Wendt's constructivist theory on my graph to track the progression that diplomatic theory has made from the mid-1900s. This was particularly difficult to assign for Wendt because of how broad his theory was in comparison to the previous writers addressed in this thesis. However, when looking at the contributions Wendt offers in both *Anarchy Is What States Make of It* and *Why a World*

State is Inevitable, constructivism offers many assumptions that affect diplomatic endeavors just as much as they do general international affairs. I have tried to judge Wendt's scores accordingly to maintain my focus on diplomatic theory while also recognizing the importance Wendt and constructivism have on the field despite the wider field they encompass.

First, I have assigned Wendt high marks on the philosophic axis of my graph. The basis on which he grounds constructivism, especially in *Anarchy Is What States Make of It*, shows a dedication to carving out a new philosophy in international relations to better encompass the phenomena he views in the history and potential future of the world. Wendt's theory in particular raises several philosophical concerns regarding the true relationship of states, as well as the desires that he believes driving them (recognition in particular). This being said, I believe I would position Wendt below Kissinger and Morgenthau, but below Bull in terms of philosophic loftiness and understanding. For these reasons, Wendt earns a score of nine out of ten on this axis. Figure 2 below reflects these values.




Figure Three: Diplomatic analysis for chapter four

For the practicality variable on my graph, I believe Wendt is about average in his pragmatic application of his theory. Though he offers many different reasons why states should and inevitably will evolve according to the constructivist principles in *Why a World State is Inevitable*, he lacks specifics on how this can be accomplished by diplomats. This could be due to the more general, wide viewpoint of his theory, but one aspect I found particularly telling was the assumptions and effects of the world state he proposes in his later writing. If we are to be untied across the globe, it would take a considerable effort on the part of diplomats everywhere, only for them to thus be made irrelevant when there are no other sovereign states to send ambassadors to. While the claims Wendt makes about desires for recognition might apply to the general populous, it seems unlikely that diplomats and foreign policy writers would be willing to work so hard in service of a system that would erase the need for their jobs. This and other factors that make Wendt so high in philosophy thus earn him a lower score for practicality: five out of ten. The variance in scores between the different writers surveyed thus far provide

an interesting pattern that will surely be tested as I move to other authors in the chapters to come.

CHAPTER FIVE

Pragmatism: Crabb's Diplomacy Post-Cold War

The Pragmatic Tradition

In this chapter, I will examine the ways in which Cecil Crabb introduces a new outlook on American diplomacy. In his book, *The American Pragmatic Tradition*, he examines historical diplomatic endeavors and finds that theory, by and large, does not guide foreign policy nor diplomatic decisions as much as a purely pragmatic approach. This “anti-theory” theory he establishes makes for a very interesting reflection on just how necessary philosophical traditions and theories are for the survival of diplomacy itself. In proposing his idea, he almost begs the question of whether or not theory shapes diplomacy or if theories are simply a reflection of the diplomatic choices made in the past. Crabb introduces a new concept into diplomatic theory: that real diplomatic decisions are not based on theory or philosophy but rather are an expression or reaction to the circumstances of the time based on the current needs of the US. I believe this particular work highlights the brief turning point in American diplomatic literature where in order to survive, diplomacy had to abandon its appeals to the greater international relations schools of thought.

In chapter four of *The American Pragmatic Tradition*, Crabb introduces pragmatism as an alternative way of reflecting on the choices American diplomats and leaders made during the Cold War. Crabb's basic argument for pragmatism is an “anti-theory” theory; American diplomacy is best explained as a response based on

circumstances and external stimuli rather than any attachment to a theory of international relations or diplomacy. The general argument for this can be seen in the beginning of chapter four in which Crabb states American diplomacy has acted “in conformity with the tenets of pragmatism, which often expressed long-standing habits of mind and action identified with the American ethos” (Crabb 1989, 132). Given these observed conformities, Crabb explains that “a pragmatic frame of reference for understanding American foreign policy is not offered, therefore, upon the assumption that it can replace all existing interpretations of the diplomacy of the United States” (Crabb 1989, 138). This pragmatic lens allows for explanation for all diplomatic and international policy choices because it transcends the existing traditions and philosophies of the field and does not have a framework for certain behaviors statesmen will *always* choose. In this way, Crabb elevates his theory above previous theories, which is why I find it most fitting to deem pragmatism an “anti-theory” theory.

Foreign policy, especially in America, has always been extremely fluid and ever-changing for the very same reasons Crabb makes his argument for pragmatism. The world itself and all its individual states are constantly changing, and foreign policy struggles to keep up at times because new situations dictate new responses from the foreign service. This belief is evident when Crabb discusses a “systems theory” compared to his own pragmatic theory. He is extremely critical of this because the basis for this systems theory lies in a belief of international structures which Crabb believes are really more of a collection of “anarchistic tendencies” (Crabb 1989, 139). Crabb does not subscribe to the belief that there are any explicit international structures because his own experiences point more towards a constantly changing international stage. Thus, “it is

difficult to detect any evidence that systems theory has in any significant way affected the diplomatic conduct of the United States” (Crabb 1989, 140). Pragmatism, however, has benefits that Crabb says the systems theory and others lack, though he does admit that there are still limitations on even the best of theories.

Due to this aforementioned fluidity in foreign policy, Crabb cautions against searching for any one theory or philosophical tradition to explain American diplomacy. Though statesmen may try to establish their decisions within some school of thought or general diplomatic tradition, as one could with the systems theory, the greater tradition of US diplomacy is one of pragmatic decisions and generally doing what is the most practical option given the circumstances. Crabb makes a convincing argument that this practical response is the most reasonable way to handle international relations because there will never be any one theory to act as a guide for every possible scenario. Navigating the pandemic, for example, was not something that Hans Morgenthau gave any instruction for in his diplomatic writings as I explored in my second chapter. Besides the systems theory, Crabb scrutinizes realism or *realpolitik* made famous by Henry Kissinger who was the subject of inquiry for the previous chapter. Crabb writes that “the modern-day embodiment of *Realpolitik*- Henry Kissinger- reflects the American aversion to ‘power politics’ divorces from the purpose for which national power is employed” (Crabb 1989, 139). Crabb also brings up game theory and its influence in American politics, but this theory also does not meet the standard achieved by pragmatism. These theories lack the irrational and almost instinctual grab that pragmatism has on foreign policy, and that “every moderately well-informed student of American diplomacy is aware that on innumerable occasions, *nonrational factors* have momentarily affect the

course of foreign relations” (Crabb 1989, 140). Thus, any one lens will not be sufficient, or comparable to pragmatism, to Crabb.

Crabb reflects on US history and emphasizes the oscillating pattern in foreign policy coming out of the first World War. As he sees it, the US went back and forth between isolationist and interventionist policies from presidency to presidency, and with each swing in the other direction, he is able to justify his theory of pragmatism further. He writes that “according to other [theories], the American diplomatic record has been characterized by the presence of alternating cycles of isolationism and inward-looking periods, followed by eras of overt foreign interventionism” (Crabb 1989, 142). This oscillation and constantly changing set of variables makes it extremely difficult to ascribe any one theory to American diplomacy, which only further supports his claims about the applicability of pragmatism. Crabb believes recognizing this oscillation between isolation and intervention and being able to have a more general view of diplomatic history is important because it gives insight to the national interest and just how flexible that is as well. To this end, he cites peace and defense through warfare as two values that “Americans have concurrently indicated” as well as other values that seem almost opposite to each other (Crabb 1989, 143). This is where other theories are unable to achieve the same level of coverage of reality that pragmatism is. He believes that “a pragmatic world view accepts the paradoxical quality of American foreign policy as a norm of diplomatic behavior, and it does not anticipate that this feature of American diplomacy will disappear in the near future” (Crabb 1989, 143). It is interesting that his theory takes the approach of moving from real diplomatic history to his explanation of pragmatism. Henry Kissinger, as previously examined, approached his diplomatic theory

in the reverse manner, moving from his first principles and philosophy to theory, then to practice in the real world.

Next, Crabb brings up the issue of pluralism in the US and how our diversity in thought as a people affects the current president and diplomatic leaders. He makes the case that this constant battle for supremacy internally leads to a quick-changing foreign policy. He states that pluralism, “accurately describes the *external environment* to which the diplomacy of the United States must be responsive and is no less applicable to the *internal environment* of American diplomatic decision making” (Crabb 1989, 156). As our internal tensions pull our leaders, the pragmatic choices in foreign affairs are often the most utilized because of their ability to respond in wildly different ways depending on the millions of different factors that go into things like negotiating a treaty or going to war. Crabb illustrates this point by going through the diplomatic history of the US from President Woodrow Wilson to President Nixon. Crabb ends this section by claiming that there are three main reasons why pluralism affects foreign policy given his pragmatic lens: its ties to democracy, an increase in nationalist movements over the last few decades of his writing, and the major role that the global superpowers played during the Cold War (Crabb 1989, 160-161). Overall, Crabb’s inclusion of this point about pluralism serves as an example of how concerned Crabb is with establishing pragmatism in American diplomacy as the most comprehensive theory as possible given the many internal as well as external elements that go into foreign policy.

Crabb’s most poignant claim about American diplomacy is that diplomatic decisions are almost always made as a response to some international crisis or issue. His argument is that foreign policy, by nature, is a response to other peoples and states, as

well as the influence they have on our geopolitical reality. As Crabb sees it, the diplomatic pragmatism he observes is always seeking to remedy a problem or respond to a different states' diplomatic (or undiplomatic) actions. His reasoning is based in psychology, as is evident in his claim that "the mind sorts these [stimuli] out and concentrates upon those perceived as being most directly related to human survival and welfare" (Crabb 1989, 162). He goes on to justify his claim that American diplomacy has always been perceived as a response to a crisis by referencing events like Pearl Harbor, the Cuban missile crisis, and other particularly dramatic moments in American history (Crabb 1989, 162-164). He goes on to add to this that since citizens are often relatively uninformed and uninterested in foreign policy, "the people are nearly always prone to let the president deal with it" and hope that they will be effective in responding to this perceived crisis (Crabb 1989, 166). In conjunction with this reaction-based diplomacy, pragmatism in diplomacy is often accompanied by a more emotional rather than philosophical response by leaders. Crabb sees this in many different US presidents who use highly charged language and opt for more emotional responses to the international community, such as President Johnson or President Reagan (Crabb 1989, 168). Pragmatism, as he understands it, though it is a logical category itself, does often pave the way for leaders to disregard theory or philosophy for the diplomatic response that *feels* the best in the interest of solving the perceived crisis.

The final point Crabb makes in his fifth chapter is that American diplomatic practice and its pragmatic framework are beginning to be adopted by other foreign services across the globe. Crabb believes that this "habituation" of US foreign policy on the diplomatic world as well as the ever-changing American foreign policies have

directly affected the way that diplomacy is practiced worldwide. He does qualify this by saying “we shall do [this] selectively, by focusing upon several ideas and behavior traits that have long been identified with the American approach to foreign relations” (Crabb 1989, 171). By doing so, Crabb is able to paint his readers a picture of how “American-sponsored innovations have been noteworthy also in the sphere of international organization and the codification and extension of international law to new areas of global concern” and generally we spread our influence on the international stage (Crabb 1989, 172). Though this thesis focuses on American diplomatic theory, the prospect of American pragmatism changing the worldwide standards in diplomacy make for an intriguing measure of Crabb’s theory.

Pragmatism in Practice

In his seventh chapter of *The American Pragmatic Tradition*, Crabb establishes further details about what his pragmatic “anti-theory” theory translates to in practice. This chapter describes in further detail how exactly pragmatism in diplomacy looks, and generally describes further how pragmatism is the most stable foundation for understanding and participating in American diplomacy. A general understanding of pragmatism as seen in his book makes the claim that in order to appreciate the reality of American diplomacy, one must abandon strict philosophic traditions and labels to best respond to the situation. For this reason, I find it best to describe Crabb’s theory as an “anti-theory” since it seeks to transcend the use of diplomatic theory and opt for a more arbitrary and useful diplomatic guide.

Crabb gives his readers twelve general guidelines for maintaining a pragmatic approach in diplomacy. These include continuous diplomatic efforts, paying attention to

the values and goals of the American public at all times, and “as pragmatists conceive it, the key fact of human experience is the interaction between human society and the environment” among other principles (Crabb 1989, 214-219). He also reemphasizes how this makes American diplomacy and the overarching foreign policies more fluid. These changes, according to Crabb, reflect the constant changes in values that the American people and their leaders hold. As previously discussed, the main reason for this that Crabb cites is the pluralistic nature of the American people and the wide range of values they hold. However, he does add onto this an explicit belief of pragmatists that “the universe is dynamic and in a constant state of change; by relying on his intelligence, however, man is able to influence the nature, direction, and pace of such change” (Crabb 1989, 224). This is particularly interesting as it challenges some of the beliefs held by other international relations traditions about the flexibility of human nature and our position in the universe. In his own way, Crabb positions mankind and our ability to reason through problems above the physical world, which only further supports pragmatism as a wider lens for understanding diplomacy.

The final, and perhaps most intriguing point that Crabb makes on American pragmatism in international affairs is how Americans tend to consider their outlook to be unique while also holding some of the most ambivalent stances on international issues. He is able to back up this claim by citing the work of John Dewey, whom he argues contributed to the more ambivalent American foreign policies of his time. In this, Crabb is especially focused on the American response to the Cold War and the nuclear movement by other states in the late twentieth century (Crabb 1989, 239-241). The fact that Crabb includes this point is interesting and goes hand in hand with his previous claim

that American diplomatic pragmatism is becoming more widely used in other foreign services across the globe. Thus, not only do Americans believe themselves to be unique in a world with far more radical stances, but their way of practicing diplomacy is catching on across the globe.

In conclusion, Crabb is able to put together a strong argument for the applicability of pragmatism in his book. I believe it to be worth noting that this “anti-theory” theory is not at complete odds with some of the other theories in the literature previously discussed in this thesis. For example, there are many similarities between Kissinger and Crabb in their desire for strong statesmen to recognize the reality of the world and use that to their advantage in the practice of diplomacy. The two simply disagree on what exactly that reality is, with Kissinger relying more on the realist school of thought and Crabb looking to more arbitrary concepts to explain diplomatic choices. It is clear, however, that Crabb marks a distinct turning point in the literature in his rejection of the classical explanations for diplomatic choices. Crabb’s pragmatism serves as the perfect example of just how many different viewpoints there are on American diplomatic theory.

Crabb and Pragmatism in Context

My final task in this chapter lies in putting Crabb onto my graph comparing a theory’s philosophical and practical values. His work, in particular, was a fairly clear outlier compared to the other theories and writers I surveyed as seen in the graph below. In fact, *American Diplomacy and the Pragmatic Tradition* is part of the reason I chose to measure my surveyed theories on a philosophic level as well as a practical or pragmatic level. Given the title and subsequent content of his work, it is clear that Crabb’s theory that American diplomacy is best understood as pragmatically motivated is reason enough

to give him a score of ten out of ten in the pragmatic category. This is not to say that I believe Crabb's pragmatism to be perfect in every way, but I do believe that when compared to the other works surveyed in this thesis, it ranks the highest and thus earns it the highest score in this category.

On the other axis, Crabb's pragmatism does profess a certain level of philosophic interest that cannot be dismissed completely. The fact that Crabb addresses the literature and existing traditional theories on diplomacy marks a response to their assumptions on human nature, the possibility of a world state, and the philosophical understanding of state power. In fact, pragmatism itself could be understood as a stance on human nature in that it paints mankind as not tied to any strict code of behavior or belief. However, there is cause to criticize Crabb's use of pragmatism to explain diplomacy *ad hoc* as a way of justifying all of American diplomatic history without truly engaging with other, deeper philosophical causes for their behavior. I do believe Crabb defends himself well against this by advocating for an approach to diplomacy that is not reliant on just one theory, including his own. For these reasons, I have given Crabb a score of four out of ten for philosophical loftiness compared to the other thinkers I have examined in this thesis. Figure 4 below reflects these values.




Figure Four: Diplomatic analysis for chapter five

In conclusion, I assert that Crabb’s pragmatism is persuasive in that he does offer pragmatism as one of the more accurate ways of analyzing American diplomacy, but he admits that his theory as well as others have not and never will encompass a complete understanding of the reasoning behind every single choice made by American statesmen. This could be understood as a way of avoiding harsh criticism, but I interpreted this as a genuine humility and recognition of the limited perspective of mankind. In the same way that Dr. Kissinger called for a statesman who had the widest and most comprehensive perspective, I think that Crabb’s “anti-theory” theory could be compared to that. Both views, though they differ slightly on their understanding of the forces driving human nature, preach an open mindedness and awareness that I believe make them worthy of time and reflection.

CHAPTER SIX

21st Century Diplomacy

An Introduction to Soft Power and Public Diplomacy

This chapter will focus on a newer branch of diplomacy, soft power, and its effects on the smaller sub-category of public diplomacy. I will explore the theories of Joseph Nye and Eytan Gilboa in their articles, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power* and *Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy*, respectively. These two authors lay the foundation for understanding public diplomatic theory that invites public opinion into diplomatic efforts, and soft power which builds on the idea of maintaining influence through diplomacy rather than through exerting force. These two, though philosophically rich, mark a departure from the classical theories of diplomacy. Both Nye and Gilboa develop unique theories that invite public opinion into diplomatic efforts and a theory of soft power which builds on the idea of maintaining influence through non-coercive diplomacy rather than through exerting force.

Joseph Nye as the Father of Soft Power

Joseph Nye, in his article *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, develops a new way of engaging the public in diplomacy and foreign policy decisions by reimagining the power dynamics and relationship that states' diplomats have with their citizens. In this article, Nye is able to create a new space in traditional power dynamics for a new kind of power that effectively moves foreign policy forward without utilizing coercion, pressure,

or threats. He also elaborates on how under this kind of power, American diplomats can successfully involve the public in international relations through a public form of diplomacy. Nye describes the dynamics between a state and its people when public diplomacy is well-utilized and makes the argument that “smart” power is developed from the efficient use of soft and hard power respectively in international affairs.

First, it is important to have a working definition for the concept of soft power. Nye describes “soft power [as] the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye 2008, 94). Nye illustrates his point by comparing coercion to “sticks” and attraction to “carrots” because one is meant to drive away, and the other is meant to reward or tempt another party. The desire to emulate or cooperate with other countries, according to Nye, comes from other states “aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness” and acting accordingly in diplomatic endeavors (Nye 2008, 94). Finally, Nye describes soft power as “more than just persuasion” and that “in behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power” in diplomacy. Nye’s most interesting argument about soft power is how he believes the attraction and pull it creates is undeniable by other diplomatic theorists. In his words, those “who deny the importance of soft power are like people who do not understand the power of seduction” (Nye 2008, 96). Nye praises US Presidents such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy for recognizing the power that can be wielded in a positive way. In framing soft power as a convergence of psychological and sociological terms, Nye is able to explain throughout this article how soft power works, where it originates, and its applications.

Next, Nye explains how soft power develops out of three key areas: culture, domestic views, foreign policies. These “resources” in creating public opinions date back to the 19th century, and Nye is quick to compare the efforts of French diplomats in 1883 to other the Allied nations in World War I. It was not until Woodrow Wilson’s presidency that Nye marks a shift in the way that American diplomacy followed suit of its European counterparts. Nye cites the invention of the radio as a turning point in the American use of soft power because America was now able to solidify their presented culture across vast distances. However, Nye also points out that “Nazi Germany perfected the propaganda film” marking a potential negative side to using soft power. As World War II progressed, so did the utilization of soft power built on culture, domestic, and foreign policies. Nye asserts that “by 1941, the United States broadcast around the clock” to keep up the “cultural offensive” involved in soft power diplomacy (Nye 2008, 98). He also describes how during the cold war, soft power through the public media was began to dwindle in the US as it turned to more coercive threats to maintain its defensive front.

Following his historical account of American soft power, Nye asserts that post-2001 power dynamics of public diplomacy and soft power are different because people have easier access to information. He makes a note that technological advancement aside, “nearly half the countries in the world [were] now democracies” in 2008 when this article was published (Nye 2008, 99). This is crucial because the open nature of democracies facilitates the spread of information within and between democratic populations. Nye explains how “public support was not so important when the United States successfully sought the use of bases in authoritarian

countries, but it turned out to be crucial under the new democratic conditions” in newer democratic countries like Mexico and Turkey (Nye 2008, 99). Nye also addresses the “paradox of plenty” coined by other diplomacy theorists before him. This paradox explains how the increase in volume of information leads to the decrease in attention given to media and those forces that would otherwise be influential soft power.

Nye then gives three “dimensions” or sectors of current American public diplomacy efforts: daily connections, strategic communications, and building strong ties with other people or groups. He references the definition of public diplomacy given by Edward R. Murrow in 1963 as including foreign relations with sovereign states, but more importantly with individuals and organizations. Nye clarifies that “good public diplomacy has to go beyond propaganda. Nor is public diplomacy merely public relations campaigns” (Nye 2008, 101). Beyond this, the first dimension of public diplomacy, daily communications, comes from what we might take for granted in our modern age of social media. This dimension includes press reports, both domestic and foreign, and timely responses on behalf of the government.

Nye then turns to the second dimension, strategic communication, which “develops a set of simple themes much as a political or advertising campaign does” in that the diplomatic group in question “plans symbolic events and communications over the course of the next year to reinforce central themes or to advance a particular government policy” (Nye 2008, 102). There are marked success using this kind of planning, and Nye cites “former secretary of state George Schultz [who] later concluded, ‘I don’t think we could have pulled it off if it hadn’t been for a very active program of public diplomacy’” (Nye 2008, 102). The next dimension of public diplomacy, building

lasting relationships, is a natural result of long and drawn-out plans involving diplomatic allies. Interestingly, though, Nye qualifies this section by saying that “even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product” meaning poorly viewed policies.

This is an interesting point that, to me, makes perfect sense given the lack of enforcement or coercion necessary to push unpopular policies forward. The soft power that public diplomacy relies runs on attraction, and one cannot use coercion or persuasion to push forward an unpopular policy without fundamentally challenging the boundaries of soft power. In conjunction with this, Nye makes the argument that public diplomacy must be oriented towards productive goals for everyone involved. To explain his reasoning, Nye draws a parallel between this kind of diplomacy and the way that businesses market products to people to improve their lives as well as make a profit from their product. If the people buy the product or get involved with public diplomacy efforts, everyone is better off. He references Newt Gingrich’s complaint that “the State Department [was] failing to sell America’s policy” in 2003, but Nye quickly responds that at the time, lack of success was the fault of the market rather than the seller, the State Department (Nye 2008, 102-103). This way of framing public diplomacy in terms of whether or not it “sells” highlights the similar use of soft power in business and advertising, a key difference between in Nye’s view of diplomacy compared to previous writers.

Research, communication, and building trust are key to public diplomacy succeeding in Nye’s opinion. He laments the lack of proper research on public diplomacy and foreign public opinions available at the time he wrote this article. Nye then breaks down different communication styles and concludes that “preaching” provides very little

results, “broadcasting” information has limited success, and that real-time, face to face communication “remain[s] the most effective, but [it] can be supplemented and reinforced by the Internet” (Nye 2008, 104). Furthermore, Nye differentiates between using words versus actions to convey messages and uses Norway as an example of public diplomacy actions that contribute to a formidable public reputation. Building trust, however, seems to be a crux in which Nye identifies the best public diplomacy is based on. He explains that, despite its importance, “developing long-term relationships is not always profitable” and “at the same time, postmodern publics are generally skeptical of authority, and governments are often mistrusted” (Nye 2008, 105). Nye aptly turns the argument around, however, and explains that “criticism is often the most effective way of establishing credibility. Part of America’s soft power grows out of the openness of its society and polity and the fact that a free press, Congress, and courts can criticize and correct policies” (Nye 2008, 106). This point ties back to a previous point he made about the effect of democratization on soft power and public diplomacy. Given these new areas to gain trust, Nye paints a hopeful picture of America’s use of public diplomacy.

Nye’s theory is made especially clear in the chart in his article that explains the different people who act and/or benefit from certain aspects of public diplomacy. Nye compares four sources of soft power in this chart: foreign policies, domestic values and politics, high culture, and pop culture. The respective recipients for the first three are foreign governments and publics, but Nye argues that pop culture is received by foreign publics alone. Fourteen years after this article was written, I would argue that even pop culture is received by foreign governments nowadays because it has become far more entangled in domestic values and high culture. The interesting part of this chart, to me, is

who Nye lists as “referees for credibility or legitimacy” between the sources and receivers of public diplomacy efforts. Governments, media, NGOs, and IGOs are listed for the first three sources, but pop culture is checked only by media and markets rather than any government-affiliated groups (Nye 2008, 107). Nye clearly means to separate pop culture from the other three sources in this chart, which is understandable when reflecting on the social media capabilities in 2008 compared to the capabilities we have now in 2022.

The final claim Nye makes in his article is his view of a “smart power” in opposition to the traditional views of power in the realm of international relations. Though a little vague, Nye writes how “smart” power is a “melding soft and hard power” to effectively work in the grey areas that neither hard nor soft power alone can succeed in (Nye 2008, 108). In summary, Nye provides a historical account of soft power as a broader concept upon which public diplomacy functions. If public diplomacy is a computer, soft power is the programming that allows it to complete certain functions with success. This account touches on both the philosophical base and practical application of soft power in public diplomacy, giving Nye a solid base on which his theory is grounded. Just as soft power, in Nye’s view, carved out a new home for itself in the broader tradition of power politics, he hopes that this “smart” power will one day bridge the gap between attraction and coercion in new ways.

Gilboa’s Theory of Public Diplomacy

In this section, I will analyze the Eytan Gilboa’s article on public diplomacy, *Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy*. Gilboa offers a similar view of public diplomacy as Nye and offers structure to a theory that by nature is more flexible because

of the direct involvement of the public, making it distinct from the more traditional views of diplomacy. Gilboa takes a more detached approach in that he reviews the existing literature on public diplomacy and then gives insights into the opportunities and gaps in the research. This article is one of the more technical approaches reviewed in this thesis but is an apt addition to Nye for this chapter because of how concentrated Gilboa's contributions are to this small (but growing) field in diplomacy.

Gilboa first tackles the historical and theoretical definitions of what public diplomacy is and how it is distinct from soft power and public relations. Regarding its origin, Gilboa says that public diplomacy "attracted attention in the previous century when diplomacy fell under the scrutiny of the media and public opinion" (Gilboa 2008, 55). He further attributes its birth to "three interrelated revolutions in mass communication, politics, and international relations" that "created two major innovations: the Internet and global news networks" (Gilboa 2008, 56). Gilboa generally claims that the spotlight cast by the media combined with the increasing pressure from the internet to report every little thing is what caused diplomacy to branch off in a way it had not needed to do before. He quickly identifies a major weakness that this kind of diplomacy has: a lack of analytical, data-based research. He laments the "anecdotal" sources we have access to combined with the fact that "many scholars and professionals have confused public diplomacy with propaganda, public relations (PR), international public relations (IPR), psychological warfare, and public affairs" (Gilboa 2008, 56). It is clear that with this article, Gilboa seeks to fill in the gaps in the literature and provide as much tangible data as he can on the subject.

Gilboa shifts to introduce three different models that explain the theoretical structure and use of public diplomacy. The first model, which he aptly names the Basic Cold War model, is based on the original use of public diplomacy as it emerged during the Cold War. It is interesting to note at this point that Nye is able to identify, though less formally, origins for public diplomacy dating almost a century before Gilboa's proposed origin. Within the Basic Cold War model, "the assumption was that if public opinion in the target society is persuaded to accept a favorable image of the other side, it will exert pressure on its government to alter existing hostile attitudes and policies" (Gilboa 2008, 59). He then moves to the Nonstate Transnational model used "to investigate public diplomacy activities of groups, NGOs, and individuals using public diplomacy across national boundaries" (Gilboa 2008, 59). The next model, the Domestic PR model, work similar to the Basic Cold War model, but instead "it hires PR firms and even lobbyists in the target country to achieve its aims" (Gilboa 2008, 60). By creating three different models within the single field of public diplomacy, Gilboa is able to account for the slight differences in theory and in application within public diplomacy's reign.

Then Gilboa provides further context for public diplomacy and says it is under the umbrella of soft power. To Gilboa, public diplomacy is a diplomatic game plan and soft power exists as a tool or method for accomplishing that game plan. He provides a helpful chart describing hard power, but also turns to other experts to compare it to soft power. He cites another article by Nye that says, "soft power arises from the attractiveness of a nation's values, culture, and policies" and then cites his own research with another expert to elaborate that "when policies and positions of states or nonstate actors have moral authority, or are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, their soft power is increased"

(Gilboa 2008, 61). He then pulls from other experts on diplomatic theory who criticize soft power, and even addresses the use of “smart” in lieu of “soft” to describe this kind of power. This clear response to Nye’s argument as previously discussed shows Gilboa (and the other experts he writes about) are not as sold on the concept as Nye was.

Gilboa argues that public diplomacy has the most significance in these three areas: communications, public relations, and branding. First, as part of communication, Gilboa points to various polls and data-driven tests used to evaluate communication in public diplomacy. He also writes how “media-government relations may stretch from a mere indexing of government internal opinions to controlling the policy-making process with a few additional modalities in between” and how “communication literature is rich in theories and models of media effects” (Gilboa 2008, 63). In a similar way, “scholars and practitioners have conducted research on public diplomacy using PR theories, models, and methodologies” that Gilboa makes note of (Gilboa 2008, 65). He runs through the various basic models based on this area and concludes that “scholars have not sufficiently applied Grunig’s (1993) four models and the four reconstructed dimensions (Grunig 1997) to public diplomacy” (Gilboa 2008, 66). He then turns to branding, and how “the *Journal of Brand Management* reflected this emerging interest by devoting a special issue to nation branding” (Gilboa 2008, 67). Gilboa concludes this section by qualifying his research by saying that though they are similar, public diplomacy and branding are similar, the key difference is in the contexts in which they are used.

Third, Gilboa argues that the most helpful way to study public diplomacy is by establishing a general base for this specific type of diplomacy. On this, he writes:

Case studies in public diplomacy may be classified into several categories, including actors, such as a particular state, international organization, or NGO; public diplomacy instruments such as international broadcasting or cultural diplomacy; target states or regions such as the Middle East; and individual leaders such as the Dalai Lama and Nelson Mandela (Gilboa 2008, 70).

He then analyzes several helpful case studies on public diplomacy from Leonard, Small, and Rose (2005), Potter (2002-2003), Ociepka and Ryniejska (2005), Zöllner (2006), Mor (2006), and one of his own pieces of research from 2006. (Gilboa 2008, 70). He continues on listing different pieces of research, but eventually concludes that “very few scholars have employed comparative analysis to examine specific public diplomacy areas or instruments, focusing instead predominantly on the management of cultural relations” (Gilboa 2008, 71). This dense literature review sets him up perfectly for his next argument about how to derive meaning from all this research.

Gilboa also provides a very detailed diagram on public diplomacy that he calls “Framework for Analysis” to help his readers understand the history behind public diplomacy. He differentiates between what he refers to as immediate, intermediate, and long-term results, all of which he says contribute meaningfully to the study of public diplomacy when used in their appropriate contexts. Beyond this, he includes a figure that displays the thirteen different sectors or fields that utilize or contribute to public diplomacy, including sociology, psychology, technology, history, and more (Gilboa 2008, 74). This article ends with Gilboa pointing out that the field of public diplomacy, despite all he has said on the subject, is still quite young compared to more traditional

diplomatic theories. Because of this, he argues that research is still necessary to better understand this diplomatic theory beyond his arguments presented in this article.

Gilboa and Nye on the Graph

My last task in this chapter is to frame Nye and Gilboa's diplomatic theories on soft power and public diplomacy on my own graph. Both Nye and Gilboa's contributions to this thesis mark the turning point in diplomatic literature, and this is reflected in the scores both earned in philosophy and pragmatism, respectively. While the two writers had very similar theories on public diplomacy and its use of soft power, they also had relatively similar scores in both categories. In the literature reviewed thus far in this thesis, no other authors addressed the philosophical and pragmatic implications of their theories as equally as Nye and Gilboa. This being said, I do not believe this makes their theories any more or less relevant.




Figure Five: Diplomatic analysis for chapter six

First, Nye's diplomatic theory as presented in his article points towards a moderate score in both philosophical loftiness and in practicality. I gave Nye a medium

score in philosophy because there are clear connections in this article to his assumptions about human nature and other philosophically deep themes. Furthermore, he effectively engages in previous diplomatic traditions in his defense of his own diplomatic theory that breaks the traditional mold and schools of thought in international relations. I also gave Nye a moderate score in the pragmatic intentions of his theory because Nye's take on soft power and public diplomacy strongly emphasizes the practicality of these concepts and how it is both useful and more effective than other types of power or diplomacy in his view. For this reason, I gave Nye a score of five out of ten in both categories.

Eytan Gilboa earned similar scores in terms of the philosophy and practicality of his version of a theory of public diplomacy. In a similar way, Gilboa scored moderately well in philosophy because there is a clear attempt to compare his theory to other international relations traditions or schools of thought. His assumptions about the involvement of the public in diplomacy likewise does require some general reflections on human nature and the nature of the masses or the citizens when acting as a group. Gilboa also received a medium score in terms of the pragmatism of his public diplomacy theory because he does a consistently focused on the costs and benefits of public diplomacy in his article. Furthermore, he does a very good job of presenting practical ways to implement public diplomacy, especially in his discussion of the three different ways to research more into public diplomacy. Given this, I awarded Gilboa a score of five out of ten in philosophy and a score of six out of ten in practicality. Both Nye and Gilboa make interesting additions to my graph as seen below, and a pattern is starting to emerge as this thesis progresses and more authors are graphed.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: Agha and Sharp

Agha's Diplomacy on the Down-Low

This chapter will conclude my exploration into diplomatic theory in covering two final thinkers: Hussein Agha and Paul Sharp. These two thinkers offer the most modern theories on diplomacy surveyed in this thesis, and in turn shows two possible routes for the future of diplomatic theory: a path back to our origins or a path to the future of humanity. Hussein Agha writes about a more evolved theory of diplomacy that shifts diplomatic endeavors away from diplomats. In forging this new path, Agha discusses how private individuals can sometimes carry out diplomacy more effectively than governmental officials can. In this way, Paul Sharp offers a theory just as revolutionary for diplomacy, but instead of asking who, asks why diplomacy is practiced from a psychological or sociological point of view. This being said, Sharp's theory on diplomacy and Agha's "Track II" talks both utilize public diplomacy and acknowledge traditional methods of diplomacy, but they both put greater emphasis on establishing common ground through their respective theories.

First, I will delve into Hussein Agha's theory of diplomacy. His book, *Track II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East*, shifts diplomatic endeavors away from career diplomats and instead discusses how private individuals can sometimes carry out diplomacy more effectively than governmental officials. In his first chapter, Agha calls this process "Track II" diplomacy, which aside from being a great play on words,

differentiates itself from “Track I” diplomacy in the actors and authority behind negotiations. Agha explains that “Track II talks are discussions held by non-officials of conflicting parties in an attempt to clarify outstanding disputes and explore the options for resolving them in settings or circumstances that are less sensitive” (Agha 2003, 1). In these Track II talks, “non-officials” or experts on the subject matter from the opposing states are hosted by a third party, but Agha quickly clarifies that this is not any kind of “secret diplomacy” nor is it a purely academic function (Agha 2003, 2). What makes these talks unique is the lack of direct government representation. Participants do argue on behalf of their state, but any decision or opinion given is solely their own and lacks any enforcement power. The beauty of this is that if the talks do not prove successful, there is no imminent threat of war, but if the talks are successful, “they can lead to secret formal negotiations, as occurred in mid-1993, during the later stages of the Oslo talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization” (Agha 2003, 2). These formal negotiations are what Agha calls Track I diplomacy, which simply refers to typical government-on-government diplomacy. There is an obvious need to connect these two kinds of diplomacy, however. As Agha says, “the exercise would be pointless if leaders and officials who can affect the course of national policy were not made aware of the information and impressions gained in these talks” (Agha 2003, 3).

Agha also offers in his chapter a new way to view the terms “hard” and “soft” diplomacy. In this context, Agha describes “soft” talks as discussions on more amenable topics that establish common ground. He compares this to “hard” talks which, as the name suggests, revolve around difficult to agree upon topics that often are at the heart of diplomatic efforts. “Soft” talks are held to “exchange views, perceptions, and information

between the parties to improve each side's understanding of the other's positions and policies" (Agha 2003, 3). One interesting part of Agha's differentiation is that he highlights how public "soft" talks can be, but that "hard" talks "often require absolute secrecy" due to the volatile nature of the issue being discussed (Agha 2003, 4). This serves as an interesting comparison to Joseph Nye's use of "hard" and "soft" power in his diplomatic theory. For Nye, the terms were descriptive of a kind of power, but Agha describes them more as a level of sensitivity. Agha published this book before Nye became renowned for his theory on soft power, and it would be interesting to ask Nye whether or not he was influenced by Agha's work when coming up with his own theory.

Agha then elaborates on diplomatic history in the Middle East and how this history led him to endorse this dual diplomatic system that allows for cooperation in a non-binding context. He notes that of the six case studies presented in the entire book, most Track II talks were kept relatively private and not often publicized. Agha remarks that "except in rare cases, even the fact that the talks took place- let alone their subsequent impact- is not made public. As a result, there is very little documented information about these talks" (Agha 2003, 5). To give further context into just how volatile the situation was, he writes how "with the failure of final status talks and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in late 2000, the Arab-Israeli peace process experienced its most severe crisis" (Agha 2003, 6). He continues to give an account of the book as a whole with special attention to the corresponding events that took place in the Middle East during this time frame. He concludes this chapter by emphasizing that "Israelis and Palestinians are unlikely to exit the cycle of violence without considerable further Track-II efforts" and that "Track-II efforts may be needed to diminish the

likelihood and impact of any further miscommunication and misunderstanding between the two sides” (Agha 2003, 8). With this vote of confidence in his Track II diplomatic theory, Agha begins a lengthy account of Track I and Track II diplomacy, in which he develops his theory further.

In chapter ten, “Lessons from the Middle East,” Agha elaborates on the sponsorship structure and how Track II diplomacy has actually increased productivity in negotiations with states not often open to relations. He writes that “Track-II talks should be seen as most effective and useful in internal or interstate conflicts where, at a certain stage, the parties involved are unwilling or unable to bridge their differences using the traditional tools of official Track-I diplomacy” (Agha 2003, 167). Despite this success, the structure of these talks is often a tailor fit and not the product of a uniform system of Track II talks. One of the more important reasons for this lies in the sponsorship system Track II diplomacy utilizes. This sponsor acts as the third-party mediator who hosts the two non-government actors, often acting of their own volition with a fair amount of independence. To this end, Agha writes “in some instances, however, the distinctions between sponsorship, facilitation, and active intervention can be blurred and a positive outcome may be secured regardless, depending on the nature of the track and the group dynamic it generates (Agha 2003, 169). Thus, the university, organization, etc. that sponsors the talks is just as, if not more important than the participants.

Agha continues to give further detail to Track II diplomacy, but the most unique thing about his theory is the way that it utilizes so many different actors and professionals. Instead of diplomats, who are often referred to as “generalists” colloquially, Agha suggests sponsors invite experts and people with specific interests to

talk about their respective issues and the way that different states agree or disagree on them. This way, you get someone who is both qualified to discuss the issues, whether it be ideological conflicts or environmental concerns, but they also are able to speak informally without a Foreign Affairs Ministry behind them. In Oslo, which Agha references in this section, the governments did know who the participants were though (Agha 2003, 173-174). He goes on to list several basic qualifications recommended for participants in Track II diplomacy: availability, a willingness to take risks or a readiness to make deals, having a problem-solving approach, expertise, and a shared language and outlook (Agha 2003, 176-177). In the end, though, the uniqueness of this style of diplomacy cannot be understated because of the people it involves in such high-stakes situations.

Agha moves on to note again that the key to success in Track II diplomacy is confidentiality and immunity where possible. After all, if the welfare of the non-state participants cannot be promised, there is little hope of bringing in the official state representatives safely. In his section, aptly titled, “The Need for Secrecy,” Agha claims “secrecy serves six goals” necessary for successful negotiations. He writes these six goals are deniability, proposing experimental ideas, political maneuverability, increased control, credibility, and uncomplicating the decision process (Agha 2003, 185). He acknowledges the risks involved with keeping these talks, however unofficial they are, on the “down-low,” but stresses that the benefits outweigh them. One idea he mentions that is common to most diplomatic theories is the idea of trust. For Agha, this means trust between the participants and trust between their respective states, but the assumption of some levels of trust is present in most discussions on diplomacy.

Agha concludes his chapters by giving an account of how Track II diplomacy can successfully be upgraded to Track I, or official bilateral diplomacy. Agha peppers in qualifications throughout this book, but his optimism for Track II diplomacy is especially prevalent in this section. He writes how “the very fact that problems widely perceived to be intractable... are demonstrated to have a potentially mutually agreed resolution can have a powerful impact” (Agha 2003, 193). However, he also frames the shift from Track II to Track I diplomacy as thus:

If and when Track-II talks are transformed into Track-I negotiations...the crossover from the Track II experience may facilitate the resolution of Track-I logjams. But there is also the danger that Track-II methods, precepts, and participants may be lost in the Track-I political and bureaucratic morass, and that participants may lose their presumed comparative advantage (Agha 2003, 193).

He bridges this idea to his comments on how to measure success in Track I and II talks and ends on the interesting topic of what he calls “citizen diplomacy.” As if making a full circle, Agha finds a home within the theoretical framework of diplomacy for his Track II diplomacy in citizen diplomacy. To me, Agha’s citizen diplomacy straddles public and traditional diplomacy because it involves the public and their opinions but differs in the main diplomatic actors. Public diplomacy involves governments swaying public opinion, whereas citizen diplomacy is that public opinion embodied by an expert who serves in place of a government to negotiate. Agha ends this chapter with the hope that Track II diplomacy can achieve much in the future, especially in the Middle East.

Paul Sharp: Humanity and Diplomacy

As the final writer examined in this thesis, Paul Sharp brings forth a remarkable theory on diplomacy. In his book, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, he offers a theory that is somewhat revolutionary for diplomatic theory. Instead of asking who, Sharp asks why diplomacy is practiced from a psychological and sociological point of view. To begin, Sharp turns a critical eye to the history, or lack thereof, of diplomatic theory. In his chapter, “The diplomatic tradition: Conditions and relations of separateness,” Sharp asserts that “there exists no great canon of diplomatic thought about international relations with its broadly settled structure of knowledge, and familiar pathways for debate and argument” (Sharp 2009, 75). Furthermore, he asks if new theorists “are... to stick with the modern diplomacy’s narrow insistence that only states are entitled to diplomatic representation or are we to adopt the sort of broader approach to which a flood of new hyphenated diplomacies – public, field, track two and, even, internal – attests?” (Sharp 2009, 75). This is a direct response to writers like Agha, Nye and Gilboa who, as previously explored, created what Sharp calls “hyphenated diplomacies” to meet the new demands the world asks of diplomacy. In doing so, Sharp sets himself up to begin analyzing diplomacy of the past, not of the future.

In this chapter, Sharp first describes how others have often thought of diplomatic history as a kind of mediation between countries or groups. He describes this as “people adopting a position between the parties from which they exercise a series of skills” and thus, “diplomatic relations, it can be argued, are those human relations which require mediation, and those who mediate may be recognized as diplomats or, at least, to be acting diplomatically” (Sharp 2009, 76). He then goes into a lengthy literature review

starting with Brian Hocking's work, next moving to Jönsson and Hall, and then to James Der Derian whom Sharp paints in a fairly positive light. He qualifies this by saying that "while their focus on mediation is fruitful, however, it does not provide us with the basis for a distinctively diplomatic tradition of international thought" that he is searching for (Sharp 2009, 78). He then does the same thing for writers who view diplomacy simply as human relations, drawing from the works of Costas Constantinou primarily. Given the variety of work sampled, Sharp assuages his reader that "people cannot call anything diplomacy, but we should not underestimate the wide variety of uses to which they put the word" (Sharp 2009, 81).

One idea that is particularly important in Sharp's chapters is his concept of what he calls the "conditions of separateness." To better frame this, Sharp describes how "for most people, international relations involve the parties they are between and the issues they are about" whereas "for diplomats, in contrast, it is the conditions of separateness that provide the distinctive site or space from which diplomats see the world" (Sharp 2009, 81). These conditions of separateness are described as simply how close, as a person or as a group, you are to the others around you, as "a physical or social fact, or some combination of both" (Sharp 2009, 82). This thought makes complete sense when you stop and think that perhaps the only reason diplomacy exists is because loyalties exist. Sharp summarizes this in his point that "relations of separateness exist, therefore, where people believe or feel that the claims of others upon them have less emotional pull, legal force or moral weight" (Sharp 2009, 85). He is also sure to point out that this norm of loyalty to one's own has exceptions, but that this framework is crucial in understanding why diplomacy exists.

Sharp elaborates further and writes on why one should rethink diplomatic history through the lens of conditions of separateness theory. His reasoning for this is because he saw how diplomatic endeavors were often explained by analyzing how isolated or how unified different groups were and forming relations thusly. He lists three arenas in which conditions of separation dictated diplomatic actions: encounter relations, discovery relations, and re-encounter relations. The first is when peoples “run into each other for the first time,” the second is when “peoples attempt to render their respective and independently developed cultures mutually intelligible,” and the third is when “we discover that strangers and foreigners are ‘just like us’” (Sharp 2009, 89-90). Sharp concludes that these places are the birthplaces of diplomacy for humans, and where some of the most complicated human concepts like economics, politics, and of course, diplomacy are traced. This birth is where Sharp concludes his chapter.

Sharp moves to his next chapter and argues that the assumptions of diplomacy do not necessarily center around making or destroying different societies, but instead on forming relationships. Sharp speculates that for ancient humanity, “indirect and unofficial relations for trading, breeding and religious purposes might be quite highly developed without anything like the imagined, heraldic diplomacy of anthropological fictions developing” (Sharp 2009, 94). The main reason that Sharp believes this is because of the practice of gift-giving being so closely tied with diplomacy, even to this day. He summarizes this argument nicely in the following quote:

Even the socialized expectations of exchange and reciprocity which surround gift-giving are initially experienced subjectively within one or both groups. With indirect contact through a successful exchange the situation changes, but even so, a rational choice story can still be told

about the generation of expectations by reciprocal behavior reinforcement (Sharp 2009, 94).

The main argument in this section is that diplomacy is not the art of overturning empires, it is the relationship that forms, “whatever the underlying trends” over the centuries, between those “who want to, or believe that they have to, have relations with each other” (Sharp 2009, 96). Sharp elaborates by giving other potential sociological stories on early diplomacy he conceives as probable, but this message is still present.

As a direct result of this, Sharp says that it takes a specific kind of person to successfully be a diplomat. Sharp dives into the common literature on early diplomats and cliches surrounding the career, but ultimately decides that “it is all very well to say that people in general, and diplomats in particular, ought to be good, but often they are not” and instead, “we should be seeking to explain and understand why this is so, rather than painting a picture of diplomats which may embellish their reputations, but which is at odds with the far less attractive facts” (Sharp 2009, 98). Sharp moves to unpack the “subjective and objective” views of diplomats, starting with Sasson Sofer’s view of “the diplomat as stranger” (Sharp 2009, 99). Sharp does not feel that this metaphor fully captures diplomats at practice because the social distance between a stranger and others is greater than the diplomat and others, but he does admit to its usefulness. Next, Sharp turns to the concept of “diplomats between worlds” which is expressed as “the objective articulation of their occupying places between communities, societies, or organizations of peoples” (Sharp 2009, 101). Sharp argues that because diplomats must carry with them their culture and priorities to a different place with different cultures and priorities, they

naturally fall into a resting place straddling the two. Sharp's commentary here serves as an interesting comparison in particular to Kissinger's conception of a statesman.

Sharp concludes this chapter in a unique way: by asking questions and raising concerns. Sharp is critical of the use of "systems, societies and communities" to identify where diplomacy belongs in the grand scheme of human existence (Sharp 2009, 105). This, despite complicating the research of this thesis in ways previous theorists did not, brings Sharp to several key arguments. Sharp brings up the differences in treatment between diplomacy and international relations as a whole, saying "notions of world systems, societies and communities appear fainter in the diplomatic tradition than do those of their international counterparts" (Sharp 2009, 108). Another observation Sharp draws on is that "from within the diplomatic tradition, something like international systems, whether they have the character of societies or communities or neither, always exist and, thus, something like world societies or communities never do" (Sharp 2009, 108). To take stock of his work, Sharp ends this chapter by using rhetorical questions to frame his and his audiences' opinions on how diplomacy, conditions of separateness, and how a better mental framework for both can contribute to better understanding.

One Last Graph: Agha and Sharp in Context

As the last two theorists examined in this thesis, Agha and Sharp will serve as the last two data entries on my line graph. Given their respective contributions to diplomatic theory, both earned relatively high scores in one category, but not the other. Agha's contributions look similar to Crabb's when looking exclusively at the graphs, and Sharp's scores match the early theorists more than any others. The best explanation I have for this is a branching off in diplomatic theory, one branch following the traditional framework

on diplomacy, and the other adopting new concepts and kinds of diplomacy that break the mold. The graph below shows a clear disjoint between the two more modern theorists from this chapter.




Figure Six: Diplomatic analysis for chapter seven

A greater explanation of the scores each theorist received in this chapter is necessary to support my claims though. First, Agha's Track II diplomacy showed how his theory reflects on diplomatic assumptions and how he thinks outside of the box to address the issues with traditional diplomacy. For these reasons, he earned a score of six out of ten for philosophical thoughtfulness. Though not particularly reflective on truth and reality, the concept of informal negotiations draws on some level of understanding about human nature and interpersonal relationships. On the other axis, Agha's Track II diplomacy is a remarkably pragmatic and creative solution to some of the main issues with traditional diplomacy. Agha writes very directly on how Track II talks work and the procedures used to make sure they are effective. For these reasons, he earned a score of eight out of ten on pragmatism.

Finally, Paul Sharp's diplomatic theory centering on conditions of separateness shows exceptional thoughtfulness and attention to philosophy and sociology, but his work is not quite as high scoring in its pragmatism. Sharp earned a score of ten out of ten in philosophy in my examination of his work because of how he questions the assumptions on why diplomacy is used from multiple perspectives: psychological, sociological, and philosophical. His section analyzing the framework we use to understand diplomacy and international relations engages on an almost metaphysical level, which is rather impressive. However, Sharp earned a score of four out of ten for practicality because he only engages occasionally with what his theory would look like in application, and none of his ideas seem to be driven by need as opposed to curiosity. I believe that in this case, Sharp is more concerned about being fundamentally right in his understanding than creating a successful tool for diplomats to reference. I end this chapter and the bulk of the research for my thesis, thus, at a crossroads between the old and the new, tradition and the future.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

Tying it All Together

In concluding this thesis, I have found a clear trend in how diplomatic theory changed pragmatically and philosophically from before and after the cold war, as well as branched in different directions at the turn of the century. This translates to a more a more uniform theoretical history to a more varied future for diplomatic theory, which can be seen in reviewing the progression of my graphs in this thesis. My research began with Morgenthau and Bull, both more traditional theorists as the end of World War II came about. Both writers received similar scores, establishing a stable base comparison with a higher score of philosophy than pragmatism, as seen in the graph shown in chapter two labeled Figure One. In chapter three and four, Kissinger and Wendt strayed from the only slightly, but interestingly enough the philosophy and the pragmatism lines move almost parallel to each other for through Wendt. To me, this indicates stable beginnings with a standard proportion of philosophy and practicality at work in some of the major works on diplomatic theory.

Then, as discussed in chapter five, Crabb's work on diplomatic pragmatism is a major variation from the standard, with a higher score in practicality for the first time. This strikes me as important because this standard proportion of philosophy to pragmatism seems to no longer be accurate for diplomatic theorists. Given the timing of Crabb's publication at the end of the Cold War, it makes sense that the tensions of the era

produced a kind of diplomacy that required more practical thinking and for a moment, the need for a connection to a higher philosophical tradition became obsolete. Through Nye and Gilboa, scores in philosophy and pragmatism fluctuated and the pattern that held together for the first four theorists disappears. With these new 21st century theories comes greater variation of overall scores and the difference between philosophic principles and practicality. Finally, my survey concludes with Agha and Sharp, the most modern of diplomatic theorists surveyed. While Agha takes a vastly different approach to diplomacy and strays again from the traditional uses of philosophy and pragmatism, Sharp's scores are similar to those of the first couple theorists surveyed in this thesis, and his theory relies far more heavily on philosophy than many modern-day counterparts.

In looking at this research from the broadest perspective, I believe my findings support the idea that diplomatic theory started off traditionally heavier in philosophy than pragmatism, then became very reliant on pragmatism during the Cold War, and by the turn of the century diplomacy began to split and thus diplomatic theory was forced to completely new kinds of diplomatic theory, or returned to a more traditional style of diplomacy focusing on the philosophic questions of old. I hope to continue surveying diplomatic theory throughout my life and see if a greater trend emerges by expanding this philosophic versus pragmatic approach for the next 50 or 100 years.

Revisiting Diplomatic Theory

To conclude this research, it is important to revisit the original purpose of this thesis in identifying the assumptions behind diplomacy to better understand the field as a whole. My goal was to establish a better appreciation for diplomacy in studying more of the questions about *why* diplomacy is used in certain ways and what that says more

broadly about its practitioners. Though theory and practice are but two sides of the same coin of diplomacy yet teaching practice without also teaching the fundamental philosophy behind it poorly sets up future diplomats to be able to flourish in their career. Protocol not based in higher principles and practices not rooted in some greater goal beyond the physical act of writing, negotiating, etc. is what makes bureaucracies into the lifeless organs that they are, and my hope is that in writing this thesis, I can provide inspiration and understanding to aspiring diplomats like myself.

It is my sincere hope that as I continue to study diplomatic theory and the philosophy behind diplomacy, I will grant myself and anyone who reads this thesis an ability to view this field of work through an underappreciated lens. As the events continue to unfold in Ukraine, as China continues to put pressure on Western democracies, and as partisan divisions in America increase, I believe the best of statesmen and stateswomen will emerge as the ones who have a grasp of why we have gotten to this point in human history, and how to continue on. Now more than ever, we will need innovative, aware, and intelligent leaders representing the U.S. abroad.

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