ABSTRACT

Who Does Consociationalism Work For? Evidence from the Arab Barometer Survey of Lebanon

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This study examines the extent to which confessional identities in Lebanon are responsible for shaping individual views toward their government. Specifically, I investigate disparities between religious groups in their perceptions of democracy and democratic principles as applied in Lebanon. Using nationally representative data from the Arab Barometer's survey of Lebanon, I find that when compared to Maronite Catholics, Druze, and Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims consistently give higher evaluations of democracy and human rights in Lebanon. When compared to members of other religious groups, Shia Muslims are also more trusting of political institutions and perceive Lebanon to be freer. I find little evidence that the application of consociational theory equally and proportionally represents the political needs of the religious groups intended to be served. Rather, my findings support consociationalism's critics who argue that consociationalism essentializes group-identity to political disputes.

Who Does Consociationalism Work For? Evidence from the Arab Barometer Survey of Lebanon

by

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A Thesis

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DEDICATION

To Siyin and Shiloh

CHAPTER ONE

Review of Literature

The sociology of religion has primarily been informed by the study of Christianity in the Western world, particularly in the United States. By making generalizations about how religion operates, while only focusing on one part of the world, scholars risk failing to see religion in the global context. In particular, the West offers a religious setting that is actually atypical when compared to the global religious landscape. The United States, for example, has a relatively unregulated religious marketplace, while most of the global population reside in nations where religious regulation and favoritism are considered high or very high (Beyer 2003; Finke and Martin 2014; Grim and Finke 2007, 2010; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2014). Religious restrictions have been steadily increasing globally, and these restrictions are increasing in every major region of the world (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2014). If moderate to high religious regulations are the most common setting in which religious practice occurs, it then follows that a general understanding of the sociology of religion cannot be limited to regions where religious choice is relatively free.

Lebanon provides unique insights into how religion operates under specific restrictions, as religious restrictions are inherent to the nature of their government structure. Lebanon's "consociational confessional" government structure exists as an attempt to end interreligious conflict and to maintain religious equality. Specifically, this structure ensures that Christians and Muslims will occupy seats in the nation's parliament

relative to their demographic presence and requires the President of Lebanon to be a Maronite Catholic, the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim, and their Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim. Other ministerial posts and political offices are also allocated according to religious confession in an attempt to maintain peace and equality. Eighteen official religious confessions are recognized, all of them Christian and Muslim, in addition to Judaism (For an exhaustive list of Lebanon's represented confessional groups, see Table 1). These religious and political restrictions contribute to Lebanon being ranked as a moderate government regulator of religion. Societal restrictions on religion in Lebanon are high, which is often linked to government imposed religious restrictions (Grim and Finke 2010; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2014).

Lebanon's constitution claims religious freedom, and their government restrictions have been implemented in an attempt to establish and maintain peace among religious groups. Consociationalists argue that distributing power based on religious identity can successfully build lasting peaceful relations in Lebanon and elsewhere. However, investigations into the effectiveness of these policies are warranted. Constitutional declarations of religious freedom have been shown to have no relationship with the actualization of religious freedom (Finke and Martin 2014; Fox and Flores 2009). Critics have argued that consociationalism unnecessarily essentializes ethnic and religious identities to political disputes, which leads to intergroup inequality and conflict.

In this study, I investigate the effectiveness of consociationalism in equally addressing the needs of Lebanon's major religious groups. I begin this paper by explaining the historical context and my theoretical and conceptual considerations. I also include a section dedicated to how consociational theorists have applied their research to

Lebanon. I then offer three hypotheses that have been developed based on these considerations. Using the Arab Barometer's survey of Lebanon, I estimate the effects of religious identity on attitudes relevant to the state and effectiveness of democracy in Lebanon. In this study I find evidence that Lebanon's consociational form of government is not working equally for the religious groups it was intended to fairly represent. Shia Muslims consistently give the Lebanese government more positive evaluations on issues related to democracy when compared to Sunni Muslims, Maronite Catholics, and Druze. Maronite Catholics and Druze respondents consistently give the Lebanese government the most negative evaluations on these issues.

Table 1. Recognized Religious Confessional Groups in Lebanon

Recognized Religious Confessions	Estimated Population
Sunni Islam	27%
Shia Islam	27%
Maronite Church	21%
Greek Orthodox Church	8%
Greek Catholic	5%
Druze	5%
Armenian Orthodox	>7%
Armenian Catholic	>7%
Syriac Orthodox	>7%
Syriac Catholic	>7%
Assyrian Church of the East	>7%
Chaldean Catholic	>7%
Copts	>7%
Protestant	>7%
Latin Catholic	>7%
Judaism	>7%
Alawite	Not specified
Isma'ili	Not specified

Source: Association of Religion Data Archives 2010

This study answers a call for further research identifying groups most impacted by religious restrictions, how institutions function under religious restrictions, and how religious restrictions impact avenues for political activities (Finke 2013). Among its most

significant contributions, this research (1) hits directly on the sociology of religion by building a profile of religious attitudes in Lebanon; (2) brings an international focus to the sociological understanding of church-state relations (Finke and Stark 2005; Gill 1998, 2008; Stark and Finke 2000); and (3) bridges together parallel literatures on consociationalism in the fields of sociology and political science.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of Literature

Historical Context

Consociational principles governed Lebanon for most of the 20th century and after. The National Pact of 1943, an unwritten agreement establishing Lebanon as a multi-confessional state, requires that the president of Lebanon always be a Maronite Catholic, the Prime Minister of the Republic a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim, and the Chief of Army Staff a Druze. The agreement also required that the parliament to be divided 6:5 with Christians holding more seats than Muslims. During this period, Christians benefited from their demographic majority status, majority presence in the parliament, and power afforded to the office of the President (Harik 1996; Lijphart 1977).

An exhaustive explanation of events contributing to Lebanon's two major civil wars, in 1958 and 1975, cannot be done justice in a paper of this length. Instead, I focus on major historical events that are relevant to changes in the amount of power confessional groups in Lebanon have been afforded. Both conflicts arose out of significant levels of discontent and anxiety regarding the future direction of the nation, with complaints being divided among confessional lines. Many Sunni and Shia Muslims were unhappy with Lebanon's power structure, which was seen as favoring Christians. Sunni Muslims were interested in drawing Lebanon closer to the rest of the Arab world, while Christians and Druze felt that this policy would lead to their being further

marginalized as minorities in the region. Lebanese Druze were also struggling to hold on to their land and unity (Harik 1996; Kreidie and Monroe 2002). Deadlock in confessionally driven urbanization projects significantly contributed to both civil wars. Salamey and Tabar have stated that "sectarian friction within the urban context, especially in Beirut, was at the heart of the short-lived civil war of 1958 and the devastating one of 1975" (2008:246). With policies resulting in mass displacement, confessionally driven political deadlock, and sectarian identity overtaking national identity, sectarian tensions were exacerbated to the point of civil war (Farha 2012; Salamey and Tabar 2008). While the 1975 Civil War emerged with variegated interests in competition, belligerent participants were still significantly divided among confessional lines. The more secular, left-leaning, nationalist Lebanese National Movement had a significant Sunni and Druze presence. The predominantly Christian, right of center, Kataeb Party was more supportive of the confessional status-quo and economically was liberal. Hezbollah emerged as a major military representative of Shia Muslims and framed itself as a religious resistance organizations (Baylouny 2014; Worral, Mabon, and Clubb 2015).

The post-war environment in Lebanon has largely been beneficial to Sunni and Shia political interests, while Christians have lost a measurable amount of political influence, and the Druze have struggled for internal cohesion and a sense of security (El-Husseini 2012; Harris 2012). Harris argues that Lebanon's Maronite population had "lost their grip on Lebanon" (2012:233) and that "by the 1990s, there was a recognizable Christian collective with a common sense of frustration and disempowerment" (2012:233). In accordance with the Taif Agreement, which was responsible for ending

the Civil War, a significant amount of political power was transferred from the office of the President (a Maronite Catholic) to the office of the Prime Minister (a Sunni Muslim). The Shia led parliament was then delegated official control over most government activities (El-Husseini 2012). Christians had lost their statistical majority status, and accordingly, their majority status in the parliament was replace with a one-to-one split with Muslim parliamentarians (See Table 2). The Druze were left with an increasing sense of vulnerability to larger confessional groups. In the post-war era, the Druze have also struggled in not having their political leaders make the alignments that they as a group would prefer (El Husseini 2012; Harris 2012).

Table 2. Confessional Requirements for Major Political Offices According to the National Pact and the Taif Agreement

Agreement	President	Prime Minister	Speaker of Parliament	Deputy Speaker of the Parliament	Parliament
National Pact	Maronite Catholic	Sunni Muslim	Shia Muslim	Greek Orthodox	6:5 Christian:Muslim
Taif Agreement	Maronite Catholic	Sunni Muslim	Shia Muslim	Greek Orthodox	1:1 Christian:Muslim

Source: Salamey 2013

On the other hand, Sunnis “discovered the virtue of a multicommunal Lebanese state” (Harris 2012:233) and “became committed Lebanese as never before” (Harris 2012:233).

Following the Civil War, Shia Muslims in Lebanon have enjoyed a significant increase in representation in political structures and increased power through activities external to politics. While all militias were required to disarm at the end of the Civil War, Hezbollah, which currently courts the majority of Lebanon’s Shia voters, was given an exception (Worral et al. 2015). Hezbollah and the Amal movement, another Shia Muslim political party, have made significant gains in the political sphere (Harik 1996; Khashan

and Mousawi 2007). While both of these parties made gains in Lebanon's first post-war election, Christians boycotted the election in part due to their opposition to the Syria's occupation and political involvement (Harik 1996). Hezbollah is now better armed than the Lebanese army, a fact that provokes a significant amount of criticism from members of Lebanon's other religious confessions. Hezbollah and the Syrian government have been accused of being responsible for the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the Sunni Prime Minister who represented the majority of Sunni citizens and had campaigned across sectarian lines with relative success (Akbarzadeh 2015; Cammett and Issar 2010; El-Husseini 2012; Khashan and Mousawi 1997).

Consociational Theory

Consociational theory is among the most prominent theories utilized for democratically managing societies that are religiously, ethnically, or otherwise segmented (Dixon 2011). This theory was initially developed to address divisions along ethnic, class, and religious lines in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland. Consociationalists have argued that consociationalism was responsible for the peace and political stability in these diverse nations, when many would expect the opposite to have resulted from their rates of diversity (Lijphart 1977; McGarry and O'Leary 2006a; Wilkinson 2000). Lijphart (1977) has identified four principles which he believes dampens ethnic and religious conflict and prescribes them for nations that are likewise demographically segmented. The four main principles are:

(1) The Grand Coalition: Governments are to be made up of representatives from each of a nation's major religious, linguistic, class, ethnic, or other demographic groupings. Their representative are to share in executive power.

(2) Proportionality: Each demographic group is required to have proportional representation in the government and in major political posts. Each demographic group is to be a “proportional beneficiary of public resources and expenditures” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006a:44)

(3) Autonomy: Each demographic group is to have a guaranteed right to autonomy and self-governance.

(4) Mutual Veto-Rights: Representatives of each demographic group are to be granted the right to veto political actions that are deemed contrary to their group interests.

In order for these principles to succeed, the interests of each demographic group should be adequately and equally reflected in a grand coalition. If one of the groups which a consociational government attempts to represent feels marginalized by the state, the legitimacy of the consociational government system may become undermined (Farha 2012). Lijphart (1977) further argues that these principles are most likely to succeed when a strong case can be made that national unity is in the best interests of all groups in conflict. For example, groups at war may find cooperation under nationalistic terms to be beneficial when a mutual threat, external to their nation, is perceived.

Empirical Support for Consociational Representation

Consociational theorists credit consociationalism for successful peace efforts in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the British government’s adoption of consociational policies that led to the Irish Republican Army’s 1994 ceasefire agreement has been cited. Consociationalists also frequently cite Northern Ireland’s 1998 Good Friday Agreement as an instance where adversarial political parties were able to agree on consociational principles, which have been largely beneficial for Northern Ireland (Dixon 2011; Taylor 2009). McGarry and O’Leary (2006b) elaborate by arguing that the consociational Good Friday Agreement is responsible for a dramatic decrease in violence in Northern Ireland.

Other sociologists and political scientists have credited consociationalism with introducing increased levels of peace between religious and ethnic groups in India. Consociationalism has also been attributed with brining more civil liberties to India's minority groups (Farha 2012; Lijphart 1996). Lijphart credits consociationalism with bringing fair representation to all of India's myriad of religious, linguistic, caste, and regional groups. Consociationalists argue that between 1947 and 1966 India was adhering closer to consociational principles than at any other point in Indian history and that this period was accompanied by the lowest rates of intergroup violence in the nation's history (Farha 2012; Lijphart 1996; Wilkinson 2000).

Criticisms of Consociational Representation

Consociationalism is criticized for essentializing group identity to the political needs of individuals, to political disputes, and to government policy (Dixon 2011; Farha 2012; Hamzeh 2001). Political decisions and group gains and losses then become inextricably tied, which increases the degree to which religious identification is politically consequential (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Brown 2010; Huddy, O'Sears, and Levy 2013; Sidanius & Pratto 2001). As group identities become intrinsic to political decision making, socioeconomic and other prudential interests are rivaled by group identity. The individual then makes political decisions with the power associated with group membership in mind, while class interests are made subservient to group membership. With the government treating individuals by their identity first, and the individual being forced to choose their group identity as their foremost political concern, the likelihood that socioeconomic and other prudential needs are addressed significantly decreases.

Critics also argue that consociational systems of government are unlikely to fairly represent all people, as representation is consolidated among specific group elites. Consociational victory is declared when political elites are publicly reconciled, while grassroots concerns are ignored. Consociational theorists assume that placing members of an ethnic group into political offices ensures that all members of an ethnic group are properly and equally represented. Consociational political structures also encourage segregation, limiting the opportunities for conflict resolution through intergroup contact (Dixon 2011). Critics note that this presupposes a one dimensional view of ethnicity, which ignores the various social spaces occupied by individuals. While consociationalists see the distribution of resources among various ethnic or religious groups as promoting equality, critics argue that this ignores the strong potential for unequal distribution within groups (Wilkinson 2000).

Wilkinson (2000) cited India as a strong case refuting the effectiveness of consociational forms of governments for managing diverse societies. Wilkinson (2000) states that from 1919 until 1947, India experienced high levels of group conflict while adhering closely to consociational political principles. Wilkinson then argues that Lijphart (1996) was incorrect in labelling India's more peaceful period in the years 1947-1964 as consociational. In further contrast to Lijphart, Wilkinson asserts that India became consociational again in 1965, and attributes an increase in religious, ethnic, and caste-based conflict to India becoming consociational again.

Consociationalism in Lebanon

Cammet and Issar (2010) describe Lebanon as a quasi, pseudo, or incomplete democracy. The degree to which power struggles are determined by democratic practices

is limited. Rather, political parties and other sectarian leaders engage in activities outside of official channels in order to gain power. This can include encouraging protests, riots, and even "militia warfare" (Cammet and Issar 2010:383). Frequent changes in Lebanon's electoral policies also may cheapen the value of electoral considerations, as political actors believe that electoral rules are easily subject to change.

According to the Taif Accords, the political agreement which ended Lebanon's civil war in 1990, parliamentary seats are to be ascribed based on religious confession. However, Lebanon's political structure is also set up so that when a religious sect has a majority in a constituency, they are able to determine "the election of candidates supposedly representing another sect without them necessarily having the backing of a majority of their own sect" (Worrall et al. 2015:92). This forces sects that are thinly and widely distributed to be represented by candidates who they did not vote for, even members of “rival factions” (Worral et al. 2015:92). This disproportionately effects Lebanon's Christian populations and benefits Hezbollah (Cammet and Issar 2010; Worral et al. 2015). Lebanon's endorsement of consociationalism communicates the message to its citizens that their religious confession is the most important factor to consider when considering political representation and positions.

Farha (2012) argues that while consociationalism has helped to maintain diversity in Lebanon's government, this has come at the expense of the "usual standards of democracy and individual (as opposed to communal) rights" (Farha 2012:376). As with other consociational governments, Lebanon's confessional consociational system often ignores class, religious, ideological, and other non-demographic identity based differences. With group identity trumping prudential political interests, the Lebanese

government has addressed urbanization along prescribed confessional and "often primordial" lines (Harik 1996; Salamey and Paul 2008:244). During the post-war period, class-based and other interests have emerged, shaping and changing individual identities. Rather than acknowledging the class, regional, and other nationally inclusive identities that that haven arisen, Lebanon has drawn political borders, set up a government structure, and organized daily life in such a manner that places ultimate value on a person's confessional identity. Because these polices treat religious confessions as primary, and the government only recognizes eighteen religious confessions, these policies treat those with other or no religious confession as if they do not exist (Salamey and Paul 2008).

CHAPTER THREE

Hypotheses

Democracy and Human Rights

This study is guided by three hypotheses. First, while Lebanon's consociational arrangements were implemented in order to fairly and proportionally represent all of Lebanon's major confessional groups, critics argue that consociational arrangements have essentialized confessional identities to political matters in the country. Rather than considering the economy, education, and other prudential needs, individuals frame political success in terms of their confessional group's relative power. Since the Taif Agreement was signed, Christians have felt collectively hurt by their relative political losses, while the Druze remain insecure in their minority status (Harris 2012). On the other hand, a significant amount of political power has been transferred from Christians to Muslims, and Muslims have made significant relative political gains. In addition, Shia Muslims have been able to benefit from political and extra-political representation from Hezbollah. Thus, I hypothesize:

H1: Shia Muslims will evaluate Lebanon as being more democratic and as having greater human rights when compared to Maronites, Sunnis, and Druze.

Trust in Political Institutions

Trust in political institutions are vital to the social and political stability of a nation (Kukovič 2013; Nikolayenka 2014) and is reflective on the legitimacy of a democracy (Kukovič 2013). Additionally, low trust in government institutions is

indicative of perceived discrimination (Liebkind and Jasinkaja-Lahti 2000). When a government is unequal in the application and proper use of democratic principles, unequal levels of trust in the government are expected to follow (Kukovič 2013; Sztompka 1999). Thus, I expect:

H2: Shia Muslims will be more trusting of political institutions when compared to Maronites, Sunnis, and Druze.

Perceptions of Freedoms

Finally, freedom is a basic value of contemporary societies and is highly desired by citizens (Naito 2007). In liberal democracies, individuals should perceive a significantly degree of a freedom (Berlin 2002; Mill 1977). Thus, perceived freedoms should be an indicator of the effectiveness of the implementation of a democratic government. I expect that:

H3: Shia Muslims will be more likely to say that Lebanon guarantees freedoms when compared to Maronites, Sunnis, and Druze.

CHAPTER FOUR

Methods

Data

This research project utilizes the third wave of the Arab Barometer's survey of Lebanon. The Arab Barometer was established in a partnership between scholars at the University of Michigan, Princeton University, and universities and research centers throughout the Arab majority world. The project has been expanded through a partnership with the Arab Reform initiative. Multi-stage area probability sampling is used to select nationally representative estimates of respondents in multiple Arab majority nations. Stratification techniques ensured representation from the seven governorates of Lebanon. The survey is stratified by socioeconomic status and by religious confessional identities, which is critical for this research project. The sample is divided according the Lebanon's 571 officially populated districts and divided into statistical blocks. Households were randomly selected to recruit interview subjects to take part in face-to-face Arabic language surveys (Arab Barometer 2014).

Dependent Variables

For the first set of analyses, two indicators of perceptions of democracy were used as dependent variables. “Extent of democracy” asks respondents how democratic (0, no democracy whatsoever, to 10, democratic to the greatest possible extent) the respondent believes their country to be. “Democracy and human rights” asks the respondent how

they evaluate (from 1, very bad, to 5, very good, after reverse coding) the state of democracy and human rights in their country on the day the survey was administered.

Next, four indicators of trust in political institutions were used as dependent variables[1]. "Trust government" asks respondents to what extent (from 0, I absolutely do not trust it, to 1, I trust it to a limited extent, I trust it to a medium extent or I trust it to a great extent, after recoding) they trust their nation's government or cabinet. "Trust parliament" asks respondents to what extent (0, I absolutely do not trust it, to 1, I trust it to a limited extent, I trust it to a medium extent or I trust it to a great extent, after recoding) they trust Lebanon's Council of Representatives (the Parliament). "Trust police" asks respondents to what extent (0, I absolutely do not trust it, to 1, I trust it to a limited extent, I trust it to a medium extent or I trust it to a great extent, after recoding) they trust Lebanon's Internal Security Force (the police). "Trust army" asks respondents to what extent (0, I absolutely do not trust it, to 1, I trust it to a limited extent, I trust it to a medium extent or I trust it to a great extent, after recoding) they trust the Lebanese Army.

Finally, seven indicators of perceptions of freedoms were used as dependent variables. "Freedom to express opinions" asks respondents to what extent (0, not guaranteed, to 1, guaranteed to a limited extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, or guaranteed to a great extent, after recoding) is the freedom to express opinions guaranteed in their country. "Freedom of the press" asks respondents to what extent (0,

[1] While the possibility of building indexes for trust in political institutions and views of freedom is interesting, I decided to keep all of the variables disaggregated. Because political offices and policies are separated along confessional lines, telling the story of how each group views each political office and freedom on each issue tells a more complete story of to what extent each office and police effects each confessional group.

not guaranteed, to 1, guaranteed to a limited extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, or guaranteed to a great extent, after recoding) freedom of the press is guaranteed in their country. “Freedom to join political parties” asks respondents to what extent (0, not guaranteed, to 1, guaranteed to a limited extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, or guaranteed to a great extent, after recoding) freedom to join political parties in guaranteed in their country. “Freedom to protest” asks respondents to what extent (0, not guaranteed, to 1, guaranteed to a limited extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, or guaranteed to a great extent, after recoding) freedom to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations is guaranteed in their country. “Freedom to join civil organizations” asks respondents to what extent (0, not guaranteed, to 1, guaranteed to a limited extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, or guaranteed to a great extent, after recoding) freedom to join civil associations and organizations is guaranteed in their country. “Freedom to sue the government” asks respondents to what extent (0, not guaranteed, to 1, guaranteed to a limited extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, or guaranteed to a great extent, after recoding) the freedom to sue the government and its agencies is guaranteed in their country. “Freedom to vote” asks respondents to what extent (0, not guaranteed, to 1, guaranteed to a limited extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, or guaranteed to a great extent, after recoding) the freedom to vote in parliamentary, municipal, and provincial elections is guaranteed in their country.

Independent Variables

Four religious categories were used in this study. Respondents in this study either identified as (a) Maronite Catholic, (b) Sunni Muslim, (c) Shia Muslim (reference category), or (d) Druze. Shia and Sunni Muslims are tied for a statistical majority status.

Shia Muslims are hypothesized to give the most positive evaluations of their government when compared to all of the confessional groups. Because every religious group will be compared to Shia Muslims, they were chosen as the reference group for this study.

Control Variables

Following research on political opinions, key sociodemographic variables are controlled for. *Urban/Rural* living location of the respondent is coded as a dummy variable where rural =1 and urban = 0. *Age* is measured in years and captures all respondents from the age of 18 to 85. The respondent's gender is reflected in the *female* dummy variable where female = 1 and male = 0. *Education* is an ordinal variable where 1 = illiterate/no formal education, 2 = elementary school education, 3 = preparatory/basic education, 4 = secondary school education, 5 = mid-level diploma/professional or technical education, 6 = bachelor's degree, and 7 = master's degree. *Employed* measures whether or not the respondent is employed (0 = no, 1 = yes). *Household Income* includes the respondents' self-reported monthly household income. A log transformation was used on this variable to correct skewness. *Married* is a dummy variable where married = 1 and bachelor and widowed = 0 after recoding. Initially, political party affiliation and regional governorates were controlled for. However, the models containing these variables had high variable inflation factors. This was anticipated, as consociationalism forces political affiliations to be drawn along religious lines. Thus, political party affiliation and religious identity are strongly correlated. Additionally, regional concentration of religious groups are also common in Lebanon (Harris 2012). Due to the problem of multicollinearity, political party affiliation and regional governorate variables were dropped from the final models.

Analytic Procedure

Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in this study. Table 4 presents the mean of each of the socioeconomic variables by each religious group.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Democracy and Human Rights	2.314	1.093	1	5
Extent of Democracy	4.221	2.700	0	10
Trust Government	0.321	0.467	0	1
Trust Parliament	0.416	0.493	0	1
Trust Police	0.679	0.467	0	1
Trust Army	0.882	0.321	0	1
Freedom to Express Opinions	0.815	0.388	0	1
Freedom of the Press	0.778	0.415	0	1
Freedom to Join Political Parties	0.894	0.307	0	1
Freedom to Protest	0.862	0.344	0	1
Freedom to Join Civil Organizations	0.915	0.277	0	1
Freedom to Sue the Government	0.284	0.451	0	1
Freedom to Vote	0.876	0.328	0	1
Maronite	0.304	0.460	0	1
Sunni	0.306	0.461	0	1
Shia	0.294	0.456	0	1
Druze	0.095	0.293	0	1
Rural	0.133	0.340	0	1
Age	40.148	15.014	18	85
Female	0.504	0.500	0	1
Education	3.849	1.702	1	7
Employed	0.660	0.473	0	1
Household Income (logged)	7.273	0.649	5.010	9.952
Marital Status	0.601	0.489	0	1

Each subheading in the results sections of this paper begins by introducing a mean comparison of each religious group's responses to the questions being used as dependent variables. I use ordinary least squares modeling as a multivariate analytic strategy to test the relationships between religious identity and perceptions of democracy and human rights in Lebanon. I then utilize binary logistic regression modeling to test the

relationships between religious identification and trust in political institutions. I end the study with binary logistic regression models that test the relationships between religious identity and perceptions of freedom in Lebanon.

Table 4. Mean Socioeconomic Descriptive Statistics by Religious Group

Independent Variables	Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Druze
Rural	0.093	0.291	0.031	0.100
Age	38.327	36.284	46.479	37.740
Female	0.501	0.498	0.514	0.500
Education	3.919	4.100	3.598	3.650
Employed	0.643	0.652	0.662	0.730
Household Income (logged)	7.110	7.313	7.383	7.360
Marital Status	0.576	0.647	0.605	0.530

CHAPTER FIVE

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Maronite, Sunni, and Shia respondents were almost evenly distributed among the sample and these religious groups compose just over 75 percent of the sample. Druze respondents were in a clear minority, making up just 8.33 percent of the sample. A number of smaller Christian denominations made up the rest of the sample, but were deleted due to their having sample sizes too small to detect much significance. In the final sample, Maronite, Sunni, and Shia respondents compose about 90 percent of the sample, while the rest of the sample is composed of Druze respondents. The average respondent is about 40 year's old, female, has at least a preparatory/basic education, is employed, and is married.

Shia Muslims were the most rurally concentrated religious group in the sample, followed by Druze, Sunni Muslims, and Maronite Catholics respectively. The average age of respondents were similar with the exception of Maronite Catholics, who have the highest average age. Men and women were essentially equally distributed in the sample and among each of the religious groups. Household Income was slightly lower among Sunni Muslims, and Sunni Muslims were also slightly less likely than other groups to be employed. Marriage rates were highest among Maronite Catholics and Shia Muslims.

Democracy and Human Rights

Table 5 presents mean comparisons for evaluations of democracy and human rights in Lebanon across religious contexts. The most significant findings occur when respondents are asked to evaluate how democratic the government of Lebanon is on a 10 item scale. Only Shia Muslims rated the Lebanese government as more democratic than undemocratic, and their mean evaluation of democracy in Lebanon significantly differs from all of the other religious groups. Shia Muslims also gave Lebanon the highest evaluation of its state of democracy and human rights, but they only significantly differed from Maronite Catholics.

Table 5. Religious Group Mean Evaluations of Democracy and Human Rights

Religious Groups	Extent of Democracy	Democracy and Human Rights
Maronite	3.620[a]	2.175[a]
Sunni	3.928[a]	2.271
Shia	5.211[bcd]	2.482[c]
Druze	4.090[a]	2.380

[a]Different from Shiites at .05 level or better.
[b]Different from Sunnis at .05 level or better.
[c]Different from Maronites at .05 level or better.
[d]Different from Druze at .05 level or better.

Table 6 presents the results from two ordinary least squares regression models investigating the relationship between religious identity and evaluations of democracy and human rights in Lebanon[2]. The first model estimates the extent to which respondents perceive the government of Lebanon to be democratic, and the second model estimates

[2] Logistic regression was initially considered for measuring extent of democracy, but the proportional odds assumption was violated. Using multinomial modeling techniques would have been conceptually problematic and would have yielded less accessible results. An OLS model is run instead, which as Zhai and Woodberry (2011) state, yields nearly identical results when the number of response categories is five.

how respondents evaluate the state of democracy and human rights in Lebanon, controlling for urban/rural living, age, gender, household income, education, employment status, household income, and marital status.

Table 6. Results from OLS Regression Models Predicting Evaluations of Democracy and Human Rights

Independent Variables	Extent of Democracy	Democracy and Human Rights
Intercept	5.985***	2.944***
Maronite	-1.542***	-0.220*
Sunni	-1.330***	-0.190*
Druze	-0.963**	-0.060
Rural	0.061	0.180
Age	0.00005	-0.001
Female	-0.466*	-0.143
Education	0.087	0.046*
Employed	-0.396*	-0.197*
Household Income	-0.069	-0.048
Marital Status	-0.165	-0.118
N	954	958
R-Square	0.073	0.033

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

H1 is mostly supported. Controlling for all else, Shia respondents evaluate Lebanon as being significantly more democratic, when compared to Sunnis (b = -1.330, p < 0.001), Maronite Catholics (b = -1.542, p < 0.001), and Druze (b = -0.963, p < 0.01) respondents. Shia respondents also evaluate the state of human rights and democracy in Lebanon as being higher when compared Sunnis (b = -0.190, p < 0.05) and Maronite Catholics (b = -0.220, p < 0.05). Females and the unemployed evaluated Lebanon as less democratic when compared to males and the employed respectively. The unemployed evaluated Lebanon as having a worse state of democracy and human rights than the employed. Increases in years of education was associated with slightly higher evaluations of the state of democracy and human rights in Lebanon.

Trust in Political Institutions

Table 7 provides comparisons of means on trust in institutions among the four religious groups that this study focuses on. Just as Shia respondents consider Lebanon to be more democratic than do Maronite, Sunni, and Druze respondents, Shia respondents are also more trusting of their democratic government and the parliament, which is made up of democratically elected participants. Sunni and Shia respondents were both significantly more trusting of the government than were Maronite and Druze respondents. Sunni respondents were significantly more trusting of the parliament when compared to Maronite and Druze respondents.

As seen in Table 7, Shia respondents were significantly more trusting of the police when compared to Maronite and Sunni respondents. Interestingly, Druze, Shia, and Maronite respondents were all significantly more trusting of the army when compared to Sunni respondents.

Table 7. Religious Group Mean Trust in Political Institutions

Religious Groups	Trust Government	Trust Parliament	Trust Police	Trust Army
Maronite	0.195[ab]	0.224[ab]	0.610[a]	0.931[b]
Sunni	0.420[cd]	0.438[acd]	0.659[a]	0.744[acd]
Shia	0.381[cd]	0.647[bcd]	0.763[bc]	0.950[b]
Druze	0.220[ab]	0.242[ab]	0.700	0.960[b]

[a]Different from Shiites at .05 level or better.
[b]Different from Sunnis at .05 level or better.
[c]Different from Maronites at .05 level or better.
[d]Different from Druze at .05 level or better.

Table 8 presents the results from four binary logistic regress models estimating trust in political institutions among religious groups, net control variables[3]. These findings provide mixed support for H2.

Table 8. Estimated Odds Ratios for Trust in Political Institutions

Independent Variables	Trust Government	Trust Parliament	Trust Police	Trust Army
Maronite	0.436***	0.193***	0.560**	0.552
	(0.211)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.368)
Sunni	1.292	0.479***	0.710	0.138***
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.307)
Druze	0.604	0.221***	0.908	1.508
	(0.292)	(0.292)	(0.289)	(0.696)
Rural	1.261	2.260***	2.030**	0.946
	(0.210)	(0.221)	(0.255)	(335)
Age	0.994	0.994	1.008	1.018*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Female	0.850	0.879	1.269	1.593*
	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.228)
Education	1.056	1.062	1.029	1.020
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.065)
Employed	0.648**	0.855	0.901	1.338
	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.235)
Household	0.898	0.772	0.953	0.925
Income	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.175)
Married	0.783	0.899	1.074	0.638
	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.246)
N	955	951	954	954
Max-Rescaled R-Square	0.087	0.191	0.042	0.169

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Notes: Trust the armed forces (the army) uses a Firth's rare event bias correction. Standard errors in parentheses.

When it comes to having a general trust in the government and trust in the police, Shia Muslims only have significantly higher odds of trust when compared to Maronite

[3] Initially ordered logistic regression models were run. Due to a violation of the proportional odds assumption, binary logistic models were estimated instead.

Catholics. When it comes to trust in the army, Shia Muslims only have higher odds of trust when compared to Sunni Muslims. Shia Muslims only had higher odds of trusting when compared to all of the other religious groups when it came to trust in the Parliament, an institution which is required to be led by a Shia Muslim. Control variables were only significant to a minimal extent, which is consistent with the criticism that consociationalism reinforces religious identity based differences over economic and other political needs. Employed respondents are less trusting of the government. Lower household income is associated with being less trusting of the parliament. Rural-based respondents had greater odds of trusting the police. Being female and increased age were associated with greater odds of trusting the Lebanese Army.

Perceptions of Freedom

Results presented in Table 9 reveal that evaluations of the freedoms that are guaranteed in Lebanon were generally high, with the exception of the freedom to sue the government. In each case, Shia respondents reported the highest levels of perceived freedoms. Shia respondents were significantly more likely than Sunni and Maronite respondents to report that their government guarantees press freedoms, while Sunni respondents were more likely to report that their government guarantees press freedom than Maronite respondents. Shia respondents were more likely to believe that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to express opinions than were members of all the other religious groups. Sunni respondents were more likely to believe that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to express opinions than were Druze and Maronite respondents. Shia respondents were significantly more likely to believe that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to join political parties than were Sunni, Druze, and Maronite respondents. Shia

respondents were significantly more likely that Sunni, Druze, and Maronite respondents to report that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to participate in peaceful protests. Sunni respondents were more likely to report that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to protest when compared to Maronite respondents. Shia respondents were more likely than Maronite respondents to say that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to join civil associations and organizations. Shia respondents were more likely to report that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to sue the government when compared to respondents from all other religious groups. Sunni respondents were more likely to believe that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to sue the government when compared to Maronite respondents. Sunni and Shia respondents were both significantly more likely to report that Lebanon guarantees the freedom to vote when compared to Maronite respondents.

Table 9. Religious Group Mean Perceptions of Freedom

Religious Groups	Freedom to Express Opinions	Freedom of the Press	Join Political Parties	Freedom to Protest	Freedom to Join Civil Associations	Freedom to Sue the Government	Free-dom to Vote
Maronite	0.601[ab]	0.710[ab]	0.835[a]	0.782[ab]	0.870[a]	0.157[ab]	0.823[ab]
Sunni	0.825[acd]	0.831[ac]	0.886[a]	0.862[ac]	0.909	0.308[ac]	0.894[ac]
Shia	0.948[bcd]	0.912[bc]	0.973[bcd]	0.957[bcd]	0.967[c]	0.432[bcd]	0.905[c]
Druze	0.670[ab]	0.800	0.860[a]	0.820	0.920	0.206[a]	0.900

[a]Different from Shiites at .05 level or better.
[b]Different from Sunnis at .05 level or better.
[c]Different from Maronites at .05 level or better.
[d]Different from Druze at .05 level or better.

Table 10 presents data offering mixed support for H3. Religious disparities in favor of Shia Muslims were observed with each freedom except for the freedom to vote. Shia Muslims had higher odds of perceiving Lebanon as guaranteeing the freedom to express opinions, the freedom to join political parties, the freedom to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations, and the freedom to sue the government when

compared to Sunni, Maronite, and Druze respondents. Shia Muslims had higher odds than Maronite and Sunni respondents of believing that the freedom of the press and the freedom to join civil associations and organizations were guaranteed in Lebanon.

Table 10. Estimated Odds Ratios for Perceptions of Freedom in Lebanon

Independent Variables	Freedom to Express Opinions	Freedom of the Press	Freedom to Join Political Parties	Freedom to Protest	Freedom to Join Civil Associations	Freedom to Sue the Government	Freedom to Vote
Maronite	0.097*** (0.317)	0.309*** (0.260)	0.161*** (0.412)	0.185*** (0.332)	0.255*** (0.389)	0.273*** (0.224)	0.661 (0.271)
Sunni	0.220*** (0.320)	0.574* (0.253)	0.227*** (0.410)	0.305*** (0.334)	0.358** (0.383)	0.584** (0.190)	1.040 (0.273)
Druze	0.121*** (0.378)	0.580 (0.372)	0.216** (0.507)	0.236*** (0.413)	0.575 (0.585)	0.389** (0.317)	1.690 (0.486)
Rural	0.958 (0.322)	2.023 (0.370)	1.967 (0.501)	2.386 (0.455)	1.764 (0.502)	0.848 (0.247)	3.025* (0.453)
Age	0.984* (0.006)	0.992 (0.006)	0.994 (0.008)	0.996 (0.007)	0.992 (0.008)	0.992 (0.006)	0.996 (0.007)
Female	0.820 (0.184)	1.146 (0.189)	0.867 (0.236)	0.942 (0.205)	1.103 (0.256)	0.973 (0.169)	0.930 (0.216)
Education	1.041 (0.055)	1.021 (0.056)	0.958 (0.069)	0.989 (0.061)	0.855* (0.076)	1.042 (0.049)	0.912 (0.064)
Employed	1.021 (0.195)	1.114 (0.198)	0.888 (0.251)	0.765 (0.244)	1.091 (0.270)	0.609** (0.175)	0.937 (0.229)
Household Income	0.814 (0.134)	1.103 (0.141)	1.078 (0.175)	0.940 (0.152)	1.125 (0.192)	0.885 (0.132)	1.186 (0.166)
Married	1.008 (0.189)	1.208 (0.193)	0.767 (0.243)	0.956 (0.212)	0.927 (0.263)	1.163 (0.178)	1.093 (0.221)
N	959	956	952	956	958	854	957
Max-Rescaled R-Square	0.190	0.076	0.091	0.101	0.066	0.098	0.040

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Notes: Freedom to Express Opinions, Freedom to Join Political Parties, Freedom to Protest, and Freedom to Join Civil Associations use Firth's rare event bias corrections. Standard errors in parentheses.

In these models, the effects of socioeconomic factors again were minimal. Age only had a slight and significant negative relationship with perceiving the right to express opinions as being guaranteed in Lebanon. Increased education was associated with having lower odds of perceiving Lebanon as guaranteeing the right to join civil associations and organizations. Being employed was associated with having lower odds

of perceiving Lebanon as guaranteeing the right to sue the government and its agencies. Rural respondents had higher odds of perceiving the right to vote as being guaranteed in Lebanon when compared to urban voters.

CHAPTER SIX

Discussion and Conclusion

The Taif Agreement, which sought to distribute political power across warring religious factions, re-established a consociational government in Lebanon. Historians suggest that Christians emerged out of post-war Lebanon united with a sense of defeat and the Druze with a decreased sense of security (El-Husseini 2012; Harris 2012). Lebanon's Muslim populations have benefitted from power shifts, and Hezbollah and the Amal movement have brought a particularly significant increase in political power to Lebanon's Shia population (Harik 1996; Harris 2012; Khashan and Mousawi 2007). My findings are consistent with this analysis; in eleven out of thirteen models investigating equal outcomes for the state of democracy, Maronite respondents consistently feel that the state of Lebanon is less democratic, less trustworthy, and less free when compared to Shia Muslims. Similar disparities were observed between Shia and Sunni Muslims in ten out of the thirteen models and with Druze in six models.

The results of my first set of analyses mostly support H1. Shia respondents were the only religious group to report seeing Lebanon as more democratic than undemocratic. Members of all of the other religious groups in this study were significantly less likely than Shia Muslims to say that Lebanon is democratic, and Sunni and Maronite respondents gave Lebanon a significantly more negative evaluation of the country's state of democracy and human rights when compared to Shia respondents.

Maronite Catholics were significantly less trusting of the Lebanese government, parliament, and police, while Sunni respondents were less trusting of the parliament and army. Druze respondents were also less supportive of the parliament of Lebanon. These findings were largely supportive of H2, as every measure of trust in political institutions was significantly segmented along religious lines.

In my final set of analyses, Shia respondents were found to have the highest levels of perceived freedoms. In almost every regard, Shia respondents perceived more freedoms when compared to Sunni and Maronite respondents. In four out of the seven models, Shia respondents also perceived more freedoms than did Druze respondents. The only exception was the model measuring the freedom to vote, where no religious differences were observed. These high rates of religious disparities are largely supportive of H3.

These findings lend support to critics of consociational theory, who argue that consociationalism essentializes group identity differences to politics and forces individuals to consider religious group interests instead of economic and other self-interests. What is particularly noteworthy are the nearly negligible socioeconomic effects. While education, gender, and income are expected to appreciably affect political attitudes, these variables only appear as significant, often marginally so, in less than half of the models. On the other hand, religious group differences were observed in all but one of the thirteen models. Comparative-historical sociologists will want to make use of longitudinal data to determine if some degree of causation between consociational forms of government and religious disparities in political opinions can be established.

Another striking finding was the consistency of Shia respondents having the most positive outlook on the government. This was confirmed in multiple comparisons of means analyses and in the regression models. In every instance where religious disparities were observed, Shia Muslims had the highest evaluation of the state of democracy and human rights, the highest levels of political trust, and the highest levels of perceived freedom. This may point to an actual state of Shia privilege. This may also be related to relative deprivation as Christian groups in Lebanon have lost a significant amount of political representation since post-Civil War consociational arrangements. Shiites have also enjoyed recent political victories which are often thought to be at the expense of Sunni respondents. Druze respondents may be experiencing the effects of being such a significantly smaller demographic minority. Longitudinal data is needed in order to measure how political attitudes have changed according to shifts in consociational representation.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Tables

Table A.1. Recognized Religious Confessional Groups in Lebanon

Recognized Religious Confessions	Estimated Population
Sunni Islam	27%
Shia Islam	27%
Maronite Church	21%
Greek Orthodox Church	8%
Greek Catholic	5%
Druze	5%
Armenian Orthodox	>7%
Armenian Catholic	>7%
Syriac Orthodox	>7%
Syriac Catholic	>7%
Assyrian Church of the East	>7%
Chaldean Catholic	>7%
Copts	>7%
Protestant	>7%
Latin Catholic	>7%
Judaism	>7%
Alawite	Not specified
Isma'ili	Not specified

Source: Association of Religion Data Archives 2010

Table A.2. Confessional Requirements for Major Political Offices According to the National Pact and the Taif Agreement

Agreement	President	Prime Minister	Speaker of Parliament	Deputy Speaker of the Parliament	Parliament
National Pact	Maronite Catholic	Sunni Muslim	Shia Muslim	Greek Orthodox	6:5 Christian:Muslim
Taif Agreement	Maronite Catholic	Sunni Muslim	Shia Muslim	Greek Orthodox	1:1 Christian:Muslim

Source: Salamey 2013

Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics

Independent Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Democracy and Human Rights	2.314	1.093	1	5
Extent of Democracy	4.221	2.700	0	10
Trust in the Government	0.321	0.467	0	1
Trust in the Parliament	0.416	0.493	0	1
Trust in the Police	0.679	0.467	0	1
Trust in the Army	0.882	0.321	0	1
Freedom to Express Opinions	0.815	0.388	0	1
Freedom of the Press	0.778	0.415	0	1
Freedom to Join Political Parties	0.894	0.307	0	1
Freedom to Protest	0.862	0.344	0	1
Freedom to Join Civil Organizations	0.915	0.277	0	1
Freedom to Sue the Government	0.284	0.451	0	1
Freedom to Vote	0.876	0.328	0	1
Maronite	0.304	0.460	0	1
Sunni	0.306	0.461	0	1
Shia	0.294	0.456	0	1
Druze	0.095	0.293	0	1
Rural	0.133	0.340	0	1
Age	40.148	15.014	18	85
Female	0.504	0.500	0	1
Education	3.849	1.702	1	7
Employed	0.660	0.473	0	1
Household Income (logged)	7.273	0.649	5.010	9.952
Marital Status	0.601	0.489	0	1

Table A.4. Mean Socioeconomic Descriptive Statistics by Religious Group

Independent Variables	Sunni	Shia	Maronite	Druze
Rural	0.093	0.291	0.031	0.100
Age	38.327	36.284	46.479	37.740
Female	0.501	0.498	0.514	0.500
Education	3.919	4.100	3.598	3.650
Employed	0.643	0.652	0.662	0.730
Household Income (logged)	7.110	7.313	7.383	7.360
Marital Status	0.576	0.647	0.605	0.530

Table A.5. Religious Group Mean Evaluations of Democracy and Human Rights

Religious Groups	Extent of Democracy	Democracy and Human Rights
Maronite	3.620[a]	2.175[a]
Sunni	3.928[a]	2.271
Shia	5.211[bcd]	2.482[c]
Druze	4.090[a]	2.380

[a]Different from Shiites at .05 level or better.
[b]Different from Sunnis at .05 level or better.
[c]Different from Maronites at .05 level or better.
[d]Different from Druze at .05 level or better.

Table A.6. Results from OLS Regression Models Predicting Evaluations of Democracy and Human Rights

Independent Variables	Extent of Democracy	Democracy and Human Rights
Intercept	5.985***	2.944***
Maronite	-1.542***	-0.220*
Sunni	-1.330***	-0.190*
Druze	-0.963**	-0.060
Rural	0.061	0.180
Age	0.00005	-0.001
Female	-0.466*	-0.143
Education	0.087	0.046*
Employed	-0.396*	-0.197*
Household Income	-0.069	-0.048
Marital Status	-0.165	-0.118
N	954	958
R-Square	0.073	0.033

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table A.7. Religious Group Mean Trust in Political Institutions

Religious Groups	Trust Government	Trust Parliament	Trust Police	Trust Army
Maronite	0.195[ab]	0.224[ab]	0.610[a]	0.931[b]
Sunni	0.420[cd]	0.438[acd]	0.659[a]	0.744[acd]
Shia	0.381[cd]	0.647[bcd]	0.763[bc]	0.950[b]
Druze	0.220[ab]	0.242[ab]	0.700	0.960[b]

[a]Different from Shiites at .05 level or better.
[b]Different from Sunnis at .05 level or better.
[c]Different from Maronites at .05 level or better.
[d]Different from Druze at .05 level or better.

Table A.8. Estimated Odds Ratios for Trust in Political Institutions

Variable	Trust Government	Trust Parliament	Trust Police	Trust Army
Maronite	0.436***	0.193***	0.560**	0.552
	(0.211)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.368)
Sunni	1.292	0.479***	0.710	0.138***
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.307)
Druze	0.604	0.221***	0.908	1.508
	(0.292)	(0.292)	(0.289)	(0.696)
Rural	1.261	2.260***	2.030**	0.946
	(0.210)	(0.221)	(0.255)	(335)
Age	0.994	0.994	1.008	1.018*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Female	0.850	0.879	1.269	1.593*
	(0.154)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.228)
Education	1.056	1.062	1.029	1.020
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.065)
Employed	0.648**	0.855	0.901	1.338
	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.235)
Household	0.898	0.772	0.953	0.925
Income	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.175)
Married	0.783	0.899	1.074	0.638
	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.246)
N	955	951	954	954
Max-Rescaled R-Square	0.087	0.191	0.042	0.169

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Notes: Trust the armed forces (the army) uses a Firth's rare event bias correction.

Table A.9. Religious Group Mean Perceptions of Freedom

Religious Groups	Freedom to Express Opinions	Freedom of the Press	Join Political Parties	Freedom to Protest	Freedom to Join Civil Associations	Freedom to Sue the Government	Freedom to Vote
Maronite	0.601[ab]	0.710[ab]	0.835[a]	0.782[ab]	0.870[a]	0.157[ab]	0.823[ab]
Sunni	0.825[acd]	0.831[ac]	0.886[a]	0.862[ac]	0.909	0.308[ac]	0.894[ac]
Shia	0.948[bcd]	0.912[bc]	0.973[bcd]	0.957[bcd]	0.967[c]	0.432[bcd]	0.905[c]
Druze	0.670[ab]	0.800	0.860[a]	0.820	0.920	0.206[a]	0.900

[a]Different from Shiites at .05 level or better.
[b]Different from Sunnis at .05 level or better.
[c]Different from Maronites at .05 level or better.
[d]Different from Druze at .05 level or better.

Table A.10. Estimated Odds Ratios for Perceptions of Freedom in Lebanon

Independent Variable	Freedom to Express Opinions	Freedom of the Press	Freedom to Join Political Parties	Freedom to Protest	Freedom to Join Civil Associations	Freedom to Sue the Government	Freedom to Vote
Maronite	0.097***	0.309***	0.161***	0.185***	0.255***	0.273***	0.661
	(0.317)	(0.260)	(0.412)	(0.332)	(0.389)	(0.224)	(0.271)
Sunni	0.220***	0.574*	0.227***	0.305***	0.358**	0.584**	1.040
	(0.320)	(0.253)	(0.410)	(0.334)	(0.383)	(0.190)	(0.273)
Druze	0.121***	0.580	0.216**	0.236***	0.575	0.389**	1.690
	(0.378)	(0.372)	(0.507)	(0.413)	(0.585)	(0.317)	(0.486)
Rural	0.958	2.023	1.967	2.386	1.764	0.848	3.025*
	(0.322)	(0.370)	(0.501)	(0.455)	(0.502)	(0.247)	(0.453)
Age	0.984*	0.992	0.994	0.996	0.992	0.992	0.996
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Female	0.820	1.146	0.867	0.942	1.103	0.973	0.930
	(0.184)	(0.189)	(0.236)	(0.205)	(0.256)	(0.169)	(0.216)
Education	1.041	1.021	0.958	0.989	0.855*	1.042	0.912
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.049)	(0.064)
Employed	1.021	1.114	0.888	0.765	1.091	0.609**	0.937
	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.251)	(0.244)	(0.270)	(0.175)	(0.229)
Household	0.814	1.103	1.078	0.940	1.125	0.885	1.186
Income	(0.134)	(0.141)	(0.175)	(0.152)	(0.192)	(0.132)	(0.166)
Married	1.008	1.208	0.767	0.956	0.927	1.163	1.093
	(0.189)	(0.193)	(0.243)	(0.212)	(0.263)	(0.178)	(0.221)
N	959	956	952	956	958	854	957
Max-Rescaled R-Square	0.190	0.076	0.091	0.101	0.066	0.098	0.040

*p<0.05, **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Notes: Freedom to Express Opinions, Freedom to Join Political Parties, Freedom to Protest, and Freedom to Join Civil Associations use Firth's rare event bias corrections. Standard errors in parentheses.

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