ABSTRACT

To Fear or not to Fear? An Offensive Structural Realist and Institutionalist Examination of Germany

John Ryan Isaacson

Director: Dr. Ivy Hamerly, Ph.D

A powerful Germany, both militarily and economically, has not always boded well for the continent of Europe. As of today, Germany has the largest European economy in terms of GDP, it has the largest population, and it is a central player within the European Union. Should Germany's neighbors hold a favorable view of German influence, despite its success? This thesis will test the explanatory power of two international relations theories in regards to German popularity by other states. The two theories are Offensive Structural Realism, which predicts that Germany's neighbors should not view a rising German influence as favorable, and Institutionalism, which predicts that institutions like the EU do allow German neighbors to view German influence as favorable. The thesis will involve two German test cases: Germany from 1871-1914, and Germany from 2008-2016. This thesis' concludes by showing that Institutionalism holds more explanatory power than Offensive Structural Realism. Indeed, states will not react to Germany based on German power capabilities alone. Instead, states will react to Germany based on the predictability of German intentions.

APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS:

_____

Dr. Ivy Hamerly, Ph.D, International Studies

APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM:

_____

Dr. Elizabeth Corey, Director

DATE: _____

TO FEAR OR NOT TO FEAR? AN OFFENSIVE STRUCTURAL REALIST AND

INSTITUTIONALIST EXAMINATION OF GERMANY.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

Baylor University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Honors Program

By

John Ryan Isaacson

Waco, Texas

May 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Figures

Acknowledgments

The completion of this thesis was only possible because of the many people at Baylor who helped me. First, I would like to thank Baylor librarians Sinai Wood and Joshua Been. Ms. Wood helped me find data, and she showed me how to better navigate the library's website. Indeed, she saved me many hours of work. Mr. Been was invaluable in helping me create the graphs in this thesis. I am very grateful for the time he spent in helping me produce graphs that really help explain this thesis' argument.

Second, I would like to thank Dr. Jennifer Good and Dr. Peter Campbell, both of whom served on my thesis defense committee. I was able to take courses with both Dr. Good and Dr. Campbell during my time at Baylor. What I learned in both of their courses has certainly influenced the content of this thesis. Further, both of them have been mentors to me at Baylor. Not only did they read this thesis and offer constructive comments, they have also written recommendation letters for me and visited with me during their office hours. I am thankful for the time they have invested into me over these last few years.

Third, I would like to thank Dr. Ivy Hamerly, my thesis director. When I finally put the thesis together and sent it out to my thesis defensive committee members, I told Dr. Hamerly that had it not been for her, my thesis would be a meandering mess of words. This sentence is still true. Dr. Hamerly spent many hours reading my drafts, giving me ideas on how I should proceed, providing encouragement when I needed it, and showing me how to be a better researcher and writer. She pushed me to be a little bit better of a student than I actually was, and I am all the better for it.

INTRODUCTION

To Fear or not to Fear?

September 24, 2017, marked a historic day for Germany. Angela Merkel won a fourth term as German Chancellor, and the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AFD) party won 94 seats in the German Bundestag. It was the first time since the Second World War that a far-right party was able to win a seat in the German national government. The German election took place in a European environment that has vastly changed since Angel Merkel ascended to the *Bundeskanzleramt* (German Chancellery). German power is rising both in Europe and internationally. Since 2005, the European Union has faced a series of difficult questions and crises. From the European financial crisis to the refugee crisis to the reemergence of Russian aggressiveness in both Western and Eastern Europe, Germany has become the major player in all issues regarding Western Europe. While other states like Greece and Spain struggle economically, Germany's economy remains healthy and growing. States like the United Kingdom and France have been subject to reputation-changing referendums and elections where populists have entered the mainstream arena of politics. Germany has not escaped such problems, as can be seen by the 94 out of 709 seats gained by the AFD, but the country has remained relatively stable.

However, other European states have not traditionally welcomed a rising Germany. Indeed, it was NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, who quipped that NATO's job was to *"keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."* Yet the bi-polar sphere of influence that split Europe between the US and the Soviets is now gone. The share of wealth on the European continent looks closer to the

1

late 19ᵗʰ century than it does to the 1950s. Unlike the 19ᵗʰ century, Germany's military power currently exists solely for defensive purposes and is small compared to France and Great Britain. Yet, as stated earlier, Germany's economic power and its influence inside the European Union has continued to grow relative to the other European states. This paradox of German influence coupled with a changing world leads to several questions. Are Germany and Europe heading into uncharted territory, or have we seen something like this before? The last 20 years of Bismarck's Chancellorship saw him try to create regimes in order to portray Germany as a sated power and prevent it from choosing between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Soon after Bismarck was dismissed, Kaiser Wilhelm II deviated from Bismarck's strategy by concentrating German power in pursuit of *Weltpolitik*. Consequently, by 1914 Europe descended into chaos. However, today Germany is growing in power. So, if Germany exists within regimes with its neighbors, can Europe escape the race for power that occurred during the time of the Kaiser?

This thesis attempts to answer the question of whether European cooperation will persist as Germany continues to become a stable and powerful player in Europe. Is today more like the 1880s, the early 1900s, or something completely different? Different theories of international relations have different expectations in this case, especially regarding the response of other states to rising powers. Here I compare the predictions of Offensive Structural Realism and Institutionalism to see which theory best interprets the international community's reaction to German power. In this first chapter, I set out the two theories and introduce the methods I will use to test them. Then, each preceding chapter concerns itself with one of the two test cases: Germany from 1871-1914, and 2008-2016.

I argue that Institutionalism is the theory that will hold the most explanatory power. That does not mean that Offensive Structural Realism holds no explanatory power. Rather, I argue that Institutionalism takes into account factors that Offensive Structural Realism does not. Namely, that states want to survive, but their strategy to do so is not based solely on the power of other states. Instead, states will not fear a rising power if it can reasonable discern the state's intentions. This is why regimes matter. They give states a framework to predict the intentions of other states.

CHAPTER ONE

Offensive Structural Realism and Institutionalism, an Explanation

This chapter explains the two International Relations theories used in this thesis. Each theory predicts a different outcome in regards to these two time periods of German history and cooperation on the European continent. I begin this chapter with defining the assumptions that each of these theories share. This provides a theoretical foundation from which to view the theories. Next I outline Offensive Structural Realism, its foundations and assumptions, and what predictions it makes regarding the formation and perpetuation of regimes and cooperation among powers in a region. Similarly, I explore the foundations and assumptions of Institutionalism, also examining its predictions for regimes and cooperation among a region's states. With this basic outline of each theory established, I explore what each theory would predict about a rising power. This chapter concludes with a justification of my case selection, those being Germany from 1871-1890 and Germany from 2008-2016.

What do Offensive Structural Realism and Institutionalism Have in Common?

Before laying out the particulars of each theory, it is important to note that both work from the same set of common assumptions. Keohane builds his Institutionalist argument on the "Realist foundation" (Keohane 1984, *x*). Though the theories differ in their predictions of what is possible in the international system, their common assumptions explain why both theory adherents see the international system as a chaotic and dangerous one. Indeed, it is the structure of the system that helps drive state behavior.

The first assumption is that the **international system is anarchic**. There is no hierarchic structure or overriding power to enforce a set of international rules on all states within the international system. The second assumption is that **states will inherently regard each other with suspicion** because the international system is anarchic. A consequence of this is pithily named "9-1-1" problem (Mearsheimer 2001, 32). A state under duress may pick up the phone and dial for help, but no one will be on the other end. The third assumption is that **survival is the primary goal** of the state. It will do whatever it needs in order to survive. Finally, the fourth assumption is that **all states are rational actors** (Mearsheimer 2001, 30).

It is easy to see how the four assumptions above can lead to a tumultuous world. The fact that both OSR and Institutionalism work from these assumptions is helpful in the application of the theories to the case of Germany. Each theory predicts different outcomes from these assumptions. As we will see below, one theory suggests that the mistrust inherent in such an anarchic system will sow a deep and salient insecurity between the great powers. In contrast, the other theory predicts that great powers can overcome this mistrust if they construct a system where cooperation meets their self-interest.

What is Offensive Structural Realism?

As stated above, Offensive Structural Realism is rooted in its assumptions. Yet, unlike Institutionalism or Kenneth Waltz's Defensive Realism, OSR has one more assumption about the international system: "great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability" (Mearscheimer 2001, 30). This assumption means that states not only live in an international system without a hierarchy or power to ensure their

protection, but every great power now has the ability to wage war on anyone in the system. In explaining OSR, I will lay out the importance of this assumption and then lay out some predictions this theory makes about states in the international system.

First, the assumption that all states have some offensive capability causes states to fear one another. Out of this fear, states begin to increase their security by building up a military capacity because they realize that "the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system" (Mearsheimer 2001, 32). Yet, maximizing their power leads to a security dilemma where any state that attempts to increase its own defensive security "decreases the security of others" (Jervis 1978, 186). To illustrate this more clearly, if State A feels insecure in its region, it could install defensive protections within its borders. This action could be completely benign. Yet, neighboring State B would question why State A is installing these new defensive protections. Is it planning an attack? Does State A know of a danger that State B does not? Out of suspicion and insecurity, State B will also begin to build up its military capabilities. One can see how this example could perpetuate itself to the other powers residing within the system. Now, there is an increased military presence among the states, and the international system is less safe. Hence, we see the paradox of how one state seeking to bolster its own defense leads to making itself and others unsafe.

Yet, one could ask why there must be such an inherent distrust of a state who wishes only to bolster its defense? If State A's intentions are truly benign, why must insecurity occur among the other powers? Mearsheimer answers that all weapons can used offensively. He very grimly writes that even if a state has no physical weaponry, that the individuals in that state "could still use their feet and hands to attack the

population of another state" (Mearsheimer 2001, 31). There is no way to guarantee the benign intentions of other states. Consequently, fear will always exist, and the only way to rid the state of fear is to become the most powerful state in the system "so other states dare not attack it" (Mearsheimer 2001, 33). This is a rational goal of a state because if it is impossible to discern other states' intentions, it is unreasonable for any state to base its survival on any alliance or agreement with other states. The only way for a state to truly guarantee its survival is for it to possess the capacity to defeat all other states in the system. To do this, a state must achieve regional hegemony.

The pursuit of regional hegemony is the great prediction of OSR. Yet, it is important to note that the Offensive Structural Realism does not predict that all great powers inherently wish to make war in order to achieve this. OSR predicts that the powers wish to satisfy their own security concerns. This may mean an eventual war or aggression towards other states. Yet, it could also mean a state joins an alliance or an international regime if it sees those as vehicles to increasing their own security and power in a system. Mearsheimer writes at length about the influence the balance of power has over states in a region. When the balance of power greatly favors one state over others in a region, it "is likely to behave more aggressively, because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so" (Mearsheimer 2001, 37). Conversely, when the balance of power is more evenly distributed among a region's great powers, those states "will be less inclined to consider offensive action and more concerned with defending the existing balance of power from threats by their more powerful opponents" (Mearsheimer 2001, 37). This theory predicts that states are not seeking to be pugnacious warriors with a singular goal of war. Unless the opportunity presents itself, they are focused on more

incremental, relative advances in their power. Recall that for Mearsheimer, states are rational actors. So, if states can get what they want without a costly war, they will do so.

It is essential to note the important difference between relative and absolute gains. Within a region, states will seek to increase their power in terms of relative gains because it means other states are not gaining power as well. For example, State A would likely forgo a large gain in power from cooperation with State B if it meant that State B would also receive a large gain in power (Mearsheimer 2001, 36). It is important for states to gain power, but it is more important that a state gains more power than the other states. Likewise, if another state grows in power then the powers around it have declined in relative terms.

However, polarity is also imperative in understanding the balance of power and a state's bid to become a regional hegemon in an OSR system. Polarity describes the balance of power in a region. And since states exist in anarchy, OSR assumes there will be inherent suspicion among them. Mearsheimer explains that "the distribution of power among the states in the system markedly affects the levels of fear" Mearsheimer 2001, 44). There are several types of polarity. In a **bi-polar system**, there are two states which have the most power within the system. One can think of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War as an example of a bi-polar system. It is generally stable and causes less fear among the other states within a system (Mearsheimer 2001, 44).[1] Yet, there is another type of polarity that is much more dangerous. A **multipolar system** is where power is spread more-or-less evenly among several states. One can think of

---

[1] This is because each of the two states must only be suspicious of each other. Yet small states still matter in a bi-polar system. Just like the United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence during the Cold War, small states can often swing the balance of power between the more powerful two states.

Europe during the 30 Years War as such a system. The multipolar system is far more dangerous in that the states have more actors to be highly suspicious of, and all are competing for power. OSR would predict that a state would eventually try to break from this multipolar system and make a bid for regional hegemony.

Therefore, the main predicted outcome from the OSR theory is that states will seek their survival by attempting to become the most powerful state in the system. By carefully examining their own capabilities and the current balance of power in a system, states will acquire "additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals (Mearsheimer 2001, 34). Thus, for OSR, a state's survival strategy is based on power consideration alone.

What is Institutionalism?

Much like Offensive Structural Realism, Institutionalists see an anarchic world full of rational actors. Yet, they are more optimistic about what states can accomplish in such a system. For Institutionalists, states can cooperate to build lasting international regimes that can deter conflict. Though, it is important to note what Institutionalism is not. It does not assume that states are altruistic towards one another; rather, the theory does advocate that states may cooperate despite "egoistic players" (Keohane 1984, 73). This section explains the underlying theory of Institutionalism, shows how states may overcome their different interests in order to cooperate, and how regimes can indeed function past their intended purpose.

States inherently wish to pursue their own interests, which too often can impede the interests of other states in the system. States are rational, "egoistic players" (Keohane 1984, 73). Much like in OSR, this leads to the assumption that states are suspicious of

one another. This suspicion carries with it the constant risk of conflict between rational-egoistic states, which can "produce uncertainty and risk" (Keohane 1982, 332). This uncertainty and risk does not only apply to conflicts of interest in the present, but it also shapes how the states interact long term. So, how do states overcome this in order to function in an international system without an authority? They build regimes that foster interaction between them while not requiring the states to forgo their interests. In other words, states try to build regimes that give some structure or means of predictability to the system. To do this, Institutionalists seek to create reiteration between states. If states develop norms, principles, or standard-operating-procedures for interaction with one another, they can in turn become more predictable. This predictability would mean a greater flow of information between the states. With greater information flow between states, they can discern what their interests are against the interests of other states and find ways to cooperate (Keohane 1984, 84). In other words, the payoff structure of cooperating in the international system is altered. The best way to demonstrate this is to use an example from game theory.

Institutionalists think about the interaction between states as an iterated game. The Prisoners' Dilemma demonstrates how two rational players would react in a system with the incentive to betray each other. The game goes as follows: two prisoners are arrested as suspects for a crime. The DA puts the prisoners in separate rooms and then, separately, lays their options before them. If both prisoners agree to not confess to the crime, the DA will only have enough evidence to convict them of a misdemeanor with 30 days in prison. Yet, if both confess to the crime, then both prisoners will each serve a one-year prison sentence. As Keohane notes, this "might seem to give both an incentive not to confess,

except that the clever DA has promised that if either confesses while the other refuses, the confessor will not be prosecuted at all, while his recalcitrant partner is punished severely with a five-year sentence" (Keohane 1984, 68).

Table 1 below represents the Prisoners' Dilemma. In the chart, the higher number equals the greater payoff for each prisoner. So, if prisoner A and prisoner B cooperate with one another and do not confess to the DA, they will each receive the number 3, signifying that they will receive only a misdemeanor and 30 days in prison. If both prisoners defect by confessing to the DA, each will receive a 2 on the chart which means one-year prison sentence. The number 4 is the highest payoff because if obtained the defector walks away free. The number 1 is the lowest, meaning that if prisoner A confesses to the DA but prisoner B does not, then prisoner A will walk free while prisoner B serves a five-year sentence. Keohane is right when he says at first glance it would seem better for each player to cooperate so they both can walk away with a misdemeanor. Yet the payoff for defecting makes the game intriguing. If prisoner A can trick prisoner B into not confessing while he himself defects, then prisoner A receives the greatest benefit; he walks away free. Yet, in an attempt to not be tricked by the other prisoner, it follows that both will indeed defect and not cooperate with one another. Prisoner A may try to convince prisoner B not to confess so that they both can walk away with only a misdemeanor, but the prisoners are not able to communicate and are forced to assume the worst of their partner in crime. Both will confess out of fear that they will receive the five-year prison sentence. Thus, the equilibrium for a single-shot version of Prisoner's Dilemma is mutual defection.

Table 1

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3,3	1,4
Defect	4,1	2,2

(Keohane 1984, 69)

Institutionalists try to prevent a Prisoners Dilemma. They see the interaction of states as a repeated, not one-shot, iteration. States have reiterated encounters with each other over a range of issues over time. Indeed, the goal of Institutionalists is to create a framework for these repeated encounters among states that makes clear that their interactions are not a Prisoners' Dilemma. For example, Keohane uses the scenario that both prisoners are in the mafia. They are bounded together by this regime which is providing the prisoners with certain principals and norms: "to confess would be the equivalent to signing one's own death warrant: a confessor could expect to be murdered on leaving prison, if not before" (Keohane 1984, 74). Now, the situation facing the prisoners is drastically different than when they were in a single-play Prisoner's Dilemma. In table 2, Prisoner A no longer gets to go home if he confesses and prisoner B does not. Instead, it is now in the interests of both prisoners to cooperate and receive the misdemeanor of 30 days in prison. If both confess, they both will receive the lowest payoff (number 1's) and be terminated by the mafia. If prisoner A cooperates and prisoner B defects by confessing, prisoner A now receives the higher payoff. He will still have to serve five years in jail, but prisoner B receives the payoff of being wanted by the mafia.

Table 2

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	4,4	3,2
Defect	2,3	1,1

(Keohane 1984, 74).

This example is a simplified but nonetheless fair example of how regimes can alter the payoffs of rational players in the system. Neither want to serve a long amount of time in prison. Neither want to be terminated by the mafia. In a strong regime, both players have an expectation that the regime's principles and norms will be enforced (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). The equilibrium of their iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is mutual cooperation.

So, how do states get to a situation in which players in the international system are constrained in their actions and yet still able to pursue their own interests? When is there a demand for such regimes? Ronald Coase's theory says that if states had "(a) a legal framework establishing liability for actions; (b) perfect information; and (c) zero transactions costs", then states would never need *ad hoc* agreements and tension in the international system would be low (Keohane 1982, 338). Yet, at least one of the three conditions above will not be met because of the lack of an existing international hierarchy or world government (Keohane 1982, 338). But, international regimes still try to obtain one or all of these three conditions.

For some state interests, the lacking of one of these three conditions does not matter. For less important issues, states can often make *ad hoc* agreements with one another since the transaction costs of establishing a regime would be too high. Keohane

acknowledges this when he writes about *issue density*. He writes that "the denser the policy space, the more highly interdependent the different issues, and therefore the agreements made about them" will be more interdependent (Keohane 1982, 340). By this denser policy space, he means that a state asking another state to reduce its industrial tariffs will have linkage to other issues, like a state reducing its agricultural tariffs (Keoahne 1982, 340). That, in turn, could have issue linkage to another component in one of the two states' economies. An Institutionalist would argue that it would not be prudent or in the best interests of either state to create such agreements on an *ad hoc* basis. Rather, because the issue linkages are so complex and important, it would take an international regime to establish liability for actions, to make sure the information between the states is perfect, and to reduce the transaction costs. In short, a demand has been created in which it is in both states' interest to cooperate. In a sense, issue linkage plays the role of the mafia by incentivizing cooperation in order to avoid a Prisoner's Dilemma.

We see here the important function *issue linkage* plays in creating a demand for regimes. It decreases the possibility that states will lie to one another or defect because doing so would hurt their own interests. This is precisely an answer to those who would say that regimes create collective action problems. They would argue that states banding together in order to create a public good like low tariffs is unlikely because certain states could become "free riders" within the system (Pease 2010, 70). This means that some states could contribute very little to the regime, and this could create the belief that they could easily defect. Yet, by having an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, states will have linked interests and reputations that will discourage defection because it could leave the

states "worse off" in the pursuit of their interests (Keohane 1984, 77). By having states with many interests that affect both themselves and the interests of other states, regimes will have to be larger, the payoffs possible will be greater, and their reputation will matter even more (Keohane 1982, 341). Further, if the regimes provides a legal liability framework, information, and low transaction costs, then these regimes could last beyond their intended and founding purposes. Keohane writes that "a set of networks, norms, and institutions, once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange" (Keohane 1982, 348).

What do These Theories Predict about a Rising Power?

Now that we have examined the general ideas of the two theories, we must now ask a central question of this work. What does each theory predict about a rising power? This section gives the structure needed to later examine the two test cases. It begins by explaining what OSR predicts about a rising power. Then, it examines an Institutionalist's view.

For a state to feel secure in its environment, it must try to become the regional hegemon. Yet does this attempt look like? First, a state must have power. If we use Kenneth Waltz's Hobbesian definition **power**, it is defined as "the capacity to produce an intended effect" (Waltz 2001, 2015). Further, power can be either hard or latent. Hard power "is embedded mainly in [a state's] army and the air and naval forces that directly support it" (Mearsheimer 2001, 43). OSR makes a great appeal to the importance of hard power when making a bid for regional hegemony. Yet, OSR also describes latent power, which is of greater importance for this thesis. Latent power "is based on the size of [a

state's] population and the level of its wealth" (Mearsheimer 2001, 43). If a state has a large population and much wealth, it can easily convert those into a war fighting machine.[2] Thus, to make a bid for regional hegemony, a state must have "so much actual military capability and so much [latent] power that it stands a good chance of dominating and controlling all of the other great powers in its region of the world (Mearsheimer 2001, 44-45). To make a bid for regional hegemony, a power does not need to defeat the whole region at once. Indeed, to be seen as a rising power, "it must have excellent prospects of defeating each opponent alone, and good prospects of defeating some of them in tandem. The key relationship, however, is the power gap between the potential hegemon and the second most powerful state in the system: there must be a marked gap between them" (Mearsheimer 2001, 45).

So, when a state begins to develop hard or latent power relatively greater than its regional neighbors, what should be the reaction of other states? For the purposes of this thesis, states will be existing in a multi-polar environment. There are four main responses states can have when confronted with a rising power in their region: balancing, buck-passing, bandwagoning, and appeasement. First, in **balancing** states will band together in order to check or confront the rising power together. "In other words, they are willing to shoulder the burden of deterring, or fighting if need be, the aggressor" (Mearsheimer 2001, 139). States who practice **buck-passing** "try to get another great power to check the aggressor while they remain on the sidelines" (Mearsheimer 2001, 139.[3]

---

[2] A good example of this would be the US using its large number of factories to produce wartime weapons during WWII.

[3] A popular example of buck-passing would be Great Britain during Hitler's early aggression in Europe. The Chamberlain government tried to pass the issue to the French in an attempt to keep Great Britain out of a war.

Bandwagoning is when a state joins a rising power rather than confronting it, normally in order to "get at least some small portion of the spoils" if the rising power becomes a regional hegemon (Mearsheimer 2001, 139). **Appeasement** tries to halt the advance of a rising power by conceding to it certain demands, "in the hope that this gesture will make the aggressor feel more secure" (Mearsheimer 2001, 139).[4]

With the concept of states balancing against a rising power, it also matters how a state rises. To put another way, it is not often that states effectively balance against a rising power. Especially in a multi-polar system, states have many interests at stake when considering balancing. In describing this phenomenon, Kenneth Waltz appealed to game theory. He wrote:

> *"if there is an advantage in forming coalitions, then logically the players will pursue the advantage until all of them are divided into two blocs. Yet the game of power politics does not often eventuate in two blocs unalterably opposed and using whatever means come to hand in order to weaken each other… all states are playing more than one game. The aim of game theory is 'a set of rules for each participant which tell him how to behave in every situation which may conceivably arise.' But no set of rules can specify how important the game should be considered" (Waltz 2001, 205-06).*

By this, Waltz means that states may be, for example, pursing goals of economic development. Other states may be pursing this to. When a goal of this sort is being sought and being achieved more effectively by a certain state in a system, it complicates how other states should respond. Just because State X is doing well economically does not mean States Y and Z must balance against it. Not all rising powers rise in the veil of evil or malicious intentions. This is not to say that Offensive Structural Realism predicts a moral basis for balancing either. The purpose of this point is to show that it can be

---

[4] The Chamberlain government during the 1930s provides an example of appeasement. Great Britain conceded parts of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in hopes of stopping him from advancing further.

difficult to discern the beginning of a state's rise to power, especially when it is through economic means rather than a military buildup. What OSR does predict is that states will be suspicious of each other's success when it is greater than their own. States may exist in institutions or alliances with one another, but in a multi-polar system, when a state begins to have greater actual power relative to its neighbors, suspicions will arise. Further, when a state begins to have an economic gains greater than its neighbors, it will arouse fear in the system. States may not immediately or collectively balance against the threat, but there will be some vestiges of suspicion.

Viewing a rising power through Institutionalism requires a different kind of examination. This theory has several predictions about how states respond to a rising power, but these predictions are based on the predictability of the rising power. Cooperation with a rising power is still possible without a regime, but the rising power's intentions must be clear. When the intentions are not clear or are aggressive, Institutionalism predicts that states will become fearful of the rising power. Yet, when a rising power does exist in a regime, the main predictions are these: (1) a strong and rooted regime coupled with a high degree of interdependence between states should discourage any rising power from maliciously deviating from established rules and norms, and (2) institutionalists do not fear a rising power just because it is rising; rather, they only fear it when it begins to violate established principles, rules, and norms for its own benefit. Yet, what options do states have when responding to a rising power?

It is not a state's increase of power in-and-of itself that breeds suspicion. A strong regime with established means of catching and punishing cheaters can deal with a malicious rising power. If a rising power works within a regime that has rooted

principles, rules, and norms, it has placed its reputation in connection with its interests. Axelrod and Keohane call this the "**shadow of the future**" (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 227). If an international regime has an effective shadow of the future, then there are four factors that affect states' behavior: (1) there are "long time horizons" which alters states' behavior by taking away the option of a Prisoner's Dilemma payoff scenario; (2) there is a "regularity of stakes" which, like long time horizons, also decreases the incentive for self-interested states to sometimes defect because the payoff would be better; (3) there is the "reliability of information" which gives states the ability to clearly identity who in the regime is playing by the rules; and (4) there is "quick feedback about changes in other's actions" (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 233). As long these four factors are strongly rooted among states in an international regime, a state's relative power increase should not matter. If it were cheating, the rising state would be caught and punished.

Yet, how do states know when a power is rising within a regime, and could this change the character of the regime? Oran Young writes that regimes do undergo changes "from shifts in the underlying structure of power" (Young 1982, 292). Yet, he aptly points out that it is hard for states to see when this happens. Young gives both an empirical reason and a conceptual reason for this struggle. First, the empirical reason is that "it is exceedingly difficult to pin down the early stages of significant shifts [in power] or to monitor them as they unfold" (Young 1982, 293). In other words, think of the growth of a child. If one sees the child every day, that person does not easily recognize the fact that the child has grown. They know the child has grown, but it is difficult to gage how much. It is easy to see the growth by looking back at past photos; however, it is difficult to recognize this growth in real time.

Young also likens this idea to rising powers within a regime. The other powers may know another state is rising, but they may be underestimating how much growth has occurred. As long as the rising state is not breaking with the principles, rules, and norms, then it is difficult for members of a regime to punish the rising-state without violating those principles, rules, and norms. The conceptual reason Young gives when writing about the difficulty of states responding to changes in their regime's power structure is this: there is a "lack of consensus with respect to the definition of power" (Young 1982, 293). When the underlying power structure of a regime is changing, Young argues that social scientists, much less states, may not even know what to look for exactly. This contrasts with Offensive Structural Realism, which predicts that states will react to relative gains in either actual or latent power.

Thus, a state gaining power relative to others in a regime will not necessarily cause alarm among the other states. Indeed, there must be a breech in principles, rules, or norms, or there must be a highly visible change in the underlying power structure of a regime. These two scenarios would cause the states to become afraid of a rising power. Now, we must ask what Institutionalists predict when a rising power does fit one of the above two scenarios. States in a regime can use the nature of its cooperation and linked interests among states in an attempt to change the payoff structure of state decision making. In other words, states within a regime can punish the rising power by taking away their interests. An Institutionalist would predict some form of incentive manipulation.

Cooperation and issue-linkage among states discourages a rising power from breaking the rules of the regime. As explained above, cooperation and issue linkage increase the

shadow of the future of states. Their reputations matter. If their reputation was damaged, then it would be harder for that state to use the benefits of regimes for its own interests. As explained earlier, when Keohane writes of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, it is no longer in the interests of a state to defect if he is a part of a regime like the mafia. If he defected, then his reputation would be damaged, and the mafia would retaliate. When states are in a regime, they function in a similar way as Keohanen's mafia example. When a state breaks the principles, rules, and norms, they can be ostracized from the regime. They lose access to framework to which states are held accountable, the information sharing between states, and the lowered transaction costs (Keohane 1982, 338).

Thus, in terms of an Institutionalist's predictions of a rising power, many of the predictions depend on the nature of the existing regimes. However, we do know that states are rational players. They want what is in their self-interests. A strong international regime will alter the payoffs for states by making it unattractive for them to defect. And, even when they do defect, a strong regime should have effective means to punish the cheater. Further, if the established regimes are good at providing a legal liability framework, information, and low transaction costs, then these regimes could last beyond their intended and founding purposes. Keohane writes that "a set of networks, norms, and institutions, once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange" (Keohane 1982, 348). If the regime is hard to change, then a rising power will not cause much fear within a system because there is a framework there to deal with it if it begins to defect from the established norms. Unlike OSR where we would expect a rising power to grab power where it can at the expense of its neighbors, Institutionalists are not as

pessimistic. They do not believe a rising power inherently has such intentions, or that those intentions are uncontrollable. Institutionalists do not fear a rising power because it is a rising power. They fear it if the state is unpredictable.

Research Design

This thesis uses a congruence multiple within-case comparison testing method. In other words, the thesis tests two types of theories to see if their predictions match up within the two cases of German history. I am using a multiple within-case comparison method in order to obtain a variation of situations for evaluating the theories and their predictions for the dependent variable. I have chosen these two specific German cases because they offer a broad range of circumstances in which to test the two theories. Below I will explain which variables I will specifically target within each case. Then, I will outline why each test case offers a fertile ground for the theory testing.

First, the operationalization of the dependent variable is how states react to a rise in German power. Offensive Structural Realists looks for how much hard and latent power Germany has relative to the other states. From this factor, OSR predicts whether or not states should noticeably react to German power. In other words, OSR predicts that states will balance against or bandwagon with a Germany who has a relatively large amount of hard or latent power. Institutionalists, when predicting the dependent variable, examine the possibility of cooperation and level of predictability of a rising power. They look at whether or not Germany is in a strong regime with other states and whether or not there is issue linkage. If Germany is a part of a strong regime or has predicable unaggressive intentions, then Institutionalism predicts that other states would not fear a rising

Germany. However, because Institutionalism has many of the same assumptions as OSR, if a rising Germany's actions are not predictable, then Institutionalism's predictions would be similar to OSR.

This thesis is be able to verify whether or not the two theories' dependent variable predictions were correct. For Germany from 1871-1914, the dependent variable is verified by how states reacted to Germany. Because this test case includes much historical literature, this thesis can measure how states reacted to a rising Germany by the actions states took against Germany. For the second test case, which is Germany from 2008-2016, the dependent variable is verified by a Gallup World Poll which measures how states feel about the performance of German leadership. The wording of the survey's questions is this: *Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany*? The wording of the survey question does not ask whether the surveyed states 'fear' Germany, However, the public opinion of Germany's influence works in a similar way as to measure fear, since it would be illogical for public opinion to both fear Germany while also favoring Germany's influence. A dramatic change in public approval of Germany could be an early sign of fear. Each test case chapter will contain more information on how the dependent variable is being measured.

Each theory within each test case will have its own set of testable independent variables. For Germany from 1871-1914, the OSR independent variables will be the standing army strength, military expenditure, population, coal and steel production, and the energy consumption of Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, and Spain. The Institutionalist independent variables will be the actions Germany

took during two distinct phases in their foreign policy; Germany from 1871-1890 and Germany from 1890-1914.

The second test case is Germany from 2008-2016, the OSR independent variables will be total military spending in US Dollars and the share of wealth held by Germany and all states inside the EU, NATO, and some states that are not members of either regime. The Institutionalist variables will be the regimes Germany is in and the economic interdependence between Germany and the other states being measured. Because this second test case involves a larger number of states, there will be a statistical component that measures the correlation coefficient between the independent variables and the dependent variable. This measures whether or not there is a correlation association between, for example, higher military spending and lower German approval rating.

Each case has strengths of data richness, clear values for the dependent variables, and a divergence of predictions made for each case by the two competing theories. I have attempted to make sure that the necessary variables needed to test both of the competing theories are present in each case so that both theories can be fairly assessed

Conclusion

This thesis aims to test two theories in international relations to see if states react against a rising Germany because of power capabilities alone. The test cases chosen provide situations in which Germany has shown a relatively large amount of hard or economic power when compared to other states in the international system. If states react to Germany based on this fact alone, then problems may lie ahead for a rising Germany. However, if the predictability of Germany's behavior matters more than its power

capabilities, then this changes how the international system should judge a rising Germany. This thesis argues that the latter of these two choices is true.

The first test case shows that Germany's predictability in the international system influenced how states reacted to its growing power, even though there were no consistent regimes. From 1871-1890, there was no active balancing against Germany because Germany made efforts to make itself predictably unaggressive. However, Germany's behavior after 1890 no longer signaled that it was willing to be unaggressive. This is when active balancing began to occur, even though German power capabilities had been growing since 1871. The second test case shows that Germany holds a much larger share of wealth than most states in the international system. Yet, despite this obvious power advantage, states that are in regimes with Germany have, in the aggregate, a higher approval of German leadership than states that are not in a regime with Germany. This is because the principles, rules, and norms established in regimes like the EU and NATO provide a predictability to Germany.

Institutionalism, not Offensive Structural Realism, examines these factors when predicting how states will respond to a rising power. Like OSR, Institutionalism believes that a state's main goal is to survive. However, the state's survival strategy is not based on power capabilities alone. If a rising power state can be predictably unaggressive, either through its actions or by membership in a strong regime, then that rising power does not necessarily have to be feared in the international system.

CHAPTER TWO

When to get the Balancing Band Together? Offensive Structural Realism in Germany
1871-1914

Europe from 1871-1914 reveals Great Power politics at its extreme. Prussia had
united the disparate German states into one unified Germany that sat in the middle of the
European continent. To its western border, France had just been humiliated in the Franco-
Prussian War by Prussia. To Germany's east sat Russia and Austria-Hungary. Both were
large, conservative empires with ambitions to expand into the Balkans. In the north was
Great Britain, who enjoyed the world's largest navy and was active in most parts of the
world. To the south of Germany were Italy and Spain. Italy had just unified, and it was
struggling to attain great power status. Spain, rife with domestic turmoil, was no longer
able to enjoy a great power status. Indeed, the balance of power was precarious on the
continent, and Germany's rise in power complicated the picture. By 1914, Germany
would be at war with France, Russia, and Great Britain. However, if Germany's rise was
obvious in the 1870s, then why did it take France, Russia, and Great Britain until 1914 to
balance against it? If Germany's power in and of itself was the prime motivator for
causing its neighbors to fear a change in the balance of power in Europe, shouldn't
balancing have occurred earlier?

Chapter 2 seeks to reevaluate the Offensive Structural Realist theory. The
Institutionalist theory will be explored in chapter 3. Institutionalism seems to be an
unusual theory to test on this case, since this author has not found a great amount of
Institutionalist literature on 19th century Europe. Although this time period had alliances

and *ad hoc* agreements between states, there was not a sophisticated regime like NATO or the EU. Nevertheless, the assumptions Institutionalism shares with OSR makes it a compatible theory to test this case. Indeed, without the regimes that create principles, rules, and norms for states to follow, Institutionalism's predictions largely align with Realism. Yet it is Institutionalism's predictions about the impact of norms and behavioral expectations that reveal what OSR misses. States respond to rising power for reasons that expand beyond the simple calculation of power itself.

This chapter tests the predictions of Offensive Structural Realism in the case of the European System from 1871-1914. The dependent variable is how Germany's neighbors reacted to Germany during Germany's rise in power. Following that is an outline of each theory's independent variables. Because this test case is a historical test case, it uses a different type of evidence from chapter 4. Because chapter 4 deals with Germany from 2008-2016, it is in some ways an ongoing test case. Yet we are over 100 years removed from the end of World War One. Because of this, it is easier in this chapter to conclude how states reacted to Germany. After examining OSR in this test case, this chapter will conclude that OSR cannot explain why states waited until after 1890 to balance against Germany. This will lead into the Institutionalist analysis in chapter 3.

Balancing, Bandwagoning, or Nothing at all? How Neighboring States React to a Rising Power

What Does OSR Predict About a Rising Power in This Context?

For OSR, the power balancing that occurred in Europe before the First World War is the quintessential example of states trying to increase their power in order to make themselves more secure. For most of the 19th century, the polarity in Europe had been relatively unchanged; it was a multi-polar system. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 had established a European order based on conservative governments that would balance against an army like Napoleon's. Indeed, Klemens von Metternich, who was the architect of this new European order, designed it to be a check on a rising power. Europe's main powers consisted of Austria-Hungary, Russia, Great Britain, a defeated France, and a weak Prussia. However, Prussia had advanced greatly in the years following its embarrassing defeat by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena. Indeed, in less than 70 years Prussia rose from a lesser European power to a state of enormous potential. By 1866 Prussia had defeated Austria-Hungary to become the most influential German power. By 1871, Prussia surprised the French and other European Great Powers with its use of railroads and swiftness of military action in its decisive defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War. After Prussia defeated France in 1871, it was able to unite the disparate German kingdoms into one state, a unified Germany. The polarity in Europe was still a multi-polar system, but the balance of power had changed greatly. It was a unified Germany that sat in the middle of the European continent. It was gaining the most power in Europe.

Recalling from chapter 1, OSR measure power in a few ways. One is the hard power that a state possesses. In this test case, hard power would be the number of soldiers a state could deploy to the field or how much a state spent on its military. Another form of power is 'latent' power that can be converted for military use. Examples of latent power are population, share of wealth, energy consumption, and iron and steel production (Mearsheimer 2001, 55). In this test case, if Germany were outperforming its neighbors in these functions, then the balance of power would be shifting to Germany and away from its neighbors. It is true that the speed in which Germany began to pull ahead in these categories matters, and the relative difference between Germany and its neighbors in these categories matters even more.

Unlike Institutionalism, OSR place the most emphasis on power alone rather than state behavior. Indeed, Institutionalists see regimes as ways to make state behavior more predictable, even if a particular state is a rising power. OSR makes the argument that a German increase in power in and of itself would be enough to cause unrest in the European region. Even further, OSR would say that Germany had an incentive to grow and expand its borders (Mearsheimer 2001, 213). The geography on the European continent not only caused insecurity for German neighbors, but since Germany was in the middle of the continent, there was the potential for it to be surrounded by enemies. Regardless of alliances or other regimes, Offensive Structural Realists believe that "as [a state's] capabilities, interests, or both change, [a state] may alter such arrangements [relating to regimes] or the nature of their participation in them" (Baldev 1995, 142). If Germany did not grow in its capabilities, then it would be vulnerable from all sides of its borders. This would be true even if Germany was a part of a regime with its neighbors.

The prediction of this theory would be that Germany had to grow in power relative to its neighbors in order for self-preservation.

An argument against the Offensive Structural Realist predictions for this environment is that if Germany was truly insecure in its environment, or if German neighbors were truly fearful of German power, then why did war not come earlier? Why was there relative peace in Europe from 1871-1914? Offensive Structural Realism in general, and in the context of this test case in particular, does not suggest that states will immediately strike at the moment they begin to feel insecure. Indeed, although Germany was a rising power, the other European powers had security considerations outside of Germany as well. This theory would predict that Germany and its neighbors would begin to build up their offensive capabilities [or defensive depending on which state you asked] if the balance of power began to change drastically. However, they would not act in a way that would damage their strategic position. "They weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment" (Mearsheimer 2001, 37).

What Does Institutionalism Expect About a Rising Power in This Context?

There is a void of Institutionalist research on this time period of 1871-1914. Indeed, most Institutionalist literature focuses on post-World War II cases. Yet the lack of Institutionalist research on this specific time period does not preclude the testing of this theory. The foundation of the theory and the predictions it makes are still applicable, despite this chapter not containing modern regimes like the EU. The assumptions of

Institutionalism still apply to this case, and its predictions, which are based on how regimes affect state behavior, still apply in this case.

Recalling chapter 1, a regime contains "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1982, 186). Indeed, regimes help prevent the suspicion that arises from the anarchic character of the international system because a regime can provide a way for states to become predictable to one another. Even further, Institutionalists believe that "once patterns of cooperation are thus established to coordinate state behavior, they tend to persist because of the functions they preform and in turn come to influence state behavior" (Baldev 1995, 143). This belief is a schism between Institutionalism and OSR. The former believes that regimes can shape state behaviors while the latter believes that regimes are more likely to be changed by a state. This test case in particular does not have regimes whose character resembles the regimes mainly used in chapter 4, the European Union and NATO. However, Europe from 1871-1914 did have alliances, and those alliances did create expectations of state behavior.

A strong and rooted regime helps to make states predictable. Axelrod and Keohane refer to this as the "shadow of the future" (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 227). When states act within regimes, they are signaling certain intentions to their neighbors and members of that regime. States abide by the regime's norms because the nature of the regime has made the payoff to do so better than defecting from the regime. Consequently, because the regime reinforces certain norms for its members, states can better predict the

behavior of other member states, or they can adequately sanction their behavior when rules and norms are violated (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 233).

Even though this test case does not feature strongly rooted regimes, the test case does speak to the importance of what a state's actions can signal.[5] The behavior of states is exactly what regimes aim to influence. Regimes aim to make state behavior more predictable. Indeed, without regimes influencing state behavior, Institutionalism predicts the same outcome as Realism. That is, states that cannot predict the behavior of their neighbor will grow suspicious of that neighbor, especially if that neighbor begins to grow in relative power.

States can still signal their intentions outside of a strongly rooted regime. Indeed, the very act of a state joining an alliance, defecting from an alliance, or abstaining from an alliance signals something about that state's behavior to the other states in the international system. For example, Germany trying to bind Russia and Austria-Hungary into an alliance would signal that Germany did not want a conflict between those two states. It does not matter if Germany's attempt was successful. The act alone still signals to German neighbors something about Germany's intentions.

Conversely, without a strongly rooted regime, states cannot easily sanction another state when that state's intentions are no longer clear. A defecting state in this case would be a state that is no longer clearly signaling non-aggressive intentions to its neighbors. Thus, without a strongly rooted regime, Institutionalism's expectations of

---

[5] I am not intending to make a Constructivist argument. Indeed, this test case is working from the assumption that states exist in an anarchic system, not that states are somehow changing the nature of the system through a changing of norms.

behavior towards a rising power look like Offensive Structural Realism's predictions. There would be suspicion in the system.

If a rising power in a strongly rooted regime has kept up the expected principals, rules, and norms, Institutionalism would not predict that other member states would become fearful of that rising power. Similarly, if no regime exists but a rising power is seen by its neighbors as having non-aggressive intentions, then the fact that a state is rising in power is not enough to elicit fear among neighbors. There must be a behavioral change or lack of clear intentions in order for Institutionalism to predict fear among that rising power's neighbors.

In conclusion, this test case will extrapolate the principles of regimes and apply them to Germany during 1871-1914. Indeed, there were no strongly rooted regimes during this time, but there were efforts to create them. What Institutionalism is looking for in this case is whether Germany signaled certain intentions, whether those intentions were seen as non-aggressive, and whether Germany violated those expectations. Institutionalism would predict that if Germany was thought to be non-aggressive, then Germany rising in power would not be sufficient to cause other states to balance against it. However, if Germany's intentions were not clear or seen as aggressive, then Institutionalism would predict that German neighbors would become fearful of Germany.

What is this Case Measuring?

The dependent variable in this test case is how Germany's neighboring states reacted to Germany's rising power. Unlike in chapter 4, this test case cannot measure the dependent variable in a quantifiable manner. However, given the amount of literature on

this time period, this chapter can quantify how much military and economic wealth Germany had relative to its neighboring states, when Germany had this wealth, and how states reacted to Germany. States can react to a rising power by either balancing against, bandwagoning with, or by doing nothing towards the rising power. If there is an immediate disparity between Germany's power relative to its neighbors, then OSR would expect a dependent variable of states quickly bandwagoning with or balancing against Germany. Conversely, if there is a power disparity between Germany and its neighbors without a series of balancing or bandwagoning, Institutionalism would predict that states see Germany as non-aggressive, showing that German power alone is not acting on the dependent variable.

Soldiers, Coal-Miners, and Diplomats: Independent Variables

The Offensive Structural Realist test will contain two independent variables, hard power and latent power. Hard power will be measured by two indicators; size of standing army and military spending. The latent power variable will be measured by three indicators: total population, primary energy consumption, and iron and steel production. OSR regards total population, energy consumption, and iron and steel production as *latent* powers since a state can convert them into military assets (Mearsheimer 2001, 55). As will be explained in the results of analysis section, these two variables and their indicators are complementary of each other, and the reader should not take the results of one variable alone to either validate or invalidate the theory. Indeed, OSR predicts that states react to power disparities within the international system, and power cannot be measured solely by the size a state's standing army. Further, latent power indicators are

just as important in evaluating which state had power during 1871-1914. Just because iron and steel production is not overtly military does not mean that a state with a high output did not influence its neighbors.

For Institutionalism, the independent variables are two specific time periods in German foreign policy, and the variable indicators are the actions Germany took that either signaled their level of commitment to the status quo or made their intentions unclear. The two variables are the time periods of Germany from 1871-1890 and Germany from 1890-1914. In the first period, Germany pursued a foreign policy of portraying itself as a sated power. The indicators in this time period are the alliances Germany joined and the agreements made during 1871-1890. These alliances and agreements signaled Germany's intentions, which acted on the dependent variable. Further, in the second time period that this test case observes, 1890-1914, Germany pursed a foreign policy of *Weltpolitik*. There are two specific actions that characterized nature of this foreign policy; Germany's naval proliferation and the Schlieffen Plan. These actions are the indicators that showed Germany's new, aggressive intentions that influenced how other states reacted to it.

Methodology

Data for the Offensive Structural Realist variables come from a variety of sources. Data for military expenditure, population, primary energy consumption, and iron and steel production are compiled by David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey in their dataset titled *Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965*. Conversely, data for military personnel for each state comes from issues of the

Statesmen's Yearbook. The data for each of these variables was measured in intervals of five years, except for 1871-1875 and 1910-1914. This irregularity is due to the end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 and the beginning of the First World War in 1914.

The Institutionalist model is comparing two different foreign policy time periods, 1871-1890 and 1890-1914. Although a sophisticated regime is not consistently present across these two time periods, Germany did try to create such regimes during 1871-1890. This chapter will examine those attempted regimes; what principles, rules, and norms Germany tried to establish through them; and finally how Germany's neighboring states reacted to Germany's attempts. The second time period will measure Germany's foreign policy reorientation; the German actions that signaled different German intentions; and finally how Germany's neighboring states reacted. To do this, this chapter relied on a variety of historical scholars and resources in order to evaluate the expected behavioral norms of the Great Powers during the tested time period.

Results of Analysis

Standing Army

Standing army, even more than reserve army capacity, is a good representation of both Great Power strength and Great Power intentions since the standing army indicator is overtly hard power. Indeed, if Austria-Hungary felt the prospect of war was near, it would make sense that they would increase their standing army. This section will examine the standing army strength of the Great Powers in Europe from 1875-1914. The standing army data is from the Statesman's Yearbook from the years of 1874-1915. Of course, the standing army of each power is not indicative of their total military strength.

Indeed, each power had a reserve army capacity that they could call up in a time of war. However, data for the reserve army numbers was inconclusive and not uniform. The standing army numbers are likely much more accurate.

Figure 1

Great Power Standing Armies 1871-1914

The figure represents the size of the European Great Powers' standing armies from 1871-1914.
Source: All data comes from *The Statesman's Year-Book* (London: Macmillan, various years).
Austria-Hungary: 1876, p. 18; 1881, p. 17; 1886, p. 19; 1891, p. 350; 1896, p. 356; 1901, p. 386; 1906, p. 653; 1910, p. 588; 1914, p. 55.
Great Britain: 1876, p. 227; 1881, p. 224; 1886, p. 242-243; 1891, p. 55-56; 1896, p. 55-56; 1901, p. 58; 1906, p. 283-84; 1910, p. 52-53; 1914, p. 55.
France: 1876, p. 70; 1881, p. 70; 1886, p. 77; 1891, p. 479; 1895, p. 487; 1901, p. 556; 1906, p. 853; 1910, p. 764; 1914, p. 827.
Germany: 1876, p. 102; 1881, p. 102; 1886, p. 109; 1891, p. 538-39; 1896, p. 547-48; 1901, p. 629-30; 1906, p. 936-37; 1910, p. 839; 1914, p. 903.
Russia: 1876, p. 371; 1882, p. 380; 1887, p. 430; 1891, p. 870-72; 1896, p. 886-88; 1901, p. 991; 1906, p. 1336; 1910, p. 1164; 1914, p. 1244.
Italy: 1877, p. 310; 1881, p. 311; 1886, p. 337; 1891, p. 693; 1896, p. 702; 1901, p. 783; 1906, p. 1088; 1910, p. 959; 1915, p. 1066.
Spain: 1877, p. 399; 1881, p. 412; 1886, p. 451; 1891, p. 941; 1897, p. 953; 1902, p. 1074; 1906, p. 1411; 1910, p. 1223; 1915, p. 1348

Figure 1 shows that all states except for Spain saw a net increase in the size of their standing armies. Indeed, Russia, who had the largest population in Europe, began with the largest standing army in Europe in 1875, and it ended with the largest in 1914. France mirrored the German increase during these years. Great Britain's standing army does not necessarily reflect the power it had on the continent. It did have a relatively small standing army, but that does not factor in its naval supremacy in Europe. Austria-

Hungary had the fourth largest army, but its being lower than Germany's reflects Germany's status as the primary German power.

The dependent variable is whether the other Great Powers in Europe responded by changing their policy to bandwagon with or balance against Germany. What OSR would predict is that an increasing German standing army would act on other states by forcing them to expand their standing armies. Of course, there could be the possibility of a state bandwagoning with Germany, which would not necessarily cause the bangwagoning state increase its standing army. Figure 1 shows that France's standing army increases mirrored Germany's. Indeed, OSR would expect this, since France had suffered a defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1871. Especially after 1910, both France and Germany grew their armies at an exponentially greater rate. Does this mean that France was increasing their army in response to Germany? Given historical context, Germany had a powerful army and had demonstrated its might during the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. France had not been the beneficiary in either of those wars, the latter of which united all the disparate German states at France's border. It appears that OSR makes a correct prediction in that Germany's growing standing army did cause France to react with its own increase.

The Russian case is a bit more complicated to analyze. Russia had the largest population in Europe from 1875-1914, and thus it could field a larger standing army. Russia saw an increase in its standing army after Germany demonstrated its might in 1871, but then in 1880 Russia decreased its army back to 1875 levels. During 1873-1876, Russia allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Three Emperors League. The League's purpose was to unify the three members against Liberalist trends and

revolutions, thus preserving the conservative monarchies of each member (Kissinger 1994, 146). Yet Russia and Austria-Hungary had opposing interests in the Balkans, with Russia seeing itself as the protector of the Balkan Slavic people (Kissinger 1994, 148). Austria-Hungary, seeing its empire in decline and having no real colonial assets, wanted to keep the Balkans within its sphere of influence. Because of the Russian and Austrian opposing interests, the Three Emperor's League ended in 1876 when a crisis in Bulgaria broke out.

This conflict put Germany in a position between Russia and Austria-Hungary. However, the conflict was resolved at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The alleviation of pressure that resulted from the Congress might explain Russia bringing its standard army levels down in 1880. Nevertheless, this Bulgarian conflict represents the relationship Germany had with Russia from 1872-1890. It was a precarious one in which Germany tried to keep itself, Austria-Hungary, and Russia all on its side in order to avoid war. Indeed, Germany tried to ally Austria-Hungary and Russia with itself with a second Three Emperors League in 1881. When that failed to keep Germany from choosing between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia signed the Reinsurance Treaty in 1887 as a last effort to keep the three powers on the same side. However, by 1892 Russia signed a military pact with France. It was no longer an official German ally.

Thus, OSR would predict that after 1892, when Russia allied itself with Germany's most aggressive foe, France, Russia's standing army would increase if Germany's increased. Of course, figure 1 shows that Russia's army increased at a rate much larger than Germany's. However, it is not clear whether Russia was reacting to Germany alone. Russia had very strong ambitions in the Balkans and thus had to guard

against Austria-Hungary. Russia also had problems in the east, and it suffered a humiliating defeat against Japan in 1905 (Kissinger 1994, 192). Nevertheless, it would seem that Germany's later solidarity with Austria-Hungary, after Russia signed a military pact with France in 1892, helped influence Russia's troop levels.

Great Britain's troop levels as a measurement of the dependent variable is also a more complex case than France's. Indeed, Britain's strength was its naval power rather than its ground troops. Unlike France and later Russia, Great Britain stayed relatively neutral with Germany, and it cooperated with Germany during the Congress of Berlin. However, Great Britain was greatly distressed by Germany's decision to proliferate its navy in the late 1890s. British reaction to the German naval buildup does not manifest itself in figure 1 until 1910, when there is a large increase in British troop levels (Geiss 1976, 57).[6] However, a much clearer indicator of British reaction to Germany can be seen in the indicators corresponding with figures 2, 5, and 6. These figures better correspond with Great Britain's increase in naval spending.

The Italian and Austrian cases are easier to describe. Italy and Austria-Hungary were allies of Germany from 1871-1914. Since Austria's defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866, Austria went from preeminent European Power to the secondary German power in Europe. Austria, whose conservative government detested the liberal revolutions inspired by France, could only bandwagon with Germany for its own protection against further loss of power at the hands of the Russians. Italy had not unified until 1871, and it benefited greatly from past indirect Prussian assistance in helping expel both Austria and

---

[6] Despite the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, Germany had begun to feel endangered by the prospect of a two-front war with Russia and France. Indeed, Bismarck spoke in the Reichstag and called "for the strengthening of all powers who were capable of preventing Russia from starting a war or of opposing Russia successfully in the case of war" (Geiss 1976, 57).

France from Italian territory. Italy was not a great power in 1871, but she bandwagoned with Germany with hopes of becoming one. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy had a natural ally in Europe except for Germany. Great Britain was traditionally neutral, Austria feared Russia's Balkan ambitions, and Italy feared French reoccupation. Thus, OSR would not be surprised that these states bandwagoned with Germany.

Thus, the size of standing army does not refute the Offensive Structural Realist predictions, but it does not sufficiently prove it either. The OSR hypothesis predicted that as Germany's hard military power increased, then other European powers would bandwagon on or balance against Germany. However, the standing army numbers only tell part of the story. All of the Great Powers did expand their military numbers from the years of 1875-1914. However, not every power was increasing its troop numbers in a reaction to Germany. Indeed, after 1892 Austria-Hungary and Italy were the only two official German allies with the three of them making up the Triple Alliance. Great Britain was neutral for most of these years, but figure 2 will show a correlation between British military spending and the German naval proliferation. Russia increased its troop levels in response to a number of foreign policy issues: Germany's power, Austria's Balkan ambitions, and its war with Japan in 1905. This chapter must examine another related indicator: Great Power military expenditure.

Military Expenditure

The size of the standing army is not the only factor that can measure power. Indeed, Great Britain was powerful because of its world class navy rather than its standing army. Further, the standing army indicator only measures numbers. It does not measure the quality of troops or equipment the soldiers carried.

The military expenditure of the Great Powers from the years of 1875-1914 is another way to measure hard power. If military spending increased, then this is a potential sign of balancing against a rising power. If military spending stays the same, then it indicates that the Great Powers are note changing their military strategy. OSR predicts that Great Powers would see their military budgets increase in response to an increase in German power. Below are two figures that exhibit military spending. Figure 2 will be Great Power military expenditure from 1875-1895, and figure 3 will be a closer look at the military spending from 1895-1914.

Figure 2

Great Power Military Expenditure 1871-1895

Figure shows the Great Powers' military expenditure from 1871-1895 in relative year's British Pounds.
Source: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

Figure 2 shows that Great Power military spending between 1871-1895 fluctuated between the Great Powers. Great Britain increased its spending in 1880, reflecting the concerns it had over the latest Balkan crisis involving Russia. Germany soon followed with an increase of its own. Although figure 1 showed Russia having a much larger standing army total than the other great powers, it still spent almost the same in British Pounds as did the other states. However, figure 3 below shows another rise in British military spending after 1895. This specifically corresponds with the tensions it had with Germany over Germany's naval build-up. Nevertheless, it is unclear from both figures 2 and 3 whether or not the proliferation in military spending was in reaction to Germany. Yet historical context helps assess the dependent variable.

Figure 3

Great Power Military Expenditure 1895-1914

Figure shows the Great Powers' military expenditure from 1895-1914 in relative year's British Pounds.
Source: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

The British increase in military spending after 1895 did correlate with Germany's new naval policy. This helps show the resulting "naval arms race between the United Kingdom and Germany that lasted until World War I" (Mearsheimer 2001, 188). Indeed, Germany had superior ground troops and could use its new navy to conquer Great Britain (Manserleugh 1949, 144). Great Britain, with its small number of ground troops, posed no such threat to Berlin, despite having the superior navy.

It is difficult to claim that Russia's increase in military spending was a reaction to Germany. After 1892, France and Russia had entered into a military alliance with one another, leaving Germany alone with only Italy and Austria-Hungary. If Germany were ever pulled into a conflict with either Russia or France, Germany could expect a two-front war. This became the impetus of the Schlieffen Plan, which sought to quickly dispose of a two-front war by quickly eliminating France so to allow Germany to focus

solely on Russia. Indeed, Russian military maneuvers in Kiev during March of 1890 sparked a fear in Germany. The Kaiser believed war was imminent, and he broke with Bismarck by using this war scare as an excuse to put "more weight on military considerations" (Geiss 1976, 59). On the other hand, after Russia signed a military pact with Germany's chief rival, Germany had little choice but to firmly ally itself with Austria-Hungary. This could have made Russia increase its military spending so it could fight both Austria and Germany in a Balkan conflict.

The French case is the same as in the first variable. France was Germany's chief rival during this time period. France's loss of Alsace-Lorraine "produced a permanent French desire for *revanche…*France sublimated its frustrations for nearly fifty years in the single-minded pursuit of regaining Alsace-Lorraine" (Kissinger 1994, 138). Because of this, OSR would predict that any increase in German military spending would cause the French to increase theirs as well, lest they be easily overtaken by Germany again.

Thus, the variable of military expenditure does seem to confirm the predictions of Offensive Structural Realism. Historical context does show that Germany's naval proliferation correlated with an increase in British spending. Further, after 1892 when Russia signed a military treaty with France, Germany had little choice but to back Austria-Hungary, whose interests in the Balkans carried with them a risk of conflict with Russia. Each state vastly increased their standing army levels and military expenditures, especially after 1910. Given that the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary differed from those of France and Russia, Offensive Structural Realism would have predicted this to happen.

Population

OSR sees population as a latent power, meaning that population is important for a state's wartime capacity, but it is not an obvious hard power indicator like the size of a state's standing army or their military expenditure. Offensive Structural Realism predicts that neighboring states will be suspicious of a strong power whose population is increasing (Mearsheimer 2001, 61).

Figure 4

Great Power Total Population 1871-1914

Figure shows Great Powers' total population from 1871-1914.
Source: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

Figure 4 above shows that all Great Powers and Europe saw an increase in population during 1871-1914. Only France's population saw a slight decrease after 1910. While Germany's population size is relatively larger than most of the other powers, including its chief rival in France, all of the states were dwarfed by the Russian

population. Similar to the standing army size in figure 1, Russia had a net increase over all of the other European states measured.

OSR would not predict that a state's large population alone would be sufficient to cause anxiety among that state's neighbors. However, OSR would predict that Germany's population, combined with its superiority in military spending, would cause anxiety among German neighbors. Again, given Germany's attitude towards the British navy, its constant rival in France, and its alliance with the Austrians, Germany's foreign policy affected most of its other surrounding neighbors in a negative way. The indicator of population does not alone cause Germany's neighbors to increase their military sizes, but as a latent power it does help support the OSR prediction that Germany's neighbors would increase their military sizes. Indeed, if any Great Power became entangled in a conflict with Germany, the German population size would give Germany greater man power in reserves and more citizens to help in a war-time economy.

Primary Energy Consumption & Iron and Steel Production

Great Power primary energy consumption and iron and steel production are measured from the time period of 1871-1914. These indicators are used because they best explain both a state's "mobilizable wealth" and their "technological development" (Mearsheimer 2001, 62). These two characteristics refer to the "economic resources a state has at its disposal to build military forces" (Mearsheimer 2001, 62). Indeed, the development of steel in the 19th century "profoundly changed the arsenals of the great powers… [and] contributed to [the] building [of] formidable military forces" (Mearsheimer 2001, 62). However, in order to quickly produce a technology like steel into a military asset, a state needs a high energy consumption capability. Primary energy consumption and iron and steel production are better latent power indicators than the GNP. The GNP essentially measures the value of goods produced by a state, but it can be misleading. Because it partly relies on "the size and productivity of a state's labor force…focusing on GNP alone might lead one to think that the United Kingdom and Russia had the most powerful economies" in the 19th century (Mearsheimer 2001, 63). This is not true, especially since Russia industrialized much later than Great Britain. Thus, primary energy consumption and iron and steel output help mitigate any population bias while also showing two critical indicators that can be easily turned from latent to military power.

Figure 5

Figure shows Great Power primary energy consumption in coal-ton equivalents.
Source: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

Figure 5 shows the primary energy consumption of the Great Powers in Europe from 1871-1914. Primary energy is measured by thousands of coal tonnage consumed per year by each state. It is useful in indicating the productivity and modernity of a state. When primary energy consumption is coupled with the iron and steel production indicator, it can help clarify how a state was investing in those latent power technologies. As the figure shows, all states, except for Italy and Spain, primarily saw an increase in their energy consumption. However, France and Austria-Hungary dipped in their consumption in 1910. Nevertheless, both Great Britain and Germany's energy consumption vastly dwarfed the other European powers.

Figure 5 reveals an interesting correlation between German and British energy consumption and their quarrel over the German naval proliferation. From 1871-1890,

Germany's energy consumption increased, but it grew at an even faster rate from 1895-1914. This was the time period that Germany began its hard push towards challenging Great Britain's navy. Great Britain's primary energy consumption also grew at rates that rivaled Germany's. Figure 5, when coupled with figure 3, shows that both Germany and Great Britain outpaced the other European powers in energy consumption and military spending. This correlation implies that Great Britain was at least partially responding to Germany's naval increase, which it saw as an aggressive act.

In terms of Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary, their lack of energy consumption highlights Germany's superior production. Since Austria-Hungary was allied with Germany, OSR would not necessarily expect Austria-Hungary to increase its energy consumption unless Russia was quickly increasing its own. Figure 5 does show some parallel between Austrian and Russian energy consumption. France's energy consumption did not increase, but this does not mean that France was not reacting against Germany power. Indeed, figures 1, 2, and 3 show that France did increase its troop total and military spending.

Thus, the results of primary energy consumption are inconclusive on their own. Indeed, it is a latent power indictor, so a state's increase in standing army total or military spending more clearly shows how secure states in Europe felt. However, what is notable from this variable alone is the correlation between German naval proliferation and the exponential increase in energy consumption between Great Britain and Germany. When this indicator is coupled with the preceding indicators, it further supports Germany having both greater actual and greater latent power than its neighbors.

Figure 6

Great Power Iron and Steel Production 1871-1914

Figure shows Great Power iron and steel production from 1871-1914.
Source: Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

Figure 6 shows the next indicator of latent power, which is the iron and steel production of European Great Powers from 1871-1914. It is measured by iron and steel production in thousands of tons per year. As stated above, steel was a cutting edge technology in the 19th century (Mearsheimer 2001, 63). A state's production of steel and iron shows not only the modernity of the state, but it also shows the potential military power of a state since military weapons would require both metals. Like figure 5, figure 6 shows that Great Britain and Germany dominated the other European states with their iron and steel production. However, Germany's production grew at an amazing rate after its naval policy changed in 1890.

This variable alone does not sufficiently indicate whether or not Germany's neighboring states were reacting to Germany's increase in power. However, like in figure 5, there is a correlation between Germany's naval build-up and Great Britain's coal and steel production. Especially after 1900, Great Britain reversed course from decreasing its iron and steel production to increasing it at a swift rate. Though not all of Germany's coal and steel production went into its navy, a great portion of it did so that Germany could build its fleet as quickly as possible. Figure 6 helps put into context of how quickly Germany was out-producing its Great Power neighbors.

However, like the variable of primary energy consumption, Austria-Hungary's, France's, or Russia's lower iron and steel production does not necessarily signal that they were not reacting to German power. Indeed, after 1910 they all vastly increased their military spending, which shows that none were feeling especially secure on the continent. Yet, like Germany's primary energy consumption, Germany's iron and steel production, especially after 1895, indicates of how powerful Germany was becoming on the continent. Though it may have had a smaller standing army and population than Russia, Germany was first in all other indicators.

Thus, while other states did not mirror Germany in their iron and steel production, this indicator does help bolster the OSR case when it is combined with the preceding indicators. Indeed, Germany's iron and steel production shows that Germany had great power that could quickly be converted for actual military usage.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to test the predictions of Offensive Structural Realism for Europe during 1871-1914. This test included five indicators of Germany's growing power in that era. Indeed, Germany's iron and steel production, total energy consumption, population, military expenditure, and standing army made it the most powerful state in Europe during this time. When the indicators are examined together, it does seem that Offensive Structural Realism's predictions were accurate In 1871 Germany was either allied with or had transactional relationships with all of the European Great Powers, except for France. By 1892, Germany was only officially allied with Austria-Hungary and Italy, and Germany's foreign policy interests conflicted with those of Russia, France, and Great Britain. Indeed, OSR would predict a series of balancing against or bandwagoning with Germany. This happened with the eventual formation of the Triple Entente, and by1914 the Triple Entente was at war with Germany and its allies.

However, OSR does not explain why balancing did not occur before 1890. Why did the Great Powers take so long to respond to Germany's rising power? Although Offensive Structural Realists might counter with the fact that standing army levels increased during these years, this alone does not prove that Germany's neighbors were increasing troop totals in response to German power. As will be seen in the next chapter, more was seemingly at play than Germany's increase in power. Historical context tells us that German foreign policy shifted after 1890. This shift is seen not only by Kaiser Willhelm II's vison of *Weltpolitik* and the dismissal of Bismarck, but it is also seen in Britain's increase iron and steel production in 1900 and the great proliferation of military spending that occurred in Europe after 1905. The point is this: if OSR's predictions were

valid, if German power was the prime reason for other states spending more on their

military, then the proliferation of military spending should have occurred before 1905.

Indeed, though the ultimate predictions of Offensive Structural Realism came true, the

theory cannot explain why military expenditure took off in 1905 rather than in 1875. It

cannot explain why the Triple Entente waited until after 1890 to balance against

Germany.

CHAPTER THREE

Germany Sending a Strong Signal? Institutionalism in Germany 1871-1914

OSR correctly predicts the Great Power balancing and bandwagoning in regards to German power. However, OSR does not explain why the balancing occurred after 1890 rather than before. Institutionalism can fill this void. Institutionalism predicts that insecurity in Europe in regards to German power was much lower during the years of 1871-1890 because Germany's actions signaled Germany's desire to be seen as a sated power. Indeed, Germany pursued a role of power balancer rather than a state who aimed to change the balance of power. However, Germany's foreign policy actions changed when Bismarck was dismissed by the Kaiser in 1890, and Kaiser Willhelm II began Germany's pursuit of *Weltpolitik*, or world power. Behavior expectations had been established by the regimes that Germany was a part of in the years of 1871-1890. Those behavioral expectations changed in 1890 with Germany's new foreign policy goals. Institutionalists regard the "configuration of information" as important for states when they make decisions in the international system (Moravcsik 1997, 513). Since there was no broad regime to help regulate behavior and thus information in 1890, Germany's behavior changes in foreign policy disrupted the reliability of information its neighboring states had for Germany. Germany's new actions signaled different intentions and created fear and insecurity in Europe. This insecurity was not, as Offensive Structural Realists would posit, derived from Germany's new, relative advantage in war-making capabilities.

This chapter will explain the two different German foreign policies during the years of 1871-1914. The first period will explain Bismarck's system of alliances, how

Germany tried to create regimes that would have 1) kept it out of a two front war with France and 2) have kept Germany from having to choose sides in a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary. By trying to create regimes that accomplished these two goals, Germany was trying to signal its desire to be seen as a sated power. The second period examined is Germany's *Weltpolitik* foreign policy. This policy is marked by Germany's desire to signal itself as a preeminent world power. This section will show this by examining Germany's naval build up and Germany's post-Bismarck military strategy. The analysis will show that Germany's new actions sent a different and more aggressive message to its neighbors in Europe. This behavior change is what drove the Triple Entente to balance against Germany. Indeed, this is why balancing occurred after 1900 and not before.

Bismarck's System of Alliances

As was seen through the variable indicators of the OSR section, Germany's material capabilities were rising throughout 1871-1890, yet there was no active attempt by Great Powers to balance against Germany. From 1871-1890, the German foreign policy under Bismarck was characterized by Germany's attempts to create regimes that 1) kept Germany out of a two-front war with France and 2) to keep Austria-Hungary and Russia from going to war. By attempting to create regimes that accomplished these two goals, Germany signaled its desire to be seen as a sated power. Consequently, Institutionalism would predict that this signaling created behavioral expectations of Germany being cooperative and not looking to expand territorially. Indeed, during this time period, Germany acted as the crux of European diplomacy. This eliminated the need

for neighboring Great Powers to balance against Germany. This chapter will examine

five instances of Germany's foreign policy attempting to signal its non-aggressive

intentions: the first Three Emperors League, the Congress of Berlin, the second Three

Emperors League, the Triple Alliance, and the Reinsurance Treaty. In each of the five

instances above, this chapter will explain what Germany's foreign policy goals were, how

the other Great Powers reacted, and finally how this contributed to Germany's goal of

signaling its un-aggressive intentions.

The First Three Emperor's League

After the end of the Franco-Prussian War, the Great Powers of Europe had serious

reservations about Germany's intentions in Europe. Before the war, Germany existed as

several separate independent states, and Prussia was the most powerful among them. Yet

through Bismarck's skillful politicking, he used the war to unite the states into a single

German state. In consequence, a large and powerful Germany now sat in the middle of

Europe. Of course, without a regime to bind this new Germany with its neighbors,

Institutionalism would predict insecurity among the Great Powers. This indeed happened.

Responding to the German victory over France in 1871, British minority leader Benjamin

Disraeli "suggested [to the House of Commons] that the revolutionary change in the

balance of power might pose a threat to British security" (Craig 1978, 103). France, of

course, was just defeated by the Germans. Even in Austria-Hungary, some leaders in

"influential circles… still wanted revenge" for Prussia's victory in the Austro-Prussian

War in 1866 (Craig 1978, 103). Bismarck of course realized the anxiety surrounding

Germany. He saw that the unification of Germany could only stand if Germany could

convince its neighbors that it was not looking to expand territorially (Geiss 1976, 13). Institutionalism would predict that Great Power states would begin to balance against Germany unless Germany could signal its non-aggressive intentions. In order to foster cooperation, Germany would have to try and lengthen what Axelrod and Keohane call "the shadow of the future", meaning that Germany would have to signal that it could be reliably and predictably non-aggressive (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 232).

Creating the first Three Emperor's League was Bismarck's first attempt to lengthen this "shadow of the future". The goal was to establish a peace between Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. Germany in particular had good reason to try and bind Austria-Hungary and Russia into an alliance because a war between them could force Germany to take sides. Such a scenario would open Germany to a potential two-front war, with France attacking from the west. The main contention between Russia and Austria-Hungary was each's ambitions in the Balkans. Russia in particular had been "swept up by Pan-Slavic sentiments" and saw itself as the protector of the Slavic people (Kissinger 1994, 148). Of course, this was in conflict with Austria-Hungary, who neighbored those Balkan lands and feared Russian expansionism. Yet, despite the opposing interests in the Balkans, Germany created the Three Emperor's League on the basis of preserving the conservative governments in each state. Essentially, each government pledged its support to the others in helping them expel liberalist or radical tendencies within their government (Kissinger 1994, 146).

The first Three Emperors League ended in 1876 because of a Balkan crisis, the very thing that Germany was trying to prevent. Uprisings against Turkish rule in Bosnia and Bulgaria caused Russia to intervene on behalf of the Slavs. This brought in both

Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, "the former motivated by suspicion of the Russians and interest in acquiring Bosnia, the latter by concern over the future of the [Turkish] Straits [that lead to the Mediterranean Sea]" (Craig 1976, 110). This Balkan crisis brought the Great Powers on the brink of war, but it was settled by the Congress of Berlin.

Despite the Three Emperors League failing to prevent further strife between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the alliance did signal something about Germany; Germany had no desire for conflict on the continent. As stated earlier, Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian War caused serious suspicion about its growing power in Europe. In the war's aftermath, rather than trying to opportunistically make further gains, Germany staked its foreign policy in creating an alliance that tried to halt further war on the continent. Of course, this action was not altruistic. However, it was important that Germany calmed the suspicions that surrounded it and signal to its neighbors that it intended to be continent with its current territorial gains. If not, Germany would find itself in isolation (Craig 1976, 104). Though the first Three Emperors League ultimately failed, it did help Germany's image in the eyes of its neighbors. Indeed, Germany became a major player in the resolution of this Balkan crisis at the Congress of Berlin.

Congress of Berlin

The Congress of Berlin was not an alliance so much as it was a stop-gap measure in order to prevent a war in the Balkans, but the results did not hurt what Germany was trying to signal to its neighbors; it was not looking to expand. The Congress' results were pleasing to Germany, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary, but the results left Russia

frustrated. This marked the beginning of the end for Germany's plan to keep both Austria-Hungary and Russia dependent on German leverage.

The Congress began in 1878. Germany had "no direct interest in the Balkans", and it expect to prevent war between Austria-Hungary and Russia (Geiss 1976, 31). Indeed, Germany set out to be seen as the "honest broker" (Geiss 1976, 31-32). Germany had to play a balancing act. It needed to try and satisfy the Balkan ambitions of both Austria-Hungary and Russia, otherwise "it had to face the reality that any of the two Powers who did not feel satisfied…would turn against Germany in the long run by approaching France" (Geis 1976, 31). Germany also had to appease Great Britain, whose navy operated in the Mediterranean and had already gone to war with Russia over the Turkish Straits in 1854 (Kissinger 1994, 93-94).

The outcomes of the Congress left Germany, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary satisfied. Russia was less so. The Austrians gained control of Bosnia, and Great Britain gained Cyprus (Craig 1978, 113). The Russians gained various lands they had lost in their war with Great Britain in 1854, and Bulgaria was split into three parts with one being independent (Kissinger 1994, 154). Indeed, this was meant to please the Russians, since this move helped free some of the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians from Turkish rule (Craig 1978, 113). However, Russia was not content with the outcomes. Tsar Alexander III stated that the Congress was "a European coalition against Russia under the leadership of Prince Bismarck" (Craig 1978, 113). He was angry that Austria-Hungary and Great Britain had gained so much, even though it was Russian troops that had died in the Bulgarian intervention (Craig 1978, 113). Since Germany had self-proclaimed itself

as the 'honest broker' of the Congress, Russia blamed Germany for this slight. This would mark the beginning of Russia's pivot towards France.

Even though the Congress of Berlin was only a stop-gap measure to prevent war rather than an alliance or regime, Germany's actions in this effort further showcased Germany's ambitions in Europe. It wanted to be seen as non-aggressive, and it wanted to prevent a situation in which it would have to choose sides. Germany's actions were egotistic. It tried to exhibit itself as an 'honest-broker' in solving this issue so that it would not have to choose between Austria-Hungary and Russia in a war, lest one pivot towards France. Of course, this goal was unmet. Nevertheless, despite Germany's growing military and economic power during this time, it did not act as a bully in this conference. It did not try to use this Congress as a chance to preemptively cripple Russia, even though the OSR section showed Russia with a growing population and standing army. Further, Germany had no interest in the Balkans, with Bismarck quipping that "the whole of the Balkans is not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer" (Craig 1978, 110). Germany had much to gain in playing peacemaker in Europe.

The Second Three Emperors League

The Three Emperors League was renewed in 1881, and this alliance particularly demonstrated Germany's efforts to keep war from breaking out in Europe. Unlike the first Three Emperors League which sought to preserve the conservative character of its member's regimes, its renewal set out to ensure neutrality if certain members were attacked by other Great Powers (Geiss 1976, 40).

The Second Three Emperors League was the result of Germany's fear of a Russian pivot towards France. After the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Russia left angry at Germany. In fear of a future Russian attack, Germany agreed to the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879. Incidentally, Bismarck "persuaded his sovereign to ratify [it] only by threatening to resign if he refused to do so" (Craig 1978, 114). It was to be a secret treaty, and its provisions were that Germany and Austria-Hungary would come to each other's aide if one were attacked by Russia (Geiss 1976, 39). If either Germany or Austria-Hungary were attacked by another power, then one would stay neutral. However, Germany's intentions with this alliance were purely defensive against a potential Russian attack[7]. On September 7, 1879, Bismarck wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm I:

> *"Austrian policy is also only a matter of security against Russian attacks, and not actually of hostile aspirations against Russia. War with Russia, even if successful, can never be desirable as such for Austria, nor for us either" (Geiss 1976, 184).*

Although Bismarck hoped to parlay the Dual Alliance into an eventual alliance with Great Britain, the knowledge of the alliance actually led Russia to a rapprochement with Germany in a renewal of the Three Emperors League (Geiss 1976, 39-40). The League promised to use the diplomatic collective action of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary to close the Turkish Straits if Great Britain should ever go to war with Russia (Taylor 1998, 308). Even further, the League required its members to stay neutral if one of them was attacked by a fourth country (Kissinger 1994, 158). The League again provided Germany the chance to keep Germany and Austria-Hungary on the same side, and it gave Germany more control over the direction of European affairs. Even though

---

[7] The Pan-Slavic political movement in Russia allied itself more with France than the conservative governments in Germany or Austria-Hungary. Though Bismarck had confidence in the Tsar, he greatly feared that the internal stability resulting from the Pan-Slavic movement would cause Russia to attack Germany in order to fulfill their Balkan ambitions.

Bismarck had hoped to turn the Dual Alliance into a tripartite agreement between itself, Austria, and Great Britain, the fact that Russia eventually agreed to a renewal of the Three Emperors League still dealt into Germany's ambitions of putting itself into a majority coalition among the five Great Powers. Indeed, Bismarck told the Russian Ambassador Peter Alexandrovich Saburov in 1880:

> *"[One] must not lose sight of the importance of being one of three on the European chess-board. That is the invariable objective of all cabinets and of mine above all others. Nobody wishes to be in a minority. All politics reduce themselves to this formula: to try to be one of three, as long as the world is governed by an unstable equilibrium of five Powers" (Craig 1978, 115).*

As long as Germany was one of the three, it could leverage its power to prevent a war in which it had no interest. By renewing the Three Emperors League, Germany was signaling that it was content with its gains from the Franco-Prussia War and was not wanting to expand.

The failure of the second Three Emperors League was caused by the same reason that broke the up the first; a crisis in the Balkans. By 1886, Russia was growing frustrated by the Bulgarian government's resistance towards Russian influence, and Russia broke off diplomatic relations (Craig 1978, 130). Germany feared that Russian troops would invade Bulgaria, and both Austria-Hungary and Great Britain demanded that Germany use its influence to stop Russia. However, Germany thought that such an action would provoke Russia into pivoting towards France (Geiss 1976, 54). On the other hand, if Germany allowed Russia to invade Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary would retaliate, and Bismarck had little faith in Austria's military capability (Craig 1989, 130). Bismarck wrote to his son Herbert that:

> *"The Russians do not possess the kind of self-restraint that would make it possible for us to live alone with them and France on the Continent. If they had eliminated Austria or*

brought it to their heels, we know from experience that they would become so domineering
towards us that the peace with them would be untenable" (Craig 1978, 126).

Germany's solution was to give Great Britain the initiative by having them and Italy sign the Mediterranean Entente whose goal was to enforce the status quo in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and the Black Sea (Geiss 1976, 54). However, this Balkan crisis spelled doom for the second Three Emperors League since it showed that an alliance which included both Austria-Hungary and Russia was not tenable. Yet Germany was still able to try and repair its relationship with Russia in the Reinsurance Treaty.[8]

Nevertheless, the second Three Emperors League shows a continuation of Germany's effort to show its non-aggressive intentions in Europe. The reader must keep in mind that all throughout this time period, Germany is still a growing and militarily powerful state. Yet it is the primary actor in helping to resolve conflicts on the continent. Germany's efforts are consistent since the end of the Franco-Prussia War; they wanted to prevent a European War in which Germany would open itself to a war on two fronts. The fact that Germany was willing to accept a rapprochement between itself, Austria-Hungary, and Russia shows that despite Germany's military and economic power, it was also "regarded as the diplomatic capital of Europe" (Craig 1978, 116). Europe was afraid of Russian or Austrian aggressiveness in the Balkans. Because Germany was a central player in resolving this fear, Germany's actions signaled that Europe need not be afraid of German aggressiveness on the continent.

---

[8] This Treaty will be discussed in its own section.

The Triple Alliance

The Triple Alliance was an agreement between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy in 1882 that further insured Germany against a potential Russo-Franco alliance. It was forged after the Congress of Berlin, in which Russia blamed Germany for its meager gains in the Balkans. This alliance also ran concurrently with the second Three Emperors League.

The Triple Alliance required Germany to try and sooth tensions between Austria-Hungary and Italy. Italy was a newly independent state, and some of its territory had long been occupied by the Austrians and the French. When France began to further expand into northern Africa in 1881, Italy approached Germany about "the possibility of an alliance" in order to deter a possible French advance into Italy (Craig 1978, 115). However, Bismarck had long wanted a reconciliation with France, but the Panslavs in Russia "were fighting for favor of the new [Russian] Tsar…[and] an alliance with France was the Panslav's strangest card" (Taylor 1998, 305). Germany could not allow itself to be without allies in the event of a Russo-Franco alliance. Thus, in 1882 all three Powers agreed to the Triple Alliance.

The preamble of the treaty states that the three Powers "wished 'to increase the guarantee of general peace, to strengthen the monarchical principle and to keep intact by that the social and political order of their states'" (Geiss 1976, 42). The rules were that Italy pledge to assist Germany if Germany were attacked by France. Austria-Hungary pledged to remain neutral in such an event. However, if Italy were attacked by France, then both Germany and Austria-Hungary would intervene. All the members would intervene if one member was at war with two other great powers (Taylor 1998, 305).

Further, this alliance gave Germany insurance against a potential Russian attack or a demise of the second Three Emperors League.

For Germany, this alliance had a similar signal of the second Three Emperors League; "we must not lose sight of the importance of being one of the three on the European chess-board" (Craig 1978, 115). However, a major difference between the Triple Alliance and the second Three Emperors League is that the second Three Emperors League was actually made of three Great Powers. The Triple Alliance had only two, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the alliance represents Germany's efforts at creating a defensive organization that would guarantee Germany some aid if there was a Russo-Franco attack on Germany. The goal was never to allow Germany to obtain support for an attack on France or Russia. Though Germany was growing in its military and economic capabilities, this alliance helps show that Germany's intentions were still defensive. Italy's actions could be seen as them bandwagoning to Germany power in order to have protection from France, and this interpretation would be correct. However, there was not yet a concerted effort among the Great Powers in Europe to either balance against or bandwagon with Germany.

The Reinsurance Treaty

The Reinsurance Treaty was an agreement between Germany and Russia that was signed in 1887. It is the consequence of the failed second Three Emperors League and of Germany's continued attempts to keep Russia from an alliance with France.

The historical context of the Reinsurance Treaty lies in the failure of the second Three Emperors League. Essentially, Bulgaria had begun to disregard Russian influence

in its affairs, and Russia broke off diplomatic relations. This led to fears of Russia occupying Bulgaria, which would have prompted a response from Austria-Hungary, which would have "brought Germany into the position of having to again choose between Russia and Austria-Hungary" (Geiss 1976, 53). Because of this latest strife between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the second Three Emperors League could not continue. Nevertheless, Germany had not given up hope of keeping Russia from pivoting towards France. In 1887, there was internal pressure within Germany for Bismarck to authorize a preventative war against Russia. Yet Bismarck wrote to one of his German ambassadors, "so long as I am minister, I shall not give my consent to a prophylactic attack upon Russia, and I am far from advising Austria to make such an attack, so long as she is not absolutely certain of English co-operation" (Taylor 1998, 354). Much like a reverse Schlieffen Plan, the German General Staff made the argument that Germany could hold a defensive front against France and quickly help Austria-Hungary subdue Russia in a preventative war (Taylor 1998, 354). Nevertheless, Bismarck decided to take a different approach by negotiating the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia.

For Germany, Reinsurance Treaty's goals were to obtain a promise of "benevolent neutrality" from Russia if Germany were attacked by France (Geiss 1976, 187). Similarly, for Russia, Germany promised its own neutrality if Austria-Hungary attacked Russia (Geiss 1976, 187). Yet if Germany was the aggressor towards France or if Russia was aggressive towards Austria-Hungary, then neither Germany nor Russia were obliged to be neutral (Geiss 1976, 187). This treaty seemed to assuage Germany's fear of an aggressive Russo-Franco coalition from developing. However, the bi-lateral nature of the Reinsurance Treaty created problems for Germany and its relationship with

Austria-Hungary. There was a secret component to the Reinsurance Treaty that was not published with the other articles. This secret component stated that Germany would "lend Russia a free hand in order to re-establish a regular and legal Government in Bulgaria" (Geiss 1976, 188). Further, the secret addition of the treaty went on to say, "if His Majesty the Emperor of Russia should find Himself under the necessity of assuming the task of defending the entrance of the Black Sea in order to safeguard the interests of Russia, Germany undertakes to accord its benevolent neutrality and its moral and diplomatic support to the measure which His Majesty may deem it necessary to take to guard the key of His Empire" (Geiss 1976, 188). In other words, Germany was passively giving Russia permission to act in the Balkans, even though such action would provoke Austria-Hungary. Germany did not do this because it desired conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Instead, Germany was makings a last-ditched effort to keep St. Petersburg on its side.

This secret addition to the treaty is part of the reason why the Reinsurance Treaty failed. When Bulgaria elected Ferdinand of Coburg as their new prince, the Russians strongly disapproved. This led Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain to fear a Russian retaliation to the Bulgarian choice (Craig 1978, 132). Bismarck encouraged Great Britain and Italy's Mediterranean Entente to pressure Russia into not acting (Craig 1978, 132). This left Russia frustrated with Germany and the Reinsurance Treaty, since the treaty only offered passive German support. This, coupled with economic difficulties between Russia and Germany, eventually lead Russia into the arms of France who "had

accumulated surplus capital" and was willing to lend it to an industrializing Russia (Geiss 1976, 52).[9]

The Reinsurance Treaty signaled Germany's last, best attempt to prevent itself from having to choose between Vienna or St. Petersburg. Because the Balkan ambitions of Austria and Russia were too untenable, the treaty's provisions proved to be too contradictory to Germany's other agreements. The promises Germany made in the Reinsurance Treaty were too great. Nevertheless, the Reinsurance Treaty shows that Bismarck did not buckle under the internal pressure to launch a preventative war against Russia. Indeed, Germany would have had the support of Austria-Hungary in such an event. Yet Bismarck decided against it. Instead, he tried to create a bi-lateral treaty that would have run concurrently with the Triple Alliance, thus placing Germany in Bismarck's preferred position in Europe; it would have been one of three on the European chess board. At the very least, Germany's actions in the Reinsurance Treaty signaled that it was willing to make large promises in the hope of preventing a war coalition against itself. This treaty failed, but it was not because of aggressive German intentions.

Conclusion of Bismarck's System of Alliances

Bismarck's system of alliances shows how a state can change its behavioral expectations. Indeed, Institutionalists think about the interaction between states as an iterated game, and with an iterated game, the past actions of states matter because those

---

[9] The economic difficulties between Germany and Russia in 1887 had to do with tariffs and finance methods. Germany "forbade the Reichsbank to accept Russian securities as collateral for loans. This move was regarded by investors as a sign of lack of confidence in Russian credit" (Craig 1978, 132). Further, Russia had begun to ban "all foreigners from buying real estate in Russia's western provinces. Mostly Germans were hit by this move" (Geis 1976, 56)

actions give information. Neighboring states take this information, and they use it to make predictions on how they should posture towards their neighboring states. In 1871, Great Powers in Europe were suspicious of Germany because it was a growing economic and military power with recent military victories over two other Great Powers, Austria-Hungary and France. Future British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was making speeches in the House of Commons about the negative prospects of German power. There were influential politicians in Vienna who still simmered over their 1866 defeat against the Prussians. Yet Germany's actions from 1871-1890 show a consistent narrative of Germany trying to align Austria-Hungary, Russia, and itself in order to prevent further war on the continent. This strategy meant Germany would not obtain further territorial gains, but Bismarck realized that the unification of Germany could only stand if Germany could convince its neighbors that it was a not looking to expand its territory (Geiss 1976, 13). Germany's actions signaled a narrative of information. As seen in the OSR component of this test case, Germany's standing army, population, coal and steel production, and other power indicators outranked almost all of the other Great Powers. Yet there was no concerted effort to balance against Germany. There is evidence of bandwagoning; Austria-Hungary and Italy are the prime examples. Yet both Russia and Great Britain worked with Germany in times of crisis. They did not balance against it.

Institutionalists write that regimes can help states cooperate because they set "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1982, 186). Without regimes, conflicts of interest among states can "produce uncertainly and risk" (Keohane 1982, 332). Yet states operate in iterated games of interactions, and

70

regimes can help provide a longer "shadow of the future" because they produce a "regularity of stakes" and can give more reliable information (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 233). From 1871-1890, Germany tried to set up regimes aimed at reducing the prospect of conflict and suspicion among its neighbors. Between Austria-Hungary and Russia in particular, the Balkans represented a large conflict of interests between them, and Germany's regimes were aimed at either preventing a conflict in that region or to protect itself in the case of a conflict. Even though most of Germany's regime creation attempts failed, its efforts at establishing such regimes did change how Germany's neighbors viewed it. Germany's attempts signaled certain information about Germany. In consequence, Russia and Great Britain were not actively seeking alliances in order to balance against German power. Instead, most of the Great Powers worked with Germany to help solve the Balkan crises. Indeed, Germany's actions showed itself as a territorially satisfied power in Europe, and by the 1880s, its effort in creating regimes helped make it "regarded as the diplomatic capital of Europe" (Craig 1978, 116).

Weltpolitik

After the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, Germany's foreign policy changed. There are many reasons why Bismarck's and the Kaiser's relationship was strained. Some of the tensions had to do with labor law reform that the Kaiser wanted in 1888. Another strain originated from Bismarck wanting to temper the Kaiser's idea for more aggressive military posture (Craig 1978, 171-179). Yet from 1890-1914, Germany tried to posture itself as a world power, i.e. its pursuit of *Weltpolitik*. As observed in the OSR section of this test case, it is during this time period that Germany saw growth in both its

hard and latent power indicators. It is also after 1890 that France and Russia began to actively balance against Germany. Great Britain joined in soon after. Further, there were no active attempts by Germany to create the type of regimes that were characteristic under Bismarck. This section will focus on two key indicators in Germany's *Weltpolitik* foreign policy: 1) Germany's naval build up, and 2) Germany's change in military strategy as represented by the Schlieffen Plan. These two indicators signaled that Germany was no longer content with the status quo. Consequently, this led to actions that made German neighbors suspicious of the growing German power. Institutionalism would then predict that some form of balancing or bandwagoning would occur.

Germany's Naval Proliferation

Germany's naval proliferation began with Kaiser Willhelm II, and it eventually pushed Great Britain into balancing against Germany with France and Russia. Germany had never had a powerful navy, but Germany's foreign policy under the Kaiser considered naval power as "an indispensable means to world power" (Meansergh 1949, 62).

Kaiser Wilhelm II came to the throne in 1888 with the intention to "give greater emphasis to military considerations and to conservative principles" (Geiss 1976, 58). He wanted to use these considerations to form Germany into a world power, not just a European one.[10] German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was instrumental in promoting the idea that naval power was key for Germany increasing its power. By March 1898, Tirpitz

---

[10] There is much to write about Germany's *Weltpolitik* goals, especially those involving colonial lands. Unfortunately, this thesis will not cover them in detail. Instead, this section will focus more on how Germany's neighbors reacted to Germany's naval policy rather than give an evaluation of the policy's goals.

had become Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office. In this capacity, he used the office as a "propaganda centre whose objective was to make all Germans proud of their fleet" (Craig 1978, 307). The Naval Office's messages were largely targeted towards the emerging German middle class, which had begun to grow due to Germany's rising coal and steel production (Geiss 1976, 78-79). In March 1898, the German Reichtag approved "400 million Reichsmarks for new naval construction, which was intended to bring the Imperial Navy up to a fixed strength of 19 battleships, 8 coastal armored ships, 12 large and 30 small cruisers, and a supporting force of torpedo boats, special ships, and training vessels" (Craig 1978, 308). Further, after the Spanish-American War, the German Naval Office was able to secure funding for "a doubling of the number of battleships" (Craig 1978, 308).[11]

Germany knew that its naval policy would upset Great Britain, but Germany's *Risikogedanke* (Risk Theory) strategy planned to mediate any British retaliation. Germany realized it could not build a navy as powerful as Great Britain's in the span of a few years. However, Germany's plan was to quickly build a navy that was capable of delivering a devastating blow to the British navy (Mansergh 1949, 144). The logic was that if Germany was able to deliver this devastating blow to the British home fleet stationed near their island, then Great Britain would be forced to confront the possibility of recalling "its squadrons from the Mediterranean and the Far East at the cost of leaving its interests in these areas vulnerable to attacks by other Powers" (Craig 1978, 309). Germany relied on the assumption that Great Britain would not risk leaving those other

---

[11] The Imperial Naval Office used the Spanish-American War as a metaphor for the British and German relationship. The narrative was this; if Germany wished to avoid the fate of Spain, then it must increase its naval capacity (Craig 1978, 308).

areas vulnerable. Thus, Germany could continue to build its navy without British retaliation.

However, there were some large flaws in assumptions of the *Risikogedanke*. Firstly, it assumed that the "British people would be unwilling to pay the costs of maintaining their decided superiority in naval strength" (Craig 1978, 310). Secondly, German leadership never considered the possibility of a British and French or British and Russian alliance. Because Great Britain and Russia still had a long-standing contention over the Turkish Straits, German Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow believed "that Anglo-Russian reconciliation was impossible and that Germany could continue to enjoy a balancing position in Europe" (Mansergh 1949, 71). Even though Great Britain had begun to speak louder about their objections to the German navy, Germany's confidence in its power precluded it from seriously tempering its naval proliferation. Indeed, in 1896 German Admiral Georg von Müller wrote to the Kaiser Wilhelm II's brother, "Here, too, our motto must be all or nothing. Either we harness the total strength of the nation, ruthlessly, even if it means accepting the risk of a major war, or we limit ourselves to continental power alone" (Geiss 1976, 194). Of course, Admiral Müller ended his letter with an endorsement of the naval proliferation and of *Weltpolitik.*

Germany's blindness to the flaws of the *Risikogedanke* came true in 1907 with Great Britain's induction into the Triple Entente. Since Great Britain had become alarmed at Germany's naval proliferation, Britain reacted "by always remaining ahead of the German navy in numbers, deplacement[12], and caliber of her capital ships" (Geiss 1976, 79). Further, Great Britain's entrance into the Triple Entente meant that Germany

---

[12] The author probably meant 'displacement' in terms of ship tonnage.

would be encircled by British, French, and Russian forces. The Triple Entente was not a mutual defense alliance. Indeed, "there was no formal instrument of alliance, but only a system of bilateral treaties [a dual alliance between France and Russia] combined with bilateral agreements between Britain on the one hand, and France and Russia on the other. The Triple Entente was not so much a direct response against the Triple Alliance [which still consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy], but rather against" German *Weltpolitik* (Geiss 1976, 79). Britain could veto any provocation by France or Russia against Germany, but Britain's warming relationship with France and Russia foreshadowed the future; "the powers of the Triple Entente would stand up against Germany" if Germany crossed a line too far (Geiss 1976, 107). This of course happened when Germany violated Belgian neutrality in 1914.

Germany's naval proliferation signaled that Germany was defecting from the foreign policy of Bismarck. From 1871-1890, Europe had become accustomed to using Germany as the diplomatic vehicle for solving problems between the Great Powers. This was due to Bismarck's efforts to signal Germany as having non-aggressive intentions. Yet Kaiser Wilhelm II's *Weltpolitik* reoriented Germany into projecting power onto its neighbors. From 1899-1901, Great Britain had tried to negotiated with Germany over its naval policy. Germany entertained the negotiations because it wanted to recruit Great Britain to the Triple Alliance. However, Germany was not willing to make any concessions about its naval fleet (Geiss 1976, 94). This was a term Great Britain could not meet. Because Germany believed an Anglo-Russo reconciliation was impossible, German leadership was confident that Germany could handle a two-front war with France and Russia, especially since Great Britain was expected to remain out of the war. Since

there was no international regime to impose principles, rules, and norms among the Great Powers, they had to base their strategy on what Germany was signaling. Germany's signals indicated that it was willing to, as Admiral Müller succinctly wrote, "harness the total strength of the nation, ruthlessly, even if it means accepting the risk of a major war" (Geiss 1976, 194). Even though Germany had been a rising power since 1871, its insistence on naval proliferation after 1890 drove Great Britain, France, and Russia into balancing against it.

The Schlieffen Plan and Germany's New Military Strategy

The Schlieffen Plan represents the newfound aggressiveness in Germany's foreign policy after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890. Unlike the military strategy under Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who served as the Chief of the German General Staff under Bismarck, Germany's new military strategy was not concerned with obtaining political victories against its adversary. Instead, Germany sought to further increase its military power so it could impose total victory, especially over France and Russia in the case of a two-front war.

The historical context for this change in German strategy originated in Germany's long-held fear of a two-front war. Germany was confronted with how to defend itself if France attacked from the west and Russia from the east. After the Franco-Prussian War, Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke the Elder considered a solution that involved "a combination of political and military means" (Craig 1978, 316). He wanted to split German forces on two defensive, eastern and western fronts (Kissinger 1994, 204). His logic was that if Germany could stop either the French or the Russian offensive,

especially a French offensive, then "France would be obliged to consider a compromise [political] peace" (Kissinger 1994, 204). Moltke the Elder's plan did not consider a war that went for total military victory. Indeed, the elder Field Marshall espoused Clausewitz's view that "in the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards" (Clausewitz 1989, 86). In other words, a general may have a great battle strategy for a total military victory, but there is a possibility that such a strategy may go astray once the bullets leave the barrel of the gun. Thus, it would be wiser for the German General Staff to always leave open a political compromise.

However, soon after Moltke the Eder retired, Field Marshall Alfred von Schlieffen became Chief of the German General Staff. His creation of the Schlieffen Plan promoted a different strategy for a potential two-front war.[13] Schlieffen became the head Field Marshall in 1891. In 1892, Russia and France entered into a formal military alliance.[14] This kept the specter of a two-front war firmly in the minds of German military leaders. Schlieffen observed that Russia had upgraded its defensive fortifications, especially in terms of its improved railway network (Craig 1978, 316). Because of this, Schlieffen began to "study the possibilities inherent in an initial offensive in the west" (Craig 1978, 316). That is, Schlieffen was looking for ways in which Germany could take out France first in order to turn its military focus towards Russia. The Schlieffen Plan

---

[13] After Helmuth von Molkte retired as the Chief of General Staff, he was replaced by Field Marshall Alfred von Waldersee. Waldersee lasted one year in this role, and then he was replaced by Field Marshall Alfred von Schlieffen in 1891.

[14] Russia pivoted to France for many reasons. One was disagreement with Germany over certain financial laws between the two states. Another, as Henry Kissinger writes, was Russia's fear of a localized war in the Balkans. Kissinger writes that Russia feared such a scenario because Germany could come on the side of the Austrians and dictate a resolutioin in which Russia would be unhappy with. By entering into a formal military alliance with France, Russia could ensure that if there was a war in the Balkans, Germany would have to consider France attacking from the west. This might cause Germany to not strongly back Austria (Kissinger 1994, 202-03).

aimed to avoid French defenses altogether by launching an attack through Belgium and Luxemburg. This would allow German forces to encircle France and render the eastern French defenses useless. Schlieffen was convinced "that the fighting power of France would be destroyed in six weeks, and Germany could shift their forces eastwards to deal with Russia" (Craig 1978, 317).

The Schlieffen Plan epitomizes the confidence Germany had in their military power, but neither the Schlieffen Plan nor German leadership accounted for the balancing that would occur against Germany by 1914. For Russia and France, Germany's more aggressive strategy drove them closer together. When Tsar Alexander III was asked what would be gained from helping France against Germany, he answered, "What we would gain would be that Germany would, as such, disappear. It would break up into a number of small, weak states, the way it used to be" (Kennan 1984, 153). Yet Germany accounted for such a Franco-Russo alliance. What they did not account for was Great Britain's entry into the Triple Entente. It is clear why Britain could not stay neutral. If both France and Russia fell to Germany, Great Britain would at Germany's mercy in Europe (Kissinger 1994, 212). Thus, Germany's invasion of Belgium against British objections proved to be the tipping point for Great Britain. By 1914, the Schlieffen Plan had gone into effect, and all members of the Triple Entente were at war with Germany.

The Schlieffen Plan and Germany's military confidence signaled that Germany was willing to fight for its *Weltpolitik* ambitions. Even though many in German leadership never thought Great Britain would enter on the side of Russia, by 1906 there were whispers about Germany's neighbors wanting to encircle Germany in order to check

its aggressiveness. In response, German Chancellor Büllow gave a speech in which he said:

> *"Germany need not to be afraid of isolation… A nation of 60 million, with an army such as the German army, will never be isolated as long as it remains true to itself… As long as we keep our sword sharp, we will be in the position to make ourselves useful to our friends and to become a nuisance to our enemies"* (Geiss 1976, 127).

Indeed, Germany's more aggressive posturing, as epitomized by the Schlieffen Plan, forced Great Britain, France, and Russia to act by balancing together against German power.

Conclusion

Institutionalist analysis helps interpret the delay between Germany's growth in power and the balancing that occurred by its neighbors. Indeed, Institutionalism predicts that a lack of information or cooperation will cause states to regard each other with suspicion, and this suspicion can lead to balancing against or bandwagoning with a rising power. Germany was a rising power during this time period, and there was no consistent international regime to impose principles, rules, and norms on the Great Powers. Nevertheless, a lack of a regime does not preclude the existence of factors that influence Institutionalist predictions. Those factors are information and cooperation. In this test case, Germany had two different foreign policy paths, and each was different in terms of what Germany signaled to its neighbors. This had an effect on the information and cooperation among the Great Powers.

Germany from 1871-1890 actively sought to create regimes that would signal Germany's desire to be seen as a satisfied continental power and prevent it from going to

war. Although the first Three Emperors League, the Congress of Berlin, the second Three Emperors League, and the Reinsurance Treaty failed, Germany's attempts to institutionalize a peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia signaled Germany's desire for peace on the European continent. Germany's actions were out of self-interest, but they nevertheless eased the suspicions of German power. Despite Germany's economic wealth, it did not build up its navy, and it largely stayed out of the colonial race in Africa. When Bismarck was asked why Germany was not aggressively pursuing a German colonial presence in Africa, he pointed to a map and responded, "Here is Russia, and here is France, and we're in the middle. That's my map of Africa" (Bluemenau 2011, 4). However, the reputation Germany had built changed after Bismarck was dismissed.

Germany from 1890-1914 aggressively pursued a *Weltpolitik* policy. This strategy was the direct opposite of Bismarck's. Instead of actively seeking peace between itself, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain, Germany began policies aimed at asserting itself as a preeminent world power. Its naval proliferation quickly soured relations with Great Britain, which drove the British into the arms of the French and Russians. The Schlieffen Plan further epitomized German confidence in its military. Because of this military confidence, Germany no longer actively sought to bring Russia onto its side. If there was to be a two-front war with Russia and France, Germany had no doubt it would win.

Each of these actions signaled to Germany's Great Power neighbors that they should be wary of Germany's rising power. This is why the first signs of British, Russian, and French balancing against Germany occurred in the early 20th century instead of earlier. The information that states have about each other matter. Further, Germany's

change in foreign policy in 1890 and the Great Power balancing that occurred soon after correlate with the change in German signaling. Institutionalism would predict that before 1890, a rising Germany had signaled its intentions well enough in which its neighboring Great Powers felt secure in not balancing against it. Further, Institutionalism also correctly predicts that Germany's behavior after 1890 signaled that German neighbors should begin to actively react against it.

What chapters 2 and 3 both show is that states do no react against a rising power based on power considerations alone. Indeed, Germany was the most powerful state in Europe from 1871-1914. Yet balancing did not occur until Germany began to signal a newfound aggressiveness. Thus, it seems that predictability, not power, matters more when predicting state reactions to a rising power.

CHAPTER FOUR

Offensive Structural Realism and Institutionalism in Modern Germany 2008-2016

In 2017, Germany had the largest economy in all of Europe. In fact, it has the world's fourth largest economy. Yet, if one is familiar with recent European history, a powerful Germany has not always brought warm tidings to its European neighbors. Indeed, whether it be 1869 or 1935, it cannot be said that the French have always been happy with their neighbor's good economic fortunes. Since Angela Merkel ascended to the German Chancellery in 2005, Germany has not only improved its economy, but has done so while successfully weathering the EU financial crisis that erupted in 2009. Other European states have been slow to recover from the crisis, but Germany has continued to grow economically and to increase its influence over the European Union. So what does all of this mean for Germany's European neighbors? Are they happy with how well Germany is doing, or are they nervous about German growth?

This chapter seeks to answer that question by testing the predictions of Offensive Structural Realism and Institutionalism. This chapter first outlines a literature review of what each theory predicts about neighboring state reactions to a rising power. Next, this chapter discusses this case's operationalization of the dependent variable followed by an outline of each theory's independent variables. This chapter will detail the methodology of how each theory was tested. Chiefly, this paper will test the public opinions of Germany with citizens in all EU member states, NATO member states, and a group of states that are in neither of those two regimes. This public opinion in each state will verify whether each theory predicted the actual dependent variable outcomes resulting

from Germany's rise in power. After examining both theories, this chapter will conclude with my argument: states that share regimes with Germany are less likely to have a lower approval rating of Germany, despite Germany's economic power. However, states that do not share regimes and have less power than Germany do have a lower approval of German leadership. This is consistent with Institutionalism rather than Offensive Structural Realism.

Literature Review

A Rising Power in a Multipolar World: Offensive Structural Realism's Predictions

Germany exists in a multi-polar system. This does not mean that all states on the European continent are equal in terms of power. Instead, power in a multi-polar system is more spread among the European states rather than primarily concentrated in one or two. OSR regards a multi-polar system as especially dangerous. Because a state's primary goal is survival, it should be fearful of another state gaining power relative to other states in the region.[15] Why? OSR predicts that a state who gains relative power "is likely to behave more aggressively, because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so" (Mearsheimer 2001, 37). This is because all states want to become a regional hegemonic power since gaining a regional hegemonic status is when a state is most secure; it can control all other states around it and better ensure that no other state will harm it.

For Offensive Structural Realists, a rising power can rise in two ways. The first is hard military power, which produces the most fear. An OSR would say that if Germany today was building a large military relative to its neighbors, then they should be

---

[15] This section will continue to use the term 'fear' rather than 'approval, since this section is the explanation of the theory.

suspicious or fearful. The balance of power would be shifting to Germany and away from other states.

Another way a state can rise in power is through *latent* power. It "is based on the size of [a state's] population and the level of its wealth", and it has the potential for conversion into hard power (Mearsheimer 2001, 43). If a state has a large population or much economic prowess, it can quickly turn that population into soldiers and the economic strength into a component of military strength. Thus, in a multipolar system, OSR would predict that when one state is gaining more latent power, its neighboring states should be alarmed and would be wise to adjust their own tactics to either balance or bandwagon with the rising power.

Yet the Realist tradition[16] also has expectations for how states should behave in international regimes. Indeed, Germany today participates in many international regimes, and this chapter will focus specifically on the European Union and NATO. As chapter 1 detailed and the literature review of Institutionalism below will explain, Institutionalists believe that international regimes can create rules and norms that alleviate the inherent suspicion that states have towards one another. While OSR believe that states may join an international regime, they believe that a state would only join for its own benefit. If the balance of power swings to one particular state that shares a regime with other states, Realists—both Offensive Structural Realists and others—would expect that the more powerful state would not be as tightly bound by the regime's standards, rules, and norms. "As [states'] capabilities, interests, or both change, they may alter such arrangements [relating to regimes] or the nature of their participation in them" (Baldev 1995, 142). A

---

[16] This expectation of state behavior in regimes is not limited to Offensive Structural Realists.

rising power might renegotiate rules or change them unilaterally in order to benefit the rising power at the expense of the other regime members. When this happens, the regime takes on a different character than its original purpose.

Unlike Institutionalists, OSR see balance of power as the key to state behavior. If Germany today were gaining a significant advantage in either hard or 'latent' power, it would not necessarily matter that Germany is a part of the EU or NATO. Instead, the expectation would be for other states to become suspicious or German influence.

We're all on the Same Team: an Institutionalist Perspective

Institutionalists are similar to OSR in their assumptions of how states interact with one another (Keohane 1984, x). Yet when looking at a rising power, Institutionalists believe that regimes can help reduce information asymmetries and can help states signal clearly, even in the context of a rising power. Indeed, they believe a strongly rooted regime can influence the behavior of the states that created it (Krasner 1982, 357). Unlike in OSR, if a state can devise a system for better cooperation and information, the balance of power between states is no longer the primary force behind a state's strategy to survive. What is important is the type of regimes that the states are a part of. In other words, are the states members of regimes that establish principles, rules, and norms in which the states can monitor each other, work with each other, and not forgo their own interests (Keohane 1982, 338)?

If a state is gaining greater hard or soft power, an Institutionalist would first look at the regimes that the state and its neighbors are a part of. If an Institutionalist was examining whether modern Germany was a rising power, they would inspect whether

Germany's shared regimes were (1) strong and rooted regimes coupled with a high degree of interdependence between states. This should discourage any rising power from maliciously deviating from established rules and norms. (2) If this were the case, Institutionalists would not fear a rising power just because it is rising; rather, they only fear it when it begins to violate established principles, rules, and norms for its own benefit. As explained in chapter 1, regimes have what Axelrod and Keohane call **"the shadow of the future"** which can damage the reputation of a state if it begins to deviate at the expense of other states (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 227). In other words, by de-incentivizing the prospect of deviating from a regime, a regime influences state behavior. This chapter will deal with two particular regimes that Germany is a member of, the EU and NATO.

Thus, the main conclusion of Institutionalism for a rising power in the context of this chapter would be this: despite Germany gaining power economically, as long as Germany, or any rising power, is keeping with the established principles, rules, and norms of the regimes it shares with its neighbors, it will be less likely to see neighboring states turn against it. Unlike the Realists, Institutionalists do not fear a change in the balance of power will necessarily change the character or usefulness of the regime. Depending on the strength of the regime, the regime can influence the behavior of a powerful state more than a powerful state could influence the regime. As Krasner writes, "regimes may function as intervening variables. Regimes may assume a life of their own, a life independent of the basic casual factor that led to their creation in the first place" (Krasner 1982, 357).

Dependent Variable: Response to Germany's Rising Power

This section will discuss the operationalization of this case's dependent variable. The dependent variable is whether or not the public opinions of Germany's neighbors regarding Germany decreased because of a rise in German power. Unlike chapters 2 and 3, this test case is still ongoing. Of all the states measured in this test case, only the United States' GDP has been greater than Germany's since 1990.[17] Figure 1 shows Germany and the other EU member states' GDP levels since 1990. Germany's has always been larger than its European neighbors, but the divide has grown since 2008.

OSR predicts that if Germany is rising relative to its neighbors, then there will eventually be fear by at least some states. This fear will eventually lead to a policy change towards Germany. Because this test case is still ongoing, it is too early to definitely measure these states' policy changes towards Germany. However, this test case can measure perception changes towards Germany inside its neighboring states. A dramatic change in public approval of Germany could be an early sign of fear. However, if states who share regimes with Germany have stable and high approval ratings of Germany, then it could be a sign that regimes are helping other states feel secure with Germany, despite its rise.

---

[17] See Appendix for graph of Germany's GDP rise compared to NATO members and states in neither the EU or NATO

GDP of EU Members 1990-2016

However, a note should be made about the language for this case's dependent variable. The language OSR (and sometimes Institutionalism) uses to describe relations between states involves terms like "fear or suspicion." In other words, if Germany where building a very large military, OSR would say something like, "other states will begin to fear or grow suspicious of them." However, in order to verify the dependent variable for each tested theory, this chapter is employing a series of Gallup World Poll public opinion surveys between the years of 2008-2016. The wording of the surveys' question was this: *Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?* The wording of the survey question above does not ask whether the surveyed states 'fear' Germany. However, the public opinion of Germany's influence works in a similar way as

to measure fear, since it would be illogical for public opinion to both fear Germany while also favoring Germany's influence. Ideally, a public opinion survey would use the word 'fear'. Yet, for the purposes of this chapter, public opinion on German influence is a good substitute.

Figure 8

Approval of Germany in the EU, NATO, and Outside States, 2008-2016

18

A Rising Power in Germany or Relative Gains?

OSR will use the following independent variables for Germany and the other states being tested: military spending and a state's share of wealth. The only 'hard power' indicator is the size of military spending. The other variable is a 'latent' power indicator. If Germany has shown a relatively large military expenditure or holds more wealth than its neighbors, then OSR would predict that other states should be hold a negative opinion of German performance. Data for the independent variables will come from the years 2008-2016. The data will be cross-referenced to the Gallup World Poll surveys in order to verify the dependent variable outcome.

- Hypothesis 1: As Germany's military grows larger, other states' opinions of Germany will become more negative.

- Hypothesis 2: As Germany's share of wealth grows, other states' opinions of Germany will become more negative.

-

How Interdependent Are We?

This section will detail the independent variables of Institutionalism and how they act on the dependent variable. This chapter will use the EU and NATO as regimes that Germany shares with many of its neighbors. This chapter will also test some states that are not in either of those regimes with Germany to see if there is a difference in the approval of Germany. Another independent variable being tested is economic interdependence and whether it acts on a state's approval of Germany. This will be measured by the import and export relationship Germany has with member states in the

EU, NATO, and some states that are in neither of those regimes. Institutionalism would

predict that if Germany shares a regime, and if Germany has a strong import and export

relationship with the states being measured, then those states should not have a low

opinion of German influence just because Germany is rising a rising power. All data for

this variable will be cross-referenced with the public opinion survey of German

leadership performance.

- Hypothesis 3: If a state shares a regime and is economically

  interdependent with Germany, its opinion of Germany will stay positive

  even as Germany's hard or soft power rises.

Methodology

This section details how each theory will be tested, beginning with data and

following with analysis methods. First, in regards to data, the public opinion poll that is

being used to verify the dependent variable comes from a series of surveys conducted by

the Gallup World Poll over the years of 2008-2016. The states' answers on whether they

had a positive opinion of German performance will act as the actual dependent variable

outcome and will be contrasted against each theory's predicted dependent variable

outcomes.

Next are the sources of the independent variables' data. In regards to the

Offensive Structural Realist independent variables, the data for military expenditure and

share of wealth all come from the World Bank Development Indicators database. Military

expenditure is measured by the total amount in United States Dollars that each state

spends on its military. Share of wealth is measured differently for each group of states.

For the European Union, each member state's GDP is divided out of the total GDP of the European Union. For the NATO member states and the states that reside in neither the EU nor NATO, this chapter uses each state's total GDP as the indicator for share of wealth. The reason for this is because the United States' GDP is an outlier in NATO, so aggregating the NATO GDP and dividing out each state's share would skew the numbers towards the US. In regards to the Institutionalist independent variables, the data for each measured state's import and export relationship with Germany comes from the World Bank Trade Solution database.

The analysis method begins with testing both theories separately, beginning with Offensive Structural Realism followed by Institutionalism. Within the testing of each theory and each set of states, data is extracted for each independent variable for the years of 2008-2016. Each independent variable section will contain a chart that corresponds both the data of that independent variable and the Gallup World Poll survey data.

Because this chapter is testing a larger number of states, each graph will contain a correlation coefficient value. This value explains the strength of the correlation between the independent and dependent variables. These values can range from -1 to 1. When the correlation coefficient is close to 1, this implies that there is a strong, positive association between the independent and dependent variables. The closer the correlation coefficient is to -1, the stronger negation association the independent and dependent variables have. When the correlation coefficient is closer to zero, this implies that there is a weak or non-existent association between the variables. This method helps us see if, for instance, a state's increase in military spending is strongly correlated with a decrease in approval of Germany.

This chapter will conclude each independent variable section with an analysis of whether the independent variable acted on the dependent variable and whether the tested theory's prediction was valid. The independent variables being tested are by no means the only testable independent variables. However, the independent variables being tested in this chapter are here because they either have been shown in the literature to be imperative to validating each theory's predictions or they represent a large relative difference between Germany and the other tested states.

Results of Analysis

Offensive Structural Realism

Independent Variable 1: What is the Military Expenditure?

The European Union. From 2008-2016, Germany spent an average of $45.53 billion in military expenditures (World Bank).[19] Only France and Great Britain spent more on their military. Germany's military expenditure stayed relatively consistent during the years measured, so there is not enough evidence to suggest it is rising by its hard power. In terms of how other states see Germany, by 2016, 15 out of 27 EU member states being measured had a 50% or more approval of German influence (Gallup World Poll).[20]

---

[19] The appendix includes a table that shows military spending for each state for each year.

[20] See Appendix for which states.

Figure 9

EU Military Expenditure and German Approval

The trends of total military expenditure and approval of German leadership performance are broken down by states and year. Each state has a different color denoted in the legend. Each circle represents a year measured.
Total military expenditure was calculated by multiplying each state's GDP by the percentage of GDP spent on their military.
Military expenditure source: Data from World Bank Development Indicators (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Figure 9 shows the total military spending by EU members from 2008-2016. The linear trend line cutting through the graph shows the mean of military spending and approval ratings towards German performance. Each color circle represents a state, and there is a circle for each respective year from 2008-2016. The correlation coefficient for this model is r = - 0.007, indicating that there is very little correlation between military spending and approval of Germany.

Thus, OSR cannot be interpreted in this case because Germany's military expenditure has stayed so consistent. Germany's position as the third highest military spender in the EU is a consequence of its economic size rather than a relative rise in hard power. Further, despite Germany spending more than most EU members, the correlation coefficient is close to zero. This indicates that there is not a potential relationship between these states' military spending and their approval of Germany.

94

NATO. Like the EU above, military spending for NATO members is measured in total US dollars. Figure 4 includes all of the NATO members' military spending [except for Germany's and the United States'] on the x-axis. Military spending by member states of NATO is similar to that in the EU, with the United States being an outlier. In NATO, Germany spends the fourth most in military expenditure, but this does not mean that Germany's hard power is rising.

Again, from 2008-2016, Germany spent an average of $45.53 billion in military expenditures (World Bank). In NATO, only the United States, France, and Great Britain spent more. Yet Germany's spending stayed very consistent, which does not suggest a rise in German hard power. Further, Germany had a strong approval rating among members of NATO. By 2016, 14 out of the 28 members had a 50% approval rating or higher in terms of German performance. (Gallup World Poll).

Figure 10 shows the linear trend line between NATO members' military spending and German approval. Much like the EU, there is not a strong relationship between military spending and approval of Germany. The correlation coefficient is r = - 0.03. The correlation coefficient is measured without the US because the US was an outlier in terms of military spending. Nevertheless, the correlation coefficient value with or without the US still does not give enough evidence to suggest a relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.[21]

---

[21] When including the US, the correlation coefficient is r = - 0.071.

Figure 10

NATO Military Expenditure without U.S. and German Approval

The trends of total military expenditure and approval of German leadership performance are broken down by states and year. Each state has a different color denoted in the legend. Each circle represents a year measured.
Total military expenditure was calculated by multiplying each state's GDP by the percentage of GDP spent on their military.
Military expenditure source: Data from World Bank Development Indicators (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

States outside of EU and NATO. Figure 11 includes states that are in neither the EU nor NATO: Bangladesh, Belarus, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. These states were chosen because of data availability, proximity to Europe, or size of economy. Germany spends more in military than all of these states except for Russia and India. Yet, the disparity in military spending between most of these states and Germany is much greater than it was in the EU or NATO. Thus, OSR might expect a lower German approval rating among these states.

Figure 11 below does show a linear trend line moving downwards. The correlation coefficient is r = -0.49. What this suggests is that there is a moderate, negative association between a state's military spending and their approval of Germany. Russia

and India exemplify this since they are both the highest military spenders and have among the lowest approval rating of Germany. Russia and India are peers of Germany in terms of power, so OSR would not be surprised to see their lower approval rating of Germany coupled with higher military expenditure.

Thus, OSR would predict that since Germany is a rising power and spends more militarily than most of these states, then these states would have a lower approval of German performance. Figure 11 shows that from 2008-2016, almost all of the states had a uniformly low approval opinion of German influence. Further, the correlation coefficient does show a moderate, negative association between these states' spending more on military and having a lower approval rating for Germany, especially with larger states who exist outside of a regime with Germany.[22]

---

[22] It should be noted that Institutionalists would not be surprised by this result. Indeed, these states exist outside of a regime with Germany, so the information asymmetries are likely much greater between these states and Germany. Thus, an Institutionalist would not be surprised to see these lower approval ratings.

Figure 11

Outside States' Military Expenditure and Approval of Germany

The trends of total military expenditure and approval of German leadership performance are broken down by states and year. Each state has a different color denoted in the legend. Each circle represents a year measured.
Total military expenditure was calculated by multiplying each state's GDP by the percentage of GDP spent on their military.
Military expenditure source: Data from World Bank Development Indicators (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Independent Variable 2: Share of Wealth

     European Union. From 2008-2016, Germany held an average of 20.4485% of wealth in the European Union (World Bank).[23] The next closest state is the United Kingdom, which held an average of 15.4933% of the EU's wealth during those years. In other words, Germany holds a very large relative share of wealth in the European Union. Because of this, OSR would expect to see a lower approval of German performance in Europe.

     However, figure 12 shows a linear trend line that is almost horizontal. The correlation coefficient is r = 0.032. This indicates that there is no association between a state's share of wealth and their approval of Germany. This directly contradicts the OSR predications.

---

[23] See appendix for percentage by year.

Figure 12

Share of Wealth in the European Union and Approval of Germany

The share of wealth and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
For EU share of wealth, I took the GDP of each measured state and divided it by the EU's total GDP.
Share of wealth source: Data from World Bank Development Indicators (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Indeed, there is no uniform behavior by states that own less wealth in Europe.

Some have a lower opinion of German performance, and some have a very positive

opinion. This is similar to states that do have a larger share of wealth in the EU. Earlier,

figure 7 showed that Germany has had the largest GDP among current EU members even

before 1990. Unfortunately, the scarceness of consistent public opinion data before 2008

makes it difficult to see if public opinion has stayed the same towards Germany since the

1990s. However, what the public opinion does show is that despite the Euro crisis in

2009 and Germany's continued economic growth, there is still strong approval of

German performance in the EU. Indeed, by 2016, 15 out of 27 EU member states being

measured had a 50% or more approval of German influence (Gallup World Poll).[24] Even

further, figure 12 indicates that there is not a relationship between how much wealth an

EU member state owns and their approval rating of German performance.

NATO. Unlike the European Union section, share of wealth by NATO countries

is measured by a state's GDP only. Germany, from 2008-2016, had an average GDP of

$3.65 trillion (World Bank). Of all the NATO member states, Germany's GDP was the

second highest. Only the United States had a higher GDP from 2008-2016. The next

closest GDP to Germany's was France, who averaged a GDP of $2.78 trillion (World

Bank). Because of Germany's relative advantage in GDP to the other NATO members,

OSR would predict that NATO member states should have a less favorable opinion of

German performance.

Figure 13 represents the GDP's of all NATO member states [except the US] from

2008-2016 and their approval of German performance.[25] The linear trend line is almost

horizontal, like the EU's. The correlation coefficient is r = 0. 02, indicating little to no

association between a state's share of wealth and their approval of Germany. Once again,

this goes against what OSR would expect.

---

[24] See Appendix for which states.

[25] The United States is not included because the largeness of its GDP makes it an outlier. However, when the US is included, NATO has a correlation coefficient of r = 0.06. This shows there is little or no association between a state's share of wealth and their approval of Germany.

Figure 13

NATO Member States' Share of Wealth (without U.S.) and Approval of Germany

The share of wealth and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
For share of wealth, I took the GDP of each measured state.
Share of wealth source: Data from World Bank Development Indicators (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Like in the EU, there is no uniform behavior by states with a lower share of wealth. Indeed, many states in this category have a lower opinion of German performance, but many in this category also have very high approval ratings for Germany. Further, states that do have a larger GDP also fluctuate in their approval to Germany. Italy and Spain are not as approving to Germany as Great Britain and France are. Nevertheless, when the US is exempted, Germany's GDP is significantly higher than all of these NATO member states. Again, there are data limitations which prohibit the author from examining opinions of Germany before 2008. Nevertheless, the data shows that Germany's economic power has continued to grow despite the world financial crises of 2008-2009, and there is generally still a high approval rating of Germany within NATO.

States Outside of the EU and NATO. Germany has a large relative GDP advantage to all of the states in this category. Germany's average GDP from 2008-2016 was $3.65 trillion (World Bank). The next highest GDP is Russia, who averaged a GDP of $1.86 trillion. OSR would predict that Germany's large relative advantage would reduce its approval rating in other states.

Figure 14

Outside States' Share of Wealth and Approval of Germany

The share of wealth and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
For share of wealth, I took the GDP of each measured state.
Share of wealth source: Data from World Bank Development Indicators (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Figure 14 shows the GDP of all of the states measured, and the linear trend line indicates that there is a relationship between GDP and approval of Germany. The correlation coefficient is r = -0.53. This indicates a moderate, negative association between a state's share of wealth and their approval of Germany. Much like military expenditure, this association is strongest in Russia and India.

OSR would predict that since Germany's GDP is much higher than the other state's measured, that there would be less approval of Germany. While all states in this

model had a relatively low approval of Germany, India and Russia both had an especially low approval. Since states like India and Russia are larger and have more hard or latent power than the other states in this model, OSR would expect them to be wary of a rise in Germany power. These predictions are seen on figure 14, and the correlation coefficient value helps to solidify this observation.[26]

Conclusion for Offensive Structural Realism

OSR would predict that if Germany were spending more on its military than its neighbors or had a higher share of wealth, then those neighbors should have a lower opinion of German performance in the world. This OSR section tested all of the member states in the EU and NATO. This section also tested some states outside of those regimes. The results of the EU and NATO were the same. There was little to no association between military spending and lower approval of German performance, even though Germany was one of the highest military spenders in those regimes. Further, there was no association between a state's share of wealth and their approval of Germany, even though Germany had a far larger share of wealth than all the measured states except for the United States.

OSR could argue that since most states in the EU and NATO regimes do not spend a lot of money on military expenditure or do not have a higher share of wealth relative to Germany, their higher approval of Germany could be a sign of bandwagoning. However, there are two problems with this counter-argument. The first is that by 2016, only 12 out of the other 27 states being measured in the EU had an approval rating of

---

[26] Institutionalists would also not be surprised by this result. Again, when states do not share regimes with Germany, there is a higher possibility for information asymmetries and a lower approval.

Germany under 50%, and all of those states spent less than $15 billion in military expenditure (World Bank). Further, none of the 12 had a GDP over $1 trillion (World Bank). This is not an obvious sign of bandwagoning. Second, both Great Britain and France spent more on their military than Germany but had a lower share of wealth, and by 2016 both had approval ratings of Germany over 50%. That is not an indication that France or Great Britain are fearing a growing Germany. NATO had similar results. Further, the correlation coefficient values for both the EU and NATO showed no association between military expenditure, share of wealth, and approval of Germany.

However, the states that were not in the EU or NATO with Germany told a different story. The correlation coefficient values were higher in both the military expenditure and share of wealth variables. This indicates a stronger, negative association between military expenditure, share of wealth, and German popularity. Indeed, Germany spent more on military expenditure than all of those states, except for India and Russia. Germany also had a larger share of wealth than all of the states measured. For all the states measured in this group, Germany's approval rating was under 50%. However, lower German approval was notably prevalent in Russia and India, both of whom have the most power relative to Germany.

Public opinion data scarceness prevents this chapter from consistently examining the public opinion towards Germany before 2008.[27] Thus, this chapter cannot conclude that Germany is currently a rising power and the public opinion reaction is being measured while Germany rises. However, Germany's economy has continued to grow despite the economic crises in 2008-2009. Further, it has continued to grow while other

---

[27] The Gallup World Poll used in this chapter goes back to 2006 for some states, but it is not until 2008 that the public opinion polls had more uniform data among states.

European economies either stagnated or declined. Yet German approval stayed consistently positive in the EU and NATO, especially among the larger powers: France and Great Britain. Although Germany was a top military spender, its consistency in spending suggests that states should not fear a rise in German hard power. Thus, this chapter is really concerned with Germany's economic power.

Because of Germany's strong economic power, as seen by its large share of wealth, OSR would expect to see a larger trend of a lower German approval. Yet, for states that share regimes with Germany, the data shows there is not as much shakiness as OSR would expect. This would contradict OSR's predictions. However, for states that exist outside of the EU and NATO, both OSR and Institutionalism are correct. Those states do have lower approval ratings of Germany.

OSR believes that states want to survive, and to achieve this goal they form their strategy based on the power capabilities of others in the international system. This means that states should react in some way to a rising power. OSR does not believe regimes can alter this strategy of survival since "as [states'] capabilities, interests, or both change, they may alter such arrangements [relating to regimes] or the nature of their participation in them" (Baldev 1995, 142). Yet, despite Germany being one of the top military spenders in the EU and NATO and having one of the largest shares of wealth, there was no uniform evidence of those regime member states declining in their approval of Germany. There was, however, evidence of a lower German approval rating with states that were not in a regime with Germany. OSR predictions were right for the latter case, but they were incorrect in the former. This suggests that regimes matter in how other states respond to German power.

Institutionalism

Independent Variable: Economic Interdependence

  The European Union. This section will analyze the economic interdependence between Germany and the other EU member states. First, this section will analyze the German import partner share from 2008-2016. Essentially, this is the percentage of German goods that other EU states receive. Next, this section will examine the German export partner share. This is the percentage of exports from each state that go to Germany. Institutionalists predict that states will not fear a rising power if that power is a part of a strong regime or if the rising power has issue linkage in something like economic interdependence. That gives a rising power less reason to defect. Thus, if Germany is a part of the EU, and if it is economically interdependent with the member states, then Institutionalism does not predict that states will show a lower German approval.

  First, figure 15 shows the German import partner share between Germany and all of the EU member states from 2008-2016, with the Netherlands and France receiving the most German exports. The correlation coefficient value is r = 0.24, which suggests a weak but noticeable association between how much a state imports from Germany and their approval of Germany. However, the export relationship must also be examined in order to have a clearer picture of economic interdependence.

Figure 15

German Import Partner Share with EU Member States and German Approval

The data for import partner share and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
Import partner share source: World Bank's World Trade Solution Database, "German Import Partner Share%" (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Figure 16 shows the German export partner share relationship between Germany and the rest of the EU, with France and Great Britain being the two largest exporters to Germany. Figure 10 has a correlation coefficient value of 0.154. This indicates a weak association between German export partner share and a state's approval of Germany.

Figure 16

German Export Partner Share with EU Member States and German Approval

The data for export partner share and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
Export partner share source: World Bank's World Trade Solution Database, "German Export Partner Share%" (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

NATO. Unlike the NATO charts for military expenditure and share of wealth, Germany's import and export partner share will include the United States since the US is not a significant outlier for this variable. Once again, Institutionalism would predict that states who are more economically interdependent with Germany and who share a regime would not necessarily show a low approval for Germany.

First, figure 17 shows the German import partner share to NATO, with the Netherlands and France receiving the most German exports. The correlation coefficient value is r = 0.19. This is a weak association between the two variables.

109

Figure 17

German Import Partner Share with NATO States and German Approval

The data for import partner share and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
Import partner share source: World Bank's World Trade Solution Database, "German Import Partner Share%" (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Figure 18 shows the German export partner share with NATO, with France and the United States being the two largest exporters to Germany. The correlation coefficient is r = 0.09, suggesting a very weak association between a state's exports to Germany and their German approval.

Figure 18

German Export Partner Share with NATO and German Approval

The data for export partner share and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
Export partner share source: World Bank's World Trade Solution Database, "German Export Partner Share%" (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

States Outside of the EU and NATO. For states that are not in the EU or NATO, Institutionalism would predict that since these states do not share a regime with Germany, then it would not be surprising to see these states have a lower opinion of Germany. However, if Germany had a strong economic interdependence with the states, then there is reason to suggest that the states should not have a low German approval rating.

Figure 19 shows the German import partner share for the measured states who are not in a regime with Germany. Most of the measured states receive very little exports from Germany. Russia is the largest, and from 2008-2016 Germany accounted for an average of 3.86% of Russia's total imports. The correlation coefficient value for figure 13 is r = -0.26, suggesting a weak but noticeable association between a state's German import partner share and their approval of Germany.

111

Figure 19

German Import Partner Share with Outside States and German Approval

The data for import partner share and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
Import partner share source: World Bank's World Trade Solution Database, "German Import Partner Share%" (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Figure 20 below shows the German export partner share between Germany and these states. Again, all of these states have a relatively small trade relationship with Germany. From 2008-2016, Russia was the largest. They averaged 2.78% of Germany's total imports. Figure 14's correlation coefficient value is r = -0.24. This suggests a weak association between how much a state exports to Germany and that state's German approval.

Figure 20

German Export Partner Share with Outside States and German Approval

The data for export partner share and German approval are broken down by state and year. Each color represents a state, as denoted by the legend. Each circle represents a year between 2008-2016.
Export partner share source: World Bank's World Trade Solution Database, "German Export Partner Share%" (2008-2016).
Public Opinion Source: Surveys conducted by Gallup World Poll from 2008-2016. See bibliography.
Survey question: "*Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of Germany?*"

Conclusion for Institutionalism

Institutionalism predicts that regimes do matter when states are assessing a rising power. Indeed, if Germany were a part of regimes that established strong principles, rules, and norms, then the member states of those regimes would not necessarily fear a German rise in power. This is because strong regimes could provide states with better information on the intentions of the rising power. This Institutionalist section tested this prediction with two regimes and some states that existed in neither of those regimes. Further, this section also tested the economic interdependence of Germany with all of the states measured.

What the data showed is that when states measured in the aggregate were in a regime with Germany, there was a higher general approval rating of Germany than that of states who existed outside of the EU and NATO. Yet the correlation coefficient values showed that there was not a strong relationship between economic interdependence with Germany and a state's approval rating of Germany. This is interesting since Institutionalism would expect to see a stronger relationship between these two. Nevertheless, there is no mistaking the difference in German approval between states that exist in regimes with Germany and those that do not.

Conclusion

What this chapter did show was that regimes seem to matter when assessing German approval. As the OSR section showed, Germany is among the top spenders in military expenditure, and it is one of the largest holders of wealth in the EU and NATO. Yet, for states that exist in the EU and NATO with Germany, neither variable showed a strong association with a state's German approval. However, there was much stronger association between the OSR variables with states that exist outside of the EU and NATO. OSR would expect this, but so would Institutionalism.

What this chapter also showed was that economic interdependence does not seem to be as powerful of a variable when predicting a state's approval of Germany. Nevertheless, states that are not members of the EU or NATO generally have a lower opinion of Germany. Even Russia's relatively large import and export relationship with Germany does not help bolster their lower approval ratings of Germany.

Thus, it does seem that regimes do matter when assessing how a state will react to German power. Again, this test case does not suggest Germany is rising in hard power, and data limits make it hard to show exactly how states viewed Germany before it began its economic rise. Yet Germany has continued to grow its share of wealth after the financial crises of 2008-2009. And, states that shared a regime with Germany have continued to generally approve of German leadership. The same cannot be said for the outside states.

Average Level of German Leadership Approval, 2008-2016	NATO	Non-NATO	
EU	52%	58%	*Table 3*
Non-EU	48%	31%	

Institutionalism's goal, like OSR's, is for a state to survive. Yet Germany's continued rise in share of wealth has not visibly and negatively impacted its perception with those in the regimes it shares, at least in the aggregate. Unlike what OSR would predict, it seems that power imbalances are not driving those states' perception of Germany. Of course, further research can be conducted into whether or not Germany is following these regime's principles, rules, and norms. Further research can also explore why some state's approval of Germany has fallen since 2008. Yet there is a stark difference in German approval between states that share a regime with Germany and those that do not. Institutionalism would predict this because it predicts that states react based on its information of others. When regimes are present, state can have better information on possible cooperation, the intentions of other states, etc. When regimes are

not present, cooperation and approval is still possible, but it is harder. This chapter shows

that despite Germany having more economic power than the other states measured,

regimes are correlated with states' having a higher approval of German leadership.

CHATPER FIVE

What Can We Expect For The Future?

Since Angela Merkel ascended to the Chancellery in 2005, Germany has taken on a more visible leadership role in Europe and the world. The global financial crisis presented Germany with an opportunity to distinguish itself from the other states in Europe. Yet, what can we expect from this new development? Will other states in Europe and the world accept Germany as a more active player in world affairs?

To answer this question, this thesis used two theories of international relations. Each of those theories made certain predictions of how states will react to power changes in the international system. Offensive Structural Realism and Institutionalism are similar because the end goal in both theories is that states want to survive and that states will act rationally to get there. Yet the survival strategy of each theory is different.

For Offensive Structural Realists, their survival strategy is influenced by the balance of power in the international system. For them, a state wants relative power gains in order to eventually become a regional hegemon. This is the only way a state can guarantee its survival in the international system (Mearsheimer 2001, 33). However, one state's relative power gain is another state's loss. This breeds suspicion in the international system. OSR does not believe that regimes can alter this suspicion because they think a rising power can change the rules of the regime. A regime may begin with certain principles, rules, and norms that benefit all states involved. Yet, if one power rises above the others, that rising power can change the character of the regime. If this happens, the rising power could continue to rise at the expense of others.

Institutionalism also argues that states want to survive, but the strategy is not influenced by power capabilities alone. Indeed, Institutionalists believe that information asymmetries cause suspicion in the international system. If states cannot discern each other's intentions, then of course there is reason to fear a rising power. Yet Institutionalists argue that if such information asymmetries can be avoided and cooperation incentivized, then states should not necessarily fear a rising power. This is where regimes come in. Regimes establish principles, rules, and norms in which states can create expectations of each other (Krasner 1982). Because states exist in an iterated game, regimes offer the ability to help provide stability in the iterated international system. A regime's principles, rules, and norms can unveil a state's intentions and establish a reputation. This can help prevent suspicion between states. Further, regimes can create issue linkage between states, or they can create a legal liability frame work. Both of these deincentivize states to defect at the expense of others (Keohane 1982, 341). As for the Realist argument that rising powers can change the original character of a regime, Institutionalists say that "a set of networks, norms, and institutions, once established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange" (Keohane 1982, 348).

During 1871-1914, Germany was unmistakably a rising power. It had just unified into one, single state in the middle of Europe. The data showed that its military, population, coal and steel production, and energy consumption all grew. In fact, Germany lead the European Great Powers in most of the variables. Yet states did not immediately balance against Germany. In fact, there were no serious attempts by other Great Powers to balance against Germany until after 1890. OSR would not predict this behavior. This is

not to say that OSR was incorrect. It did predict that some states would bandwagon with Germany. This happened with Austria-Hungary and Italy. Yet OSR does not account for why balancing occurred after 1890.

Germany's actions during this time period influenced when the balancing occurred. Indeed, Institutionalism predicts that a state will grow suspicious of a rising power when 1), the state cannot discern the intentions of a rising power, or 2), a state knows a rising power has aggressive intentions. From 1871-1890, Germany tried to convince the other Great Powers that it was not aggressive. Despite German growth in both hard and soft power, Germany consistently tried to create international regimes that would have prevented a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Further, Germany's actions during this time established it as the go-to diplomatic solver in Europe... the 'honest broker'. Of course most of the regimes that Germany tried to create did fail, but Germany's narrative stayed consistent. It tried to prevent a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Such a scenario would have forced Germany to choose between them. With France waiting on Germany's western border, Germany would have been vulnerable to a two-front war.

However, after 1890, when Bismarck and Moltke the Elder were gone, Germany's actions changed. It began to pursue a policy of *Weltpolitk*, and with this policy came a naval build-up and a more aggressive military strategy. Indeed, Great Britain was never silent about its disapproval of Germany's naval proliferation. Yet Germany continued on in its policy. Further, when Russia and France made a military alliance, Germany did not devise a military strategy that considered potential political compromises with either state. Its confidence in its military assured it that total victory

could be had. The other Great Powers noticed these changes in German behavior. No longer was Germany the reliable diplomatic partner it had been before 1890. Instead, it was an overly ambitious state bent on achieving a world power status. Balancing against Germany thus occurred after 1890. Institutionalism predicted as much. It predicted that states would fear a rising power if that rising power clearly had aggressive intentions. Indeed, the other Great Powers did not react to a rising Germany because of power considerations alone. The other Great Powers operated on their perceptions of Germany that stemmed from German actions. In this test case, both OSR and Institutionalism predicted that states would balance against Germany. Only Institutionalism explains why balancing occurred after 1890.

Turning to the contemporary era, Germany's power is rising again. Since German reunification occurred in 1990, Germany has had the largest GDP in Europe. Germany's share of wealth has continued to grow despite the financial crises of 2008-2009. Indeed, by 2016 Germany made up almost one quarter of the EU's entire GDP. The next closest was France, that made up less than 15%. Even though Germany was by no means rising in hard power, from 2008-2016 Germany's soft power continued to grow while other states' stagnated or decreased.

OSR would have predicted that since Germany's share of wealth was greater than all states measured except for the United States, that there should have been a low approval of German leadership. Yet, in the aggregate, only states that existed outside the EU or NATO consistently had less than a 50% approval of Germany. For states that shared a regime with Germany, their German approval was high, even among the more powerful states like France and Great Britain.

So, what does all of this signal? It seems that states do not grow suspicious of a rising power based on power capabilities alone. If this were so, balancing against Germany would have occurred before 1890, and there would not be a generally high German approval among EU and NATO member states today. Institutionalism argues that suspicion does not have to flare up when the balance of power changes. If Germany can show that it has non-aggressive intentions, or if it is a part of strong regimes that establish principles, rules, and norms, then states can be more comfortable with a rise in German power. These observations can help us look at Germany today. If Germany continues to reside in regimes with its European neighbors, and if it does not show aggressive intentions towards them, then we should not expect to see Germany's European neighbors grow suspicious of a more active Germany. However, if German leadership continues to grow, it would not be surprising to see German approval decline in states like India or Russia, both of whom exist in neither the EU nor NATO. So, will a more powerful Germany cause fear in Europe? No, it does not have to. As long Germany's neighbors can predict non-aggressive behavior from Germany, and as long as Germany keeps its shared regimes' principles, rules, and norms, then German power will likely rise without inciting suspicion in Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Approval of Germany's Leadership." 2008-2016. *Gallup World Poll*. Accessed March 1, 2018. https://analyticscampus.gallup.com/Tables/

Axelrod, R., Keohane, R.O., 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38, 226–254.

Baldev, Raj Nayar., 1995. "Regimes, Power, and International Aviation." *International Organization* 49, no.1:139-170.

Blumenau, Bernhard., 2011. "The Map of Africa Lies in Germany: The Two Germanys and their Struggles for Recognition in Africa," *Working Papers in International History*, no.4. http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_history_politics/shared/working_papers/WPIH_10_Blumenau.pdf.

Byman, D., Pollack, K., 2001. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." *International Security* 25, 107–146.

Clausewitz, Carl von., 1989. *On War, Indexed Edition*. Translated by Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret. Reprint edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Craig, Gordon Alexander. 1978. *Germany, 1866-1945*. Oxford History of Modern Europe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Friedberg, Aaron., 1988. *The Weary Titan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

George, A.L., Bennett, A., 2005. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, BCSIA studies in international security*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Geiss, Imanuel., 1976. *German Foreign Policy 1871-1914.* London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Germond, Carine, and Henning Türk, eds. 2008. *A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe: From "hereditary Enemies" to Partners*. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gilpin, R., 1983. *War and Change in World Politics*, Revised.ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Milton Keynes UK; New York.

Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., Kessler, C.R., 2003. *The Federalist Papers*, 1 edition. ed. Signet, New York, NY.

Jervis, R., 1999. "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *International Security* 24, 42–63.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1886. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 23. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1887. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 24. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1891. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 28. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1895. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 32. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1896. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 33. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1897. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 34. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1901. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 38. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1902. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 39. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1906. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 43. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1910. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 47. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1914. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 51. London: Macmillan.

Keltie, J. Scott, ed., 1915. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 52. London: Macmillan.

Kennan, George., 1984. *The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War*. New York: Pantheon.

Keohane, R.O., 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

Keohane, R.O., 1982. "The Demand for International Regimes." *International Organization* 36, 325–355.

Keohane, R.O., Joseph, N., 1977. *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Little, Brown, Boston.

Kissinger, Henry., 1994. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Krasner, S.D., 1982. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." *International Organization* 36, 185–205.

Lindley, D., 2007. *Promoting Peace with Information*. Princeton University Press.

Lipson, C., 1984. "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs." *World Politics* 37, 1–23.

Martin, Frederick, ed., 1876. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 13. London: Macmillan.

Martin, Frederick, ed.,1877. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 14. London: Macmillan.

Martin, Frederick, ed., 1881.*Statesmans Year-Book* no. 18. London: Macmillan.

Martin, Frederick, ed.,1882. *Statesmans Year-Book* no. 19. London: Macmillan.

Mearsheimer, J.J, 1995. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19, 5–49.

Mearsheimer, J.J., 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Norton, New York.

Mearsheimer, J.J., 1995. "A Realist Reply." *International Security* 20, 82–93.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51 (4): 513–53.

Nayar, Baldev Raj. 1995. "Regimes, Power, and International Aviation." *International Organization* 49 (1): 139–70.

North, D.C., 1991. "Institutions." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, 97–112.

Oye, K.A., 1985. "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38, 1–24.

Pease, K.-K.S., 2011. *International Organizations*, 5 ed. Routledge, Boston.

Stein, A.A., 1990. *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey., 1972. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.

Taylor, A.J.P., 1954 *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1878-1914*. London: Oxford University Press.

The World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution. 2008-2016. "German Export Partner Share." https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/DEU/Year/2008-2016/TradeFlow/Export.

The World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution. 2008-2016. "German Import Partner Share." https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/DEU/Year/2008-2016/TradeFlow/Import.

The World Bank. 2008-2016. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (producer and distributor). https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

Tuchman, Barbara., 1962. *The Guns of August.* New York: The Macmillan Company.

Van Evera, S., 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Waltz, K.N., 2001. *Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis.* Columbia University Press, New York.

Waltz, K.N., 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed. McGraw-Hill, Boston, Mass.

Wetzel, David. 2001. *A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War*. Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press.

Young, O.R., 1982. "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes." *International Organization* 36, 277–297.

APPENDICES

Peace Potential Troop Totals							
Year	AH	UK	FRA	GER	RUSS	ITALY	SPAIN
1875	278,470	92,386	430,703	419,738	765,872	199,557	151,668
1880	239,615	123,731	502,697	419,014	884,319	199,557	151,668
1885	284,495	188,657	523,883	445,392	757,238	250,085	140,943
1890	336,717	210,218	573,277	492,246	814,000	262,247	144,912
1895	354,252	222,151	598,024	584,734	868,672	252,829	80,144
1900	361,693	212,449	598,765	600,516	1,100,000	268,005	117,774
1905	386,870	221,300	607,493	609,758	1,100,000	264,516	83,000
1910	382,808	258,109	629,500	621,162	1,200,000	261,409	93,000
1914	424,258	315,485	790,000	790,985	1,200,000	305,033	152,118

APPENDIX TWO: Great Power Total Population 1871-1914

Year	State	Total Population (millions)	Year	State	Total Population (millions)
1871	ITA	25950000	1890	ITA	30250000
1871	RUS	85400000	1890	RUS	117800000
1871	GMY	41030000	1890	GMY	49239000
1871	SPN	15920000	1890	SPN	17760000
1871	AUH	36140000	1890	AUH	42650000
1871	UKG	31556000	1890	UKG	37485000
1871	FRN	36190000	1890	FRN	38380000
1875	ITA	27380000	1895	ITA	31300000
1875	RUS	90200000	1895	RUS	123900000
1875	GMY	42510000	1895	GMY	52001000
1875	SPN	16140000	1895	SPN	18160000
1875	AUH	36436000	1895	AUH	44455000
1875	UKG	32839000	1895	UKG	39221000
1875	FRN	36660000	1895	FRN	38460000
1880	ITA	28210000	1900	ITA	32350000
1880	RUS	97700000	1900	RUS	132900000
1880	GMY	45093000	1900	GMY	56046000
1880	SPN	16860000	1900	SPN	18530000
1880	AUH	38960000	1900	AUH	46798000
1880	UKG	34623000	1900	UKG	41155000
1880	FRN	37450000	1900	FRN	38940000
1885	ITA	29190000	1905	ITA	33190000
1885	RUS	108800000	1905	RUS	143900000
1885	GMY	46705000	1905	GMY	60134000
1885	SPN	17320000	1905	SPN	19120000
1885	AUH	40672000	1905	AUH	48881000
1885	UKG	36015000	1905	UKG	42981000
1885	FRN	38110000	1905	FRN	39220000

1910	ITA	34380000
1910	RUS	160700000
1910	GMY	64568000
1910	SPN	19790000
1910	AUH	50894000
1910	UKG	44916000
1910	FRN	39540000
1914	ITA	35890000
1914	RUS	175100000
1914	GMY	67790000
1914	SPN	20330000
1914	AUH	52594000
1914	UKG	46048000
1914	FRN	33220000

APPENDIX THREE: Great Power Primary Energy Consumption, Iron and Steel Production, and Military Expenditure 1871-1914

State	Year	Primary Energy Consumption (thousands of coal-ton equivalents)	Iron and Steel Production (thousands of tons)	Military Expenditure (British Pounds)
ITA	1871	882	17	6531
RUS	1871	2038	359	22409
GMY	1871	32129	1424	27404
SPN	1871	1200	54	4776
AUH	1871	6874	425	9326
UKG	1871	108646	6733	16177
FRN	1871	18921	860	54323
ITA	1875	1154	28	7677
RUS	1875	2741	428	26943
GMY	1875	38160	1759	18262
SPN	1875	1408	37	9841
AUH	1875	7090	463	9723
UKG	1875	120906	6467	21098
FRN	1875	24610	1448	25528
ITA	1880	1851	17	8872
RUS	1880	5222	449	30408
GMY	1880	47298	2468	19397
SPN	1880	1774	86	6605
AUH	1880	8767	464	10314
UKG	1880	131039	7873	21448
FRN	1880	28738	1725	32816
ITA	1885	3150	16	12898
RUS	1885	5870	528	25140
GMY	1885	60677	3268	19973
SPN	1885	2320	159	7694
AUH	1885	11253	715	10426

UKG	1885	139339	7534	38021
FRN	1885	29911	1631	35721
ITA	1890	4576	14	15198
RUS	1890	6622	928	30191
GMY	1890	78351	4100	37454
SPN	1890	2991	192	7040
AUH	1890	12851	965	12801
UKG	1890	156388	8031	29602
FRN	1890	36762	1962	36771
ITA	1895	4517	9	16677
RUS	1895	19693	1455	36019
GMY	1895	89736	4770	30885
SPN	1895	3488	236	4855
AUH	1895	16511	1128	13719
UKG	1895	161765	7827	35743
FRN	1895	38547	2004	35936
ITA	1900	5237	116	14112
RUS	1900	33930	2216	43104
GMY	1900	122681	6461	39681
SPN	1900	4703	199	5547
AUH	1900	20158	1170	16242
UKG	1900	185652	4980	119587
FRN	1900	48650	1565	40569
ITA	1905	6745	270	14844
RUS	1905	33355	2266	170006
GMY	1905	137771	9669	46167
SPN	1905	5722	247	5138
AUH	1905	22638	1459	20591
UKG	1905	193559	5905	55604
FRN	1905	48114	2255	41947
ITA	1910	9820	732	22016
RUS	1910	45029	3314	62099
GMY	1910	170443	13100	60416
SPN	1910	6304	261	8477

AUH	1910	35970	2174	23208
UKG	1910	208082	6476	61417
FRN	1910	57047	3413	49539
ITA	1914	10508	911	87453
RUS	1914	48412	4466	857000
GMY	1914	187335	13810	1785000
SPN	1914	7300	356	99874
AUH	1914	32416	2162	1042000
UKG	1914	213992	7971	1678843
FRN	1914	45084	2802	1235000

State	Year	Approve	GDP ($)	Share of Wealth EU	Military Spending ($)
Austria	2016	65%	390,799,991,147	2.37%	--
Austria	2015	70%	382,065,930,308	2.33%	2,536,990,256
Austria	2014	66%	441,885,415,806	2.37%	3,305,159,095
Austria	2013	63%	430,068,712,972	2.39%	3,229,065,062
Austria	2012	57%	409,425,234,155	2.37%	3,187,229,081
Austria	2011	56%	431,120,310,089	2.35%	3,409,720,006
Austria	2010	53%	391,892,746,545	2.31%	3,218,351,429
Austria	2009	55%	400,172,297,861	2.34%	3,334,954,154
Austria	2008	53%	430,294,287,388	2.25%	3,746,594,405
Belgium	2016	69%	467,955,709,818	2.84%	4,064,001,372
Belgium	2015	69%	455,200,045,096	2.77%	4,217,780,959
Belgium	2014	69%	531,075,861,047	2.85%	5,183,548,726
Belgium	2013	57%	520,925,468,953	2.89%	5,263,163,612
Belgium	2012	30%	497,884,216,569	2.88%	5,169,000,481
Belgium	2011	47%	527,008,453,887	2.87%	5,499,369,025
Belgium	2010	28%	484,552,792,442	2.85%	5,255,618,817
Belgium	2008	52%	518,625,897,173	2.71%	6,295,591,036
Bulgaria	2016	45%	53,237,882,473	0.32%	756,178,949
Bulgaria	2015	63%	50,199,117,547	0.31%	660,847,880
Bulgaria	2014	64%	56,732,006,512	0.30%	835,707,502
Bulgaria	2013	60%	55,758,744,571	0.31%	899,565,689
Bulgaria	2012	48%	53,903,028,252	0.31%	807,555,848
Bulgaria	2011	55%	57,418,391,042	0.31%	829,008,176
Bulgaria	2010	54%	50,610,031,136	0.30%	893,461,486
Bulgaria	2009	57%	51,884,481,410	0.30%	963,247,316
Croatia	2016	52%	50,714,957,391	0.31%	694,687,013
Croatia	2015	59%	48,921,877,448	0.30%	753,465,232
Croatia	2014	63%	57,080,369,368	0.31%	906,620,452
Croatia	2013	46%	57,769,872,075	0.32%	956,949,289
Croatia	2012	41%	56,485,301,967	0.33%	955,318,531
Croatia	2011	52%	62,236,751,773	0.34%	1,106,457,830
Croatia	2010	56%	59,665,427,465	0.35%	1,015,878,501

Croatia	2009	64%	62,703,095,751	0.37%	1,130,307,106
Cyprus	2016	32%	20,047,013,274	0.12%	352,776,549
Cyprus	2015	31%	19,676,167,240	0.12%	327,891,760
Cyprus	2014	29%	23,359,294,149	0.13%	357,821,414
Cyprus	2013	18%	24,084,572,491	0.13%	384,904,408
Cyprus	2012	30%	25,041,372,222	0.14%	414,493,126
Cyprus	2011	28%	27,427,161,523	0.15%	479,705,310
Cyprus	2010	26%	25,562,251,656	0.15%	477,615,894
Cyprus	2009	32%	25,942,622,951	0.15%	471,380,939
Czech Republic	2016	36%	195,305,084,919	1.18%	1,955,125,324
Czech Republic	2015	57%	186,829,940,546	1.14%	1,763,252,198
Czech Republic	2014	53%	207,818,330,724	1.12%	1,881,594,604
Czech Republic	2013	45%	209,402,444,996	1.16%	2,082,988,499
Czech Republic	2012	51%	207,376,427,021	1.20%	2,145,687,652
Czech Republic	2011	47%	227,948,349,666	1.24%	2,474,310,929
Czech Republic	2010	50%	207,477,857,919	1.22%	2,497,909,494
Czech Republic	2009	49%	206,179,982,164	1.21%	2,718,559,513
Denmark	2016	77%	306,899,653,410	1.86%	3,514,258,781
Denmark	2015	76%	301,298,464,861	1.84%	3,364,047,774
Denmark	2014	70%	352,993,633,221	1.89%	4,056,861,511
Denmark	2013	67%	343,584,385,594	1.91%	4,216,646,319
Denmark	2012	58%	327,148,899,962	1.89%	4,422,461,491
Denmark	2011	58%	344,003,209,696	1.87%	4,518,588,835
Denmark	2010	63%	321,995,350,347	1.89%	4,503,496,130
Denmark	2009	69%	321,241,396,034	1.88%	4,337,331,418
Denmark	2008	64%	353,361,056,080	1.85%	4,788,058,296
Estonia	2016	27%	23,337,907,619	0.14%	502,192,875
Estonia	2015	47%	22,566,956,982	0.14%	469,135,247
Estonia	2014	53%	26,224,622,451	0.14%	512,119,224
Estonia	2013	63%	25,137,153,149	0.14%	479,314,345
Estonia	2012	52%	23,043,864,510	0.13%	436,853,135

Estonia	2011	53%	23,170,239,901	0.13%	389,237,444
Estonia	2009	42%	19,652,492,637	0.11%	434,148,375
Estonia	2008	46%	24,194,039,256	0.13%	506,371,759
Finland	2016	69%	238,502,900,312	1.45%	3,246,555,260
Finland	2015	76%	232,439,324,530	1.42%	3,051,042,708
Finland	2014	74%	272,609,288,690	1.46%	3,599,428,639
Finland	2013	70%	269,980,111,643	1.50%	3,786,716,100
Finland	2012	67%	256,706,466,091	1.48%	3,602,753,504
Finland	2011	68%	273,674,236,773	1.49%	3,749,190,663
Finland	2010	66%	247,799,815,768	1.46%	3,399,797,579
Finland	2008	64%	283,742,493,042	1.48%	3,615,057,859
France	2016	61%	2,465,453,975,282	14.95%	55,758,342,172
France	2015	66%	2,433,562,015,516	14.83%	55,344,650,387
France	2014	58%	2,849,305,322,685	15.29%	63,613,566,045
France	2013	47%	2,808,511,203,185	15.58%	62,417,084,108
France	2012	49%	2,681,416,108,537	15.51%	60,035,184,557
France	2011	59%	2,862,680,142,625	15.60%	64,600,904,444
France	2010	58%	2,646,837,111,795	15.58%	61,781,752,036
France	2009	46%	2,693,827,452,070	15.75%	66,888,024,451
France	2008	60%	2,923,465,651,091	15.28%	66,007,030,907
Greece	2016	28%	192,690,813,127	1.17%	4,974,474,842
Greece	2015	19%	195,541,761,243	1.19%	4,948,101,433
Greece	2014	29%	237,029,579,261	1.27%	5,531,285,639
Greece	2013	21%	239,862,011,450	1.33%	5,655,181,670
Greece	2012	16%	245,670,666,639	1.42%	5,914,991,453
Greece	2011	21%	287,797,822,093	1.57%	7,128,605,754
Greece	2010	23%	299,361,576,558	1.76%	8,163,619,906
Greece	2009	55%	330,000,252,153	1.93%	10,641,983,884
Hungary	2016	44%	125,816,640,421	0.76%	1,254,237,067
Hungary	2015	73%	122,879,042,002	0.75%	1,131,010,534
Hungary	2014	71%	140,118,140,455	0.75%	1,209,802,165
Hungary	2013	61%	135,215,704,419	0.75%	1,280,050,962
Hungary	2012	59%	127,856,647,108	0.74%	1,322,276,724
Hungary	2011	69%	140,782,064,609	0.77%	1,472,069,832
Hungary	2010	66%	130,922,638,689	0.77%	1,350,819,331
Hungary	2008	62%	157,998,423,132	0.83%	1,867,874,243

Ireland	2016	68%	304,819,020,501	1.85%	999,363,821
Ireland	2015	71%	290,617,006,704	1.77%	997,051,034
Ireland	2014	71%	258,099,015,104	1.39%	1,192,733,633
Ireland	2013	59%	239,389,337,003	1.33%	1,195,763,156
Ireland	2012	54%	225,571,857,948	1.30%	1,157,532,322
Ireland	2011	53%	239,018,540,057	1.30%	1,300,331,089
Ireland	2010	49%	221,951,353,967	1.31%	1,274,228,769
Ireland	2009	49%	236,311,338,427	1.38%	1,415,809,947
Ireland	2008	53%	275,020,018,163	1.44%	1,582,832,869
Italy	2016	55%	1,858,913,163,928	11.27%	27,940,241,722
Italy	2015	63%	1,832,347,450,962	11.17%	25,295,781,410
Italy	2014	61%	2,151,732,868,243	11.55%	31,572,442,042
Italy	2013	48%	2,130,491,320,659	11.82%	33,891,905,742
Italy	2012	41%	2,072,823,157,060	11.99%	33,732,771,222
Italy	2011	42%	2,276,292,404,601	12.40%	38,129,978,008
Italy	2010	38%	2,125,058,244,243	12.51%	36,032,291,757
Italy	2009	31%	2,185,160,183,384	12.78%	38,303,695,471
Italy	2008	36%	2,390,729,163,615	12.49%	41,242,126,849
Latvia	2016	35%	27,572,698,482	0.17%	406,953,213
Latvia	2015	40%	27,009,231,911	0.16%	282,701,122
Latvia	2014	46%	31,419,072,948	0.17%	295,728,951
Latvia	2013	54%	30,314,363,219	0.17%	283,605,385
Latvia	2012	50%	28,119,996,053	0.16%	255,687,570
Latvia	2011	49%	28,223,552,825	0.15%	294,291,310
Latvia	2009	44%	26,169,854,045	0.15%	363,775,368
Latvia	2008	47%	35,596,016,664	0.19%	581,786,289
Lithuania	2016	49%	42,738,875,963	0.26%	636,258,462
Lithuania	2015	61%	41,402,022,148	0.25%	471,242,474
Lithuania	2014	60%	48,545,251,796	0.26%	426,900,251
Lithuania	2013	58%	46,473,646,002	0.26%	354,930,649
Lithuania	2012	60%	42,847,900,766	0.25%	328,509,128
Lithuania	2011	59%	43,476,878,139	0.24%	344,232,025
Lithuania	2010	57%	37,120,517,694	0.22%	326,234,650
Lithuania	2009	47%	37,440,673,478	0.22%	404,839,993
Lithuania	2008	39%	47,850,551,149	0.25%	540,881,173
Luxembourg	2016	65%	58,631,324,559	0.36%	294,236,354
Luxembourg	2015	67%	57,784,495,265	0.35%	276,157,628

Luxembourg	2014	65%	66,327,344,189	0.36%	279,018,999
Luxembourg	2013	64%	61,739,352,212	0.34%	258,655,844
Luxembourg	2012	57%	56,677,961,787	0.33%	237,503,171
Luxembourg	2011	59%	60,004,630,234	0.33%	256,962,325
Luxembourg	2010	57%	53,212,476,812	0.31%	274,135,450
Luxembourg	2008	71%	55,849,686,539	0.29%	236,711,499
Malta	2016	59%	10,999,047,580	0.07%	57,549,779
Malta	2015	61%	10,285,547,954	0.06%	51,796,606
Malta	2014	60%	11,217,780,149	0.06%	56,517,182
Netherlands	2016	75%	777,227,541,581	4.71%	9,254,728,872
Netherlands	2015	81%	757,999,453,314	4.62%	8,668,244,128
Netherlands	2014	77%	879,635,084,125	4.72%	10,332,602,375
Netherlands	2013	74%	866,680,000,367	4.81%	10,226,257,856
Netherlands	2012	78%	828,946,812,397	4.79%	10,364,726,095
Netherlands	2011	72%	893,757,287,202	4.87%	11,647,930,502
Netherlands	2010	70%	836,389,937,229	4.92%	11,220,523,994
Netherlands	2008	72%	936,228,211,513	4.89%	12,374,395,781
Poland	2016	39%	471,364,408,714	2.86%	9,337,323,426
Poland	2015	47%	477,279,647,755	2.91%	10,211,160,447
Poland	2014	43%	545,075,908,846	2.93%	10,343,322,874
Poland	2013	47%	524,201,151,607	2.91%	9,275,183,498
Poland	2012	42%	500,284,003,684	2.89%	8,985,569,543
Poland	2011	42%	528,725,113,046	2.88%	9,453,668,084
Poland	2010	37%	479,257,883,742	2.82%	8,789,004,211
Poland	2009	39%	440,346,575,958	2.57%	7,913,805,276
Poland	2008	41%	533,815,789,474	2.79%	9,349,576,623
Portugal	2016	49%	204,836,597,909	1.24%	3,765,340,411
Portugal	2015	32%	199,420,256,050	1.22%	3,556,777,159
Portugal	2014	41%	229,629,822,122	1.23%	4,111,547,863
Portugal	2013	29%	226,073,492,966	1.25%	4,724,100,941
Portugal	2012	25%	216,368,178,659	1.25%	4,137,256,164
Portugal	2011	30%	244,895,101,712	1.33%	4,904,391,790
Portugal	2010	30%	238,303,443,425	1.40%	4,718,924,338
Portugal	2009	33%	243,745,748,819	1.43%	4,949,986,107
Portugal	2008	23%	262,007,590,450	1.37%	4,811,923,246
Romania	2016	58%	187,592,037,840	1.14%	2,766,554,986

Romania	2015	63%	177,911,101,680	1.08%	2,580,572,684
Romania	2014	58%	199,493,490,983	1.07%	2,691,450,197
Romania	2013	57%	191,549,024,911	1.06%	2,452,527,720
Romania	2012	52%	171,664,638,717	0.99%	2,102,886,223
Romania	2011	57%	185,362,855,081	1.01%	2,379,879,289
Romania	2010	55%	167,998,080,493	0.99%	2,086,220,460
Romania	2009	48%	167,422,949,529	0.98%	2,225,166,432
Slovakia	2016	29%	89,768,598,023	0.54%	1,035,357,998
Slovakia	2015	51%	87,501,423,882	0.53%	985,960,366
Slovakia	2014	56%	100,948,236,941	0.54%	997,703,773
Slovakia	2013	53%	98,478,349,315	0.55%	967,922,874
Slovakia	2012	43%	93,413,992,956	0.54%	1,020,180,557
Slovakia	2011	53%	98,181,259,740	0.53%	1,064,842,435
Slovakia	2010	47%	89,501,012,916	0.53%	1,137,680,608
Slovenia	2016	43%	44,708,598,649	0.27%	404,223,231
Slovenia	2015	57%	43,072,415,017	0.26%	400,635,956
Slovenia	2014	60%	49,904,928,335	0.27%	486,194,847
Slovenia	2013	52%	48,116,256,926	0.27%	506,742,810
Slovenia	2012	57%	46,352,802,766	0.27%	543,496,695
Slovenia	2011	58%	51,290,792,018	0.28%	665,679,437
Slovenia	2009	62%	50,244,793,832	0.29%	798,916,366
Spain	2016	54%	1,237,255,019,654	7.50%	14,896,545,039
Spain	2015	50%	1,197,789,902,774	7.30%	14,935,802,308
Spain	2014	44%	1,376,910,811,041	7.39%	17,178,548,478
Spain	2013	31%	1,361,854,206,549	7.55%	17,242,955,159
Spain	2012	42%	1,336,018,949,806	7.73%	18,860,633,022
Spain	2011	58%	1,488,067,258,325	8.11%	19,695,428,551
Spain	2010	50%	1,431,616,749,640	8.42%	19,710,786,703
Spain	2009	36%	1,499,099,749,931	8.77%	20,179,480,411
Spain	2008	37%	1,635,015,380,108	8.54%	22,226,907,866
Sweden	2016	59%	514,459,972,806	3.12%	5,322,242,975
Sweden	2015	55%	497,918,109,302	3.03%	5,386,942,196
Sweden	2014	47%	573,817,719,109	3.08%	6,555,518,064
Sweden	2013	38%	578,742,001,488	3.21%	6,528,735,797
Sweden	2012	47%	543,880,647,757	3.15%	6,243,675,445
Sweden	2011	34%	563,109,663,291	3.07%	6,324,744,118
Sweden	2010	38%	488,377,689,565	2.87%	5,885,932,398

Sweden	2009	40%	429,657,033,108	2.51%	5,062,975,254
Sweden	2008	44%	513,965,650,650	2.69%	6,024,791,006
United Kingdom	2016	64%	2,647,898,654,635	16.06%	48,286,640,378
United Kingdom	2015	66%	2,885,570,309,161	17.58%	53,862,185,493
United Kingdom	2014	64%	3,022,827,781,881	16.22%	59,141,019,971
United Kingdom	2013	55%	2,739,818,680,930	15.20%	56,861,797,136
United Kingdom	2012	56%	2,662,085,168,499	15.40%	58,495,657,750
United Kingdom	2010	43%	2,441,173,394,730	14.37%	58,082,817,781
United Kingdom	2009	41%	2,382,825,985,356	13.93%	57,916,342,109
United Kingdom	2008	44%	2,890,564,338,235	15.10%	65,615,349,265
Germany	2016		3,477,796,274,497	21.09%	41,076,943,636
Germany	2015		3,375,611,100,742	20.57%	39,814,388,302
Germany	2014		3,890,606,893,347	20.88%	46,102,670,752
Germany	2013		3,752,513,503,278	20.82%	45,930,529,472
Germany	2012		3,543,983,909,148	20.50%	46,470,894,689
Germany	2011		3,757,698,281,118	20.48%	48,140,330,968
Germany	2010		3,417,094,562,649	20.11%	46,255,524,125
Germany	2009		3,418,005,001,389	19.99%	47,472,909,152
Germany	2008		3,752,365,607,148	19.61%	48,079,683,605

APPENDIX FIVE: NATO Share of Wealth, Military Spending, and Approval of Germany

State	Year	Approve	GDP ($)	Military Spending ($)
Albania	2016	75%	11,863,865,978	146,655,937
Albania	2015	78%	11,335,264,967	132,350,700
Albania	2014	71%	13,228,244,357	178,120,426
Albania	2013	66%	12,776,277,515	180,015,463
Albania	2012	67%	12,319,784,787	183,205,373
Albania	2011	66%	12,890,867,539	197,006,789
Albania	2010	73%	11,926,953,259	185,892,527
Albania	2009	57%	12,044,212,904	182,736,862
Belgium	2016	69%	467,955,709,818	4,064,001,372
Belgium	2015	69%	455,200,045,096	4,217,780,959
Belgium	2014	69%	531,075,861,047	5,183,548,726
Belgium	2013	57%	520,925,468,953	5,263,163,612
Belgium	2012	30%	497,884,216,569	5,169,000,481
Belgium	2011	47%	527,008,453,887	5,499,369,025
Belgium	2010	28%	484,552,792,442	5,255,618,817
Belgium	2008	52%	518,625,897,173	6,295,591,036
Bulgaria	2016	45%	53,237,882,473	756,178,949
Bulgaria	2015	63%	50,199,117,547	660,847,880
Bulgaria	2014	64%	56,732,006,512	835,707,502
Bulgaria	2013	60%	55,758,744,571	899,565,689
Bulgaria	2012	48%	53,903,028,252	807,555,848
Bulgaria	2011	55%	57,418,391,042	829,008,176
Bulgaria	2010	54%	50,610,031,136	893,461,486
Bulgaria	2009	57%	51,884,481,410	963,247,316
Canada	2016	51%	1,529,760,492,201	15,164,671,431
Canada	2015	62%	1,552,807,652,015	15,317,240,429
Canada	2014	61%	1,792,883,225,804	17,853,640,478
Canada	2013	53%	1,842,628,005,830	18,515,792,883
Canada	2012	58%	1,824,288,757,448	20,452,100,771
Canada	2011	55%	1,788,647,906,048	21,393,727,525
Canada	2010	50%	1,613,464,422,811	19,315,636,644
Canada	2009	51%	1,371,153,004,986	18,936,226,052
Canada	2008	50%	1,549,131,208,997	19,342,783,505

Croatia	2016	52%	50,714,957,391	694,687,013
Croatia	2015	59%	48,921,877,448	753,465,232
Croatia	2014	63%	57,080,369,368	906,620,452
Croatia	2013	46%	57,769,872,075	956,949,289
Croatia	2012	41%	56,485,301,967	955,318,531
Croatia	2011	52%	62,236,751,773	1,106,457,830
Croatia	2010	56%	59,665,427,465	1,015,878,501
Croatia	2009	64%	62,703,095,751	1,130,307,106
Czech Republic	2016	36%	195,305,084,919	1,955,125,324
Czech Republic	2015	57%	186,829,940,546	1,763,252,198
Czech Republic	2014	53%	207,818,330,724	1,881,594,604
Czech Republic	2013	45%	209,402,444,996	2,082,988,499
Czech Republic	2012	51%	207,376,427,021	2,145,687,652
Czech Republic	2011	47%	227,948,349,666	2,474,310,929
Czech Republic	2010	50%	207,477,857,919	2,497,909,494
Czech Republic	2009	49%	206,179,982,164	2,718,559,513
Denmark	2016	77%	306,899,653,410	3,514,258,781
Denmark	2015	76%	301,298,464,861	3,364,047,774
Denmark	2014	70%	352,993,633,221	4,056,861,511
Denmark	2013	67%	343,584,385,594	4,216,646,319
Denmark	2012	58%	327,148,899,962	4,422,461,491
Denmark	2011	58%	344,003,209,696	4,518,588,835
Denmark	2010	63%	321,995,350,347	4,503,496,130
Denmark	2009	69%	321,241,396,034	4,337,331,418
Denmark	2008	64%	353,361,056,080	4,788,058,296
Estonia	2016	27%	23,337,907,619	502,192,875
Estonia	2015	47%	22,566,956,982	469,135,247
Estonia	2014	53%	26,224,622,451	512,119,224
Estonia	2013	63%	25,137,153,149	479,314,345
Estonia	2012	52%	23,043,864,510	436,853,135
Estonia	2011	53%	23,170,239,901	389,237,444
Estonia	2009	42%	19,652,492,637	434,148,375
Estonia	2008	46%	24,194,039,256	506,371,759
France	2016	61%	2,465,453,975,282	55,758,342,172
France	2015	66%	2,433,562,015,516	55,344,650,387
France	2014	58%	2,849,305,322,685	63,613,566,045

France	2013	47%	2,808,511,203,185	62,417,084,108
France	2012	49%	2,681,416,108,537	60,035,184,557
France	2011	59%	2,862,680,142,625	64,600,904,444
France	2010	58%	2,646,837,111,795	61,781,752,036
France	2009	46%	2,693,827,452,070	66,888,024,451
France	2008	60%	2,923,465,651,091	66,007,030,907
Greece	2016	28%	192,690,813,127	4,974,474,842
Greece	2015	19%	195,541,761,243	4,948,101,433
Greece	2014	29%	237,029,579,261	5,531,285,639
Greece	2013	21%	239,862,011,450	5,655,181,670
Greece	2012	16%	245,670,666,639	5,914,991,453
Greece	2011	21%	287,797,822,093	7,128,605,754
Greece	2010	23%	299,361,576,558	8,163,619,906
Greece	2009	55%	330,000,252,153	10,641,983,884
Hungary	2016	44%	125,816,640,421	1,254,237,067
Hungary	2015	73%	122,879,042,002	1,131,010,534
Hungary	2014	71%	140,118,140,455	1,209,802,165
Hungary	2013	61%	135,215,704,419	1,280,050,962
Hungary	2012	59%	127,856,647,108	1,322,276,724
Hungary	2011	69%	140,782,064,609	1,472,069,832
Hungary	2010	66%	130,922,638,689	1,350,819,331
Hungary	2008	62%	157,998,423,132	1,867,874,243
Iceland	2016	52%	20,047,413,006	
Iceland	2015	51%	16,783,714,958	
Iceland	2013	33%	15,479,256,845	
Iceland	2012	29%	14,218,575,093	17,444,447
Iceland	2008	40%	17,640,375,722	
Italy	2016	55%	1,858,913,163,928	27,940,241,722
Italy	2015	63%	1,832,347,450,962	25,295,781,410
Italy	2014	61%	2,151,732,868,243	31,572,442,042
Italy	2013	48%	2,130,491,320,659	33,891,905,742
Italy	2012	41%	2,072,823,157,060	33,732,771,222
Italy	2011	42%	2,276,292,404,601	38,129,978,008
Italy	2010	38%	2,125,058,244,243	36,032,291,757
Italy	2009	31%	2,185,160,183,384	38,303,695,471
Italy	2008	36%	2,390,729,163,615	41,242,126,849

Latvia	2016	35%	27,572,698,482	406,953,213
Latvia	2015	40%	27,009,231,911	282,701,122
Latvia	2014	46%	31,419,072,948	295,728,951
Latvia	2013	54%	30,314,363,219	283,605,385
Latvia	2012	50%	28,119,996,053	255,687,570
Latvia	2011	49%	28,223,552,825	294,291,310
Latvia	2009	44%	26,169,854,045	363,775,368
Latvia	2008	47%	35,596,016,664	581,786,289
Lithuania	2016	49%	42,738,875,963	636,258,462
Lithuania	2015	61%	41,402,022,148	471,242,474
Lithuania	2014	60%	48,545,251,796	426,900,251
Lithuania	2013	58%	46,473,646,002	354,930,649
Lithuania	2012	60%	42,847,900,766	328,509,128
Lithuania	2011	59%	43,476,878,139	344,232,025
Lithuania	2010	57%	37,120,517,694	326,234,650
Lithuania	2009	47%	37,440,673,478	404,839,993
Lithuania	2008	39%	47,850,551,149	540,881,173
Luxembourg	2016	65%	58,631,324,559	294,236,354
Luxembourg	2015	67%	57,784,495,265	276,157,628
Luxembourg	2014	65%	66,327,344,189	279,018,999
Luxembourg	2013	64%	61,739,352,212	258,655,844
Luxembourg	2012	57%	56,677,961,787	237,503,171
Luxembourg	2011	59%	60,004,630,234	256,962,325
Luxembourg	2010	57%	53,212,476,812	274,135,450
Luxembourg	2008	71%	55,849,686,539	236,711,499
Montenegro	2016	31%	4,374,127,212	67,206,858
Montenegro	2015	41%	4,052,913,386	55,545,082
Montenegro	2014	38%	4,587,928,884	67,546,769
Montenegro	2013	35%	4,464,260,489	64,832,714
Montenegro	2012	35%	4,087,724,528	67,711,679
Montenegro	2011	30%	4,538,198,499	79,371,699
Montenegro	2010	35%	4,139,192,053	75,099,338
Montenegro	2009	38%	4,159,330,370	76,687,969
Netherlands	2016	75%	777,227,541,581	9,254,728,872
Netherlands	2015	81%	757,999,453,314	8,668,244,128
Netherlands	2014	77%	879,635,084,125	10,332,602,375
Netherlands	2013	74%	866,680,000,367	10,226,257,856

Netherlands	2012	78%	828,946,812,397	10,364,726,095
Netherlands	2011	72%	893,757,287,202	11,647,930,502
Netherlands	2010	70%	836,389,937,229	11,220,523,994
Netherlands	2008	72%	936,228,211,513	12,374,395,781
Norway	2016	76%	371,076,190,476	5,999,761,905
Norway	2015	63%	386,663,139,403	5,815,107,988
Norway	2014	67%	499,338,534,779	7,336,789,209
Norway	2012	45%	510,229,136,227	7,143,962,183
Norway	2008	52%	462,554,432,624	6,370,921,986
Poland	2016	39%	471,364,408,714	9,337,323,426
Poland	2015	47%	477,279,647,755	10,211,160,447
Poland	2014	43%	545,075,908,846	10,343,322,874
Poland	2013	47%	524,201,151,607	9,275,183,498
Poland	2012	42%	500,284,003,684	8,985,569,543
Poland	2011	42%	528,725,113,046	9,453,668,084
Poland	2010	37%	479,257,883,742	8,789,004,211
Poland	2009	39%	440,346,575,958	7,913,805,276
Poland	2008	41%	533,815,789,474	9,349,576,623
Portugal	2016	49%	204,836,597,909	3,765,340,411
Portugal	2015	32%	199,420,256,050	3,556,777,159
Portugal	2014	41%	229,629,822,122	4,111,547,863
Portugal	2013	29%	226,073,492,966	4,724,100,941
Portugal	2012	25%	216,368,178,659	4,137,256,164
Portugal	2011	30%	244,895,101,712	4,904,391,790
Portugal	2010	30%	238,303,443,425	4,718,924,338
Portugal	2009	33%	243,745,748,819	4,949,986,107
Portugal	2008	23%	262,007,590,450	4,811,923,246
Romania	2016	58%	187,592,037,840	2,766,554,986
Romania	2015	63%	177,911,101,680	2,580,572,684
Romania	2014	58%	199,493,490,983	2,691,450,197
Romania	2013	57%	191,549,024,911	2,452,527,720
Romania	2012	52%	171,664,638,717	2,102,886,223
Romania	2011	57%	185,362,855,081	2,379,879,289
Romania	2010	55%	167,998,080,493	2,086,220,460
Romania	2009	48%	167,422,949,529	2,225,166,432
Slovakia	2016	29%	89,768,598,023	1,035,357,998

Slovakia	2015	51%	87,501,423,882	985,960,366
Slovakia	2014	56%	100,948,236,941	997,703,773
Slovakia	2013	53%	98,478,349,315	967,922,874
Slovakia	2012	43%	93,413,992,956	1,020,180,557
Slovakia	2011	53%	98,181,259,740	1,064,842,435
Slovakia	2010	47%	89,501,012,916	1,137,680,608
Slovenia	2016	43%	44,708,598,649	404,223,231
Slovenia	2015	57%	43,072,415,017	400,635,956
Slovenia	2014	60%	49,904,928,335	486,194,847
Slovenia	2013	52%	48,116,256,926	506,742,810
Slovenia	2012	57%	46,352,802,766	543,496,695
Slovenia	2011	58%	51,290,792,018	665,679,437
Slovenia	2009	62%	50,244,793,832	798,916,366
Spain	2016	54%	1,237,255,019,654	14,896,545,039
Spain	2015	50%	1,197,789,902,774	14,935,802,308
Spain	2014	44%	1,376,910,811,041	17,178,548,478
Spain	2013	31%	1,361,854,206,549	17,242,955,159
Spain	2012	42%	1,336,018,949,806	18,860,633,022
Spain	2011	58%	1,488,067,258,325	19,695,428,551
Spain	2010	50%	1,431,616,749,640	19,710,786,703
Spain	2009	36%	1,499,099,749,931	20,179,480,411
Spain	2008	37%	1,635,015,380,108	22,226,907,866
Turkey	2016	34%	863,711,710,427	14,805,868,283
Turkey	2015	36%	859,794,177,118	15,880,877,733
Turkey	2014	33%	934,167,809,302	17,772,148,111
Turkey	2013	24%	950,595,270,314	18,662,591,308
Turkey	2012	24%	873,981,786,532	17,958,230,963
Turkey	2011	24%	832,546,270,784	17,304,834,532
Turkey	2010	30%	771,876,791,232	17,939,386,870
Turkey	2009	24%	644,639,902,581	16,351,879,849
Turkey	2008	21%	764,335,657,318	17,127,576,415
United Kingdom	2016	64%	2,647,898,654,635	48,286,640,378
United Kingdom	2015	66%	2,885,570,309,161	53,862,185,493
United Kingdom	2014	64%	3,022,827,781,881	59,141,019,971
United Kingdom	2013	55%	2,739,818,680,930	56,861,797,136
United Kingdom	2012	56%	2,662,085,168,499	58,495,657,750
United Kingdom	2010	43%	2,441,173,394,730	58,082,817,781

United Kingdom	2009	41%	2,382,825,985,356	57,916,342,109
United Kingdom	2008	44%	2,890,564,338,235	65,615,349,265
United States of America	2016	39%	18,624,475,000,000	611,186,443,000
United States of America	2015	50%	18,120,714,000,000	596,009,639,000
United States of America	2014	45%	17,393,103,000,000	609,914,000,000
United States of America	2013	47%	16,691,517,000,000	639,704,000,000
United States of America	2011	48%	15,517,926,000,000	711,338,000,000
United States of America	2010	46%	14,964,372,000,000	698,180,000,000
United States of America	2009	43%	14,418,739,000,000	668,567,000,000
United States of America	2008	49%	14,718,582,000,000	621,131,000,000

APPENDIX SIX: Other States' Share of Wealth, Military Spending, and Approval of Germany

State	Year	Approval of Germany	GDP	Military Spending ($)
Bangladesh	2016	31%	221,415,162,446	3,192,340,963
Bangladesh	2015	29%	195,078,665,828	2,848,668,183
Bangladesh	2014	22%	172,885,454,931	2,353,593,968
Bangladesh	2013	39%	149,990,451,022	2,001,099,667
Bangladesh	2012	22%	133,355,749,482	1,886,467,325
Bangladesh	2011	16%	128,637,938,711	1,876,393,194
Bangladesh	2010	23%	115,279,077,465	1,635,568,121
Bangladesh	2009	27%	102,477,791,472	1,263,121,759
Bangladesh	2008	21%	91,631,278,239	1,029,844,370
Belarus	2016	19%	47,407,217,531	603,287,093
Belarus	2015	18%	56,454,734,397	723,659,425
Belarus	2014	18%	78,813,839,984	1,010,837,148
Belarus	2013	29%	75,527,984,234	971,113,288
Belarus	2012	33%	65,685,102,555	817,060,094
Belarus	2011	34%	61,757,788,945	756,221,106
Belarus	2010	40%	57,222,490,769	767,573,011
Belarus	2009	39%	49,209,523,810	675,438,596
Belarus	2008	36%	60,763,483,146	883,192,884
India	2016	23%	2,263,792,499,341	56,025,539,719
India	2015	15%	2,089,865,410,868	50,263,944,111
India	2014	15%	2,035,393,459,979	50,819,097,583
India	2013	15%	1,856,722,121,395	45,911,657,320
India	2012	12%	1,827,637,859,136	46,373,492,669
India	2011	6%	1,823,049,927,771	48,338,115,460
India	2010	10%	1,656,617,073,124	46,255,942,426
India	2009	13%	1,323,940,295,875	39,506,984,067
India	2008	16%	1,186,952,757,636	31,216,843,213
Kazakhstan	2016	28%	137,278,320,084	1,102,408,230
Kazakhstan	2015	25%	184,388,432,149	2,046,197,982
Kazakhstan	2014	23%	221,415,572,820	2,306,468,436
Kazakhstan	2013	50%	236,634,552,078	2,551,121,021

Kazakhstan	2012	43%	207,998,568,866	2,177,550,507
Kazakhstan	2011	44%	192,626,507,972	1,803,973,243
Kazakhstan	2010	39%	148,047,348,241	1,501,815,344
Kazakhstan	2009	39%	115,308,661,143	1,271,892,863
Kazakhstan	2008	38%	133,441,612,247	1,540,808,251
Kyrgyzstan	2016	29%	6,551,287,938	206,453,348
Kyrgyzstan	2015	35%	6,678,178,340	230,507,539
Kyrgyzstan	2014	28%	7,468,096,567	252,114,936
Kyrgyzstan	2013	33%	7,335,027,592	234,443,548
Kyrgyzstan	2012	36%	6,605,139,933	211,852,057
Kyrgyzstan	2011	26%	6,197,766,119	210,645,394
Kyrgyzstan	2010	32%	4,794,357,795	184,382,227
Kyrgyzstan	2009	32%	4,690,062,255	148,960,123
Kyrgyzstan	2008	40%	5,139,957,785	149,311,271
Russia	2016	6%	1,283,162,985,989	69,267,581,227
Russia	2015	7%	1,365,864,126,833	66,418,653,805
Russia	2014	12%	2,063,662,665,172	84,696,520,420
Russia	2013	29%	2,297,128,039,058	88,352,896,464
Russia	2012	29%	2,210,256,976,945	81,469,399,931
Russia	2011	32%	2,051,661,732,060	70,237,523,951
Russia	2010	36%	1,524,916,112,079	58,720,227,609
Russia	2009	35%	1,222,643,696,992	51,532,116,798
Russia	2008	42%	1,660,844,408,500	56,183,785,393
Tajikistan	2016	41%	6,951,657,159	
Tajikistan	2015	50%	7,853,450,374	288,377,238
Tajikistan	2014	39%	9,236,309,138	104,220,674
Tajikistan	2012	53%	7,633,049,792	76,260,633
Tajikistan	2011	48%	6,522,732,203	71,341,807
Tajikistan	2010	47%	5,642,178,580	53,756,565
Tajikistan	2009	40%	4,979,481,980	47,529,389
Tajikistan	2008	41%	5,161,336,170	52,467,426
Ukraine	2016	33%	93,270,479,389	3,424,874,664
Ukraine	2015	42%	91,030,959,455	3,616,895,631
Ukraine	2014	41%	133,503,411,376	4,033,331,370
Ukraine	2013	44%	183,310,146,378	4,386,463,155
Ukraine	2012	46%	175,781,379,051	4,136,904,017
Ukraine	2011	52%	163,159,671,670	3,684,672,925

Ukraine	2010	47%	136,013,155,905	3,729,522,657
Ukraine	2009	39%	117,227,769,792	3,452,484,855
Ukraine	2008	43%	179,992,405,832	4,811,038,123

APPENDIX SEVEN: German Import and Export Partner Share with European Union

State	Year	Approve	Import Partner Share	Export Partner Share
Austria	2016	65%	4.01%	4.88%
Austria	2015	70%	3.90%	4.86%
Austria	2014	66%	3.95%	4.95%
Austria	2013	63%	4.08%	5.14%
Austria	2012	57%	4.01%	5.15%
Austria	2011	56%	4.10%	5.41%
Austria	2010	53%	4.24%	5.60%
Austria	2009	55%	4.31%	5.96%
Austria	2008	53%	3.93%	5.30%
Belgium	2016	69%	3.95%	3.41%
Belgium	2015	69%	3.87%	3.41%
Belgium	2014	69%	3.95%	3.72%
Belgium	2013	57%	4.08%	3.88%
Belgium	2012	30%	4.01%	3.99%
Belgium	2011	47%	4.10%	4.40%
Belgium	2010	28%	4.24%	4.84%
Belgium	2008	52%	4.31%	5.04%
Bulgaria	2016	45%	0.33%	0.29%
Bulgaria	2015	63%	0.30%	0.29%
Bulgaria	2014	64%	0.28%	0.29%
Bulgaria	2013	60%	0.31%	0.24%
Bulgaria	2012	48%	0.25%	0.24%
Bulgaria	2011	55%	0.23%	0.22%
Bulgaria	2010	54%	0.22%	0.23%
Bulgaria	2009	57%	0.21%	0.24%
Croatia	2016	52%	0.15%	0.25%
Croatia	2015	59%	0.13%	0.22%
Croatia	2014	63%	0.11%	0.20%
Croatia	2013	46%	0.10%	0.19%
Croatia	2012	41%	0.10%	0.20%
Croatia	2011	52%	0.09%	0.21%
Croatia	2010	56%	0.09%	0.21%
Croatia	2009	64%	0.10%	0.28%

Cyprus	2016	32%	0.01%	0.06%
Cyprus	2015	31%	0.01%	0.05%
Cyprus	2014	29%	0.01%	0.05%
Cyprus	2013	18%	0.01%	0.08%
Cyprus	2012	30%	0.01%	0.06%
Cyprus	2011	28%	0.03%	0.07%
Cyprus	2010	26%	0.03%	0.07%
Cyprus	2009	32%	0.03%	0.08%
Czech Republic	2016	36%	4.42%	3.19%
Czech Republic	2015	57%	4.11%	3.05%
Czech Republic	2014	53%	4.02%	2.97%
Czech Republic	2013	45%	3.69%	2.84%
Czech Republic	2012	51%	3.60%	2.85%
Czech Republic	2011	47%	3.64%	2.88%
Czech Republic	2010	50%	3.68%	2.81%
Czech Republic	2009	49%	3.70%	2.81%
Denmark	2016	77%	1.21%	1.52%
Denmark	2015	76%	1.24%	1.47%
Denmark	2014	70%	1.29%	1.49%
Denmark	2013	67%	1.29%	1.45%
Denmark	2012	58%	1.25%	1.36%
Denmark	2011	58%	1.35%	1.38%
Denmark	2010	63%	1.38%	1.48%
Denmark	2009	69%	1.55%	1.64%
Denmark	2008	64%	1.29%	1.59%
Estonia	2016	27%	0.06%	0.14%
Estonia	2015	47%	0.06%	0.13%
Estonia	2014	53%	0.06%	0.15%
Estonia	2013	63%	0.06%	0.15%
Estonia	2012	52%	0.05%	0.14%
Estonia	2011	53%	0.06%	0.14%

Estonia	2009	42%	0.06%	0.12%
Estonia	2008	46%	0.04%	0.15%
Finland	2016	69%	0.84%	0.77%
Finland	2015	76%	0.92%	0.75%
Finland	2014	74%	0.80%	0.78%
Finland	2013	70%	0.68%	0.75%
Finland	2012	67%	0.68%	0.73%
Finland	2011	68%	0.73%	0.79%
Finland	2010	66%	0.75%	0.81%
Finland	2008	64%	0.99%	0.98%
France	2016	61%	6.87%	8.25%
France	2015	66%	7.01%	8.58%
France	2014	58%	7.30%	8.92%
France	2013	47%	7.10%	9.08%
France	2012	49%	7.05%	9.34%
France	2011	59%	7.31%	9.53%
France	2010	58%	7.67%	9.45%
France	2009	46%	8.09%	10.13%
France	2008	60%	8.12%	9.56%
Greece	2016	28%	0.20%	0.42%
Greece	2015	19%	0.19%	0.39%
Greece	2014	29%	0.19%	0.43%
Greece	2013	21%	0.20%	0.43%
Greece	2012	16%	0.20%	0.43%
Greece	2011	21%	0.22%	0.48%
Greece	2010	23%	0.24%	0.62%
Greece	2009	55%	0.28%	0.82%
Hungary	2016	44%	2.60%	1.90%
Hungary	2015	73%	2.49%	1.82%
Hungary	2014	71%	2.40%	1.76%
Hungary	2013	61%	2.18%	1.60%
Hungary	2012	59%	2.04%	1.48%
Hungary	2011	69%	2.01%	1.48%
Hungary	2010	66%	2.07%	1.49%
Hungary	2008	62%	2.16%	1.76%
Ireland	2016	68%	1.25%	0.49%

Ireland	2015	71%	1.14%	0.49%
Ireland	2014	71%	0.97%	0.46%
Ireland	2013	59%	0.98%	0.50%
Ireland	2012	54%	1.12%	0.42%
Ireland	2011	53%	1.38%	0.41%
Ireland	2010	49%	1.74%	0.44%
Ireland	2009	49%	2.06%	0.46%
Ireland	2008	53%	2.03%	0.56%
Italy	2016	55%	5.40%	5.01%
Italy	2015	63%	5.14%	4.84%
Italy	2014	61%	5.31%	4.81%
Italy	2013	48%	5.25%	4.87%
Italy	2012	41%	5.31%	5.06%
Italy	2011	42%	5.32%	5.83%
Italy	2010	38%	5.42%	6.10%
Italy	2009	31%	5.89%	6.31%
Italy	2008	36%	5.56%	6.31%
Latvia	2016	35%	0.08%	0.14%
Latvia	2015	40%	0.07%	0.14%
Latvia	2014	46%	0.07%	0.13%
Latvia	2013	54%	0.07%	0.13%
Latvia	2012	50%	0.08%	0.13%
Latvia	2011	49%	0.07%	0.12%
Latvia	2009	44%	0.06%	0.11%
Latvia	2008	47%	0.06%	0.14%
Lithuania	2016	49%	0.18%	0.25%
Lithuania	2015	61%	0.18%	0.23%
Lithuania	2014	60%	0.18%	0.23%
Lithuania	2013	58%	0.20%	0.23%
Lithuania	2012	60%	0.20%	0.22%
Lithuania	2011	59%	0.19%	0.21%
Lithuania	2010	57%	0.18%	0.19%
Lithuania	2009	47%	0.17%	0.18%
Lithuania	2008	39%	0.15%	0.24%
Luxembourg	2016	65%	0.33%	0.44%
Luxembourg	2015	67%	0.34%	0.44%
Luxembourg	2014	65%	0.33%	0.47%

Luxembourg	2013	64%	0.33%	0.50%
Luxembourg	2012	57%	0.30%	0.51%
Luxembourg	2011	59%	0.33%	0.58%
Luxembourg	2010	57%	0.37%	0.60%
Luxembourg	2008	71%	0.42%	0.45%
Malta	2016	59%	0.04%	0.05%
Malta	2015	61%	0.03%	0.06%
Malta	2014	60%	0.04%	0.05%
Netherlands	2016	75%	8.72%	6.48%
Netherlands	2015	81%	9.22%	6.61%
Netherlands	2014	77%	9.61%	6.45%
Netherlands	2013	74%	9.92%	6.50%
Netherlands	2012	78%	9.49%	6.41%
Netherlands	2011	72%	9.05%	6.51%
Netherlands	2010	70%	8.54%	6.59%
Netherlands	2008	72%	7.99%	6.22%
Poland	2016	39%	4.85%	4.39%
Poland	2015	47%	4.69%	4.35%
Poland	2014	43%	4.34%	4.23%
Poland	2013	47%	4.03%	3.89%
Poland	2012	42%	3.66%	3.81%
Poland	2011	42%	3.58%	4.08%
Poland	2010	37%	3.53%	3.97%
Poland	2009	39%	3.39%	3.91%
Poland	2008	41%	3.19%	3.96%
Portugal	2016	49%	0.60%	0.67%
Portugal	2015	32%	0.58%	0.63%
Portugal	2014	41%	0.57%	0.63%
Portugal	2013	29%	0.57%	0.58%
Portugal	2012	25%	0.54%	0.56%
Portugal	2011	30%	0.52%	0.66%
Portugal	2010	30%	0.52%	0.82%
Portugal	2009	33%	0.53%	0.76%
Portugal	2008	23%	0.52%	0.82%
Romania	2016	58%	1.30%	1.14%
Romania	2015	63%	1.13%	1.02%

Romania	2014	58%	1.12%	0.95%
Romania	2013	57%	1.03%	0.88%
Romania	2012	52%	0.95%	0.83%
Romania	2011	57%	0.93%	0.82%
Romania	2010	55%	0.83%	0.77%
Romania	2009	48%	0.79%	0.83%
Slovakia	2016	29%	1.50%	1.07%
Slovakia	2015	51%	1.43%	1.02%
Slovakia	2014	56%	1.40%	1.00%
Slovakia	2013	53%	1.37%	0.97%
Slovakia	2012	43%	1.33%	0.94%
Slovakia	2011	53%	1.19%	0.97%
Slovakia	2010	47%	1.16%	0.92%
Slovenia	2016	43%	0.58%	0.40%
Slovenia	2015	57%	0.54%	0.38%
Slovenia	2014	60%	0.53%	0.36%
Slovenia	2013	52%	0.51%	0.37%
Slovenia	2012	57%	0.51%	0.35%
Slovenia	2011	58%	0.49%	0.37%
Slovenia	2009	62%	0.46%	0.39%
Spain	2016	54%	2.90%	3.32%
Spain	2015	50%	2.75%	3.23%
Spain	2014	44%	2.71%	3.09%
Spain	2013	31%	2.64%	2.87%
Spain	2012	42%	2.57%	2.83%
Spain	2011	58%	2.49%	3.27%
Spain	2010	50%	2.76%	3.58%
Spain	2009	36%	2.85%	3.88%
Spain	2008	37%	2.64%	4.35%
Sweden	2016	59%	1.50%	2.08%
Sweden	2015	55%	1.46%	1.92%
Sweden	2014	47%	1.53%	1.90%
Sweden	2013	38%	1.56%	1.89%
Sweden	2012	47%	1.52%	1.92%
Sweden	2011	34%	1.56%	2.07%
Sweden	2010	38%	1.64%	2.05%
Sweden	2009	40%	1.55%	1.97%

Sweden	2008	44%	1.71%	2.06%
United Kingdom	2016	64%	3.72%	7.02%
United Kingdom	2015	66%	4.02%	7.43%
United Kingdom	2014	64%	4.21%	7.02%
United Kingdom	2013	55%	4.41%	6.52%
United Kingdom	2012	56%	4.59%	6.46%
United Kingdom	2010	43%	4.79%	6.20%
United Kingdom	2009	41%	4.93%	6.58%
United Kingdom	2008	44%	5.37%	6.64%

APPENDIX EIGHT: *German Import and Export Partner Share with NATO*

State	Year	Approval	Import Share	Export Partner Share
Albania	2016	75%	0.01%	0.03%
Albania	2015	78%	0.01%	0.02%
Albania	2014	71%	0.01%	0.0142
Albania	2013	66%	0.01%	0.01%
Albania	2012	67%	0.01%	0.02%
Albania	2011	66%	0.01%	0.02%
Albania	2010	73%	0.00%	0.02%
Albania	2009	57%	0.01%	0.02%
Belgium	2016	69%	3.95%	3.41%
Belgium	2015	69%	3.87%	3.41%
Belgium	2014	69%	3.95%	3.72%
Belgium	2013	57%	4.08%	3.88%
Belgium	2012	30%	4.01%	3.99%
Belgium	2011	47%	4.10%	4.40%
Belgium	2010	28%	4.24%	4.84%
Belgium	2008	52%	4.31%	5.04%
Bulgaria	2016	45%	0.33%	0.29%
Bulgaria	2015	63%	0.30%	0.29%
Bulgaria	2014	64%	0.28%	0.29%
Bulgaria	2013	60%	0.31%	0.24%
Bulgaria	2012	48%	0.25%	0.24%
Bulgaria	2011	55%	0.23%	0.22%
Bulgaria	2010	54%	0.22%	0.23%
Bulgaria	2009	57%	0.21%	0.24%
Canada	2016	51%	0.41%	0.79%
Canada	2015	62%	0.39%	0.84%
Canada	2014	61%	0.40%	0.78%
Canada	2013	53%	0.46%	0.82%
Canada	2012	58%	0.47%	0.82%
Canada	2011	55%	0.56%	0.70%
Canada	2010	50%	0.50%	0.67%
Canada	2009	51%	0.47%	0.64%
Canada	2008	50%	0.45%	0.62%

Croatia	2016	52%	0.15%	0.25%
Croatia	2015	59%	0.13%	0.22%
Croatia	2014	63%	0.11%	0.20%
Croatia	2013	46%	0.10%	0.19%
Croatia	2012	41%	0.10%	0.20%
Croatia	2011	52%	0.09%	0.21%
Croatia	2010	56%	0.09%	0.21%
Croatia	2009	64%	0.10%	0.28%
Czech Republic	2016	36%	4.42%	3.19%
Czech Republic	2015	57%	4.11%	3.05%
Czech Republic	2014	53%	4.02%	2.97%
Czech Republic	2013	45%	3.69%	2.84%
Czech Republic	2012	51%	3.60%	2.85%
Czech Republic	2011	47%	3.64%	2.88%
Czech Republic	2010	50%	3.68%	2.81%
Czech Republic	2009	49%	3.70%	2.81%
Denmark	2016	77%	1.21%	1.52%
Denmark	2015	76%	1.24%	1.47%
Denmark	2014	70%	1.29%	1.49%
Denmark	2013	67%	1.29%	1.45%
Denmark	2012	58%	1.25%	1.36%
Denmark	2011	58%	1.35%	1.38%
Denmark	2010	63%	1.38%	1.48%
Denmark	2009	69%	1.55%	1.64%
Denmark	2008	64%	1.29%	1.59%
Estonia	2016	27%	0.06%	0.14%
Estonia	2015	47%	0.06%	0.13%
Estonia	2014	53%	0.06%	0.15%
Estonia	2013	63%	0.06%	0.15%
Estonia	2012	52%	0.05%	0.14%
Estonia	2011	53%	0.06%	0.14%
Estonia	2009	42%	0.06%	0.12%
Estonia	2008	46%	0.04%	0.15%
France	2016	61%	6.87%	8.25%
France	2015	66%	7.01%	8.58%
France	2014	58%	7.30%	8.92%

France	2013	47%	7.10%	9.08%
France	2012	49%	7.05%	9.34%
France	2011	59%	7.31%	9.53%
France	2010	58%	7.67%	9.45%
France	2009	46%	8.09%	10.13%
France	2008	60%	8.12%	9.56%
Greece	2016	28%	0.20%	0.42%
Greece	2015	19%	0.19%	0.39%
Greece	2014	29%	0.19%	0.43%
Greece	2013	21%	0.20%	0.43%
Greece	2012	16%	0.20%	0.43%
Greece	2011	21%	0.22%	0.48%
Greece	2010	23%	0.24%	0.62%
Greece	2009	55%	0.28%	0.82%
Hungary	2016	44%	2.60%	1.90%
Hungary	2015	73%	2.49%	1.82%
Hungary	2014	71%	2.40%	1.76%
Hungary	2013	61%	2.18%	1.60%
Hungary	2012	59%	2.04%	1.48%
Hungary	2011	69%	2.01%	1.48%
Hungary	2010	66%	2.07%	1.49%
Hungary	2008	62%	2.16%	1.76%
Iceland	2016	52%	0.05%	0.49%
Iceland	2015	51%	0.05%	0.49%
Iceland	2013	33%	0.06%	0.03%
Iceland	2012	29%	0.07%	0.03%
Iceland	2008	40%	0.07%	0.04%
Italy	2016	55%	5.40%	5.01%
Italy	2015	63%	5.14%	4.84%
Italy	2014	61%	5.31%	4.81%
Italy	2013	48%	5.25%	4.87%
Italy	2012	41%	5.31%	5.06%
Italy	2011	42%	5.32%	5.83%
Italy	2010	38%	5.42%	6.10%
Italy	2009	31%	5.89%	6.31%
Italy	2008	36%	5.56%	6.31%

Latvia	2016	35%	0.08%	0.14%
Latvia	2015	40%	0.07%	0.14%
Latvia	2014	46%	0.07%	0.13%
Latvia	2013	54%	0.07%	0.13%
Latvia	2012	50%	0.08%	0.13%
Latvia	2011	49%	0.07%	0.12%
Latvia	2009	44%	0.06%	0.11%
Latvia	2008	47%	0.06%	0.14%
Lithuania	2016	49%	0.18%	0.25%
Lithuania	2015	61%	0.18%	0.23%
Lithuania	2014	60%	0.18%	0.23%
Lithuania	2013	58%	0.20%	0.23%
Lithuania	2012	60%	0.20%	0.22%
Lithuania	2011	59%	0.19%	0.21%
Lithuania	2010	57%	0.18%	0.19%
Lithuania	2009	47%	0.17%	0.18%
Lithuania	2008	39%	0.15%	0.24%
Luxembourg	2016	65%	0.33%	0.44%
Luxembourg	2015	67%	0.34%	0.44%
Luxembourg	2014	65%	0.33%	0.47%
Luxembourg	2013	64%	0.33%	0.50%
Luxembourg	2012	57%	0.30%	0.51%
Luxembourg	2011	59%	0.33%	0.58%
Luxembourg	2010	57%	0.37%	0.60%
Luxembourg	2008	71%	0.42%	0.45%
Montenegro	2016	31%	0.00%	0.01%
Montenegro	2015	41%	0.00%	0.01%
Montenegro	2014	38%	0.00%	0.01%
Montenegro	2013	35%	0.00%	0.01%
Montenegro	2012	35%	0.00%	0.01%
Montenegro	2011	30%	0.00%	0.01%
Montenegro	2010	35%	0.00%	0.01%
Montenegro	2009	38%	0.00%	0.01%
Netherlands	2016	75%	8.72%	6.48%
Netherlands	2015	81%	9.22%	6.61%
Netherlands	2014	77%	9.61%	6.45%
Netherlands	2013	74%	9.92%	6.50%

Netherlands	2012	78%	9.49%	6.41%
Netherlands	2011	72%	9.05%	6.51%
Netherlands	2010	70%	8.54%	6.59%
Netherlands	2008	72%	7.99%	6.22%
Norway	2016	76%	1.31%	0.74%
Norway	2015	63%	1.70%	0.69%
Norway	2014	67%	1.95%	0.76%
Norway	2012	45%	2.40%	0.79%
Norway	2008	52%	1.41%	0.75%
Poland	2016	39%	4.85%	4.39%
Poland	2015	47%	4.69%	4.35%
Poland	2014	43%	4.34%	4.23%
Poland	2013	47%	4.03%	3.89%
Poland	2012	42%	3.66%	3.81%
Poland	2011	42%	3.58%	4.08%
Poland	2010	37%	3.53%	3.97%
Poland	2009	39%	3.39%	3.91%
Poland	2008	41%	3.19%	3.96%
Portugal	2016	49%	0.60%	0.67%
Portugal	2015	32%	0.58%	0.63%
Portugal	2014	41%	0.57%	0.63%
Portugal	2013	29%	0.57%	0.58%
Portugal	2012	25%	0.54%	0.56%
Portugal	2011	30%	0.52%	0.66%
Portugal	2010	30%	0.52%	0.82%
Portugal	2009	33%	0.53%	0.76%
Portugal	2008	23%	0.52%	0.82%
Romania	2016	58%	1.30%	1.14%
Romania	2015	63%	1.13%	1.02%
Romania	2014	58%	1.12%	0.95%
Romania	2013	57%	1.03%	0.88%
Romania	2012	52%	0.95%	0.83%
Romania	2011	57%	0.93%	0.82%
Romania	2010	55%	0.83%	0.77%
Romania	2009	48%	0.79%	0.83%
Slovakia	2016	29%	1.50%	1.07%

Slovakia	2015	51%	1.43%	1.02%
Slovakia	2014	56%	1.40%	1.00%
Slovakia	2013	53%	1.37%	0.97%
Slovakia	2012	43%	1.33%	0.94%
Slovakia	2011	53%	1.19%	0.97%
Slovakia	2010	47%	1.16%	0.92%
Slovenia	2016	43%	0.58%	0.40%
Slovenia	2015	57%	0.54%	0.38%
Slovenia	2014	60%	0.53%	0.36%
Slovenia	2013	52%	0.51%	0.37%
Slovenia	2012	57%	0.51%	0.35%
Slovenia	2011	58%	0.49%	0.37%
Slovenia	2009	62%	0.46%	0.39%
Spain	2016	54%	2.90%	3.32%
Spain	2015	50%	2.75%	3.23%
Spain	2014	44%	2.71%	3.09%
Spain	2013	31%	2.64%	2.87%
Spain	2012	42%	2.57%	2.83%
Spain	2011	58%	2.49%	3.27%
Spain	2010	50%	2.76%	3.58%
Spain	2009	36%	2.85%	3.88%
Spain	2008	37%	2.64%	4.35%
Turkey	2016	34%	1.60%	1.86%
Turkey	2015	36%	1.52%	1.87%
Turkey	2014	33%	1.47%	1.71%
Turkey	2013	24%	1.38%	2.00%
Turkey	2012	24%	1.34%	1.84%
Turkey	2011	24%	1.30%	1.90%
Turkey	2010	30%	1.23%	1.69%
Turkey	2009	24%	1.23%	1.43%
Turkey	2008	21%	1.17%	1.49%
United Kingdom	2016	64%	3.72%	7.02%
United Kingdom	2015	66%	4.02%	7.43%
United Kingdom	2014	64%	4.21%	7.02%
United Kingdom	2013	55%	4.41%	6.52%
United Kingdom	2012	56%	4.59%	6.46%
United Kingdom	2010	43%	4.79%	6.20%

United Kingdom	2009	41%	4.93%	6.58%
United Kingdom	2008	44%	5.37%	6.64%
United States of America	2016	39%	6.21%	8.85%
United States of America	2015	50%	6.47%	9.53%
United States of America	2014	45%	5.49%	8.53%
United States of America	2013	47%	5.61%	8.19%
United States of America	2011	48%	5.47%	6.95%
United States of America	2010	46%	5.59%	6.83%
United States of America	2009	43%	5.90%	6.65%
United States of America	2008	49%	5.51%	7.05%

State	Year	Approval of Germany	Import Share	Export Partner Share
Bangladesh	2016	31%	0.52%	0.07%
Bangladesh	2015	29%	0.49%	0.05%
Bangladesh	2014	22%	0.42%	0.05%
Bangladesh	2013	39%	0.40%	0.04%
Bangladesh	2012	22%	0.36%	0.04%
Bangladesh	2011	16%	0.34%	0.04%
Bangladesh	2010	23%	0.29%	0.05%
Bangladesh	2009	27%	0.29%	0.04%
Bangladesh	2008	21%	0.21%	0.02%
Belarus	2016	19%	0.05%	0.10%
Belarus	2015	18%	0.07%	0.11%
Belarus	2014	18%	0.06%	0.16%
Belarus	2013	29%	0.05%	0.21%
Belarus	2012	33%	0.09%	0.21%
Belarus	2011	34%	0.07%	0.21%
Belarus	2010	40%	0.06%	0.21%
Belarus	2009	39%	0.07%	0.20%
Belarus	2008	36%	0.06%	0.20%
India	2016	23%	0.81%	0.84%
India	2015	15%	0.81%	0.82%
India	2014	15%	0.79%	0.79%
India	2013	15%	0.79%	0.84%
India	2012	12%	0.79%	0.95%
India	2011	6%	0.84%	1.03%
India	2010	10%	0.77%	0.96%
India	2009	13%	0.76%	0.99%
India	2008	16%	0.64%	0.79%
Kazakhstan	2016	28%	0.30%	0.09%
Kazakhstan	2015	25%	0.30%	0.11%
Kazakhstan	2014	23%	0.49%	0.16%
Kazakhstan	2013	50%	0.51%	0.20%
Kazakhstan	2012	43%	0.45%	0.19%
Kazakhstan	2011	44%	0.49%	0.17%

Kazakhstan	2010	39%	0.48%	0.14%
Kazakhstan	2009	39%	0.34%	0.17%
Kazakhstan	2008	38%	0.53%	0.16%
Kyrgyzstan	2016	29%	0.00%	0.00%
Kyrgyzstan	2015	35%	0.00%	0.00%
Kyrgyzstan	2014	28%	0.00%	0.01%
Kyrgyzstan	2013	33%	0.00%	0.01%
Kyrgyzstan	2012	36%	0.00%	0.01%
Kyrgyzstan	2011	26%	0.00%	0.01%
Kyrgyzstan	2010	32%	0.00%	0.00%
Kyrgyzstan	2009	32%	0.00%	0.01%
Kyrgyzstan	2008	40%	0.00%	0.01%
Russia	2016	6%	2.78%	1.76%
Russia	2015	7%	3.18%	1.86%
Russia	2014	12%	4.22%	2.66%
Russia	2013	29%	4.64%	3.36%
Russia	2012	29%	4.73%	3.56%
Russia	2011	32%	4.44%	3.32%
Russia	2010	36%	3.95%	2.75%
Russia	2009	35%	3.71%	2.54%
Russia	2008	42%	3.08%	3.20%
Tajikistan	2016	41%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2015	50%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2014	39%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2013	48%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2012	53%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2011	48%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2010	47%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2009	40%	0.00%	0.00%
Tajikistan	2008	41%	0.00%	0.00%
Ukraine	2016	33%	0.19%	0.32%
Ukraine	2015	42%	0.18%	0.27%
Ukraine	2014	41%	0.18%	0.33%
Ukraine	2013	44%	0.18%	0.52%
Ukraine	2012	46%	0.16%	0.55%
Ukraine	2011	52%	0.21%	0.51%
Ukraine	2010	47%	0.20%	0.46%

Ukraine	2009	39%	0.18%	0.44%
Ukraine	2008	43%	0.20%	0.64%

APPENDIX NINE: Approval of Germany in the European Union, NATO, and Outside States Measured 2006-2017

State	Year	Approve		State	Year	Approve
European Union	2006	39%		Other States	2017	28%
European Union	2007	48%		Other States	2016	26%
European Union	2008	46%		Other States	2015	28%
European Union	2009	42%		Other States	2014	25%
European Union	2010	47%		Other States	2013	36%
European Union	2011	51%		Other States	2012	34%
European Union	2012	47%		Other States	2011	32%
European Union	2013	49%		Other States	2010	34%
European Union	2014	57%		Other States	2009	33%
European Union	2015	60%		Other States	2008	35%
European Union	2016	55%		Other States	2007	41%
European Union	2017	56%		Other States	2006	36%

State	Year	Approve
NATO	2006	46%
NATO	2007	51%
NATO	2008	45%
NATO	2009	41%
NATO	2010	45%
NATO	2011	48%
NATO	2012	45%
NATO	2013	46%
NATO	2014	51%
NATO	2015	54%
NATO	2016	47%
NATO	2017	51%