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dc.contributor.advisorBuras, Todd
dc.contributor.authorSandridge, Shannon
dc.date.accessioned2017-05-25T00:19:27Z
dc.date.available2017-05-25T00:19:27Z
dc.date.copyright2017-05-05
dc.date.issued2017-05-24
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/10022
dc.description.abstractCan we give an account of free will in terms of the same kind of causal relations that govern all other interactions? I claim we cannot. In what follows, I outline the strongest account of free will of this kind. I then argue that this account does not successfully provide the sort of control our theory needs to account for free human actions.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsBaylor University projects are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.titleHow to be a Libertarianen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide accessen_US
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity Scholars.en_US
dc.contributor.schoolsUniversity Scholars.en_US


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