Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorBuras, Todd
dc.contributor.authorFastenau, Conner
dc.contributor.otherBaylor University.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-29T13:35:22Z
dc.date.available2020-05-29T13:35:22Z
dc.date.copyright2020-05-04
dc.date.issued2020-05-29
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2104/10946
dc.description.abstractAn epistemological issue garnering increasingly more interest is the relation between the doxastic taxonomies of traditional and formal epistemology, and especially the relation between rational, outright belief and credence. Proposed solutions to this issue fall into one of three classes, viz. eliminativism, non-reductionism, and reductionism. In this thesis, I introduce and subsequently defend my own variation of the traditional reductionist view, which I call the Vague Reduction. To do so, I consider a score of eliminativist and non-reductionist objections to reductionism, and argue that they all fail; the upshot is that eliminativism is deemed untenable, non-reductionism unfounded, and traditional reductionist views implausible. In turn, I suggest that the Vague Reduction naturally recommends itself as an attractive and viable theory governing the relation between rational belief and credence.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsBaylor University projects are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.titleBelief and Credence: A Defense of the Vague Reductionen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide accessen_US
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity Scholar.en_US
dc.contributor.schoolsuniversity scholaren_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record