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    The conscious mind unified.

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    RICKABAUGH-DISSERTATION-2020.pdf (2.678Mb)
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    Date
    2020-07-30
    Author
    Rickabaugh, Brandon, 1976-
    0000-0002-8484-2381
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    Abstract
    The current state of consciousness research is at an impasse. Neuroscience faces a variety of recalcitrant problems regarding the neurobiological binding together of states of consciousness. Philosophy faces the combination problem, that of holistically unifying phenomenal consciousness. In response, I argue that these problems all result from a naturalistic assumption that subjects of consciousness are built up out of distinct physical parts. I begin by developing a Husserlian mereology of part-whole relations, which I apply to both an ontology of the holistic unity of the subjects of consciousness and the holistic unity of phenomenal consciousness itself. After a detailed analysis of the ontology and neuroscience of phenomenally unified consciousness, I argue against the three major naturalist views: physicalism, Russellian panpsychism, and emergentism. I develop various arguments demonstrating that these views each fail to account for the possibility of subjects of phenomenally unified consciousness. In the final chapter, I show how these arguments entail that the subject of phenomenal unity must be partless, must be a simple holistic unity. In turn, this provides a defense of substance dualism or at least something near enough. Given the widespread rejection of mind-body dualism, I answer certain neurological objections and conclude by sketching the details of an underexplored neo-Aristotelian form of substance dualism. I conclude that each of us, indeed every subject of phenomenally unified consciousness, is not made up of distinct parts. Not a brain. Not a body. Every embodied subject of phenomenally unified consciousness is a bodily soul.
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    https://hdl.handle.net/2104/11139
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    Copyright © Baylor® University All rights reserved. Legal Disclosures.
    Baylor University Waco, Texas 76798 1-800-BAYLOR-U
    Baylor University Libraries | One Bear Place #97148 | Waco, TX 76798-7148 | 254.710.2112 | Contact: libraryquestions@baylor.edu
    If you find any errors in content, please contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
    Contact Us | Send Feedback
    TDL
    Theme by 
    Atmire NV