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dc.contributor.advisorStegemoller, Michael
dc.contributor.authorWalton, Katherine
dc.contributor.otherBaylor University.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-20T19:01:28Z
dc.date.available2022-05-20T19:01:28Z
dc.date.copyright2022-05-03
dc.date.issued2022-05-20
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2104/11891
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the complex phenomena of corporate virtue signaling, tracing it through the roots of Aristotelian virtue and evolution during the growth of utility theory, increased focus on economic wealth, and conflicting views on the purpose of a corporation. As virtue signaling becomes a staple in corporate publicity, the phenomenon warrants examination of if it is truly virtuous, aligns with corporate objectives, and fosters social benefits. Corporate virtue signaling lacks essential requirements of true virtue, but on a case-by-case basis signaling can provide, or fail to provide, useful benefits to corporations and society. While a consistent and intentional corporate signaling strategy is most likely to be successful, the private and public gains associated with corporate virtue signaling are not guaranteed. Signaling is a double-edged sword able to harm both companies and the public through poorly executed campaigns. The increased focus on stakeholder objectives may point to stakeholder theory itself being a virtue signal that can insulate executives from claims of mismanagement, increasing their ability to serve themselves rather than stakeholders and shareholders. Additionally, the analysis of virtue compared to the corporate signaling trend prompts the consideration of what people can and should expect from corporations.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsBaylor University projects are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.subjectCorporate Virtue Signalingen_US
dc.titleCorporate Virtue Signaling: The Devolution of Virtue into Signalingen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide accessen_US
dc.contributor.departmentBusiness Fellows.en_US


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