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dc.contributor.advisorBuras, Todd
dc.contributor.authorAveritt, Autumn S.
dc.contributor.otherBaylor University.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-02T18:56:59Z
dc.date.available2014-06-02T18:56:59Z
dc.date.copyright2014-04-30
dc.date.issued2014-06-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/9028
dc.description.abstractIn the discipline of philosophy today, the nature of consciousness is an extremely popular topic. Additionally, there is a general consensus on the truth of naturalism. This thesis investigates whether a naturalist conception of consciousness is tenable. The zombie argument against the naturalist program is very striking, as it clearly delineates the apparent differences between the phenomenal and psychological concepts of the mind. This thesis explores the naturalist program and the nature of consciousness. It then outlines the zombie argument and evaluates naturalist responses to the argument. It concludes that the strongest naturalist response still falls short of defeating the zombie argument. Naturalism therefore fails to adequately account for consciousness.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsBaylor University projects are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of Mind.en_US
dc.subjectConsciousness.en_US
dc.subjectThe Zombie Argument.en_US
dc.subjectNaturalism.en_US
dc.titleThe Zombie Argument and Its Implications for Naturalismen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide accessen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophy.en_US
dc.contributor.schoolshonors collegeen_US


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