A Sexual Revolution in the Court: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Morally Based Sexual Laws
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In the United States, the standards of acceptable sexual conduct are continually evolving. Socially, a shift has occurred towards accepting actions that, at other points in time, were considered grievous sexual deviancies. Similarly, the Supreme Court since McLaughlin v. Florida has gradually acknowledged not only a definite right to privacy, but a right to choose whether to bear children, whom to marry, and what sexual intimacies to engage in. Through the line of these cases, beginning with McLaughlin and including such cases as Loving v. Virginia, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and particularly Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court undergoes a sexual revolution, setting the stage for the acknowledgement of further sexual rights. In light of these cases, and particularly in light of Lawrence v. Texas, the laws regarding cohabitation, adultery, and fornication can no longer be considered sound legal statutes. These laws are, in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, unconstitutional and when and if they arrive before the Supreme Court, if principles follow they will be declared as such, or else repealed by the states in which they were enacted in favor or more progressive stances towards the changing social environment surrounding sexual relationships and intimacy within the home.