Fine-Tuning in Light of Multiverse Confirmation




Buras, Benjamin

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Fine-tuning for life is extraordinarily unlikely given random chance but substantially more likely given the existence of a God. The fine-tuning argument framed in Bayesian probability, claims that because fine-tuning for life is more likely given the existence of God, the existence of God receives relative confirmation over atheism. The multiverse theory decreases the strength of the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God by explaining the unlikely evidence of fine-tuning. Hacking (1987) and White (2000) responded to the multiverse objection by claiming that confirmation for the multiverse theory was an inverse gambler’s fallacy. Isaacs, Hawthorne, and Russell (2022) respond to Hacking and White and offer a compelling argument that fine-tuning for life provides relative confirmation for a multiverse given any standard method for updating priors on self-locating evidence. In this paper, I show that fine-tuning still provides relative confirmation for theism over single universe atheism. Furthermore, I show that under at least one of the leading theories of self-locating epistemology, fine- tuning in multiple universe atheism also confirms a massive sprawling multiverse that introduces skeptical concerns for atheism.