

ABSTRACT

Religion, Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, and Attitudes toward Democracy:
An Evaluation of a Changing Europe

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Currently, Europe struggles to negotiate the challenges of a changing society and its historical commitment to liberal values. Nativist backlashes against mostly Muslim immigrants challenge the European project's dedication to equality, democracy, secularism, and the free movement of peoples. This has only been exacerbated by refugee crises bringing in larger numbers of Muslim immigrants. In the first study of this dissertation, I challenge common assessments of anti-democratic politics in Europe, which largely attribute democratic-deconsolidation to a rise in far-right, populist movements. In this perspective, nativism is relevant to anti-democratic sentiment, but only as a secondary factor accompanying the populist far-right. I ask whether or not hostilities towards immigrants are a primary political contributor to an increasing proportion of Europeans rejecting democratic politics. I find that opposition to immigrants is a stronger predictor of anti-democratic sentiment than far-right affiliation and populist views. In the second study of this dissertation, I investigate the role of religion in attitudes toward refugees in the context of secularization. I find that

marginalized religious groups offer the highest amounts of support for admitting refugees, while there are mixed results in terms of differences between Christians and the unaffiliated. This study contributes to research on religion and charity towards strangers by framing this relationship within the contexts of policy and social change. This research also reveals how religious moral communities condition attitudes towards government policies on refugees. The final study in my dissertation asks how religion affects attitudes toward democracy. I engage classical sociological theory and its framing of Protestantism's contributions to democratic consolidation in the United States. I test and find support for this theoretical framework in a contemporary and more pluralistic environment. I also find in Tocqueville a justification for considering pluralism and pro-immigrant sentiment to be critical contributors in the positive relationship between Protestantism and democracy. I find that Protestants are uniquely pro-democratic in their political philosophy and that Protestant national cultures are associated with citizens, including non-Protestants, being pro-democratic in their political philosophy. I find that Protestants who embrace nativist views are uniquely anti-democratic in their outlook. Overall, my dissertation research is centered around questions of how individuals and communities build peaceful and just societies. Classical sociological theory laid the foundations for answering these questions through the study of democracy in the early United States. My research speaks to its persisting explanatory power in new regional and historic contexts. This research also contributes to contemporary sociological theories that speak to political movements, religion, social change, and characteristics of community, all of which have the power to contribute to both flourishing and pluralistic democracies and authoritarian regimes built on prejudice.

Religion, Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, and Attitudes toward Democracy:
An Evaluation of a Changing Europe

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A Dissertation

Approved by the Department of Sociology

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

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Accepted by the Graduate School
May 2019

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like thank Paul D. Froese, Jerry Z. Park, Christopher Pieper, Chuck North, and Charles M. Tolbert for serving on my dissertation committee. I am also grateful for the methodological support offered by Matthew Andersson, Michael Lochspeich, and Xiuhua Wang. Thank you to my wife, Siyin Vaughan, for her endless emotional support and the confidence she has placed in me.

DEDICATION

To my wife, Siyin
In honor of her pride in now living in a democratically-governed nation

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The European project has been one committed to the free movement of people, multiculturalism, equality, and democracy. Today, we see all these commitments being challenged, and at times, at odds with each other. The limits of the free movement of people and multiculturalism have been reached, according to many Europeans (Alexander 2013; Carrera 2005; Fukuyama 2006; Huysman 2000; Karp, Banducci, and Bowler 2003; Kymlicka 2000). Limits on the cultural contributions of new immigrants are now being enforced. States and publics have become increasingly likely to support restricting the admittance of new immigrants and regulating their religious practices. These restrictions are often applied unequally by targeting specific groups, and populations are becoming more open to electing authoritarian leaders and parties to enforce these restrictions (Body-Gendrot 2007; Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017; Pew Research Center 2010, 2018). In this series of studies, broadly, I ask (1) how do citizens of liberal-democracies come to reject liberal-democracy as a form of governance? (2) What is the relationship between nativism and anti-democratic sentiment? And (3) what roles do religion play in these critical moments of large-scale social change?

While European nations have experienced such transitions before, one trigger for these events in their contemporary context has been several waves of refugee crises. Warfare and destabilization of Middle Eastern and African nations have introduced large numbers of mostly Muslim refugees and other migrants into European nations, leading to

anxieties within Europe (Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2017; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). The free movement of people no longer simply means allowing white neighbors from allied nations to come work in a state under a shared governing body (the European Union). Increasingly, the free movement of people includes non-white migrants of religious minority statuses. If multiculturalism is to persist, it is now required to expand beyond the confines of historically Christian societies and celebrated secular progress. In sum, old challenges of equality are exacerbated as they now apply to populations that are growing racially, ethnically, and religiously heterogenous.

As with previous moments in Europe's history, a new immigrant population has triggered a hostile response. This has led to an increase in new far-right politics and some populist movements that are openly hostile to migrants and religious minorities (Alexander 2013; Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheepers 2004). Far-right politicians and political parties have made strides by campaigning against Muslims and immigrants. In other cases, far-right politicians and parties lose political capital, but only as mainstream political parties adopt their anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim positions (Coenders et al. 2008; Rooduijn 2014; Van Praag 2003). For example, in the Netherlands, the far-right List Pim Fortuyn party had grown increasingly popular and saw electoral successes as a result of this. While the popularity of the List Pim Fortuyn party ultimately decreased, a new government appropriated the party's far-right positions (Coenders et al 2008. Van Praag 2003). In France, Marine Le Pen and her National Front party have experience some increase in popularity, but not to the extent of controlling the French government. However, positions embraced by the far-right, such as regulating the religious

expressions of Muslims, have been integrated into mainstream politics (Body-Gendrot 2007; Mayer 2013).

These political changes are linked to a crisis of democracy. Many of the new far-right parties and leaders advocate for illiberal policies and appeal to authoritarian rhetoric. Concurrently, even outside of the far-right, an increasing proportion of Europeans report that they no longer believe it is important to live in a country that is governed democratically (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017). Others may claim democratic political commitments but ultimately promote a version of democracy that is defensive, illiberal, and authoritarian (Watts and Feldman 2001). Nativism and democratic deconsolidation has also resulted in policy changes. For example, targeted legislation has been enacted in several parts of Europe in order to regulate Islamic dress and religious practice (Body-Gendrot 2007; Mayer 2013; Pew Research Center 2010, 2018).

The unfolding story of anti-democratic politics and nativism point to the importance of religion, yet the religious factor remains understudied. The European project was initially committed to the free movement of peoples. This changed when the religious composition of migrants changed. It stands to reason that religion is partially responsible for shaping attitudes towards immigrants. Scholars understand that the nature of hostilities towards refugees are religious. In this line of research, the focus tends to be on the religion of the refugees (Ribberink et al. 2017; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). However, migrants seeking asylum are generally not the source of hostilities. Rather, hostilities generally arise from the host populations receiving these refugees. As Europe secularizes and experiences religious change, it is not

immediately clear which religious communities, if any, will have an affinity toward the needy and which will foment hostilities towards newcomers.

Religion is also important for understanding democracy and social change. Alexis de Tocqueville (1956) argued for the critical role religion, particularly Protestantism, played in ensuring that the United States was founded as a liberal-democracy.

Tocqueville argued that religious doctrines helped to shape a political theology that was conducive to liberal-democracy. Religious civic-associations helped to create a social climate that was conducive to liberal-democratic nation-building. Woodberry's (2012) groundbreaking research found that the presence of conversionary Protestants was critical in the establishment of subsequent liberal-democracies throughout the world. This body of research, however, focused on Protestantism in the era of democratic consolidation. This era was characterized by large numbers of people enthusiastically being converted to and striving for democracy. Currently, scholars are concerned over citizens of many of the same liberal-democracies now growing in discontent with democracy in what is a potential era of democratic deconsolidation (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017). The role of Protestantism, or religion in general, remains understudied in this area.

In this dissertation, I investigate anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe and changes in attitudes towards European democracies, while exploring the understudied religious factors. I investigate the intersection between nativism, anti-democratic sentiment, and religion. My research helps to identify sources of nativism and compassion towards immigrants. It also sheds light on nativism as a critical mechanism for fueling anti-democratic sentiment. Finally, I focus on the continuing role of Protestantism in maintaining contemporary democratic values and the potential for nativism to erode this.

This research makes several contributions to scholarly literatures and to society. First, by identifying sources of anti-democratic sentiment, I identify a key predictor of the erosion of democratic governments (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). Second, by identifying sources of nativism, I shed light on a key motivator for opposing democratic governance. This research contributes to sociological theory by testing the potential for classical sociological theories of American society to persist in new geographic and historic contexts. I also challenge important claims of secularization theory and research on religion and charitable choices (Bennet and Einolf 2018; Bruce 2002; Inglehart 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Lubbers, Coenders, and Scheepers 2006; Martin 1978; Pipes and Ebaugh 2002). My research utilizing contextual measures contributes to the scholarly understanding of how religious moral communities (Stark, Kent, and Doyle 1982) and national contexts shape values and political decisions.

The first empirical chapter of my dissertation investigates sources of opposition to democracy in contemporary Europe. I integrate parallel literatures in sociology, political science, social-psychology, and social-philosophy on what makes for a flourishing democracy. I find that in this body of literature, the far-right and populist movements are often treated as one, and it is argued that these are primary catalysts for anti-democratic social change. Nativism is treated as a latent factor in these movements. I do not argue that populism and the far-right are not efficient mechanisms for authoritarian politics, as the record is fairly clear on this matter. However, I differ from the dominant narrative by arguing for the unique role of nativism, independent of any populist movements and the far-right, in predicting anti and illiberal-democratic sentiment. Empirically, I find that opposition to immigrants and immigration are strong predictors of not wanting to live in a

democratically governed nation and of illiberal and defensive interpretations of democracy, even when controlling for far-right affiliation and populist political views.

The second empirical chapter of this dissertation addresses gaps in these literatures on the religious factor. Specifically, I investigate the role of religious identities and religious communities and opposition towards refugees. Contextualized within the current refugee crises facing European nations, I ask how religious identity is tied to affinity towards new immigrant groups, as indicated by policy preferences. While previous research predicts that religious people would be more charitable toward the vulnerable when compared to the religious unaffiliated (Bennett and Einolf 2017; Bruce 2006; Pipes and Ebaugh 2002; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Ruiter and De Graaf 2004), I find that that this relationship does not hold in the current political climate. Only religious adherents of religions common among new immigrant groups are consistently more supportive of their governments admitting refugees into their nations when compared to the unaffiliated. However, at the community-level, religious service attendance is positively associated with support for admitting refugees, while secularization is negatively associated with support for admitting refugees.

The third and final chapter of my dissertation integrates the sociological study of religion, approaches to democracy, and opposition to immigration. I revisit Tocqueville's (1956) arguments for the primacy of Protestant religiosity in the foundations of U.S. democracy. I also find in Tocqueville a justification for tolerance towards immigrants as a necessary condition for a flourishing democracy. I connect these ideas to contemporary research and test them within the context of contemporary Europe. Specifically, I investigate if Protestantism is still an important factor in predicting support for

democracy and establishing pro-democratic societies. I also ask how tolerance towards immigrants condition Protestants' attitudes toward democracy. Finally, I test if Protestants are more opposed to democracy when they make up a larger share of a national population, and thus have a stronger potential for establishing a religious monopoly. I find support of Tocqueville's thesis in contemporary Europe. European Protestants remain more positive in their evaluations of democratic governance when compared to other religious groups and the unaffiliated. Higher national rates of Protestantism are associated is positively associated with evaluations toward democracy as well, including among individual Protestants. However, Protestants are increasingly skeptical of democracy at higher rates of hostilities towards immigrants.

This research illustrates that democracy is worthy of continued study by sociologists. While much of the research on democracy is conducted by political scientists and scholars of international relations, I find that classical and contemporary sociological theory are directly relevant to our conceptualization of democracy. Further, theories in the sociology of religion, social capital, political sociology, and the sociology of race and ethnicity have predictive power in studying democracy. As Weber, Tocqueville, and many other classical sociological theorists observed, religion has the power the power to shape individual value systems as they relate to major social institutions. These values systems can become pervasive at the community or national-level and persist, as institutions often do. Further, democracies flourish in open, tolerant, and pluralistic societies. Democracy thrives when people of diverse backgrounds, including national backgrounds, are able to contribute. Pro-social norms and attempts at bridging social capital between groups of different national origins are healthy for

democratic consolidation. Attempts at dominating groups, or creating social stratification, are inextricably tied to authoritarianism and democratic deconsolidation.

CHAPTER TWO

Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and Attitudes toward Democracy in Europe

Introduction

A major challenge of the contemporary European project has been to provide an equal, liberal-democratic experience for the populations of several nations that are growing increasingly pluralistic. These include the rights of electoral participation and the free movement of people of different racial, ethnic, and national backgrounds. Nativist backlashes and an increase in far-right politics have placed strain on Europeans' commitment to providing liberal-democratic privileges to an increasingly diversifying populace (Carrera 2005; Fukuyama 2006; Huysman 2000; Karp et al. 2003). Democracies require citizens with pro-democratic values in order to function. In recent years, there has been a rise in anti-democratic views in multiple European nations. These trends are present in multiple European regions and in nations that vary considerably in their government structures, levels of pluralism, and histories with immigration. For example, less than half of respondents in Great Britain and the Netherlands born in the 1970s or later responded that it is essential to live in a democratically governed nation. Sweden and Poland also experienced a similar decline in democratic confidence (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). Foa and Mounk (2017:7) observe a global rise in citizens reporting that they would like to have strong leaders who do not "have to bother with elections" in established liberal democracies. They also argue that increasing dissatisfaction with

democracies is important to understand, as these trends often precede democratic deconsolidation.

Anti-democratic views include not considering it important to live in a nation that is democratically governed and believing that democratic governance is a poor way to run a nation. Similarly, some citizens want to maintain democracy, but in an illiberal and defensive form (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017; Watts and Feldman 2001). Illiberal-democrats believe in having a government that is democratically oriented in its foundations, but that also limits certain freedoms usually deemed necessary for democracy (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Mudde 2007; Rooduijn 2014; Watts and Feldman 2001). This includes the right to vote for certain, typically marginalized populations, restrictions on free speech, and restrictions on citizenship.

Concurrently, significant segments of European society have been engaged in a nativist backlash against multiculturalism (Alexander 2013; Kymlicka 2000). Nativism is “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007:19). A strong trend in this backlash moves against immigrants from the Muslim-majority world. This has led to citizens pushing for illiberal policies imposing assimilation onto minority populations and placing restrictions on new immigrants. Most Europeans reported that they believed their nations had peaked in terms of acceptable limits of ethnic and cultural diversity (Alexander 2013:543; Coenders, et al. 2004:3). Nearly half of the respondents supported limiting the civil rights of immigrants. Restrictions on civil liberties were supported for immigrants who had arrived legally and illegally. Additionally, one third of

respondents supported the repatriation of immigrants. This is an important development, as civil rights are critical to the health of a democracy. These recent developments suggest that opposition to immigration and immigrants may predict the future erosion of liberal-democratic policies.

The relationship between opposition to immigration and opposition to liberal-democratic governance is not, however, taken for granted. Native-born citizens of a nation may support the curtailing of immigrants' rights out of a desire to protect liberal-democracy, if the immigrants in question are perceived as anti-democratic. This is particularly relevant with immigrants from Muslim majority countries, who may be stereotyped as theocratic or loyal to foreign authoritarian regimes. Some scholarship anticipates a positive or neutral relationship between strict impositions on immigration and liberal-democratic orientation. The modern nation-states, which have provided a foundation for liberal-democratic regimes, often emerged out of nationalist movements and social cohesion built, in part, around ethnic solidarity (Hobsbawm 1990; Langewiesche 2000; Smith 1986; Wehler 2004 in Hjerm and Schnabel 2012). Limiting heterogeneity through immigration policies is said to contribute to democratic and redistributive stability (Canovan 1996; Miller 1995, 2016; Tamir 1993). Abizadeh (2002) observes that arguments along these lines have become increasingly respectable in scholarship. Further, civilizational theorists, such as Huntington and Fukayama, expect that immigrants may bring in illiberal, anti-democratic values into liberal-democracies, and impose these ideals onto them through voting. Restrictions on these immigrants may be imposed in order to protect democracy (Huntington 1997; Fukuyama 2006; Gundelach 2010).

Much of the research on the place of immigration in liberal-democracies focuses on national-level factors. For example, Kymlicka's (2000, 2003) socio-cultural theoretic framework argues for a positive relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and illiberalism, but at the national-cultural level. As societies increase in their opposition to immigrants, nativists will decrease the size of the public sphere in which rights for immigrants are guaranteed. This inherently makes a larger portion of the society less democratic. Other research, also at the national level, argues for a relationship between anti-immigrant policy and illiberal-democratic political outcomes (Abizadeh 2008, 2010; Carens 1989; Heller and Evans 2010). Some research makes the connection between hostilities toward immigrants and democratic deconsolidation by proxy through the study of far-right, populist movements (Foa and Mounk 2017; Muller 2014; Rooduijn 2014). However, Akkerman (2003) warns against this, arguing that populism is not necessarily concerned with immigration or multiculturalism. This makes the study of populism an inadequate proxy for studying the effects of nativism in politics.

Because illiberal and anti-immigrant democratic regimes are often elected by popular vote, more opinion research needs to be done. Watts and Feldman find evidence that Japanese nativists are more illiberal in their political philosophy, but leave open a call for further, cross-national research to determine whether nativists are "a different kind of democrat" (Watts and Feldman 2001). My research addresses this call for further research. In this study, I test the relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and immigration and illiberal-democratic sentiment. I begin this paper by explaining important empirical contributions that have been made to lay a groundwork for my approach to this topic and offer hypotheses for testing. Using data from the 2012 sixth

wave of European Social Survey, I then investigate the relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and immigration and attitudes toward democracy. I first ask if negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are associated with illiberal-democratic political orientations. Second, I ask if negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are associated with a decreased evaluation of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation. I find that negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are consistently associated with a stronger illiberal-democratic political orientation and lower evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed country. The study of democracy and what makes it work is a topic that has been foundational to sociology and political science and continues to be investigated by top scholars today (Abizadeh 2010; Hall 2002; Hunter 2017; Kymlicka 2003; Tocqueville 1956; Woodberry 2012). I continue this project by investigating how citizens arrive at political worldviews that have been linked to democratic deconsolidation.

Review of Literature

Structure and Policy

Currently, much of the research on the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and liberal-democratic consolidation focuses on structure and policy. Notable research finds that societies that are open to immigration may be more likely to engage in bridging and problem solving activities that create the kind of social capital necessary for upholding liberal-democratic structures (Putnam 2002; Putnam, Leonardi, and Narnetti 1994). However, if mass immigration is met with nativist hostilities and high levels of

distrust, this may inhibit the development of social capital and thus be harmful toward democratic consolidation (Hall 2002:32).

Tilly measures democracy by the “character of citizenship” or the relationship between subjects and a regime. The breadth of the democracy is expanded by being inclusive, with the standard being that nobody is excluded (Heller and Evans 2010). Abizadeh expands this standard to those governed by immigration and border policies, which includes immigrants and potential immigrants. For a liberal-democracy to truly protect popular sovereignty, all effected by its laws must be given a right to political participation in the creation of these laws. These include non-citizens who are affected by immigration and border policies (Abizadeh 2008, 2010). Carens (1989) argues that liberal criteria for citizenship are inherent to democracies. After a period of time, nations should minimally allow workers, residents, and the children of foreigners to the rights of citizenship. Carens states “if one moves beyond the passage of time as a requirement for citizenship, one risks imposing demands on new citizens that old ones could not meet and defining the meaning of citizenship in terms of the social and cultural characteristics of the dominant majority. Any such approach threatens to conflict with fundamental liberal democratic principles” (1989:42). This increases the “democratic ideals of participation and consent” and “the liberal ideas of toleration and respect for diversity” at the national level (Carens 1989:35). Restrictions on citizenship and national membership, on the other hand, decrease democratic consolidation by limiting participation and ruling against the consent of potential citizens and members.

Populist Movements

Other scholars have paid considerable attention to the concurrent rise of anti-immigrant sentiment and illiberal-democratic politics, though not in direct relationship to each other. Currently, many scholars treat both phenomenon as a result of populist movements, which are often far-right in their political orientation. As populists seek to challenge the establishment, elevating the common citizen over political elites, the social construction of the common citizen often involves some redefining. This redefinition excludes immigrants and other minorities. The authoritarian power of the majority is taken advantage of to oppose democratic pluralism, which requires majority and minority group members to reconcile differences and reach compromise through democratic channels (Rooduijn 2014; Muller 2014; Foa and Mounk 2017). Through factor analyses, Rooduijn (2014) has provided support for this position by identifying a consistent “populist radical right” (2014:80) attitude within the Netherlands. This ideology brings together populism, nativism, and authoritarianism.

Akkerman (2003), however, argues that this conceptualization of populism is too narrow. Populist movements, Akkerman argues, range from progressive to far-right and are not inherently concerned with immigration or multiculturalism. Anti-immigration policies do not explain the electoral successes of populist parties and that these sentiments are not at all unique to them. Populists will often challenge informal consensus between established parties and promote popular agendas. Akkerman refers to this as “good work for democracy” (2003:157).

Liberal-Democratic Culture

Kymlicka's theory of liberal democracy (2003) emphasizes the socio-cultural environment that is important for liberal democracies to thrive. In his theory of liberal-democratic nation building, Kymlicka argues that national and other minorities should all be able to equally participate in national politics in the cultural and political sphere. Liberal-democratic theory is said to leave no room for discriminatory treatment in regard to citizenship privileges and human rights. Kymlicka states "the evidence in the West strongly suggests...that democratic stability can only be achieved by recognizing, not suppressing, minority national identities" (Kymlicka 2000:190). The suppression of minorities into assimilation is inherently "unfair" and leads to oppressive policies, which are anti-democratic in nature (Kymlicka 2000:191). Likewise, Hunter (2017) argues that nativism, among other factors, contributes to the degeneration of the liberal-democratic culture of the United States.

Kymlicka argues that a liberal-democratic society should be supported by a "thin" culture that embraces immigrants into their society and political structures. In these situations, immigrants and other minorities should not be burdened with new customs and lifestyles as a requirement for immigrating or being integrated into the national culture. This is consistent with Kymlicka's explicit rejection of illiberal, non-democratic, coercive attempts to force immigrants into a narrow conceptualization of assimilation. Illiberal democracies are also more prone to penalizing or disadvantaging immigrants who do not assimilate in a fashion desired by the dominant national group. Thus, in a liberal democracy, national minorities are allowed and encouraged to maintain their own senses of identity, without losing any societal or political benefits. Similarly, Alexander (2013)

argues that the cultural structures of western democracies need to be broadened to be inclusive of immigrants as well as their qualities. “Only by making itself multicultural” Alexander argues, “can Europe preserve its democratic values in the globalizing world that it confronts today (2013: 547).

In general, liberal democracies favor protections for freedom of speech and mobilization. The illiberal, far-right, populist movement has been more authoritarian in nature and more welcoming of restrictions on the freedom of speech and political mobilization, particularly when it is deemed as threatening to the dominant national group (Kymlicka 2000). For liberal-democrats, the speech and political mobilization of national minorities should be protected. Likewise, Hunter (2017) argues that a democratic culture is strengthened by celebrating a public sphere where people from various backgrounds can present and contest each other’s claims. This is undermined when the speech of immigrants is restricted.

Anti-Immigrant and Illiberal-Democratic Attitudes

Fewer studies have paid attention to the significance of public opinion towards immigrants and the ideas about democracy. This should not be neglected, as the political structures and policies of a liberal democracy are often informed by popular vote (Tocqueville 1956). Early research posited that there were authoritarian personality types that were associated with prejudices towards minorities and anti-democratic attitudes (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998). Watts and Feldman (2001) argue that nativists are a “different kind of democrat.” This type of nativist often has some ideas that are consistent with democracy but are not likely to see democracy as suitable in a pluralist context. For these nativists, democratic nations and their benefits

are only for members of the native in-group. Defensive, illiberal democracies are formed in order to protect a democratic state from threatening outsiders. In limiting access to democratic benefits to foreigners, this necessarily makes parts of the public sphere and government less democratic. This approach to democracy decreases the degree to which one can be universalistic in their application of democratic benefits. Steps toward authoritarianism are deemed necessary to establish and maintain order (Mudde 2007; Rooduijn 2014).

Counter-Arguments

It is worth noting that sociologists and political scientists do not agree on treating openness to immigrants and immigration and democratic-liberalism as synonymous. Abizadeh observes that arguments for liberal-democracies only functioning within limited, culturally exclusive terms “has gained a conspicuous respectability recently” (2002:495). Mouffe (2000) claims that a democratic conception of equality requires an understanding of an in-group covered by democratic principles as well as mechanisms for exclusion. For Walzer (1983), democracies maintain their national character and self-determination by maintaining a unilateral right to border closures.

Others have argued that a strong, national identity contributes to democratic stability (Canovan 1996; Miller 1995, 2016; Tamir 1993). Such a national identity may include a specific national culture in a territorially defined space which they utilize for their own purposes. Along with this comes “rights of jurisdiction,” as Miller (2016:448) proposes. Miller further offers that citizens may utilize these rights to build an environment that functions as “an important repository of culture” (2016:448). Supporters then preserve this repository by exercising their rights over immigration and

limiting the cultural contributions immigrants may introduce (Miller 2005, 2016). For the immigrants that are allowed, Miller proposes “it is also a subject for democratic deliberation to which immigrants once they are citizens are fully entitled to contribute” to a nation’s national religious and cultural character (2016:450).

For many, “heterogeneity is often seen as a threat to the existence of liberal Western democracies because it challenges the consensus on—and the legitimacy of—its basic institutions and its redistributive instruments” (Hjerm and Schnabel 2012:346). A real or perceived identification with the community of a nation-state provides mechanisms for uniting under culture, institutional frameworks, or political practices, including those of liberal-democratic regimes (Anderson 1983; Hjerm and Schnabel 2012). Homogeneity is argued by some to increase this sense of unity, which in turn leads to increased feelings of acceptance toward a democratic government. Thus, participants in a liberal democracy need to be concerned about threats to heterogeneity caused by migration. Further, the modern nation-states, which provide for democratic regimes, are argued to have emerged out of homogenous and nationalistic movements (Hobsbawm 1990; Langewiesche 2000; Smith 1986; Wehler 2004 in Hjerm and Schnabel 2012).

Hypotheses

In sum, many scholars argue that at the structural and cultural levels, anti-immigration sentiment is inconsistent with liberal-democratic theory by being discriminatory and exclusionary. Likewise focusing on culture and structure, others dissent and argue that limiting immigration helps to preserve a common culture, on which democracy can thrive. Those who wish to impose limitations on immigration often do so to protect their democracy. These studies have focused on the relationship between anti-

immigrant policies and democratization at the national-level. Because these policies are often implemented by popular demand, I hypothesize that the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and democratization should hold at the individual level. To test these positions of liberal-democratic theory at the individual-level, I hypothesize:

H1: Negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are associated with significantly lower scores on a liberal-democracy index.

H2: Negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are associated with decreased desire to live in a democratically governed nation.

Methods

Data

Data on respondents' political beliefs are obtained from the sixth wave (2012) of the European Social Survey (ESS-6). The ESS-6 is unique in its documentation of democratic political philosophy and attitudes towards immigrants among 54,673 respondents aged 15 and over in 29 nations throughout Europe and Israel. Israel is removed from the final analyses in order to focus on developments on Europe. This leaves a final N of 52,165. Respondents are asked how important they believe it is to live in a democracy, as well as what they believe are essential characteristics of a democratically governed country. Questions about democracy in the ESS-6 uniquely address several key points of liberal-democratic theory. The ESS-6 also contains a battery of questions investigating attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (ESS Round 6: European Social Survey 2016; European Social Survey 2013; European Social Survey Round 6 Data 2012). Upon request from the ESS, all analyses utilize a combined population size and design weight.

Political party information was gathered from two sources. The ESS-6 surveys which political party respondents feel closest to. To harmonize political party affiliation across Europe, I utilize the 1994-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES 1994-2014). The CHES 1999-2014 dataset identifies political parties in 28 European nations (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017). Political parties are harmonized into 11 categories, including radical right, conservative, liberal, Christian-democratic, socialist, radical left, green, regionalist, no family, confessional, and agrarian/center. Information on political parties is also provided in a document provided by the ESS (European Social Survey 2012).

Measurements

Dependent variables. For my first set of analyses testing H1, I estimate respondents' scores on a liberal-democracy index. Potential items for the index were identified by consulting previous literature, which provides a theoretical foundation for the characteristics citizens should expect from a liberal-democracy and tests these expectations empirically (Kymlicka 2000; Gibson 1996, 1998; Watts and Feldman 2001). Items probing for tolerance of political, national, religious and other outgroup members, freedom of speech, equal treatment for all citizens, a wide net for democratic inclusion, and anti-authoritarian policies were all included for factor analyses.

The liberal-democracy index is composed of several variables asking how important traits are for democratically governed societies (0 = not at all important for democracy in general to 10 = extremely important for democracy in general). These variables include, (1) national elections are free and fair, (2) opposition parties are free to

criticize the government, (3) the media are free to criticize the government, (4) the rights of minority groups are protected, (5) the courts are able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority, (6) the courts treat everyone the same, (7) the government explains its decisions to voters, and (8) governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job. The result is a liberal-democracy scale ranging from 0 to 80. Each of the factor loadings scored higher than .66 (Table 1). The alpha reliability coefficient for the liberal-democracy index is .865. This provides empirical justification for moving forward with the theoretically formed liberal-democracy index.

To test H2, I rely on a dependent variable asking respondents how important it is that they live in a democratically governed country. Responses range from 0 = not at all important to 10 = extremely important.

Table 1.
Factor Loadings for the Liberal-Democracy Index

Variables	Factor Loading
National elections should be free and fair	.737
Opposition parties should be free to criticize the government	.740
The media should be free to criticize the government	.714
The rights of minority groups should be protected	.678
The courts should be able to stop the government from acting beyond its authority	.734
The courts should treat everyone the same	.771
The government should explain its decisions to voters	.746
Governing parties should be punished in elections when they have done a bad job	.660
Alpha reliability coefficient	.865

Independent variables. Two key independent variables are utilized in this study. The first is an index of attitudes towards immigration and the second is an index of attitudes toward immigrants. The alpha reliability coefficient for the first index is .885,

with all the factor loadings scoring above .874 (Table 2). Three questions in the index probe at respondents' willingness to accept new immigrants into their countries. They are asked if (1) their nations should allow many or few immigrants of different races and ethnic groups from the majority to immigrate, (2) if their nations should allow many or fewer immigrants of the same race and ethnicity as the majority to immigrate, and (3) if their nations should allow more or fewer immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe to immigrate. The responses for each of these are 1 = allow many to come and live here, 2 = allow some, 3 = allow a few, and 4 = allow none.

Table 2.
Factor Loadings for Index of Anti-Immigration Sentiment

Variables	Factor Loading
Nation should allow many or few immigrants of different racial and ethnic groups	.935
Nation should allow many or few immigrants of the same racial and ethnic group	.895
Nation should allow many or few immigrants from poorer nations outside of Europe	.874
Alpha reliability coefficient	.885

Table 3 presents factor loadings on the index measuring attitudes towards the immigrants themselves. First, respondents are asked if immigrants are bad or good for the economy (0 = good for the economy to 10 = bad for the economy). Next, respondents are asked if their country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants (0 = cultural life enriched to 10 = cultural life undermined). Finally, respondents are asked if immigrants make their nation a worse or better place to live (0 = better place to live to 10 = worse place to live). All factor loadings scored higher than .868. The alpha reliability coefficient is .859.

Table 3.
Factor Loadings for Index of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

Variables	Factor Loading
Immigrants undermine the culture	.887
Immigrants make the country a worse place	.896
Immigrants are bad for the economy	.868
Alpha reliability coefficient	.859

Covariates. I control for standard demographic factors in all models. Age ranges from 15 to 103. Gender is accounted for in a female dichotomous variable where male = 0 and female = 1. I control for education with the European Survey version of the ISCED (EISCED). This measure harmonizes over a dozen categories from the EDULVLB index into seven categories, where 1 = less than lower secondary education, 2 = lower secondary education, 3 = lower-tier upper-secondary education, 4 = upper-tier upper-secondary education, 5 = advanced vocational education with a sub-degree, 6 = lower-tertiary education at the BA level, and 7 = higher-tertiary education at the MA level or higher. I control for annual household income, which accounts for respondents' total net income coming from all sources. Respondents are placed into one of ten decile income groups. Finally, I include dichotomous variables for minorities and respondents who were born outside of their countries. A system of dichotomous variables was also created to create country fixed-effects.

Other controls are put in place to control for marginalization, which previous research indicates is associated with attitudes toward democracy (Mitchell 2010). I include a dichotomous variable asking if respondents have ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months. I also include a dichotomous variable for being a member of a group discriminated against in the respondent's country.

A final set of control variables are put in place to avoid conflating attitudes towards immigrants and immigration and broader political movements (Akkerman 2003; Foa and Mounk 2017; Muller 2014; Rooduijn 2014). First, I harmonize political party identification to a dichotomous variable measuring affiliation with a far or extreme-right political party. To control for populist and anti-globalism attitudes, I control for attitudes toward the European Union and politicians in general. Respondents were asked if European unification needed to go further or has gone too far (0 = needs to go further to 10 = unification has already gone too far). Finally, I include a measure of political distrust, asking respondents to what extent they trust politicians (0 = complete trust to 10 = no trust at all).

Analytic Strategy. All analyses for hypotheses testing utilize ordinary least squares linear regression models. To test H1, I utilize the liberal-democracy index as the dependent variable. Model 1 includes basic demographic variables. Models 2-3 include the immigration attitudes and anti-immigrant attitudes indexes separately. Model 4 includes the immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes indexes concurrently. Model 5 includes control variables to test for the effects of marginalization, which previous research indicates may be associated with attitudes toward immigration and democracy. Finally, Model 6 includes political covariates, to ensure that the observed relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and attitudes toward democracy are not detecting broader political movements by proxy. To test H2, I repeat these steps

with attitudes toward living in a democratically governed nation as the dependent variable. All models utilize country fixed effects.¹

Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study. The mean score on the liberal-democracy index is 68.794, making the sample more liberal-democratically oriented than illiberal. The average response for wanting to live in a democratically governed country is 8.068, making this a strong sentiment among the sample. The average score on the immigration index was more favorable than unfavorable (4.108). The sample averaged slightly toward a negative view of immigrants (15.270). The average respondent is female, about 47 years old, and has an upper-tier upper-secondary education. Average income falls between the fifth and sixth decile of society. About 31 per cent of respondents report having ever been unemployed while looking for work for a period of more than three months. Being a minority (.081) and foreign birth (.085) were rare. About 31 percent of respondents reported employment. Reporting membership in a discriminated group was rare (.067). Feeling closest to a far or extreme-right wing political party was rare, with approximately 3 per cent of respondents reporting feeling closest to such a political party. A slight majority of respondents believed that integration into the European Union could go further (4.745). Distrust for politicians was high (7.017).

¹ Multiple imputation models were run to correct for missing data (Rubin 1996). However, the findings of the study were not substantively altered. Therefore, the original models are presented.

Table 4.
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample (Weighted)

Variables	N	Mean	Std	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Democracy Index	46743	68.794	11.569	0	80
Importance of living in a democratically-governed nation	50921	8.068	2.425	0	10
<i>Key Independent Variables</i>					
Anti-immigration sentiment	48858	4.108	2.583	0	9
Anti-immigrant sentiment	47258	15.270	7.174	0	30
<i>Demographics</i>					
Age	52050	46.836	18.982	15	103
Female	52148	.549	.517	0	1
EISCED	51839	4.003	1.978	1	7
Household Income	42312	5.514	2.890	1	10
Minority	51534	.081	.283	0	1
Born Outside the Country	52139	.085	.289	0	1
<i>Marginalization</i>					
Unemployment	51823	.311	.480	0	1
Discriminated Against	51490	.067	.259	0	1
<i>Political Controls</i>					
Far-right affiliation	52165	.030	.177	0	1
EU integration has gone too far	46542	4.745	2.832	0	10
Distrust Politicians	51079	7.017	2.441	0	10

Liberal-Democratic Attitudes

Table 5 presents OLS regression models, which utilize the liberal-democracy index as the dependent variable. Model 1 regresses demographic variables on the liberal-democracy index. Increased age ($\beta = .088, p < .001$), education ($\beta = .168, p < .001$), and annual household income ($\beta = .071, p < .001$) were all associated with increased scores on the liberal-democracy index. Females ($\beta = -.053, p < .001$) and foreign-born ($\beta = -.007, p < .001$) respondents scored lower than males on the index, while minorities scored higher. Models 2-4 test H1 by including the immigration and immigrant attitudes indexes. H1 is supported. In Model 2, the immigration attitudes index is negatively associated with the liberal-democracy index ($\beta = -.125, p < .001$) and is the second strongest variable in the model. Model 3 reveals similar findings for negative attitudes toward immigrants, which is also negatively associated with the liberal-democracy index ($\beta = -.128, p < .001$). This is, again, the second strongest effect in the model. Model 4 includes both the immigration and immigrant attitudes indexes. Unsurprisingly, including these related items together notably reduces the coefficients for both. Education ($\beta = .136, p < .001$) and age ($\beta = .098, p < .001$) are the strongest effects in the model, followed by restrictive immigration attitudes ($\beta = -.082, p < .001$) and anti-immigrant sentiment ($\beta = -.080, p < .001$). Model 5 includes variables to estimate the effects of marginalization. Experiencing unemployment ($\beta = .041, p < .001$) and discrimination ($\beta = .042, p < .001$) are both positively associated with the liberal-democracy index. The changes to the beta coefficients for restrictive immigration attitudes ($\beta = -.080, p < .001$) and anti-immigrant sentiment ($\beta = -.082, p < .001$) are marginal.

Table 5.
OLS Regression Models Estimating Liberal-Democratic Attitudes

Independent Variables	M1			M2			M3			M4			M5			M6								
	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>					
Intercept	70.100	0.807	***	72.545	.809	***	73.088	.812	***	73.561	.814	***	72.836	.814	***	70.126	.834	***						
Demographic Variables																								
Age	0.053	.003	***	.088	.059	.003	***	.098	.056	.003	***	.093	.059	.003	***	.098	.063	.003	***	.105	.064	.003	***	.106
Female	-1.11	.111	***	-.053	-1.110	.111	***	-.053	-1.078	.110	***	-.051	-1.091	.110	***	-.052	-1.074	.110	***	-.051	-1.007	.110	***	-.048
Education	0.935	.034	***	.168	.807	.034	***	.145	.782	.034	***	.140	.757	.034	***	.136	.747	.034	***	.134	.750	.034	***	.135
Household Income, All Sources	0.263	.022	***	.071	.231	.022	***	.062	.230	.022	***	.062	.221	.022	***	.060	.253	.022	***	.068	.256	.022	***	.069
Minority	0.874	.234	***	.021	.678	.233	**	.017	.665	.233	**	.016	.628	.232	**	.015	.341	.234	***	.008	.422	.232	***	.010
Foreign Born	-0.27	.209	***	-.007	-.470	.207	**	-.012	-.627	.208	**	-.017	-.624	.207	**	-.016	-.733	.207	***	-.019	-.701	.207	***	-.018
Key Independent Variables																								
Restrictive Immigration Attitudes					-.550	.025	***	-.125					-.358	.030	***	-.082	-.350	.030	***	-.080	-.336	.030	***	-.076
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment									-.200	.009	***	-.128	-.125	.011	***	-.080	-.129	.011	***	-.082	-.158	.012	***	-.101
Marginalization																								
Unemployed																.926	.121	***	.041	.813	.121	***	.036	
Discriminated Against																1.753	.221	***	.042	1.506	.221	***	.036	
Political Variables																								
Far-Right																					.983	.313	**	.017
EU Integration has Gone too Far																					-.061	.023	**	-.016
Distrust Politicians																					.384	.027	***	.085
R-Square	.098			.112			.111			.115			.119			.125								
N	32629			32629			32629			32629			32629			32629					32629			

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Source: European Social Survey, 2012 Wave 6; All Data Weighted

Notes: Country fixed-effects included

Model 6 is the full model and includes political controls, to ensure that the anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment are not simply detecting broader political movements by proxy. Far-right affiliation ($\beta = .017, p < .01$) and political distrust ($\beta = .085, p < .001$) are associated with higher scores on the liberal-democracy index while opposition to EU integration ($\beta = -.016, p < .01$) is associated with lower scores on the liberal-democracy index. Anti-immigrant sentiment ($\beta = -.101, p < .001$) has a stronger effect on the liberal-democracy index than any of the other political variables, and the effect of restrictive immigration attitudes ($\beta = -.076, p < .001$) is stronger than far-right political affiliation and opposition to EU integration.

Desire to Live in a Democracy

Table 6 presents results from OLS regression models estimating evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation. Model 1 includes demographic characteristics. Increased age, education, and income are all positively associated with evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation. Women, minorities, and foreign-born respondents all offer higher evaluations when compared to men, majority-group members, and native-born respondents, respectively. Model 2 includes the anti-immigration index, which is negatively associated with evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation. This is the second strongest effect ($\beta = -.119, p < .001$) in the model, following education ($\beta = .142, p < .001$). Model 3 includes the anti-immigrant attitudes index, which is also negatively associated with evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation. This is the strongest effect in the model ($\beta = -.187, p < .001$). Model 4 includes both the restrictive immigration ($\beta = -.021, p < .001$) and anti-immigrant ($\beta = -.173, p < .001$) attitude indexes simultaneously, along with the demographic controls. The anti-immigrant sentiment is still the strongest effect in the model. Model 5 adds unemployment and

discrimination experiences to control for experiences of marginalization. Unemployment ($\beta = -.022, p < .001$) is negatively associated with evaluations of the importance of living in a democracy, while unemployment is insignificantly associated with attitudes toward democracy. Anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment maintain their negative relationship, and anti-immigrant sentiment is still the strongest effect in the model ($\beta = -.173, p < .001$). Model 6 is the full model. Model 6 includes several political variables to ensure that the relationship between opposition to democracy and immigrants is not simply detecting developments in broader political movements. Far-right political affiliation is associated with slightly elevated evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation ($\beta = .027, p < .01$), while opposition to EU integration ($\beta = -.053, p < .01$) and political distrust ($\beta = -.064, p < .001$) are negatively associated with wanting to live in a democratically governed nation. Anti-immigration ($\beta = -.022, p < .001$) and anti-immigrant ($\beta = -.142, p < .001$) attitudes are still negatively associated with attitudes toward democracy, and anti-immigrant sentiment is still the strongest effect in the model.

Discussion

This paper makes multiple contributions to sociology and political science. The findings can be summarized in four primary conclusions. First, negative attitudes toward immigrants are associated with having an illiberal worldview in terms of the nature of democracy. Second, being less open to immigration is associated with an illiberal-democratic worldview. Third, negative attitudes towards immigrants are associated with a devaluation of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation. Finally, being unwelcoming to the arrival of immigrants is also associated with lower evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed society.

Table 6.
OLS Regression Models Estimating Evaluations of the Importance of Living in a Democracy

Independent Variables	M1				M2				M3				M4				M5				M6			
	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>	<i>b</i>	Standard Error	P	Std. <i>b</i>
Intercept	7.572	.160	***		8.061	.160	***		8.478	.160	***		8.507	.160	***		8.580	.160	***		9.028		***	
Demographic Variables																								
Age	.011	.0006	***	.084	.012	.0006	***	.093	.012	.0006	***	.092	.012	.0006	***	.094	.011	.0006	***	.091	.011		***	.089
Female	.029	.022		.007	.029	.022		.007	.041	.021		.009	.040	.021		.009	.038	.021		.009	.033		***	.008
Education	.191	.007	***	.164	.166	.007	***	.142	.145	.007	***	.124	.143	.007	***	.123	.143	.007	***	.123	.141		***	.121
Household Income, All Sources	.076	.004	***	.097	.069	.004	***	.089	.065	.004	***	.083	.065	.004	***	.083	.062	.004	***	.079	.060		***	.077
Minority	.301	.046	***	.034	.264	.045	***	.030	.229	.045	***	.026	.227	.045	***	.026	.241	.045	***	.028	.214		***	.025
Foreign Born	.096	.041	***	.012	.056	.040		.007	-.013	.040		-.002	-.013	.040		-.002	-.006	.040		-.0008	.00003		***	.000004
Key Independent Variables																								
Restrictive Immigration Attitudes					-.109	.005	***	-.119					-.021	.006	***	-.023	-.022	.006	***	-.024	-.020		***	-.022
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment									-.061	.002	***	-.187	-.057	.002	***	-.173	-.057	.002	***	-.173	-.047		***	-.142
Marginalization																								
Unemployed																	-.105	.024	***	-.022	-.085		***	-.018
Discriminated Against																	-.060	.043		-.007	-.014		***	-.002
Political Variables																								
Far-Right																					.330		***	.027
EU Integration has Gone too Far																					-.044		***	-.053
Distrust Politicians																					-.060		***	-.064
R-Square	.179				.191				.207				.207				.208				.215			
N	33947				33947				33947				33947				33947				33947			

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05

Source: European Social Survey, 2012 Wave 6; All Data Weighted

Notes: Country fixed-effects included

This research addresses a problem highlighted in political science (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). Scholars observed that some populations are beginning to express preferences toward autocratic leadership and a lack of desire to live in a democratically-governed nation. This has alarmed some political scientists, as such devaluations often preceded transitions from liberal-democratic governance to illiberal, autocratic, forms of governance. While at the national-structural level, much had been said about the incompatibility between nativist policies and democratic nation-building, little had been definitively said as to why some people were less likely to value democratic governance than others. This study demonstrates that part of this change is attributable to nativism. Negative attitudes toward immigrants and restrictive attitudes toward immigration are associated with devaluing the importance of living in a democracy. This is consistent with previous research, arguing that nativists can draw on authoritarian power to keep outsiders out and give outsiders no venue for challenging their discrimination (Kymlicka 2000; Mudde 2007; Watts and Feldman 2001).

My research also provides evidence that the anti-democratic effects of nativism are not simply a byproduct of larger political movements. It is well known that much of the far-right is populist, nativist, and anti-democratic (Fielding 1981; Mudde 2007; Rooduijn 2014; Szócs 1998). This has led to the conflation of opposition toward immigration and immigrants with larger far-right and populist movements and the neglect of their own anti-democratic effects. However, my analyses of the ESS-6 data reveal that anti-immigrant sentiment consistently predicts illiberal and anti-democratic political sentiment. In fact, anti-immigrant sentiment is a stronger predictor of an illiberal approach to democracy than any of the indicators of populism,

anti-globalism, and far-right affiliation. Opposition to immigrants and immigration are stronger predictors of not wanting to live in a democratically governed nation than any of the other political variables.

This research also addresses theoretical tensions in the conceptualization of what makes citizens democratically oriented. Previous research suggested that citizens may support a system of government properly called democratic, while still preferring a nativist or “defensive” interpretation of it. Watts and Feldman (2001) propose that nativism and democracy may be compatible, but only in a defensive and illiberal form. This is supported by findings that nativists in Japan have a favorable view of a defensive form of democracy but not an open, tolerant, and universalistic approach of democracy. My study contributes to this discussion by evaluating the relationship between nativism and illiberal-democracy as well as nativism and democracy in general. My findings do not support Watts and Feldman’s proposition that democracy may be important to nativists, albeit with a “defensive” caveat. This study finds that nativism is associated with support for illiberal-democracy. Moreover, when citizens are asked about democracy in general, nativism is also associated with a decreased commitment.

Future scholarship should track the progress of anti-immigrant sentiment in global politics. There is some evidence that this specific wave of anti-immigrant politics has spread to the United States. While nativism has always been present in the US, the most recent presidential election had cross-national elements. Donald Trump identified with the European exit movement in the UK and nativist critics of Angela Merkel who accused her of hurting Germany through pro-immigration policies. Further, the Trump campaign helped introduce the UK Independence Party’s former leader, Nigel Farage,

into US political commentary. Future scholarship should investigate potential international origins of the Trump phenomena.

CHAPTER THREE

Religion and Secularization: Individual and Regional-Level Explanations for Restrictive Refugee Policy Preferences

Introduction

In the face of several recent waves of immigration triggered by multiple refugee crises, the European project now struggles to meet its previous, deeply held commitments to pluralism, equality, and the free movement of peoples (Carrera 2005; Fukuyama 2006; Huysmans 2000; Karp et al. 2003). However, following an influx of Muslim refugees, European public support for immigration, immigrant populations, and democracy is in decline (Alexander 2013:543; Coenders et al. 2004:3; Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012; Ribberink et al. 2017). Consequences of these developments include the erosion of liberal-democratic policies, political successes for authoritarian political parties, and violent discrimination (Alexander 2003; Forti and Pittau 1998; Semyonov, Rajzman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Traditionally, at the political-level, far-right, nationalist, and certain types of populist groups have been most closely tied to anti-immigrant sentiment (Foa and Mounk 2017; Muller 2014; Rooduijn 2014). France's National Front and the Netherland's List Pim Fortuyn advanced anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies into the mainstream (Body-Gendrot 2007; Coenders et al. 2008; Mayer 2013; Van Praag 2003). Europe's far-right has celebrated a Swiss referendum aimed at halting mass immigration (Abu-Hayyeh, Murray, and Fekete 2014). Austria, Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Poland, and Hungary have also seen far-

right electoral gains in recent years (Halikiopoulou 2018; Hanley and Vachudova 2018; Pirro and Rona 2018).

Religion at the national-level may also shape how Europeans view refugees, by enforcing charitable or hostile norms through religious moral communities (Stark et al. 1982). In the past, religiosity at the community-level has been associated with personal altruism towards strangers and refugees (Bennett and Einolf 2017; Scheepers et al. 2006). Increased rates of charitability and altruism, including towards strangers, may lead religious adherents to have warmer attitudes to this particular population of immigrants. In some cases, faith-based organizations cooperate with governments to assist in refugee resettlement (Bruce 2006; Pipes and Ebaugh 2002). And because current waves of immigrants include large refugee populations fleeing wars beyond their control, faith communities may be more likely to see them as a “deserving poor” population (Katz 1986).

Yet, when Europeans think of new immigrants, Muslims are the first people that come to mind (Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012; Ribberink et al. 2017). If this is the case, then secular cultures and governments may provide the most welcoming scenario for new immigrants and refugees. Secularization decreases the presence of religion in the public sphere, eroding its overall cultural, social and political relevancy. In turn, conflict will likely not occur over what “doesn’t matter” to a population (Machacek 2003:152). Consequently, secularization may naturally increase interreligious tolerance and decrease in interreligious conflict (Bruce 2002; Casanova 2004; Emerson and Hartman 2006; Inglehart 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Penninx 2006; Ribberink et al. 2017). Still, stereotypes of Muslims being illiberal and intolerant

may lead the religiously unaffiliated to see Muslims as a threat to the secularization project (Akkerman 2005; Casanova 2004; de Koster et al. 2014; Ribberink et al. 2017). In this case, secularization would decrease the likelihood that a population embraces Muslim newcomers.

My study addresses these issues in a number of ways. Utilizing new data from the European Social Survey, I am able to analyze attitudes toward a specific group of refugees in the specific historical moment in question. By addressing religion at the individual and national level, I am able to test which communities are most welcoming to new refugees. In this study, I ask (1) do the charitable norms associated with religiosity translate in to immigration policy preferences? And (2) does the secularization process introduce tolerant and pluralistic norms into a society, leading to generous policy preferences toward Muslim refugees?

At the individual-level, I find that with the exception of Catholics, Christians and the unaffiliated are mostly similar in their policy preferences regarding the admittance of refugees. Catholics and Jews are more supportive of restrictive refugee policies when compared to the religiously unaffiliated. Members of newer immigrant religious groups, specifically Muslims and adherents of Eastern religions, are less likely to call for restrictions on the admittance of refugees into their respective nations. At the regional-level, secularization is associated with higher preferences for restrictive refugee policies, while religious service attendance is associated with more generous policy preferences.

This study addresses the intersection of political sociology and the sociology of religion by asking how individual religious affiliations and religiosity at the community-level influence political decision making. This study also helps to decenter the sociology

of religion from the United States, while addressing critical issues in European social change (Bender et al. 2012). Beyond its academic contributions, this research is helpful for the integration of refugees into new societies. Societal tolerance shown towards refugees is critical in predicting successful assimilation (Hook et al. 2007). By identifying the types of communities that are the most receptive to refugees, activists and social workers are better equipped to choose settlement locations for refugees.

Review of Literature

Historical Context

Anxieties about European immigration has been a salient social problem for several decades. Approximately 3.4 million people sought refuge in Europe between 1985 and 1994, leading to calls for immigration and asylum law reform (Forti and Pittau 1998). Anti-foreigner sentiment rose significantly between 1988 and 2000, with a particularly steep increase between 1988 and 1994 (Semyonov et al. 2006). Currently, facing increased rates of immigration again, many Europeans report that their societal limits on multiculturalism have been reached (Alexander 2013:543; Coenders et al. 2004:3).

The current discussion of refugees in Europe is framed around the war on terror, the Arab Spring, and other contemporary events involving Muslims. This study is conducted within the context of largescale immigration of Muslims, a religious minority, into European nations. New immigrants come from predominately Muslim backgrounds in several European nations, and most Europeans think of Muslims when they think of immigrants (Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012; Ribberink et al.

2017). As refugees come to Europe from Muslim-majority nations experiencing political turmoil, anxieties about high rates of Muslim immigration have inspired new far-right and populist political victories. Following these developments, political parties and charismatic leaders have risen to prominence campaigning on nativism, against targeted religions and multiculturalism, and for an autocratic enforcement of these policies. Policies rooted in nativism, “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” are encouraged to be implemented unilaterally. (Mudde 2007:19). This campaigning is often done explicitly, without the use of dog-whistles or other coded language. In the Netherlands, for example, the List Pim Fortuyn party saw significant electoral gains campaigning on such messages. After declining in popularity, their far-right, nativist, and Islamophobic sentiment were appropriated by a new right-wing government (Coenders et al. 2008; Van Praag 2003). Similarly, in France, the far-right leader Marine Le Pen has risen in prominence, and her National Front party has seen electoral gains as well. While they did not take over the government, a far-right shift can be seen in mainstream politics to accommodate their ideals. For example, the French government has imposed headscarf bans predominately targeting Muslim women (Body-Gendrot 2007; Mayer 2013).

Sources of Compassion and Tolerance

In a study of attitudes towards asylum seekers in the Netherlands, Lubbers et al. (2006) found that church attenders had more generous attitudes toward asylum seekers than non-attenders. This is often attributed the “good Samaritan” lessons that exist culturally among them (Einolf 2011; Lubbers et al. 2006; Wuthnow 1991). This leads to

“human compassion” among frequent church attenders (Lubbers et al. 2006: 251). Spontaneous actions to welcome asylum seekers are often led by religious adherents, which is attributed to religious teachings on caring for “othered” groups. These “norms of altruism” (Bennett and Einolf 2017:327) are observed among various religious populations in cross-national research. In other research, religiosity is associated with higher rates of volunteer work (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Ruiter and De Graaf 2004). This includes volunteering for secular organizations, suggesting that self or group interest is less likely to be the primary motivator. This spillover effect was strongest for Catholics, suggesting that religious identities may be responsible, rather than a general religious effect. National devoutness was associated with increased likelihood of volunteer work, even for the non-religious.

For many religious adherents, religious doctrine is explicitly understood to be the source of all objective morality and must be acted upon as a part of one’s religious conviction. This provides a rare “deductive cultural logic” (Swidler 2001:187-190) to govern values and norms. Generosity and care for the stranger are encoded in an objective moral standard. According to the religious adherent’s cultural logic, it follows that in order to be a good person, tolerance and charitability must follow. Einolf (2011) finds that religious motivations for voluntary behaviors and attitudes are often explicitly rooted in the adherent’s affiliation as a primary identity. For example, Christian respondents believe that compassion and love across boundaries is an inherent character trait of the Christian identity.

Religion at the national-level also encourages altruistic norms among the general population, including the non-religious. When religious affiliation and commitment is

normative, a “moral community” is formed (Stark et al. 1982). The expressions of this religiosity is then more likely to become pervasive throughout daily life within the community, including among those who do not share in the majority religious affiliation or practice (Stark 1996). Further, in these nations, non-religious people are more likely to have religious people in their networks. As previous research indicates “religious people are more likely to volunteer, to tell their nonreligious friends and colleagues about volunteer opportunities, and to invite them to participate” (Bennett and Einolf 2017:326-327; Ruiter and de Graaf 2006; Kelley and de Graaf 1997). These communities and the networks within are able to provide and enforce conformity to dominant norms (Hoffman and Bahr 2006; Rivera, Lauger, and Cretacci 2018). An emerging, yet limited body of literature describes a competition between charitable actors, as religious firms seek to present their services as a higher quality product (Bennett 2015; Borgonovi 2008; Wiepking, Bekkers, and Osili 2014). However, it remains unclear if the encouraged voluntary and charitable activity extend to the religious out-groups, and if so, how far.

Other scholars see religious tolerance as a function of secularization.

Summarizing research on the United States, Gorski and Altinordu (2008) state “scholars of American religion and politics widely agree that pluralism, secularism, and democracy go hand-in-hand” (Hecl et al. 2007). When secularization occurs, religion is relegated to the private sphere, where it cannot dominate over religious minorities and create conflicts based on church-state relations (Luckman 1967). Greater tolerance is then shown to religious minorities in the absence of clerical and ecclesiastical influence in the public sphere. For example, when education is secularized, conflicts about religious accommodation and supremacy disappear, and citizens are merely concerned that

“teachers can teach” (Machacek 2003:153). In this body of literature, religious indifference is largely expected to provide for the lowest rates of religious conflict, as religion is seen as inconsequential. This is most likely to occur in a secular environment rather than one dominated by any particular religion (Beyer 1994; Machacek 2003; Martin 1978).

Minority religions are more likely to freely operate in the public sphere and even grow in secular settings. (Beyer 1997; Hall 1998; Hatch 1989; Hutchison 2003; Martin 1978; Murphy 2001). In some cases, secularization can provide the social and cultural foundations for the non-prejudicial integration of religious groups into collective life (Beyer 1994). This is also true for those immigrants who come from religious minority backgrounds and are now granted the legal rights to freely practice their faith (Bender 2011). When religion does not dominate, and secularism is not aggressively pushed on populations by the state, not only will conflict decrease between religious minorities and the secular state, but also between religious minorities and other citizens (Grim and Finke 2007; Grime and Finke 2010).

Finally, the relationship between secularization and modernization may also be beneficial for religious minorities. Pluralism, religious tolerance and indifference, equal treatment for religious groups, and open-mindedness are all a part of the modern secularization process. Widespread education, which is generally associated with modernization and secularization is also associated with increased tolerance. Religious restrictions on migration should also decrease as secularization causes religion to no longer define citizenship (Berger 2001; Body-Gendrot 2007; Bruce 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Fox 2008; Gorski 2010; Gorski and Türkmen-Derrişođlu 2013).

Secularism in multicultural and interfaith settings can be treated as an objective and neutral starting point, by removing the ability of any single religious group to have cultural dominance. Within a secularized environment, encounters with religious pluralism are expected to produce decreased rates of religious fervor and salience of religious identities, when compared to religious societies. This has been effective in negotiating multi-cultural experiences in the public sphere. For example, secularism assumed as an intellectually neutral starting point for ideas is argued to make maneuvering religiously pluralistic classrooms easier. A secular starting point may also moderate the potential of pluralism to cause the othering of out-group members (Flensner 2018). Secularized societies also have higher rates of interfaith marriages than religious societies, suggesting higher rates of tolerance, bridging social capital, and willingness to compromise along religious lines (Bender 2011; Berger 1967; Gans 1967, 1979; Herberg 1955; Yinger 1967).

Sources of Fear and Loathing

Opposition to refugees and other migrants have been explained through a number of well-established sources in the sociological literature. Support for repatriation of migrants, including those who are well established in their host nations, is often explained by group-threat models (see Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Blumer 1958; Coser 1956). Migrants are interpreted as an economic or other resource-based threat. Within Europe, native born citizens are more likely to support repatriating migrants in areas with the highest rates of immigration (Coenders et al. 2008). Prior to the Holocaust, anti-Semitism increased when Jews were seen as a political threat and when economic

conditions worsened in Romania. Anti-Semitism increased when the Jewish population increased while leftist political parties were growing in power (Brustein and King 2004).

The group-threat model or theory of group position predicts that hostilities towards minorities occur when the presence of said minorities are perceived as a threat by majority group members. In this model "feelings of competition and hostility emerge from historically and collectively developed judgments about the positions in the social order that in-group members should rightfully occupy relative to members of an out-group" (Bobo and Hutchings 1996: 955; Blumer 1958). Religious and national minorities may threaten religious majority group members and native-born citizens' sense of economic privilege or strong political representation, which may be guaranteed by their majority group status. When responding to groups who are stereotyped as violent, such as Muslims, majority-group members also may perceive a threat to their physical safety. In contemporary Europe, anti-foreigner sentiment is highest in areas with large proportions of non-native populations and poor economic conditions, suggesting that the presence of potential threats and viable conditions for infringing on valuable resources explain anti-foreigner sentiment (Semyonov et al. 2006). Anti-immigrant hostilities in Europe are higher among those who believe that their national and cultural identities are being threatened (McLaren 2004).

How this divides along religious lines remains unclear. Secularization and religious pluralism are inextricably tied in the European context. In recent history, most European nations contained a religious group holding a religious majority status. In other nations, some form of religious adherence has still historically been more common than non-affiliation. Even in post-Soviet states, which experienced forced secularization in

recent memory, religious resurgence has been the norm (Froese 2004, 2008).

Secularization introduces or increases an additional religious category into the religious marketplace of European nations. Such diversity challenges the group position of the religious majority group. This, especially in unregulated religious economies, increases fair, interreligious competition, but not necessarily tolerance (Stark and Finke 2000). As European Christians lose their statistical majority-group status to secularization, many may feel uniquely threatened by immigration, as immigrant religious minorities threaten their group position. New religious groups are seen as competitors in the religious economy and a threat to their religious majority and potential monopoly status. They may also threaten Christian-majority block voting and pose as a political threat. As secularization occurs, each major religious group grows increasingly marginalized. According to the religious economies perspective, as religious groups become increasingly marginalized, their levels of commitment and fervor increase, along with interreligious competition. A common tactic in this instance to build tension with society at large and with religious others. Christians may be especially prone to this, as they have experienced the greatest losses due to secularization (Finke and Stark 2004; Stark and Finke 2000; Ribberink et al. 2007).

However, the unaffiliated may also feel uniquely threatened by Muslim immigration. Foner and Alba (2008) argue that the reason Western Europe struggles with integrating immigrants is because their immigrants are generally religious, and a secularized Europe is unequipped to work with them. The cultural and social claims of newcomers are likely not be honored, as when these are based on religion, they are treated as illegitimate. This is exacerbated when the religion is Islam (Foner and Alba

2008; Cesari 2004). In fact, as Europe secularizes anti-Muslim sentiment has been on the increase along with targeted legislation against Muslims (Body-Gendrot 2007; Pew Research Center 2010, 2018). In the eyes of secularists, mass migration is bringing in a new religious population to replace the old one, thus eroding their looming majority status and its associated benefits. Secularization, for some, means that religious expression cannot be tolerated within public institutions, such as schools. Foner and Alba (2008) argue that “a secular mind-set dominates in most Western European countries. Claims based on religion have much less acceptance and legitimacy there – and when the religion is Islam, these claims often lead to public unease, sometimes disdain and even anger, and, not surprisingly tensions and conflicts” (2008: 376). This has notably challenged Muslims’ rights to dress in a way deemed appropriate by their faith (Balibar 2004; Body-Gendrot 2007).

Further, a popular motif ties progress, liberalism, open-mindedness, and pluralism to secular identity and the secularization process (Bruce 2002; Casanova 2004; Emerson and Hartman 2006; Inglehart 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Ribberink et al. 2017). Concurrently Muslims are stereotyped as backwards, intolerant, illiberal, and thus a threat to the benefits that secularization has brought to European societies. There remains a persisting concern that Islam is inextricably tied to theocratic government and is incompatible with liberal-democratic societies (Akkerman 2005; Casanova 2004; de Koster et al. 2014; Fukuyama 2006; Huntington 1997; Ribberink et al. 2017). These feelings are likely exacerbated as European Muslims, who often hold to different values when compared to the unaffiliated, challenge church-state relations, approaches to pluralism and religious rights, and other developments that have accompanied

secularization (Asad 2008; Achterberg et al. 2009; Balibar 2004; Body-Gendrot 2007; Casanova 2012; Cesari 2011; Glendinning and Bruce 2011; Luckman 1967; Modood 2009; Ribberink et al. 2017).

Hypotheses

Reviewing the literature on religion, secularization, and attitudes toward refugees reveals a complicated picture. At the individual level, empirical research is fairly consistent in finding a positive relationship between religion and charitability towards strangers, including refugees. Much of this rooted in the religious identity of the believer. It is unclear whether or not warmth towards refugees would be transferred to political policy preferences. What limited research is available does suggest that religious people do at times cooperate with the government to assist refugees. To test these arguments against expectations that religious people will turn on refugees in a time of perceived threat, I hypothesize:

H1: Those with a religious affiliation will be more opposed to restrictive government policies on refugees when compared to those with no religious affiliation.

Much of the research summarized attributes the relationship between religion and treatment towards strangers, immigrants, and refugees to community-level attributes. Religion at the community-level enables the enforcement of pro-social norms and pro-voluntary values held by religious groups at the individual level. This is heightened when religious organizations provide a structural stronghold for monitoring members' behaviors and promulgating their views into the community. To test this motif against expectations that religious communities are hostile to religious newcomers and that

secularization provides the essential social conditions of tolerance that new immigrants need, I hypothesize:

H2: Higher regional rates of religious service attendance will be associated with less restrictive attitudes on government policies on refugees.

H3: Higher regional rates of secularization will be associated with more restrictive attitudes on government policies on refugees.

Methods

The data for this study come from the eighth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS-8). The ESS-8 provides data on religion and political attitudes from representative samples of 23 nations across Europe and Israel. Respondents can be clustered into 274 regions. This organizational scheme utilizes the ESS-Region variable, which harmonizes the preferred regional nesting across countries. These are typically Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS 1, 2, or 3) regions. When a country is not included in the NUTS system, the ESS-Region variable provides a comparable regional unit (Aassve, Arpino, and Billari 2013; European Social Survey 2016; European Social Survey Round 8 Data 2016).

The ESS-8 sample includes 44,387 respondents aged 15 and older. Respondents are asked several questions about their attitudes toward refugees, including their assessment of the character of refugees and their policy preferences for government treatment of refugees. Respondents are also asked about their religious affiliation (Protestant, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, other Christian, Jewish, Muslim, eastern religion, other religion, or none) as well as indicators of religiosity. The variables utilized in the study are harmonized across country, therefore no countries were removed from the sample. All analyses are weighted with a combined population size and design

weight, upon request from the European Social Survey (European Social Survey 2016; European Social Survey Round 8 Data 2016).

Dependent Variable

The key dependent variable in this study assesses how respondents believe the government should respond to current refugee crises. Respondents are asked if their respective governments should be generous in judging applications for refugee status (1= agree strongly, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = disagree, 5 = disagree strongly).

Independent Variables

The first key independent variable in this study is religious affiliation. First, respondents are asked whether or not they belong to a religion or denomination. Those who respond yes are may respond that they are Protestant, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, other Christian, Jewish, Muslim, members of eastern religions, or members of other religions. Those who respond that that they do not belong to a religion or denomination are categorized as religiously unaffiliated. For this study, I include a system of dichotomous variables for the religious categories with the unaffiliated serving as the reference category.

Two level-2 variables are created in order to measure the effects of secularization and regional service attendance. Aggregate scores of regional mean rates of religiously unaffiliated are utilized to measure secularization. Regional religious service attendance is measured by mean rates of religious service attendance at the regional-level. At the individual-level, respondents can report never (1), less often (2), only on special holy

days (3), at least once a month (4), once a week (5), more than once a week (6), and every day (7).

Covariates

Age is measured in years and includes all respondents aged 15 and older. To control for gender, I have created a dichotomous variable in which female = 1 and male = 0. Income is controlled for with a measure of annual household income, coming from all sources, ranked into decile groups. Education is measured with the European Survey harmonization of the ISCED variable (EISCED), which harmonizes all of the categories from EDULVLB across countries into seven categories (1 = less than lower secondary education, 2 = lower secondary education, 3 = lower-tier upper secondary education, 4 = upper-tier upper-secondary education, 5 = advanced vocational education with a sub-degree, 6 = lower-tertiary education at the BA level, and 7 = higher-tertiary education at the MA level or higher). A dichotomous variable is included for respondents who report belonging to an ethnic minority group (1 = yes, 0 = no). Another dichotomous variable controls for foreign birth (1 = yes, 0 = no).

Marginalization experiences are controlled for with two dichotomous variables (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Blumer 1958; Coser 1956). The first is unemployment, which measures whether or not respondents have ever been in a position of unemployment and seeking for work for a period of more than three months (1 = yes, 0 = no). The second dichotomous variables asks respondents if they have been victims of discrimination for any reason (1 = yes, 0 = no).

Finally, I control for political attitudes to ensure that religion, attitudes towards immigrants, and political ties are not conflated (Gorski and Türkmen-Derviřođlu 2013;

Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Wouter, Hobolt, and de Vreese 2009). The left-right scale asks respondents to rank themselves on a political left to right scale (0 = left to 10 = right).

Political distrust asks respondents to what extent they trust in politicians (0 = complete trust to 10 = no trust at all, after reverse coding). Anti-Europe sentiment is controlled for with a variable asking respondents if their nation's unification into the European Union should go further or has gone too far (0 = unification could go further to 10 = unification has already gone too far).

Analytic Strategy

I begin the study with an individual level ordinary least squares regression model estimating attitudes toward refugee admittance. Model 1 includes basic demographic variables. To test H1, Model 2 adds religious affiliation and religious service attendance. Model 3 adds marginalization experiences. The full model (Model 4) adds the political control variables.

H2-H3 are tested with a series of hierarchical linear models. The estimation of an empty models confirms that policy preferences regarding refugee admittance varies across European regions. The next step of my analytic procedure utilizes two sets of hierarchical linear models with random slopes. The first set of models estimates the effects of secularization on attitudes toward government refugee policies. Model 1 includes basic demographic variables and national rates of secularization. Model 2 includes individuals-level religious variables Model 3 adds all of the covariates.

The final set of models estimate the effects of regional religious service attendance on attitudes toward admittance of refugees. Model 1 includes basic demographic variables and regional religious service attendance. Model 2 adds

individual-level religious affiliation to the model. Model 3 is the full model, including all of the covariates. Tests for random slope coefficients (Wang, Xie, and Fisher. 2012) reveal that Catholic, Muslim, and Eastern religious affiliation varies across European regions. To account for this, I estimate random coefficients for these variables. All non-dichotomous variables in the study are mean-centered (Wang et al. 2012).¹

Findings

Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables utilized in the study. The average respondent is female and about 49 years old. The average respondent has an upper-tier upper-secondary level of education (4.109). Most respondents placed about in the middle-income decile group (5.189). About seven percent of respondents identified as a minority, and about 11 percent were foreign born.

Protestants made up about 12 percent of the sample. Catholics were the largest Christian denomination, making up about 34 percent of the sample. Eastern Orthodox Christians comprised about four percent of the sample. Other Christians accounted for one percent of the sample. Jews made up about five percent of the sample, while Muslims made up about three percent of the sample. Adherents of Eastern religions and other religions each comprised less than one percent of the sample. The unaffiliated comprised a plurality of respondents at about 40 percent. About eight percent of respondents have experienced discrimination.

¹ Multiple imputation models were run to account for missing data (Rubin 1996). The observed results did not substantively differ from the original results. Therefore, the original results are presented in this study.

Table 7.
Descriptive Statistics for all Variables (Unweighted)

Variables	N	Mean	STD	Min	Max
Age	44232	49.143	18.613	15	100
Female	44378	.526	.499	0	1
Education	4428	4.109	2.927	1	55
Income	36445	5.189	2.734	1	10
Minority	43946	.065	.246	0	1
Foreign birth	44370	.106	.308	0	1
Protestant	43895	.116	.320	0	1
Catholic	43895	.343	.475	0	1
Eastern Orthodox	43895	.043	.203	0	1
Other Christian	43895	.010	.100	0	1
Jewish	43895	.045	.208	0	1
Muslim	43895	.031	.175	0	1
Eastern Religions	43895	.004	.060	0	1
Other Religions	43895	.003	.053	0	1
No religion	43895	.405	.491	0	1
Discriminated Against	44045	.082	.274	0	1
Unemployment	44169	.282	.450	0	1
Right-leaning	38583	5.157	2.239	0	10
Distrust Politicians	43741	6.350	2.418	0	10
Anti-EU Sentiment	40776	4.890	2.673	0	10
Regional Secularization	44387	.404	.225	0	.951
Regional Religious Service Attendance	44387	2.518	.617	0	6

A notable minority of respondents (28 percent) have experienced unemployment for more than 3 months. The average score on the left-right scale was 5.157. Distrust for politicians was slightly elevated (6.350). Anti-EU sentiment was relatively low (4.890). The average region was about 40 percent secular, in terms of average religious affiliation. Average regional rates of religious service attendance were between only on special holy days and less than once per month (2.518).

Religious Affiliation and Attitudes toward Democracy

Table 8 presents results of OLS models estimating preferences for restrictive government policies regarding refugees. Model 1 includes the key demographic variables. Model 2 tests H1 by adding religious affiliation. H1 has mixed support. Protestants and nones do not significantly differ in their policy preferences. Catholics ($b = -.105, p > .001$), Muslims ($b = -.234, p > .001$), and adherents of Eastern religions ($b = -.333, p > .001$) hold to less restrictive policies on admitting refugees when compared to those with no religious affiliation. Eastern Orthodox Christians ($b = .562, p > .001$) and Jews ($b = .474, p > .001$) support more restrictive policies when compared to those with no religious affiliation. Model 3 include the unemployment and discrimination measures, and the religious variables maintain their statistical significant and directions. Model 4 is the full model, and includes the left-right political scale, distrust for politicians measure, and a measure of anti-EU sentiment. Catholics ($b = -.138, p > .001$), Muslims ($b = -.167, p > .001$), and adherents of Eastern religions ($b = -.357, p > .001$) still prefer less restrictive policies regarding the admitting of refugees when compared to those with no religious affiliation.

Table 8.
OLS Regression Analyses Estimating Attitudes on Refugee Policies

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	3.080*** (.010)	3.069*** (.013)	3.093*** (.014)	3.166*** (.014)
Age	-.0006 (.0004)	-.0004 (.0004)	-.0006 (.0004)	-.001*** (.0004)
Female	-.052*** (.014)	-.064*** (.014)	-.063*** (.014)	-.036** (.013)
Education	-.010** (.004)	-.030*** (.004)	-.029*** (.004)	-.010* (.004)
Income	.002 (.003)	.005 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.005 (.003)
Minority	.058* (.029)	.063* (.030)	.079** (.030)	.067* (.029)
Foreign birth	-.329*** (.026)	-.316*** (.026)	-.310*** (.026)	-.250*** (.025)
Protestant		.034 (.023)	.029 (.023)	.031 (.022)
Catholic		-.105*** (.016)	-.108*** (.016)	-.138*** (.016)
Eastern Orthodox		.562*** (.026)	.555*** (.026)	.395*** (.025)
Other Christian		-.008 (.065)	.006 (.065)	.044 (.063)
Jewish		.474*** (.078)	.474*** (.078)	.331*** (.075)
Muslim		-.234*** (.044)	-.221*** (.044)	-.167*** (.042)
Eastern Religions		-.333*** (.099)	-.343*** (.099)	-.357*** (.095)
Other Religions		.109 (.129)	.157 (.129)	.149 (.124)
Discriminated Against Unemployment			-.136*** (.026)	-.171*** (.025)
Right-leaning			-.043** (.015)	-.050*** (.015)
Distrust Politicians				.087*** (.003)
Anti-EU Sentiment				.033*** (.003)
R-Squared	.006	.030	.032	.112
N	29,885	29,885	29,885	29,885

***p<.001, ** p<01, * p<.05

Source: European Social Survey, 2016 Wave 8; All Data Weighted.

Eastern Orthodox Christians ($b = .395, p > .001$) and Jews ($b = .331, p > .001$) still support more restrictive policies when compared to those with no religious affiliation.

Religious Service Attendance at the Regional-Level

Table 9 presents results from multi-level random intercept models estimating attitudes towards restrictive refugee policy preferences. Model 1 includes basic demographic information and regional religious service attendance rates to test H2. Consistent with H2, regional rates of religious service attendance are negatively associated with respondents' preferences for restrictive policies towards refugee admittance ($b = -.206, p > .001$). Model 2 includes religious affiliation at the individual-level. Regional rates of religious service attendance remain negatively and significantly associated with preferring restrictive refugee policies. In the multi-level model, some of the relationships between the individual religious variables and attitudes toward refugee policy has changed, suggesting that part of the relationship between affiliation and policy preferences is explained by regional-level variations. Model 3 is the full model and includes experiences of marginalization and the political covariates. Regional rates of attendance remain associated with less restrictive refugee policy preferences in the full model ($b = -.115, p > .001$). Returning to the H1, in the full multi-level model, Catholics now offer more restrictive policies when compared to nones ($b = .089, p > .001$). The difference between Eastern Orthodox Christians and Jews and the unaffiliated is now insignificant. Protestant respondents still do not significantly differ from nones, while Muslims ($b = -.369, p > .001$) and adherents of Eastern religions ($b = -.292, p > .01$) still prefer more generous refugee policies when compared to the unaffiliated.

Table 9.
OLS Regression Analyses Estimating Attitudes on Refugee Policies by Regional Religious Service Attendance

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	3.585*** (.126)	3.627*** (.109)	3.656*** (.126)
Age	.0002 (.0004)	-.00004* (.0004)	-.001*** (.0003)
Female	-.057*** (.013)	-.067*** (.013)	-.036** (.012)
Education	-.045*** (.004)	-.044*** (.004)	-.022*** (.004)
Income	-.00007 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.0003 (.003)
Minority	-.165*** (.028)	-.112*** (.029)	-.084** (.028)
Foreign birth	-.157*** (.024)	-.098*** (.025)	-.065** (.024)
Protestant		.050* (.023)	.029 (.022)
Catholic		.134** (.028)	.089*** (.033)
Eastern Orthodox		-.022 (.032)	-.040 (.030)
Other Christian		.050 (.060)	.067 (.057)
Jewish		.328* (.155)	.271 (.148)
Muslim		-.467*** (.068)	-.368*** (.096)
Eastern Religions		-.291** (.107)	-.293** (.096)
Other Religions		.208 (.118)	.184 (.113)
Discriminated Against			-.035 (.023)
Unemployment			.017 (.013)
Right-leaning			.090*** (.003)
Distrust Politicians			.062*** (.003)
Anti-EU Sentiment			-.083*** (.002)
Regional Religious Services Attendance	-.206*** (.049)	-.245*** (.053)	-.262*** (.050)
-2 LL	113065.9	112737.1	109748
AIC	113085.9	112779.1	109800
BIC	113122	112855	109893.9
N	29885	29885	29885

***p<.001, ** p<01, * p<.05

Source: European Social Survey, 2016 Wave 8; All Data Weighted

Secularization at the Regional-Level

Table 10 presents results from multi-level random intercept models estimating attitudes towards restrictive refugee policy preferences as predicted by regional rates of secularization. Model 1 includes basic demographic information and regional rates of religious disaffiliation to test H3. Consistent with H3, regional rates of secularization are positively associated with restrictive refugee policy preferences ($b = .875$, $p > .01$). Model 2 again adds religious affiliation at the individual-level. Regional rates of secularization remain positively and significantly associated with preferring restrictive refugee policies. Model 3 is the full model and includes experiences of marginalization and the political covariates. Regional rates of secularization remain associated with increased restrictive refugee policy preferences in the full model ($b = 1.031$, $p > .001$). Muslims ($b = -.365$, $p < .001$) and adherents of Eastern Religions ($b = -.290$, $p < .01$) remain more open to their nations receiving refugees. In this model, Jewish respondents prefer stricter regulations on refugees when compared to the unaffiliated ($b = .303$, $p < .05$).

Discussion

This study begins with the formulation of a hypothesis that, based on previous research on religion and attitudes towards refugees and religion and charitable behavior, religious adherents would be more charitable when compared to the unaffiliated in their political preferences in terms of their governments allowing refugees into their nations. I find mixed support for this hypothesis, but not in a manner consistent with the primary framing of the study. This study compares Christians to the unaffiliated. However, only Muslims and adherents of Eastern religions consistently called for more generous policies toward refugees throughout the models.

Table 10.
OLS Regression Analyses Estimating Attitudes on Refugee Policies by Regional Secularization

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	2.705*** (.071)	2.576*** (.076)	2.568*** (.073)
Age	.0004 (.0004)	-.001* (.0004)	-.001*** (.0004)
Female	-.057*** (.013)	-.067*** (.013)	-.036** (.012)
Education	-.045*** (.004)	-.044*** (.004)	-.022*** (.004)
Income	-.0002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	.0004 (.003)
Minority	-.164*** (.028)	-.112*** (.029)	-.084*** (.028)
Foreign birth	-.156*** (.024)	-.098*** (.025)	-.065*** (.024)
Protestant		.052* (.023)	.032 (.022)
Catholic		.140** (.028)	.094** (.026)
Eastern Orthodox		-.019 (.032)	-.039 (.030)
Other Christian		.051 (.060)	.067 (.057)
Jewish		.362* (.154)	.303* (.148)
Muslim		-.463*** (.068)	-.365*** (.067)
Eastern Religions		-.289** (.107)	-.290** (.096)
Other Religions		.208 (.118)	.164 (.114)
Discriminated Against			-.035 (.023)
Unemployment			.017 (.013)
Right-leaning			.090*** (.003)
Distrust Politicians			.062*** (.003)
Anti-EU Sentiment			-.082*** (.002)
Regional Secularization	.875** (.063)	1.041 *** (.155)	1.031*** (.149)
-2 LL	113065.9	112716.4	109730
AIC	113085.9	112758.4	109782
BIC	113085.9	112834.3	109875.9
N	29885	29885	29885

***p<.001, ** p<01, * p<.05

Source: European Social Survey, 2016 Wave 8; All Data Weighted

This is likely because Muslims and adherents of Eastern religions are likewise mostly new immigrants to Europe. In some Models Jewish respondents called for stricter regulations on refugees. This may be related to historic conflicts between Jews and Muslims, which have been reignited in Israel and Europe due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Firestone 2016).

The comparisons between the unaffiliated and Christians are more complicated. In individual level OLS models, Catholics are more open to accepting refugees than the unaffiliated, while the Eastern Orthodox are more restrictive when compared to the unaffiliated. In the full multi-level models, these findings change. Catholics now hold to stricter policy preferences when compared to nones, and the Eastern Orthodox do not significantly differ from the unaffiliated. This change suggests that contextual variation partially explains religious groups' attitudes toward refugee policies. The full multi-level models also reveal parity between nones and Protestants as well as other Christians. It may be that Catholic, being the largest Christian denomination in Europe, have the most to lose in terms of group position. Future research should investigate how religious majority status effects attitudes towards welcoming newcomers. That Christian groups do not offer more generous views toward refugees breaks with previous expectations in the literature (Bennett and Einolf 2017; Ruiter and de Graaf 2006). This suggests that charitable norms either do not inform policy preferences or that the political moment associated with the refugee crisis overrides previous charitable commitments. While previous research indicates that charitable norms have been integrated into the Christian identity (Einolf 2011), membership alone may not predict the internalization of these

specific doctrines. Future research may investigate how attitudes towards refugees vary among the religiously committed at varying levels of different indicators of religiosity.

At the regional-level, I formulated two hypotheses. First, that aggregate religious service attendance would decrease overall preferences for keeping refugees out of nations and second, that secularization would increase overall preferences for keeping refugees out of nations. Both hypotheses were supported. It is a bit surprising that indicators of religiosity differ at the individual and national-level, but this is not inconsistent with previous research (Ribberink et al. 2017). One interpretation is that while affiliation does not ensure that certain values, or at least those that transfer to policy preferences, are held, religious services serve a unique pro-social and pro-refugee function. Religious organizations are often involved in the resettling of refugees and facilitating charitable activities involving refugees. These may facilitate friendly attitudes towards refugees in a way that the values tied to a religious identity do not. A similar process may be occurring with secularization. Many of the unaffiliated may not be plugged into discussions on secular values and arguments regarding the progress secularization and modernization bring. However, in areas with high rates of religious disaffiliation, this may come to define the region. Local policies rooted in secularism are more likely to pass, and the secularization project may be celebrated as a part of the local identity.

A limitation of this study is that it does not account for secularization within religions. This may blur lines between the religious and the unaffiliated in the data. Future research may investigate the parity between Christian groups and the unaffiliated with this in mind. One possible explanation is that secularization within religious cultures leads to a lack of difference between majority religious adherents and secularists. As

Christians decrease and the unaffiliated increase in their share in the religious market place, they may be at a crossroads where they feel equally secure or equally threatened in their status. Future research should investigate the possible mediating effects of a sense of group position in explaining religious and non-religious attitudes toward refugee policies

CHAPTER FOUR

Protestants and Democracy: A Protestant Ethic or a Tyranny of the Majority?

Introduction

An abundance of sociological research documents the close relationship between religion and democracy (Bloom and Arikan 2013; Carls 2019; Da Silva, Clark, and Cabaço 2014; Finke and Stark 2007; Gamm and Putnam 1999; Putnam 2002; Putnam, Campbell, and Garrett 2010; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Stark 2006, 2015; Tocqueville 2007; Weber 2002; Woodberry 2012). Much of this research occurs at the macro-level, documenting state formation. The early era of democratic consolidation was significantly influenced by religious institutions and theology, namely those within Protestantism. Tocqueville and Weber argued for the theological and associational contributions that Protestant theology made to U.S. religious life, and how this provided the foundations for the first modern, national democratic government. Bollen, and Jackman's (1985) groundbreaking study found a similar relationship between national rates of Protestantism and democratic consolidation in post-colonial states (Tusalem 2009). Woodberry's (2012) landmark study found that conversionary Protestant missions helped to create new, early democracies throughout the world. The shared central argument is that a series of norms and values particular to Protestants allowed for structural changes that were conducive to democratic consolidation.

This literature also primarily focuses on democracy in its early stages, telling us how democracies are formed, but not how they are maintained and passed on. This body

of literature focuses on macro-level phenomenon, yet Tocqueville warned that at the individual level, public opinion matters as well. A liberal-democracy, by design, implements the political philosophy of the majority. Democratic consolidation occurs when the pro-democratic ideals of the public are institutionalized (Tocqueville 2007). Tocqueville warned of the possibility of an authoritarian version of democracy in which free citizens vote away the liberties of others; this is Tocqueville's "tyranny of the majority" (Tocqueville 2007:110). He further noted important contextual factors of U.S. Protestantism that were conducive to democracy—namely toleration and the willingness to engage in interreligious cooperation.

The possibility of the tyranny of the majority in liberal-democracies is worth revisiting in the contemporary era, as several liberal-democracies are experiencing an upsurge in citizens who desire democracies with authoritarian characteristics. Currently, a significant proportion of Europeans are voicing support for anti-democratic policies and politicians, and opposition to national and religious pluralism (Alexander 2013; Coenders et al. 2004). Significant segments of European populations now report that they no longer believe that it is important to live in a democratically governed nation and express preferences for having their countries led by authoritarians who do not have to deal with elections (Foa and Mounk 2017). Much of the authoritarian backlash is aimed at limiting the rights of national and religious minorities in favor of forced assimilation efforts (Alexander 2013; Kymlicka 2000).

Some argue that to erode such liberties is to erode the cultural foundations for a free liberal-democracy (Abizadeh 2008, 2010; Carens 1989; Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017; Heller and Evans 2010; Kymlicka 2000; 2003). Others counter that cultural restrictions

may in fact be healthy for a democracy. In addition, immigrants may bring in cultural values that are theocratic, authoritarian, or otherwise illiberal. If these citizens are allowed to contribute to the public sphere and national character, it is argued that the nation could become less liberal. According to this perspective it is within the rights of democratic citizens to limit migrants into their nations and the rights immigrants are afforded out of these concerns (Fukuyama 2006; Gundelach 2010; Huntington 1997; Miller 2016).

In this study, I revisit the relationship between Protestantism and liberal-democracy in its contemporary context. Tocqueville noted that early liberal-democrats were able to channel religious values to unite Anglo peoples towards a democratic form of government. Contemporary research suggests that recent waves of non-white Muslim immigrants have fundamentally challenged the way that mostly white, Protestant Christians think about democracy, as evidenced by a surge in anti-immigrant policies. Religious nationalism may also be on the rise, which leads populations to eschew democratic policies for an approach to government that favors the in-group and protects their majority status. Therefore, I ask (1) are Protestants still uniquely pro-liberal democratic when compared to other religious groups? (2) Is nativism¹ a significant predictor of Protestant opposition toward democracy? And (3) to what extent does the Protestant share of a national population effect democratic values?

¹ Nativism is defined as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007:19)

Review of Literature

Protestants and Democracy

Protestant Values. Democracy initially thrived in Protestant societies to the extent that Protestants exhibited high levels of religiosity, while endorsing the separation of church and state (Finke and Stark 2005; Graebner 1976; Tocqueville 2007; Weber 2002). Primary religious beliefs focused on the relationship between God and people, keeping American Protestants from bridging church and state through presumed religious political obligations. Tocqueville praised US democracy because religion remained relevant in the public sphere while not being too closely tied to the state as to exercise power antagonistically over citizens. Weber (2002) found a similar ethos among Protestants, particularly Calvinists, who were able to fulfill religious callings in the secular economic sphere. This decreased a need or desire to expand the religious sphere into other areas of life through institutionalizing religion at the state level. Tocqueville likewise sees the separation of church and state as implicit in Protestant social theologies of vocation, evidenced by clergy avoiding transitions into political careers. The separation of church and state is also implicit in Weber's (2002) observations of American religious sects not seeking dominance over one another. "Competitive religious evangelism" between religious sects in a country with no established religion (Skocpol 2002:110; Tocqueville 2007) helped contribute to pluralism and liberal-democracy. Denominationally divided Protestant Christians in the United States, who wanted to secure their own religious freedom to practice and share their faith, were uniquely motivated to institutionalize a separation of church and state (Finke and Stark 2005). Approaching the separation of

church and state from political theology provided a unique foundation of concurrent secularism and civil religion. Privatizing religion prevented any single denomination from dominating politically or economically. The privatization, however, was done in such a way that religion remained highly relevant to the individual and was thus able to provide them with pro-democratic values. Highly religious people, bringing their faith in the public sphere, were balanced in their individualism and public commitment (Amos 1992; Tocqueville 2007; Leege 1993). They maintained this level of necessary religious fervor, while simultaneously contributing to religiously pluralistic broader civic sphere. This, “on the grounds of Protestant religiosity” granted to U.S. democracy its critical traits of “flexibility of structure and its individualistic character” (Weber 2002:212).

Because liberal-democracies are ruled by popular vote, Tocqueville (2007) argues that they require that a majority of citizens hold to values and mores that are conducive to liberal democracies. These are “consecrated theories” of governance among the “human family” (Tocqueville 2007:4). This is consistent with other works of classical social theory, which argue that religious groups’ theologies can shape governments, economies, and other major institutions (Troeltsch 1992; Weber 2002). Religion is a critical “mediating institution” that prevents equality from degenerating into tyranny. Rather than relying on the pure authority of the state, religious adherents follow “dogma from all classes of citizens,” providing a check on government authority and a source of social leveling and unification (Leege 1992:19; Tocqueville 2007). Religious teachings, coming from God, are held in higher esteem than any political authority’s teachings, providing a check on absolutism invested in a state or individual. Tocqueville (2007) and Weber (2002) both find such values among Protestants.

Tocqueville stated that “amongst the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of conditions,” which was the “fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived, and the central point at which all [his] observations constantly terminated” (2007:9). When the inequality of conditions between disparate groups arise, institutionalized Christian doctrine elevated disfavored groups to an equal position with favored ones before the law. Where it failed to do so, such as in the case of blacks and Native Americans, the ruling class is described in anti-democratic terms. When successfully implemented, the equality of conditions also led to a pluralistic social theology, which allowed democracy to thrive by encouraging people from different social positions to contribute. Pluralism at the political level allows for bridging capital at the national level, provides checks and balances on would be tyrants and the “social supremacy” of groups, and creates the type of competition that can adequately represent a diversity of peoples, values, and customs. Political pluralism breaks the power of intolerance, which is tied to arbitrary power and poor democratic conditions (Craiu 2008:268; Montesquieu 1734, 1748 in Craiu 2008; Tocqueville 2007).

This continues to be observed in contemporary research on the foundations of early democracies. Woodberry’s (2012) groundbreaking study found that the presence and success of conversionary Protestants were critical in the consolidation of liberal-democracy and its necessary precedents throughout the world. Consistent with the arguments in classical theory, conversionary Protestants contributed general values, norms, and structural developments, such as commitments to religious liberty and other civil rights, literacy and education, and voluntary organizations, all of which provide

ideal conditions for stability with liberal-democratic consolidation. Protestant values, such as individual moral responsibility and ideas regarding autonomy and responsibility have also been directly conducive toward democracy, and toward civil liberties that stabilize democratic societies (Rindermann and Carl 2018; Weber 2002).

Research on contemporary democracies also finds that the conditions necessary for democratic consolidation and maintenance are associated with Protestant as well as generally Christian societies. Research reveals lower levels of corruption, higher levels of trust, and higher levels of social and economic freedoms in Protestant-majority nations. Rindermann and Carl (2018) find that several expressions of Christianity, particularly Protestantism, have positive effects on human rights. During the 20th century, the transitional states with higher rates of Protestant religious adherence had the highest rates of citizens' political empowerment, political pluralism, pluralism in civil societies, political rights, and civil liberties when compared to Islamic and Catholic societies (Tusalem 2009). Civic involvement also remains closely related to democratic political participation, attitudes, and norms, particularly in Protestant social contexts (da Silva, Clark, and Cabaço 2013). While not direct measures of democracy, all of these characteristics are critical for establishing and maintaining a healthy-liberal democracy (Delher and Newton 2005; Harrison 2013; Rindermann and Carl 2018; Putnam 2000, 2002; Putnam et al. 1994).

Still, some research complicates the narrative of Protestantism's consistent relationship with democracy. Gamm and Putnam (1999) find that religious social behaviors are associated with increased support for democracy, which is explained by increased institutional trust and political interests. Inconsistent with classical sociological

theory, this mechanism only finds mixed support among Protestants. The findings hold among evangelicals but not among mainline Protestants. Gorman, Naqvi, and Kurzman (2018) find evidence that Protestant nations produce some of the highest levels of support for democracy, when compared to nations of other cultural backgrounds. However, they work with a “historically Protestant” (Gorman et al 2018:7) measure, which combines Protestant European nations and English-speaking zones, excluding Ireland. The authors go on to reveal that disaggregated findings, not shown in their study, produce mixed results. They also find in supplementary analysis that respondents in this historically Protestant zones are not significantly more pro-democratic than those in Muslim-majority nations. A study of Catholic and Muslim-majority countries revealed a positive relationship between religiosity and support for democracy (Gu and Bomhoff 2012). Support for democracy was comparable in the two sets of countries. In a sample of Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, religiosity was negatively associated with support for democracy, especially among those who did not support a separation of the religious and political spheres. Notable differences between the groups were not observed (Valenta and Strabac 2012). Bloom and Arikan (2012) likewise found that religious belief is negatively associated with support for democracy, mediated by traditional and survival-based values.

The emerging body of literature may be finding mixed results for a several reasons. First, much of the conflicting research overlooks the theoretically important, unique contributions of Protestantism to democracy by collapsing Protestants into broader categories or neglecting them altogether. Further, research on attitudes toward democracy in recent years is operating with different baseline attitudes toward

democracy, as confidence in democratic governance and institutions decrease (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017). To test whether Protestantism remains closely tied to democracy in the contemporary era, I hypothesize:

H1: Cross-nationally, Protestants will offer the highest evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation.

Nativist Interaction

Hostility towards immigrants and immigration is problematic for liberal-democracies. Early research found a relationship between anti-minority sentiment, which includes opposition to national minorities, and pro-authoritarian tendencies (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998). Kymlicka (2000, 2003) argues that liberal-democracies are supported by thin “socio-cultures,” in which the contributions of all minorities, included national minorities, are valued. Kymlicka argues “the evidence in the West strongly suggests...that democratic stability can only be achieved by recognizing, not suppressing, minority national identities” (Kymlicka 2000:190). Suppressing the rights of immigrants or forcing them into assimilation erodes at the inherent fair and liberal policies of liberal-democracies. Likewise, Alexander contends that “Only by making itself multicultural...can Europe preserve its democratic values in the globalizing world that it confronts today (2013: 547). Abizadeh (2008, 2010) argues that restrictions on immigrants and immigrations violate the very premises of liberal-democratic theory. Liberal-democracies must give everyone under the jurisdiction of their laws the right to contribute to them. This should include immigrants and foreigners.

Religious nationalism, for example, may move Protestant Christians toward tyrannical political ideology and nativism. Gorski and Türkmen-Derviřođlu (2013) define

religious nationalism as “a social movement that claims to speak in the name of the nation and that defines the nation in terms of religion.” Religious nationalism is cited to occur when these social movements operate on premises that their nations are religiously based, and religion is considered inherent to what it means to belong to a given nation (Barker 2009; Gorski and Türkmen-Derviřođlu 2013; Rieffer 2003). Gorski (2010) argues that religious nationalists desire for the religious and political spheres of society to overlap to the greatest extent possible. This often involves a distinct understanding of in-group identity, at the religious, ethnic, and national levels, and of hostilities toward respective out-group members.

Religious nationalists utilize the state, its power, and its security as a means of preserving perceived traditional values and thwarting perceived threats by other ethnicities (Fox 2004). In a liberal-democracy, religious-state power must be justified by popular consent. Because religion provides the basis for political-decision making (Friedland 2001), religious popular consensus is desired. The religious nationalist is then motivated to keep those who do not want to be governed by a national religion out of the democratic process, which can be accomplished by oppressive laws and restrictive, nativist immigration policies. Tying together nativism and authoritarianism, religious nationalists are motivated to keep religious others from immigrating into their nations, and thus, into their voting pools. Further, religious nationalists are motivated to erode the democratic spheres of their society by limiting the populations for which these freedoms are guaranteed. Religious nationalism extends the institutional logic of reach of religion into democratic institutions (Friedland 2001), without valuing democracy. When religion is conflated with native birth, ethnicity, or other demographic characteristics, this

hegemony is extended over the various other demographics (Oommen 1994), leading to a tyranny of the religious majority (Tocqueville 2007).

Classical sociological theory also notes that Protestants were pro-democratic only to the extent that they were religiously tolerant (Craiutu 2008; Tocqueville 2007; Weber 2002). Contemporary research also argues that anti-immigrant sentiment and religious intolerance are tied through a nationalist and nativist project, which contains anti-democratic and illiberal elements, in order to prevent religious newcomers from arriving to their shores (Barker 2009; Gorski 2010; Gorski and Türkmen-Derivoğlu 2013; Rieffer 2003). To test these arguments, I hypothesize:

H2: Protestants will be more supportive of democracy only to the extent that they are tolerant of immigrants.

Tyranny of the Majority

In addition to outlining pro-democratic conditions, Tocqueville theorized conditions that would lead to despotism and democratic illiberalism. In perhaps his most notable contribution on the topic of despotism, the tyranny of the majority empowers majority group members to utilize democratic powers to disenfranchise a minority group. Politically represented majority group members assume political control and moral authority for themselves and the opposite for non-represented minority group members. When left unchecked, their absolute rule allows for political and social repression against targeted minority groups. Unfettered majoritarian rule is likely to prefer absolutism in institutions of government as well, granting them an “entire control over the law” (Tocqueville 2007:147). The guaranteed political rights of minority group members are necessary to prevent extreme oppression (Tocqueville 2007:110). However, the offices of

utilizing and guaranteeing political rights have already been awarded to majority group members.

Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017) validate Tocqueville's concerns over the tyranny of the majority in a democratic system in the era of democratic de-consolidation. In several nations, such as Poland and Venezuela, free citizens voted for their liberal-democratic governments to take an authoritarian turn. Foa and Mounk found that in each of these cases, pro-authoritarian electoral outcomes were preceded by large proportions of citizens becoming skeptical of the value of living in a liberal-democracy. European citizens remain divided in their evaluations of the state of democracy in their respective countries. Many see a crisis of legitimacy and a deficit of democracy in the very structure of the European Union and European Parliament (Karp et al. 2003).

The theory of religious economies also predicts that those interested in religious dominance and uninterested in the overall health of the religious economy may develop an interest in monopolizing the religious marketplace. Members of particular denominations or broader religious categories may seek to keep competitors out of the religious marketplace, in order to limit competition and proliferation. The ability for a religious firm to monopolize their religious economy is contingent upon their ability to convince the state to coercively regulate on their behalf (Stark and Finke 2000:163). While this typically takes the form of regulating religious activity, in some cases, religion-state mergers regulate the presence of religious outsiders. This includes policies of detention, extermination, and targeted immigration regulations (Fox 2008, 2013, 2015; Gill 2008; Grim and Finke 2010). As a religious group increases in their national share of a population, the opportunities for and likelihood of interfaith interactions decrease.

Members of the religious group may also grow comfortable in their religious majority status and take efforts to hold onto this even at the risk of undermining democratic rule. I

hypothesize:

H3: Preference for democratic governance is inversely proportional to the share of Protestants in a national population.

Methods

Data

Attitudes toward democracy and immigrants are obtained from the sixth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS-6). The ESS-6 is unique in its documentation of attitudes toward democracy and immigrants. This survey utilizes a sample of 54,673 respondents aged 15 and above in 29 nations throughout Europe as well as Israel. Respondents are asked how important they believe it is to live in a democracy. The ESS-6 also asks respondents for their religious identification. Respondents could identify that they had no religious affiliation or identify as Protestant, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, other Christian, Jewish, Muslim, a member of an eastern religion, or other religion. (ESS Round 6: European Social Survey 2016; European Social Survey 2013; European Social Survey Round 6 Data 2012). Political party information was gathered from two sources. The ESS-6 surveys which political party, in their respective countries, respondents feel closest to. To harmonize political party affiliation across Europe and Israel, I utilize the 1994-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES 1994-2014) (Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017). Upon request from the European Social Survey, all analyses utilize a combined population size and design weight.

The ESS-6 sample is clustered into countries, making multi-level logistic regression the appropriate modeling technique to utilize (Snijders and Bosker 1999). The first level of the data accounts for individual level respondents. All non-dichotomous variables are mean-centered (Wang, Xie, and Fisher 2012). The second level of the data is the country the respondent lives in, which allows for responses to be aggregated at the country-level. The variables utilized in this study are present and standardized across country, meaning no country needed to be removed from the sample.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study measures respondents' evaluation of the importance of living in a democratic country. Respondents are asked how important it is for them to live in a democratically governed nation. This measure has been particularly useful in previous research on attitudes toward democracy and predicting democratic deconsolidation (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017). Responses range from 0 = not at all important to 10 = extremely important.

Independent Variables

The first key independent variable is an individual-level categorical variable for Protestants. Protestant respondents are treated as their own category as are the religious unaffiliated. Those who identify as Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and other Christian are categorized as other Christians. Jews, Muslims, adherents of eastern religions, and adherents of other religion are categorized under non-Christian religions. In order to simplify Protestantism's interaction with the moderator variable, in later analyses,

Protestant is treated as 1 and all other religious categories are treated as 0.² To estimate the effects of majority status on Protestant attitudes towards democracy, I have created an aggregate score of mean rates of Protestant adherence at the country-level.

To estimate the moderating effects of anti-immigrant sentiment, I have created an index of anti-immigrant attitudes. Three questions in the index address respondents' attitudes towards immigrants. Respondents are asked if immigrants are good or bad for their nation's economy (0 = good for the economy to 10 = bad for the economy). Respondents are also asked if their nation's cultural enriched or undermined by immigrants (0 = cultural life enriched to 10 = cultural life undermined). Finally, respondents are asked if immigrants make their resident nations better or worse places to live (0 = better place to live to 10 = worse place to live). Each of the variables scored a factor loading higher than .850, and the alpha reliability coefficient is .856 (see Table 11).

Table 11.
Factor Loadings for Index of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

Variables	Factor Loading
Immigrants undermine the culture	.888
Immigrants make the country a worse place	.891
Immigrants are bad for the economy	.866
Alpha reliability coefficient	.856

² Before settling on this typology, which was chosen to simplify the analyses, results were run comparing disaggregated religious groups to Protestants individually. The results of the analyses were substantively similar to the final results.

Covariates

This study makes use of standard demographic variables. Age is measured in years and ranges from 15 to 103. I control for gender in a dichotomous variable where male = 0 and female = 1. To control for education, I make use of the European Survey harmonization of the ISCED variable (EISCED), which harmonizes more than a dozen categories from the EDULVLB variable into seven categories (1 = less than lower secondary education, 2 = lower secondary education, 3 = lower tier upper secondary education, 4 = upper tier upper secondary education, 5 = advanced vocational education with a sub-degree, 6 = lower tertiary education at the BA level, and 7 = higher tertiary education at the MA level or higher). I control for income with an annual household income variable, which measures net income from all sources. Respondents are placed into decile income groups. Minority status and foreign birth are also controlled for with respective dichotomous variables.

Another set of variables are included to control for marginalization, which has been shown to effect attitudes toward democracy (Mitchel 2010). I have included a dichotomous variable asking if respondents have ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months (yes = 1, no = 0). A second dichotomous variable ask respondents if they have been discriminated against for any reason (1 = yes, no = 0).

An additional set of variables are utilized to avoid conflating religious affiliation and attitudes towards immigrants with broader political movements (Akkerman 2003; Foa and Mounk 2017; Muller 2014; Rooduijn 2014). To control for anti-globalist sentiment, I include a variable assessing attitudes toward the European Union.

Respondents are asked if European Union unification has either gone too far or needs to go further (0 = needs to go further to 10 = unification has already gone too far). To control general populist sentiment, I include a measure of distrust of politicians (0 = complete trust to 10 = no trust at all) Political party affiliation is controlled for with a dichotomous variable in which far or extreme-right political party = 1 and other political affiliations = 0.

Analytic Strategy

I begin the study with analyses of individual-level predictors of attitudes toward democracy. To estimate evaluations of democracy by religious affiliation, I utilize ordinary least squares linear regression models. I begin analyses with a model including basic demographic characteristics. H1 is tested with a model other Christians, non-Christian religious adherents, and the religiously unaffiliated with Protestants serving as the reference category. A third model includes experiences of marginalization as covariates. The fourth model includes the political covariates, to ensure that religious involvement in political movements does not explain the relationship between religion and attitudes toward democracy.

H2 is tested in models with a Protestant dichotomous variable, so that I may estimate democratic attitudes of Protestants at different levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Model 1 includes the Protestant dichotomous variable and the anti-immigrant

sentiment moderator along with all of the covariates in this study. Model 2 adds the interaction term for Protestant*anti-immigrant sentiment.³

H3 is tested with a series of hierarchical linear models. The estimation of a null model reveals that attitudes toward democracy varies across countries. Model 1 includes national rates of Protestantism along with the covariates in order to test for the significance of the moderator. Model 2 adds individual rates of Protestantism. Finally, Model 3 adds the Protestant*national rates of Protestantism interaction term. Tests for random slope coefficients (Wang et al. 2012) reveal that anti-immigrant sentiment varies across countries. To account for this, I estimate random coefficients for anti-immigrant sentiment.

Findings

Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables in the study. The average respondent has a high evaluation of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation (8.080). About 9 percent of the sample are Protestant. About 45 percent of respondents belong to another Christian denomination. About 6 percent of respondents belong to a non-Christian religion, and about 38 percent of respondents report no religious affiliation.

³ Multiple imputation models were run in order to correct for missing data (Rubin 1996). Because the findings remain substantively similar, the original results are presented

Table 12.
Descriptive Statistics for all Variables (unweighted)

Variables	N	Mean	Std	Min	Max
Important to Live in a Democracy	53408	8.080	2.377	0	10
Protestant	54673	.091	0.294	0	1
Other Christian	54673	.446	0.507	0	1
Other Religion	54673	.062	0.246	0	1
None	54673	.383	0.496	0	1
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	49296	15.276	7.060	0	30
National Protestantism	54673	.092	0.135	.0008	.504
Age	54540	18.646	18.646	15	103
Female	54656	0.549	0.507	0	1
Education	54309	4.006	1.941	1	7
Annual Household Income – All Sources	43981	5.509	2.846	1	10
Minority	54011	.081	0.279	0	1
Foreign Birth	54647	0.087	0.287	0	1
Unemployment	54300	0.087	0.471		
Discriminated Against	53979	0.068	0.256	0	1
Anti-EU Sentiment	47901	4.745	2.800	0	10
Distrust for Politicians	53514	5.940	2.398	0	10
Far-Right	54673	.030	.173	0	1

Protestantism and Attitudes toward Democracy

Table 13 presents results from OLS models estimating evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation by religious affiliation. Model 1 includes basic demographic information. Model 2 introduces religious affiliation to test H1. Consistent with H1, when compared to Protestant respondents, other Christians ($b = -.594, p < .001$), adherents of other religions ($b = -.645, p < .001$), and the unaffiliated ($b = -.613, p < .001$) all offer lower evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed country. Model 3 controls for marginalization experiences with a measure of unemployment and experienced discrimination. Model 4 is a full model, including anti-EU sentiment, distrust for politicians, and far-right political affiliation as political controls. H1 remains supported in the full model. Other Christians ($b = -.535, p < .001$), respondents with other religious affiliations ($b = -.658, p < .001$), and nones ($b = -.544, p < .001$) remain significantly less optimistic in their evaluations toward democracy.

Protestantism, Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, and Attitudes toward Democracy

Table 14 presents analyses of Protestant attitudes toward democracy along with the nativism scale and the interaction term between these two variables. Model 1 includes the independent variable (Protestant) and the moderator (anti-immigrant sentiment). Both variables relate to attitudes toward democracy as expected. Protestants remain more positive in their evaluation of democracy when compared to other groups ($b = .525, p > .001$). As expected, anti-immigrant sentiment is negatively associated with evaluations of the importance of living in a democracy ($b = -.084, p > .001$).

Table 13.

OLS Regression Models Estimating Attitudes toward Democracy by Religious Affiliation

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	8.349*** (.018)	8.880*** (.036)	8.902*** (.037)	8.856*** (.037)
Age	.014*** (.0007)	.012*** (.0007)	.012*** (.0007)	.012*** (.0007)
Female	-.064** (.024)	-.070** (.024)	-.071** (.024)	-.076** (.023)
Education	.116*** (.007)	.114*** (.007)	.114*** (.007)	.093*** (.007)
Household Income	.044*** (.005)	.040*** (.005)	.037*** (.005)	.030*** (.005)
Minority	-.528*** (.048)	-.484*** (.051)	-.482*** (.051)	-.514*** (.050)
Foreign Born	.422*** (.044)	.435*** (.043)	.439*** (.044)	.387*** (.043)
Protestant (ref)				
Other Christian		-.594*** (.038)	-.591*** (.039)	-.535*** (.039)
Other Religion		-.645*** (.067)	-.643*** (.068)	-.658*** (.067)
None		-.613*** (.039)	-.608*** (.039)	-.544*** (.039)
Unemployment			-.077*** (.026)	-.023
Discriminated Against			-.002*** (.047)	.125** (.047)
Anti-EU Sentiment				-.108*** (.004)
Distrust Politicians				-.105*** (-.106)
Far-Right				-.056 (.067)
R-Square	.038	.038	.038	.072
N	32,808	32,808	32,808	32,808

***p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.10

Source: European Social Survey, 2012 Wave 6; All Data Weighted

Table 14.
OLS Regression Models Estimating Attitudes toward Democracy Predicted by Protestant Nativism

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	8.353*** (.020)	8.355*** (.019)
Age	.013*** (.0007)	.013*** (.0007)
Female	-.029 (.023)	-.029 (.023)
Education	.066*** (.007)	.068*** (.007)
Household Income	.026*** (.004)	.026*** (.004)
Minority	-.421*** (.046)	-.420*** (.046)
Foreign Born	.191*** (.042)	.187*** (.042)
Unemployment	-.052* (.025)	-.052* (.025)
Discriminated Against	.091* (.045)	.086† (.045)
Anti-EU Sentiment	-.042*** (.004)	-.042*** (.004)
Distrust Politicians	-.058*** (.005)	-.059*** (.005)
Far-Right	.148*** (.065)	.151* (.065)
Anti-immigrant Sentiment	-.084*** (.002)	-.087*** (.002)
Protestant	.525*** (.036)	.540*** (.037)
Protestant*Anti-Immigrant Sentiment		.033*** (.006)
R-Square	.127	.128
N	32,808	32,808

***p<.001, ** p<01, * p<.05, † p<.10

Source: European Social Survey, 2012 Wave 6; All Data Weighted

Model 2 is the full model, which includes the Protestant*anti-immigrant sentiment interaction term to test H2. H2 is supported, as Protestants are significantly less positive in their evaluation of democracy at higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, as Figures 1-2 illustrate, Protestants increase in anti-immigrant sentiment, their attitudes toward democracy become increasingly unfavorable, yet they maintain higher evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed nation when compared to other religious groups at similar levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. The positive interaction term, with the negative effect of anti-immigrant sentiment on Protestant attitudes toward democracy, suggests that Protestant affiliation buffers against the anti-democratic effects of nativism.

Protestant Support for Democracy by National Rates of Protestant Affiliation

Table 15 presents hierarchical linear models estimating support for democracy as conditioned by contextual variables at the national level. Model 1 includes the moderator, national rates of Protestantism, along with all the covariates in this study. The rate of Protestantism at the national level is significantly and positively associated with evaluations of democracy at the individual level ($b = 1.494, p < .05$). Model 2 includes Protestant affiliation at the individual level and national rates of Protestantism as a level-2 variable, along with all of the covariates. Protestants remain significantly more positive in their outlook toward democracy than other religious groups ($b = .106, p < .001$). The coefficient is noticeably smaller in this model, when compared to the individual-level models, suggesting that country-level characteristics partially explain the relationship between Protestant affiliation and attitudes toward democracy. National rates of Protestantism are positively associated with attitudes toward democracy at a marginal

level of significance ($b = 1.390$, $p < .10$). Model 3 adds the interaction term for Protestant*national rate of Protestantism to test H3. H3 is not supported. As Figures 3-4 illustrate, in countries with higher levels of Protestant adherence, Protestant individuals offer significantly higher evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed country ($b = 1.349$, $p < .001$).

Discussion and Conclusion

At the individual level, European Protestants are more supportive of democracy when compared to other religious groups and those without a religious affiliation. This suggests that in contemporary Europe, arguments for a unique pro-democratic Protestant ethic continue to hold, even in an era when democracies are being challenged rather than built up. Protestants are significantly less optimistic about democracy at higher rates of anti-immigrant sentiment. These results support H2, providing supporting evidence for classical arguments that pluralism contributed to pro-democratic ethic among Protestants. Interestingly, while nativist sentiment is associated with decreased support for democracy among Protestants, they still offer more generous evaluations of democracy than adherents of other religions at similar levels of nativism. This suggest that, at least to some extent, the pro-democratic value commitments of Protestants can protect against the anti-democratic effects of other ideologies.

At the national level, I also find evidence of a pro-democratic Protestant ethic. As Protestants increase in share of national populations, citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation, more strongly assert the importance of living in a country that is governed democratically. This belies my expectation that that Protestants would be less supportive of democracy as their share of the nation grew.

Table 15.
Random Intercept Models Estimating Attitudes toward Democracy

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	8.360*** (.143)	8.359*** (.142)	8.373*** (.143)
Age	.012*** (.0006)	.012*** (.0006)	.012*** (.0006)
Female	.058** (.021)	.056** (.021)	.055* (.021)
Education	.145*** (.007)	.145*** (.007)	.145*** (.007)
Household Income	.057*** (.004)	.057*** (.004)	.057*** (.004)
Minority	.156*** (.046)	.159*** (.046)	.162*** (.046)
Foreign Born	.004 (.040)	.009 (.040)	.017 (.040)
Unemployment	-.102*** (.024)	-.101*** (.024)	-.100*** (.024)
Discriminated Against	.003 (.043)	.002 (.043)	.005 (.043)
Anti-EU Sentiment	-.044*** (.004)	-.044*** (.004)	-.044*** (.004)
Distrust Politicians	-.059*** (.005)	-.058*** (.005)	-.058*** (.005)
Far-Right	.037*** (.063)	.057*** (.063)	.506*** (.063)
Anti-Immigrant Sentiment	-.037*** (.006)	-.037*** (.006)	-.037*** (.006)
Protestant		.106** (.038)	-.257* (.102)
National Protestant Affiliation	1.494* (.714)	1.390† (.715)	1.166 (.716)
Protestant*National Protestant Affiliation			1.349*** (.351)
-2 LL	164141.2	164138.2	164123.6
AIC	164147.2	164144.2	164129.6
BIC	164151.3	164148.3	164133.7
N	32,808	32,808	32,808

***p<.001, ** p<01, * p<.05, † p<.10

Source: European Social Survey, 2012 Wave 6; All Data Weighted




Figure 1. Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and Attitudes toward Democracy by Protestant Affiliation




Figure 2. Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and Attitudes toward Democracy by Protestant Affiliation




Figure 3. Attitudes toward Democracy at National Rates of Protestantism by Protestant Affiliation




Figure 4. Attitudes toward Democracy by National Percent Protestant

Rather, national rates of Protestantism condition individuals toward support for democracy. And individual Protestants are likely more easily able to recognize these values when they are disseminated at the national level. This speaks to observations in classical sociological theory about the nature of religious values to permeate structure and culture and influence even those who do not share these religious values (Tocqueville 2007; Weber 2002).

Classical sociological claims about Protestantism and democracy are largely upheld. Protestants appears to have held onto pro-democratic values, as indicated by their high evaluations of the importance of living in a democracy. This mirrors pro-democratic value commitments among Protestants in the U.S. colonial era and conversionary Protestants who helped build new democracies around the world (Tocqueville 2007; Woodberry 2012). These values extend beyond Protestant enclaves, as indicated by the pro-democratic effects of Protestantism at the national level. Classical and contemporary research on the importance of pluralism for democratic society is also vindicated, while arguments for religious and nativist protectionism are not.

Future scholarship should track the progress of anti-immigrant sentiment in global politics. There is some evidence that this specific wave of anti-immigrant politics has spread to the United States. While nativism has always been present in the US, the most recent presidential election had cross-national elements. Donald Trump identified with the European exit movement in the UK and nativist critics of Angela Merkel who accused her of hurting Germany through pro-immigrant policies. Further, the Trump campaign helped introduce the UK Independence Party's former leader, Nigel Farage, into US political commentary and staffed Hungarian far-right activities Sebastian Gorka.

There is also evidence that these ideas have developed roots among a religious base in the United States (Gorski 2017). Future scholarship should investigate the potential explicit European origins of new political developments in the United States.

One important limitation in this paper was the variability of rates of Protestantism by country. When focusing researching a rapidly changing Europe, secularization is expected to show in the data. At this level of secularization, I was at most able to assess Protestants holding a slightly majority of national populations. Future research could utilize longitudinal data with samples of European populations at higher rates of Protestant affiliation in the past. This would also be advantageous in allowing scholars to assess causation and the effects of growth and decline.

CHAPTER FIVE

Discussion and Conclusion

Taken together, these studies illuminate contributors to significant social change in contemporary Europe. These studies were oriented around the challenges Europeans face as they are tasked with building free, fair, and tolerant societies. Treatment of immigrants and refugees as well as attitudes toward democracy all speak to the vision of having a free and just liberal-democratic society (Kymlicka 2000, 2003). Throughout the chapters, I make reference to the fact that an influx of non-white, Muslim migrants have forced Europeans to rethink liberal-democratic policies and the politics of the free movement of peoples, which are both key components of the European political project (Carrera 2005; Huysman 2000; Karp et al. 2003). My research finds that a decline in a commitment to the rights and dignity of migrants is associated with a decline in commitment to democracy. A complicated story arises among Protestants. As the third study reveals, Protestants have maintained exceptionally high levels of commitment to democracy. Yet, as the second study reveals, they have not maintained particularly high-levels of openness towards migrants, which is an important factor in predicting support democracy, as the first study reveals. Examining Protestant attitudes towards democracy at different levels of anti-immigrant sentiment does reveal that anti-immigrant sentiment erodes Protestant commitments to democracy. However, when compared to other groups at the same level of nativism, Protestants maintain relatively higher commitments to democratic governance. Gorski's (2010) research highlights the fact that different

religious groups, in different nations, will generate their own myths of church-state relations and the place of outsiders in their nations. Future research may take a comparative-historical approach to more narrowly focus on the particular religious denominations in particular European nations and how they have negotiated the presence of new national and religious minorities.

In this dissertation, I seek to understand various aspects of major social change in Europe. I identify values embraced by the European project and presented a literature revealing that major commitments of the European project are being challenged. These include commitments to the free movement of people, equality, and democracy. This is indicated by increased opposition to migrants, especially Muslim refugees, and increased skepticism towards democracy (Alexander 2013; Carrera 2005; Fukuyama 2006; Huysman 2000; Karp et al. 2003; Kymlicka 2000). It was often commented that these phenomena were bridged in elections, which saw far-right and authoritarian leaders and parties seeing electoral gains (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2017; Van Praag 2003). My dissertation research investigates the sources of and consequences of anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as the sources of dissatisfaction with democracy.

There is another clear instance of large-scale social change occurring in Europe, which is not often immediately associated with democracy and the refugee crises. This is occurring in the religious sphere. Namely, widespread secularization has changed and continues to change the European social landscape. My dissertation research bridges together parallel literatures in the sociology of religion and political sociology, by finding associations between religious identity, religious culture, democracy, and attitudes towards immigrants.

One central contribution of my dissertation is its identification of a clear source of anti-democratic sentiment and consequences of nativism. One body of literature associates opposition to immigration with anti-democratic sentiment, but mostly as a latent function within broader far-right and populist movements. (Abizadeh 2008; Alexander 2003; Kymlicka 2000, 2003). A smaller, but notable body of literature argues that limits on immigration and immigrants' contributions are consistent with liberal-democratic nation building (Hjerb and Schnabel 2012; Miller 2016). I find that at higher levels of opposition to immigration and increased anti-immigrant sentiment, Europeans are the most skeptical about the benefits of living in a democratically governed nation. Further, the first empirical chapter of my dissertation provides evidence that intolerance towards migrants negatively alters perceptions of democracy. As opposition to immigration and nativist sentiment towards immigrants increases, Europeans are more prone to embrace a form of democracy with authoritarian characteristics. These illiberal or "defensive" democrats believe that democratic governments do not need to treat minority groups fairly, run free and fair elections, protect press freedoms, or otherwise guarantee freedoms and or be held accountable by citizens (Watts and Feldman 2001). My findings show that opposition to immigrants and immigration stand out among far-right and populist movements in predicting anti and illiberal-democratic sentiment. My findings also give reason to doubt that citizens oppose immigrants and their contributions to society in order to protect liberal-democracies.

In the second empirical chapter of this dissertation, I address gaps in the literature on religion's contributions to European social change by asking who in Europe is antagonistic towards immigrants. In this chapter, I highlight the fact that as Europe

experiences religious change through secularization, the religious profile of migrants has changed as well. Today, most immigrants to Europe come from Muslim-majority nations, and most Europeans are cognizant of this fact (Ribberink et al. 2017; Spruyt and Elchardus 2012; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Theories of secularization have long predicted that religious indifference would arise in secular societies, leading to lower rates of religious conflict. Secularization is also expected to be complimentary to modernization, leading to a tolerant and liberal environment, which is conducive to democracy and open to othered people groups (Bruce 2002; Casanova 2004; Emerson and Hartman 2006; Inglehart 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Ribberink et al. 2017). Other bodies of literature argue that a secular society will resist religious newcomers, as the unaffiliated are hoping to achieve religious majority status through the secularization process. Moreover, Muslim immigrants may have value differences with European secularism (Asad 2008; Akkerman 2005; Casanova 2004, 2012; de Koster et al. 2014; Ribberink et al. 2017). Finally, there is a strong religious tradition of showing charity towards the less fortunate, including refugees (Bruce 2006; Bennett and Einolf 2017; Bruce 2006; Pipes and Ebaugh 2002; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Ruiters and De Graaf 2004). My findings challenge both the expectations of theories of secularization and findings on religion and charitability toward strangers. This study finds that the religiously unaffiliated are more welcoming of refugees than established religious groups. However, religious newcomers are consistently more supportive of their nations admitting refugees when compared to the unaffiliated. Secularization at the community-level is inversely related to preferences for generous refugee policies, while the opposite is true for religious service attendance.

Perspectives on democracy, attitudes towards immigrants, and religion are all revisited in the third and final empirical chapter of this dissertation. This chapter draws from classical sociological theory, namely from Tocqueville (1956) and Weber (2002), on Protestantism and democratic nation-building. Classical sociological theory, as well as contemporary research, argues that in the era of new democracies, Protestant values, social norms, and religious institutions were critical in providing the foundations for new democracies (Tocqueville 1956; Weber 2002; Woodberry 2012). In the contemporary era, in which democratic governance is being challenged, there has thus far been mixed evidence as to the role Protestantism is serving in maintain democratic governments. Protestant values may persist into the current era and maintain consolidated democracies and even protect them from deconsolidating forces. On the other hand, nationalist movements and attempts at establishing religious monopolies may lead Protestants to embrace authoritarian tendencies and eschew their once held democratic values and norms (Gorski 2010; Gorski and Türkmen-Derivoğlu 2013). I find that Protestants still maintain a uniquely high level of confidence in democracy. Further, Protestants are the most supportive of democracy in countries where they make up a larger share of the population. The presence of Protestants in a nation is also generally associated with elevated evaluations of democracy. This suggests that Protestants still hold to personal values that are consistent with democracy and also speaks to the power of religious institutions to persist and reach beyond their constituents in perpetuating values, norms, and mores (Weber 2002). However, Protestants tend to be *more* skeptical of democracy at higher rates of nativism. This research finds support for the persisting explanatory power of classical sociological theories of Protestantism and democracy in a new regional

and historic context. This study also provides support for observations in classical sociological theories Protestantism succeeds in being pro-democratic to the extent that it is pluralistic, by testing this theoretical framework in a context that is far more pluralistic than those observed by Tocqueville and Weber. While this study of does not test theories of secularism and modernization directly, it does find that support for democracy is uniquely vibrant among Protestants compared to the unaffiliated and other religious groups. Protestant national cultures (Ribberink et al. 2017; Tocqueville 2007) also provide a fertile climate for pro-democratic sentiment. Further research directly address theories of secularization and modernization may expand beyond the Protestant focus and compare how non-religious societies fair in maintaining democratic norms when compared to religious societies.

This research also highlights the importance of contextual factors in understanding how religion shapes attitudes towards democracy and immigrants. In the second study, individual-level models reveal that most of the religious groups differ from the religiously unaffiliated in their policy preferences regarding admitting refugees into their nations. Taking regional religious characteristics into account renders several of these differences insignificant. In the case of Catholics, it changes the relationship with restrictive policy preferences from negative to positive. This strongly suggests that factors that regionally vary partially explain the relationship between religious identity and attitudes toward refugee policy. In the third study, accounting for Protestant national culture notably decreases the size of individual-level Protestant coefficient in predicting attitudes toward democracy. This suggests that national variations in Protestant presence partially accounts for Protestant attitudes towards democracy. Future research should

investigate mediating variables and additional factors at the contextual-level and move the field toward theories of how religious contexts shape democracies and political attitudes. One promising potential avenue would be to investigate how legacies of religious regulations and current religious restrictions shape attitudes towards democracy.

Moving forward, scholars should continue to monitor the state of democracy and conditions offered to migrants if Europe further secularizes. We can expect that if nativism increases throughout Europe, then more citizens will eschew democratic values and waiver in their commitments to democratic norms. Over time, the values of these anti-democratic citizens would likely be represented in electoral outcomes.

While secularization has the potential to decrease conflict through religious indifference and increase tolerance and other liberal sentiments through modernization, the findings in this study complicate this narrative. Secularization may have a negative effect on democracies if the secularization process attempts to remove the pro-democratic values and norms found among Protestants and within Protestant societies. Secularization may lead to an influx in individuals who are open to immigrants, as individual-level analyses reveal relatively high rates of support for refugees among the unaffiliated. However, religion at the community-level is positively associated with support for refugees. If the secularization process diminishes the potential for religion to contribute to values and norms at the community-level, hostilities towards refugees may rise. Ultimately, as previous research, and the studies in this dissertation reveal, hostilities towards othered groups will be harmful for democracy.

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