

Manuscript Number: JEPO-D-15-01852R1

Title: Department of Defense energy policy and research: A framework to support strategy

Article Type: Full length article

Section/Category: Energy and Society

Keywords: Energy strategy; knowledge management; energy security; department of defense; military operations management

Corresponding Author: Dr. Joshua K Strakos, Ph.D.

Corresponding Author's Institution: Air Force Institute of Technology

First Author: Joshua K Strakos, Ph.D.

Order of Authors: Joshua K Strakos, Ph.D.; Jose A Quintanilla, M.S.; Joseph R Huscroft, Ph.D.

Abstract: The Department of Defense (DOD) is the major consumer of energy within the Federal government, and it has been directed to implement cost cutting measures related to energy dependence through numerous Executive Orders and Congressional legislation. As a result, the DOD released an Energy Strategy which outlines ways to reduce energy requirements in order to meet both Presidential and Congressional mandates for energy security. With this research, we provide a historical review (1973-2014) of energy policy, legislation, and research. Additionally we identify gaps between strategy and research. The results show that DOD energy research lacks a unifying structure and guiding framework. We propose a knowledge management framework to unify and guide research efforts in direct support of the DOD Energy Strategy.

Department of Defense energy policy and research: A framework to support strategy⁺

Joshua K. Strakos^{a,*}, Jose A. Quintanilla^{a,b}, Joseph R. Huscroft^a

^a Air Force Institute of Technology, AFIT/ENS, 2950 Hobson Way, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 45433

^b Present address: PSC 2 Box 7178, APO AE 09012

⁺Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.

* Corresponding author. Email address: Joshua.strakos@afit.edu, jmjjstrakos1@gmail.com
Phone: (937) 255-3636 ext. 4318

1
2
3
4 **Abstract**
5
6
7

8 The Department of Defense (DOD) is the major consumer of energy within the Federal
9
10 government, and it has been directed to implement cost cutting measures related to energy
11
12 dependence through numerous Executive Orders and Congressional legislation. As a result, the
13
14 DOD released an Energy Strategy which outlines ways to reduce energy requirements in order to
15
16 meet both Presidential and Congressional mandates for energy security. With this research, we
17
18 provide a historical review (1973-2014) of energy policy, legislation, and research. Additionally
19
20 we identify gaps between strategy and research. The results show that DOD energy research
21
22 lacks a unifying structure and guiding framework. We propose a knowledge management
23
24 framework to unify and guide research efforts in direct support of the DOD Energy Strategy.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 **Keywords:** Energy strategy; knowledge management; energy security; department of defense;
34
35 military operations management
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4
5
6
7 **DOD ENERGY POLICY AND RESEARCH: A FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT**
8 **STRATEGY**
9

10
11 **1. Introduction**
12

13
14 *“Energy security for the Department [of Defense] means having assured access to*
15 *reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet*
16 *operational needs.”*
17

18
19 *—2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*
20

21 *1.1 Background*
22

23
24
25 The United States Department of Defense (DOD) is the single largest consumer of energy
26 in the country (Gauntlett & Adamson, 2012). This energy is consumed in the form of petroleum
27 products, electricity, and in other forms (Energy Information Administration, 2015a). This
28 consumption coupled with the price volatility and supply vulnerability creates budgetary and
29 security risks for the DOD and the United States. This risk has been addressed through policy
30 throughout the modern era, particularly since the oil embargo and price shock of the early 1970s.
31 US energy policy has repeatedly attempted to address this risk for the past four decades. In the
32 most recent decade, policy has aggressively addressed the risk to the DOD by focusing attention
33 on energy strategy (Department of Defense, 2011a).
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 The United States and the DOD is reliant upon many sources for its supply of fuel and
49 energy (Energy Information Administration, 2014). These sources vary from domestic producers
50 and refiners to imported sources and alternatives as shown in table 1.4b of the December 2015
51 Monthly Energy Review (Energy Information Administration, 2015a). The continued
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 dependence of the United States on imported oil and the importance of reducing this dependence
5
6 is quantified in economic and national security terms (Brown & Huntington, 2015; Geller et al.,
7
8 1994; Greene, 2010). The cost of the US presence in the Persian Gulf has been evaluated in
9
10 terms of a national security objective as well as having been linked directly to the oil
11
12 consumption of the US transportation sector (Delucchi & Murphy, 2008; Stern, 2010). Amidst
13
14 the growing world demand, price volatility, and supply uncertainty, a new age of increased
15
16 energy awareness in DOD policy has emerged.
17
18
19
20
21

22
23 Although the energy policy focus has led to a formal DOD energy strategy within the
24
25 past 5 years (Department of Defense, 2011a), this strategy is in its infancy, and the means to
26
27 support this strategy are not fully developed. As the DOD and each of its military services strives
28
29 to make progress toward energy security, the efforts they expend are largely independent and
30
31 uncoordinated, resulting in a less than optimal use of resources.
32
33
34

35
36 Research addresses how the DOD and the US should deal with specific aspects of
37
38 fulfilling its energy security goals from different perspectives. Demand reduction is presented as
39
40 a challenge-ridden objective for the DOD where a gap in policy and implementation is
41
42 highlighted (Closson, 2013), and studies suggest the need for unification in efficiency efforts by
43
44 the DOD (Simon, Regnier, & Whitney, 2014; Umstadd, 2009). Although there are suggested
45
46 maxims to guide research (Sovacool & Brown, 2015) and the notion that DOD efforts need more
47
48 coordination in this area (Closson, 2013; Simon, Regnier, & Whitney, 2014), there is no big
49
50 picture in terms of what research has been done, how this research supports the DOD energy
51
52 strategy, or how future research should be structured and prioritized. In its infancy, the landscape
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 of DOD energy awareness needs a focus and a unifying structure to assure its scarce human
5 capital and monetary resources are used in the most effective way possible.
6
7
8
9

10 In this paper, we provide a first look at what DOD energy research has been done within
11 military schools, paint a picture of common issues being addressed, and provide a state of the art
12 in terms of issues and research. We suggest a framework based on the DOD Energy Strategy to
13 illustrate how research supports the strategy. This serves as a guide for future research as well as
14 a basis for unification of effort within the DOD.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23 Although the US no longer relies primarily on imported sources of petroleum, the DOD
24 still uses petroleum to meet most of its energy needs. In 2014, about 27% of petroleum was
25 imported from foreign countries (Energy Information Administration, 2015b). The DOD cost of
26 petroleum products for fiscal year 2014 was 13.9 billion US dollars (Defense Logistics Agency –
27 Energy, 2015). Compared to an overall DOD energy expenditure of 18.8 billion US dollars in
28 that same year (Department of Energy, 2014), petroleum makes up about 74% of the total. The
29 price volatility of the oil market places huge strains on the US defense budget. It has been
30 estimated that an oil price increase of one dollar per barrel costs the DOD about 130 million
31 dollars (Miles, 2008). And with the price of oil fluctuating between \$10.25 and \$145.31 since
32 2008 (WTI Cushing spot price, source: EIA), this makes budgeting for energy use difficult.
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 Countries like China and India have experienced rapid economic growth and along with
49 this an increased energy demand. A 2007 report, sponsored by the US Department of Energy,
50 found that total global demand for energy is projected to grow by 50-60 percent by 2030, driven
51 by increasing population and the pursuit of improving living standards (Raymond, Deming, &
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Nichols, 2007). Although the growth of energy supply is expected to keep pace with this growth
5
6 in demand for the next 25 years (Dimotakis, Grober, & Lewis, 2006), there remains significant
7
8 uncertainty related to energy supply due to regional instability (Loechl et al., 2012). The advent
9
10 of globalization, the war on terrorism, and the need to safeguard the earth's environment are all
11
12 intertwined with US energy concerns (Wirth, Gray, & Podesta, 2003). Our economy and way of
13
14 life depend on various sources of energy, the most important of which is oil (Tewksbury, 2006).
15
16 These circumstances place great strain on the US government as it strives to ensure our
17
18 continued economic resiliency and national security. CNA, a nonprofit research and analysis
19
20 organization located in Arlington, VA, notes that US dependence on oil weakens international
21
22 leverage, undermines foreign policy objectives, and entangles America with unstable or hostile
23
24 regimes (CNA Military Advisory Board, 2009).
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 The DOD is the largest single U.S. consumer of energy, consuming 3.8 billion kilowatt
33
34 hours (kWh) of electricity and over 120 million barrels of oil per year (Gauntlett & Adamson,
35
36 2012), having peaked at 145 million barrels in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. The DOD also relies on
37
38 foreign supplies of crude oil and the finished transportation fuels that are derived from it
39
40 (Dimotakis et al., 2006). As a result, the DOD spends billions of dollars per year on fuel, and is
41
42 pursuing numerous initiatives for reducing its fuel needs and changing the mix of energy sources
43
44 that it uses (Blakely, 2012).
45
46
47
48
49

50 The DOD Operational Energy Strategy, released in 2011, sets the overall direction for
51
52 operational energy security for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Combatant
53
54 Commands, Defense Agencies, and Military Departments/Services (Department of Defense,
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 2011a). The goal of the DOD Operational Energy Strategy is “energy security for the warfighter”
5
6 - to assure that U.S. forces have a reliable supply of energy for 21st century military missions
7
8 (Department of Defense, 2011a). Furthermore, the strategy outlines three principle ways to
9
10 achieve this goal. Additionally, seven targets were introduced to support the goal in the
11
12 Operational Energy Strategy: Implementation Plan (Department of Defense, 2012). The
13
14 categories are explained below.
15
16
17
18
19

20 Category one is: “More Fight, Less Fuel...Reduce Demand for Energy in Military
21
22 Operations.” This category focuses on reducing demand and increasing efficiency to enhance
23
24 combat effectiveness (Department of Defense, 2012). It includes three specific targets which are:
25
26 Measure Operational Energy Consumption; Improve Energy Performance and Efficiency in
27
28 Operations and Training; and Promote Operational Energy Innovation.
29
30
31

32 Category two is: “More Options, Less Risk...Expand and Secure Energy Supplies for
33
34 Military Operations”. This category focuses on diversifying and protecting energy sources
35
36 (Department of Defense, 2012). It includes two targets which are: Improve Operational Energy
37
38 Security at Fixed Installations; and Promote the Development of Alternative Fuels.
39
40
41

42 Category three is: “More Capability, Less Cost...Build Energy Security into the Future
43
44 Force.” This category focuses on integrating energy considerations into planning and policy
45
46 (Department of Defense, 2012). It includes two targets which are: Incorporate Energy Security
47
48 Considerations into Requirements and Acquisition; and Adapt Policy, Doctrine, Professional
49
50 Military Education, and Combatant Command Activities (Change Culture).
51
52
53

54 *1.2 Purpose*

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Although this strategy signaled a committed focus on energy management by the DOD, a
5
6 unified effort and means to achieve these goals has not materialized. Policy, strategy,
7
8 implementation, and research associated with these goals is fragmented and highly parochial
9
10 among the military service departments. In this paper, we review US DOD energy policy since
11
12 1973, analyze the current DOD energy posture, and present a framework to organize and enable
13
14 unified research to support the DOD Operational Energy Strategy and its goal.
15
16
17
18
19

20 **2. Methods**

21
22
23 Our systematic approach included a review and analysis of US energy legislation, policy,
24
25 and DOD-specific energy studies from military schools.
26
27

28
29 We review US energy policy and legislation since 1973 to frame the evolution and
30
31 context of the DOD's thought and perspective on energy security. Next, we present a qualitative
32
33 analysis of the broad spectrum of US DOD energy literature to assess the current posture and
34
35 issues associated with DOD energy security and provide a basis for a research framework. We
36
37 confine the scope of the final literature survey and content analysis to include only objective
38
39 research from military academic institutions. A broader scope is not included at this time for two
40
41 reasons. First, the graduate military academic institutions provide a well-catalogued and
42
43 accessible collection of studies from which to base an analysis, and second, our time and
44
45 resources were not sufficient to cover the potential breadth of areas, outlets, and topics to be
46
47 covered in a truly exhaustive search of energy literature. This, however, does not detract from the
48
49 primary contribution of this study, which is to provide a structure and classification schema for
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 connecting research to strategy in the DOD. Finally, we develop a framework and present an
5
6 initial categorization of the aforementioned military research.
7
8

9 10 **3. Analysis**

11 12 13 *3.1 The Inception and Evolution of US Energy Policy*

14
15
16 Policy makers have been wrestling with the concept of US energy security for decades.
17
18 The most notable shift of attention toward US energy policy occurred in 1973 as a consequence
19
20 of the Arab Oil Embargo in reaction to the US support for Israel in the Yom Kippur war (Fehner
21
22 & Holl, 1994). The Arab oil embargo, sometimes referred to as “Energy Pearl Harbor Day”
23
24 (Light, 1976) caused the price of oil to triple overnight, which resulted in long gas lines and large
25
26 price increases at the pump.
27
28
29

30
31
32 A string of executive policy decisions have been made in every administration since this
33
34 time. During this crisis, President Nixon launched “*Project Independence*,” consisting of
35
36 synthetic fuel programs (Fialka, 2006) and assured, “In the last third of this century, our
37
38 independence will depend on maintaining and achieving self-sufficiency in energy” (Potter,
39
40 2008). President Nixon further asserted this project would “...insure that by the end of this
41
42 decade, Americans will not have to rely on any source of energy beyond our own” (Fehner &
43
44 Holl, 1994). On the policy front, the *Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974*, which
45
46 established the Federal Energy Administration was passed. Since Nixon, every U.S. President
47
48 has made an effort to free the United States of its dependence on foreign fossil fuels.
49
50
51

52
53
54 President Ford continued this agenda by signing the *Energy Reorganization Act of 1974*,
55
56 which consolidated the various departments and administrative staffs that dealt with energy
57
58

1
2
3
4 under one umbrella (Black, 2009). He later moved the date for achieving American energy
5
6 independence to 1985 with the signing of the *Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975*. It
7
8 was this Act that required fuel efficiency labeling for new car and major appliances. President
9
10 Jimmy Carter, in his 1979 “Crisis of Confidence Speech,” declared “Beginning this moment, this
11
12 nation will never use more foreign oil than we did in 1977—never.” He proposed an energy plan
13
14 of 142 billion dollars to establish energy independence by 1990 (Carter, 1979) and gave the
15
16 management of energy a cabinet-level position with the establishment of the Department of
17
18 Energy in 1977 (Black, 2009).
19
20
21
22
23

24 In the 1980’s, the U.S. government looked to the development of synthetic fuels and to
25
26 eliminating price controls on oil and natural gas. Congress, through the passing of the *Energy*
27
28 *Security Act of 1980*, sought to reduce dependence on foreign energy resources by producing
29
30 synthetic fuel. It established a national goal of achieving a synthetic fuel production capability
31
32 equivalent to at least 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil by 1987 and of at least 2,000,000
33
34 barrels per day of crude oil by 1992 from domestic sources (Energy Security Act, 1980).
35
36 However, this venture never produced the expected results and was terminated in 1986
37
38 (Blumberg, 2013). Additionally, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order (EO) 12287 –
39
40 “*Decontrol of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products*” in 1981 which eliminated price
41
42 controls on oil and natural gas.
43
44
45
46
47
48

49 In 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced a strategy aimed at “reducing our
50
51 dependence on foreign oil.” He later funded the U.S. Advanced Battery Consortium with a 260
52
53 million dollar research project with the goal of developing lightweight battery systems for
54
55 electric vehicles (Kraemer, 2006). Later, with the *Energy Policy Act of 1992*, we sought to
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 account for the full cost of energy to include accounting for the cost of production, distribution,
5
6 proper disposal and ensuring access to sources of supply for imported energy resources (Energy
7
8 Policy Act, 1992).
9

10
11 President Bill Clinton’s approach to the energy problem was to propose a large tax on
12
13 crude oil in order to discourage dependence on foreign sources of oil in 1992. The following
14
15 year, he launched a billion dollar Partnership for New Generation Vehicles with the Big Three
16
17 automakers, to produce a prototype car, three times more fuel-efficient than conventional
18
19 vehicles by 2004 (Fehner & Holl, 1994). Additionally, he issued Executive Order (EO) 13123 –
20
21 “*Greening the Government through Efficient Energy Management*,” directing the Federal Government,
22
23 as the Nation’s largest energy consumer, to significantly improve its energy management to save
24
25 money and reduce emissions that contribute to air pollution and global climate change (Clinton,
26
27 1999). EO 13123 was later revoked by the new and improved EO 13423 – “*Strengthening*
28
29 *Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management*,” in 2007.
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

37 President George W. Bush asserted that addressing the nation’s “energy crisis” was his
38
39 most important task as president prior to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
40
41 Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Klare, 2004). During his first term in office, he declared this,
42
43 via his 2003 State of the Union address, “to promote energy independence for our country”
44
45 (Bush, 2003). He announced a 1.2 billion dollar FreedomCAR (Cooperative Automotive
46
47 Research) proposal to develop hydrogen-fueled vehicles (Kraemer, 2006; Wirth et al., 2003).
48
49 Additionally, the Bush administration modified the *Energy Policy Act of 2005* and called it the
50
51 *Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007* as a way to address the country’s energy security
52
53 concerns (Scofield, 2009).
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 In early 2007, President Obama, who was then just beginning his campaign for the White
5 House, declared that America must break free of the “tyranny of oil” (Bryce, 2009). In his 2011
6
7 “*Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future*,” he continued the assault on the country’s dependency
8
9 on foreign oil by proposing an ambitious but achievable standard for America. He declared that
10
11 by 2035, “we will generate 80 percent of our electricity from a diverse set of clean energy
12
13 sources - including renewable energy sources” (White House, 2011). The Obama administration
14
15 gave energy security its due share of benefits through the passing of the \$800 billion dollar
16
17 *American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009* (ARRA) also called the *Recovery Act of 2009*.
18
19 The energy portion alone consisted of approximately \$50 billion dollars whereby the largest
20
21 partition of that money (\$11B) was appropriated for development of an electric smart grid to
22
23 digitize power distribution and improve the grid’s efficiency (Scofield, 2009).
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31
32 Additionally, the DOD is moving aggressively to integrate alternative fuels on its bases,
33
34 ships, and aircraft from the \$7.1 billion in stimulus appropriations by the ARRA to, among other
35
36 things, modernize DOD’s energy infrastructure and conduct targeted energy efficiency research
37
38 and development projects (Rosen, 2010). The Obama administration is now pushing automakers
39
40 to hit a 54.5 miles per gallon fleet-wide average by 2025 as a means of increasing vehicle fuel
41
42 efficiency and thus reducing the consumption of fossil fuels (Krauss & Lipton, 2012). Most
43
44 recently, an Executive Order was signed on March 19, 2015 on the subject of planning for
45
46 federal sustainment over the next decade. This policy focuses the government on reducing
47
48 greenhouse gas emissions while continuing to meet mission requirements.
49
50
51
52
53

54 *3.2 Continued Policy and Action in the Department of Defense*

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 In an effort to align the DOD with federal energy policies, the DOD Operational Energy
5 Strategy was released and the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy
6 Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)) was established in 2011 (Department of Defense, 2011a),
7 and an accompanying Energy Strategy Implementation Plan was released in 2012 to guide the
8 department with specific targets to achieve the overall strategic goal of the plan (Department of
9 Defense, 2012).
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20 All military branches have developed their own policies (United States Air Force, 2013,
21 United States Army, 2009, United States Marine Corps, 2009, United States Navy, 2010) with
22 respect to energy and have been actively engaged in energy reduction efforts as well as
23 alternative energy initiatives - a process often referred to as decarbonization (Shinnar & Citro,
24 2008). As of 14 December 2012, the military service departments had spent approximately 48
25 million dollars on alternative fuels, and the Navy proposed a 170 million dollar investment in
26 biofuel production capability. By comparison, DOD purchases of petroleum fuels totaled 18.1
27 billion dollars in FY2011 (Defense Logistics Agency - Energy, 2013). These figures are evidence
28 that progress is being made by each military branch as they strive to meet both Federal and DOD
29 mandates and policies.
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 *3.3 Current Posture and Issues*

46 *3.3.1 The DOD is in need of a cultural revolution (reduce demand)*

47
48
49
50
51
52 Leadership must begin promoting the message that (fuel) efficiency at the tactical
53 platform and system level is a clear strategic path to improve performance, reduce logistics
54 burden and free resources from modernization and readiness (Defense Science Board, 2008;
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Closson, 2013). The CNA Military Advisory Board identified in its May 2009 report that DOD
5
6 leadership must take an active role in transforming its energy posture and stated, "...leadership
7
8 must demonstrate the proper focus and attention..." for development, testing, and deploying new
9
10 technologies (Allen, 2012; CNA Military Advisory Board, 2009).
11
12

13
14 *3.3.2 DOD energy security is threatened by the risk of price fluctuation (reduce demand and*
15
16 *ensure supply)*
17
18

19
20 If fuel costs exceed the amount budgeted for them, then they are financed by taking
21
22 money from the budgets of other programs. This can severely affect other DOD programs, if not
23
24 cancel them entirely (Fisher & Macheret, 2007). Both a reduction in demand as well as a focus
25
26 on efforts to expand supply sources lessen this risk.
27
28
29
30

31 *3.3.3 The DOD's petroleum use contributes to environmental concerns (reduce demand and*
32
33 *expand supply)*
34
35
36

37 The United States needs an energy security strategy the entire nation can support in order
38
39 to cut our dependence on oil and our emissions of greenhouse gases (Center for a New American
40
41 Security, 2008). Already, the carbon lodged in the atmosphere by the Industrial Revolution over
42
43 the last 150 years has taken a toll: disappearing glaciers, a thinning Arctic icecap, dying coral
44
45 reefs, and increasingly violent hurricanes (Kraemer, 2006). Although there has been added
46
47 pressure for the U.S. to increase its domestic production of fossil fuels as a means of alleviating
48
49 the dependency of foreign produced energy, critics of domestic oil production argue that fossil
50
51 fuels are destroying the environment and play a role in global warming by increasing the amount
52
53 of carbon in the atmosphere (Weidenmier, Davis, & Aliaga-Diaz, 2008).
54
55
56
57
58

1
2
3
4 3.3.4 *Political and Security effects (ensure supply)*
5
6
7

8 Since the US still relies to some extent on foreign petroleum imports to meet demand, the
9 potential for reliance on countries that have opposing political and national interests exists.
10 Furthermore, the economic cost of dependence on foreign oil is staggering (Stein, 2011). The
11 high oil prices of 2008 fueled one of the biggest wealth transfers in history (Haigh, 2009). At the
12 time, the U.S. was importing some 60% of its oil from foreign sources resulting in prices
13 adversely affecting our trade balance (Defense Science Board, 2008).
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22 According to Powers (2010), the U.S. at one time had an oil trade deficit of
23 approximately \$1 billion dollars per day (Halff, 2008), larger than our trade deficit with China,
24 which in 2010 was approximately \$748,000,000 per day (United States Census Bureau, 2011).
25 This outflow of capital not only weakened our national economy by increasing our trade deficit,
26 but has the potential of enriching countries who may wish to harm us. Although our trade deficit
27 has declined (Energy Information Administration, 2015b) any money from the United States to
28 potentially hostile countries enables those nations to purchase the most advanced military
29 technology and the human expertise to further develop and deploy it (Stein, 2011).
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 Former national security adviser Robert McFarlane and former CIA director James
43 Woolsey once described our dependence on foreign oil as, “the well from which our enemies
44 draw their political strength and financial power: the strategic importance of oil, which provides
45 the wherewithal for a generational war against us” (McFarlane & Woolsey, 2011). Time and
46 again, the U.S. military and national security leaders have warned of the substantial risk this
47 outflow of capital poses to the security of the United States (Stein, 2011). However, due to the
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 increasing demands of petroleum fuels from developing countries like China and India, the
5
6 offending oil regimes will enrich themselves whether or not America does business with them
7
8
9 (Nivola, 2008).

10 3.3.6 *Cost and infrastructure favor oil (build energy into the future force)*

11
12 By some accounts, the DOD is postured as an instrument of policy to shape the future energy
13
14 development. The U.S. Congress has codified annual reporting on operational energy
15
16 management and implementation of operational energy strategy (Duncan Hunter National
17
18 Defense Authorization Act, 2009). By addressing its own fuel demand, the DOD can serve as a
19
20 stimulus for new energy efficiency technologies, and mitigate national dependence on foreign oil
21
22 (Defense Science Board, 2008).
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30 The Defense Science Board, a group of civilian experts appointed to advise the DOD on
31
32 technical and scientific matters, recommended that, “it is essential that the DOD support
33
34 fundamental science investments that can lead to revolutionary improvements in the fuel
35
36 efficiency of tomorrow’s weapon platform systems” (Defense Science Board, 2008). The DOD
37
38 has the capability to explore better technology to reduce fuel consumption and make equipment
39
40 more fuel efficient. By doing so, the DOD can also stimulate the economy and allow further
41
42 development of systems the nation can use to reduce our dependence on foreign fuel and
43
44 increase our national security (Allen, 2012).
45
46
47
48
49

50 However, there are opposing viewpoints which claim the DOD may not have the market
51
52 power to effect alternative energy development. Furthering the threat to alternative energy are
53
54 the strict requirements that must be met in order to fully integrate such fuels into the military
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 infrastructure. Each military service must first certify the use of alternative fuel blends with their
5
6 tactical systems and these fuels must be able to be “dropped in” to current systems and meet
7
8 standards for energy density, flash point, freezing point, thermal stability, lubricity, and viscosity
9
10 (Mullen, 2011). However, the use of alternative energy sources must be synchronized with
11
12 efforts to reduce consumption; otherwise there is no energy savings realized, but merely a shift
13
14 from one supply source to another (United States Army, 2009). By seeking alternative energy
15
16 technologies in combination with continued reliance on fossil fuels and conservation policies, the
17
18 DOD will reduce foreign energy dependence (Holzman, 2006).
19
20
21
22
23

24 The primary consideration in the development and implementation of substantial
25
26 alternative energy technologies is the cost of oil compared to the cost of alternative sources.
27
28 Additionally, the current energy infrastructure, built over the last century, was designed to enable
29
30 the reliable production and delivery of low-cost fuels to consumers (Verrastro et al., 2007). As a
31
32 result, this infrastructure has been one of the major cost advantages for the continued use of
33
34 traditional fossil fuel resources over alternative sources of energy (Verrastro & Ladislaw, 2007).
35
36
37
38

39 The high oil prices and fears of running out of oil in the 1970s and early 1980s
40
41 encouraged investments in alternative energy sources, including synthetic fuels made from coal,
42
43 but when oil prices fell, investments in these alternatives became uneconomical (Government
44
45 Accountability Office, 2007). A 2006 report, Reducing DOD Fossil Fuel Dependence, asserts
46
47 that an energy shortage is unlikely in the near term to hinder DOD operations and emphasizes the
48
49 value of optimizing the energy efficiency of weapon systems over pursuing alternative fuel at
50
51 this time (Blackwell, 2007; Dimotakis et al., 2006). At present, alternative fuels command a
52
53 price premium which is expected to decline significantly as the market develops over the next
54
55
56
57
58

1
2
3
4 decade. The DOD must send a clear market signal in order to enable the private sector to
5
6 continue to develop cost-competitive alternative fuels (Parthemore & Nagl, 2010). A 2011 DOD
7
8 study stated: “Despite the reduced premium, the Services’ renewable fuel goals could still
9
10 impose \$2.2 billion in additional estimated annual fuel costs by 2020.” This would represent a 10
11
12 to 15 percent increase over the cost of conventional petroleum fuels (Department of Defense,
13
14 2011b). However, 10-year future fuel price predictions are subject to significant fluctuation in
15
16 most cases and must be considered with a level of caution. Future price uncertainties
17
18 notwithstanding, some analysts predict that petroleum will remain the primary source of
19
20 operational energy for the DOD. According to Dimotakis and Grober (2006), barring
21
22 externalities like subsidies, governmental and departmental directives, etc., non-fossil-derived
23
24 fuels are not likely to play a significant role in the next 25 years because cost and current
25
26 infrastructure (refining and distribution networks) favor petroleum.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34 As long as petroleum-based fuels are less expensive than other fuel or energy sources,
35
36 this nation will continue to focus on the use of petroleum-based fuels (United States Army,
37
38 2009). With their high power density and relative low cost, fossil fuels will be difficult to replace
39
40 (Blackwell, 2007). A 2011 RAND report found “that a domestic alternative fuel industry could
41
42 yield large economic profits within the United States. However, RAND further concluded that
43
44 there was no direct benefit to the DOD from using alternative fuels rather than petroleum-derived
45
46 fuels (Bartis & Bibber, 2011). Absent a major increase in the relative reliance on alternative
47
48 energy sources, oil and coal will continue to drive the energy train (United States Joint Force
49
50 Command, 2010). In essence, oil will leave the economic system when it becomes more
51
52 expensive than alternative sources or when the end uses it satisfies disappear (Watkins, 2006).
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 **4. Results and Discussion**
5

6 The issues revealed by the analysis of current DOD energy posture are closely aligned
7 with the “ways” to achieving energy security identified in the DOD energy strategy and
8 implementation plan described in section one. In the final stage of this project, we adapt these
9 strategic categories to develop a framework and perform a content analysis of existing military
10 research to establish theory to guide future research firmly grounded in published strategy and
11 the current issues revealed by the qualitative analysis.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21 DOD energy research was collected from the Air Force Institute of Technology and the
22 Naval Postgraduate School. These institutions focus on relevant operational problems for their
23 respective services and the DOD, however, the concepts within the energy research they produce
24 are applicable to all branches. They are unique in that they provide high quality academic
25 research for the DOD through graduate education programs in the management sciences,
26 engineering, and other technical fields. Figure 1 below shows the number of studies collected
27 from each source, by year.
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 -----
43 **Insert Fig. 1 here**
44 -----
45
46
47

48
49 **Fig. 1. Number of studies by source, per year**
50
51
52
53

54 The analysis revealed that there has been an increase in energy research at these schools in the
55 last decade, but there is no single coordinating structure behind the research.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 In total, 350 studies were reviewed, catalogued and classified from AFIT and NPS, as
5
6 listed in Appendix 1. This research is where the most fruitful and detailed results have been
7
8 harvested. For example, the result of a single aircraft refueling logistics study has yielded the Air
9
10 Force and the DOD \$111 million per year in savings via cost reduction (Air Force Institute of
11
12 Technology, 2012). This type of research is where the DOD should place its largest investment.
13
14 In addition to using the human capital resource available to conduct valuable research toward
15
16 strategic goals, the research at these military schools also serves as an enabler for educating the
17
18 force and driving culture change, a part of building energy into the future force. The students and
19
20 faculty conducting this research receive educational benefit from conducting the research, and
21
22 then return to the operational force with an enhanced understanding of energy matters and
23
24 analytical tools to be agents of change. So, the second and third order benefits accrue to the DOD
25
26 through investing in this type of research. However, the lack of a guiding framework or
27
28 institutional coordination for this research means that this valuable resource is not being fully
29
30 utilized.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

41 *4.1 Conceptual Development*

42
43 Although the DOD has established a clear strategy, goals, and implementation plan, the
44
45 research is guided only by DOD and service department mandates, sponsor encouragement, and
46
47 individually established researcher and student interest. This is not to say that these are
48
49 unimportant factors, but to suggest the need for a structure such as a single research center to
50
51 categorize and prioritize what the combined efforts should be focused on, and to enable long-
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 term projects in pursuit of a single body of knowledge. Additionally, other than this project, there
5
6 is no consolidation and categorization of the research to date.
7
8

9 10 *4.2 A knowledge management framework*

11
12 Knowledge has been viewed as a resource in strategic decision making and discussed in
13
14 the context of achieving the performance-oriented goals of an organization (Holsapple & Singh,
15
16 2001; Hoopes & Postrel, 1999; Yang, 2010). In the context of energy security, knowledge
17
18 management is a way of converting knowledge gathered through existing and ongoing research
19
20 into a strategic asset – something the DOD has not taken advantage of to this point. One way to
21
22 do this is through information technology, however, this is not always the necessary or sufficient
23
24 ingredient for transforming existing knowledge into a strategic asset (Teece, 2000).
25
26
27
28

29
30 Foundationally, knowledge management resides in underlying structures used to gather,
31
32 store and disseminate knowledge throughout an organization, and involves not only content but
33
34 context (Teece, 2000). Knowledge management may enable organizational elements such as
35
36 structure, culture, and strategy to positively influence organizational effectiveness (Zheng, Yang,
37
38 & McLean, 2010). Knowledge transfer in and of itself may require a particular strategy to exploit
39
40 the creation and transfer of new and existing knowledge (Von Krogh, Nonaka, & Aben, 2001).
41
42
43
44

45
46 A framework consisting of elements to not only assemble, but to contextualize DOD
47
48 energy research will have a better chance of translating existing knowledge (research) into a
49
50 strategic asset for the DOD as well as guide knowledge creation (future research) toward the
51
52 attainment of the overall goal of energy security for the warfighter, which is our goal for the
53
54 framework presented here.
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Energy is fungible, therefore, the structure must recognize that all energy research is a
5 joint endeavor. There is no “color” for energy. The Air Force, Army, and Navy all use the same
6 energy from the same sources. Uncoordinated parochial efforts to improve energy efficiency,
7 supply management, and culture are sub-optimal. Not all such efforts will overlap, however,
8 there is ample opportunity for complementary efforts within a unifying schema which establishes
9 coordinated priorities and allows for knowledge transfer and resource-sharing, which does not
10 exist. A joint DOD center for energy research would enable the strategic exploitation of
11 knowledge creation and transfer amongst the military services.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 Previous taxonomies are sparse and either address the categorization of energy research
25 without respect to the specific concerns of the DOD or focus on only one particular focus area of
26 research. For example, a general set of maxims was introduced by Sovacool and Brown (2015)
27 to guide energy researchers. The maxims presented are information, inclusivity, symmetry,
28 reflexivity, prudence, and technological agnosticism. These maxims when taken as a whole point
29 to the importance of having the “big picture” when conducting research. The framework
30 presented herein theoretically organizes these general doctrinal ideals for DOD energy research.
31 A very specific set of categories for improving energy efficiency within the DOD is presented by
32 Umstatted (2009). These categories suggest that efficiency efforts need focus and can be grouped
33 into three solution categories: develop renewable sources, reduce and conserve, and improve
34 efficiency. These categories are very specific to the implementation of overall efficiency
35 improvements in the DOD and are too narrow to capture the breadth of research topics currently
36 being researched. Finally, Simon, Regnier, and Whitney (2014) rightfully point out that a “lack
37 of precision and consistency in DOD guidance limits practical usefulness” of policy in analyzing
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 decisions. They present a value focused thinking approach to identify common objectives of
5 semi-overlapping policy. The results include a comprehensive set of common objectives taken
6 from current policy. These objectives include the ideas of demand reduction, supply assurance,
7 and maximizing motivation to improve the DOD energy profile.
8
9
10
11
12
13

14 Since the goal of all DOD energy research is ensuring energy security, the research to
15 support such a goal should fit within the strategy which aims to achieve the goal. The DOD
16 Operational Energy Strategy addresses energy security through three ways: Reducing demand,
17 expanding and securing supply, and building energy into the future force. Our framework
18 translates the ways into research categories. These three ways form the foundational categories
19 of our framework. A common categorization of research will enable knowledge transfer and
20 coordination between services and within the DOD energy research community, while a joint
21 energy research center will practically drive the strategy.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34 A total of 350 studies are included in these categories. The three framework categories
35 are adapted from the three principle ways outlined in the DOD Operational Energy Strategy.
36 Using these categories as a basis for the framework connects and focuses past and future
37 research efforts on the overarching goal of energy security for the warfighter. The categories are
38 broad enough to encompass the spectrum of research being conducted to support the goal, but
39 focused enough to allow researchers and consumers of research to identify the knowledge base
40 that exists for a particular topic. Additionally, we found that the categories need not be limited to
41 operational energy topics. The scope of the categories allows for inclusion of installation energy
42 topics as well as operational topics, as the goal of energy security for the warfighter certainly
43 encompasses both realms. The categories are described next.
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 The first category is “reduce demand.” This category includes research that contributes to
5 measuring consumption, improving performance and efficiency, elimination of non-value-added
6 activities, and promoting energy innovation. This is the most straightforward of the categories as
7 it deals primarily with energy efficiency studies and the immediate temporal benefits that accrue
8 from energy savings. Interest in this category has been lower than the other two areas. This can
9 be due to the focus on supply assurance and alternative energy sources found in policy since the
10 1970’s. The psychological link between demand reduction and energy security must be
11 strengthened, as it is just as important a factor as supply expansion and assurance.
12
13

14 The second category is “expand and secure supply.” This includes research that
15 contributes to improved energy security at installations. This category covers both current and
16 future temporal bounds, which include the development and use of alternative fuels, physical
17 security, grid security, broadening supplier base, etc. It may also include the development of
18 technology or operations management techniques for the use of alternative fuels. Our analysis
19 shows that the interest in this category has been greater than the other categories, partly because
20 of the policy focus on alternative energy and the linkage between energy security and supply
21 assurance.
22
23

24 The third category is “build energy into the future force.” This category has an exclusive
25 forward looking temporal focus and includes literature that encompasses strategic decision
26 making, planning, policy development, legislation, the role of geopolitics in energy strategy, and
27 the incorporation of energy security into requirements and acquisitions. More broadly, this
28 category includes research that promotes overall culture change in the DOD with regard to
29 energy. This is a particularly broad category in that it encompasses more than the typical supply
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 chain management considerations of supply and demand. It includes factors that typically fall
5
6 into the realms of public policy, political science, strategic policy, and acquisitions and
7
8 requirements. A breakout of these categories and examples of topics within each is found in table
9
10
11
12 1 below.
13
14
15

16 **Table 1**
17 Categories and topics of DOD energy research
18
19
20

21 -----
22
23 **Insert Table. 1 here**
24
25
26 -----
27

28
29
30
31 Although the scope of this review does not include the general category of independent
32
33 peer-reviewed research, more strategically-focused DOD sponsorship of civilian research,
34
35 guided by a singular structure would benefit the DOD as well as all energy consumers.
36
37

38
39 Finally, the framework categories inherently include classification of research by either a
40
41 near or long term focus. For example, many conflicting views exist on the importance of
42
43 alternative energy research and application. Some believe the DOD will be a driver to the rest of
44
45 society and a change agent for this type of energy implementation and research (Defense Science
46
47 Board, 2008). However, some believe that the DOD simply does not constitute a large enough
48
49 demand on the system to be such an agent of change (Dimotakis et al., 2006). In short, the use of
50
51 alternative energy sources such as biofuels (a chief implementation goal for the DOD) is too
52
53 expensive to be economically viable while the price of fossil fuels remains relatively low. It is
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 important to deconflict these views by recognizing the temporal element in each category. For
5
6 example, a given alternative energy source may become a source of security and economically
7
8 feasible in the long-term, so while research in this area is extremely important to the long-term
9
10 strategic outlook of our energy security future, immediate implementation may be short-sighted
11
12 and extremely costly. Therefore, it should be classified as such and recommendations should not
13
14 hinge on immediate implementation given the economic consequences. The three categories fall
15
16 along a temporal continuum. Reducing demand encompasses current implementation, whereas
17
18 building energy into the future force looks to future considerations. Assurance of supply takes
19
20 both a current and long-term outlook.
21
22
23
24
25

26
27 Figure 2 below depicts such a framework which support the main goal of energy security
28
29 for the warfighter.
30
31

32
33
34
35 -----
36
37 **Insert Fig. 2 here**
38
39
40 -----
41

42 **Fig. 2. A framework for research to support DOD energy strategy**
43
44

45
46
47 A preliminary classification of existing research in the categories of this framework is
48
49 represented in figure 3 below.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Insert Fig. 3 here

Fig. 3. Initial categorization of DOD research by framework categories (2000-2015).

This initial classification should be refined and maintained to reflect the state of the art in the field of DOD energy research. Although it is beyond the scope and resources of this study, the classification should be expanded to include non-DOD sources of research. Further detail should be added to classify and refine the research within each broad category.

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

The number of DOD energy studies shows a spike in interest in the most recent decade. As a result of the DOD’s thrust to attain energy security, this is no real surprise. The result of this study is that most research produced is based only on a single, short-term topical research question. Additionally, much of the work done outside the DOD is of a very high level policy-oriented nature. In the DOD, policy must precede efforts to attain specific goals, however, it is important to bring more balance to the policy efforts with actionable research.

The absence of a unifying construct for DOD energy research is partially to blame for the lack of focus on specific goals and topics. Although we see a fairly wide spread of topical coverage in the research reviewed, the motivations are often driven solely by researcher interest, sponsor guidance, or parochial budgetary reasons. There is no central mechanism in-place to ensure that research efforts are directly supporting strategic goals and that efforts are not

1
2
3
4 duplicated. The proposed framework will serve as a theoretical focal point and enabling
5
6 mechanism for guiding energy research. The ideals of such a framework should be put into
7
8 practice by a research center operating as a single unifying structure within the DOD. This will
9
10 provide coordination, guidance, focus, and knowledge management functions which ultimately
11
12 support the goal of the DOD energy strategy, and do not currently exist. A unifying effort is
13
14 needed to maximize the research potential – particularly from the most abundant source of
15
16 thought leadership available to the DOD – its military schools, students, and faculty. Such a
17
18 unifying effort will ensure that research supports strategy. Additionally, research by traditional
19
20 academic institutions should be encouraged and sponsored by the DOD when possible.
21
22
23
24

25
26 Next, we have to realize that education, research, and culture change go hand in hand.
27
28 The research being conducted by faculty and students at military schools fuels education efforts.
29
30 This happens through direct learning of those involved in the research, the secondary benefits of
31
32 taking the research findings into the classroom, and finally the third order effect of having well-
33
34 informed energy change agents reintegrated into the operational environment. In short, education
35
36 will spur culture change and the ability to build energy into a future force.
37
38
39

40
41 These observations drive three recommendations. First, a formal, joint, and permanent
42
43 structure is needed to ensure the unified effort. In order to unify the research and education
44
45 efforts of the DOD, a joint center or academic group is needed. This structure will ensure multi-
46
47 way communication between policy makers, operational customers, and academic institutions.
48
49 Next, education and research must be integrated with strategic goals of the DOD. Although the
50
51 services currently have some educational opportunities in energy management, they focus almost
52
53 entirely on specific jobs or career paths. With the exception of the Navy, no formal plan for
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 energy education exists (United States Navy, 2015). Fostering an energy aware culture should
5
6 have intentional education built into multiple career paths and professional military education in
7
8 order to reach the widest audience and permeate the organizational culture to educate the total
9
10 force. Finally, the terms, definitions, and goals of an energy aware culture must be standardized.
11
12 A common language, established by a guiding framework, will enable clear communication to
13
14 occur across service boundaries and within the DOD.
15
16
17

18 *5.1 Limitations and Future Research*

21 Although the content analysis presented in this paper provides the first summary of DOD
22
23 energy research to date, it is not all-inclusive. The broad nature of this survey provides the “big
24
25 picture” of where we are with respect to DOD energy research, however, its breadth and our
26
27 limited resources prevent a deep exploration of topics by specific category at this time.
28
29 Additionally, there is some overlap in the categories presented. No one set of categories will be
30
31 able to capture the richness or complexity of the subject of energy security. This does provide,
32
33 however, a unifying direction for future research.
34
35
36
37

38 What is the next step in DOD energy research? Suggestions for future research include
39
40 the revising of topical categories within the framework as research evolves and technological
41
42 advances are made in the areas of alternative fuel sources. Additionally, the changing budgetary
43
44 posture of the DOD and the highly volatile price of oil will no doubt continue to shift focus and
45
46 interest in terms of economic feasibility.
47
48
49

50 As with any large organization, culture change within the DOD is difficult and slow.
51
52 Such a rigid and segmented structure changes only as senior leadership guides and codifies
53
54 expected changes in policy. Communication is key to cultural shifts, and so a steady stream of
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 information and education is needed to initiate real change. Finally, culture change and the
5
6 priority placed on it will only be as effective as the budget and resources allocated to the topic.
7
8 As more research is conducted and education and training programs are developed, the “spend”
9
10 will reveal what the true priorities are.
11
12

13
14 Where does environmental research fit into the energy picture? More research is needed
15
16 to align the complementary priorities of environmental sustainment and energy efficiency.
17
18 Although the two go hand in hand, the DOD has not yet captured how to integrate the topics, and
19
20 it is outside the intended scope of the framework presented in this paper.
21
22

23
24 Are there other categories to be considered? Although the DOD primarily divides its
25
26 energy use by whether it supports a fixed installation or an operational force, the two are not
27
28 mutually exclusive, nor are they all encompassing. A combined effort with more detailed
29
30 breakouts of energy use may be helpful in guiding and focusing future research efforts.
31
32

33
34 Finally, the mission of the DOD is to focus on effectiveness. Although efficiency is part
35
36 of overall effectiveness, in the end, the DOD has a charge to provide security of a nation, which
37
38 comes at a high cost. In short, we have to win wars. In the end, efficiency takes second place to
39
40 meeting mission requirements.
41
42

43
44 Energy security is an overwhelmingly broad topic. Without a guiding framework to focus
45
46 the future efforts and a unifying structure to make the best use of resources available for
47
48 research, the time and effort needed to cover this topic will be enormous. In order to keep pace
49
50 with the economic and budgetary pressures being exerted by changing technology,
51
52 environmental concerns, and the ever volatile price of oil, the DOD must move forward with a
53
54 combined and unified focus to address its goal of energy security.
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the office of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy for sponsorship of the original thesis work represented in this paper; The faculty and staff of the Air Force Institute of Technology and the Naval Postgraduate School for providing historical energy research; Ryan Crean for cataloguing of source documents; James Cotton and George Lafiguera for their review and comments on this paper; and Ken Schultz and Adam Reiman for their comments and conversations concerning DOD energy strategy.

1
2
3
4 **References**
5

6
7 Air Force Institute of Technology. Center for Operational Analysis (COA) Significant Research.
8 Retrieved September 15, 2015, from <http://www.afit.edu/coa/page.cfm?page=166>
9

10 Allen, S., 2012. Cultural Change and the Operational Energy Strategy. Army War College.
11 Carlisle Barracks, PA.
12

13
14 Bartis, J.T., Bibber, L.V., 2011. Alternative Fuels for Military Applications. RAND Corporation.
15

16 Black, C., 2009. Post Oil America and a Renewable Energy Policy Leads to the Abrogation of
17 the Middle East to China. National Defense University. Norfolk, VA. Joint Advanced
18 Warfighting School.
19

20
21 Blackwell, K. E., 2007. Department of Defense and Energy Independence: Optimism Meets
22 Reality. Air University. Maxwell AFB, AL.
23

24
25 Blakely, K., 2012. DoD Alternative Fuels Policy, Initiatives and Legislative Activity. Library of
26 Congress. Washington, DC. Congressional Research Service.
27

28
29 Blumberg, G., 2013. The Origin of the Department of the Navy's Biofuel Initiative and the
30 Volatility Problem for Defense Energy. Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA.
31

32
33 Brown, S. P., Huntington, H. G., 2015. Evaluating US Oil Security and Import Reliance. Energy
34 Policy, 79, 9-22.
35

36
37 Bryce, R., 2009. Energy Security Means Energy Interdependence. National Defense University.
38 Washington, DC. Institute for National Strategic Studies.
39

40
41 Bush, G. W., 2003. State of the Union Address, 28 January.
42

43
44 Carter, J., 1979. Crisis of Confidence Speech, 15 July.
45

46
47 Center for a New American Security, 2008. A Strategy for American Power: Energy, Climate
48 and National Security.
49

50
51 Clinton, W.J., 1999. Executive Order 13123, Greening the Government through Efficient Energy
52 Management, 3 June.
53

54
55 Closson, S., 2013. The military and energy: Moving the United States beyond oil. Energy Policy,
56 61, 306-316.
57

58
59 CNA Military Advisory Board, 2009. Powering America's Defense: Energy and the Risks to
60 National Security.
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4
5 Defense Logistics Agency – Energy, 2013. Fact Book Fiscal Year 2012.

6
7 Defense Logistics Agency - Energy, 2015. Fact Book Fiscal Year 2014.

8
9
10 Defense Science Board, 2008. More Fight - Less Fuel: Report of the Defense Science Board
11 Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy, February.

12
13
14 Delucchi, M. A., Murphy, J. J., 2008. US Military Expenditures to Protect the Use of Persian
15 Gulf Oil for Motor Vehicles. Energy Policy, 36(6), 2253-2264.

16
17 Department of Defense, 2011a. Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strategy.

18
19 Department of Defense, 2011b. Opportunities for DOD use of Alternative and Renewable Fuels.
20 18 July.

21
22 Department of Defense, 2012. Operational Energy Strategy: Implementation Plan.

23
24 Department of Energy, 2014. Site-Delivered Energy Use and Costs by End-Use Sector and
25 Energy Type, by Federal Agency. Retrieved from
26 [http://ctsedweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/BEARReport.aspx?ef=Excel&fy=1&yo=&ag=6&au=](http://ctsedweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/BEARReport.aspx?ef=Excel&fy=1&yo=&ag=6&au=false)
27 [false](http://ctsedweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/BEARReport.aspx?ef=Excel&fy=1&yo=&ag=6&au=false)

28
29 Dimotakis, P., Grober, R., Lewis, N., 2006. Reducing DOD Fossil-Fuel Dependence (No. JSR-
30 06-135). Mitre Corp., Mclean, VA. JASON Program Office.

31
32 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act, 2009. Public law 110-417, 110th Congress,
33 14 October.

34
35 Energy Information Administration, 2014. Primary Energy Consumption by Source and Sector
36 2014. Department of Energy. Retrieved from <http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/>

37
38 Energy Information Administration, 2015a. Monthly Energy Review, 23 December. Retrieved
39 from <http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#summary>

40
41 Energy Information Administration, 2015b. How Much Oil Consumed by the United States
42 comes from Foreign Sources? Department of Energy. Retrieved from
43 <http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=32&t=6>

44
45 Energy Security Act, 1980. Public law 96-294, 96th Congress, 30 June.

46
47 Energy Policy Act, 1992. Public law 102-486, 102nd Congress, 3 January.

1
2
3
4 Fehner, T. R., Holl, J. M., 1994. Department of Energy, 1977-1994: A Summary History. US
5 Department of Energy.
6

7
8 Fialka, J. J., 2006. Energy Independence: A Dry Hole?. The Wall Street Journal, 5 July.
9

10 Fisher, B., Macheret, Y., 2007. Should DOD be Concerned with Potential Petroleum Supply
11 Shortage and What Could It Do to Stimulate Alternative Fuels Development? (No. IDA-P-4255).
12 Institute for Defense Analyses. Alexandria, VA.
13
14

15 Geller, H., DeCicco, J., Laitner, S., Dyson, C., 1994. Twenty Years after the Embargo US Oil
16 Import Dependence and how it can be Reduced. Energy policy, 22(6), 471-485.
17
18

19 Greene, D. L., 2010. Measuring Energy Security: Can the United States Achieve Oil
20 Independence?. Energy policy, 38(4), 1614-1621.
21
22

23 Government Accountability Office, 2007. Uncertainty about Future Oil Supply Makes It
24 Important to Develop a Strategy for Addressing a Peak and Decline in Oil Production, 28
25 February.
26

27 Gauntlett, D., Adamson, K.A., 2012. Renewable Energy for Military Applications. Pike
28 Research.
29
30

31 Haigh, C. S., 2009. Getting Over the Barrel: Achieving Independence from Foreign Oil in 2018.
32 Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, PA.
33
34

35 Halff, A., 2008. Energy Nationalism, Consumer Style: How the Quest for Energy Independence
36 Undermines US Ethanol Policy and Energy Security. Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev., 19, 402.
37
38

39 Holsapple, C. W., Singh, M., 2001. The Knowledge Chain Model: Activities for
40 Competitiveness. Expert systems with applications, 20(1), 77-98.
41
42

43 Holzman, S. L., 2006. A Need for Change: The Looming Energy Crisis. Army War College.
44 Carlisle Barracks, PA.
45
46

47 Hoopes, D. G., Postrel, S., 1999. Shared Knowledge, "Glitches," and Product Development
48 Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 20(9), 837-865.
49
50

51 Klare, M., 2004. Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World's Oil. Foreign
52 Policy in Focus, 0113-01.
53
54

55 Kraemer, T. D., 2006. Addicted to Oil: Strategic Implications of American Oil Policy. Strategic
56 Studies Institute.
57
58

1
2
3
4 Krauss, C., Lipton, E., 2012. US Inches Toward Goal of Energy Independence. New York
5 Times, 22 March.
6

7
8 Light, A.R., 1976. Federalism and the Energy Crisis: A View from the States. Publius, 81-96.
9

10 Loechl, P. M., Kemme, M. R., Shah, P. S., Goran, W. D., 2012. Resource Efficiency in the US
11 Army Corps of Engineers: Examination of Strategies to Reduce Energy Use and Greenhouse
12 Gas Emissions (No. ERDC/CERL-TR-12-17). Engineer Research and Development Center.
13 Champaign, IL. Construction Engineering Research Lab.
14
15

16 McFarlane, R., Woolsey, R. J., 2011. How to Weaken the Power of Foreign Oil. New York
17 Times, 20 September.
18

19
20 Miles, D., 2008. Military Looks to Synthetics, Conservation to Cut Fuel Bills. American Forces
21 Press Service, 6 June.
22

23
24 Mullen, M. G., 2011. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011:
25 Redefining America's Military Leadership. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February.
26

27 Nivola, P. S., 2008. Rethinking Energy Independence. Brookings institution. Governance Studies
28 at Brookings.
29

30
31 Parthemore, C., Nagl, J., 2010. Fueling the Future Force. Center for a New American Security,
32 September.
33

34
35 Potter, N., 2008. How Brazil Achieved Energy Independence and the Lessons the United States
36 Should Learn from Brazil's Experience. Washington University Global Studies Law Review,
37 7(2), 331-351.
38

39 Powers, J., 2010. Oil Addiction: Fueling Our Enemies. Truman National Security Project.
40

41
42 Raymond, L. R., Deming, C. P., and Nichols, M. W., 2007. Hard Truths—Facing the Hard
43 Truths about Energy. National Petroleum Council report, July.
44

45
46 Rosen, M. E., 2010. Energy Independence and Climate Change: The Economic and National
47 Security Consequences of Failing to Act. U. Rich. L. Rev., 44, 977.
48

49 Scofield, J. P., 2009. Energy Security through 2030: Some Considerations. Marine Corps
50 Command and Staff College. Quantico, VA.
51

52
53 Shinnar, R., Citro, F., 2008. Decarbonization: Achieving Near-Total Energy Independence and
54 Near-Total Elimination of Greenhouse Emissions with Available Technologies. Technology in
55 Society, 30, 1-16.
56
57

1
2
3
4 Simon, J., Regnier, E., Whitney, L., 2014. A Value-focused Approach to Energy Transformation
5 in the United States Department of Defense. *Decision Analysis*, 11(2), 117-132.
6

7
8 Sovacool, B. K., Brown, M. A., 2015. Deconstructing Facts and Frames in Energy Research:
9 Maxims for Evaluating Contentious Problems. *Energy Policy*, 86, 36-42.
10

11 Stein, F., 2011. Ending America's Energy Insecurity: How Electric Vehicles Can Drive the
12 Solution to Energy Independence. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA.
13

14
15 Stern, R. J., 2010. United States Cost of Military Force Projection in the Persian Gulf, 1976–
16 2007. *Energy Policy*, 38(6), 2816-2825.
17

18
19 Teece, D. J., 2000. Strategies for Managing Knowledge Assets: The Role of Firm Structure and
20 Industrial Context. *Long range planning*, 33(1), 35-54.
21

22
23 Tewksbury, D. D., 2006. Preemptive Energy Security: An Aggressive Approach to Meeting
24 America's Requirements. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, PA.
25

26 Umstadd, R. J., 2009. Future Energy Efficiency Improvements within the US Department of
27 Defense: Incentives and Barriers. *Energy Policy*, 37(8), 2870-2880.
28

29
30 United States Air Force, 2013. US Air Force Energy Strategic Plan. Office of the Secretary of
31 the Air Force, March.
32

33
34 United States Army, 2009. Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy. Office of the Deputy
35 Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Partnerships, January.
36

37
38 United States Marine Corps, 2009. Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy and
39 Implementation Plan. Marine Corps Expeditionary Office.
40

41
42 United States Navy, 2010. Department of the Navy's Energy Program for Security and
43 Independence. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the navy Energy Office. October.
44

45
46 United States Navy, 2015. Navy Energy Training and Education Plan. Assistant Secretary of the
47 Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment. 2 July.
48

49
50 United States Census Bureau, 2011. Trade in Goods with China.
51

52
53 United States Joint Force Command, 2010. Joint Operating Environment. Joint Futures Group
54 (J59), 18 February.
55

56
57 Verrastro, F., Ladislaw, S., 2007. Providing Energy Security in an Interdependent World.
58 *Washington Quarterly*, 30(4), 95-104.
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1
2
3
4 Von Krogh, G., Nonaka, I., Aben, M., 2001. Making the most of your company's knowledge: a
5 strategic framework. *Long range planning*, 34(4), 421-439.
6

7
8 Watkins, G. C., 2006. Oil Scarcity: What Have The Past Three Decades Revealed? *Energy*
9 *Policy*, 34(5), 508-514.
10

11 Weidenmier, M. D., Davis, J. H., Aliaga-Diaz, R., 2008. Is Sugar Sweeter at the Pump? The
12 Macroeconomic Impact of Brazil's Alternative Energy Program (No. w14362). National Bureau
13 of Economic Research.
14

15
16 White House, 2011. *Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future*, 30 March.
17

18
19 Wirth, T. E., Gray, C. B., Podesta, J. D., 2003. The Future of Energy Policy. *Foreign Affairs*,
20 132-155.
21

22
23 Yang, J., 2010. The Knowledge Management Strategy and its Effect on Firm Performance: A
24 Contingency Analysis. *International Journal of Production Economics*, 125(2), 215-223.
25

26 Zheng, W., Yang, B., McLean, G. N., 2010. Linking Organizational Culture, Structure, Strategy,
27 and Organizational Effectiveness: Mediating Role of Knowledge Management. *Journal of*
28 *Business Research*, 63(7), 763-771.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Table 1

Categories and topics of DOD energy research

Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
Reduce Demand	Expand and Secure Supply	Build Energy into the Future Force
Measure consumption Improve performance and efficiency Promote innovation	Improve energy security at installations Develop and use alternative fuels Physical security Grid security Broaden supplier base Develop technology or operations management techniques for the use of alternative fuels	Strategic decision making Planning Policy development Legislation Geopolitics Incorporation of energy security into requirements and acquisitions Culture change Education and Training

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3

