ABSTRACT

Cartels: The New Face of Mexico’s Democracy

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Director: Dr. Victor Hinojosa Ph.D.

This thesis demonstrates why the Mexican drug cartels pose the single greatest threat to Mexico’s democratic institutions. A comprehensive analysis of the shift in Mexican politics from the authoritarian rule of the PRI to the current democracy it is today, coupled with the concurrent shift in the drug trade market, provided the perfect opportunity for the cartels to emerge as the most formidable threat to Mexico’s fledgling democracy. This thesis examines how this concurrent evolution occurred which allowed the cartels to infiltrate and corrupt the foundational institutions that are the backbone to a democracy. In addition, an analysis is provided detailing the insidious influence the cartels have on the political sector, the military, law enforcement agencies, and elections. This thesis concludes that had the concurrent shifts not occurred simultaneously then Mexico’s democracy would offer not only a better quality of democracy to its people, but also safety within its borders.
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CARTELS: THE NEW FACE OF MEXICO’S DEMOCRACY

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By

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Waco, Texas

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................. v
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................... vi
PREFACE ..................................................................................................... vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................... x
DEDICATION ............................................................................................... xii
EPIGRAPH ................................................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER

ONE. THE GENESIS OF MEXICO’S DEMOCRACY ..................1
  1910-2000: The Authoritarian Era ................................................. 3
  Twenty First Century Mexico: The Democratic Era Begins ............. 23

TWO. EMERGENCE AND TRANSFORMATION ....................... 31
  Pre Cocaine Boom .......................................................................... 32
     How the Cartels Flourished Under the PRI ........................... 35
  The Post Cocaine Boom ................................................................. 38
  The Turf Wars for Trade Routes ..................................................... 43
  Coercion and Payment of Politicians .......................................... 48
     Political Ideological Shifts ......................................................... 51
## PAGE

THREE. MEXICO’S SECURITY FAILURE .................................. 54

Current Problems- Law Enforcement .............................. 54

Inequality Leads to Violence ........................................... 56

Police Operations Lead to Violence ............................... 59

  Cartels Create Inefficiency of Law Enforcement ............... 67

  Cartels Corrupt and Coerce Law Enforcement ................. 69

  Cartels Corrupt the Mexican Military: Militarization Failure ......................................................... 74

Law Enforcement Reform ............................................. 79

FOUR. CARTEL INFLUENCE IN MEXICO’S ELECTIONS ...... 87

Section One: Electoral Violence ...................................... 87

Section Two: Regression ................................................ 95

  Introduction .................................................................. 95

  Theory ........................................................................... 98

  Methodology .................................................................. 102

  Results .......................................................................... 109

  Discussion ................................................................. 113

  Implications .............................................................. 117
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ideological Oscillation by PRI President’s 1934-1994</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mexico Drug Trading Routes</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cocaine Drug Trafficking Routes Prior to 1984</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cocaine Drug Trafficking Routes Post 1980</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mexican Cartels: Areas of Dominant Influence</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Journalists and Mayors Assassinated in Mexico, 1999-2011</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sampling of CNDH Cases of Alleged Torture and or Ill-Treatment (2002-2002)</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Characteristics of All Medical Evaluations in Cases Where Torture or Ill-Treatment was alleged (2000-2002)</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Assessment of Quality of Certificates of Physical Integrity for Which Complete Records Were Available (2000-2002)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF TABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Percentage Distribution of Power in the Chamber of Deputies (1946-1994)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Percentage Vote Change</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Independent Variables</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Results</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 1</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 2</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 3</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 4</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 5</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 6</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 7</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 8</td>
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PREFACE

After centuries of oppressive colonialism, bloody revolutions, and failed governments, Mexico’s democracy now faces its most formidable enemy. It is not another foreign power, but rather a bloodthirsty lawless group of its own people. They are known as cartels: groups of highly organized and armed individuals that operate outside the rule of law; control cities, states, and police; and reign supreme over the general population. The shift from authoritarian rule to democracy, concurrent with the shift in the makeup of the drug trade in Mexico, provided the drug cartels the opportunity to compromise all foundations of Mexico’s democracy: the political spectrum, the law enforcement agencies, the military, and elections. These structural actors are necessary for a democracy to function properly.

The wave of violence crippling the state of Mexico is already 50 times deadlier than the standard threshold used to define the onset of a civil war, and has already killed five times more people than the median civil war death toll of 10,500 casualties (Osorio 2012). This thesis demonstrates that the violence and influence of the Mexican drug cartels are a direct result of two monumental shifts that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s; the shift in the Mexican government from
an authoritarian regime to a democracy, concurrent with the shift in the drug trade. Furthermore, this thesis analyzes the influence of the cartels on the foundational democratic institutions of Mexico’s democracy; politicians, law enforcement, the military, and elections.

Chapter 1 summarizes the political evolution that occurred in Mexico from 1910- present day. Specific emphasis will be placed on what reform and political pressure lead Mexico away from the authoritarian rule of seventy years to the democracy it is today.

Chapter 2 summarizes the evolution of the drug trade from its inception in 1910 as middlemen, to the creation of the drug cartels, which have become the single greatest threat to Mexico’s democratic institutions.

Chapter 3 analyzes how the cartels undermine politicians. The chapter will analyze the relationship between cartels and the PRI prior to the democratic transition, and then the relationship between politicians and the cartels post democratic transition.

Chapter 4 analyzes how the cartels undermine Mexico’s security sector. Specifically, this chapter will focus on how the security sector operated prior to the democratic transition, and how the democratic transition changed the relationship between cartels and law enforcement agencies.
Chapter 5 will analyze how the cartels undermine Mexico’s electoral system through their calculated increase in violence during election years towards politicians and journalist. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze how the increase in violence during former President Felipe Calderón’s sexennial lead to the reemergence of the PRI.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is the culmination of efforts of many people without whom this final product would not have been possible. The graciousness and encouragement I have received from the faculty of Baylor University, friends and family has been boundless.

First and foremost I would like to express my unending gratitude to my thesis director, Victor Hinojosa, Ph.D. who has provided unwavering support and guidance both academically and personally during my entire career at Baylor University. Without whom I would not have completed this undertaking. It is through your guidance that I was able to enter into the Honors College as a transfer, and through your direction that I was able to complete this thesis.

I would like to thank my committee, Victor Hinojosa, Ph.D., David Bridge, Ph.D., Tom Offit, Ph.D. for their encouragement, constructive feedback and insight that they provided during this thesis process.

Thanks must be further extended to David Bridge, Ph.D. for is instruction and guidance not only throughout this endeavor, but my entire career at Baylor University. I would not be the student, researcher, and individual that I am today without your guidance and friendship.
I would like to thank everyone in the Department of Political Science, Honors College, and in the Dean’s Office in the College of Arts and Science who helped ensure my financial support during this process.

I owe the faculty of the Department of Political Science a specific thank you for the recognition bestowed upon me as the Richard D. Huff Distinguished Student in Political Science 2012-2013.

I have had an intricate network of friends who have stood beside me and cheered me on during the various phases throughout my career at Baylor University. I am not able to name all of them, but each one has touched my life in a special way, and for that I am grateful. Specific thanks must go to the following, my brothers of Phi Gamma Delta who have been with me from the start and never doubted my ability to reach my academic goals.

Special thanks must go to Elisabeth Johnson. As my girlfriend, provided unwavering support through the toughest times during this process. Without her love and support this thesis would not be the work that it is today.

Finally, my deepest love and gratitude to my mother and father who have always believed in me and allowed me to chase my dreams no matter what they have been or where they have led.
DEDICATION

To my father,
From the outside looking in,
Nobody can understand our relationship.
From the inside looking out,
We can never explain it.
EPIGRAPH

“With organized crime there is no truce, there is no treaty, there is no agreement…We have to face organized crime, which is my commitment, my challenge, to return to Mexico peace and security.”

-Current Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto
CHAPTER ONE
The Genesis of Mexico’s Democracy

On September 16th, 1810 Mexico gained its independence from Spain. However, this did not lead to political or social stability. For approximately 100 years after Mexico gained its independence, Mexico was faced with political, social, and economic chaos. Immediately following independence, the first political conflict broke out between Liberals and Conservatives. The Conservatives wanted a strong centralized government with Catholic Church rule. The Liberals, made up of the middle class, were committed to individual liberty and a more decentralized government. During the Liberal era (1810-1910), the Constitution of 1824 was adopted. The Constitution of 1824 resembled the United States Constitution, such as a provision for freedom of the press. During the Liberal era, the Mexican presidency had two distinct periods. The first was an era in which there were 50 presidents in 50 years; thirty-five of these regimes were led by army officers (Skidmore, Smith, Green 2010). This was a failure of the democratic process because no president was able to establish social peace or create order for a national government due to the constant illegitimate regime changes. This chaotic rule led to the second period of the Mexican
presidency: the rise of Porfirio Díaz, who, from 1876-1910, ruled Mexico as its leader or through surrogate presidents¹.

Under Díaz, Mexico saw economic growth and stability. Mexico went through industrialization under Díaz where he increased the railroad lines from 400 miles to 15,000 miles (“Díaz and…”). The Díaz regime promoted foreign direct investment into its industrialization process and by 1910 had accumulated almost 1 billion U.S. dollars worth of foreign investment (Wasserman 1979). Within the State of Chihuahua alone, from 1884-1902 the state received $30 million by American investors, and from 1902-1907 another $20 million was added (Wasserman 1979). While Mexico as a whole experienced economic expansion, it did not filter down to the lower classes. In 1900, it was estimated that 16 percent of the population was homeless, and in 1910, 50 percent of Mexican houses were unfit for human habitation (Tuck1997). Furthermore, for such an economic success under the Díaz regime, only one-fourth of the population was literate, and 29 percent of male babies died within their first year (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010).

From a political standpoint, Díaz campaigned on a “no-reelection” policy, but again, and again kept running, and winning through

¹ The reign of Porfirio from 1876-1910 subsequently became know as the Porfiriato (Andrés 1999).
fraudulent elections. This was important because the people did not have a legitimate voice in the government. What grew was a class of politically active elites who wanted access to political power, which Díaz was unwilling to cede (Skidmore, Smith and Green 2010). Díaz had all the vestiges of a dictator, including the use of traditional coercive measures when necessary. Conditions worsened for the labor and peasant classes. Most troubling was that the peasants found their land confiscated by the government or foreign investors. Foreign investment companies controlled one-fifth of Mexico’s total territory by 1894 (Merrill and Míro 1996). The Liberal era ended much for the same reasons the Independence movement began in 1810: the Liberal era failed to rectify the rampant poverty. The resulting inequality caused vast sectors of society to lash out against the government. This period of chaotic rule resulted in the Revolution of 1910.

1910-2000: The Authoritarian Era

The Revolution of 1910 was an event in Mexico’s history that seemed inevitable. While there was no single cause, the Revolution resulted from a confluence of a series of different grievances from various sectors of the state. The economic elites wanted more political power, but Díaz shut out the economic elites who were not within his selected group. Many of the elites believed in political rights, real
elections, and wanted political reform. The economic elites had more power than the other economic groups. However, there was still not an institutional procedure available for them to channel their grievances. As a result, they sought extra institutional means. The middle class did not have room to advance under the Porfiriato. They were searching for opportunities of social advancement which were not available to them. The Peasants wanted their land back that was confiscated during the Díaz regime. The Labor/Workers wanted better working conditions, the rights to organize, strike, and better wages. The Labor class, like the middle class, saw their standing decline under Díaz.

A revolution against the Díaz regime began in 1910. It featured a number of factions- Emilio Zapata’s agrarian reformers in the south, and a number of Northern generals with heterogeneous interests in the north. While the landmark is the Constitution of 1917, fighting continued into the early 1920’s amongst the government and the Villa and Zapata agrarian rebels (Skidmore, Smith and Green 2010).

The immediate effect the Revolution was the physical impact it had on the population. It was the bloodiest conflict ever witnessed in the Western Hemisphere. Out of a population of 14 million, one and a half million people were killed, one million of which were non-combatants (Hellman 1988). Furthermore, 8,000 villages were wiped off the map (Hellman 1988). Despite the horrific legacies of the
Revolution, the Constitution of 1917 was a lasting positive. In turn, the Constitution of 1917 paved the way for democracy, even if it took almost 80 more years for it to come to fruition. The Constitution of 1917 created a very strong state, which had the right to intervene on national affairs. Furthermore, it gave one of the most progressive labor standards in world history. Specifically, Article 123, providing hourly workday requirements, child labor laws, a minimum wage, and maternity leave requirements. The Constitution further provided the legislative basis for the largest land reform in history. Article 27, dictated the procedures by which the government can impose eminent domain as well as the return of previously usurped public land.

Following the Revolution of 1910, a nationalist state was created with a presidential system. This was not an invisible hand approach, but rather an interventionist state. The agrarians rebels- Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata- continued to be a formidable opposition to the leftist presidents until Zapata’s assassination in 1919 by troops of President Venustiano Carranza (Skidmore and Smith 1992). However, the size, organization, and revolutionary spirit of these sects created a required rhetoric of any aspiring politician (Skidmore and Smith 1992). Potential governmental representatives, and in particular presidential successors, were forced to state the belief that the state needed to actively intervene to promote economic growth, as well as political and
social stability.

The political right, led by Catholic militants, were outspoken opponents to the leftist ideologies of the post revolution presidential regimes. Furthermore, at the direction of President Plutarco Elías Calles, draconian religious restrictions were placed against the Church. Specifically, “…banning the mass in public places, eliminating the right to vote for the clergy, and barring the Church from owning land” (Plutarco, The Storm That Swept Mexico 2012). The religious right activists became known as Cristeros, and were proponents of the old economic, and social order (Skidmore and Smith 1992). The persecution of the Catholics by the Calles regime and consequent Cristero rebellion that occurred became known as the Cristero War (1926-1929) with a death toll of approximately 90,000 (Plutarco, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs). One of the most significant political events of this war was the 1928 assassination of Mexican President-elect Álvaro Obregón (Hamilton 2011). The assassination of Obregón is important for two reasons. First, he ran on the platform that he was not a successor to the Calles administration. Secondly, the legacy of the Obregón assassination allowed the lame-duck President Plutarco Elías Calles to reestablished himself as president until a new election was held. As the agrarian and peasant sector became increasingly skeptical of the leftist lefts goal of economic reform, Calles
established a new political party with the ruling elite and, the Partido Nacional Revolucionário (PNR) continued to rule behind his successors until the election of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934 (Skidmore and Green 1992).

One of President Lázaro Cárdenas’s first initiatives was the exile of former President Calles. This sent the message to the peasant class that the new government was concerned with the revolutionary goals (Skidmore and Green 1992). As Cárdenas stated himself, “[t]he state alone embodies the general interest, and for this reason only the state has a vision of the whole. The state must constantly broaden, increase, and deepen its intervention” (Hamilton 2011).

Lazaro Cárdenas reorganized the structure of the political party. First, by changing the party name to the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM). In addition, he mobilized different sectors of the State. Specifically, the agricultural (peasant), the labor sector, the military sector, and the ‘popular’ sector [middle class] (Skidmore and Green 1992). To prevent any of these sectors from centralizing their power and overthrowing the regime, Cárdenas decided to independently empower the peasants and the working class to compete against each other for the limited resources of the government. This prevented any centralized dissent from any group. In addition, Cárdenas oversaw the largest land redistribution in Mexican history,
“…distributing 44 million acres of land to landless Mexicans, almost twice as much as that distributed by all his predecessors combined” (Skidmore and Green 1992). This helped ease the tension that was brewing amongst the peasants who were dissenting against the revolutionary government for failing to abide by the revolutionary goals. Furthermore, the post revolutionary military became extremely powerful. The government knew that it must co-opt the military in order to prevent a coup d’état dissent. The cooperation of the military was done through monetary control. Every president from 1921-1964 reduced the military’s allocation as a percentage of the federal budget in relation to their predecessor (Camp 2007).

Due to a lack of political opposition, there was no viable alternative for a group to dissent. If the military, peasant, or labor sector were dissatisfied with the ruling regime, there was no alternative with which they could align. All major opposition movements were co-opted by the ruling party. In 1938, Cárdenas expropriated all oil reserves within the Mexican border. This action, coupled with the solidification of the nationalistic and governmental intervention policies, allowed the hegemony of the revolutionary political party to become firmly engrained into the Mexican political system. What ensued was a totality of seventy years of rule by one political party.

The state was governed under the corporatist party formerly
known as the PNR, followed by the PRM, and thereafter, under the rule of President Miguel Alemán, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

The main objective of the party was to amass enough power to stay in control and govern. The PRI did not run on an ideological basis. Rather it was a corporatist party that oscillated along the political ideological spectrum to be at whatever popular standard was necessary for reelection. See Figure 1.
The PRI was able to rule as a corporatist party because they co-opted the major facets of Mexican society. Through the PRI, the president controlled the judicial, legislative branches, and the military.
For the six years that the president was in control, virtually all legislation action deemed necessary for success in Mexico would be passed. There was no fear of political opposition or political backlash from citizens because elections were so corrupt that the PRI candidate would always win.

The ideological oscillation that occurred allowed for the incorporation continually of enough facets of the society for the PRI to rule with a sweeping mandate. This allowed for monopolistic control of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies by the PRI from 1946-1994.

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Power in the Senate (1946-1994)

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<td>PRI</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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Source: Seele an Peschard *Mexico’s Democratic Challenges* (120)

*In 1994, the number of senators grew from 64 to 128.
Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Power in the Chamber of Deputies (1946-1994)

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<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>PRD</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
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Source: Seele an Peschard *Mexico’s Democratic Challenges* (119)
Dashes indicate not applicable or not available

The PRI control of the legislative branch began from the executive level. The President would appoint a congressional leader who would then appoint the head of each state delegation. These appointments were of individual who already showed their loyalty through service to the party, or an individual who the party believed could ascend the power rankings within the party (Camp 2007). Until the democratic transition of 1997, the role of the legislature was to advise the initiatives put forth by the President, but ultimately accept them. Until 1997, the executive branch had a successive passage rate of 99 percent (Camp 2007).

The Supreme Court in Mexico was structured similar to that of the United States. There were twenty-one justices appointed by the President, and required confirmation by the Senate (Article 94, Mexican
Constitution). District and circuit court judges were appointed by justices of the Supreme Court and were required to be reappointed every four years (Camp 2007). Given the monopoly of the PRI in the executive and legislative branches, the Supreme Court routinely sided with the ruling party of politically charged issues brought forth before the Court. It was not until the 1994 Judicial reforms that the Supreme Court began to operate with independence as a separate branch of the federal government.

In his 1994 Judicial reform package, President, Ernesto Zedillo delivered the Court the power of independent Judicial Review “to declare as null and void any law found to be unconstitutional” (Finkel 2003). The implication of this was the change in the application of Judicial Review. Prior to 1994, if the court found legislation to be unconstitutional, it was only applied to the case brought before the court and had no precedential application to other similarly situated cases. The judicial reform of 1994 allowed the Court to not only declare the law unconstitutional, but also restrain the power of the executive and legislative branch from the continued enforcement of the invalidated legislation. Furthermore, the Judicial Reform of 1994 reduced the number of judges from 21 to 11 (Finkel 2003). Additionally, the judicial administration was overhauled alleviating the Supreme Court of the duty of administrating oversight over lower courts shifting this power to
the Federal Judicial Council (Finkel 2003). The only constraint in the 1994 judicial reform was that the Judicial Review powers granted to the Supreme Court could not be used to challenge laws regulating electoral matters. This issue was remedied in the 1996 electoral reform which broadened the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to electoral matters (Finkel 2003). This expansion of Supreme Court jurisdiction allowed the Court to address electoral rules which previously gave the PRI unfair electoral representation, such as 74 percent of the seats in the Senate when they only received 48 percent of the votes (Finkel 2003).

Even with its monopoly on all facets of federal, state and municipal governments, the PRI was still unable to run as a pure dictatorship because of term limit requirements set within the Mexican Constitution. Specifically, no individual could serve two terms as President or in repeating terms in the legislature (Chapter III, Article 83, Mexican Constitution). This created a progressive ambition political scene ruled by a Presidentialism form of government. The progression of same minded politicians occurred through the pre determined selection by the departing politician of individuals who had shown a similar, if not identical political beliefs. Thus, the departing president chooses his like minded successor because of the influence of the President, and the fracture nature of the opposition parties guarantees nomination and election. Without politician opposition ideologically,
there was consequently great party loyalty. However, as time progressed, the PRI was forced to slowly allow political opposition to win at the municipal level which ultimately lead to the downfall of the PRI authoritarian rule.

Due to the changes in the attitudes of the Mexican people and the abrupt decline of the Mexican economy, the PRI was forced to acknowledge political dissent. Following the economic crises in the 1980s, and changes of the electoral rules, other political parties began to win support and elections at the municipal levels. The recognition of opposition victories began at the municipal level which empowered citizens with a taste of true democracy (Shirk 2005). The goal of the PRI was to deflect attention from the national arena of corruption by allowing seemingly inconsequential victories at the municipal level. This empowerment and backlash gave opposition parties bargaining leverage to force changes in election laws (Shirk 2005). Major electoral laws occurred at the national level in 1970 and electoral law reforms of the 1980s.

In 1970, electoral reform passed that allocated an additional 100 seats to the Chamber of Deputies to be allocated based on the proportion of vote received by each political party (Camp 2007). This expansion of the number of deputies and the requisite that secondary parties receive a seat in the Chamber began the decline of PRI
hegemony in the legislature. Furthermore, this proportional representation gave political relief to secondary parties because their goal no was longer to solely win the specific seat which each of the 300 districts were allocated for representation in the chamber. The party ideology of opposition parties became that even a losing vote could parlay into a winning vote because the party was guaranteed representation if they received enough overall votes. In 1977, the regulations were modified to require a party to receive only 1.5% of the total vote to receive representation in the Chamber (Carmona 2977).

The 1986 electoral Reform Law enlarged the proportional representation granted in elections. The Law enlarged the Chamber by another 100 seats, requiring that 200 of the 500 seats be distributed based on proportional representation\(^2\) (Merrill and Miró 1996).

By the 1988 presidential election, the PRI was facing formidable opposition in the presidential race by Manuel Clouthier of the National Action Party (PAN) and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the National Democratic Front (FDN) which subsequently became known as the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). The authoritarian rule of the PRI was waning. Citizens had enough of being subjected to the PRI rule because the PRI was no longer able to rig elections at the

\(^2\) “A clause [referred herein as the governability clause] in the electoral law provides that enough proportional seats in the Chamber of Deputies be assigned to the party winning the overall plurality in the election, for that party to receive a majority in the Chamber of Deputies” (Merrill and Miró 1996).
municipal levels and their voices began to be heard at the ballot box. Opposition parties were winning elections with overwhelming numbers (Reding 1988). Despite these low level victories, when it came to the national level, the presidential election, there were “[r]eports of ballot box stuffing, frauds of ballot manipulation and manufactured computer glitches to throw the [1988] election to the PRI candidate [Carlos] Salinas” (Matrisciano 1990).

Opposition candidate Cárdenas (FDN) believed the 1988 election was stolen from him. He was right. In his memoirs, former PRI Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1986) details the fraudulent election of 1988. During the 1998 election, President Madrid was informed of information that the PRI was losing drastically throughout the region. “The electoral upset was a political earthquake for us," Mr. de la Madrid wrote. "As in any emergency, we had to act because the problems were rising fast. There was not a moment for great meditation, we needed agility in our response to consolidate the triumph of the PRI!” (Thompson 2004). President Madrid believed that any other result than a victory for the PRI would cause alarm amongst the citizens. As a result, he declared victory for the PRI before Cárdenas could declare himself victorious or openly contest the election results before victory was claimed (Thompson 2004). This admission by the former President himself is some of the only concrete evidence
of the fraudulent election because, conveniently, in 1991, “…the Mexican Congress ordered the ballots of the 1988 election burned…” ending any form of actual proof of the election fraud (Thompson 2004). One of the only positives to be taken from this fraudulent election is that the PRI no longer controlled a super-majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

The PRI was forced to implement the governability clause from the election reform of 1986 allowing the overall party winner to allocate enough Chamber seats for a majority. “The PRI obtained 233 seats in the 1988 election, 18 short of the simple majority it was allowed to obtain by the provision,” and was forced to implement the [clause] to reach a simple majority (Camp 2007). The fraud of the PRI and the victory of dissenting parties within the electoral process set the stage for a difficult sexennial for President Carlos Salinas, and lead to the first fair Presidential election in Mexico’s democratic history in 1994.

The Salinas administration is important because many of its initiatives were departures from revolutionary principles. The Church, long oppressed, could now own land and the clergy could wear their attire in public (Norman 2000). One of the major battle cries of the revolution was the redistribution of land back to the peasants whose land was usurped. A signature Cárdenas reform was the communal
land system known as the ejido system\(^3\). Salinas abolished under this system as “He declared ‘[i]n the past, land distribution was a path of justice; today it is unproductive and impoverishing’” (Norma 2000).

From an economic standpoint, more lasting than anything else was the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) creating a conglomerate of trading partners with Mexico, Canada, and the United States with $6.5 trillion worth of goods (Norman 2000). From an electoral reform standpoint, since the 1970s, each President has implemented some sort of electoral reform and through his creation of Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) Salinas was no different. The IFE is an autonomous organization with the charge of organizing federal elections ("IFE: Nature and Attributions."). Since its inception in 1990 the IFE continues to operate as the chief director of all federal elections and election reforms. The Presidential sexennial of Carlos Salinas however productive it was from 1988-1993, will be remembered for the year of 1994. That was the year the first free and fair Presidential election occurred, and through a fear campaign, the PRI retained power.

\(^3\) The Ejido System refers to the lands redistributed to peasants under Article 27 of The Mexican Constitution. Land was redistributed not to singular families, but as parcels to regions. Peasants became registered as an ejidatario member and were given a portion of the ejido land to work and live on (Thompson and Wilson 1999). Ejido land accounts for 48.6 percent of Mexico’s arable land and represents approximately 18 million people (Thompson and Wilson 1999).
The PRI 1994 presidential win by Ernesto Zedillo is attributed to many circumstances that preceded the election. The first issue that favored a PRI victory was the economic and peso crisis that crippled the Mexican economy. Under the authoritarian rule, Mexico experienced all types of economic progress and failures. There was progress and growth from the 1940s-1980. Stagnation, and decline, coupled with a globalization/liberalization economic model during most of the 1980s, culminated in the peso crisis of 1994. Following the privatization of Mexico’s banking sectors in 1992, Mexican monetary authorities were forced to widen the peso exchange rate in 1994 (Wilson, Saunders and Caprio Jr. 2000). Following the devaluation of the peso in 1994, the Peso/Dollar Exchange Rate increased 72% from December 1, 1994- December 27, 1994 and 114% by March 7, 1994 (Wilson, Saunders and Caprio Jr. 2000). In four months the exchange rate went from $1U.S./3.5pesos to $1U.S./7.5pesos and the Mexican stock market Indez of Prices and Quotes (IPC) fell 1,200 pesos or the equivalent of $500U.S. from $700 to $200 (Wilson, Saunders and Caprio Jr. 2000). Mexico was in economic chaos, and the PRI ran a fear campaign that a total and irreversible economic collapse would occur if an opposition party was elected.

Second, beyond just the economic turmoil in the State, there was political uncertainty. In 1994, an indigenous army taking the name of
former agrarian reformer Emiliano Zapata, rose up in Chiapas because the economic inequality in Mexico was helping a select few to prosper. For example, there was the creation of 13 new billionaires under the Salinas administration (Bacon 1999). This Zapatista uprising in Chiapas is attributed as a direct result of the abolishment of Article 27 ending the ejido system (Whitmeyer and Hopcroft 1997). Furthermore in March 1994, the PRI Presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated at a rally in Tijuana (Hamilton 2011). The Peso Crisis, Chiapas uprising, and death of Donaldo Colosio were all external shocks which the PRI used in their fear campaign to win the election in 1994. Beyond the external events, electoral reform directly benefited the incumbent PRI party.

With the economic and political crisis on hand, the final change that attributed to a PRI victory was more electoral reform during the Salinas administration. In 1990, there were two major changes in the electoral reform passed by Congress under the Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales. The first change, as stated herein, was the establishment of the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) which was designed as a nonpartisan commission to oversee elections to prevent anymore fraud through certifying the electoral results and addressing campaign finance regulations. The purpose of these reforms was to minimize the monopoly the PRI controlled on campaign
spending. The second change was the expansion of the Senate from 64 to 128, 3 from each of the 31 states plus the Federal District of Mexico City, and 32 allocated based on proportional representation. The biggest change that came was in the governability clause, providing that if a party received a plurality in the election it would receive a majority in the Chamber. The change guaranteed a party that received over 35% of the vote an allocation of enough Chamber seats to have a majority in the Chamber (Klesner 1997). The significance of this provision is that if the PRI garnered 35% of the vote, and the other 65% was spread over multiple parties, the PRI could obtain a 50%+1 majority in the Chamber. The provision further provided such that if no party received 35% of the vote, the Chamber seats would be allocated based on direct proportional representation. Also added, was the prohibition that no party would be allowed to obtain over 70% representation in the Chamber (Klesner 1997).

With the economic and political crisis, and the change to electoral laws which were clearly designed to subvert anything other than a PRI majority in the Chamber, the 1994 election was not an equal playing field. The PRI still controlled the two major television networks, Televisa and Azteca, and used “…threats, intimidation, bribes, and promises to secure votes” (Hamilton 2011). Furthermore, if the PRI did violate the campaign spending laws set in place, the punishment was
not a new election, not a loss in seats, but rather a $90 million fine (Thompson 2005). The PRI won the 1994 election because the PRI had the status and record of governing when times were tough. The 1994 election had the highest voter turnout in Mexican history as voters felt the PRI was best suited to govern during this period of economic and political unrest. This resulted in the continued PRI rule winning 50% of the votes cast (Camp 2007).

The significance of the 1994 election, even with an unequal electoral playing field, is that the both the PRI and opposing candidates believed the PRI won the election. While there were violations of campaign laws, and the playing field was not completely level, both the PRI and opposition parties agreed that, at the end of the election, the PRI did obtain the most votes. The first democratically held election still resulted in a victory for the regime that ruled under authoritarian measures for sixty years. The end of the PRI Presidency came one election later, in the 2000 Presidential election.

*Twenty First Century Mexico: The Democratic Era Begins*

In 2000, with the election of Vicente Fox (PAN), the reign of the PRI came to an abrupt end. With the fall of the corporatist rule, power was vested in a more independent legislative and judicial branch, creating a less efficient government. This process began in 1997 when
the PRI lost control of the legislature for the first time. As a result, the president was ineffective in directing the passage of whatever legislature he deemed desirable. This was due, in part, to the reality that no singular party held a majority control of the legislature. Due to a lack of majority by the PRI, the coalition building required for a majority passage of legislature required compromise by the PRI and the Executive Branch. The requirement of compromise led to increased inefficiency in the national government, and reforms were slow in forthcoming. In 1997 the PRI no longer held a 50-percent majority coalition, and by 2000 only held a 3-seat majority of its closest competing party the PAN.
Table 3: Composition of Chamber of Deputies: 1997-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)</td>
<td>239 (47.8%)</td>
<td>208 (41.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Action Party (PAN)</td>
<td>121 (24.2%)</td>
<td>205 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)</td>
<td>125 (25%)</td>
<td>54 (10.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Green Party of Mexico</td>
<td>8 (1.6%)</td>
<td>17 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party (PT)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of Convergence for Democracy (PCD)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nora Hamilton *Mexico Political, Social and Economic Evolution* 159

The 2000 election of President Fox was a historic moment in Mexico’s history. The transfer of executive power from the PRI to the PAN ended any vestiges of the former authoritarian rule. There were now distinct oppositions in control, with the PAN in control of the executive, and no single party majority in Congress.

Mexico had become a competitive democracy with a three-party system wherein the parties competed for power and governed at the state and national levels. By the 2000 election, the PRD and PAN controlled 11 of the 32 governorship seats (Klesner 2001). Not only were different levels of government governed by different parties, but for the first time since the revolution, all three levels had significant
independent governing power. This created inefficiency amongst the various governing bodies because the PRI political hegemony was eroded.

Mexican and U.S. historians will retrospectively view the advent of the 21st century as the most influential time period in the state of Mexico since the Revolution. A democracy is functional and appears legitimate when there is a transfer of power because it is when a democratically elected party is ousted from power that the mettle of the democratic nation is tested. The ousted party has two choices, either peacefully step aside, or continue to rule as an undemocratic regime. Mexico’s PRI faced this decision when, in 2000, they were deprived of Presidential power. The elections of the twenty-first century offered three potential opportunities for Mexico’s fledgling democratic institutions to fail.

First, in 2000, the hegemony of the authoritarian PRI ended with the transfer of power to President Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN). Following the first transfer of power, Mexico proved that the declared winner of an election would assume the Presidency. This led to the controversial Presidential election of 2006, Mexico's second opportunity for failure.

As Mexico faced its second election, and test of true democracy, it took the power of the Federal Electoral Tribunal court to certify that
Felipe Calderón (PAN) had indeed won the election over Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD) by one half of one percent, 35.8% to 35.3% respectively (Suarez 2006). The certification of these results led to a coffin bearing the word “Democracy” paraded through center of Mexico City and expressed the sentiments of a significant population of Mexico (McKinley 2006). The peaceful transfer of power was on the brink of collapse. There was not a transfer of power between parties that had to occur, but rather a concession by the second place recipient that they had indeed lost the election. Obrador contested the results of the election because of the numerous transgressions he believed his opponents committed. He accused the Calderón administration of ballot box tampering, and following certification of the results by the election tribunal, of bribing the tribunal official’s (McKinley 2006). With the release of the tribunal results, Obrador claimed “[w]ith this decision, the constitutional order is broken and the road is opened for an usurper to occupy the presidency through a coup d’état” (McKinley 2006). With the election results in dispute, Obrador declared himself the legitimate President of Mexico.

Obrador did not stop at self-proclaiming himself the legitimate President of Mexico. In addition to his proclamation, he created an alternative cabinet, with the intent of creating a viable alternative and blockade of the Calderón administration. With his cabinet and self
declaration as the official President, Obrador established the platform by which his administration would pursue a legislative agenda against the Calderón administration (Reséndiz 2006).

With this outward disobedience of the democratic process, Mexico’s democracy faced a direct threat of legitimacy. Obrador was challenging the framework of democratic principles by trying to establish an alternative regime. In a previous time in history, this type of rebellion would result in a military coup or societal rebellion. However, Mexico did not have a violent overthrow. The people who were with Obrador marched against the Calderón administration, challenged the legitimacy of the new government, but there was no violence. The end result was a group within the government that outwardly protested the ruling party. The democratic right of free speech and freedom to protest the government was being exercised. Democracy was starting to thrive through political dissent. With no violent coup in the foresight, the Calderón administration continued with its business as the ruling party. With no official overthrow of the administration, the Obrador regime became merely a dissenting view of the Calderón administration.

During the 2006 election, the PRI came in such a distant third that their acknowledgement of defeat came immediately. The PRI failed to win a single state in the 2006 election. The gravity of this
defeat becomes more perplexing when the PRI comfortably wins the Presidential election in 2012. The PRI won by a double digit margin percentage wise. The transfer of power back to the party that ruled under an authoritarian regime for seventy years was a fundamental statement in Mexico’s democratic history and posed the third threat to Mexico’s democracy. The power that was striped of the PRI by the people in 2000 was restored to the party in 2012 under a democratically held election. The twenty-first century came with many challenges to Mexico’s democracy.

There were multiple opportunities for Mexico’s democracy to falter, with the first transfer of power in 2000, or the contested election and creation of an alternative regime in 2006, or the restoration of power back to the PRI in 2012. However, Mexico’s democratic institutions maintained their stability during these volatile times and the declared winner of the election assumed power without force or violence.

However, the transition to democracy made these new democratic institutions vulnerable to corruption and coercion. This resulted in less stability in the political sphere while these institutions struggled to learn how to deal with the challenges presented under the new democratic principles. This instability and vulnerability ultimately opened the door the for drug cartels to undermine the foundational
institutions of Mexico’s fledgling democracy. While Mexico’s democracy was overcoming challenges, the Mexican drug trafficking system was evolving as well. The concurrent identity shift in Mexico’s democratic state and the narco-trafficking system created the Achilles’ heel of Mexico’s democracy.
CHAPTER TWO
Emergence and Transformation

Drug trafficking in Mexico is not a new phenomena. Rather, “[d]rug trafficking became publicly visible in Mexico in the 1990s” (Kenny, Mónica, and Sotomayor 2012). This chapter will focus on the effect of the cartels during the time of democratic transition that Mexico experienced. During the democratic transition, the Mexican drug trade was undergoing an identity transformation of its own. Elevating itself from a middleman transporter of cocaine, and producer of marijuana and heroin to the United States, the cartels became a monopolistic transporter of cocaine (Toro 1995). While cartels still produced and transported marijuana and heroin, during the late twentieth century, and into the twenty-first century, the drug of choice by Mexican traffickers became cocaine. This single transfer in product change is credited with the change in the Mexican narco-trafficking system empowering the cartels to undermine all facets of Mexico’s democracy. Thus, while drug trafficking in Mexico is not a new phenomenon, the nature and type of this trade has drastically changed. This paradigm shift has led to violence, corruption, and the ultimate threat to Mexico’s democracy.
Pre Cocaine Boom

For over a century Mexico produced illicit drugs which were demanded in the US and transported across the US Mexico border. The nature of the trade “…was chiefly confined to marijuana and small quantities of heroin and involved a large number of small trafficking organizations” (Bonner 2010). Unlike Colombia and other drug producing countries, Mexico had an advantage in that it had specific trade routes that had been used for decades which enabled the smuggling of drugs more efficiently into the United States. Figure 2,

Figure 2: Mexico Drug Trading Routes

Drug trafficking in Mexico began in the 1920s and it was during this period that drug trade routes in the northern region began to form. During the 1920s the Mexican State sought to regulate “products that
can be used to encourage vices which degenerate mankind\textsuperscript{4} i.e. drugs (Recio 2002). This regulation required “permits issued by the Health Department necessary in order to introduce to Mexico opium, morphine, heroin and cocaine…” (Recio 2002). The regulation of the drug control industry by the government was controlled until the first change in the drug trade in the state of Mexico. The first change in the drug trafficking industry was the shift in drug trafficking organizations from opium middlemen to opium producers in the northern region of the country (Recio 2002). This shift to opium producers required more trade routes to be formed in the northern region because of the increased supply of opium. This shift towards opium production became the tip of the iceberg by which Mexico became a drug producing and trafficking country.

Prior to Mexico becoming the chief transporter of cocaine into the United States, estimates show that by 1975 Mexico was the main supplier for heroin and marijuana. According to Mathea Falco, the former, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs acknowledged that “Mexico at the time [1975] was supplying around 87 percent of the heroin and nearly 95 percent of the marijuana available on the U.S. market” (Toro 1995).

\textsuperscript{4} The law was enacted by Mexico’s Department of Public Sanitation entitled “Dispositions on the Cultivation and Commerce of Products that Degenerate the Race” (Campos 2010).
This was a result of the first blowback effect\textsuperscript{5} that occurred in the Mexican drug trade. The eradication of opium products in Turkey and the dislocation of the heroin manufactures in Marseilles in the late 1960s and early 1970s, “…resulted in the development of new production sites in Mexico as [Mexican] traffickers chose [Mexico] as an alternative production and export platform (Toro 1995).

Overtime, drug trafficking organizations became professionals in the industry due to its profitability. The lucrative nature of the industry encouraged traffickers to increase not only technological innovations, such as aviation, but also the ability for traffickers to change routes with ease. This indicates, that as early as the 1920s, there were multiple means of drug transportation (Recio 2002).

It was after the cocaine boom in the United States and the crackdown on drug trafficking in Colombia that the drug trafficking and trade in Mexico became a serious security threat to the Mexican state and Mexican democracy (Willoughby 2003). The shift in cocaine trafficking from Colombia to Mexico was the launching point for the cartels to become the most powerful influence in Mexico’s political, economic, and social strata. However, prior to this shift to cocaine, drug traffickers had approximately sixty years of experience developing

\textsuperscript{5} The term “blowback” is used to describe the geographical rearranging of a drug product and transportation of that product due to circumstances prohibiting the previous distributing country or region to continue its means of production and transportation.
and improving channels to distribute drugs into the United States (Recio 2002). Prior to the cocaine boom, the cartels were not a threat to Mexico’s democracy because Mexico was ruled under the authoritarian PRI. An analysis of the relationship between the cartels and PRI prior to the cocaine boom is necessary to understand how the cocaine boom occurred, concurrent with the shift in the Mexican state to a democracy which enabled the cartels to undermine Mexico’s democratic institutions.

*How the Cartels Flourished Under the PRI*

The PRI control of Mexico created a sanctuary allowing the cartels to operate outside the rule of law. Not only did the PRI control Mexico’s economic and social strata through its authoritarian rule, it also controlled and curbed the effect of drug traffickers. This was not a new relationship as “[t]ies between the PRI and illegal traders began in the first half of the twentieth century… and by the end of World War II, the relationship between drug traffickers and the ruling party had solidified” (O’Neil 2009). This relationship created both positive and negative consequences for the future of Mexico because this relationship was no different than the relationship the government had with any other political or social actors in Mexico.
This agreement permeated all levels of Mexican politics, from the municipal level, to the federal police and national politicians. The government had “…established [a] patron-client relationships with drug traffickers” (O’Neil 2009). This relationship was mutually advantageous for the cartels and the government because the government established the framework for which these organizations would operate. This enabled the cartels to operate outside of the rule of law as long as they curtailed the violence towards each other and innocent citizens (O’Neil 2009). The cartels manipulated the institutions by purchasing injunctions from judges, to graft payment in the millions to politicians and officials (Morris 1999). This disregard for the law worked for Mexico until two simultaneous shifts began to occur in the late twentieth century. During this time, both the political and drug makeup of Mexico were undergoing a metamorphous.

In the late twentieth century, Mexico was politically shifting away from its corporatist authoritarian rule towards a democracy. At the same time, the drug trade in Mexico was shifting from solely supplying marijuana and heroin, to partnering with the Colombian cocaine drug lords, and becoming the primary route and transporters of the most sought after drug in the United States. It is through these two distinct and mutually independent changes, that the relationship between the government and the drug cartels morphed.
The shift in political dynamics in the twentieth century severed many of the traditional ties between the cartels and the government. This previous mutually dependent relationship was disrupted because there were new actors in play. Specifically, there were new political parties with new political agendas with substantial power. As stated in Chapter 1, by the 1980s, opposition parties of the PRI began winning elections at the state and national level. Furthermore, because of the increased profit from the boom in cocaine trafficking, there were more drug cartels wanting to expand their influence into the political arena coupled with their control of the drug market. This resulted in a split between the cartels from the government. The cartels realized the government could no longer offer the benefits they had previously received under the PRI rule. The cartels used this political change as the opportunity to end their subservience to the government. This new found independence allowed the cartels to use coercion, their most efficient mean for requiring the safe trafficking of their drugs across the border. Thus, the cartels were able to continue to operate outside the rule of law without the aid of the government (O’Neil 2009).
The Post Cocaine Boom

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, both Liberal President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) and Conservative President Belisario Betancur Cuartas (1982-1986) of Colombia launched crackdowns on the Medellín and Cali cartels of Colombia (Bagley 1990). These cartels controlled upwards of 80 percent of Colombia’s cocaine traffic earning between $2 and $4 billion annually (Bagley 1990). Betancur's successor, President Virgilio Barco Vargas declared all-out war on the Colombian traffickers utilizing the police and military in this endeavor (Bagley 1990). With full support from the United States, the United States passed the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act in 1986 (Sheehy 2011). The chief role of this legislature was to eliminate the cocaine trade from Colombia across the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico into the United States. This blockade coincided with the 1994 Peruvian Airbridge Program which “provided tactical aerial intelligence assistance to the Government of Peru, to help it stop the shipment of illegal drugs across its border” (Leahy 2003). Even following the mistaken 2001 downing of a missionary aircraft, the US State Department recommended the reinstatement of the programs in Peru and Colombia (Leahy 2003). This crackdown on the Colombian cocaine traffickers and the routes which they transported cocaine into the US, resulted in
the Colombian cartels search for alternative routes for transportation of their product

The shift in the drug market changed in the mid 1980s when 30 percent of U.S. cocaine consumption traveled across the Mexican border (Toro 1995). The unintended consequences of the drug war in Colombia resulted in increased violence and geographical rearranging of the cocaine production and transportation referred to as the “blowback” effect (Gootenberg 2010). The focus was on the cocaine market because “US consumers have spent twice as much on cocaine as on heroin and marijuana combined [from 1989-1998], with cocaine expenditures totaling nearly 500 billion dollars” (Willoughby 2003). The profitability of the cocaine market occurred because of the crackdown by the U.S. and Colombians officials on the Colombian cartels. By 1984, the price of cocaine doubled from $5,000 a kilogram to $9,000 in Colombia. In the U.S., the street price of cocaine jumped from $17,000 to $36,000 (Richey 1985). Cocaine became the most profitable drug to traffic into the United States. A review of the statistical data explains the impact that the shift in the cocaine routes had on Mexico narco-trafficking. Prior to 1984, the trafficking of cocaine across the US Mexico border was virtually nonexistent (Bonner 2010). Cocaine previously came across the southeastern border of the United States. See Figure 3 below.
These routes shifted with a spike in 1989 when one third of the US cocaine market crossed the Mexico border. By the late 1990s, over three fourths of the illegally transported cocaine market came across this border. This surge and change in cocaine trafficking is the best evidence of the “blowback” effect (Gottenberg 2010). Figure 4 shows the change in the Cocaine trafficking trade routes as they no longer went through the southeastern border (Figure 3) of the United States. Instead those routes almost exclusively shifted through the Mexico-United States border (Toro 1995).
Figure 4: Cocaine Drug Trafficking Routes Post 1980


It is no coincidence that the crack down on cocaine smuggling from Colombia through the Caribbean, and the decrease in the U.S. sea routes, occurred at the same time as the boom in trafficking of cocaine through Mexico. As the US cracked down on the drug trade, Colombian drug traffickers looked to Mexico as their new means of transporting cocaine into the United States. Initially the Mexican traffickers operated as the middlemen of the cocaine trade between Colombia and the United States. However, this relationship began to shift as the Mexican traffickers realized how integral of a part they
played in this chain. This began the shift of the balance of power in their favor over Colombia. As the crackdown on the maritime trade of cocaine into the U.S. to Colombia, the Mexican cartels began to acquire Colombian cocaine for a cheaper fixed price than before because the Mexican land routes became the safest means of transportation without seizure (Islas 2011). One man and organization in particular, Miguel Ángel Félix Gallarado of the Sinaloa Cartel, “…swiftly won bargaining power against the beleaguered Colombians, demanding instead half shares in kind” (Gootenberg 2010). Gallardo commercialized cocaine, and dispersed the Sinaloan smugglers across Mexico’s territory. However, over time, the organization split into a series of regional competing cartels (Gootenberg 2010).

The “blowback” effect resulted in the creation of these newly empowered Mexican cartels, all of which competed for a share of the cocaine market. By 2010 over 90% of the cocaine market came across the Mexican border (Gootenberg 2010). In 2006, there was an estimated $32,876,712.33 to $219,178,082.19 a day in illicit drug profits that occur from transfers over the U.S.-Mexico border (Rios 2008).6 Understanding how the drug cartels came into existence is not all that is required to analyze the cartels crippling grip on Mexico’s fledging

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6 These daily figures were calculated by this author from the studies statement of “12 to 80 billion annual drug revenue.”
democracy. The competition amongst the cartels themselves, is critical to understanding how the cartels have systematically become the single greatest threat to Mexico’s democratic institutions.

*The Turf Wars for Trade Routes*

To comprehend the violence occurring in Mexico and the threat that it has on Mexico’s democracy, a review of the evolutions of the operations of competing rival cartel factions is necessary. When the drug market shifted from marijuana to the transportation of cocaine, the cartels needed to acquire new trade routes or, take over another cartel’s trade route, or a combination of both. As a result, two major cartels emerged from this struggle and they continue to fight each other to this day.

These two distinct cartels have two distinct goals and methods of operation. The Sinaloa Cartel, through its main commanders, Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo⁷, operates its cartel and drug trade as a legitimate business enterprise (Mennen 2011). In a message left to politicians, law enforcement, and the people, in an SUV with 14 chopped-up murder victims as a warning to the Gulf Cartel, the Los Zetas Cartel, and those who cooperate with them; “We are drug traffickers, and we don’t mess with honest, hard-working people of

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⁷ Gallardo is serving a 40 year prison sentence after his conviction of drug trafficking and bribery (Rohter 1989).
“businesses” (Keller and Pipitone 2010). The Sinaloa Cartel in its attempt to operate as a legitimate business operates in stark contrast to their largest counter insurgent, the Gulf Cartel, which has amassed a bloody and violent image (Keller and Pipitone 2010). The Gulf Cartel gained this notorious reputation of violence because its most famous sect, Los Zetas. Los Zetas, initially comprised of a group of special force deserters of the Mexican military now have more than 1,200 members and have broken away from the Gulf Cartel to create a third rival faction. Los Zetas use violence as means for achieving their drug trafficking operation goals. “Much of the current violence in Mexico can be attributed to a war raging between the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas, [and] among other smaller participants” (Keller and Pipitone 2010). The current violence that Mexico is experiencing began approximately in 2003, when the territory of the Zeta’s Nuevo Laredo, one of the largest inland routes across the Rio Grande, was attacked. Violence has ensued ever since, with other cartels, including the Juarez Cartel and Tijuana Cartel, increasingly becoming more involved (Keller and Pipitone 2010). While this turf war escalated during the twenty-first century, it was not the only time there had been inner cartel fighting for these prized routes.

In the 1990’s, fighting among cartels for turf was rampant. In the early 1990’s while violence was waning in Tijuana, conflict between the
Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels skyrocketed in Ciudad Juarez (O’Neil 2009). Following the death of the Juarez Leader, Armando Carrillo Fuentes, and the resulting organizational instability, the Tijuana and Sinaloa cartels were trying to take control of the newly founded unstable turf. The conflict subsided in 1999 (O’Neil 2009).

Figure 5: Mexican Cartels: Areas of Dominant Influence

The conflict for turf war still continues into 2013. The infighting amongst the cartels presents major challenges for politicians and law enforcement. There are no codes for combat, and no rules of engagement. This allows the cartels to operate with a sense of
impunity. While citizens usually are not the main target of cartels, their collateral deaths are no impediment to the operation of the cartels as “[s]hootouts in broad daylight with automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades…” put civilians in danger even when they are not the initial targets of the cartel violence (O’Neil 2009). The death toll from the drug violence from December 2006 through 2011 has been over 50,000 persons (Beittel 2012). Furthermore, “…the number of reported crimes in Mexico increased from 810,000 in 1991 to 1,370,000 in 1998- a 70 percent increase…” (Willoughby 2003). The crime in Mexico has only continued to increase, and there is a direct correlation between an increase in crime and the increase in drug violence. Figure 6 illustrates the consolidation of crime-related killings. Figure 6 below shows that the largest area for violence is not only along the Northern border, but also where cartel regions border rival cartel territories.
Figure 6 illustrates that in the state of Chihuahua had the most homicides due to drug violence. Chihuahua is the home to the Juárez Cartel which is surrounded on all boarders by the Sinaloa Cartel.

Furthermore, Figure 6 shows the influence of the Sinaloa Cartel into the Chihuahua region, specifically into the Ciudad Juárez region. The Northeast region of Nuevo León illustrates the regional turf war violence between the Gulf Cartel which is surrounded regionally by Los Zetas.

This violent era is a break from the past. Under PRI rule and prior to the cocaine blowback in Mexico, there was insignificant cartel
related violence. However, the cocaine blowback ushered in a new era, not only of violence, but also in the relationship between the cartels and politicians. The violence is not restricted to cartels and innocent bystanders, but became apart of the relationship between the cartels and politicians. The turf war increased the competition for the coercion and corruption of politicians.

Coercion and Payment of Politicians

Under the PRI rule, politicians were heavily involved with and dependent on the drug cartels. When the shift to democracy occurred, politicians were no longer able to be openly involved with cartels and drug trafficking affairs. However, this did not prevent drug cartels from incorporating or coercing politicians to aid in their illegal operations. The shift towards democracy also shifted the view of politicians toward the cartels. Presidential candidates ran on the platform of ending drug violence and trafficking in Mexico. Understanding the deep roots the cartels have in politics and the extent the cartels will go to coerce and co-opt individual politicians is necessary for understanding how the cartels are undermining democracy in Mexico.

Former Mexican president Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) was so resolute to end drug violence that he pledged the “War on Drugs.” From 2006-2011 the result of this “War” has had a death toll in excess of
50,000 people (Beittel 2012). With the exception of Former President Calderón, no level of government is safe from infiltration from the cartels. The cartels have given politicians two choices, silver or lead. The former, leading to corruption, and the latter to coercion. This policy has been successful in that “…drug cartels have corrupted as much as 60 percent of the country’s 2,500 municipal governments” (Althaus 2009). This is more than just mayors who have been corrupted by the cartels. Senators, governors, and others similarly situated, have been accused or arrested for serving as protectors of the drug cartels (Althaus 2009). If the drug cartels are unable to convince an individual to participate in their illegal activity, they have coercive means of reaching their goals.

Following two assassination attempts by cartel leaders, Mexican Congressman David Figueroa dropped out of the race for Sonora governor. Figueroa “…headed Calderón’s 2006 presidential campaign in Sonora, a state that's a thoroughfare for drugs heading to the western United States” (Hall 2008). The cartels attempts to send President Calderón and other politicians a message did not stop there. A cousin of Calderón’s wife was murdered by the cartels in order to send a message to the president on their views of his crackdown on their enterprise (Hall 2008). Coinciding with the 2010 elections, 15 mayors, most from small towns, were assassinated (Beittel 2012). The
assassination of PRI gubernatorial candidate Rodolfo Torres (PRI) was the highest level assassination since the death of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in 1994 (Luhnow and Casey 2010). The difference between these assassinations are that Colosio was not assassinated by cartels and Rodolfo was. The assassination of Torres was a message from the cartels to the government because this act was an abnormality from the typical violence of cartels towards politicians who previously targeted parties opposing the PRI (Luhnow and Casey 2010). The influence of the cartels into the political sector cannot be understated.

Following the assassination of Torres, the PAN asked its candidates in smaller cities not to campaign to avoid being exposed to possible attacks (Luhnow and Casey 2010). In 2010, it was estimated that 8% of Mexican municipalities were completely under control of organized crime, and 63% were under considerable influence (Beittel 2012). However, while more politicians have seemingly fled or become corrupt, to the extent the cartels could be held accountable by law enforcement agencies, their growth and influence would be impeded.
Political Ideological Shifts

The cartels have fundamentally changed the ideological mindset of politicians. As stated, politicians previously had a mutual understanding with the cartels. Now politicians must campaign against cartels. An analysis of the position of the four major presidential candidates during the 2012 election, reveals the influence that the cartels have on the political strata of Mexico.

The PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador ran for the presidency in 2006 and in 2012. The shift in his platform from these two elections exemplifies the political change that occurred in Mexico. In 2006, Obrador ran on the platform of “for the good of all, the poor first” (Seelke 2012). This platform was an economic platform dealing with the economic disparity that exists within Mexico. In 2012, Obrador ran on the platform of a “republic of love.” This platform was oriented on justice and the well-being for all (Seelke 2012). A platform shift from economic to personal well-being was in response to the gravest issue facing the Mexican people, i.e. their safety.

The current President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, of the PRI, was the governor of the state of Mexico before running for the presidency. As governor, Peña Nieto ran on the platform of “a government that delivers” (Seelke 2012). This platform dealt with economic prosperity within the state of Mexico. However, during the
Presidential campaign, Peña Nieto’s pivoted and his number one platform issue was restoring peace and liberty. As with Obrador, the campaign has shifted from economic prosperity to providing peace within the nation.

The PAN candidate, Josefina Vázquez Mota was the first woman presidential candidate from the three major parties. Mota faced the problem of distancing herself from the Calderón administration, which started the “War on Drugs” contributing to the security crisis Mexico faces today. Her campaign contained two pillars focusing on security and well being (Seelke 2012). These pillars sought to restore Mexico back to a safe state and rectifying the securitization issues that her party has created.

The PANAL candidate, Gabriel Quadri de la Torre did not have a succinct slogan for his presidential campaign. However, unlike the previously discussed candidates, de la Torre outlined major proposals for sustainable economic growth. His failure to be from one of the three major parties hindered his campaign. In addition, security was not a forefront issue during his campaign. While there was no doubt that he wanted to curtail cartel violence like any right minded candidate, his forefront of economic advancement issues left some uncertainty in his commitment to restoring peace within the violent state of Mexico.
The results of the 2012 election showed what the Mexican people wanted. The PRI received almost 40% of the election votes cast, the PRD came in second with 32%, the PAN 26%, and PANAL with 2%. While there is more to an election than one issue, and Torre faced a great challenge coming from a secondary party, the results show that security was the greatest issue facing the people of Mexico. While all candidates supported security reform efforts, the two results of the campaigns with direct slogan’s dealing with peace restoration within the state is no coincidence.

The shift in the drug trade coupled with the politician transition that occurred at the same time severed the previous relationship between the cartels and politicians. However, it is not the responsibility of politicians to enforce the rule of law. They are obliged to abide by the rule of law, which shown here in is not adhered to. However, it is not the duty of politicians for enforcement. It is the duty of law enforcement agencies to enforce the rule of law to all individuals within its jurisdiction. Understanding how law enforcement agencies fail to enforce the rule of law amongst cartels, politicians, but also themselves, is crucial to understanding how the cartels have undermined the foundational democratic institutions within Mexico.
CHAPTER THREE

Mexico’s Security Failure

Mexico, like most Latin American democracies, faces many formidable challenges. One of the most significant challenges is the inadequate law enforcement agencies. An analysis of the effect inefficient law enforcement agencies have on Latin American democracies is essential to understanding the gravity of the challenges facing Mexico. This chapter will expose the direct effect that the cartels have on Mexico’s democratic law enforcement and security institutions and will detail alternative theories and proposals for reform.

Current Problems- Law Enforcement

With the dramatic political changes occurring during the 1980s and 1990s, Latin America was shifting towards a democratic region in all countries except Cuba. However, while these democracies were evolving at different paces, they all faced a similar underlying problem: corruption of the law enforcement and, in particular, their police agencies. Under the previous authoritarian and non-democratic rule that preceded the democratic transition in Latin American countries, the police force was then the bastion designed to protect the rights and safety of the elite and upper class (Davis 2006; Michaud 2011).
Democracy required an inevitable shift that required the police and other law enforcement agencies to reassess their role to actually serve the entire population. The demographic change in the makeup of Latin America required law enforcement agencies to adapt. Over a 50 year period dating from 1950-2000, the demographic makeup shifted from 41 percent of Latin America living in rural areas in 1950, to 75 percent of Latin America living in cities in 2000 (Johnson 2012). This shift in urbanization has created a problem for law enforcement as they already attempt to grapple with the new regulations they face resulting from the emergence of democracy. The shift to a democratic state required law enforcement officials to apply the rule of law equally to all persons under its jurisdiction. The urbanization that occurred in Latin America required urban law enforcement officials to provide safety and security to a greater number of people. By 1988, only 24% of the workforce was employed in the agriculture industry, and 76% of the workforce were in the industry/service sector (“World Bank Database”). These law enforcement agencies did not have the resources, personnel, or training to meet the new demands.

The challenges facing the police in Latin America are that they are foundationally, and systematically ill-equipped and functionally inadequate to handle the increased crime resulting from the increased population they are supposed to protect. The cause of the increase in
crime and violence in Latin America has no single root. Some scholars point to the neo-liberal economic model that accompanied democratic transitions as the problem that lead to the vast inequality gap between the rich and poor (Pinheiro 1996). This inequality is widely ascribed as one of the causes of the increased violence. Other scholars point to the inefficiencies and problems within the police as the root to this violence and fundamental problems with Latin American democracies (Kenny, Mónica, Sotomayor 2012; Johnson 2012; Osorio 2013). Mexico fits both theories. Mexico has the same social and economic problems previously identified. Mexico also has the same police corruption and inefficiency. Furthermore, Mexico has an outlier issue that is not necessarily prevalent in all other Latin American countries in that they have insidious drug cartels that run rampant throughout the country.

*Inequality Leads to Violence*

The violence and income inequality in Mexico is paralyzing. As a result of the free market neo-liberal model, the Mexican economy created income inequality gaps that have forced those disenfranchised individuals to seek alternative means of lucrative employment (Sanchez 2006). From 1992-2000, the average population below the poverty line
was 58.4% and 16.8% of the population live under $2 a day\(^8\) ("World Bank Database"). The most accessible alternative was the underground black market, which “…accounted for 40 percent of all economic activities,” and the drug trade (Shirk 7). The drug trade as a whole accounts for approximately 3 to 4 percent of Mexico’s GDP (Shirk 2011). Mexico has a GDP of 1.657 trillion dollars. Thus the drug trade is approximately a 66.28 billion\(^9\) dollar a year industry ("Mexico."). For individuals who have become disenfranchised by the new economic model, the drug trade becomes a profitable means of living. Mexico has a population of approximately 115 million, and it has been found that there are an “…estimated 450,000 people who rely on drug trafficking as a significant source of income today” (Shirk 2011). With this alternative means of economic benefits has come an increase in violence.

The majority of Latin America experiences inequality with an average GINI Index\(^{10}\) of 52.2\(^{11}\), Mexico has a GINI Index score of 51

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\(^8\) These numbers were independently calculated by this author using the average poverty statistics reported by the World Bank Database for the years 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000.

\(^9\) This number was independently calculated based on the figures given by Shirk and The CIA-The World Fact Book with respect to GDP and percentage of GDP attributed to the drug trade.

\(^{10}\) The GINI Index measures the distribution of income within a country. A GINI Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 is perfect inequality. This Index is an adequate measurement of poverty through income distribution.
The importance of this representation is that Latin America as a whole faces inequality. There are multiple causations for this inequality, and the cartel affect that plagues Mexico is not the sole causation for inequality in the entire region. Economic inequality is pervasive throughout Latin America as the top 10% richest families own 48% of the total income in the Latin American region, and the bottom 10% families own 1.6% of the total income (Sanchez 2006). Economic inequality leads to social inequality because those less fortunate are disadvantages in their access to public assets such as education, clear water, good, and voice (Sanchez 2006). Inequality leads to violence because the deprivation of resources causes individuals to use violent means as a necessary survival tool and; these tools constitute a growing criminal economy (Sanchez 2006). Mexico and other Latin American countries have turned to using the police as a means of curtailing this violence. However, the use of violence to combat violence is questionable because “[r]aising the levels of violent law enforcement by 10 percent is related to an increase of 31.6 percent in violence among criminals” (Osorio 2013).

Not unlike other Latin American countries, Mexico has seen a dramatic increase in violence. From 2005 to 2010 there has been a

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11 This GINI Index score was independently calculated by this author, through the average of GINI Index scores for Latin American countries for the year 1993, if a score was not given for that year, the average of the score from the year closest before and after 1993 was used.
sixfold increase in crime (Shirk 2012). It is no coincidence that also there has been an increase from four major drug trafficking organizations in the early 1990s to at least seven today (Shirk 2012). Mexico is becoming more violent and the police and law enforcement institutions are ill equipped to curtail the rampant lawlessness that has occurred. Because the local and federal police forces are demonstratively incapable of protecting its citizens, Mexico has turned to augmenting its police force with its military to greater strengthen the power of its law enforcement institution.

*Police Operations Lead to Violence*

With the shift towards democracy, police power increased. The military rule of the authoritarian regimes decreased. Mexico was a unique authoritarian regime in that it never experienced military rule during its seventy year authoritarian era (Geddes 2004). Unlike the military, the police were less involved in obvious human rights violations imparted by the military, such as disappearances, or large political oppressions. However, the police have created a different oppression throughout the region. An example would be the disenfranchisement of groups of people based on social standing. When Latin America shifted to a democratic process, there was little done to reform police institutions to accompany this new shift. Consequently the police were
ill equipped to provide the same protection the socially elite disproportionally enjoyed (Pinheiro 1996).

In Latin America there are many instances in which the police operate with impunity. There is little oversight, investigation or questions into their actions. These are direct violations of the rule of law which has been established in Latin American countries through stringent Constitutions. What is occurring in Latin America is the problem of “… a dramatic gap between the letter of the law and the brutal reality of law enforcement” (Pinheiro 1996). Brazil for example, like many other Latin American countries, has established Constitutional reform that is designed to protect the basic liberties and rights of all their citizens. However, these rights are routinely not protected and many times are intentionally violated by the police. These actions have created distrust and dissatisfaction amongst the citizens.

The public support for the police system in Latin America is, low. In 2009, the Latinobarometro found that 64.2 percent of Latin Americans had either little or no confidence in the police force. Furthermore, 64.1 percent said they were not at all or not very satisfied with the way police operate. Most importantly, only 38 percent said their local police protected citizens (Johnson 2012). This lack of public support and belief that the police cannot do their jobs has forced many
Latin Americans, with the financial ability, to hire private security guards. In some countries, there are more hired private security guards, than police officers. This is exemplified in Guatemala where “… private security guards now outnumber the country’s 25,000 police by more than 5 to 1” (Johnson 2012). This is not an outlier example. In most Latin American countries, security guards outnumber police officers (Ungar 2007). Not only do the elites distrust the police, but the impoverished do not believe that police work to protect the indigent citizens. Instead of relying on the police force for protection, citizens that are unable to afford the protection of private security guards have turned to protecting themselves. Thus, police inefficiency and direct disregard of protecting all citizens under the rule of the law has created more violence. The lack of police reform cannot be cited as the only problem for police inefficiency in Latin America. Due to different state constitutions, as well as different stages in the democratic process, Latin American countries have different means by which their law enforcement agencies operate.

Mexico’s law enforcement institutions face the same problems that foundationally exist in other Latin American countries. While there is the problem of enforcement of the rule of law by the police, more insidious is that the “[p]olice themselves believe that rampant corruption is institutionally predetermined and attributable to high-level infiltration
by organized crime and inadequate internal investigations” (Shirk 2012). The implications of this mindset is that not only do the citizens in Mexico lack faith in the police as an institution, but the officers of that institution itself do not have faith in the effectiveness of their ability to enforce the rule of law. The problem this lack of institutional faith poses is that citizens consequently operate outside of the institution. Within Mexico, “…an estimated three-quarters of crimes go unreported” (Shirk 2011). The root of the problem is deeper than a lack of reporting of crimes. Even when a crime is reported, “[e]veryone in Mexico seems to mistrust the process, suspecting that every claim of guilt or innocence has some hidden purpose behind it” (Chevigny 1996). The challenge facing Mexico is what type of reform is necessary to establish an effective law enforcement institution that would protect all citizens under the rule of law and gain the trust and confidence of its people?

Structural differences between countries law enforcement institutions hinder the ability for nations to operate together. For example, “[b]razil’s police are controlled primarily by state governors, whereas Colombia’s national police serve under the Ministry of National Defense” (Johnson 2012). Structural differences make communication and reform problematic because it is difficult to create reform looking at countries with successful institutions if that country’s institutions do not operate or have the authority to operate in a like manner. Not only is
reform difficult, mere communication between countries becomes difficult due to the different institutions in place. For example, “[p]olice who are tracking drug smugglers in Guatemala might have to exchange information with the army on Mexico's side of the border. In turn, Mexico’s federal police might have to coordinate with a county sheriff on the U.S. border…” (Johnson 2012).

The impunity given to police officers allows them to be subjective in their use of deadly force, torture and detention. Due to this impunity, police in Latin America are held in contempt by the citizens and rightly so. Chile, which is revered as one of the most democratic countries in Latin America, still operates outside of democratic rule of law because “…torture is still practiced in the majority of police for their policy of shoot first, ask questions later” (Pinheiro 1996). These actions, are not unique to Chile, but rather occur throughout all of Latin America. They rarely go investigated or punished. This impunity is in direct violations of constitutional reforms that have already taken place in Latin America and prevent these fledgling democracies from flourishing to their full potential.

Mexico fits with the impunity pattern even though torture and ill-treatment of detainees is strictly prohibited (Moreno et al. 2003). The study by the Mexican National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) conducted between January 2000 and July 2002 comprehensively
investigated accusations or torture or ill-treatment of detainees (Moreno et al. 2003). During this timeframe, the CNDH received 9,919 complains of human rights violations, 529 which were categorized as torture or ill-treatment. However, only 16 of these torture or ill-treatment cases were opened to the public for review\(^{12}\) (Moreno et al. 2003). Figure 8 in appendix A details a flowchart of the breakdown of case categorization from the study investigating the documentation of torture and ill-treatment in Mexico through reviewing medical forensic files (Moreno et al. 2003). The results of this investigation found that 97% of the cases reported some form of physical abuse, the most common of which was blunt trauma, and in 85% of the cases, some form of mental abuse was reported (Moreno et al. 2003). These abuses are investigated by forensic medical examiners who then report evaluations which are used as evidence to either affirm or deny the torture or ill-treatment allegation. The CNDH and the study cited have concluded that the evaluations by the forensic medical evaluations of torture and ill-treat of victims in Mexico are inadequate (Moreno et al. 2003). The inadequacies stem from affiliation of physicians conducting medical evaluations wherein 69% were affiliated with the Federal Attorney

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\(^{12}\) For the study cited, the Office for the Protection of Human Rights (OPHR), a branch within the Attorney General’s Office, granted access to the study cited for the 21 CNDH case investigations of human rights violations between January 2001 and July 2002, 17 of the 21 cases included allegations of torture or ill-treatment of detainees (Moreno, Heisler, Keller, Iacopino 32).
General’s Office, Federal District or State Attorney General’s Office.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, the reports by these medical evaluators fail to give detailed reports in their evaluations.\textsuperscript{14} The abuse by Mexican police officers can be attributed to the lack of integrity within the profession itself, and the lack of incentive for morally righteous individuals to engage in the profession.

Mexico does not need to simply add more bodies to their police force because “[m]exico reportedly has between 450,000 and 500,000 police and public security personnel, giving it about 471 per 100,000 citizens, higher than the regional median[off 283 per 100,000 citizens]…” (Johnson 2012). Mexico does, however, need to increase the incentives for performing the duties of a police officer. The lack of incentives or pay for police officers that is prevalent throughout Latin America is particularly noticeable within Mexico. Mexico’s police “…earn from MEX$9,250(US$687) to MEX$18,672(US $1,387) per month depending on rank” (Johnson 33). Even those receiving the high end of the police pay scale, US $1,387 fall below the US $1750 average monthly income for a Mexican citizen, and those at the starting monthly salary of US $687 fall almost 3times below the monthly

\textsuperscript{13} See Figure 9 in the appendix at the end of the chapter for a detailed affiliation of physician’s conducting the medical evaluations.

\textsuperscript{14} See Figure 10 and Figure 11 in the appendix following the chapter which outline where evaluations lacked, or completely left out details in their evaluations.
average\textsuperscript{15} (Passel, Cohn, Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). A step to reforming the institution would be to make the position within the institution one worth holding. This can begin to be done through increasing the pay of those who work within the institution. The reform that Mexico needs cannot be accomplished solely by the state itself. They need the help of the United States, much of which is currently provided.

In 2008, the United States pledged $1.4 billion to Mexico through the Merida Initiative which was designed to help foster institutional reform in Mexico’s law enforcement institutions. However, this money came with the expectation that Mexico would use the funds to begin the eradication of the cartels. However, Mexico turned to its army to militarize the conflict which caught the local the law enforcement sectors in the crosshairs. As a result, through 2010, “the U.S. State and Defense Departments had been able to obligate only 46 percent of the funds approved and spend only 9 percent\textsuperscript{16}” (Johnson 2012). Figure 12 in Appendix A details the complete allocation of funds to Mexico by the United States from FY2007 to FY2013. The Merida Initiative has the tools and funds to fundamentally

\textsuperscript{15} These figures were independently calculated by this author using the data provided by the source of approximately US $7,000 average quarterly household income.

\textsuperscript{16} The $1.6 billion pledge was to be spaced over 6 fiscal years which outlines the lack of allocation of funds. The approval for funds is subject to strict scrutiny of the US Congress, and the funds are sent to multiple Mexican organization such as the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Economic Support Fund (ESF) (Seelke and Finklea 2013). Furthermore, included in the pledge are non-monetary assets such as surveillance, and weaponry assistance (Seelke and Finklea 2013).
reform Mexico’s law enforcement institution. Even with its lack of utilization of all funds, the program has managed to “… train more than 4,000 police graduates from Mexico’s federal police training center…” (Johnson 2012). While these numbers are promising, Mexico is still viewed as a semi-democratic country that operates with “…impunity [as] the rule and legality is the exception” (Davis 2006).

The most effective way to analyze the effect the cartels are having on local law enforcement is by addressing the inefficiency of law enforcement due to the corruption and coercion by the cartels on law enforcement. Understanding both is a prerequisite in understanding how the cartels are undermining Mexico’s democracy.

Cartels Create Inefficiency of Law Enforcement

The inefficiency of law enforcement agencies in policing the drug cartels is nothing new in Mexico. Under the PRI, the lack of application of the law to the cartels allowed for lawless action, within boundaries. The judicial, legislative, and all facets of law enforcement, were mere puppets which rarely held drug cartels accountable for their violence or illegal activity. Even the shift towards democracy has not remedied these procedures for accountability. The shift to democracy actually exacerbated these problems because the law enforcement institutions that previously protected elites under the authoritarian rule were now
forced to protect all citizens under the democratic rule of law. This has proved to be an insurmountable task for these institutions. Since 2006, of the 1,000 murders that have occurred in the state of Sinaloa, not one has been solved (Ling 2011). The reason it is hard to prosecute the cartels is because they have infiltrated the law enforcement agencies that are supposed to prosecute them, including the Office of the Attorney General (Jiménez 2003).

The infiltration of cartels into agencies whose purpose was to eradicate their existence has been around for decades. Even when the PRI and cartels had a stable relationship, the cartels still infiltrated the Mexican Department of Justice (PGR). The PGR’s had primary jurisdiction for drug enforcement (Willoughby 2003). However, the outcome was that “…65 percent of the PGR staff was controlled by the cartels” (Willoughby 2003). Another means by which the cartels create inefficiency of law enforcement agencies is by infiltrating these agencies with their own personnel.

The Customs and Boarder Protection Agency (CBP) not only had many of its members co-opted by the cartels, but they also experienced direct infiltration by cartel members. From 2005-2009 Louis Enrique Ramirez- CBP official took a total of $500,000 worth of bribes, and also smuggled drugs into the state of Texas while he was a boarder inspector (Peters 2011). Ramirez is not an isolated case. From
“…October 2004, 121 current or former CBP employees have been...prosecuted for corruption” (Peters 2011). Ramirez was a prime example of the extent drug cartels will bribe individuals to ship drugs. Margarita Crispin is an even better example. It is not clear when Crispin began taking bribes from cartels to allow drug shipments through the lanes she worked while employed by the CBP at the El Paso port of entry, but the estimated total sum she received was $5 million (Peters 2011). The cartels devised unique tactics to infiltrate the CBP. For example, they have sent drug traffickers to take the entrance examination to work at the CBP. After the CBP began administering polygraph tests to determine if individuals were eligible for employment; “…60 percent [who took the test] were found to be ineligible for employment... These individuals were ineligible because they had a history of drug abuse or criminal activity that they failed to disclose” (Peters 2011). Bribery, however, is still the most common form of corruption utilized by the cartels.

*Cartels Corrupt and Coerce Law Enforcement*

The cartels corrupt law enforcement, and specifically police officers, in two ways: coercion and bribery. Understanding the corruption and coercion of law enforcement is necessary in understanding how the cartels threaten Mexico's democracy. Law
enforcement personnel are charged with the duty to enforce the rule of law, not operate outside of its realm. Mexico’s police force is plagued with disorganization and dishonorable members. Those that are honorable are often targeted and killed by the cartels.

The first problem is that the persona of a police officer is not one of great integrity because many join the field for capital gain rather than a true interest towards law enforcement. Not only is the intent of officers many times corrupt, police municipalities are so disconnected that individuals have been known to go from one force to another after being discharged for links to drug trafficking and corruption (Botello and Rivera 2000). An example of an individual in the Mexican police force would be Rodrigo [last name not given], who murdered a man (Carmelo 1977) in Veracruz when the man called him a “fag.” Rodrigo then joined the police force in a different state because “[a]s a policeman, no one will come looking for me for killing Carmelo” (Botello and Rivera 2000).

Individuals with questionable morality on the police force are prime prospects to accept bribery and extort citizens when a law is broken. One example of this type of occurrence is the matter of José [last name not given]. José, a police officer, saw two young men drinking beer on a bench and picked them up. He then drove the two men to a quiet street where his extortion began. He asked the men “[a]ll right now, boys, would you like me to alleviate your problem of
drinking in the public right of way, or would you like to spend 36 hours locked up” (Botello and Rivera 2000)? After the men vehemently deny wanting to go to jail, the officer asks “[w]ell what are you going to do” (Botello and Rivera 2000)? It seems that the ten pesos the men had on them were not enough, and José forced the men to take him to their house so they could get more money from their family members. 50 pesos later, José and his partner left wealthier men. Extortion is not the primary means by which the police make most of their money. Rather, direct payment by the drug cartels is an even more lucrative and get rich quick scheme for an officer.

Between 1988 and 1989, the Juárez cartel processed 21 billion dollars’ worth of cocaine. Furthermore, this cartel allocates at least 10 percent of its income to bribery of officials (Dettmer 1997). Assuming this cartel spent the minimum allocated this year for paying off law enforcement, they would have a bribery budget of 2.1 billion dollars from cocaine alone. Mexico has 366 officers per 100,000 people. With a 2010 population of approximately 1,134,230,150, there were approximately 415,128 police officers (“Under the Volcano” The Economist 2010). This allows the Juarez Cartel to give every single police officer $5,000 in bribes in that year alone. The average police officer earns $350 a month, culminating to $4,200 a year in salary. The Juarez Cartel, could literally double the salary of every police officer in
Mexico, and still have a surplus of $332 million to pay to justices and politicians. However, there are select individuals who join the police force for the proper reason. However righteous their motives, those individuals that do not fall under cartel corruption, face cartel coercion.

Within two days during 2008, the drug cartels murdered Mexico’s federal Police Chief Edgar Eusevio Millan Gomez and Esteban Robles Espinosa the commander of Mexico City’s investigative police force. These brutal murders came only a week after the director of investigation for organized crime, Roberto Velasco Bravo, was murdered. The common denominator between these individuals was that they were active participants in the Mexican government’s crackdown on the drug cartels. These were individuals who embodied what the police sought to enforce and obtain: justice. They were murdered because they tried to enforce the rule of law which is supposed to govern Mexico’s society (“2 Top Mexican Police” 2008). The cartels, however, have no allegiance to the police officers they bribe. At any point, they do not fear breaking the alliance they have with the corrupt officials. Police officers who previously worked with cartels, but cooperate with judicial officials, are not immune from the violence of the cartels. The cartels allegiance is to their members and their profits.

17 These are the independent calculations of the author given the statistics provided.
Miguel Angel Barraza was not a model Mexican police officer. He was a corrupt officer who played a role in the death of 53 citizens who were killed during a premeditated casino fire in Northern Mexico (BBC News 2011). After being detained by law enforcement, Barraza began to name individuals of the Los Zetas Cartel who were involved in the incident. The cartel responded with unmitigated revenge on his family. During his detention for his role in the casino fire the Zeta cartel killed his father, stepmother, and stepbrother. This example shows the inhumane nature of the cartels, the horrific methods they will use, and the fear and terror they impose on the state of Mexico (BBC News 2011). Violence is the means by which the cartels communicate their message. That message has been clear- you are either with us or against us. The cartels will stop at nothing to exterminate those who are against their operations.

There is, however, one political entity that has the nascent potential to end the violence and rule of the cartels. That is the Mexican army. Understanding the role the army plays in the state of Mexico in relation to the drug cartels is critical in understanding why the cartels are capable of posing such a threat to democracy in the state of Mexico.
Cartels Corrupt the Mexican Military: Militarization Failure

The militarization of the “war on drugs” by former President Felipe Calderón occurred in response to the widespread carnage that the drug cartels continue to inflict upon the Mexican people. However, this reform is misplaced and will not provide long term institutional reform in Mexico’s law enforcement sector. The drug violence sweeping Mexico is actually very secularized with “[t]wo-thirds of drug-related homicides occur in just five of the thirty-two Mexican states and roughly 80 percent in just 168 of the 2,456 municipalities” (Shirk 2012). Thus, the militarization of the public security system in Mexico is not the requisite reform necessary for long term institutional stability. The biggest consequence of the drug trade is that the “…pervasive corruption has been the further erosion of the public’s already tarnished faith in the state” (Andreas 1993). Furthermore, militarization has been shown to have the reverse effect than was anticipated. The military was presumably engaged in order to stop the cartels because the police were either incapable or unwilling to stop cartel operations due to widespread corruption. Not only has there been a sixfold increase in reports of human rights violations by the military, but also a “… high incidence of desertion among Mexican armed forces- averaging around twenty thousand troops per year…” (Shirk 2012). The military has consequently become impotent to not only stop the cartels, but also to
assist in creating lasting institutional reform for Mexico’s law enforcement institutions.

Using the military to purport an antidrug policy by the Mexican government had been done at times, with success, under the PRI. The 1948 “national eradication campaign” known as La Gran Campaña was the first successful eradication force eliminating 680 illicit growth fields (Toro 1995). The use of herbicides as the core of the eradication efforts became full force in 1975 under Operation Condor and continued into the 1980s. When Operation Condor took effect, the Mexican government “… admitted that 600,000 square kilometers were being utilized for illicit farming” (Craig 1980). Mexico has 1,964,375 sq. km., when Operation Condor went into effect with over 30% of Mexico’s land being used for illicit farming\(^\text{18}\). Operation Condor was a successful use of the military in the eradication of marijuana and opium field in Mexico (Toro 1995). These eradictions are direct results of the militarization of the eradication program by the Mexican government.

The military, has a better reputation for effectively using force than the intelligence agencies, the police, or judiciary. Operating under the belief that the military was less vulnerable to corruption than the police

\(^{18}\) The 30% figure was independently calculated by the author and has not been verified by outside resources. The computation was calculated through taking the CIA World Factbook’s Land area for Mexico and finding the percent of the 600,000 sq. km figure given under (Craig 1980).
units, Calderón turned to the military in his attempt to militarize the “War on Drugs” (Toro 1995).

President Felipe Calderón deployed approximately 50,000 soldiers to fight against the drug cartels and organized crime that has engulfed Mexico. While this seemed to be one of the only ways by which the government could combat the military prowess of the cartels, this failed to provided the results Calderón intended. Within the first eight months of the operation against the cartels, one-tenth of the force had to be fired because of corruption (“Under the Volcano” The Economist 2010). Corruption of the army is nothing new in Mexico, and understanding the relation between the army and cartels is critical in understanding how the cartels undermine Mexico’s democracy.

Since the second half of the twentieth century, the army has played an active role in helping drug trafficking across the Mexico-US border. Since the 1960’s and 1970’s, Mexican army soldiers guarded cartel marijuana fields throughout Mexico. However, the greatest benefit of the army that the cartels enjoyed was that it physically helped transport drugs across the border (O’Day 2001). From 1997-2000 “…the army [was] the primary transporter of marijuana shipments to the border” (O’Day 2001). The Mexican army ran these operations the same way the cartels run their operations today, through bribery and coercion.
In October 1998, a Mexican army officer offered a citizen $5,000 so that the army and cartel could use his land for the purpose of transporting cocaine into the United States. After the man agreed, the army sent “…100 [army] men establishing a perimeter and setting up camp along the river” (O’Day 2001). The next day, the army sent men to the American side of the border to set up a perimeter so as to allow for easy transportation. Like the cartels, the military used bribery to assist the cartels in their drug trade. However, sometimes establishing a border for easy access is not easy on the American side. Consequently, the army, like the cartels, did not hesitate to use violence when necessary.

C. S. Cruce, a US border patrol agent, approached two Mexican soldiers in a bush. After they saw Cruce, they began running back towards the Mexico side of the border. As one man dropped his radio, Cruce: “…picked up the radio and heard the operations commander on the Mexican side tell the soldier who still had his radio (in obvious reference to Cruce), Truenalo (shoot him)” (O’Day 2001). However, a superior officer then went over the airwave instructing the soldiers to “…strip down to their civvies, and if it were necessary to avoid arrest, to feign being mojados (undocumented immigrants, who would routinely be repatriated to Mexico)” (O’Day 2001). Cruce was lucky he was still alive. Especially because, at this time, the Juarez Cartel had posted a
$200,000 reward for each border patrol agent killed (O’Day 2001). Training new army personal has yet to solve the problem of corruption by the cartels.

O’Day reports that many of the army individuals who are suspected of transporting drugs and inciting violence were trained by the United States in an effort to constitute a Special Forces branch of the Mexican military. The goal of this branch was to seize landing strips used by the drug smugglers (O’Day 2001). This operation seems to have had the reverse effect, as these individuals are now seen collaborating with the cartels.

Concurrent with individuals in law enforcement who attempt to enforce the rule of law, military officials who attempt to combat the cartels are met with violence. There are violent standoffs between the military and cartels, as the military actively seeks to capture leaders and those involved with cartel operations (DeMoura 2011). However, even soldiers merely on patrol are not safe from uninitiated violence from the cartels. In 2010 as soldiers were patrolling mountainous areas in Madera, they were ambushed by cartel operatives (8 Dead in Clash with Drug Traffickers 2010). The cartels are sending a message to the military involvement during the “War on Drugs” by attacking those who attempt to thwart their operations. Following a ceremony in Morelia, the top security official Minerva Bautista Gomez’s armored SUV was
attacked by cartels wounding her and killing 10 people (Wilkinson 2010). The overt actions by the cartels to use violence against military officials are parallel to their violence on law enforcement individuals who do not take to the bribes desired by the cartels.

Law Enforcement Reform

As stated herein, police reform is necessary for Mexico to continue their evolution into a strong democratic state. While there have been attempts at reform of law enforcement sectors in Mexico, the majority of reform efforts have been futile in creating the lasting fundamental reform necessary for Mexico’s democracies to flourish. Some of the greatest efforts for police reform in Mexico have come from the superpower within the hemisphere, the United States.

The process necessary for institutional police reform has to come not only from the resources of the countries as a whole, but also from the assistance of the United States. The United States has a substantial interest in the promotion of democracy in Latin America, and in particular Mexico. The United States relies on Mexico as a substantial economic partner because “Mexico has become [the United States] third largest trading partner and the rest of Latin America is number four” (Johnson 2012). Beyond just economic considerations, the United States has historically been involved in the fostering of
security in Mexico. The foreign policies implemented by the United States towards Mexico have direct effects on Mexico's security. One of the most infamous policies by the U.S. “Fast and Furious” allowed individuals who purchased guns illegally for transport to Mexico to walk away with the guns with the notion that these guns and individuals had been marked for surveillance. However, this policy led to hundreds of guns becoming unaccounted\textsuperscript{19} for in Mexico and while the U.S. knew of this failure of surveillance, it took the death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry by one of these guns for the program to be shut down (\textit{The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence 2011}).

With respect to police institutions, the majority of United States foreign policy in Latin American countries has been focused on training police for specific missions. They have rarely been directed toward institutional reform (Johnson 2012). The major type of policy the United States has provided to Latin America has been military training and assistance, with some law enforcement advice. Historically the aid has been in the form of arms (Johnson 2012). However, the institutional reform necessary in Latin American countries requires that the United States assist Latin America in developing their police institutions for

\textsuperscript{19} 241 firearms have been found in Mexico to have entered the country due to Operation Fast and Furious (\textit{The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and Furious: Fueling Cartel Violence 2011}).
long term stability instead of training based on ad hoc mission needs. There have been two programs that are examples of non-military reform that the United States has given Latin American countries: The Office of Public Safety and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

The Office of Public Safety was designed under the United States Agency for International Development and since its inception in 1954 has “…trained approximately 1 million police officers abroad as well as in the United States” (Johnson 2012). While not all of these trained officers have been from Latin American countries, Latin America has benefited greatly. Specifically, Brazil has received the most benefit from this program in that over 100,000 officers have been trained under the program (Johnson 2012). Unlike the Office of Public Safety which trained police and law enforcement agencies all over the world, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was specifically designed to help reform Latin American law enforcement agencies.

In 1986, The United States created the ICITAP for two major reasons “… [one] [t]o enhance the professional capabilities of Latin American and Caribbean law enforcement agencies to carry out investigative and forensic functions; [two] to assist in the development of academic instruction for criminal justice personnel and to improve the
administrative and management abilities of law enforcement agencies…” (Yochelson 1993). Thus, this institution has been designed to help reform the police and law enforcement institutions of Latin America for long term stability. Since its inception, the ICITAP has trained approximately 10,000 students (Yochelson 1993).

The ICITAP does not provide military assistance. Rather its goal is to help train and enhance regional and national police forces to help alleviate the problems created by lack of proper dialogue among the different agencies. The program further attempts to train civilian police with an emphasis on the rule of law and the protection of the rule of law by these police once they complete this program (Yochelson 1993).

Not only does the ICITAP attempt reformation of these institutions by emphasizing democratic principles and adherence to the rule of law, but it also has programs designed to prevent violations of human rights. The program recognizes the difficulty in attempting to create a cookie cutter program for all countries. The ICITAP operates under the premise that “…recipient countries are 15 to 50 years behind those in the United States [with respect to law enforcement institutional capability]” (Yochelson 1993). Due to the vast discrepancies of law enforcement capabilities, the ICITAP tailors its programs based on the needs of each specific country. In those countries where law enforcement institutions have not been able to keep up with the times,
the training focuses on the basic foundations of a democratic law enforcement institution including “…sound investigation and prosecution” (Yochelson 1993). For countries with a stronger foundation, the program focuses on providing “…counseling in such areas as protection strategies for judges and others under threat, management skills, threat assessments, and forensic techniques” (Yochelson 1993). This program has been proven successful as recipients of ICITAP training point to the training “…as the reason for thorough prosecution” (Yochelson 1993).

Both the ICITAP and The Office of Public Safety programs are designed to provide institutional reform for Latin American law enforcement agencies. These reforms provide long term goals as opposed to specific mission to mission efforts. However, these programs alone cannot provide all the tools required for police and institutional reform. For lasting reform to occur, the United States and Latin American cannot rely solely on programs like ICITAP and The Office of Public Safety because these programs cannot rectify all of the problems facing law enforcement agencies.

Two major obstacles that these programs cannot rectify are the low paying salary and basic education barriers that make reform difficult. Beyond the low pay that police in Latin American countries make, police agencies offer little, if any, job security. Because of the
low pay and little job security, “…few incentives exist for officers to perform professionally, and in fact, there are a number of disincentives to being thorough and conscientious” (Yochelson 1993). These disincentives result in the catering to elites and individuals who can pay additional sums to officials. Another obstacle these programs cannot overcome is the inherent educational barrier that is present within law enforcement agencies. Throughout Latin American countries, “…police recruits possess little more than a ninth grade education” (Yochelson 1993). The problem is that the police are asked to uphold the rule of law and to be unyielding against corruption without the proper pay and education. With these major impediments, it is difficult to make wholesale reforms within the democratic institution necessary to stabilize Latin American law enforcement.

ICITAP has specifically tried to reform the law enforcement institutions within Latin America to create lasting effects. This program and The Office of Public Safety cannot solve all the problems that these institutions face, but they have established the groundwork for fundamental reform. Despite these efforts, there needs to be more programs that are specifically designed to cater to these countries with their specific needs. While there is no one plan fits all model for this type of institutional reform, “…ICITAP hopes to improve the conditions under which law enforcement officers in these countries serve”
(Yochelson 1993). These programs are not designed to take on the institutional reform by themselves. Rather, they are designed and operate for specific and seemingly mundane changes that are necessary within Latin America.

Reform like this is necessary because it can measure the incremental effect that has or is occurring. If these institutions are able to teach and train officers to return to their countries and operate by the rule of law and aggressively oppose corruption and oppressive actions, than these programs are successful. These programs will not necessarily bring the sweeping reform many institutions need by themselves; but it starts with a few police officers believing and showing that “… the wall of impunity can be breached” (Chevigny 1996). Once this barrier has been broken, these countries can begin to undertake more dramatic reform necessary for reformation within these law enforcement institutions.

The cartels have used corruption and coercion as a means to thwart the democratic efforts of law enforcement institutions, the bodies that are designed to apply and uphold the rule of law to all individuals equally. The failure of law enforcement institutions led to the use of the military as a necessary means to combat the continuing cartel violence towards law enforcement agencies. This deviated some violence away from law enforcement agencies towards the military. However, law
enforcement agencies, and the military are not immune to the payroll of 
the cartels. This overt obstruction of these institutions by the cartels 
has hindered Mexico’s fledgling democracy to grow as Mexico 
experiences a grave security failure. However, the foundation of a 
democracy are democratically held elections. If the cartels have an 
immediate influence in elections, the quality and longevity of Mexico’s 
democracy becomes highly questioned.
CHAPTER FOUR
Cartel Influence in Mexico’s Elections

Section One: Electoral Violence

Mexico became a democracy once it held a free and fair election in 2000. Mexico’s government has a constitution which mandates the rule of law by which all citizens and government officials must abide. It is within this rule of law that Mexican democracy must operate. Furthermore, a democracy must create, uphold, and defend the personal liberties by which its citizens are free to exercise, without fear of repercussion. These rights include freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom to own property. A democracy must protect and defend these rights for the citizens to actively or passively consent to the perpetuation of the democratic institution. Mexico’s Constitution establishes these liberties, and Mexico has the institutions in place that are designed to protect and defend these liberties from those who wish to take them away.

Citizens must have the conviction that the institution governing them exists with their consent (Cook 2000; Lubenow 2012). Otherwise, the institution is not a democracy. Citizens must look to the government as the answer to their problems, and that, through the
democratic process, their problems can be remedied. This does not necessarily imply governmental intervention; rather, it could require government restraint. Citizens must not look to alternative options outside the rule of law to alleviate their problems. They must operate through the rule of law to mend any transgressions they may have, or lawlessness and anarchy will prevail.

Since the Presidential election in 2000, Mexico has been classified and embraced as a democratic state (Klesner 2001; Teichman 2009; Greene 2008; Krauze 2006). 2000 is the year cited with this recognition because it was the first transition of power between parties in Mexico between the PRI and the PAN in over seventy years. It was not until 1988 that the PRI gave up 100 percent hegemony in the Senate, and in 1997 the PRI lost complete control over the legislative branch when for the first time the PRI no longer held a majority number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Klesner 1997).

As a fledging democracy, Mexico faces many challenges in stabilizing all of the different facets of its democratic institutions (Holmes 2009). The fundamental tenants of a democracy are the equal application of the democratic rule of law to all its citizens and that citizens equally, without reserve, must consent to be governed under these rules through free and fair election (Holmes 2009). If these aspects of Mexico’s democracy become compromised, then Mexico will
no longer be considered a viable democratic state. This theory is based on a procedural aspects of democracy and political liberties (Holmes 2009). To analyze the cartel influence on Mexico’s electoral institutions, this chapter seeks to find if the increased cartel violence has had an impact on elections, party affiliation in Mexico, and if this affiliation has led to the reemergence of the PRI to the presidency in 2012. The PRI is no longer the authoritarian regime of the past. However, as this chapter will analyze, the recent success of the PRI in the 2012 election came following a non-competitive showing in the 2006 election. One of the fundamental changes in the state of Mexico between the 2006 and 2012 election was the increase in violence by the cartels.

The drug cartels that plunder and terrorize the state of Mexico operate outside the rule of law. However, they are not able to accomplish their feat alone. As stated herein, they use corruption and coercion to incite fear and corruption in politicians, law enforcement, and citizens. Since the cartels have been able to corrupt the very institutions that are designed to hold them accountable, they are able to operate outside the rule of law.

The cartels have corrupted the police force and the army, two major institutions that are designed to apprehend individuals who operate outside the rule of law. The cartels have corrupted the justice
system to such an extent that those individuals who are apprehended are not held accountable for their unlawful actions. Only 28 percent of individuals arrested for a federal violation were brought to trial (Corcoran 2011). The inability to bring arrested drug traffickers to justice lead former President Calderón to view the judicial system as saying “nobody has done anything, nothing is wrong; now it turns out that everything is fine” (Corcoran 2011). Finally, the cartels have corrupted the democratic institution itself by corrupting politicians, who are the individuals in a democracy granted power by the governed, to uphold and establish the rule of law which is to govern everyone.

Furthermore, a subcategory of the rule of law are the foundational inalienable liberties which the rule of law must protect and defend. Two of those most basic liberties are the right to freedom of the press and freedom to participate in governmental affairs. Using these two liberties as examples, the drug cartels operate outside the rule of law, infringing on these basic liberties undermining the foundation of Mexico democracy.

While the cartels have incited significant fear among citizens, there is still freedom of speech and press, but with restrictions. Individuals who write about the cartels operations are targeted by the cartels and murdered for their actions. The number of journalists murdered per year “…has risen from under three from 1971 to 1987 to
over six from 1988 to 1994 (Willoughby 2003).” From 2000 to 2011 this figure increased to 54 murdered journalists (Molzhan, Ríos, Shirk 2012).

The cartels have incited enough fear into journalists and citizens, that members of the group “Anonymous”, who were allegedly going to release the names of 60 politicians involved with the Zetas, have called off the release of these names (Hacktivists 2011). Their reasoning for not releasing these names was that the Zetas threatened to kill ten citizens for every name released (Hacktivists 2011). Furthermore, these journalists are in fear of their own lives, as the Zetas have their own technicians that are trying to track down the individuals involved in “Anonymous”. The decapitation of Marisol Macías Castañeda, a reporter for Primera Hora Newspaper, remains unparalleled, and resonates with journalists in Mexico, as they do not want to meet her same fate (Woman’s 2011). The cartels have stimulated enough fear in citizens that journalists will not write about the cartels under anonymity for fear of death if they are discovered. The cartels have also deterred politicians, just as they have deterred journalists.

Journalists and the media are a necessary tool for a functioning democracy because the media is a means which the public can better understand society (“The Role of Media” 1999). The media provides avenues for debate over diverse issues and opinions, and the inner
workings of the government can be exposed (McConnell and Baker 2002; Groshek 2011). The media as an independent agency has the ability, and duty, to report on corruption, and competence of political agents (Moehler and Luyimbzi 2008). If the media becomes a compromised institution that no longer has the ability, or fears, to report on the issues facing a democracy, then the democratic stability as a whole is at risk (Coronel 2005). The cartels have through violence deterred the voice of journalists in the media industry and have consequently prohibited citizens from vital information that is necessary for the perpetuation of its fledgling democracy. Beyond the influence in the media, the cartels have deterred individuals from participating in politics.

Vanda Felbab-Brown, argues that “[drug-related violence] could deter leaders from taking governmental positions, a very pernicious development (Katrandjian 2010).” Olivia Katrandjian, reports that more than 20 mayors have been killed between 2007 and 2010 (2010). If individuals are afraid to enter, or coerced out of, public office, than the ruling institution is no longer a democratic institution. In a democratic institution, any individual should have the freedom to run for public office without fear of retribution for their service. The cartels have taken away this aspect of the democratic process by creating an institution in which citizens do not run for office for fear of their safety.
There is an external, unpreventable variable, that appears to influence cartel violence towards journalists and politicians. That variable is whether there is an election that year. It appears that cartel violence toward politicians increases as elections approach. Figure 12 below details Journalist and Mayoral Assassinations in Mexico from 1999-2011. The purpose of this chart is to show the increased violence that occurred in 2010 in relation to other years.

Figure 9. Journalists and Mayors Assassinated in Mexico, 1999-2011

From 2006-2011 there were 30 Mayors assassinated and 38 journalists murdered. The year when most of these transgressions took
place was 2010, the year of the midterm elections at the municipal and federal level. After the “War on Drugs” began in 2006, cartels began to use violence on each other, politicians, law enforcement and innocent citizens. The increase in violence in 2010 toward journalists and mayors is consistent with the overall violence that increased in 2010. From 2009-2010 the organized homicide rate increased in all but 4 Mexican states, and this violent increase only continued in 16 of 33 states from 2010-2011 (Seelke 2012, Shirk 2012).

Given the direct violence that is correlated with election years, the second part of this chapter seeks to determine if the increase in violence by the cartels correlates to the return of the PRI to power in the 2012 election. The violence that has occurred during President Calderón’s sexennial was nationwide. Every state saw an increase in their annual average homicide rate during his sexennial. The average homicide rates for states during his sexennial ranged from 5.4 a year to 2611.8 a year. 23 States had an average over 50 organized homicide related deaths a year, 16 had over 100, and 2 states recorded an average annual rate over 1000. The remainder of this chapter seeks to identify if this increase in violence during 2006-2012 correlated to the reemergence of the PRI to the presidency in 2012.

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20 These figures are independently observed by this author given the raw data of organized homicide rates for each state, including the Federal District for the years 2009-2011.
Section 2: Regression

Introduction

This section will analyze the variables which have an impact on a states’ likelihood to affiliate with the PRI in a presidential election. The ousting of the PRI from power in 2000 coupled with the insignificant numbers of votes received by the PRI in the 2006 Presidential election, winning zero states\textsuperscript{21}; to the sweeping mandate and presidency they received in 2012 is the foundation to the research question in this analysis. This section ferrets out the variables which accounted for this drastic change in the vote of confidence in favor of the PRI in 2012 by testing what variables either attract individuals to align with or against the PRI.

The basis for this analysis is not due to the fact that the PRI returned to the presidency. The PRI of 2012 is not the authoritarian regime that ruled for seventy years. However, the basis for this research is what attributed to the nationwide shift by the voting populous towards the PRI. This issue is important because, since 2000, Mexico has only held three democratic elections and faces many challenges in its attempt to maintain its democratic state. The PRI was

\textsuperscript{21} Throughout this article the reference to a party “winning a state” is not synonymous to the winner take all system in the United States where electoral votes are allocated to the winning candidate. Rather, this term will be used to signify if a party received the highest percentage of votes cast in a specific state. If a party receives the highest percentage, then that party will have “won” that state for purposes of this analysis.
the ruling party for seventy years. Its dramatic decline resulting in a
distant third place finish in the 2006 election coupled with its dramatic
gain in the 2012 presidential election is significant. The PRI enjoyed
increases of an average of 14.1% increase in votes per state from the
2006 to 2012 election culminating in the reclamation of the Presidency.
Table 4 below shows the disparity of change that occurred in favor of
the PRI between the 2006 and 2012 elections. This analysis seeks to
identify what variables accounted for this increase in PRI affiliation and
its voting block.

Table 4. Percentage Vote Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Change in Vote for PRI from 2006-2012 Presidential Election</th>
<th>Number of States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15+&lt;</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 &lt; 15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 &lt; 10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is extensive literature that explores factors which influence
voting blocks and party affiliation in Mexico (Klesner 2001; Camp 2007;
Hamilton 2011; Lelee and Peschard 2010; Macmahon 2006; Gómez-
Vilchis 2012). However, this literature fails to address the effect of
cartel violence and its influence on party affiliation. This section
analyzes the variables that influence voter party affiliation towards the
PRI in an attempt to address the reemergence of the party which ruled under authoritarian measures for seventy years. This section tests similar variables dealing with PRI party affiliation as a result of social and economic status of voters. Particular attention is given to the effect that the cartel violence plays towards PRI affiliation. Utilizing empirical data, through an original database, this section analyzes the extent to which the organized-homicide rate, and other social and economic variables have a significant effect on PRI affiliation resulting in the reemergence of the PRI in the 2012 presidential election. This analysis provides a quantitative analysis of key variables, and discusses the findings in response to the existing literature, with an emphasis on the implications of these results to Mexico’s democratic institution as a whole.

First, an examination of the existing literature on variables that affect presidential elections and party affiliation in Mexico will be analyzed. This is followed by a regression model that seeks to determine whether and how cartel violence affects elections. This section concludes with providing a framework for future research with alternative variable designs and what the implications of future research could imply to the democratic stability of the Mexican state.
Theory

While the literature on Mexico’s democracy continues to grow, much of the literature focused on the fledgling democracy’s reactions to seventy years of authoritarian PRI rule (Langston 2001; Teichman 2009; Osorio 2012). With the emergence of three major parties, extensive research has been conducted on which the type of voter align with the competing parties based on social and economic class alignment (Béjar and Breña 2006; Klesner 2005; Selee and Peschard 2010). The emerging political parties in Mexico have developed political platforms to attract certain voting bases. Under the authoritarian regime, the PRI was able to oscillate amongst political platforms to attract enough of the population to win the fraudulent elections held during the pre democratic era (Skidmore, Smith & Green 2010; Rodríguez and Ward 1994). Joseph Klesner analyzed what caused the creation of political platforms by parties and how they attract their respective voting base (Klesner 2001; 2005; 2006). With the inability of the PRI to ideologically oscillate as it previously had, there has been a consensus throughout the literature that the PRI attracts voting blocs of those less educated, impoverished, and draws allegiance from individuals throughout the entire state.
Determining the effect that economic impact has on party affiliation, Klesner uses the percentage of those employed in manufacturing in localities with greater than 20,000 citizens. Utilizing this criterion, Klesner finds that the National Action Party (PAN) is more popular in places with more manufacturing than the other parties (Klesner 2005). Klesner’s findings corroborates existing literature, which indicates that states with a higher GDP per-capita would be less likely to vote for the PRI because they tend to align with the PAN (Camp 2007; Hamilton 2011). This study analyzes economic inequality utilizing the GDP per-capita for each state to categorize economic production within a given state. This variable is utilized to analyze economic impact on party affiliation because Mexico presents an economic dichotomy. In February 2013, Mexico posted an unemployment of 4.8 percent (Ricardo 2013). However, approximately 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (Mexico CIA-The World Factbook). Through using GDP per-capita this study disseminates this dichotomy by differentiating between regions which are experiencing disproportionate economic success and the relationship this has towards party affiliation.

In addition to economic classes, Klesner analyzed the difference of the educational level of the population and its relationship with party affiliation. Klesner determined that there was a direct correlation
between the illiteracy and the vote in favor of the PRI (Klesner 2005).
To correlate literacy to education, those who are less literate are
assumed to have less formal education training (Denny 2002; Hull and
Schultz 2001). Thus, the PRI garners a larger percentage of votes from
those who have less formal education (Camp 2007; Klesner 2005).
Intending to measure the same variable of educational influence on the
election, this study will use the literacy rate for each state. Based on
existing research, this study predicts that the states with lower literacy
rates will be more likely to vote for the PRI.

While there are three major parties which compete on the
national level, there is the regional breakup of party competition as the
PAN and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) are predominant in
the northern and southern region of the state respectively (Klesner
2005; Lelee and Peschard 2010; Macmahon 2006). The national
influence of the PRI, in the northern and southern regions of Mexico, is
largely due to its previous ruling influence of seventy years. To capture
political affiliation regionally and the competition the PRI faces in
different regions, measuring the percentage of directly elected PRI
deputies in the Chamber of Deputies per state allows this affiliation to
be captured. Utilizing the assumption that a state with a higher
percentage PRI deputies will be more likely to vote for the PRI
presidential candidate, the Chamber of Deputies provides a better
source of analyzing state ideological leaning because, unlike the Senate or Gubernatorial positions, deputies are voted from districts within a statewide election. This allows for more variance of political leaning.

Furthermore, measuring regional affiliation through a state can offer an explanation for the election of the PRI. Individuals hold more allegiance to a party that they previously supported because of their identification to the party itself (Campbell 1960; Kaniovski and Mueller 2006). This study will measure whether a state voted for the PRI in the previous election. This will be a necessary variable to measure because it measures the level of party affiliation within the state for or against the PRI historically.

With a skyrocketing organized-crime rate ignited by the drug cartels, crime has become more prevalent throughout Mexico. In his study, Gómez-Vilchis found that the population has begun to prefer presidential candidates that appear better equipped to curtail cartel violence (Gómez-Vilchis 2012). Through examining national surveys his study shows then that the candidate which the populous believes to be most likely to curtail cartel violence would be more likely to receive the vote. This study seeks to empirically analyze these findings.
This analysis is measured in four different ways in this study:

1) The percentage homicide rate increase 2 years before the election
2) The organized homicide rate 5 years before the election
3) The organized homicide rate in 2006
4) The number of murdered politicians in the sexennial preceding the election.

Methodology

In analyzing those factors which could predict the proclivity of a vote for the PRI, the election results from the Presidential elections from 2006 and 2012 for each state plus the Federal District of Mexico (N=64) are analyzed. Both elections are necessary because of the dramatic change that occurred in electoral response for the PRI coupled with the significant increase in cartel violence between the two elections. The dependent variable utilized was the percentage of votes received by the PRI per state, per election. This data was obtained from the official results certified by the Federal Electoral Institute (Consulta En Tiempo Real 2012).

The method of regression is linear due to the operationalization of the dependent variable which is measured based on the percentage of the vote cast for the PRI presidential candidate per state for each election.

This first variable hypothesis derives from whether a state voted for the PRI in the previous election. This viable was measured with (0-
1), with zero denoting a state that did not vote for the PRI in the previous election and 1 determining a PRI victory in that state. Given the political allegiance individuals have when aligning with a party, the expectation is that a positive correlation will exist between a state previously voting for the PRI in the previous election, and that state affiliating with the PRI in the following election. See Table 5, following this subsection.

The second variable hypothesis involves the effect that the literacy rate has on the percentage of votes received by the PRI. Using the literacy rate from 2005, obtained from the Panorama educativo, showed the discrepancy amongst the Mexican states based on regional education (Porcentaje de Población 2006). This factor would seemingly indicate a negative correlation between literacy rate and a higher percentage vote for the PRI. See Table 5, following this subsection.

The third variable hypothesis is the percentage homicide rate increase 2 years before the election. Organized-homicide\textsuperscript{22} is used to categorize homicides committed by drug cartels. This variable was calculated through finding the average homicide rate from the third year before the election and the second year and deriving the percentage change. The importance of this variable is that it details the increase in

\textsuperscript{22} Organized-homicide is a specific categorization within the homicide rate to not conflate homicides as a result of organized crime and non organized-crime homicides. This distinction is necessary because the homicide variables tested were only those which categorized only organized-homicide, not the overall homicide rates.
violence as presidential campaigns begin to start. The data was obtained from the Reforma Newspaper publication which “attempted to avoid the conflation of other homicides [by non cartel organizations] committed” form 2006-2010 (Shirk & Ríos 2011).

A positive correlation is expected between a higher percentage increase in the homicide rate and that state’s affiliation with the PRI. Mexico has experienced an epidemic increase of violence from 2006-2012. Before 2000, and under PRI rule, the organized-homicide rate was virtually non-existent. Drug cartels were not involved in violence amongst each other, and certainly not involving civilians. It was not until former President Felipe Calderón (PAN) declared the “War on Drugs” in 2006 that organized homicide began to significantly occur. See Table 5, following this subsection.

The fourth variable hypothesis tested is the percentage of directly elected PRI deputies within the Chamber of Deputies per state\(^{23}\). This hypothesis tests the ideological leaning of a particular state. If a state has a higher percentage of directly elected PRI deputies then that state necessarily would be more inclined to vote for the PRI in the presidential election. This was measured through the percentage of

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\(^{23}\) The Chamber of Deputies allocated 300 of the 500 seats through direct elections of deputies from individual states. The final 200 deputies are allocated based on proportional representation principles based on the total voter turnout from the entire election. To prevent misrepresentation of voters voices, only those individuals directly elected are used in this analysis.
deputies for each respective state following both the 2006 and 2012 election. This data was obtained from the official certified results of the Federal Electoral Institute ("Eleccion De Diputados Federales" 2006; 2012).

A greater PRI political leaning by a state seemingly would lead to a greater likelihood in percentage of votes received for the PRI. The Chamber of Deputies is a better source of determining state ideological leaning than either the Senate or Gubernatorial positions because deputies are elected from districts within a state. This allows for a greater variety of ideological leanings within a state to be represented. Furthermore, by using the percentage of PRI Deputies versus raw number of Deputies from a state will better help analyze the percentage vote received by the PRI in the presidential election because a state may have more PRI deputies, but a lower percentage and consequently in the election would be more likely to have a lower percentage of vote cast for the PRI overall. See Table 5, following this subsection.

The fifth variable tested is the organized homicide rate 5 years before the election. Using the Reforma publication numbers, the organized homicide rate is calculated for 2001 and 2007 (Shirk & Ríos 2011). This hypothesis was designed to test the response of voters to violence at the start of a presidential sexennial. Understanding this response is necessary for understanding the grace period voters give to
a newly elected administrations in their ability to combat violence.

The wholesale increase in organized-homicide throughout the entire state of Mexico has cast an aura throughout the population as it seeks to find a party and administration which can curtail the violence. The violence that occurred from 2006 to 2007 is striking, all but three states saw an increase in their organized homicide rate between the two years. However, administrations are given grace periods to allow their policies to become effectual (Gómez-Vilchis 2012; Frendreis, Tatalovic and Schaff 2001). Given this grace period, this study predicts a negative correlations between PRI affiliation and the increase in violence. See Table 5, following this subsection.

The sixth variable tested is the organized homicide rate for 2006. This was the year when the violence began to escalate in Mexico because of the “War on Drugs”. If presidential administrations are given a grace period wherein the public does not hold the administration accountable for the violence that ensues following its election, then the variable will have a negative correlation. If this variable has a negative correlation, then the violence of 2006 should not be attributed as a negative outlook by Felipe Calderón’s “War on Drugs.” All candidates in 2006, Felipe Calderón (PAN), Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD), Roberto Madrazo (PRI) sought to combat corruption and cartel influence (Klesner 2007; Moreno 2006; Arnson
Given these overt pledges to combat the cartels, and the “grace period” given to new administrations, a negative correlation is predicted. See Table 5, following this subsection.

The seventh variable measured is the GDP per-capita for each specific state. This was measured using the raw GDP Per-capital data for each state from 2007 obtained from the List of Mexican States by GDP. Beginning in the 1990's, many individuals of wealth voted against the PRI (Camp 2007). Due to the economic problems in Mexico attributed to failed PRI policy, the economic positions of the PAN are heralded because they involve fiscal responsibility (Greene 2008; Hamilton 2011). Historically, individuals of lower economic class tend to vote for the PRI (Camp 2007; Selee and Peschard 2010). Economically, Mexico is very diverse with certain states prospering at much higher levels than others. Given the historical alignment of lower and higher wealth sectors, there should be a negative correlation between higher GDP and the vote received for the PRI. See Table 5, following this subsection.

The eighth variable measured is the number of murdered politicians in a state during the sexennial preceding the election. This variable was obtained through the List of Politicians Killed in the Mexican Drug War and does not discriminate based on party affiliation. Furthermore, for election years 2006, and 2012, politicians that were
murdered before election day in 2006 were counted under the sexennial preceding the 2006 election, and all murdered politicians post election day 2006 until election day 2012 were counted under the sexennial preceding the 2012 election. Continuing with the prediction that the violence of the cartels has lead the populous to look to the PRI to curtail the violence, a positive correlation is predicted between more murdered politicians in a state, and that states likelihood in voting for the PRI. See Table 5, following this subsection.

Table 5. Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
<th>Theoretical Relationship</th>
<th>Predicted Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State vote for PRI previous election</td>
<td>(0-1)</td>
<td>A state that previously voted for the PRI in theory would hold a greater allegiance to the PRI then a state that did not</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy Rate</td>
<td>2005 Literacy Rate</td>
<td>A higher literacy rate decreased the percentage vote for the PRI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Homicide Rate increase 2 years before the election</td>
<td>Reforma Data</td>
<td>An increase in the homicide rate two years before the election would increase the likelihood of a state voting for the PRI</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage PRI Deputies</td>
<td>Official Election Results Data</td>
<td>A higher percentage of PRI deputies increases the percentage vote for PRI</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Homicide 5 years before next election</td>
<td>Reforma Data</td>
<td>An increase in the homicide rate five years before the election would increase the likelihood of a state voting for the PRI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Homicide 2006</td>
<td>Reforma Data</td>
<td>An increase in the homicide rate in 2006 would decrease the likelihood of a state voting for the PRI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per-Capita</td>
<td>GDP Per-Capita 2007 Data</td>
<td>A higher GDP Per-Capita decreases the percentage vote for the PRI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murdered Politicians</td>
<td>“List of Politicians Killed…”</td>
<td>The more politicians killed in a state would increase that states likelihood in voting for the PRI</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results

These variables were measured using an SPSS ordinary least squares regression model. The independent variables in the model were tested simultaneously. The coefficients of crime related variables show a significant correlation towards PRI affiliation\textsuperscript{24}. The results are in Table 6.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Variables & Unstandardized Coefficients & Standardized Coefficients \\
\hline
State vote for PRI previous election & -2.969 (2.317) & -.124 \\
Literacy Rate & -.416** (2.06) & -.192 \\
Percentage Homicide Rate increase 2 years before the election & .005* (.003) & .158 \\
Percentage PRI Deputies & .122**** (.024) & .459 \\
Organized Homicide 5 years before next election & .045*** (.014) & .441 \\
Organized Homicide 2006 & -.021** (.008) & -.273 \\
GDP Per-Capita & .000** (.000) & -.197 \\
Murdered Politicians & .106 (.368) & .035 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Results}
\end{table}

Dependent variable=Percentage of vote PRI received in election. (N=64)
Cell entries are linear coefficients. Standard errors are below in parentheses.
****p<.001 ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1 
R\textsuperscript{2}=.59

\textsuperscript{24} The results of the multicollinearity tests between independent variables are in Tables 7-Table 14, Appendix B.
The first variable tested is if a state that voted for the PRI in the previous election was more likely to align with the PRI in the following election. This study found no statistically significant relationship between these variables which is counter to the positive correlation which was expected. See Table 6.

The second variable tested is the correlation between the literacy rate and the vote for the PRI. Utilizing the literacy rate of each state, it was expected that a negative correlation would exist between higher literacy rates and percentage vote received for the PRI because higher educated individuals tend to align with the PAN party. The data supports this hypothesis with a negative coefficient between the variables indicating that lower literacy correlates to higher PRI affiliation. Furthermore, the data established that literacy rate has a significant relationship to party affiliation. See Table 6.

The third variable tested is the percentage increase of the homicide rate 2 years before an election. It was expected that a positive correlation would exist between the increased homicide rate and percentage of votes received by the PRI. The data supports this hypothesis with a statistically significant, positive, correlation. See Table 6.

The fourth variable sought to find a correlation between regional affiliations to the PRI utilizing the percentage of deputies the PRI had
following an election. This allowed for more diversity amongst states than the senatorial or gubernatorial position because each district is allowed to elect a representative. It was expected that positive a correlation would exist between a greater percentage of PRI deputies and the percentage of vote for the PRI, and the data supports this with a positive, significant correlation. See Table 6.

The fifth variable tests the relationship between organized homicide 5 years before the next election and the likelihood of a state affiliating with the PRI in the following election. While cartel violence has had extreme increases in certain regions of the country, all but three states saw an increase in their organized-homicide rate, even if a small increase. Expecting a negative correlation between increased violence and affiliation towards the PRI due to the grace period to be given to the new administrations, the results were the opposite. There was a positive, significant, correlation between the rate of violence and PRI party affiliation following two years of a new administration. This indicates that states with greater increases in organized crime following the second year of an administration are more likely to align with the PRI in the following election. Table 6.

The sixth variable tested the relationship between the organized homicide rate in 2006 and that states likelihood in voting for the PRI. As stated above, this variable was used to analyze the grace period
given to the newly elected administration to have their policy take action. With the substantial increase in violence in 2006, this variable was utilized to determine if grace periods were given at all to the Calderón administration. Expecting to find a negative correlation to corroborate a negative correlation of variable five, there was a negative, significant, correlation. However, this variable does not corroborate the hypothesis of variable five of a long grace period. Expanded on further in the following section, this variable indicates then that states that had an increase in violence in 2006 were less likely to vote for the PRI in the following election. However, the increase in violence through 2007 caused individuals to search for an alternative. See Table 6.

The seventh variable tested was the effect that GDP per-capita had on a state’s likelihood to vote for the PRI. As stated herein, individuals of lower economic status tend to align with the PRI. Thus a higher GDP per-capita should lead to a negative correlation. The results verify this assumption with a negative, significant correlation. See Table 6.

The eighth and final variable tested was the effect that the numbered of murdered politicians within a state in the preceding sexennial influenced that states likelihood in voting for the PRI. There was no statistically significant relationship observed which is counter to the positive correlation expected. See Table 6, Appendix B.
Discussion

The variables that demonstrated a significant impact are 1) literacy rate, 2) percentage homicide rate increase 2 years before the election, 3) percentage of PRI deputies, 4) organized homicide 5 years before election 5) organized homicide 2006, and 6) GDP per-capita. Equally important in this analysis are the variables which held no significant values: 1) state voting for the PRI in the previous election, and 2) murdered politicians. The goal of this research was to find which variables affect a states likelihood in affiliating with the PRI in a presidential election.

The first significant variable is the literacy rate. The negative correlation between literacy rate and affiliation to the PRI is consistent with existing literature. Literacy is a basic measure of education and historically those less educated have continued to align with the PRI. The results of this variable warrant further research on its implication and impact on elections. However, the results are consistent with existing literature.

The second significant variable is the percentage homicide rate increase 2 years before the election. The results of this variable validate previous literature theorizing that citizens believe the PRI is better able to curtail the cartel violence. The increase in violence two years before the 2012 election (2010) versus the 2006 election (2004)
are non comparable. By 2010, the violence of the cartels was in full force due to former President Felipe Calderón’s “war on drugs”. The significance of this positive correlation is that the increase in violence during the campaign period prior to 2012 election had significant influence aligning voters with the PRI.

The third significant variable is the relationship between the percentage of PRI deputies in the Chamber of Deputies in each state following the presidential election and that states likelihood in voting for the PRI. This variable validates existing literature that the influence of the PRI is nationwide and not regionally isolated as with opposing parties. Furthermore, this validates the state allegiance towards a party and the proclivity to vote along straight party lines. The percentage increase of PRI deputies throughout the entire state from the 2006 to the 2012 election demonstrates that this increase at the state level was also seen at the national level favoring the PRI during the Presidential election.

The fourth significant variable was the organized homicide rate 5 years preceding the next election. It was anticipated that the administrations would be given a grace period to curtail violent activities following their inauguration. The results were just the opposite. Given the control of the presidency the PAN has had since the 2000 election, the increase of violence that occurred, as a spike, following 2006, and
escalating during 2007 appears directly attributed to citizens distancing themselves from the PAN and looking to the PRI as a viable alternative. With the lack of violence that occurred in 2001 versus 2007, the positive correlation indicates that the increased violence of 2007 was directly associated with the policies of PAN, President Felipe Calderón, and consequently led citizens to search for a viable political alternative, the PRI.

The fifth significant variable validates the above conclusion that the increase in organized homicide rate 5 years preceding the election had a direct correlation in the relationship of the organized homicide rate in 2006 and voting for the PRI. The “War on Drugs” and the militarization of this “war” by former President Felipe Calderón in 2006 lead to an increase in violence, an unintended consequence. Given the results of the fourth significant variable which does not give new administrations a grace period with respect to increased violence, the violence that occurred in 2006 pre and post Calderón administration, it was anticipated that the same positive correlation would occur towards PRI affiliation. The results were just the opposite, showing a negative correlation between the violence in 2006, and PRI affiliation. This can be explained not through a grace period, but the necessity of the utilization of force to eradicate the cartels and the public support behind the use of force (Kohut 2012). The people wanting the violence and
cartel operations to subside, looked to the violence in 2006 as a necessary evil to curtail the cartels. However, as the results from the fourth significant variable show the grace period given to the administration was of minimal time. By the second year of the administration, the people wanted the violence gone, and looked to the militarization of the “War on Drugs” as a failed policy that only brought violence with no results.

The sixth significant variable was the GDP per-capita variable. As the literature has suggested, individuals with more wealth are more likely to align with the PAN. As a result, it was expected to find a negative coefficient with state GDP per-capita and voting for the PRI. This analysis concurs with existing literature on this variable and finds that regions with a higher GDP per-capita are less likely to affiliate with the PRI.

While the remaining two variables held no significant correlation in this analysis, their lack of significance is important in this research. The first insignificant variable was that a state that previously voted for the PRI would be more likely to vote for the PRI in the next election. This variable, while not holding a significant relationship, is unique and can possibly be explained through the operationalization of the variable. Following the 2000 campaign, the PRI finished second in votes cast during the election. In the 2006 election, the party came in a distant
third, failing to win a single state. The measuring of this variable with a (0-1) created no room to show the decrease that occurred from the 2000-2006 election and 2006-2012 election. This defect in the metric can be rectified in future research by analyzing the percentage vote garnered by the PRI by that state in the previous election. This would necessarily show the disparity of affiliation that the PRI received and would be a tool to analyze if it has an affect on future affiliation.

The final insignificant variable was the correlation of murdered politicians in the sexennial preceding the election. This variable held an insignificant relationship towards a states proclivity in aligning with the PRI. The lack of significance can be explained due to the small sample size empirical data available. While death of politicians can have significant political impact on campaigns and political leaning, this variable did not distinguish between party identification of those murdered, and the small number of those murdered failed to demonstrate a statistically significant impact.

**Implications**

Mexico has been a democratic state for three presidential elections and democratically elected the party that ruled as an authoritarian regime back into power in 2012. This analysis sought to determines which variables attributed for the re-emergence of the
political prowess of the PRI.

This empirical analysis indicates the increase in cartel violence was a significant variable in the success of the PRI presidential election. The importance of this finding is that the Mexican populace will elect officials perceived to be effective in curtailing the cartel violence. With the overwhelming support for the PRI, the people granted the PRI a mandate to use the necessary means to curtail the cartel violence. The PAN began the “War on Drugs” in 2006 which exasperated the cartel violence within Mexico. With the assumption of the PRI rule, the data demonstrated that if the cartels are to adhere to the voice of the people, that a decrease in cartel violence can be expected. This does not necessarily correlate to an expectation in a decrease in drug trafficking. Permitting the cartels to operate outside the rule of law in return for their decrease of violence does not equate Mexico to a democratic state. Under the previous 70 years of PRI authoritarian rule, the drug cartels flourished. The government stayed out of the cartel’s business, and the cartels contained their violence. The problem is that the relationships that the PRI politicians had with the cartels have been severed since the ousting of the PRI in 2000. While the population believes the PRI can curtail cartel violence, they can no longer resort to their previous relationships and policies of giving a blind-eye to cartel operations if Mexico wishes to maintain its fragile
democratic status. The PRI is a democratic party and the authority granted to the PRI by the people has the potential to jeopardize democracy in Mexico if the PRI resorts to its previous means of ruling. While this does not appear to be a viable political platform of the PRI, this study has shown that increase in violence leads citizens to look to alternative parties as means of a remedy. Thus, if the PRI is unable to curtail the violence during the 2012-2018 sexennial of President Enrique Peña Nieto, then a regime change in the 2018 election can be expected.

As shown throughout the previous chapters, the cartels have been able to systematically influence the political sector, law enforcement sector, military and the electoral foundations of Mexico’s democracy. Given these direct implications of the cartels, the final chapter will focus on the quality of Mexico’s democracy and the potential ramifications to the fledgling democracy if the cartel influence is not significantly curtailed.
CHAPTER FIVE

Quality of Democracy

Introduction

Latin America has had many waves of democratic transitions, authoritarian regimes, and dictatorships (Weyland 2004; Mainwaring 1999). Thus, democracy is not politically viewed as the sole system of government necessary to maintain social order or specific civilian liberties (Karl 2000). In practice, democracy is constantly being tested in Latin America. While there is no longer guerilla groups or military leaders threatening democratic institutions, the failure of democratic institutions result in questioning the viability of democracy in Latin American countries. If democratic institutions designed to uphold civil liberties fail, the people may search for a different institution which can assure this protection. Specifically, in Latin America 67% of women reported that their rights are always or almost always respected compared to only 23.1% of indigenous people and 17.8% of poor people. Mexico falls below all these regional standards with women reporting only 54.8%, indigenous 7.8% and the poor 5.8% (Brown 2004). More startling is that 54% of Latin Americans in the region
would support an authoritarian government if it resolved economic problems (Brown 2004).

Latin American democratic regimes gained power and attempt to maintain that power on the promises of holistic equality by the government and democratic institutions. If the government fails to uphold these foundational cornerstones of social order and equality, then they necessarily lose validity and legitimacy. Thus, the constitutional codes that outline the duties of the government that are blatantly violated cause citizens to view not only those codes, but the document as a whole, as an interpretive document due to the impunity that is granted to those who are required to uphold the document (Pinheiro 1996). Mexico is no different than other Latin American democracies in its attempt to enforce the democratic rule of law in all its institutions. However, Mexico faces a colossal external challenge in its democratic endeavors because of the influence of the cartels on Mexico’s democratic institutions.

The quality of democracy offered to Mexico’s citizens is still being undermined because of the two monumental transformations that occurred simultaneously in the late 1980s and through the 1990s. The evolution of the government from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, concurrent with the rise in cocaine production allowed the
cartels to undermine the foundational institutions of a democracy and inhibit the quality of democracy within Mexico.

There are four fundamental institutions that all must operate as democratic entities for a democracy to flourish; political, law enforcement, military, electoral (Orozco 2004; Dahl 2000; Moisés 2006; D. The Americas 2001). The cartels have undermined all four institutions. Cartel-related violence is viewed by 75% of the population as being a serious problem (Kohut 2012). Corrupt political leaders are viewed by 69% as a major problem, the court system and police are viewed by only 44% and 38% respectively as a having a positive influence, and the human rights violations by the military are viewed by 74% as a major problem (Kohut 2012). Even without the cartels undermining Mexico’s democratic institution, Mexico, like other Latin American democracies face the challenge of evolving its democratic institutions (Mainwaring and Scully 2008). The cartels merely exacerbate the problems of these institutions.

*Political*

The political sector of a democracy is a foundational institution because it is through politicians that citizens are represented and have their voice heard in the government. The political sector is politicians who are elected to represent the population. The political shift that
occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s was a monumental shift in the Mexican political sphere. By the 1990s, politicians who were not members of the PRI were winning seats in elections.

Alternative party candidates were winning elections because the authoritarian regime of the past seventy years was waning. The PRI could no longer continue to fraudulently win elections through ballot tampering. The democratic transition began at the municipal level as the PRI focused its efforts in retaining its hegemonic national power. Due to the control and influence of not only the President, but the federal government as a whole, relinquishing control at the municipal level appeared to be the necessary prerequisite in retaining national control. However, this proved to be a miscalculation and the opposite effect occurred. Citizens began, for the first time, to have their voice heard through the electoral process at the municipal level and this taste of democracy began to permeate to the national level. By July 1997 approximately 37 percent of Mexico was government by the PAN as it controlled 4 governorships and 247 municipalities (Scherlen 1998).

The political pressure for political change came from opposition parties at the state level.

Given the pressure to change the political landscape away from fraudulent elections, the electoral reform in the early 1990s transitioned the political institution into a democratic institution. The creation of the
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was created to oversee federal elections (Scherlen 1998). The expansion of the Senate to include proportional representation seats and campaign finance laws all were designed to level the political playing field and erode the PRI hegemony created under the authoritarian era. The 1994 elections were overseen not only by political party representative, but citizen observers, and foreign visitors (Scherlen 1998). What occurred were democratically elected politicians who were legitimately elected by the people.

This democratic shift was met during the same transition of the drug trade from marijuana and opium transporters, to the chief suppliers of cocaine. This transition in the makeup of the drug market created the desire for more cartels to form and fight to control the largest share of the cocaine market as possible. Under the authoritarian rule of the PRI, politicians and cartels had the mutual understanding that politicians would allow cartel operations to occur, if the violence was controlled. However, this relationship was impeded with the democratic transition towards democratically elected officials.

When politicians were forced to run under democratic principles, and held to the vote of the public, the mutually beneficial relationship was no longer there for the cartels. The old relationships between cartels and politicians were gone because there were new cartels and new politicians, neither of which were subservient to the traditional
relationship. The cartels were forced to seek alternative measures in
diluting the influence of the new political actors.

The cartels turned to an operation of corruption and coercion of
politicians. The first measure was attempting to influence politicians
through bribery, and if this measure failed, the next step was violence.
This violence was towards politicians who did not accept bribes, and to
politicians who were on the payroll of rival cartels.

Had either the political transition or the drug-trade metamorphous
occurred without the other, Mexico’s political sector would be markedly
different. If the democratic transition occurred without the drug
transformation, then the democratically elected officials would be faced
with curtailing marijuana and opium cartels which had been
successfully done under the PRI. Furthermore, the cartels would not
have the financial resources to influence the political sector. Had the
drug transition occurred prior to the democratic transition, the
relationship the cartels held with the PRI politicians could have been
maintained. However, both transitions occurred simultaneously and the
result is the current political turpitude between politicians and the
cartels.
Law Enforcement

Given the improbity of politicians because of the democratic transition that occurred if law enforcement agencies did their democratic duty of upholding the rule of law to all individuals within the state, then the quality of democracy in Mexico would be drastically better. However, the cartels have systematically corrupted law enforcement institutions created to curtail cartel operations.

During the authoritarian era, law enforcement agencies operated under selective enforcement. Bribery of law enforcement individuals by cartels was an assumed practice, and the law was seemingly applicable only to individuals who could pay for it. However, this traditional relationship changed with the democratic transition.

The shift from an authoritarian rule to a democratic rule of law required the law to be applied equally to all individuals regardless of economic, social, or political class. However, the law enforcement agencies were ill-equipped for this transition. Many factors such as lack of sheer number of officers, inadequate pay and training are major factors attributing to the inefficiency of law enforcement agencies to operate as a democratic institution. Coupled with these inefficiencies are the overt corruptive actions of the cartels.

Under the authoritarian regime, the cartels cooperated with enough political and high law enforcement individuals that there was
little violence, and little attempt to curtail cartel operations. The
democratic shift changed this through the mission of law enforcement
agencies. They could no longer standby and allow illegal operations to
occur and in their attempt to subvert illegal cartel operations, violence
has ensued.

Cartel violence is not solely attributed to the attempt by law
enforcement individuals to enforce the rule of law equally. Rather, the
violence is a combination of many factors, but the change in law
enforcement principle is a markedly important factor. In an attempt to
curtail rival cartel operations, the cartels used the same premise they
used towards politicians; corruption or coercion. If law enforcement
individuals did not submit to bribery, or submitted to the bribery of a
rival cartel, they were met with violence. This violence, coupled with
the violence between cartels overwhelmed the law enforcement
institution as a whole. Had either the democratic transition or the
change in drug trade not occurred, then the law enforcement institution
itself would be more equipped to handle the transition.

If Mexico did not shift to a democracy at the same time the drug
trade change shifted, then law enforcement agencies would not be
required to act under democratic principles. The shift in the drug trade
would have been met with the same rule of law of allowing the cartel
operations to ensue. Had the drug trade not morphed at the same time
as the democratic transition, then the newly founded democratic principles would have been able to be more efficiently applied. There would not have been the inter-cartel fighting for new turf, and the cartels would not have had the financial resources to influence the law enforcement agencies. However, both these transitions occurred simultaneously and the cartels used this opportunity to exert its influence over law enforcement institutions and undermine the very institutions designed to subvert its illegal operations.

Military

The military is an institution that is designed to protect the national interest of a state from international threats. Unlike other non-democratic regimes, under the authoritarian era, the military did not hold political power in Mexico. So the democratic transition should not have been a monumental change in the mission and expectation of the military. However, this is not the case. The military has become one of the most altered institutions following the democratic transition and it is a direct result of the cartel evolution that occurred concurrently.

Prior to the democratic transition, the military was operated with a substantial amount of autonomy. The autonomy granted to the military under the PRI explains why, even during the ideological oscillation that occurred, there was never a military coup d’état (Díez 2008). Even with
the lack of civilian oversight by the legislature, the president still exerted control over the military to the same extent he did over all other facets of Mexico’s institutions. The democratic transition required this autonomy to cease.

The military as a democratic institution is now required to be overseen by both the executive and legislative branch. The power granted to the legislature became greater then had under the PRI, expanding its power to exercise control over the military. The legislature and president act as civilian oversight of the military (Díez 2008). Since the military is an institution that is not held accountable to the voice of the people, it is the role of those democratically elected officials to oversee the actions of the military. This oversight could have been more readily complete had the democratic transition not have occurred concurrent with the evolution of the drug trade.

The evolution of the drug trade created an internal conflict in Mexico that required the militarization of the conflict. Due to the inefficiencies of law enforcement agencies in their ability to curtail cartel operations and violence, the task was given to the military. However, what has occurred is the attempt to use the military as a police force which it is inadequately trained to do. The move to militarize the war on drugs was initially viewed by the citizens as a popular move. The military was one of the most revered political institutions and the
corruption of the military was minimal compared to the police and law enforcement agencies. However, as stated, the militarization of the drug war led to the corruption of the military. What has occurred is more violence, and that has become unpalatable to the citizens. When it comes to choosing the lesser of two evils, the population is increasingly leaning towards the cartels instead of the military in order to curb the violence.

Joaquín Guzmán Loera, “El Chapo,” is the head of the Sinaloan Cartel, and one of the richest and most violent men in the world (Ling). El Chapo is revered by citizens of the Sinaloan Valley where he resides and controls the area because “[h]e supports the economy (Ling).” Worth over $1 billion, El Chapo, like many of the cartels, has an extreme arsenal of money at his disposal. As a result, he provides hospitals, roads, and electricity to the community, virtually single-handedly stimulating the economy” (Ling). On the other hand, there is the negative view of the military held by the same group of citizens. The citizens view the military and police force as corrupt. Amongst the citizens, the military’s reputation is well stated herein, but the military has also has been known to take residence in citizens’ homes without their consent, adding to their anger and distrust (Ling). Furthermore, with the cartel offering such substantial benefits to many citizens the military appears to be taking from the citizens instead of protecting
them. This places the cartels in a more favorable light with the local citizens.

Had the shift in the drug trade not occurred concurrently with the democratic shift, the military would not be faced with task it faces today. Had Mexico not of shifted to a democracy, the law enforcement entities would not have needed the military to overtake the role as a police force. On the other hand, had the drug trade not evolved during the democratic shift, law enforcement agencies would have been well equipped to curtail the nascent operations that occurred pre-cocaine boom. However, since both these evolutions occurred simultaneously, the military has become another institution that has inhibited the quality of democracy in Mexico.

Elections

Because elections are a foundational institution in a democracy, elections in Mexico are a necessary component to analyze when discussing the quality of democracy. It is through free and fair elections that citizens elect representatives to represent their interests in making policy which governs the State. The electoral reform that took place during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s fundamentally altered the electoral institution as a whole. The electoral reform eroded the ability of the PRI to rule the entire landscape of the federal and municipal government.
The electoral reform shifted Mexico away from an authoritarian government to a democratic government.

The change in Mexico’s electoral process was necessary for the ending of the authoritarian regime of the PRI. The shift in vote for the PRI in the 2012 election versus the 2006 election is startling. It has been shown herein that the violence of the drug cartels towards citizens, politicians, and law enforcement agencies directly motivated certain citizens to vote for the PRI in 2012. If it were not for the two shifts from authoritarianism to democracy concurrent with the cocaine boom, the cartels would not have the resources to undermine the political and security agencies that they have. If the cartels were unable to undermine these institutions, elections would not be based on which party can best curtail cartel violence, rather it would be which party can deliver the best economic and social advantages to the Mexican people.

Conclusion

The cartels have corrupted the foundational institutions of Mexico’s democracy and have stalled the progress of Mexico’s democracy. Mexico undertook a daunting task when it shifted from its authoritarian rule to a democracy, and the cartels have further exposed the weaknesses of the fledgling democracy. This thesis has shown
how it was the direct result of the shift in the government from an authoritarian regime to a democracy concurrent with the shift in the drug trade industry as primary cocaine distributors that the Mexican cartels are able to systematically undermine the four foundational institutions of Mexico’s democracy and weaken the quality of democracy offered to the Mexican people.

The first chapter examines the evolution of Mexico’s democracy from the authoritarian regime of the early 1900’s to the democracy it is today. This chapter outlines how Mexico was able to shift form its authoritarian regime to a democracy without a military coup d’etat, rather this peaceful transition came within the institution itself.

Under the authoritarian era the PRI oscillated ideologically to the necessary position to retain political power. Furthermore, the PRI co-opted the major political actors; the agricultural, labor, military, and popular sector by empowering these sectors to compete against one another for limited governmental resources. This prevented any of these sectors for defecting to other political parties because any politically ambitious individual aligned with the PRI. During this era, because of the constitutional regulations prohibiting a president from serving for more than one term, politically ambitious individuals could only final solace through working within the regime of the PRI. The PRI
maintained a majority control of the executive and legislative branch until 1997.

The hegemony of the PRI began to wane from the municipal level. One of the factors that attributed to this shift is that the PRI economic policies were seen as the major factor in the economic crisis in the 1980s. Furthermore, the electoral reform of the 1970s and 1980s which allowed for proportional representation within the legislature gave politically ambitious individuals a viable alternative to gain political representation without aligning with the PRI.

The political pressure from the municipal level, and the creation of an independent electoral oversight agency, the Federal Electoral Institute, the PRI could no longer fraudulently win elections through ballot tampering, manipulation, and consequently fraud could no longer be a viable practice for maintaining the presidency.

The democratic shift from authoritarianism which was complete by the shift in presidential power in 2000, created a problem for Mexico in their attempt to consolidate and effectuate the newly elected democratic government. The problem was that agencies that previously accustomed to the authoritarian rule of the PRI were forced to operate as democratic entities. Specifically, politicians were required to abide by the constitutional democratic regulations in place, and law enforcement agencies were required to apply and uphold the rule of law.
equally amongst citizens. While this process in itself is a daunting task, Mexico faces an additional challenge, the cartels.

Chapter two addresses the transformation of the cartels within Mexico. The cartels have a history and longevity in Mexico that has lasted longer than the authoritarian era of the PRI and continues to operate under Mexico’s democratic era. Drug trafficking began in the 1920s and has been a continuous illegal operation since. This chapter analyzes how the cartels operated under the authoritarian era of the PRI versus the democratic era. Furthermore, this chapter shows how it was the shift in the drug trafficking product during the 1980s, the same time as the democratic transition, that created the influence of the cartels today on Mexico’s democratic institutions.

During the authoritarian era, the cartels and politicians had a mutually beneficial relationship. The cartels would continue with their illicit activities and in return the violence would be kept to a minimal. However, politicians were not passive bystanders to cartel operations, they were continuously involved through bribery to help facilitate cartel operations. When Mexico shifted to a democratic state, the previous relationship the cartel had with politicians was severed. The new political actors in play were not accustomed to operating with the cartels, and under the newly democratic principles, could not passively allow cartel operations to continue. Consequently, the cartels and
politicians no longer held a mutually advantageous relationship. This relationship became exacerbated with the blowback of the cocaine market from Colombia through Mexico.

Prior to the crackdown on cocaine trafficking in the 1980s, cocaine was almost fully transported through the south east region of the U.S. Following the crackdown of these routes, the transportation routes shifted to Mexico and the southern region of the U.S. This shift exponentially increased the lucrative of the drug trafficking market. As Mexican cartels began to gain an upper hand in the relationship with the Colombian cartels, the profitability of the market allowed more cartels to operate. This created inter-cartel fighting as smaller cartels fought for a share of the cocaine market, and larger cartels sought to expand their influence of the trafficking routes.

The profitability of the market gave the cartels a monetary resource that allowed them to corrupt politicians. However, because of the inter-cartel fighting, and necessity for securing means of transportation of their new product, cartels resorted to coercion of politicians who were not aligned with their operations. This violence has lead to many responses by politicians. The most notable is the “War on Drugs” by former President Felipe Calderón. However, other politicians either succumbed to the coercion of cartels, and became corrupted, or they were met with death. This method of corruption or
coercion became the means of operation towards Mexico’s law enforcement agencies.

Chapter three analyzes how the role of law enforcement agencies in Mexico have shifted because of the democratic transition, and how the cartels further inhibit the democratic progress of law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies in Mexico were faced with a difficult task as a result of the democratic transition. These agencies were forced to apply and uphold the rule of law equally to all citizens within the state.

Due to the lack of institutional reform following the democratic transition, police were ill equipped to provide equal protection to citizens. The rule of law was selectively enforced under the authoritarian era and the lack of police reform left the police incapable of effectually apply the rule of law equally. The cartels further prohibited the democratic transition of law enforcement agencies because cartels used corruption and coercion to perpetuate their illicit activities. The inefficiencies of police agents to enforce the rule of law on the cartels created the foundation for the “War on Drugs.”

The militarization of the “War on Drugs” by former President Felipe Calderón is a direct result of the incapability of the police to uphold the rule of law. However, the attempt to use the military to combat cartel operations has led to an increase in violence un
paralleled in the last hundred years in Mexico. The attempt to use the military to enforce the rule of law towards the cartels has been met by cartels with the same attitude they have towards politicians and law enforcement agencies; corruption or coercion. The cartels have used corruption to inhibit the effectuation of the “War on Drugs” and more importantly the cartels have used violence. The military has become a replacement to the police force and that is a direct result of the cartels. If the cartels did not operate with the means and resources at their disposal, the transition of law enforcement agencies during the democratic transition would have been more capable.

Chapter four details how the cartels have influenced Mexico’s electoral process. Since 2000 Mexico has been a democratic state through free and fair elections. However, this process is becoming compromised because of the violence used by the cartels. The cartels increase their violence during election years. The cartels target more journalists and politicians during an election year for the purpose of deterring individuals who seek to alter cartel operations. Beyond the direct effect the cartels use to deter politicians and journalists during an election year, the increase in violence perpetuated by the cartels has cast an aura throughout Mexico as citizens search for an alternative to the violence.
Citizens have turned to the PRI as an alternative to the violence associated with the PAN’s “War on Drugs” policy. The militarization effort by the PAN was at first seen as a positive policy. However, the violence did not subside, and actually continued to increase in Mexico. The increase in violence directly lead citizens in the 2012 election to search for an alternative party to curtail the violence, and the drug problem. The party was the PRI. The implications are that if the PRI cannot curtail the violence that engulfs Mexico that citizens may continue to search for a party that can. Mexico is faced with its most challenging task as a nation since the Revolution of 1910. The cartels are the single greatest entity inhibiting the quality of democracy offered to Mexico’s citizens.

Chapter five explicitly states how it was the direct result of the shift from an authoritarian regime concurrent with the shift in the drug trade that allowed the cartels to become the single greatest threat to Mexico’s democratic institutions. This assertion falls from the fact that had either of these shifts occurred without the other that Mexico would have been able to effectually move forward.

If there was not the democratic transition then the authoritarian regime would have been able to continue their patron-client relationship with the cartels which would not have lead to violence. Had the democratic shift occurred without the blowback of cocaine through
Mexico then the cartels would not have the resources to have as impactful of an influence in Mexico’s society. Furthermore, without the blowback effect, there would not be new cartels seeking to enter into the industry because the lucrativesness of the drug trade market was heavily controlled by four major cartels until the insertion of cocaine.

It took the shift from authoritarianism to a democracy, concurrent with the blowback effect from the cocaine crackdown in Colombia, to allow the cartels to become the single greatest threat to Mexico’s fledgling democracy.
Figure 8: Sampling of CNDH Cases of Alleged Torture and or Ill-Treatment
(2000-2002)

Source: (Moreno, Heisler, Keller, Iacopino 2007)
Figure 9: Characteristics of All Medical Evaluations in Cases Where Torture or Ill-Treatment was alleged (2000-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of medical evaluation</th>
<th>Total n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certificates of physical integrity</td>
<td>58 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forensic reports</td>
<td>36 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency medical care documentation</td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autopsy reports</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation of physician conducting medical evaluation</th>
<th>Total n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Attorney General's Office</td>
<td>50 (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal District or State Attorney General's Office</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>7 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDH or local human rights commission</td>
<td>9 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Examiner's Office</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison</td>
<td>11 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent/NGOs</td>
<td>9 (9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical findings*</th>
<th>Total n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eccchymosis/hematomas</td>
<td>40 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pain on palpation</td>
<td>39 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft tissue edema</td>
<td>22 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excoriations/abrasions</td>
<td>21 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erythema</td>
<td>11 (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Torture considered in forensic evaluation as a possibility</th>
<th>Total n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not considered</td>
<td>50 (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered</td>
<td>22 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence considered, but no torture</td>
<td>12 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>19 (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Moreno, Heisler, Keller, Iacopino 2007)
Figure 10: Assessment of the Quality of Certificates of Physical Integrity for Which Complete Records Were Available (2000-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certificates of Physical Integrity</th>
<th>Total n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>25 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical exam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>23 (92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of external lesions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>5 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>7 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;No physical lesions&quot;</td>
<td>12 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>14 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>3 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>8 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of findings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>25 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>13 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>6 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>6 (24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Moreno, Heisler, Keller, Iacopino 2007)
Figure 11: Assessment of the Quality of Forensic Reports for Which Complete Records Were Available (2000-2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forensic Reports</th>
<th>Total n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>22 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trauma history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>7 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>10 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past medical history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>2 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>6 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>14 (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychiatric history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent¹</td>
<td>21 (100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Substance abuse</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>12 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>10 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical exam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>21 (95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>18 (95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological exam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>19 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of external lesions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>10 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>7 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;No physical lesions&quot;²</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagrams and photographs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>3 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>16 (73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of findings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>7 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>10 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>5 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-complete</td>
<td>13 (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present-incomplete</td>
<td>9 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>0 (00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Moreno, Heisler, Keller, Iacopino 2007)
Figure 12: U.S. Assistance to Mexico by Account, FY2007-FY2013 (U.S. $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>FY2007</th>
<th>FY2008</th>
<th>FY2009</th>
<th>FY2010</th>
<th>FY2011</th>
<th>FY2012 (est.)</th>
<th>FY2013 (req.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>242.1</td>
<td>454.0</td>
<td>365.0</td>
<td>117.0</td>
<td>248.5</td>
<td>199.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>299.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHCS\footnote{a}</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>405.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>786.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>403.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>178.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>324.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>269.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: GHCS=Global Health and Child Survival; DA=Development Assistance; ESF=Economic Support Fund; FMF=Foreign Military Financing; IMET=International Military Education and Training; INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR=Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism and Related Programs. Funds are accounted for in the fiscal year for which they were appropriated as noted below:

a. FY2008 assistance includes funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252).
b. FY2009 assistance includes FY2009 bridge funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252) and funding from the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32).
c. $94 million provided under P.L. 111-32 and counted here as part of FY2009 funding was considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
d. $175 million provided in the FY2010 supplemental (P.L. 111-212) and counted here as FY2010 funding was considered by appropriators as “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2011 request.
e. $260 million provided under a FY2009 supplemental (P.L. 111-32) and counted here as FY2009 funding was considered by appropriators “forward funding” intended to address in advance a portion of the FY2010 request.
f. Prior to FY2008, the Global Health and Child Survival account was known as Child Survival and Health.

Source: (Seelke and Finklea 2013)
# APPENDIX B

## Table 7. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Collinearity Statistics</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>VIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy_Rate_2010</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>1.097</td>
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<td>Percentage_of_Deputies</td>
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a. Dependent Variable: State_vote_for_PRI_previous_election

## Table 8. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 2

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a. Dependent Variable: Literacy_Rate_2010
Table 9. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 3

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a. Dependent Variable: Percentage_Homicide_2_yr_before_election

Table 10. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 4

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a. Dependent Variable: Percentage_of_Deputies
### Table 11. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 5

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a. Dependent Variable: Organized_Homicide_5_yr_before_0107

### Table 12. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 6

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a. Dependent Variable: Organized_Homicide_2006
Table 13. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 7

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a. Dependent Variable: GDP_Per_Capita

Table 14. Multicollinearity Test Independent Variable 8

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a. Dependent Variable: Murdered_Politicians
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158


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164


169


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