

ABSTRACT

Charitable Giving and Its Effects on Altruistic Behavior

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Prosocial behavior is comprised of the acts of volunteering and charitable giving and is an aspect of human behavior that has been analyzed by economists in the recent past. When volunteering and contributing to charity are analyzed at surface level, it appears that those individuals who engage in these behaviors do so only for the benefit of those less fortunate or for the betterment of society. Research has shown, however, that one's desire to volunteer can stem from various motives, one of which is warm-glow motivation. Warm-glow motivation is the desire to engage in prosocial behavior not because the prosocial behavior benefits society, but rather because it provides the individual engaging in the prosocial behavior with positive feelings that boost self-image. The research conducted in these laboratory experiments further analyzes prosocial behavior to draw conclusions relating to charitable giving and the manner in which charitable giving affects an individual's altruistic behavior. Specifically, the laboratory experiments focus on the ways in which different social settings, including the public knowledge of an individual's charitable donation, affect altruistic behavior and the motivations that underlie this behavior.

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CHARITABLE GIVING AND ITS EFFECTS ON ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| List of Figures | iii |
| List of Tables | iv |
| Acknowledgments | v |
| Chapter One: Introduction and Background Information | 1 |
| Chapter Two: Experimental Design and Procedures | 11 |
| Chapter Three: Experimental Results | 27 |
| Chapter Four: Conclusions and Significance | 46 |
| Appendices | 53 |
| References | 69 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| | |
|---|----|
| Figure 1: Design of the Traditional Dictator Game | 17 |
| Figure 2: Design of the Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game | 18 |
| Figure 3: Design of the Traditional Dictator Game with Taxation | 19 |
| Figure 4: Design of the Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game with Taxation | 21 |
| Figure 5: Distribution of Warm-Glow Motivation | 29 |
| Figure 6: Motivations in the Private without Representative Treatment | 32 |
| Figure 7: Motivations in the Public Without Representative Treatment | 33 |
| Figure 8: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU | 37 |
| Figure 9: Distribution of Warm-Glow | 39 |
| Figure 10: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU, Charitable | 41 |
| Figure 11: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU, Knowledge of CKBU | 42 |
| Figure 12: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU, Church Attendance | 44 |

LIST OF TABLES

| | |
|--|----|
| Table 1: Parameters of the Experimental Treatments | 14 |
| Table 2: Summary Statistics and T-Test Results Pertaining to Warm-Glow | 30 |
| Table 3: OLS Regression Results Pertaining to Warm-Glow Motivation | 31 |
| Table 4: Summary Statistics of Treatments | 36 |
| Table 5: Results of Mann-Whitney Test, Total Amount Donated to CKBU | 38 |
| Table 6: Results of Mann-Whitney Test, Warm-Glow Motivation | 40 |
| Table 7: Results of Mann-Whitney Test, Charitable | 41 |
| Table 8: Results of Mann-Whitney Test, Prior Knowledge of CKBU | 43 |
| Table 9: Results of Mann-Whitney Test, Church Attendance | 45 |

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Background Information

1.1: Prosocial Behavior and Its Settings

The daily lives of individuals are dotted with opportunities to engage in prosocial behavior, or a behavior undertaken for the benefit of a third party and a “voluntary contribution[] to [the] public good[]” (Gneezy et al. 2011). Individuals volunteer their time at soup kitchens, homeless shelters, and afterschool kids’ programs. People provide monetary donations to charities and to people they encounter on the streets. Families provide Christmas gifts to those less fortunate and sponsor children in foreign countries to help pay for their education. Restaurant customers anonymously pay for the future meals and beverages of patrons in the newly initiated “pay-it-forward” campaigns. The options and opportunities available for engagement in prosocial behavior are endless.

Prosocial behavior is an umbrella category that can be divided into two subcategories, volunteering one’s time and donating one’s money. The economics experiments discussed in this thesis specifically focus on the charitable giving aspect of prosocial behavior and seek to explore the way which the public announcement and public knowledge of an individual’s level of charitable donation affects the amount donated by this individual.

In the real world, there are a variety of opportunities for individuals to make donations to charitable organizations, and, depending on the setting, these donations can remain private and anonymous or can be publicly displayed. On the private end of the spectrum, individuals have the opportunity to mail money to charities or donate money to their church or religious congregation in an unmarked envelope. These settings allow donors to maintain their anonymity and to ensure their donation amount remains undisclosed to the general public.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, there exist settings in which the donation amount of an individual is public knowledge. Live charity auctions provide one example of this setting. In these live auctions, individuals vocally bid on items, and anyone present at the auction will know how much these individuals are bidding. Due to the fact that the bid amounts are donated to charity, everyone present at the auction knows how much each individual is, in reality, donating to charity.

Donations in the online setting typically provide donors with the option of making their donation amount and their identity publicly known or undisclosed. Through this structure, websites allow donors to select the level of anonymity that is most comfortable for them and, as a result, avoid excluding entire groups of donors by dictating the level of publicity associated with the donation.

1.2: The Motivations of Prosocial Behavior

When analyzed at surface level, it appears that individuals engage in prosocial behavior solely to provide assistance to those around them and to help someone in need. Those individuals who volunteer their time, talents, and money do so because they recognize the needs of those around them, whether those needs be food, money, company, or any other form of assistance, and want to ensure that those needs are met.

Within the sphere of economics, however, there has been much debate as to whether these prosocial behaviors are motivated solely by the desire to help an individual or an organization in need. Some claim that “the motives for charitable behavior that may appear pure could be strategic and selfish” (Lilley and Slonim 2013). Previous economics research related to prosocial behavior sought to determine the motivations that underlie prosocial behavior, and this research defined two overarching motivations for prosocial behavior: a purely altruistic motivation and a warm-glow motivation.

Pure altruism or a purely altruistic motivation is defined as a motivation that stems solely from “an interest in the welfare of the recipients of their largesse” (Crumpler and Grossman 2008). A defining characteristic of the purely altruistic motivation is that the welfare of the donor “is a function of the level of the public good provided [and] not how [the public good] is funded” (Crumpler and Grossman 2008). In other words, the utility function of the pure altruist consists of both his own monetary well-being and the well-being of the individual in need. The scenario that maximizes the pure altruist’s utility function is the scenario in which he keeps all his money, and a third party provides for the individual in need. While the well-being of an individual in need affects the

utility function of the pure altruist, the pure altruist will only assist an individual in need if no other person is willing to do so. An underlying assumption of the purely altruistic motivation is the idea that “private charitable contributions are crowded out dollar-for-dollar by public fund increases” (Crumpler and Grossman 2008).

Warm-glow motivation stems from the idea that “donors may not receive utility from the fact that other people benefit from the public good, but rather receive utility from the act of giving itself” (Crumpler and Grossman 2008). Individuals motivated by warm-glow engage in prosocial behavior because they receive some personal benefit or satisfaction from helping someone in need. The utility function of the warm-glow motivated individual includes his own monetary well-being, as well as the personal gain that he receives from engaging in prosocial behavior. This utility function creates an interesting scenario in which an individual is always motivated to help those in need, regardless of whether others are engaging in the same prosocial behavior. The utility that a warm-glow motivated individual receives from engaging in prosocial behavior is a direct result of the prosocial action itself and the fact that the individual was directly responsible for positively affecting the well-being of someone in need.

Warm-glow motivation can stem from a variety of underlying motivations, each of which factors into the individual’s utility function. While these sub-motivations of warm-glow have not been formally defined, the utility associated with warm-glow seems to stem from at least one of three general areas: personal sacrifice, self-signaling and the belief that you are a good person because you have helped someone in need, and outward signaling and the desire to appear generous and to have others believe that you are a good person. The extent to which these sub-motivations of warm-glow affect behavior is still

undetermined, and it is likely that these sub-motivations affect each individual in a different manner. The economics experiments discussed in this thesis partially seek to analyze the latter underlying motivation listed above, the outward signaling.

1.3: Literature Review

The sphere of prosocial behavior has become a popular area of research within economics and is a topic of study that aligns well with economic thought and economic models. The charitable marketplace is structured like any other economic marketplace and consists of actors who fill the roles on the supply and demand sides of the marketplace. In the charitable marketplace, “the donors ... are on the ‘supply’ side, [and] they provide the resources to produce public goods” (List 2008). The demand side of the marketplace is comprised of charitable organizations and individuals in need who are “developing strategies to attract resources to produce public goods” (List 2008).

Due to the fact that prosocial behavior is a broad category that encompasses different subtopics, settings, and variables of interest, the economics research pertaining to prosocial behavior studies a variety of factors, including the motivations underlying prosocial behavior, image concerns and incentives, the demographical and ideological factors that affect prosocial behavior, taxation, and the potential experimenter demand effects associated with the study of prosocial behavior.

1.3.1: Existing Research on the Motivators of Prosocial Behavior

One subset of experiments and articles in the existing body of economics literature pertaining to prosocial behavior focuses directly on the purely altruistic and warm-glow motivations that underlie prosocial behavior. One conclusion from this line of research was obtained by utilizing a public goods game with positive and negative framing and “suggest[s] a behavioral asymmetry between the warm-glow of doing something good and [the] cold-prickle of doing something bad,” or that people prefer doing something good as opposed to not doing something bad (Andreoni 1995).

Lilley and Slonim’s article, “Price of warm glow,” studies the “‘volunteering puzzle’ where agents prefer volunteering time to donating money, [despite the fact that] monetary donations are, *ceteris paribus*, more efficient for providing resources to charity.” The results of this study found that “donations of time are more strongly motivated by private warm-glow benefits than monetary donations,” and it is this warm-glow motivation associated with volunteering one’s time that provides an explanation for the ‘volunteering puzzle’ (Lilley and Slonim 2013).

“An experimental test of warm glow giving” is an article published by Crumpler and Grossman that sought “to isolate and measure the magnitude of warm-glow giving.” The Crumpler and Grossman experiment was designed in such a way “that a pure altruist has no incentive to donate” because “the participant’s giving crowds out dollar-for-dollar giving by the proctor” (Crumpler and Grossman 2008). The results of this experiment showed that “subjects donated on average 20% of their \$10 or \$15 endowment” (Crumpler and Grossman 2008). This suggests “that warm-glow giving exists and is

significant” and that it “motivates a substantial proportion of all giving, at least in the laboratory setting” (Crumpler and Grossman 2008).

1.3.2: Existing Research Pertaining to Image Concerns and Incentives

A second sector of the economics literature focusing on prosocial behavior investigates the ways in which image concerns and incentives interact with prosocial behavior. Broadly, each of these articles focuses on how an individual’s desire to be noticed for his prosocial behavior impacts his actions and decisions.

Two of these articles arrived at the same conclusion and found that incentives and extrinsic motivators can have a negative effect on an individual’s engagement in prosocial behavior. One such article studied volunteer firefighters. The results of this article suggested that the provision of “extrinsic motivations to volunteers can have unintended negative effects by crowding out image motivations to volunteer” (Carpenter and Myers 2010). Rephrased, these results conclude that extrinsic motivators, like money, actually decrease participation in prosocial behavior for those individuals motivated by image concerns. The second article reasons that the incentives “crowd out image motivation by diluting the signal to oneself or others of a voluntary contribution” and that these incentives will be more likely to positively affect prosocial behavior in the settings in which “contributions to the public goods are not visible” (Gneezy et al. 2011).

1.3.3: Demographical and Ideological Factors and Their Role in Prosocial Behavior

One group of articles is comprised of empirical studies that focus on demographical and ideological factors and how these factors are related to prosocial behavior. The correlations and relationships confirmed by these papers are that “students over age 20 [are] more likely to volunteer than traditional-age first year students,” that Caucasian students are the least likely to volunteer, and that “students with higher levels of academic achievement [are] more likely to volunteer than their lower-achieving peers” (Moore et al. 2014).

When studying religion and religious beliefs, these articles have found differing results and conclusions. One paper “found no significant relationship between religiosity and volunteer status,” while another found that “especially religious persons were more likely than other participants to volunteer for altruistic reasons” (Moore et al. 2014, Fitch 1987).

1.3.4: Taxation and How It Interacts with Prosocial Behavior

The relationship between taxation and prosocial behavior is a key area of study. Both taxation and prosocial behavior benefit charities and those in need, but the implementation of a tax has the potential to influence an individual’s level of engagement in prosocial behavior, depending on his proportion of warm-glow and purely altruistic motivations. Understanding the relationship between taxation and prosocial behavior is necessary to create a tax structure that is beneficial for all parties involved.

One of the main findings of these articles was that “people are not indifferent between paying for the public good voluntarily (through private donations) or involuntary (through taxes). Given the choice, people are assumed to prefer to give directly” (Andreoni 1990). This conclusion stems from the fact that “public giving is an imperfect substitute for private giving [and that] people prefer to make donations directly rather than indirectly” (Andreoni 1990). One reason for this preference is a result of the warm-glow motivation and the idea that individuals get utility from their decision to voluntarily donate money. This preference to donate voluntarily also supports the conclusion that “lump-sum taxes will, in general, only incompletely crowd out private giving” (Andreoni 1989).

The overarching implication of these results is that, despite taxation, individuals will still choose to engage in prosocial behavior and to donate to charity.

1.3.5: Experimenter Demand Effects and Prosocial Behavior

One paper proposed a new experimental design that sought to analyze whether the dictator game, the economic game of choice for those economists studying prosocial behavior, serves as an appropriate game with which to analyze prosocial behavior and whether the results of the dictator game experiments truly stem from the warm-glow and purely altruistic motivations of prosocial behavior.

This experimental design compared dictator games to taking games and found that “it is the transparency of responsibility in the dictator game that causes generosity,”

not an individual's desire to engage in prosocial behavior (Bardsley 2007). This study found that "subjects are more concerned to seem than to be fair" and that "most subjects' generosity appears to be reversible by allowing sufficient opportunity to take" (Bardsley 2007). The main conclusion of this paper was that "dictator giving is a product of experimental demand characteristics and [the participants'] attitudes to[ward] the experiment, with the choice set contributing to the cues which indicate appropriate behavior" (Bardsley 2007).

CHAPTER TWO

Experimental Design and Procedures

The economics experiments discussed in this thesis consist of a set of laboratory experiments that seek to analyze the charitable giving facet of prosocial behavior, the motivations that underlie this behavior, and the ways in which this behavior and its motivations are affected by different social settings, specifically the public knowledge of a participant's level of charitable donation.

Historically, experimental economists have utilized the dictator game, an economic game in which an individual is given a lump sum of money to divide between himself and a third party, as a tool to analyze prosocial behavior. To maintain consistency with the previous literature, the experimental design of the lab experiments discussed in this thesis centers around the dictator game.

In addition to serving as the economic game of choice for those economists studying prosocial behavior, the dictator game is of use because it can easily be manipulated to isolate and analyze the warm-glow and purely altruistic motivations that underlie prosocial behavior. In each treatment of the lab experiments discussed in this thesis, participants played four variations of the dictator game: the traditional dictator game, the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game, the traditional dictator game with

taxation, and the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game with taxation. Each of these variations of the dictator game will be discussed in detail in section 2.3.

In each of the four variations of the dictator game, participants were assigned to the role of dictator and were informed that the recipient with which they would be paired for the duration of the experiment was The Campus Kitchen at Baylor University, a student-led organization that provides volunteer opportunities for students. A description of The Campus Kitchen at Baylor University is provided in section 2.1.

2.1: The Campus Kitchen at Baylor University

The Campus Kitchen at Baylor University, hereafter referred to as CKBU, is a student organization that works to alleviate hunger and minimize food waste in the Waco community. Established in 2008, CKBU is a member of the national Campus Kitchens Project which is located in Washington D.C. Nationwide, there are 63 colleges and universities who run a Campus Kitchen, and CKBU is one of two Campus Kitchens in the state of Texas.

CKBU has five avenues of service: garden shifts, cooking shifts, food delivery shifts, dining hall recovery shifts, and Panera Bread recovery shifts.

CKBU is responsible for maintaining a community garden. Four days a week, student volunteers work in the garden to plant and harvest fresh produce, all of which is used in the organization's cooking shifts. On average, the Campus Kitchen Community Garden harvests six pounds of fresh produce each month.

Two days a week, students volunteer for cooking shifts. During these shifts, student kitchen managers and student volunteers work together to prepare fresh and nutritious meals for local non-profits including The Cove, The Mission Waco Youth Center, and the Family Abuse Center. These cooking shifts produce 100 meals each week, and these meals are delivered by student volunteers to non-profit locations during food delivery shifts.

Five days a week, students participate in dining hall recovery shifts. During these shifts, volunteers travel to each of Baylor's on-campus dining halls and pick up any food that went unserved during lunch. This food is transported to the Salvation Army Men's Center in downtown Waco, and this organization uses the food to provide meals to its clients. On average, students recover 460 pounds of food from Baylor's dining halls each month.

In the Fall of 2016, CKBU partnered with Panera Bread to participate in their End-of-Day Dough-Nation Program. CKBU sends volunteers to Panera Bread seven days a week. These volunteers are responsible for packing up and transporting all of Panera Bread's unsold bread and pastries to The Salvation Army Men's Center and Caritas Food Bank. On average, students recover 364 pounds of food from Panera Bread each month.

2.2: Discussion of the Different Experimental Treatments

The economics lab experiments conducted for this thesis consist of four treatments which were designed to replicate different social settings and scenarios common in the spheres of charitable giving and prosocial behavior. Specifically, these experiments sought to analyze how the public knowledge of an individual's donation amount and the presence of a charity representative influences his behavior. Table 1 provides the design and structure of each experimental treatment.

| Treatments: | Treatment Parameters: | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|
| | <i>Donation to Charity Announced</i> | <i>Donation to Charity Unannounced</i> | <i>CKBU Representative Present</i> | <i>CKBU Representative Not Present</i> |
| <i>Private without Representative</i> | | X | | X |
| <i>Public without Representative</i> | X | | | X |
| <i>Private with Representative</i> | | X | X | |
| <i>Public with Representative</i> | X | | X | |

Table 1: Parameters of the Experimental Treatments

The first treatment of the lab experiments, hereafter referred to as Private without Representative, was designed so the decisions made by each participant remain entirely private and so there was no known CKBU representative present in the lab. In this treatment, participants played all four variations of the dictator game as outlined in

section 2.3. This treatment serves as a control treatment and establishes baseline levels of total altruistic giving, warm-glow motivation, and purely altruistic motivation.

The second treatment of the lab experiments, hereafter referred to as Public without Representative, was designed so the decisions made by each participant are publicly announced to all individuals present in the lab and so there was no known CKBU present in the lab. In this treatment, participants played all four variations of the dictator game as outlined in section 2.3. This treatment allows for an analysis of the effect that the public announcement of an individual's charitable donation has on total altruistic giving, warm-glow motivation, and purely altruistic motivation.

The third treatment of the lab experiments, hereafter referred to as Private with Representative, was designed so the decisions made by each participant remain entirely private and so there was a known CKBU representative present in the lab. In this treatment, participants played all four variations of the dictator game as outlined in section 2.3. This treatment allows for an analysis of the effect that the presence of a CKBU representative has on an individual's total altruistic giving, warm-glow motivation, and purely altruistic motivation.

The fourth treatment of the lab experiments, hereafter referred to as Public with Representative, was designed so the decisions made by each participant are publicly announced to all individuals present in the lab and so there was a known CKBU representative present in the lab. In this treatment, participants played all four variations of the dictator game as outlined in section 2.3. This treatment allows for an analysis of the effect that both the public announcement of an individual's charitable donation and

the presence of a CKBU representative has on an individual's total altruistic giving, warm-glow motivation, and purely altruistic motivation.

In each of these treatments, the participants were assigned to the role of dictator and were paired with CKBU for each of the four variations of the dictator game discussed in section 2.3. The design of these treatments allows for both within-subjects and between-subjects analysis.

2.3: The Four Variations of the Dictator Game

In each of the four treatments of the lab experiments, participants played four variations of the dictator game: the traditional dictator game, the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game, the traditional dictator game with taxation, and the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game with taxation.

In the traditional dictator game, each participant was assigned to the role of dictator and was informed that he would be given ten experimental dollars, hereafter referred to as E\$10, to divide between himself and CKBU. The participant then chose how to allocate this E\$10 between himself and CKBU and did so in whatever manner he deemed appropriate. The allocation decision made by the participant was final. This version of the dictator game can be used to analyze an individual's total level of charitable giving and provides a combined level of purely altruistic and warm-glow motivations. The amount donated by the participant to CKBU is said to be his total level of charitable giving, which is comprised of both his warm-glow and purely altruistic

motivations. A pictorial representation of the design of the traditional dictator game is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Design of the Traditional Dictator Game

The Crumpler and Grossman dictator game is based on the experimental design presented by Crumpler and Grossman in their 2008 article entitled “An experimental test of warm glow giving.” Their experimental design allowed for the isolation of a participant’s warm-glow motivation. In the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game, each participant was assigned to the role of dictator and was informed that he would be given E\$10 to divide between himself and CKBU. Additionally, however, each participant was told that CKBU would always receive E\$10, regardless of the amount of money the participant chose to allocate to CKBU. In this version of the dictator game, the proctor was willing to donate up to E\$10 to CKBU, and the amount donated by the proctor was reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount that the participant elected to allocate to CKBU.

As a result, there was no incentive for a participant to donate to CKBU unless he received some personal benefit or utility from doing so. This personal benefit or utility stems from warm-glow. The participant chose to allocate the E\$10 between himself and CKBU in whatever manner he deemed appropriate. The allocation decision made by the participant was final. The design of the game can be used to isolate an individual's warm-glow motivation from his total level of charitable giving. By structuring the game in a way so that CKBU always receives E\$10 regardless of the amount of money allocated by the participant, any purely altruistic motivations are crowded out, and the amount of money allocated to CKBU by the participant is a result of warm-glow motivation. A pictorial representation of the design of the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Design of the Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game

In the traditional dictator game with taxation, each participant was assigned to the role of dictator and was informed that he would be given E\$10 to divide between himself

and CKBU. Additionally, however, each participant was informed that, after making his allocation decision, an additional E\$0.75 would be deducted from the amount that the participant kept for himself. This E\$0.75 would be donated to CKBU in addition to the amount allocated to CKBU by the participant. Ultimately, this E\$0.75 was meant to simulate a required tax. If the participant chose to keep less than E\$0.75 for himself, the tax amount would be adjusted so that the tax was equivalent to the amount that the participant kept for himself, making the amount kept by the participant equal to E\$0. The participant chose how to allocate the E\$10 between himself and CKBU and could do so in whatever manner he deemed appropriate. The allocation decision made by the participant was final. This variation of the dictator game is used to analyze how lump-sum taxes affect an individual's overall level of charitable donation and whether any changes in the level of charitable donation are motivated by purely altruistic or warm-glow motivations. A pictorial representation of the design of the traditional dictator game with taxation is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Design of the Traditional Dictator Game with Taxation

In the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game with taxation, each participant was assigned to the role of dictator and was informed that he would be given E\$10 to divide between himself and CKBU. Additionally, however, each participant was told that CKBU would always receive E\$10, regardless of the amount of money the participant chose to allocate to CKBU. In this version of the dictator game, the proctor was willing to donate up to E\$10 to CKBU, and the amount donated by the proctor was reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount that the participant elected to allocate to CKBU. As a result, there was no incentive for a participant to donate to CKBU unless he received some personal benefit or utility from doing so. This personal benefit or utility stems from warm-glow. Each participant was also told that, after making his allocation decision, an additional E\$0.75 would be deducted from the amount that the participant kept for himself. This E\$0.75 would be donated to CKBU, in addition to the amount allocated to CKBU by the participant. Ultimately, this E\$0.75 was meant to simulate a required tax. If the participant chose to keep less than E\$0.75 for himself, the tax amount would be adjusted so that the tax was equivalent to the amount that the participant kept for himself, making the amount kept by the participant equal to E\$0. The participant chose how to allocate this E\$10 between himself and CKBU and did so in whatever manner he deemed appropriate. The allocation decision made by the participant was final. This variation of the dictator game is used to analyze how lump-sum taxes are associated with warm-glow motivations. A pictorial representation of the design of the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game with taxation is shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Design of the Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game with Taxation

2.4: Experimental Procedures

The participants in these economics experiments were recruited through Baylor's SONA system, an online system used to notify Baylor undergraduate and graduate students of different experiments in which they can participate. Those individuals registered in the system received an email when new experiments were posted online and were given to opportunity to register for and attend a session. Each participant attended only one lab session to avoid repetition of participants.

Participants arrived at the Behavioral Economics Lab located in in Foster 323 and signed in with the proctors. In each session, two proctors, myself and a graduate assistant, were present in the lab. After signing in, each participant was provided with a five-digit ID number that was used to identify his data and to ensure the privacy and anonymity of each participant. The participants were told to write their code numbers at the top of each of their decision sheets and at the top of the survey that was provided at

the end of the experiment. Copies of the decision sheets can be found in Appendices L and M. Copies of the survey can be found in Appendix N.

Each participant was seated at a desk with a divider and was provided with a consent form. Participants were asked to read through the consent form. While the consent form required no signature, participants were informed that they could keep a copy of the consent form if they desired. A copy of the consent form can be found in Appendix A.

After all participants had been signed in and seated, the proctors passed out the general instructions for the lab session. A proctor read these instructions aloud to the group of participants. Copies of the general instructions can be found in Appendix B and Appendix C. In the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments, the participants were informed that a proctor would provide them with an overview of CKBU. The second proctor, myself, would then read aloud an overview of CKBU and its operations. In the Private with Representative and Public with Representative treatments, the proctor informed the participants that a representative from CKBU would be present in the lab. The second proctor, myself, would then be introduced as the CKBU representative and would provide the participants with an overview of CKBU and its operations.

A proctor then passed out the instructions for the first version of the dictator game, along with a decision sheet. Copies of the instructions for the variations of the dictator game can be found in Appendices D-K. Copies of the decision sheets can be found in Appendices L and M. These instructions were read aloud by a proctor, and

participants were asked to complete a quiz to gauge their comprehension of the instructions. After participants completed the quiz, a proctor read the quiz answers aloud. Participants were then asked to make their allocation decision and to fill out the remainder of their decision sheet to record the amount of money they were keeping and the amount of money they were donating to CKBU. These decision sheets were turned in to a submission box at the front of the lab. The procedures outlined in this paragraph were repeated for each of the additional versions of the dictator game.

In the Private with Representative and Private without Representative treatments, the decisions of each participant remained private and anonymous. The code numbers provided to participants ensured that the proctors had no identifying personal information pertaining to the participants. Additionally, the decisions of each participant were never disclosed to the other participants or to outside parties.

In the Public with Representative and Public without Representative treatments, the decisions of each participant were publicly announced to everyone present in the lab. Once the decision sheets were turned into the submission box after playing a variation of the dictator game, a proctor would read out loud the code number written on the decision sheet. The participant associated with that code number would stand up, and the proctor would announce to everyone present in the lab the amount of money the participant allocated to himself and the amount of money the participant allocated to CKBU. The participant would then sit down, and this process would be repeated for each participant in the lab session.

In each lab session, only one variation of the dictator game was paid in cash to the participants. After all four variations of the dictator game had been played, one participant would be randomly selected to roll a four-sided dice to determine which version of the dictator game was to be paid out to the participants.

A proctor would then provide participants with a survey, a copy of which can be found in Appendix N. While the participants completed these surveys, the proctors prepared each participant's payment envelope. A participant's payment included a \$5 show-up fee plus the amount of money that the participant kept for himself in the dictator game, paid out at the rate of \$2 USD to E\$3. Each payment envelope was labeled with the participant's code number. In addition, CKBU received the amount of money allocated to it by the participant at a rate of \$2 USD to E\$3.

Once all payment envelopes were filled, the code number written on each envelope would be called by a proctor. The participant associated with this code number would approach the proctors, turn in his survey, sign a receipt indicating the amount of money in USD that he was receiving and donating to CKBU, receive his payment envelope, and exit the lab.

One advantage of this experimental design is that the proctors in all four experimental treatments remained constant. In the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments, I was introduced as one of the proctors and provided the participants with an overview of CKBU. In the Private with Representative and Public with Representative treatments, I was introduced as the CKBU representative and provided the participants with an overview of CKBU. Any confounds associated

with having different proctors present in the lab were mitigated by keeping my presence in the lab constant. The only difference between the treatments with a representative and the treatments without a representative was the way in which I was introduced to the lab. Therefore, any differences between these treatments stem from the proctor being viewed as a CKBU representative as opposed to an unassociated proctor.

2.5: Questions of Interest

The various treatments and economic games conducted in these lab experiments were structured to address the following questions:

Question 1: Do the participants in these lab experiments exhibit warm-glow and purely altruistic motivations?

Question 2: Does the public announcement of a participant's allocation decision affect the total amount donated to CKBU and, if so, is this change a result of purely altruistic or warm-glow motivations?

Question 3: Does the presence of a CKBU representative affect a participant's allocation decision and, if so, is this change a result of purely altruistic or warm-glow motivations?

2.6: Hypotheses

Based on the questions posed in section 2.5, the initial hypotheses predicted for these economics experiments are:

Hypothesis 1: Participants in the lab experiments will exhibit warm-glow motivation.

Hypothesis 2: The public announcement of a participant's allocation decision will increase the total amount donated to CKBU.

Hypothesis 3: The increase in the total amount donated to CKBU associated with the public announcement of a participant's allocation decision will be a result of an increase in warm-glow motivation.

Hypothesis 4: The presence of a CKBU representative will increase the total amount donated to CKBU.

Hypothesis 5: The increase in the total amount donated to CKBU associated with the presence of a CKBU representative will be a result of an increase in the participant's warm-glow motivation.

CHAPTER THREE

Experimental Results

While sections 2.3 and 2.4 discussed an experimental design with four treatments and four economic games, the data that is analyzed and discussed in this section is the data from the traditional dictator game and the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game played in the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments. The data from the Private with Representative treatment, the Public with Representative treatment, the traditional dictator game with taxation, and the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game with taxation are not discussed in this thesis. Rather, these data will form the basis for future articles.

These lab experiments began in November of 2017 and ran through May of 2018. Lab sessions were held on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays and took place in the evening. Both the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments had 15 participants, giving a combined total of 30 participants between the two treatments. The data from these two treatments were collected over five different lab sessions, with two lab sessions for the Private without Representative treatment and three lab sessions for the Public without Representative treatment. Each participant attended only one lab session to avoid repetition of participants, and each lab session lasted about 45 minutes.

The statistical analysis conducted for these experiments used Stata, a statistical software package. The two main statistical tests used to analyze the data were the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test and the two-tailed t-test. The Mann-Whitney test is a type of statistical analysis that tests the null hypothesis that the two groups being compared have the same distribution of outcomes. The t-test is a type of statistical analysis that tests the null hypothesis that a variable is equal to a specific value, usually zero. To reject a null hypothesis, the p-value associated with the statistical test must be less than 0.10. If the p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is said to be strongly rejected. If the p-value is between 0.05 and 0.10, the null hypothesis is said to be weakly rejected.

Result 1: Warm-glow motivation was exhibited by participants in these lab experiments.

One of the goals of these lab experiments was to replicate the results discussed in Crumpler and Grossman's article, "An experimental test of warm glow giving," and to isolate the presence of the warm-glow motivation that underlies a participant's allocation decision.

A participant's level of warm-glow motivation is equivalent to the amount of money that he donated to CKBU in the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game. The amount donated to CKBU in the traditional dictator game represents a participant's combined purely altruistic and warm-glow motivations. A participant's level of purely altruistic motivation is calculated by subtracting his warm-glow motivation from the amount donated to CKBU in the traditional dictator game.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of each participant's level of warm-glow motivation as a dollar amount. In the figure, participants 1-15 are from the Private without Representative treatment, and participants 16-30 are from the Public without Representative treatment. As shown, participants in the lab experiment appear to exhibit warm-glow motivation.




Figure 5: Distribution of Warm-Glow Motivation

A two-tailed t-test was conducted on the combined data from both treatments to analyze whether the level of warm-glow motivation as a dollar amount was equal to zero. Table 2 provides the summary statistics pertaining to warm-glow, as well as the results of the t-test. Of the 30 observations, the average level of warm-glow motivation was 2.467,

with a minimum level of warm-glow motivation of zero and a maximum level of warm-glow motivation of 5. The null hypothesis that warm-glow motivation was equal to zero was rejected with strong statistical significance ($p=0.000$). As a result, it can be concluded that warm-glow motivation was present in the lab and was exhibited by participants.

| Variable | Observations | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Standard Error | Standard Deviation |
|----------------------|--------------|-------|---------|---------|----------------|--------------------|
| Warm-Glow Motivation | 30 | 2.467 | 0 | 5 | 0.3858 | 2.113 |

Table 2: Summary Statistics and T-Test Results Pertaining to Warm-Glow

To analyze the relationship between warm-glow motivation and demographical factors, an OLS regression was utilized. This regression shows the relationship between a variable and warm-glow motivation, as well as the statistical significance of this relationship. Table 3 provides the results of this regression, which had an R-squared value equal to 0.4495.

The results of this regression show that purely altruistic motivation is the only variable that is correlated with warm-glow motivation at a level of strong statistical significance ($p=0.014$). The analysis of the relationship between warm-glow and purely altruistic motivation is that a one dollar increase in purely altruistic motivation will decrease warm-glow motivation by 0.3308 dollars. This relationship between the two variables is logical because warm-glow and purely altruistic motivation will, to an extent,

crowd one another out. The other variables included in this regression are not correlated with warm-glow at a level of statistical significance.

| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Coefficient</i> | <i>Standard Error</i> | <i>P-Value</i> |
|--|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| Purely Altruistic Motivation | -0.3308 | 0.1209 | 0.014 |
| Male | -1.011 | 1.0364 | 0.342 |
| White | 1.425 | 1.3395 | 0.301 |
| Asian | -0.1707 | 1.5634 | 0.914 |
| Black | 1.6903 | 1.3295 | 0.220 |
| Multi-Racial | 0.2995 | 2.0739 | 0.888 |
| Christian | 0.8536 | 1.1377 | 0.463 |
| Charitable | 0.7100 | 1.0422 | 0.504 |
| Heard of Campus Kitchen | -0.3852 | 1.3109 | 0.772 |
| Public Announcement of Allocation Decision | -0.4268 | 0.8970 | 0.640 |
| Constant | 2.0673 | 1.8019 | 0.266 |

Table 3: OLS Regression Results Pertaining to Warm-Glow Motivation

Result 2: A portion of participants exhibited either no warm-glow motivation or no purely altruistic motivation.

Figures 6 and 7 show the proportions of each participant's warm-glow and purely altruistic motivations as a dollar amount in both the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments, respectively. In each graph, warm-glow motivation is represented by the white bar and purely altruistic motivation is represented by the black bar. Upon analysis of these graphs, one can see that, of the 30 participants, six exhibited no purely altruistic motivation and seven exhibited no warm-glow motivation.




Figure 6: Proportions of Warm-Glow and Purely Altruistic Motivations in the Private without Representative Treatment




Figure 7: Proportions of Warm-Glow and Purely Altruistic Motivations in the Public Without Representative Treatment

A dummy variable was created to indicate whether a participant was motivated solely by warm-glow, and a Mann-Whitney test compared the Private without Representative treatment to the Public without Representative treatment regarding this dummy variable. The results of this test showed that the propensity for a participant to be motivated solely by warm-glow motivation cannot be attributed to the privacy or public announcement of a participant’s allocation decision ($p=0.6953$). A similar test was conducted regarding a motivation stemming solely from pure altruism which showed. The results of this test showed that the propensity for a participant to be motivated solely by pure altruism cannot be attributed to the privacy or public announcement of a participant’s allocation decision ($p=0.4169$).

Result 3: A portion of participants exhibited neither warm-glow motivation nor purely altruistic motivation.

Figures 6 and 7 show that, of the 30 participants in these lab treatments, two participants exhibited neither warm-glow nor purely altruistic motivations. These participants, both of whom were from the Private without Representative Treatment, kept all of the money for themselves in both rounds of the dictator game, thus making their purely altruistic and warm-glow motivations equal to zero. A dummy variable was created to indicate whether a participant was motivated by neither warm-glow nor pure altruism, and a Mann-Whitney test compared the Private without Representative treatment to the Public without Representative treatment regarding this dummy variable. The results of this test showed that the propensity for a participant to have no warm-glow motivation and no purely altruistic motivation cannot be attributed to the privacy or public announcement of an allocation decision ($p=0.1501$).

Result 4: Participants exhibited a negative purely altruistic motivation.

Figures 6 and 7 show that, of the 30 participants in these lab treatments, three participants exhibited a negative purely altruistic motivation. A dummy variable was created to indicate whether a participant was motivated by a negative warm-glow, and a Mann-Whitney test compared the Private without Representative treatment to the Public without Representative treatment regarding this dummy variable. The results of this test showed that the propensity for a participant to have a negative purely altruistic

motivation cannot be attributed to the privacy or public announcement of an allocation decision ($p=0.5496$). Similarly, this negative purely altruistic motivation was compared with the aggregate levels of purely altruistic motivation in a Mann-Whitney Test, and the results showed that the negative purely altruistic motivation is significantly different from the aggregate levels of purely altruistic motivation ($p=0.0046$).

The negative valence of a purely altruistic motivation has not been observed or discussed in previous literature. To eliminate any question of participant confusion, the quiz answers and allocation decisions of these participants were double-checked. None of the three participants showed any signs of confusion in the experimental tasks which would have been exhibited through incorrect quiz responses or incorrect addition when summing their allocation decisions. While it is still possible that these three participants were confused, their lack of confusion display makes it likely that this negative purely altruistic motivation is a motivation that exists in the realm of prosocial behavior.

Two potential reasons for this negative purely altruistic motivation are that the individuals are negatively affected by the proctor donating to the charity, causing them to donate more money in the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game to bypass this negativity or that the participants are exhibiting an experimenter demand effect and are feeling pressure to give, despite the design of the experiment.

Result 5: The public announcement of a participant’s allocation decision did not affect the total amount donated to CKBU.

Table 4 provides summary statistics for both the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments. As shown in Table 4, the average donation in the traditional dictator game remained relatively consistent between the Private without Representative and Public without representative treatments. The average donation levels in the traditional dictator game differed by \$0.03 between these two treatments, with the Private without Representative treatment averaging a \$5.20 donation and the Public without Representative treatment averaging a \$5.23 donation.

| | Average Amount Kept in Traditional Dictator Game | Average Amount Donated in Traditional Dictator Game | Maximum Amount Donated in Traditional Dictator Game | Maximum Amount Donated in Traditional Dictator Game | Average Amount Kept in Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game | Average Amount Donated in Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game | Maximum Amount Donated in Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game | Maximum Amount Donated in Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game |
|--------------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|---|---|---|
| Private without Representative | \$4.80 | \$5.20 | \$10.00 | \$0.00 | \$7.80 | \$2.20 | \$5.00 | \$0.00 |
| Public without Representative | \$4.77 | \$5.23 | \$10.00 | \$1.00 | \$7.27 | \$2.73 | \$5.00 | \$0.00 |

Table 4: Summary Statistics of Private without Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Figure 8 shows the distribution of each participant’s total donation to CKBU in the traditional dictator game in terms of whether the participant’s allocation decision was publicly announced in the lab. In the figure, participants 1-15 are from the Private without Representative treatment, and participants 16-30 are from the Public without Representative treatment. One can see that these distributions are similar in shape,

providing initial evidence that there is no difference in the total amount donated to CKBU between these two treatments.




Figure 8: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU in the Private without Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

A Mann-Whitney test was conducted which compared the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments regarding the total donation to CKBU. Table 5 provides the statistical results pertaining to this statistical analysis. The results showed that the donation amount in the traditional dictator game was not significantly different between the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments ($p=0.9168$).

| <i>Total Amount Donated to CKBU in Traditional Dictator Game</i> | Observations | Mean | Standard Error | Standard Deviation |
|--|--------------|-------|----------------|--------------------|
| Private without Representative | 15 | 5.2 | 0.9217 | 3.5697 |
| Public without Representative | 15 | 5.233 | 0.6741 | 2.6109 |

Table 5: Results of Mann-Whitney Test Comparing the Total Amount Donated to CKBU in the Private without Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Result 6: The public announcement of a participant's allocation decision did not affect his warm-glow motivation.

As shown in Table 4, the average amount donated in the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game, which is representative of a participant's warm-glow motivation, remained relatively consistent between the Private without Representative and the Public without Representative treatments. The average donation in the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game differed by \$0.53 between these two treatments, with the Private without Representative Treatment averaging a \$2.20 donation and the Public without Representative averaging a \$2.73 donation.

Figure 9 shows the distribution of each participant's warm-glow motivation in dollars in terms of whether the participant's allocation decision was publicly announced in the lab. In the figure, participants 1-15 are from the Private without Representative treatment, and participants 16-30 are from the Public without Representative treatment. One can see that these distributions are similar in shape, providing initial evidence that

there is no difference in the warm-glow motivations exhibited by participants between these two treatments.




Figure 9: Distribution of Warm-Glow in the Private without Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

A Mann-Whitney test was conducted which compared the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments regarding the warm-glow motivation of each participant. Table 6 provides the statistical results pertaining to this statistical analysis. The results showed that the warm-glow motivation was not significantly different between the Private without Representative and Public without Representative treatments ($p=0.4161$).

| <i>Warm-Glow Motivation</i> | Observations | Mean | Standard Error | Standard Deviation |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------|----------------|--------------------|
| Private without Representative | 15 | 2.2 | 0.5363 | 2.0771 |
| Public without Representative | 15 | 2.733 | 0.5646 | 2.1865 |

Table 6: Results of Mann-Whitney Test Comparing Warm-Glow Motivation in the Private without Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Result 7: Participants who identified as charitable did not donate more to CKBU on the aggregate.

One of the questions answered by participants in the post-experimental survey asked whether the participant considered himself to be charitable. Figure 10 shows the distribution of each participant's total donation to CKBU in terms of whether the participant self-identified as charitable. In the figure, participants 1-11 did not identify as charitable, and participants 12-30 did identify as charitable. One can see that these distributions are similar in shape, providing initial evidence that there is no difference in the total donation to CKBU between these two groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was conducted which compared the self-identified charitable participants with the self-identified uncharitable participants regarding the total amount donated to CKBU. Table 7 provides the results pertaining to this statistical analysis. Of the 30 participants, 19 identified as a charitable or giving person. The results showed that the total amount donated to CKBU was not significantly different between the charitable and uncharitable populations ($p=0.4536$).




Figure 10: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU Comparing Charitable and Uncharitable Individuals

| <i>Total Donation to CKBU</i> | Observations | Mean | Standard Error | Standard Deviation |
|-------------------------------|--------------|--------|----------------|--------------------|
| Charitable Participant | 19 | 5.4473 | 0.5759 | 2.5105 |
| Uncharitable Participant | 11 | 4.8182 | 1.1971 | 3.9703 |

Table 7: Results of Mann-Whitney Test Comparing Charitable and Uncharitable Participants

Result 8: Participants who had a previous knowledge of CKBU did not donate more to CKBU on the aggregate.

A question answered by participants in the post-experimental survey asked whether the participant had heard of CKBU prior to starting the experiment. Figure 11 shows the distribution of each participant's total donation to CKBU in terms of whether the participant had a prior knowledge of CKBU. Of the 30 participants, five had heard of CKBU prior to starting the experiment. In the figure, Participants 1-25 had not heard of CKBU prior to starting the experiment. In the figure, Participants 1-25 had not heard of CKBU, and participants 26-30 had heard of CKBU before participating in the experiment. One can see that the distributions are of similar shape, providing evidence that there is no difference in the total donation to CKBU between these two groups.




Figure 11: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU Comparing Participants with and without a Prior Knowledge of CKBU

A Mann-Whitney test was conducted which compared the participants with a prior knowledge of CKBU to those without a prior knowledge of CKBU regarding the total amount donated to CKBU. Table 8 provides the results pertaining to this statistical analysis. The results of the Mann-Whitney test showed that the total amount donated to CKBU was not significantly different between those with a prior knowledge of CKBU and those without ($p=0.3615$).

| <i>Total Donation to CKBU</i> | Observations | Mean | Standard Error | Standard Deviation |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------|----------------|--------------------|
| Prior Knowledge of CKBU | 5 | 6.1 | 1.1874 | 2.6552 |
| No Prior Knowledge of CKBU | 25 | 5.04 | 0.6637 | 3.1686 |

Table 8: Results of Mann-Whitney Test Comparing Participants with and without a Prior Knowledge of CKBU

Result 9: Participants who were frequent church attendees did not donate more on the aggregate.

One aspect of the post-experimental survey focused on the frequency of each participant's church attendance. In order to study religiosity and its relationship with prosocial behavior, participants were sorted based on whether or not they were frequent church attendees. Frequent church attendees were defined as those individuals who attended church at least once a week. Figure 12 shows the distribution of each participant's total donation to CKBU terms of whether the participant was a frequent

church attendee. Of the 30 participants, 20 were infrequent church attendees and 10 were frequent church attendees. In the figure, participants 1-20 were infrequent church attendees, and participants 21-30 were frequent church attendees. One can see that these distributions are similar in shape, providing initial evidence that there is no difference in the total donation to CKBU between these two groups.




Figure 12: Distribution of Total Donations to CKBU Comparing Frequent and Infrequent Church Attendees

A Mann-Whitney test was conducted which compared the frequent church attendees to the infrequent church attendees regarding the total amount donated to CKBU. Table 9 provides the summary statistics pertaining to whether an individual was

a frequent church attendee. The results of the Mann-Whitney test showed that the total amount donated to CKBU was not significantly different between the frequent church attendees and the infrequent church attendees ($p=0.3615$).

| <i>Total Donation to CKBU</i> | Observations | Mean | Standard Error | Standard Deviation |
|-------------------------------|--------------|-------|----------------|--------------------|
| Frequent Church Attendee | 10 | 5.9 | 0.8876 | 2.8067 |
| Infrequent Church Attendee | 20 | 4.875 | 0.7181 | 3.2113 |

Table 9: Results of Mann-Whitney Test Comparing Frequent and Infrequent Church Attendees

CHAPTER FOUR

Conclusions and Significance

Due to the fact that charitable giving and prosocial behavior are such prevalent actions, it is important to better understand what motivates individuals to donate their money and, thus, to engage in prosocial behavior. The purpose of these laboratory experiments was threefold: to isolate and confirm the presence of a warm-glow motivation, to analyze the effect of the public announcement of each participant's allocation decision on his overall level of charitable donation and his warm-glow motivation, and to analyze if self-perceptions are correlated with a participant's total level of charitable donation.

Past research related to the topic of prosocial behavior has focused on studying warm-glow and purely altruistic motivations and how variables like incentives, image concerns, and taxation affect these motivations. These past studies have found "that warm-glow giving exists and is significant," that "extrinsic motivations to volunteers can have unintended negative effects by crowding out image motivations to volunteer," and that "lump-sum taxes will, in general, only incompletely crowd out private giving" (Crumpler and Grossman 2008, Carpenter and Myers 2010, Andreoni 1989).

These economics lab experiments found that warm-glow motivations and purely altruistic motivations were motivations exhibited by those who participated in these

experiments. This result was obtained by comparing the amounts donated to CKBU in the traditional dictator game and the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game. The amount donated to CKBU in the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game represents warm-glow motivation, and the difference in the amounts donated to CKBU in the traditional dictator game and the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game represents purely altruistic motivation. This result is important because it shows that these economics experiments successfully replicated the work of Crumpler and Grossman and that the warm-glow motivation and purely altruistic motivation are variables that can be studied individually.

The second main conclusion of this thesis was that the public announcement of a participant's allocation decision did not affect his warm-glow motivation or overall motivation to donate to charity. These results were obtained using Mann-Whitney tests that compared the warm-glow motivation and total motivation to donate to CKBU between the Private without Representative treatment and the Public without Representative treatment. While the initial hypothesis was not supported, these results are still significant because they provide evidence that the setting and organization of a charitable event does not necessarily influence the amounts donated by those individuals who are present. Charitable events where donations are publicly displayed or announced will not necessarily raise more money than charitable events where donations are kept private because the public knowledge of an individual's donation amount was not found to play a role in the amount donated.

A second conclusion of these experiments was that an individual's prior knowledge of a charitable organization did not prompt them to donate more. While we did not specifically study whether providing background information about a charity elicits a higher donation than providing no background information, we can say that there was no correlation between previous knowledge of a charity and the amount donated. This means that it isn't necessary to try and garner monetary support and donations only from those individuals who are already involved in your charity or who have heard of your charity. Rather, it might be sufficient to provide them with information about your charity immediately prior to asking for money.

In comparison with the existing literature and research, this study was the first of its kind to analyze the manner in which the public announcement or public knowledge of an individual's allocation decision affects the motivations underlying prosocial behavior.

As these laboratory experiments were being conducted, data was gathered on two additional versions of the dictator game, the traditional dictator game with taxation and the Crumpler and Grossman dictator game with taxation. Future work will focus on analyzing this data in hopes of finding how taxation is related to warm-glow motivation, purely altruistic motivation, and an individual's total motivation to donate to charity. While most individuals do not view taxation favorably, it is possible that the tax itself affects or is affected by warm-glow motivation. One goal of this research is to determine whether individuals receive any warm-glow from taxation. The study of taxation in relation to charitable giving and the motivations underlying prosocial behavior is important because it could provide insight on how to best structure the tax system so to maximize outside donations to charity.

In addition to the analysis pertaining to taxation, we plan on conducting a field experiment that parallels the lab experiments discussed in this thesis. The purpose of this field experiment is to analyze how the physical act of volunteering affects warm-glow motivations, purely altruistic motivations, and total motivations to donate to charity. Previous research has shown that individuals prefer to donate their time or volunteer as opposed to donating their money, despite the fact that monetary donations are more beneficial to the charities. One way in which the field data will be analyzed will be to see if those individuals who have volunteered with CKBU donate less on the aggregate because they have already volunteered their time.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Consent Form

Baylor University

Department of Economics

Information Sheet for Research

PROTOCOL TITLE: Charitable Giving and Its Effects on Altruistic Behavior
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Rebecca Peirce and Dr. Jason A. Aimone
SUPPORTED BY: Baylor Undergraduate Research and Scholarly Achievement
Small Grant

Introduction

Please read this form carefully. The purpose of this form is to provide you with important information about taking part in a research study. If any of the statements or words in this form are unclear, please let us know. We would be happy to answer any questions. You have the right to discuss this study with another person who is not a member of the research team before making the decision whether or not to participate in the study. This experiment is being conducted by a research group that prohibits deception, therefore all instructions given to you associated with this experiment will be truthful.

Participating in this research study is up to you, and you may keep a copy of this form.

You may only participate in this study if you are at least 18 years old.

The individuals in charge of this study are Rebecca Peirce, a Baylor student, and Dr. Jason Aimone, a faculty advisor from the economics department.

Why is this study being done?

The purpose of this study is to study economic decision making.

How long will I take part in this research study?

We expect that you will be in this research study for 30 minutes, but the experiment could be shorter or longer based on the speed of each particular group of participants.

What will happen if I take part in this research study?

In the study today, you will first read instructions and then complete some economic tasks and record your decisions of a sheet of paper. The experiment will conclude with a survey, after which you will receive

your cash payments. All surveys and decisions in the experiment will be kept strictly anonymous. This experiment is being conducted by a laboratory that prohibits deception, therefore all instructions given to you associated with this experiment will be truthful.

What are the risks or benefits associated with taking part in this research study?

To the best of our knowledge, there are no foreseeable risks or foreseeable benefits to you as a result of participating in this study.

What alternatives are available?

You may choose not to take part in this research study.

Storing Study Information for Future Use

We would like to store your study information for future research related to economic decision making. We will label and store all your study information with a code instead of your name to protect confidentiality. Future use of study information is required for this study. If you do not want your information to be used for future research, you should not be in this study.

Study Participation and Early Withdrawal

Taking part in this study is your choice. You are free not to take part or to withdraw at any time for any reason. No matter what you decide, there will be no penalty or loss of benefit to which you are entitled. This will not affect your class standing or your grades at Baylor University. You will not be offered or receive any special consideration if you take part in this research study. If you decide to withdraw from this study, the information that you have already provided will be kept confidential. You cannot withdraw information collected prior to your withdrawal.

Will I get paid for taking part in this research study?

Your payment for participating in the study today will be based upon your complete participation in this experiment and the decisions that you make during this experiment. You will be paid a \$5.00 show-up fee and will have the ability to earn up to an additional \$10.00. You are entitled to receive the \$5.00, even if you do not complete the experiment. Any payments given to you will be paid in cash.

What if I have any questions or concerns about this research study?

You can call or email us with any concerns or questions about the research. You can email us any time at Rebecca_Peirce@baylor.edu or Jason_Aimone@baylor.edu or by phone via the Department of Economics at (254) 710-2263.

If you wish to speak with someone **not** directly involved in this research study, you may contact the Baylor University IRB through the Office of the Vice Provost for Research at (254)710-1438. You can talk to them about:

- Your rights as a research subject
- Your concerns about the research
- A complaint about the research

APPENDIX B

General Instructions for Private without Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Instructions:

You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. In the course of this experiment you may earn money, which will be paid to you in cash.

You have been given a piece of paper with a unique five-digit code number which will be used to identify your responses during the experiment. Your code number will be the same for all parts of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, a participant will be randomly chosen to roll a die to determine which part of the experiment will be paid to all participants. Only decisions in that part of the experiment will be used to determine payments in today's experiment. Earnings in the experiment are in "Experimental Dollars", referred to as E\$ in the instructions. Your E\$ earnings in the paid part of the experiment, that selected by the die roll, will be converted into US dollars at the rate of 2 US Dollars (\$2) for every 3 Experimental Dollars (E\$3) that you earn in that part of the experiment. Your US Dollar earnings will be paid to you in cash.

Keep the paper with the code number. You will use this number to collect your earnings at the end of this session.

For this experiment, you will be paired with a charity called Campus Kitchen. Campus Kitchen is an organization based at Baylor University whose work focuses on fighting food waste and hunger by reducing the amount of food that is sent to landfills and by providing cooked meals to non-profits. Prior to beginning the experiment, the proctor will be introduced and will give a brief overview of what Campus Kitchen does.

APPENDIX C

General Instructions for Private with Representative and Public with Representative Treatments

Instructions:

You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment. In the course of this experiment you may earn money, which will be paid to you in cash.

You have been given a piece of paper with a unique five-digit code number which will be used to identify your responses during the experiment. Your code number will be the same for all parts of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, a participant will be randomly chosen to roll a die to determine which part of the experiment will be paid to all participants. Only decisions in that part of the experiment will be used to determine payments in today's experiment. Earnings in the experiment are in "Experimental Dollars", referred to as E\$ in the instructions. Your E\$ earnings in the paid part of the experiment, that selected by the die roll, will be converted into US dollars at the rate of 2 US Dollars (\$2) for every 3 Experimental Dollars (E\$3) that you earn in that part of the experiment. Your US Dollar earnings will be paid to you in cash.

Keep the paper with the code number. You will use this number to collect your earnings at the end of this session.

For this experiment, you will be paired with a charity called Campus Kitchen. Campus Kitchen is an organization based at Baylor University whose work focuses on fighting food waste and hunger by reducing the amount of food that is sent to landfills and by providing cooked meals to non-profits. A representative of Campus Kitchen will be present today for the extent of this experiment. Prior to beginning the experiment, the Campus Kitchen representative will be introduced and will give a brief overview of what Campus Kitchen does.

APPENDIX D

Traditional Dictator Game Instructions for Private with Representative and Private without Representative Treatments

Part I: If Part I is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen.

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$8. Campus Kitchen will receive E\$2 from you.

Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room.

APPENDIX E

Traditional Dictator Game Instructions for Public with Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Part I: If Part I is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen.

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$8. Campus Kitchen will receive E\$2 from you.

Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will remove all the DECISION SHEETS from the box. The proctor will read aloud the code number on each sheet and will ask the individual associated with this code number to stand up. The proctor will then read aloud the amount of money that the individual elected to keep for himself or herself and the amount of money that the individual elected to give to Campus Kitchen. This process will be repeated until each DECISION SHEET has been publicly announced. The proctor will then take the DECISION SHEETS and calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room.

APPENDIX F

Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game Instructions for Private with Representative and Private without Representative Treatments

Part II: If Part II is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10.00 from the proctor.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some of the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen.

PLEASE NOTE: THE AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED BY THE PROCTOR TO CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL BE REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT THAT YOU CHOOSE TO GIVE TO CAMPUS KITCHEN. CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE E\$10, NO MORE NO LESS.

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$8. Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10: E\$8 from the proctor (the original E\$10 less E\$2 in response to your donation) + E\$2 from you.

Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room.

APPENDIX G

Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game Instructions for Public with Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Part II: If Part II is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10.00 from the proctor.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some of the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen.

PLEASE NOTE: THE AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED BY THE PROCTOR TO CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL BE REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT THAT YOU CHOOSE TO GIVE TO CAMPUS KITCHEN. CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE E\$10, NO MORE NO LESS.

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$8. Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10: E\$8 from the proctor (the original E\$10 less E\$2 in response to your donation) + E\$2 from you.

Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will remove all the DECISION SHEETS from the box. The proctor will read aloud the code number on each sheet and will ask the individual associated with this code number to stand up. The proctor will then read aloud the amount of money that the individual elected to keep for himself or herself and the amount of money that the individual elected to give to Campus Kitchen. This process will be repeated until each DECISION SHEET has been publicly announced. The proctor will then take the DECISION SHEETS and calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room.

APPENDIX H

Traditional Dictator Game with Taxation Instructions for Private with Representative and Private without Representative Treatments

Part III: If Part III is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen. After you make your choice, the proctor will always deduct an additional E\$0.75 from the amount you elected to keep and give that E\$0.75 to Campus Kitchen, in addition to the amount you passed to Campus Kitchen (if the amount you elected to keep is less than E\$0.75 the proctor will deduct that smaller amount instead of E\$0.75).

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$7.25 (E\$10 less the E\$2 you passed to Campus Kitchen less the E\$0.75 the proctor deducts to give to Campus Kitchen). Campus Kitchen will receive E\$2.75: E\$2 from you + the additional E\$0.75 the proctor deducted from the amount you chose to keep for yourself. Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room.

APPENDIX I

Traditional Dictator Game with Taxation Instructions for Public with Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Part III: If Part III is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen. After you make your choice, the proctor will always deduct an additional E\$0.75 from the amount you elected to keep and give that E\$0.75 to Campus Kitchen, in addition to the amount you passed to Campus Kitchen (if the amount you elected to keep is less than E\$0.75 the proctor will deduct that smaller amount instead of E\$0.75).

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$7.25 (E\$10 less the E\$2 you passed to Campus Kitchen less the E\$0.75 the proctor deducts to give to Campus Kitchen). Campus Kitchen will receive E\$2.75: E\$2 from you + the additional E\$0.75 the proctor deducted from the amount you chose to keep for yourself. Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will remove all the DECISION SHEETS from the box. The proctor will read aloud the code number on each sheet and will ask the individual associated with this code number to stand up. The proctor will then read aloud the amount of money that the individual elected to keep for himself or herself and the amount of money that the individual elected to give to Campus Kitchen. This process will be repeated until each DECISION SHEET has been publicly announced. The proctor will then take the DECISION SHEETS and calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room.

APPENDIX J

Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game with Taxation Instructions for Private with Representative and Private without Representative Treatments

Part IV: If Part IV is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10.00 from the proctor.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen. After you make your choice, the proctor will always deduct an additional E\$0.75 from the amount you elected to keep and give that E\$0.75 to Campus Kitchen, in addition to the amount you passed to Campus Kitchen (if the amount you elected to keep is less than E\$0.75 the proctor will deduct that smaller amount instead of E\$0.75).

PLEASE NOTE: THE AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED BY THE PROCTOR TO CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL BE REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT THAT YOU CHOOSE TO GIVE TO CAMPUS KITCHEN (OR WAS DEDUCTED IN ADDITION TO WHAT YOU CHOSE TO GIVE). CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE E\$10, NO MORE NO LESS.

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$7.25 (E\$10 less the E\$2 you passed to Campus Kitchen less the E\$0.75 the proctor deducts to give to Campus Kitchen). Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10: E\$7.25 from the proctor (the original E\$10 less E\$2 in response to your donation less E\$0.75 in response to the additional E\$0.75 the proctor deducted for Campus Kitchen) + E\$2 from you + the additional E\$0.75 the proctor deducted from the amount you chose to keep for yourself.

Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room

APPENDIX K

Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game with Taxation Instructions for Public with Representative and Public without Representative Treatments

Part IV: If Part IV is selected for payment, the following will be implemented for each participant in today's experiment.

Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10.00 from the proctor.

You have **E\$10.00** to be divided between yourself and Campus Kitchen. You must decide how much of the **E\$10.00** to keep for yourself and how much to pass to Campus Kitchen. You may elect to keep all the money for yourself and give nothing to Campus Kitchen, keep nothing for yourself and pass it all to Campus Kitchen, or keep some the money for yourself and pass the remainder of the money to Campus Kitchen. After you make your choice, the proctor will always deduct an additional E\$0.75 from the amount you elected to keep and give that E\$0.75 to Campus Kitchen, in addition to the amount you passed to Campus Kitchen (if the amount you elected to keep is less than E\$0.75 the proctor will deduct that smaller amount instead of E\$0.75).

PLEASE NOTE: THE AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED BY THE PROCTOR TO CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL BE REDUCED BY THE AMOUNT THAT YOU CHOOSE TO GIVE TO CAMPUS KITCHEN (OR WAS DEDUCTED IN ADDITION TO WHAT YOU CHOSE TO GIVE). CAMPUS KITCHEN WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE E\$10, NO MORE NO LESS.

Example: You elect to keep E\$8 for yourself and pass E\$2 to Campus Kitchen. You will receive E\$7.25 (E\$10 less the E\$2 you passed to Campus Kitchen less the E\$0.75 the proctor deducts to give to Campus Kitchen). Campus Kitchen will receive E\$10: E\$7.25 from the proctor (the original E\$10 less E\$2 in response to your donation less E\$0.75 in response to the additional E\$0.75 the proctor deducted for Campus Kitchen) + E\$2 from you + the additional E\$0.75 the proctor deducted from the amount you chose to keep for yourself.

Indicate in the spaces provided on the DECISION SHEET how much of the **E\$10.00** you elect to keep for yourself and how much you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen. *NOTE: The amount you elect to keep for yourself, plus the amount you elect to pass to Campus Kitchen must sum to E\$10.00.*

Once you have made your decision and recorded it on the DECISION SHEET, please place your DECISION SHEET in the box at the front of the room and then retake your seat.

Once everyone has made their decisions, the proctor will remove all the DECISION SHEETS from the box. The proctor will read aloud the code number on each sheet and will ask the individual associated with this code number to stand up. The proctor will then read aloud the amount of money that the individual elected to keep for himself or herself and the amount of money that the individual elected to give to Campus Kitchen. This process will be repeated until each DECISION SHEET has been publicly announced. The proctor will then take the DECISION SHEETS and calculate earnings and contributions to Campus Kitchen. Your earnings will be placed in an envelope marked with your five-digit code number. The proctors will calculate the total donations

to Campus Kitchen. After all sessions of this experiment have concluded, Baylor University will issue a check to Campus Kitchen for the total amount donated.

While the proctor is making up your envelopes, you will receive a SURVEY form. Please enter your code number in the space provided and complete the survey questions. When you have completed the SURVEY, deposit it in the box at the front of the room. You are then free to go. You may pick up your envelope as you exit the room.

APPENDIX L

Decision Sheet for Traditional Dictator Game and Crumpler and Grossman Dictator Game

PART X DECISION SHEET:

Code Number: _____

Before making your allocation decision, please complete the following short quiz.

Of her E\$10, Sarah passes E\$4 to Campus Kitchen.

1. How much will Campus Kitchen receive in total? E\$ _____
2. How much will Sarah earn? E\$ _____
3. Will any individual besides yourself and the experimenter know how much money you kept for yourself and how much of your money you passed to Campus Kitchen? Yes or No

Please record your allocation decision below.

Of your E\$10.00, how much do you wish to keep for yourself, and how much do you wish to pass to Campus Kitchen?

Keep for Self: E\$ _____

Pass to Campus Kitchen: E\$ _____

Total: E\$10.00

APPENDIX M

Decision Sheet for Traditional Dictator Game with Taxation and Crumpler and Grossman
Dictator Game with Taxation

PART X DECISION SHEET:

Code Number: _____

Before making your allocation decision, please complete the following short quiz.

Of her E\$10, Sarah passes E\$4 to Campus Kitchen.

1. How much Campus Kitchen receive in total? E\$ _____
2. How much will Sarah earn? E\$ _____
3. Will any individual besides yourself and the experimenter know how much money you kept for yourself and how much of your money you passed to Campus Kitchen? Yes or No

Please record your allocation decision below.

Of your E\$10.00, how much do you wish to keep for yourself, and how much do you wish to pass to Campus Kitchen?

Keep for Self: E\$ _____ - E\$0.75 = E\$ _____

Pass to Campus Kitchen: E\$ _____ + E\$0.75 = E\$ _____

Total: E\$10.00 = E\$ _____

APPENDIX N

Post-Experimental Survey

Post-Experimental Survey:

Code Number: _____

Thank you for completing the economics experiment. Please complete the following survey and return it to the proctor. Once you have turned in your completed survey, you may pick up the envelope labeled with your ID number, sign a receipt for your pay, and then you are free to leave.

For the following questions, please circle the one response that is most accurate in describing you.

1. Age:

- A. Less than 18
- B. 18-22
- C. 23-30
- D. 31-40
- E. 40 or above

2. Year in School:

- A. Freshman
- B. Sophomore
- C. Junior
- D. Senior
- E. Graduate Student

3. Gender:

- A. Male
- B. Female

4. Race or Ethnicity:

- A. White
- B. Black or African American
- C. Asian
- D. Indian or Pacific Islander
- E. Hispanic
- F. Multiracial
- G. Other, please specify: _____

5. What state are you from? _____

6. What subject(s) are you majoring in? _____

7. Aside from weddings, funerals, and mandatory chapel services, about how often do you attend religious services?

- A. Never
- B. Less than once a year
- C. Once a year

- D. A few times a year
 - E. Once a month
 - F. Two to three times a month
 - G. Once a week
 - H. More than once a week
- 8. What is the name of the religious congregation whose services you attend most often?**
- _____
- 9. About how often do you volunteer with your religious congregation?**
- A. Never
 - B. Less than once a year
 - C. Once a year
 - D. A few times a year
 - E. Once a month
 - F. Two to three times a month
 - G. Once a week
 - H. More than once a week
- 10. How would you describe your political views?**
- A. Very Conservative
 - B. Conservative
 - C. Moderate
 - D. Liberal
 - E. Very Liberal
- 11. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as which of the following?**
- A. Republican
 - B. Democrat
 - C. Libertarian
 - D. Independent
 - E. Other/None/Don't Know
- 12. Do you consider yourself to be a charitable or giving person?**
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 13. How often do you volunteer?**
- A. Never
 - B. Less than once a year
 - C. Once a year
 - D. A few times a year
 - E. Once a month
 - F. Two to three times a month
 - G. Once a week
 - H. More than once a week
- 14. Why do you volunteer? Select all that apply.**
- A. To help those less fortunate than myself
 - B. To fill my spare time
 - C. It is the "right" thing to do
 - D. To feel better about myself
 - E. Other(s): _____
- 15. When you volunteer, do you interact with other people?**
- A. Yes
 - B. No

- 16. When you volunteer, do you interact directly with those who you are seeking to help?**
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 17. Prior to today, had you ever heard of or volunteered with Campus Kitchen?**
- A. Yes
 - B. No

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