

ABSTRACT

Dissident Political Parties in China

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Although China is a one-party state, dissident thinkers have a long history in China and have even been encouraged by the Chinese Communist Party at specific times during the last century. In recent times, many of these thinkers have coalesced into dissident political parties. This thesis translates documents recently published by some of these political parties, and provides an introduction to recent dissident thinkers in China. It shows how modern dissidents have learned from the attempts of previous 20th century dissidents.

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DISSIDENT POLITICAL PARTIES IN CHINA

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
Baylor University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Honors Program

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Waco, Texas
May 2013

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CHAPTER ONE

Dissident Thought in the 20th Century

It is only in recent years that dissident thought has been banned by the Communist Party. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, there were several instances in which the party not only allowed criticism, but actually encouraged it. Many of these critics were not actually opponents of communism, but those who believed that the party had strayed away from the ideals it was founded upon. Starting from the end of its alliance with the GMD, the CCP went through waves of allowing criticism, followed by harsh programs designed to retrain the thinking of the intellectuals who had criticized the party. This cycle continued until the party decided that it could no longer control the intellectuals and that it would be better off without their criticism in the long run. With this cycle concluded, potential critics no longer had any reason to trust in the CCP and turned to more radical calls for reform and revolution.

Dissident Thinkers During the Early Maoist Period

In the early 1940s, the party first began its thought reform campaigns in Yan'an. Intellectuals were forced to analyze political speeches, constantly exposed to party dogma and propaganda, and were forced to submit worse and worse self-criticisms until they broke down due to the guilt and conformed to the party ideals.¹ These campaigns were originally carried out on all forms of heterodoxy, both the dogmatists and the radicals.²

¹ Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 19-20.

²² *Ibid.*, 20.

The intellectuals protested enough that the party eventually focused all its attention on them, ignoring corruption in the bureaucracy.³ However, because they still needed the intellectuals to win the heart of the people, they made sure not to completely write them off.⁴ In 1949, the Communists finally got what they were hoping for and took over the mainland China.

Mao and his thought process dominated this period of time. He believed that society was a process of continuous struggle,⁵ and so constant revolution and change in thought characterized this time. Mao believed that the party needed constant vigilance and re-examination to prevent the takeover of capitalist ideas by social organizations. He could see that as various groups gained power within society, they began to become corrupt and selfish, so his method of preventing this was a zheng feng or rectification process every couple of years.⁶ His Great Leap Forward was meant to raise the level of production in China to match the United States and Britain, but also served to put more proletariats in power.⁷ Even just after the Communist Party took over the government in 1949, they continued to implement reform after reform to try and keep the revolutionary spirit alive.⁸

³ *Ibid*, 33.

⁴ *Ibid*, 70.

⁵ Peter R. Moody, *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China*, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 43.

⁶ Kurt Y. Kuriyama, *Humanists and Technocrats: Political Conflict in Contemporary China*, Washington: University Press of America, 1979, 7.

⁷ *Ibid*, 8.

⁸ Jeffrey Kopstein and Mark Irving Lichbach, "China," *Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order*, 3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 271-319.

Directly after their takeover in 1949, the Communist Party relaxed its opposition to the intellectuals. They realized that as a new regime, they needed the intellectuals to fill all the positions they had traditionally occupied.⁹ The intellectuals were the people most capable of fulfilling the administrative duties and organizing the new regime while it stabilized, so they were necessary to the party. To ensure that the intellectuals wanted to work with the Communist Party, they loosened the controls and allowed them more freedom. This was to become a common strategy of the Communist Party.

In the early 1950s, the Communist Party had enough of a hold on the country that they were able to begin again implementing intellectual reform, this time focusing specifically on the intellectuals.¹⁰ Their previous experience with the GMD-era zheng feng movements in Yan'an gave them the experience to handle such large-scale reform.¹¹ During this period, the party used the method of trying to control the direction of scholarship as a whole while allowing freedom to individual intellectuals.¹² They hoped that by dictating what the intellectuals could study, but allowing them to write what they wished, they would encourage the intellectuals to follow the party line.¹³ They were never truly interested in the criticism produced by these scholars, but in winning over their hearts to the Communist Party ideals. The party managed to persuade most intellectuals to accept the political ideals of the party, but had yet to change their

⁹ Goldman, 87.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 88.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 89.

¹² *Ibid*, 108.

¹³ *Ibid*, 110.

intellectual patterns as a whole.¹⁴ The intellectuals still tried to remain separate from the party and insisted that intellectuals had a separate role in winning over the hearts of the people, as opposed to the governmental role of telling the people what to do.¹⁵

For two years, from 1954-1956, the Communist Party attempted to change the minds of the intellectuals with a radical process known as thought reform.¹⁶ Seeing that allowing individual freedom while simply directing the course of study was not leading to reform of political thought, the party knew that it had to take more extreme measures. Thought reform was the process by which the party would hold up one person as a scapegoat and censure him.¹⁷ The leaders would explain how some part of this person's thinking was opposed to the party's policy and use this to illustrate what the policy was. They then managed to foist the blame for recent problems onto the scapegoat by condemning him for his thought. This was one way to purge the intellectual class of any oppositional ideas.

Shortly after enacting this policy, the party realized the effects it had on the intellectual class. Fearful of the harsh consequences, the intellectual class avoided any innovative thinking, which the party needed if it wanted to modernize China.¹⁸ Therefore, the government implemented the Hundred Flowers Movement. This was a method by which the intellectuals voiced their dissident views so that the party could correct their

¹⁴ Goldman, 107.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 1.

thinking with persuasion, rather than intimidation.¹⁹ After a slow start, the counter-revolutionaries voiced their opinions on the amount of control the government had over the intellectual class.²⁰ The criticisms quickly gained momentum as intellectuals were not punished for their writings, and Mao himself even encouraged the writing. The criticisms grew to the point that the movement relapsed for a short period, due to the party's fears that the criticisms were getting out of control.²¹ When it began again, the criticisms came from those within the party, while those who were not a part of the party remained silent, due to fear of censure.²²

By the end of the year, the party once again reversed its position on dissident intellectuals. The party realized that the indoctrination had not been complete.²³ It had used the inner selfishness of the people to produce visible selfless, party-oriented actions, but this didn't actually produce a change in thought, which showed in the intellectuals' writings.²⁴ If the party had allowed the intellectuals the freedom that they craved, it would have shaken the foundations of the party.²⁵ Therefore, they attempted to put limits on the criticisms allowed and decided to allow counter-criticism from party officials.²⁶ Eventually, the party realized that intellectuals were the most dangerous group to the

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 158.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 159.

²¹ *Ibid.* 182.

²² *Ibid.* 194.

²³ *Ibid.*, 203.

²⁴ Moody. 57-59.

²⁵ Goldman, 203.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 205.

party and so they sent them to work on farms and in factories as a way to stamp out the elitism.²⁷

By the 1960s, the counter-revolutionaries no longer came from the older intellectual class, but from the students. The students found that the ideals they were learning about were not actually being practiced by the government officials and the school administrators, so they protested.²⁸ While Mao was out of town, Liu sent in work teams to try and soften the movements.²⁹ Because these work teams were unable to give specific answers to the questions that the students were asking, some began to doubt that the work teams were following orders from Mao.³⁰ When they learned that Mao did support the activists, the movements quickly restarted.³¹ With the support of Mao Zedong, these students were able to organize themselves and become an effective force against the corruption of the party. When he instituted the Cultural Revolution in 1966, these groups were fueled by indications that they were supporting this movement.³²

The Cultural Revolution

In 1965, Mao decided that the party needed a new rectification campaign to purify it. He called for criticism of Wu Han, who had authored “works implicitly critical of Mao’s policies,” and a five-man Cultural Revolution group was appointed to study class

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 240.

²⁸ Kuriyama. 24.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 25.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.* 26.

³² *Ibid.* 32.

struggle and report its findings to the Politburo Standing Committee.³³ Shortly after the Politburo Standing Committee session in which this was decided, Lin Biao threw the weight of the military behind Mao as well.³⁴ In early November, an article came out that challenged Wu Han, which the authorities in Beijing republished three weeks later.³⁵ In February, the Politburo received a February Outline Report from the five-man group that indirectly contradicted Mao.³⁶ On May 4th, Mao convened a Politburo Standing Committee Conference and at this conference, the party, at the suggestion of Mao, decided to repudiate the February Outline Report and dissolved the five-man group in favor of a new group in charge of the Cultural Revolution.³⁷ In June, Mao encouraged students to create “mass organizations,”³⁸ which attacked intellectuals in the schools.³⁹ Liu also sent out work teams to try to maintain order and implement the Cultural Revolution, while protecting the party apparatus by attempting to direct the attacks on cultural leaders, instead of provincial party leaders.⁴⁰ Mao preferred the use of

³³ Richard C. Thornton, *China: A Political History, 1917-1980*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, 279.

³⁴ Frank N. Trager and William Henderson, ed., *Communist China, 1949: A Twenty-Year Appraisal*, New York: New York University Press, 1970, 74.

³⁵ Stephen Uhalley, Jr., *A History of the Chinese Communist Party*, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1988, 144.

³⁶ Thornton, 280.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 282.

³⁸ Thornton, 283.

³⁹ Trager and Henderson, 76.

⁴⁰ Thornton, 283.

committees created within schools, rather than the work units and soon issued a demand to abolish the work groups.⁴¹

After the summer, Red Guards poured into Beijing and Mao convened the plenary meeting upon his return to the city.⁴² In the eleventh party plenum, they rearranged the party hierarchy, demoting Liu Shaoqi, promoting Mao's supporters and increasing the military representation.⁴³ The plenum also created a document providing the first guidelines for the Great Cultural Revolution.⁴⁴ This document established the students as the primary force of the Cultural Revolution and the thought of Mao Zedong as their guide.⁴⁵

At the mass organization rally of August 18th, the Red Guards in Beijing received approval from Mao Zedong, which caused this form of organization to spread across the country.⁴⁶ The Red Guards began to search through cities looking for those who opposed them, but were met with resistance by local organizations created to defend local leadership.⁴⁷ Provincial party leaders built up their own mass organizations, made up of workers and peasants, to protect themselves.⁴⁸

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 284.

⁴² Trager and Henderson, 76.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 77.

⁴⁴ Uhalley, 147.

⁴⁵ Thornton, 287.

⁴⁶ *bid*, 292.

⁴⁷ Trager and Henderson, 78.

⁴⁸ Thornton, 294-5.

By January of 1967, the public security forces of larger cities tended to support more moderate groups over the extreme leftists because they were easier to work with,⁴⁹ which prompted Mao's call for direct PLA involvement in the movement.⁵⁰ Many regional military commanders had previously issued nonintervention orders to their troops, which this order overturned.⁵¹ However, because of confusion on who were the genuine leftists, the military had difficulty figuring out which groups to support.⁵²

In the six provinces where the Cultural Revolution groups had taken control of the local power structure, they began to implement a new political structure for the revolutionary committees called the three way alliance.⁵³ This alliance was composed of members of extreme revolutionary organizations, PLA, and pro-Maoist party cadres.⁵⁴ The composition of these committees was largely determined by the military.⁵⁵

In July, the violence came to a head in Wuhan. Beijing sent Xie Fuzhi and Wang Li to manage factional disputes in the city.⁵⁶ A local military group instead arrested them and beat Wang Li.⁵⁷ Mao sent Zhou Enlai to rescue the pair and the regional military commanders were summoned to the capital to find a solution to the rampant chaos and

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 307.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 298.

⁵¹ Trager and Henderson, 78.

⁵² Thornton, 301.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 304.

⁵⁴ Trager and Henderson, 80.

⁵⁵ Thornton, 305.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 317.

⁵⁷ Uhalley, 151.

violence.⁵⁸ After this incident, Mao sped up the formation of the revolutionary committees, still with a heavy military influence.⁵⁹

The party began to try and implement normal activities as soon as possible, to prevent further conflict. The party encouraged the Red Guards go back to school.⁶⁰ By September, the last of the provinces implemented the revolutionary committees.⁶¹ At the twelfth plenary meeting, Liu Shaoqi and his supporters were expelled from the party.⁶² After this meeting, the military was redeployed to focus on national defense.⁶³

The Tiananmen Square Protests

The student protests of 1989 began as a demonstration remembering Hu Yaobing and calling for a reappraisal of the government's accusations of two years before. Two years earlier, Hu had not been as strict as the party would have liked in putting down student protests and so had become respected among students and intellectuals.⁶⁴ On April 15, he died of a heart attack, which provided an occasion for the protests to begin.⁶⁵ A week after Hu's death and the beginning of student protests, three students knelt in front of the Great Hall of the People, following an ancient Chinese tradition to present a

⁵⁸ Thornton, 318.

⁵⁹ Trager and Henderson, 82.

⁶⁰ Thornton, 326.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, 334.

⁶² Trager and Henderson, 86.

⁶³ Thornton, 336.

⁶⁴ Dingxin Zhao, *The Power of Tiananmen*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001, 146.

⁶⁵ Zhao, 147.

petition to Li Peng, who never came out to receive it.⁶⁶ Four days later, a newspaper published what later became known as the “April 26 Editorial,” which attacked the “illegal organizations” that used the excuse of mourning to cause chaos in the country.⁶⁷ The day after this editorial had been published, even more students took part in the protests, prompting the government to agree to dialogue with the students, under certain restrictions.⁶⁸

Although the students met unofficially with government officials a couple of times in the following days, the officials did not agree to the students’ three demands: that the dialogue be broadcast, that there be no retaliation on the part of the government, and for a fair reappraisal of the student movement.⁶⁹ Because of the lack of effective dialogue, many students came to believe that the government was not interested in talks.⁷⁰ This belief, combined with the waning interest of many of the students, convinced some radicals to begin a hunger strike,⁷¹ which made the government officials even more reluctant to continue talks, due to the embarrassment it caused for an impending state visit by Gorbachev.⁷²

⁶⁶ Zhao, 153.

⁶⁷ Theodore Han and John Li, *Tiananmen Square Spring 1989: A Chronology of the Chinese Democracy Movement*, Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1992, 15.

⁶⁸ Han and Li, 16.

⁶⁹ Han and, 17.

⁷⁰ Zhao, 160.

⁷¹ Zhao, 162.

⁷² Zhao, 164.

A little over a month after the protests began, the government declared martial law and troops began to move into the capital.⁷³ Violence began to break out between the troops and protestors, even as the protestors tried to convince the troops of their cause.⁷⁴ At this point, students from outside of Beijing began to pour into the city to support the protestors.⁷⁵

In the night between June 3rd and 4th, the military, following orders, began to encircle the square. Four prominent intellectuals made an agreement with the troops to convince the students to leave the square.⁷⁶ By 4:30, near the end of the time that the intellectuals had been given to convince the students to peaceably leave, the students finally agreed to withdraw, but the soldiers had decided to start their final movement and force the students out of the square.⁷⁷ Shooting began and people fled the square.⁷⁸ The next day even more people poured onto the streets to protest the deaths of the night before,⁷⁹ but troops fired shots into the air, and then the crowds, to try to disperse them.⁸⁰ However, with the square occupied by the military and the realization that the government was willing to send in troops to suppress the movement, the movement had

⁷³ Han and Li, 38-39.

⁷⁴ Han and Li, 39.

⁷⁵ Zhao, 187.

⁷⁶ Zhao, 205-206.

⁷⁷ Han and Li, 65.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Han and Li, 68.

⁸⁰ Han and Li, 69.

been effectively suppressed and within the next few days, the military left the capital, having halted the protests.⁸¹

Contemporary Dissident Groups

The documents in the next chapter have been published by various dissident political parties in China. Discontented with the Chinese Communist Party, various groups have formed to try and overthrow the communist party and establish democracy in China. These modern groups, however, differ from previous dissidents in the level of their organization. These particular groups and documents have been chosen as being archetypal of the attempts to form modern parties. The first document and group describe the recreation of a previously existing party. The second group of documents describes an attempt to form a political party within the current laws. The third group describes an attempt to form a revolutionary party outside the law. The last document is a criticism of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Nationalist Party of China

The re-established Nationalist Party of China published the first document, their statement of purpose, in 2005. The authors of this document argue that they are following in the footsteps of Sun Yat-sen, and that their goals are to “bring down the totalitarian restoration” and “to seek democracy, unification, peace, and development in China.” To complete their objectives, they are secretly reforming the Nationalist Party (Guomindang).

The Chinese Democratic Party

⁸¹ Han and Li, 75.

The next two documents are from the Chinese Democratic Party: the first from the united headquarters, and the second from the chair. The Chinese Democratic Party formed during a period of relatively relaxed control over intellectual debate, from September 1997 to mid-November 1998. Their goal was to transform China into a multiparty system and establish direct elections. The founders, many of whom were involved in the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, decided that their procedure would be to start with local preparatory committees and then, once there were several of those, to form a national preparatory committee. However, when they attempted to register the committees with the government, officials from the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing discouraged provincial bureaus from considering the requests and, when the dissidents continued to submit applications, eventually began arresting them. By January 2000, there were no more public statements by the CDP in China.

The first document describes the problems the CDP United Headquarters has been having with the various factions within the party. A group claiming to represent the CDP National Committee met in New York in April 2010, without the approval of the United Headquarters. In this document, the United Headquarters reprimands those who would act without the approval of the rest of the CDP, and states that they will work with those who established the committee, provided they allow themselves to be labeled as a faction of the party and not representative of the whole. The second document describes how the CDP is to permit every faction to publicly exist and compete, because the equality of all is a major democratic principle.

It is clear from these two documents that the party suffers from lack of national leadership. The groups claiming to be local branches of the CDP are only loosely united,

in that even the United Headquarters can only claim to represent the groups that “voluntarily gather under its banner.” This extreme factionalism originates from the process by which the CDP was originally founded: in local committees without a national committee to organize the various branches. Unfortunately this method of foundation appears to have been detrimental to the party’s success and is reminiscent of the Tiananmen Square Incident, which also suffered from a lack of national cohesion.

The Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party

The next two documents deal with the Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party. In the announcement of their founding, the preparatory committee stated their objectives as ridding China of the tyranny of the Chinese Communist Party, putting those responsible for crimes against humanity on trial, and establishing democratic government in China. To this end, they have described people as having the right to defend themselves against the Chinese Communist Party and to not obey their “evil autocratic” laws. The second document is their fourth announcement and, in it, the committee encourages more people to leave the Chinese Communist Party organizations and to secretly form small Revolution Party groups in discreet contact with the national group.

This party has a much more defined purpose and plan than the previously mentioned Chinese Democratic Party. In these documents, the Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party states that, unlike the CDP they are not attempting to form legally under the current Chinese government. According to these founders, there is no way for them to operate under the current government, so for them to attempt to do so is foolish. Instead, they label themselves as a revolutionary party, with the purpose of overthrowing the current government and replacing it with a democratic system, after

which they will change themselves to be a congressional party. The entire basis for the party is the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party, and after this overthrow, it will compete for leadership of the nation.

The Contemporary Dissident Movement as a Whole

Despite the disorganization on the national level and the secrecy required for any dissident political party in China, these groups are far more organized than any previous dissident movement in modern China. They have been forming branches all around the nation and are attempting to continue contact between the branches. Though there are problems with this model, as seen with the difficulties of the CDP, they are still able to maintain communication and spread their ideas.

Though I cannot say what will be the result of this dissident movement, I can say that it has more possibility than any other in the past century. Previous movements have either been the work of isolated intellectuals working under the guidance of the party, or of groups that have responded spontaneously to the circumstances at hand. These political parties have been formed with some foresight and have a plan in mind to reform the government. Based off of the plans demonstrated, they are not clearly thought out, but they have moved further than any other movement.

The important point to take from these documents is that they are learning from the mistakes of previous dissidents. Unlike the previous attempts, they have organized themselves. Instead of attempting to work with the party's facades of reforms, they are working outside of the party. From the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Square, they know that the government is willing to bring in troops and tanks to stop change. They have learned from Tiananmen Square that protests are not working and that any attempt

to change the government must be thoroughly thought out. The Chinese National Constitutional Revolutionary Party has learned from the experience of the Chinese Democratic Party that they will not be able to form a party within the current system and so they must work outside it. They are planning for the future, rather than relying on spontaneous action.

There is hope, in that people are joining this movement, despite the fact that there is no immediate impetus to action, as with the Cultural Revolution or the Tiananmen Square incident. People are joining this movement based on the idea of future change, which is more of an investment than instantaneous action. This implies a stronger interest in the success of the parties and a stronger desire to complete its objectives. While nothing may come of these political parties, they have proved that the revolutionaries are adapting and learning.

CHAPTER TWO

Modern Documents

The following section contains a series of documents printed by modern attempts at forming dissident political parties. The documents are presented first in Chinese, followed by an English translation of the same document.

Chinese Nationalist Party Re-established – Chinese Version

大中华民国九十四年、公元二零零五年四月二十三日，来自中国境内十七个省、市的十七名代表，代表各地「尊崇三民主义、认同第一共和」的秘密同盟会组织，在中华民国首都南京中山陵前，敬告中国国民党总理孙文：

为再造国民革命，推倒专制复辟；

为继共和之伟业，垂民国之正统；

为解中国人民长期遭遇专制复辟之苦；

为求中国的民主、统一、和平与发展；

谨遵「革命尚未成功，同志仍需努力」之遗教，

决重建中国国民党，以完成上述各项历史责任。

此布。

中国国民党（重建）执行局

中华民国九十四年、公元二零零五年四月二十三日公布

Chinese Nationalist Party Re-established – English Version

In the 94th year of the great Republic of China, April 23, 2005, coming from the seventeen provinces and cities within the borders of China, seventeen representatives

representing the secret United League organization "which exalts the Three Principles of the people and recognizes the first Republic" in the Republic of China's capital, Nanjing, in front of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's mausoleum, respectfully reported to the Chinese Nationalist Party premier, Sun Wen:

To again create a nationalist revolution, to bring down the totalitarian restoration;

To continue the Republic's great undertaking, to pass on the Nationalist orthodox;

To solve the Chinese people's long-term misfortunes and the agony in the totalitarian restoration;

To seek democracy, unification, peace, and development in China;

Respectfully follow the teachings of "the Revolution that is not yet successful, the comrades still need to strive" and decide to rebuild the Chinese Nationalist Party, in order to complete the aforementioned duty.

Announced by

Chinese Nationalist Party (re-established) Executive Bureau

The 94th year of the Republic of China, published April 23, 2005

The Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters (April 10, 2010) – Chinese Version

一、中国民主党全国联合总部认为：1998年夏秋开始，中国民主党已经正式在中国大陆成立了自己的组织，从那时起，一切个人的活动，无论他是什么人，什么“资格”，只要他声称代表中国民主党，他就必须要得到中国民主党组织的授权委托。代表他人，必须经被代表者同意，这是民主的基本原则。2010年4月3-4日纽约一些人士召开的“中国民主党全国委员会特别代表大会”，在没有得到海内外1998年来成立的任何民主党组织的授权委托下，个别人就自行声称“原先的……中国民主党等团体从此组建为新的中国民主党”，一笔否定、抹去了12年奋斗和存在至今的国内外其他全部中国民主党组织，这是

不合法理的，是以个人凌驾组织之上，片面代表”他人的，因此，由他们组建和领导的“全国委员会”、即“中国民主党全国委员会”所带有的强加于海内外全体中国民主党组织的“领导”性质，是中国民主党全国联合总部不能承认的。

二、中国民主党全国联合总部重申：2009年12月2日我们决议的与纽约“民主党全筹会保持善意友好与团结合作的方针，将继续实行，求得良性的共同发展，直到条件成熟时，通过平等的协商走向海内外中国民主党组织的全面统一。我们将知会美国国会、政府和欧洲各主要国家议会、政府，知会美国NED和台湾有关方面，也知会世界各主流媒体：“中国民主党全国委员会”是中国民主党内的一个新成立的兄弟派系，不具备领导中国民主党整体的性质；当然也知会他们，中国民主党全国联合总部也同样不具备领导中国民主党整体的性质，它只领导中国和海外一切自愿聚集到它的旗帜下的中国民主党组织和同仁。

三、辛亥革命百周年纪念日很快将要到来，这是向海内外广大华人同胞广泛传导民主共和，扩大中国民主党影响的好时机。中国民主党全国联合总部正在筹划发动侨界，开展超越党派的“走向共和、薪火相传，纪念辛亥革命百周年”火炬接力活动。中国民主党全国联合总部恳切希望和热烈地欢迎中国民主党全委会各地同仁，与我们一起携手，共襄这一深具历史和现实意义的盛举，高举共和火炬，促进中国政治转型的“颜色革命”，迎接中国第三共和的明天。

The Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters (April 10, 2010) - English Version

1. The Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters believes: beginning with the summer and fall of 1998, the Chinese Democratic Party had already formally established organizations of its own in China. From that time on, a person's activities, no matter who he is, no matter what his "qualifications" are, as long as he claims to represent the Chinese Democratic Party, needs to receive the authorization and trust of the Chinese

Democratic Party. To become a representative, he must be approved by those he represents; this is a basic democratic principle. On April 3-4, 2010, in New York, a few people convened a “Special Representative Convention for the Chinese Democratic Party National Committee,” not having received the authorization and trust of any Democratic party organization established domestically or internationally in 1998. They can unilaterally claim that “from the original...Chinese Democratic Party” they organized this new Chinese Democratic Party, “denying and erasing with one stroke of a pen the twelve years of struggle and existence of all the other domestic and international Chinese Democratic Party organizations until this day. This is not within the law. This makes individuals tower above the organization, unilaterally “representing” others. Therefore, the “national committee,” established and led by them, namely the leadership which they have imposed upon all the domestic and international Chinese Democratic Party organizations is what the national Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters cannot accept.

2. The Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters declares again: we will continue to implement the decision we made on December 2, 2009 on the policy to maintain good will and cooperation with the New York “Democratic Party Preparatory Committee” so as to obtain benign joint development, until the condition matures for the overall unification of the domestic and international Chinese Democratic Party organizations through equal consultation. We will notify the American Congress and government, the Parliament and government of every main European country, the American National Endowment for Democracy, and relevant Taiwan organizations, and also tell every mainstream media: “The Chinese Democratic Party National Committee’

is a newly established brother faction within the Chinese Democratic Party and does not possess the nature of leadership of the Chinese Democratic Party's whole body;" of course we will also tell them, the Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters equally also does not possess the nature of leadership of the Chinese Democratic Party's whole body; it just leads all the Chinese domestic and international Chinese Democratic Party organizations and colleagues that voluntarily gather under its banner.

3. The 1911 Revolution Centennial Memorial Day is very quickly approaching; this is a good time for numerous fellow Chinese countrymen, domestic and international, to extensively spread democratic republican ideas and to expand the Chinese Democratic Party's influence. The Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters now plans to mobilize overseas Chinese, to launch the Olympic torch relay that transcends the party line for the "walk toward the republic, the passing down of the torch, and the celebration of the 1911 Revolution Centennial." The Chinese Democratic Party United Headquarters wishes and enthusiastically welcomes the National Committee and the Chinese Democratic Party colleagues from all places to join us, hand in hand, in this great undertaking of historical and realistic significance, in raising the republic torch, in enhancing the Chinese government's "color revolution" transformation, in welcoming and receiving the tomorrow of the third Chinese republic.

Letter from the CDP Chair - Chinese Version

在中国民主党这个大屋顶下允许各个派系公开存在和竞争同时一个没有正气、没有灵魂的党，对于中国未来存不存在也就没有什么意义了。在中国民主党这个大屋顶下，允许各个派系公开存在和竞争，类似日本自民党的这种模式，可能是中国民主党今后组织发展的必行之道。以前我就提出过，查建国 2008 年出狱后我再次以书面方式提出过；2009 年 11 月

6-7日的所谓的“罗德岛神仙会”我也向与会的人提出，只是他们不以为然。在总部内部会议里我也多次提出和通过“圆桌会议”解决问题的模式（包括中国问题的解决），文斌这次再提出，我希望国内外党的高层领导人能够考虑并采纳。希哲先生目前特别强调的地位平等，是一个基本的民主原则，切不可忽视。希哲先生全部努力也仅仅在这一点上，任何个人和派系只要不凌驾于别人之上，同意在中国民主党这个大屋顶下，允许各个派系公开存在和竞争，问题并不难解决。这也是希哲先生长期坚持的民运原则：百花齐放，各显神通。我们应对希哲先生的正义和努力表示高度的敬意，而不能是非不分，对错不分，不要搞得坚持真理和原则的反倒有罪了，公然带头和坚持破坏民主原则的反倒有理了，那中国民主党也就没有了正气，一个没有正气、没有灵魂的党，对于中国未来存不存在也就没有什么意义了。

徐文立

2010年5月14日

Letter from the CDP Chair - English Version

Under its great roof, the Chinese Democratic Party permits each faction to publicly exist and compete at the same time, as a faction without integrity, without soul, and as far as China's future is concerned, it does not matter whether it exists or not. Under the great roof of the Chinese Democratic Party, permitting every faction to publicly exist and compete resembles the model of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party; it is possibly the path that the Chinese Democratic Party must follow in the future organization's development. I had suggested this before; after Zha Jianguo's release from prison in 2008, I again suggested in writing; at the so-called "Rhode Island Immortal Gathering" of November 6-7, 2009, I also made a suggestion to the attendees, but they did not think it right. In the internal meetings at the headquarters I made suggestions many times and approved the

model of “the round table meetings” for solving problems (including the solutions of the China problem). Wu Wenbin this time again suggested, and I wish that the Party’s high ranking leaders inside and outside the country could really consider and adopt it. The equal status Mr. Wang Xizhe currently emphasizes is a foundational democratic principle that must not be ignored. Mr. Xizhe’s whole effort lies in this little point; as long as any person and faction does not tower over others, the problems are not hard to solve; under this great roof, the Chinese Democratic Party agrees to permit each faction to publically exist and compete. This is also a democratic principle that Mr. Xizhe has been insisting on for a long time: let one hundred flowers bloom and let all perform their miracles. We should show a high degree of respect for Mr. Xizhe’s justice and striving, and should not fail to tell right from wrong, to distinguish right from wrong. We do not want to make those who adhere to truth and principles have guilt, or openly justify those who take the lead in undermining rational democratic principles. Should that happen, the Chinese Democratic Party would then be a party without integrity, without soul, and as far as China’s future is concerned, it would not matter whether it existed or not.

Xu Wenli

May 14, 2010

*The first proclamation of the “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party”
Preparatory Committee - Chinese Version*

(博讯北京时间 2010 年 7 月 12 日 转载)

暴政腐烂，民怨沸腾；狗官肆虐，民变蜂起；中共党心军心已乱，中国社会大变革数年之内爆发已具备现实可能性。为迎接这次具有历史里程碑意义的中国社会大变革，我

们决意组建《中国联邦宪政革命党》筹备委员会，筹备委员会的任务是，为二零一一年辛亥革命一百周年之际，正式成立《中国联邦宪政革命党》，进行全面准备。

关于《中国联邦宪政革命党》的宗旨、原则、任务、政策、组织等内容，请见附件中的“《中国联邦宪政革命党》政治意志宣示”一文（由袁红冰执笔）。在本公告中，我们只强调和重申下列各点：

（一）中共暴政已经彻底丧失政治改良的政治意志与政治能力，只有通过全民反抗和全民起义的民主大革命，才能摧毁中共一党独裁的权贵专制。《中国联邦宪政革命党》就是发动、组织、支持、协调、指导中国民主大革命的政治组织。

（二）运用人类理性和良知允许的一切方式方法，彻底否定中共暴政，创建民主宪政的联邦中国，还权于民，还政于民，还财于民，还地于民；推动设立特别刑事法庭，对中共官僚集团犯下的屠杀人民罪、奴役人民罪、酷刑罪、文化性种族灭绝罪、群体灭绝罪等全部反人类罪行，进行符合程序正义的大审判——这是《中国联邦宪政革命党》根本的政治目标。

（三）《中国联邦宪政革命党》重申人民的下述权利：

人民拥有在暴政前起义的权利。

人民拥有对中共及其官员的暴力镇压和非法压迫进行正当防卫的权利；正当防卫中对中共官员造成的损伤，是合法的。

人民的起义权和正当防卫权是合法的政治强制力，而不是所谓“暴力”。

（四）《中国联邦宪政革命党》强调下述理念：

中共暴政的宪法和法律，是代表中共官僚阶层利益的专制恶法，中共暴政的法律制度应当同中共暴政的政治制度一起彻底废止。有鉴于此，人民有权不遵守中共的专制恶法，而没有遵守专制恶法的义务；当中共暴政以专制恶法的名义迫害人民时，人民有权采取中共法律以外的方式，反抗迫害，维护自己的人权和其它权利。

(五) 《中国联邦宪政革命党》不是按照议会民主政党的组织原则组建和运作中国仍然处于极权专制之下，议会民主政治还是未实现的理想，议会民主政党式的组织没有完成否定中共暴政的历史任务的政治能力；《中国联邦宪政革命党》是依照革命党的组织原则组建和运作，唯有如此，才能完成此次中国社会大变革所要求的革中共暴政之命的历史任务。

(六) 《中国联邦宪政革命党》追求在中国建立体现主权在民”原则的民主政治，绝不运用革命的方式为自己夺取权力；否定中共暴政，创建民主政体的目标一旦实现，《中国联邦宪政革命党》将立即由革命党改组为议会党，并将执政的诉求置于民主政治的程序之下，由人民通过自由、公正的选举来决定执政者。

(七) 《中国联邦宪政革命党》追求废止中共暴政实施的高度极权的国家体制，在中国实行联邦体制，创建体现自由人民的自愿结合原则的联邦中国。

(八) 《中国联邦宪政革命党》的组织主体和主要政治战场始终在中国国内。

《中国联邦宪政革命党筹备委员会》

二零一零年七月十二日

*The first proclamation of the “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party”
Preparatory Committee - English Version*

(A reprint from Boxun in Beijing, July 12, 2010)

The tyranny is rotten; popular grievances are boiling over; dog officials are wreaking havoc; the people’s rebellion is swarming; and the hearts of the Chinese Communist Party and their army have already taken fright. In the next few years it is actually possible for great changes to occur within Chinese society. In order to meet the great changes in Chinese society, which signify a milestone in history, we decided to establish the “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party” Preparation Committee. The preparation committee’s mission is to make preparations on all fronts to formally

establish the “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party” in 2011, on the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution.

Concerning the content of the goal, principle, mission, policy, and organization of the “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party,” please see among the attachments “The Declaration of the Political Will of the Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party” (penned by Yuan Hongbing). In this announcement, we will only emphasize and repeat the following points:

1. The Chinese Communist Party’s tyranny has already thoroughly lost the political will and capability to reform politics. Only through the great democratic revolution of the entire people’s resistance and uprising can we destroy the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship’s privileged ruling autocracy. The Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party is the political organization to launch, organize, support, coordinate, and guide this great Chinese Democratic revolution.
2. Use all means allowed by human rationality and conscience to thoroughly negate the Chinese Communist Party’s tyranny, to found the democratic constitutional federal China, to return the land to the people, to promote the establishment of special penal courts, and to carry out great trials one by one in accordance with procedure and righteousness in regard to the crime of massacring the people, the crime of enslaving the people, the crime of torture, the crime of culturally annihilating the race, the crime of annihilating the groups, and so on and so forth, all the crimes against humanity that the Chinese Communist Party’s bureaucratic group has committed. This is the “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party’s” political objective.

3. The “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party” reiterates the people’s rights as follows:

The people possess the right to rise to righteousness against the tyranny they face.

The people possess the right to carry out legitimate defense against the Chinese Communist Party and its officials’ violent suppression and illegal oppression; the harm caused by legitimate defense against the Chinese Communist Party officials is legal.

The people’s right to rise to righteousness and right to legitimate defense are the legal powers to counterbalance the government, and are not so-called “violence.”

4. The “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party” emphasizes the following ideas:

The constitution and law of the Chinese Communist Party’s dictatorship is the autocratic evil law that represents the interests of the Chinese Communist Party’s bureaucratic class. The Chinese Communist Party dictatorship’s legal system and the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship’s government system should both be abolished. Because of this, the people have the right to not obey the Chinese Communist Party’s autocratic evil laws, and they don’t have the obligation to obey the autocratic evil laws. When the Chinese Communist Party persecutes people in the name of the autocratic evil laws, the people have the right to adopt measures outside the Chinese Communist Party laws to resist persecution and to preserve their own individuals’ rights and other rights.

5. The “Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party” does not follow the congressional democratic political party’s organizational principles to establish and to

operate under the totalitarian autocracy that China is still under; the congressional democratic politics is still an ideal yet to be realized. The organization of congressional democratic political party's kind has no political power to complete the historical mission of negating the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship. The "Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party" is established and operated according to the organizational principles of a revolutionary party. Only in this way can it complete the historical mission of putting an end to the Chinese Communist Party tyranny as demanded by the great changes in the Chinese society of this time.

6. The "Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party" pursues to establish democracy in China, which gives expression to the principle of "entrusting the people with sovereign rights." It absolutely will not use the revolutionary way of seizing power for itself. Once the goals of negating the Chinese Communist Party dictatorship and creating the democratic system are accomplished, the "Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party" will immediately change its organization from a revolutionary party to a congressional party and follow the democratic political procedures in seeking the power to form a government, letting people decide on the ruler through a free and fair election.

7. The "Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party" pursues to abolish the highly totalitarian national system implemented by the Chinese Communist Party tyranny, so as to create a federal government system in China and to establish a federal government of China that gives expression to the principle of the "voluntary unity of free people."

8. The main body of the "Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party" and the chief political battlefield, from start to finish, are inside the country of China.

The "Chinese Federal Constitutional Revolution Party" Preparatory Committee

July 12, 2010

*The fourth announcement of the preparatory committee of the "Chinese Federal
Constitution Revolution Party" - Chinese Version*

2010-07-27 23:13

《中国联邦宪政革命党》筹备委员会成立了。在此，我们向已退出中国共产党、共青团和少先队的志士仁人们发出以下公告。

自从一九八九年六四大屠杀后，许多正直的中共党员愤怒退出中共，而近年来有大量的人不断地退出中共及相关组织。你们是有正义理想的优秀人才，正在寻找报国的途径。

我们热烈欢迎你们参加《中国联邦宪政革命党》，为建立自由、民主、人权、法治、宪政、共和、联邦新中国而共同奋斗。

我们收到前中共党员、工程师李书忱先生来函要求以第一名普通党员身分加入《中国联邦宪政革命党》。我们热烈欢迎李书忱先生加入《中国联邦宪政革命党》。李书忱先生是《中国联邦宪政革命党》筹备委员会委员李凤智先生的父亲（李凤智先生负责筹划《中国联邦宪政革命党》情报工作的原则、策略和方法）。

退出中共及相关组织的志士仁人中必定有更多的人想加入《中国联邦宪政革命党》。我们号召中国大陆各地想加入《中国联邦宪政革命党》的人士秘密组织革命党小组，直接与革命党建立联系。为安全保密之故，各地革命党秘密小组暂不进行相互平行联系。

《中国联邦宪政革命党》筹备委员会

二零一零年七月二十一日

*The fourth announcement of the preparatory committee of the "Chinese Federal
Constitution Revolution Party" - English Version*

2010-07-27 23:13

The preparatory committee of the "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party" has been established. In this, we issue the following announcement toward the benevolent people of integrity and ideals who have already withdrawn from the Chinese Communist Party, from the Communist Youth League, and from the Young Pioneers.

Since after the great massacre of June 4, 1989, many upright Chinese Communist Party members have angrily withdrawn from the Chinese Communist Party, and in recent years a large number of people have continually withdrawn from relevant Chinese Communist Party organizations. You are people of outstanding talent with righteous ideals, now searching for an avenue to devote yourself to your country.

We enthusiastically welcome you to participate in the "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party," to struggle together in order to establish freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, a constitution, and a republic in a new federal China.

We have received a request in a letter from the former Chinese Communist Party member, the engineer, Mr. Li Shuchen, to join as the first regular party member of the "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party." We enthusiastically welcome Mr. Li Shuchen to join the "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party." Mr. Li Shuchen is the father of Mr. Li Fengzhi, a member of the "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party" Preparatory Committee (Mr. Li Fengzhi takes charge of planning the principles, strategies, and methods of the "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party's" intelligence work).

Many more benevolent people of integrity and ideals who have withdrawn from the relevant organizations of the Chinese Communist Party will surely want to join the

"Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party." We call upon the people of all places on the Chinese mainland who want to join the "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party" to secretly organize a small Revolution Party group, to establish direct contact with the Revolution Party. For the sake of security and maintaining secrecy, for the time being, the small secret Revolution Party groups of all places should not carry out parallel contact with each other.

The "Chinese Federal Constitution Revolution Party" Preparatory Committee

July 21, 2010

The Chinese Communist Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party- Chinese Version

现在，我们可以对中国共产党和中国共产革命作一个结论。这个历史的结论就是：

第一，中国共产党是在苏俄个境外颠覆势力的直接策划操纵，命令和指挥下建立与发展起来的，是国际共产专制复辟势力的一个部分。

第二，中国共产革命的前期，曾以俄式共产革命为榜样，后期则是打著共产革命旗号的，具有鲜明暴民运动特征的传统型现代农民造反。

第三，中国共产革命的对象非但不是专制统治和君主王朝，却是推倒了专制王朝，结束了君主制度，正在与形形色色专制复辟势力进行著殊死较量，并艰难地推进著民主进步的新中国—中华民国。

第四，中共建党以来做了如下几件大事：一是受俄命“参加”诱逼和破坏孙中山先生领导的中国国民革命。二是受俄命反对北伐破坏北伐和背叛北伐。三是受俄命发动武装叛乱和武装叛国，分裂祖国和制造两个中国。四是在国难当头和中华民族奋起抗战的历史岁月里，假抗日和不抗日真扩张和真卖国。五是在中国人民战胜日本法西斯侵略之后，迫不及待地发动内战，处心积虑地反叛民主化进程，并在苏俄的支持下，打赢了那一场意在

改朝换代的农民战争。六是在中国大陆建立了一个全方位的教政合一式专制复辟政权，为中华民族制造了空前的灾难。

The Chinese Communist Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party - English Version

Now, we can reach a conclusion about the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Revolution. This one historical conclusion is:

Firstly, the Chinese Communist Party was established and developed under the direct orchestration, control, command, and order of the subversive power of Russia, which is outside China. It was part of an international Communist power to restore autocracy.

Secondly, the early phase of the Chinese Communist Revolution was modeled upon the style of the Russian Communist revolution; the later phase was a traditional peasant rebellion under the banner of the Communist revolution, a rebellion characterized by a distinct mobster movement. Thirdly, the Chinese Communist Revolution's target, not only was not the despotic regime and the monarchical dynasty, but was in fact the new China, which had overthrown an autocratic dynasty and ended the monarchical system and is engaged in a mortal battle with various revived despotic powers and has been arduously advancing democracy —The Republic of China.

Fourthly, the Chinese Communist Party, since its founding, has done the following notable things: the first is to “join,” to tempt and force, and to destroy under the Russian command the Chinese people's revolution led by Sun Yat-Sen. Second is opposing the Northern Expedition, destroying the Northern Expedition, and betraying the Northern Expedition under Russian command. The third is, under Russian command, launching an armed rebellion and armed treason, dividing the mother country, and

manufacturing two Chinas. The fourth is that, during the historical time in which the homeland was faced with a crisis and China struggled to rise in the war of resistance against Japanese invasion, falsely resisting Japan and not actually resisting Japan, truly expanding and betraying the country. The fifth is that, after the Chinese people defeated the Japanese fascist invasion, they immediately launched a civil war, in every way deliberately opposed the process of democratization, and with the support of Soviet Russia, achieved a victory in the peasant war aiming for the change of dynasties. The sixth is that in mainland China they established a political regime which in every way made politics and religion one and restored autocratic rule, manufacturing an unprecedented disaster for the Chinese people.

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