

ABSTRACT

Waco Crime Trends, 1930 – 2013: A Comparative Study of Violent, Property, and Index Crime Rates

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This thesis examines long-term trends of violent, property, and index crimes in Waco between 1930 and 2013. Data were drawn from the Uniform Crime Reports for the crime rates of Waco, the United States, Texas, three major cities of Texas (Dallas, Austin, and Houston), and four neighboring cities of Waco (Bellmead, Robinson, Hewitt, and Woodway). While crime rates of Waco were higher than those of the U.S. and Texas when examined since 1960, the rates have been decreasing for the last twenty years faster than those of other cities as well as the U.S. and Texas. To explore whether the pattern of crime rates was related to community characteristics, Waco's social, familial, and economic statistics were collected using the decennial Census data. Being consistent with Social Disorganization Theory, findings show that the economic condition and family structure of Waco changed similarly to the crime trend. Implications of findings are discussed.

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WACO CRIME TRENDS, 1930 – 2013:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VIOLENT, PROPERTY, AND INDEX CRIME RATES

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

As I study Criminal Justice, the subject of crime in Waco was a common topic among my fellow students. In most circles, the consensus was often the same: crime rates in Waco were very high, or Waco was one of the most dangerous cities in Texas. Other times, my peers (especially those who grew up in high-crime places) would argue that Waco really was not that dangerous of a city. Even one of my first memories here, is of my cousin (who was also starting college at Baylor) telling me not to go anywhere by myself in Waco at night and to never roll my windows down when driving in the area. So just how high is the crime rate in Waco? Is it as bad as most tend to suspect? Is it even worse than what many think? Or is it lower than the common belief? Also, why are the crime rates in Waco the way they are? How did they get to that level? In order to answer these questions, I decided to conduct a study of the long-term crime trends of Waco between 1930 and the most recent year that relevant data are available for, which no one seems to have done to the best of my knowledge.

After this study began, it became apparent that much more than the crime trends in Waco would need to be researched. What would be the usefulness of studying the City of Waco's trends if there were not any others to compare Waco with? Ultimately, it was decided to also research the long-term crime trends of the United States of America; the State of Texas; three major cities in Texas (Austin, Dallas, and Houston); four neighboring cities (Bellmead, Hewitt, Robinson, and Woodway); and Baylor University

campus. This way, there would be many different ways Waco could be compared with other places in order to place Waco's crime trends in different contexts.

Furthermore, this project was started in the hopes of being able to gain a clearer and more accurate empirical understanding of Waco's crime, as well as to gain an understanding of why the crime levels are the way they are (whether that be high or low). It, therefore, became important to also research and collect data on the sociodemographic characteristics of Waco so that I may apply to the understanding of Waco's crime trends a major theory of community crime rates, Social Disorganization Theory, put forth by the criminologists Shaw and McKay. In their theory, Shaw and McKay argue that three community characteristics lead to higher rates of delinquency – low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and family disruption rates. Comparing Waco's sociodemographic trends with crime trends may help explore which characteristics contribute to crimes in Waco and even what could be done to decrease the crime rates of Waco.

After this introductory chapter, I start with describing methodological approaches I applied to this research project. In this chapter you will find my adventures into the world of research chronicled as I describe the steps I took to gather the data needed for this project. It will also include all successes in my research efforts along with the challenges/setbacks faced so that if anyone else decides to further this research they can hopefully learn from my mistakes and have a better understanding of how to gather this type of data.

In Chapter Three I will discuss the crime trends found for Waco over the last eighty years or so and compare Waco's crime trends with all other geographic units. I also attempt to explain possible interpretations of the crime trends observed, using

theories by prominent criminological scholars such as Gary LaFree and Robert M. O'Brien.

In Chapter Four changes in the crime rates of Waco will be compared with those of the U.S., Texas, and other cities. In Chapter Five, the Social Disorganization Theory will be discussed as well as other relevant theories and applied to the data on Waco's demographic characteristics. Then in the final chapter, I will synthesize the information presented in preceding chapters and offer potential policy suggestions as to what would contribute in the future to decreasing Waco's crime rates.

CHAPTER TWO

Methodology: Data Collection

To collect crime data for the City of Waco, I began my search on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's website¹ and looked up their Uniform Crime Reports (UCR): *Crime in the United States*. The annual report organizes the UCR statistics into different categories, by organizing them into tables. Among them, Table 8, "Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by State by City," included the so-called index crime statistics at a city level for each year. The last fifteen years were either uploaded to the website as an excel sheet or a pdf file. I downloaded the files and searched for Waco, after which I typed in the statistics for each year into an excel sheet that I had created. In the process of recording the data into the excel sheet, I added additional columns to the original nine I had for the years (1930 – 2013) and the eight index crimes: Criminal Homicide, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Burglary, Larceny, Motor Vehicle Theft, and Arson. I eventually had sixteen total columns: Year, Population, Violent Crime Rate, Violent Crime (total), Criminal Homicide subdivided into two columns of Murder & Nonnegligent Manslaughter (henceforth, "Murder" as the UCR calls it) and Manslaughter by Negligence, Forcible Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Property Crime Rate, Property Crime (total), Burglary, Larceny-theft subdivided into two columns of Over \$50 and Under \$50, Motor Vehicle Theft, and Arson.

¹FBI website: <https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications>

For the Year column, I set 1930 as the base year because this was the year the Uniform Crime Reports were first collected from policing agencies. I then extended the column all the way down to 2013, the most recent year, for which complete annual reports were available at the time of my data collection. The Texas Almanac² was used to look up each year's population size as determined by the U.S. Census. To calculate the crime rates, the following formulas were used: $\frac{\text{Violent Crime}}{\text{Population}} * 100,000$ and $\frac{\text{Property Crime}}{\text{Population}} * 100,000$. The Violent Crime total was determined by adding the data in the columns of Murder³, Forcible Rape, Robbery, and Aggravated Assault together for each year. Property Crime total included Burglary, Larceny-Theft, and Motor Vehicle Theft.⁴

Since the FBI website had only the most recent fifteen years available on the Internet, I turned to the Baylor library as a resource for finding the years between 1930 and 1995. The library only had the recent years as well which led me to look online through the library catalog. This eventually led to a link to the full text from the HathiTrust Digital library.⁵ This new library database had the majority of the missing years I was looking for, but required a lot of sifting through the numerous pages of each year's publication to find the specific data relevant to Waco.

²Texas Almanac: <https://www.texasalmanac.com/sites/default/files/images/CityPopHist%20web.pdf>

³Manslaughter by Negligence was not used in the calculations, as it is not included as a Part One Index Crime.

⁴Since Arson was not integrated into the UCR until 1979, for the sake of uniformity Arson was not included in my crime rates.

⁵HathiTrust Digital library: <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007406857>

When I began collecting each year's statistics, I was curious about exactly which year Waco started submitting their reports to the UCR. The HathiTrust database revealed that Waco had been submitting reports from the very beginning of the UCR in 1930. This was a pleasant discovery because it meant my research could include all of the data as far back as our nation had started keeping track of it, which would allow me to examine crime trends in Waco for the longest period possible in comparison with other geographic units at the national, state, and local level.

The main challenge I had in using the HathiTrust reports was that not every year was included between 1930 and 2013 for an unknown reason, nor was I able to search for Waco in the documents as the majority of them consisted of very small, nearly illegible print which could not be identified when trying to do a whole document word search. Another downfall I discovered was that the earlier years did not include a yearly total of the statistics, but rather only kept track at the quarterly level and in some cases at the monthly level. This made it more difficult for me to gather the numbers I needed as I found it necessary to add each quarter or month's rate together on my own. Eventually, however, I was able to find the reports, which included the yearly totals. Also, since it required Internet access to see the data, which was an obstacle at different points, I wondered whether the Waco library would have a hard copy of any of the Uniform Crime Reports. This idea unfortunately was not useful as after working with the Research librarian for several hours we were unable to find even one physical UCR document in the Waco library system.

Since neither the Waco library nor the Baylor library had the older Uniform Crime Reports, to solve the problem of the missing years in the HathiTrust database I

used Google to find another source. This led me to discover that the Internet Archives⁶ had nearly all of the years for the UCR, enabling me to collect the crime statistics for every year. The Internet Archives, however, was difficult to use as the website would change the order of the yearly reports each time I would close the window, go back a page or two, or allow my computer to sleep. This cost me extra time in opening each report to find out what year it was and if I had gone through it before. It was almost impossible to find one specific year as well as to determine if the Internet Archives had every year or not. I discovered this difficulty when I could not locate the Uniform Crime Report for the year 1974 on HathiTrust and thought I had gone through every year available on the Internet Archives. As it turns out, though, I had either missed it when going through the different years a few days prior or because of the shifting nature of the website had not realized that it was now in a section I had previously looked at earlier in that same session. However, within a couple of weeks, 1974 appeared after numerous search efforts, and I was able to fill in the year initially thought to be missing.

While gathering all of the data, I also looked for the crime statistics broken down at the community level. The Waco Police Department website⁷ provided the last five years worth of monthly crime statistics divided by “neighborhood.” Unfortunately, the majority of this information was not very helpful, as the categories of the crimes were not consistent with the UCR’s index crimes. For example, the page for January 2010 had two columns labeled Assault and Sexual Assault, whereas the UCR violent crimes include Forcible Rape and Aggravated Assault. Therefore, I could not use the statistics

⁶Internet Archives:
https://archive.org/search.php?query=uniform%20crime%20reports%20for%20the%20united%20states%20AND%20collection%3Aadditional_collections

⁷Waco Police Department: <http://www.waco-texas.com/police/police-crime-statistics.asp>

provided in the Assault and Sexual Assault columns because it could not be determined how many of the assaults were “aggravated” (as opposed to “simple”) or whether sexual assault referred to forcible rape or not (e.g., statutory rape, sexual battery, etc.). To solve this problem, I called the Waco Police Department in hopes of speaking with the person in charge of reporting the UCR data to the FBI. However, my phone calls only led in circles as I was transferred from person to person, and eventually I was only able to speak with answering machines, leaving messages which were not returned. I then obtained contact information of an officer in the Waco Police Department from one of my professors, Chief Yost Zakhary, who is the Manager and Safety Director of the City of Woodway (a nearby city). From this new contact I learned that the information I had previously found on their website was all they had available. After this dead end, I turned to the Waco City records to see if it held the information I was seeking.

I submitted a request to the public records forum for the Waco Neighborhood Offense Data for years prior to 2009, particularly the Index Crimes broken down at the neighborhood level. I also asked for the individual offense data including information about location – the zip code area where the offense was committed – as well as offense type for Waco for as many years as the electronic form of the data was available. This was intended to break down crime statistics at the zip code level so that they may be linked to the U.S. Census data on demographic characteristics at the same level. I eventually received an email back stating that they had reviewed their records and determined that there were no responsive documents to my requests. Shortly thereafter, I was contacted by the City of Waco City Secretary’s Office, who informed me over the course of several emails, that the information I was seeking was on the FBI website. She

also informed me that the only information they had on the specific crime statistics I was looking for broken down at a neighborhood level were the ones already available online. While this response did not prove to be more helpful than what I had previously learned, her email had a link to the FBI UCR data tool⁸ which turned out to be extremely helpful because it directed me to a section of their website I had previously been unaware of. This allowed me to search for local police departments and pull up the UCR information for as many years as they had available electronically. Using this method, I was able to more easily collect the UCR data than with any system I had previously used.

With this new method, I collected the data for three major cities in the State of Texas (Austin, Dallas, and Houston) as well as the data on the national and state level. For the United States and Texas statistics, the FBI provided the Index Crimes from the year 1960 onwards. For the local agencies, it provided the data from the year 1985 onwards. Since the UCR data tool only included the years 1985 onwards, I had to return to the previous methods I had used when gathering the statistics for Waco to collect the years between 1930 and 1985 for the major cities. Furthermore, using the data tool, I could also collect data for smaller cities (i.e., having a population under 10,000) adjacent to Waco: Bellmead and Robinson from the late 2000's onward and Hewitt from the late 1990's. Woodway, another neighboring city, was not included in the UCR database tool on the FBI website until 1999.

After collecting the national, state, and city crime statistics, I became curious about the campus crime statistics of Baylor University since the annual report of the UCR includes Table 9 "Offenses Known to Law Enforcement, by State by University and

⁸UCR Data Tool: <http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm>

College.” Between the FBI website’s Table 9 listings and the Internet Archives, I was able to find a little over thirty years worth of data. I also used the HathiTrust database and an actual hardcopy of the year 1976 that I found in the Baylor library collection to fill in the missing years. The year 1976 was the earliest record I was able to find that Baylor University submitted data to the UCR.

Due to being unable to find sufficient data on Waco crime statistics broken down at the neighborhood level, I decided to look at data on social demographics in hopes that it could potentially help explain why crime rates were higher or lower in Waco than the surrounding cities, Texas, and the U.S. I went to www.census.gov to see what type of demographic data they collected and after pulling up Waco in the Quick Facts data tool, I decided to collect the following categories: % Black or African American; % Hispanic or Latino; Homeownership rate; % Persons below poverty level; Median household income; % Female householder, no husband present; % Unemployed; and Divorce Rate.⁹ I set these categories into column one of a new spreadsheet and made a table that gave each of these categories six decades: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. The year 1960 was determined to be the starting year as the UCR data collected for the U.S. and Texas began that time. Only the year 2010 was available for most of these categories online under Quick Facts, so I turned to the published census archives in the Baylor library for the remaining decades.

In the archives, I looked in the volumes *Census of Population: Characteristics of Population* and *Census of Population: General Social and Economic Characteristics* for the State of Texas for each decade between 1960 and 2000. Using these volumes I

⁹<http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/4876000.html>

located the categories % Black or African American; Median household income; and % Unemployed for Waco for all decades from 1960 through 2000. For the two categories % Hispanic or Latino and % Persons below poverty level, I found the Waco data starting in 1970 through 2000. For the category % Female householder, no husband present, I was only able to find the years 1980, 1990, and 2000 using the Census volumes. Divorce Rate was also a category I did not find many years for, as I was only able to find 1960, 1970, and 1980. I was unable to find the Homeownership rate in Waco category prior to 2000, so I ultimately decided to leave this category out of my research.

As I had a few decades missing in different categories, particularly the Divorce Rate category, I turned to the Statistical Abstract volumes to see if I could locate the missing numbers. After searching through the Baylor library database, I was able to find the Statistical Abstracts from the years 1886 through the present in the Census database.¹⁰ However, after downloading the zipped files and searching through these volumes it was determined that each year was limited to the national and state statistics but not cities; and therefore was irrelevant to my search. The 2010 data from Census Quick Facts also failed to include the categories Divorce Rate or % Unemployed. I was unable to find the Divorce Rate statistic, but after searching Google I discovered the category % Unemployed for Waco in 2010 on the United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics website.¹¹

Another difficulty I encountered in the data from the 1960 volume *Census of Population: Characteristics of Population* was that the categories % Black or African American, % Unemployed, and Divorce Rate were separated into male and female total

¹⁰http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html

¹¹http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LAUMT484738000000004?data_tool=XGtable

statistics without the percent or rate calculated. So to match the data I was able to find in the other volumes and online, I used the following formulas to calculate the numbers I needed:

$$\frac{(\text{male African Americans} + \text{female African Americans})}{(\text{Waco population})} * 100 = \% \text{ Black or African American}$$

$$\frac{(\text{males in CLF unemployed} + \text{females in CLF unemployed})}{(\text{males in civilian labor force (CLF)} + \text{females in CLF})} * 100 = \% \text{ Unemployed}$$

$$\frac{(\text{divorced males} + \text{divorced females})}{(\text{males ever married} + \text{females ever married})} * 100 = \text{Divorce Rate}$$

I calculated the percentages for the decades 1970, 1980, and 1990 for the categories % Black or African American; % Hispanic or Latino; and % Female householder, no husband present (only 1980 & 1990). Fortunately, these categories were no longer divided into male and female statistics. For the divorce rate statistics from 1970 and 1980 I calculated the rate as shown above, but eliminated the step of adding male and female statistics together as that was already done for me.

After collecting all of these statistics for Waco, I grouped the different categories into three groups of racial, economic, and familial demographics. I then took each group and chartered their statistics in a figure along with the property and violent crime statistics of Waco so that they could be directly compared to one another. To do this, I added two rows to my new spreadsheet and typed in the appropriate crime statistics for only the decade years. However, since the violent and property crime numbers were so much higher than the demographic statistics I had collected, I divided the violent crime numbers by 100 and property crime numbers by 1000 to make them equivalent with the demographic statistics. This step was necessary in order that the demographic statistics could be compared on a chart with all other numbers on an equal x-axis and y-axis. My

finished product was three figures labeled Waco Heterogeneity vs. Violent and Property Crime which included the two racial categories; Waco Family Disruption vs. Violent and Property Crime which included the categories % Female householder, no husband present and Divorce Rate; and Waco Economic Demographics vs. Violent and Property Crime which included the categories Median household income, % Unemployed, and % Persons below poverty level.

CHAPTER THREE

Waco Crime Trends, 1930 – 2013

Crime Rates in Waco, 1930 – 2013

The City of Waco has participated in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program since it was launched in 1930. Because Waco reported their crime statistics from the beginning, we can examine the crime trends of the last eight decades separately for violent, property, and index offenses. Overall, crime rates in Waco were relatively steady between 1930 and the early 1950s, when there began a long-term increase of almost every type of crime until the late eighties and early nineties. We then see a rather unexpected change in the crime rates, quite contrary to some scholars' prediction of crime trends in the United States entering a new millennium (Haberman, 2014): Crime has been steadily falling since the early nineties, with only a few minor upsurges.

Violent crimes are committed substantially less often than property crimes, and the index crimes are a compilation of violent and property crimes. As a result, the index crime trends always reflect property crime trends more than violent. As can be seen in Figure 1, the index crime rates of Waco are almost an exact replica of the property crime rates. Because, both the property and index crime rates completely eclipse the violent crime rates as to make them appear almost flat in comparison, I multiplied the violent crime rates by ten, so that Figure 1 could show each trend in a comparable manner. So even though violent crimes are much lower in quantity and thus rate, all types of crime committed in Waco have similar trends. It can therefore be implied that the explanations

behind the main changes in the crime rates are to be applicable to both violent and property types of crime throughout the period.

Between 1958 and 1976, violent crimes of the UCR included an offense category known as Manslaughter by Negligence, but it was removed from the UCR to only include the offense of Murder & Nonnegligent Manslaughter beginning in 1977. However, adding in the extra offense did not change the overall crime trend picture as the amount of the particular offense reported ranged from zero to nineteen in any given year they were included (see Figure 1a). Because the offense categories of Robbery and Aggravated Assault had a much higher rate in those same years than Manslaughter by Negligence, the effect Manslaughter by Negligence had on the trends was almost ignorable. Therefore, I chose not to include Manslaughter by Negligence in my overall violent crime rate calculations for consistency across years.

As mentioned above, the crime rates before 1950 remained relatively low and steady without showing any noticeable change, but they are worth briefly discussing. It is interesting to note that property crime rates were slightly higher during the 1930s than the 1940s, whereas violent crimes were slightly lower during the same period (see Figure 1). The former was consistent with what would have been predicted given the economic hardship during the Great Depression of the thirties and World War II of the early forties, which, ironically, boosted our economy. On the other hand, it is interesting to see the reversed pattern for violent crimes: that is, violent crime rates were lower during the Great Depression than the war time when many members of crime-prone age groups (i.e., ages 18 to 25) were in the military.

The second half of the nineteen hundreds, however, can arguably be the most important time period for the U.S. crime trends as the change in crime rates were quite drastic. From 1951 through 1994, there was an overall long-term increase in the violent crime rates and from 1951 through 1988 property crime rates also increased long-term (see Figure 1). Most intriguing fact about this time period is that after the increase in both violent and property crime rates there was a sudden change of direction, that is, a decrease in both types of crime during the remainder of the nineties and into the new millennium. What might have caused such a long-term increase in crime? Why did it last for only forty years? What happened in the nineties or prior to this period, which allowed for such a dramatic drop in the crime rates that continues even today? Before answering these questions, it is necessary to compare Waco and a variety of other geographic units to see whether the observed trends are unique to Waco or not. Specifically, I compare Waco with the United States, the State of Texas, three major cities of Texas (Austin, Dallas, and Houston), four neighbor cities of Waco (Bellmead, Hewitt, Robinson, and Woodway), and Baylor University campus.

Waco versus the United States and Texas

The sixties and seventies seemed an unsettling time for Waco compared to the United States and Texas.¹ The violent crime trend for Waco had three separate noticeable surges in the crime rate compared to the generally steady increase of the United States and Texas. While Waco's crime rate was increasing overall during these years, Figure 2a shows three instances where Waco's trend deviated from those of the U.S. and Texas. The observed difference might be due simply to the fact that Waco

¹Comparisons start in the year 1960 as data prior to year 1960 were not as reliable for the United States and Texas

crime trend is based on only one city, whereas, both Texas and the United States' trends are a combination of many different geographic units' (including cities) trends. That is, one city such as Waco is more likely to show fluctuating crime rates than the national and state trends that combine fluctuating crime rates of different places, which would cancel each other out and result in a less fluctuating or smoother pattern. The property crime trend of Waco also shows a couple of big surges in the late seventies when the U.S. and Texas were just steadily increasing (see Figure 2b). The index crime trend of Waco follows the Waco property crime trend as expected and has a few surges; whereas, the U.S. and Texas index crime trends just steadily increase in the seventies (Figure 2c).

The main point of interest in the crime trends was during the second half of the nineteenth century, when there was a sharp rise and fall of all types of crime in the eighties and nineties, respectively. Waco had a drastic rise in violent crime as well as property crime during the eighties, as did the United States and Texas. Then, in the early to mid-nineties, specifically 1994 for Waco and 1991 for the U.S. and Texas, violent crime rates started decreasing. Property crime rates, however, started decreasing in 1988 for Waco and Texas, and 1991 for the U.S. This observation tends to suggest consistent rather than different crime trends across Waco, the United States, and Texas, while Waco's rate of increase and decrease tends to be larger (i.e., steeper) than the U.S. and Texas. Because the trends are generally consistent across the three geographic units, possible explanations for the increase and decrease in the crime rates might apply to all three of them. In other words, if we had just seen Waco having the large increase in crime and found that the U.S. and Texas did not increase during the same time period, then we would focus on finding more of local, Waco-specific reasons for changes in

crime rates. However, since we saw the similar trends across the Nation, we can focus on reasons that would apply to the whole nation.

Waco versus Three Major Cities of Texas: Austin, Dallas, and Houston

The violent and property crime trends of Austin, Dallas, Houston, and Waco were also very similar to each other. All four cities had relatively steady crime rates throughout the thirties, forties, and fifties. All four began rising in the sixties as was the case with the U.S. as well as Texas; and all four cities began sharply decreasing in the nineties (see Figures 3a and 3b). Waco is more comparable to Houston and Dallas than Austin in the crime trends. It was interesting to see that Waco and Austin were the most different when the two cities are the closest geographically of the four. Perhaps Austin did not have as drastic increases and decreases in crime as Waco because it is the state capitol and therefore more stable, as the state would put a higher emphasis on controlling crime rates in the capitol. Furthermore, it was interesting to note that Waco had the same high spike and subsequent fall in crime rates as Dallas and Houston. This further supports the idea that whatever caused crime to start increasing in the sixties and then drop in the nineties was big enough in scale to affect several large cities in the same manner, though they are demographically different.

Waco versus Bellmead, Hewitt, Robinson, Woodway, and Baylor Campus

I first compare Waco with Bellmead in violent and property crime trends before doing the same for the other cities (Hewitt, Robinson, and Woodway) and Baylor University campus because Waco and Bellmead are more similar in crime rates to each other than the others and thus graphs were drawn separately for the two comparisons. In

1985, Waco's violent crime rates were going up, but have steadily been coming down since 1994 as we saw in other geographical units above. Bellmead's, on the other hand, spiked up, after rapidly dropping in the late eighties, and show generally increasing trends since 2001 (see Figure 4a). This is a complete opposite to Waco's trends. The property crime trends also show the same: that is, property crime rates have consistently declined in Waco since 1988, whereas they have been generally increasing in Bellmead overall since 1990 after a brief drop between 1987 and 1990 (Figure 4b). This is very interesting given that Waco and Bellmead are located right next to each other. This means one cannot use different geographical locations as the explanation for the different crime trends. Perhaps it might be due to different policing practices or socio-economic conditions, which requires further investigation.

Other cities next to Waco have very similar crime trends not only to each other but also to Waco. Robinson and Hewitt had very large spikes in violent crime in the early nineties that match with Waco's high spike in violent crime, while Baylor University campus shows a different trend, spiking in the early eighties (see Figure 4c). Hewitt, Robinson, and Woodway's violent crime rates stayed relatively steady after they levelled out from the drop in late nineties, but in Waco's rates we see a continual decrease. Baylor University campus is not very similar to Waco as instead of a steady decrease, Baylor actually has a relatively flat violent crime rate with little movement through the nineties and two thousands.

However, for the property crime trends, Waco is actually very comparable with Baylor campus as well as Robinson and Hewitt, as all follow the overall decreasing pattern since the nineties (see Figure 4d). Woodway, however, is not as comparable with

Waco because it has a relatively steady trend through the 2000s and not an overall decreasing pattern. During the first few years of the millennium, Waco and Baylor experience a small rise in the property crime trends, before both continue decreasing thereafter. Woodway also follows this small pattern of Waco's during the first couple of years of the new millennium. Currently, Waco's property crime trends are still steadily dropping and this pattern can also be seen in Baylor campus and Hewitt's property crime trends. Woodway and Robinson, however, have started a small upward turn in the last couple of years.

Possible Explanations for Crime Trends

Waco's crime trends have been found to be generally similar to those of the United States and most other comparison units. This allows me to apply what previous researchers have developed to explain the United States' crime trends to Waco's crime trends. There are a couple of theories that I found to be the most applicable when explaining the increase in crime rates. One theory, by Robert M O'Brien (2003), suggests that the increase in crime is partially due to the changes in reporting and the better efficiency of recording and reporting crimes. The other theory, by Gary LaFree (1998), suggests that the rise in crime is due to the breakdown of social institutions in the United States.

First, in his article "UCR violent crime rates, 1958 – 2000: recorded and offender-generated trends," O'Brien (2003) points out that the homicide crime rates did not change overly much during the 1970s to 1990s period, whereas the crime rates of rape, robbery, and aggravated assault increased steadily throughout this period. The significance of this argument is that if some external reason was causing crime rates to increase everywhere,

the rates of homicides should have increased in the same way. O'Brien's argument is supported by Figure 5, which depicts Waco's violent crime's individual rates. Whereas there is an increase for Waco's violent crime rates overall, there is not a clear trend for Waco's homicide rates between 1970 and 1990. The homicide rates go up and down with only a slight increase overall. To even notice this trend, however, I had to multiply the homicide crime rate by a constant, 50, for each year, so that the graph created would be comparable with the other violent crimes. I also multiplied the forcible rape rate by 10 for each year and the robbery rate by five. Between 1970 and the 1990s, there was a major increase in all three categories of forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Therefore, the homicide crime rate of Waco did not change as much as the other violent crime rates.

These violent crime rates reveal, as O'Brien suggested, that the sudden increase in rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults had more to do with the increased efficiency of reporting than with an actual increase in crime. Since homicides are the least likely crime to go unreported or unnoticed, it is highly unlikely if all violent crimes were increasing that homicides would not be reported. O'Brien goes on to point out, the "Justice Department embarked on a major effort to help local police departments improve their record-keeping, and officers on the beat began spending more time on paperwork" between 1973 and 1988, which just happens to line up perfectly with the increase in violent crime rates (p. 505). His argument might also extend to property crime rates. That is, it is possible that the increased efficiency in reporting might have attributed to the large increase in property crimes as well. But because, there is not a clear way to prove this, O'Brien's argument may apply only to violent crime rates.

One of the most interesting theories regarding the rise in the overall crime rates was proposed in a study conducted by Gary LaFree (1998) on the collapse of social institutions across the United States. He defines an institution as a “patterned, mutually shared way that people develop for living together” which can be seen in political, economic, or familial structures. In his book, *Losing Legitimacy: Street Crime and the Decline of Social Institutions in America*, LaFree (1998) first established that there are three main postwar periods of crime rates: “an early period (1946 – 1960) with stable, low crime rates; a middle period (1961 – 1973) with rapidly accelerating crime rates; and a late period (after 1973) with stable, high crime rates” (p. 6). He used data from several different sources such as the UCR and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to gather information on the crime trends of the United States.

Analyzing the data, he was able to review gender/race characteristics and concluded that any plausible explanation of the crime trends must explain why the crime rates for young, black males were so much higher than others of the same age but of a different race. He explains this through one of his theories that the legitimacy of economic institutions have left behind a large portion of the African Americans in their improvements, which causes some to have no recourse but to repeatedly commit crimes. He further argues that political institutions affect crime rates through the periods of political distrust, as can be seen by the higher crime rates in the 1960s and 1970s. As seen in this time period, there was a great deal of social/political unrest due to the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War. Therefore, LaFree argues, when the public is generally satisfied with the government’s actions, the crime rates are lower.

Families also influence crime rates through their ability to directly influence the individual. LaFree suggests that there was a strong push for individualism in the post war period (seen through the hippie and feminist movements) that affected the family structure across the board. As divorce became more acceptable throughout the nation in the 1970s and after California instituted the first “no fault” divorce laws, the amount of single parents skyrocketed (p. 142). LaFree directly correlates this breakdown in the familial institution to higher crime rates, because the people who are unhappy with their home life (especially children from broken homes) will be more likely to commit an offense. LaFree concludes his book by suggesting that the fastest way to reduce crime is to increase the trust in political institutions, reduce economic inequality (especially for African Americans), and renew the family structure.

After focusing on what could have caused the crime trends to go up, it is interesting to note the theories behind why the crime rates have dropped so drastically in the last twenty years. In his article “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not,” Economist Steven D. Levitt (2004) suggests that the main reasons crime declined so rapidly is due to the increase in the number of police, the rise in prison population, the receding crack epidemic, and the legalization of abortion. Levitt first argues that the “number of police affects the amount of crime, but the amount of crime also affects the number of police” (p. 176). As the public perceived a large increase of crime, the government and politicians responded by adding more funding to police departments, which allowed police departments to increase in size and directly affected their presence on the street. Just their presence alone would deter crime, which is why Levitt argues this factor as a main reason for the drastic drop in

crime rates. Secondly, he argues that the increased incarceration rates removed the perpetrators committing the crimes from the public presence as well as acting as a deterring effect. Because the increase in the prison population during the 1980s and 1990s rose drastically and the government incarcerated over a million people, this factor is another large cause of the crime rate drop in the 1990s (p. 177).

The third factor Levitt found to likely have an effect on the crime drop was the receding amount of crack being sold in the 1990s. The crack market created large amounts of gang violence in the 1980s after it was introduced and accounted for a large number of male homicides under the age of 25. So as this market decreased, the amount of homicides being committed also decreased. For his final factor, Levitt argues that the legalization of abortion attributed to a large portion of the drop in crime rates. He points out that abortion led to a “reduction in the number of unwanted births” and that “unwanted children are at greater risk for crime” (2004, p. 182). Therefore, when the amount of unwanted children began decreasing, the amount of crimes these children would have possibly committed did not happen, thereby causing a decrease in the crime rates. He also points out that there was a large decline in infanticide as well after abortion was legalized. Levitt concludes his article with the assumption that only increases in police forces and the continuation of abortion will lead to further declines in crime rates, as prison populations and the crack market have stabilized.

Two other theories introduced in Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman’s edited book *The Crime Drop In America* (2006) look at policing and economic opportunity. In the chapter about the role of policing, John E. Eck and Edward R. Maguire explain that changes have been made in policing in the last fifty years by putting a greater emphasis

on having more officers in the field, better community policing, and zero-tolerance policing. However, some critics argue that better community and zero-tolerance policing will not have long-term effects on the decline of crime rates. Increasing police presence seems to be the only option likely to have any relevant effect on crime rates (as pointed out by Levitt above). Unfortunately, researching police numbers to help prove this argument is almost impossible, according to Eck and Maguire, as the data available is extremely inaccurate and therefore it is hard to say.

In another chapter, Jeff Grogger proposed more of a believable thesis in his discussion on economics. He argues that because most crimes are committed for economical purposes, having shifts in the economic markets such as the introduction of crack and the rise and fall of wages could easily explain why crime was stable in the 1940s and 1950s with a good economy and better wages. Additionally, the sharp rise of crime as crack came onto the scene and wages fell in the 1960s – 1980s and when crack started to decrease from the market as well as the increase of wages in the late 1980s – 1990s, there was a sharp decrease in crime.

While largely speculative, it is possible that some of the theories mentioned above such as the rise and decline of crack, legalized abortion, and increased incarcerations might also have had impacts on the Waco crime trends specifically. Crack could have accounted for a portion of the rise of violent crimes in Waco in the seventies and eighties. While if there was an increase in the rate of abortions and incarcerations in Waco, these theories could be an explanation for the dramatic decrease of crime rates in the nineties. However, the theories that can help continue the decrease in crime seen in Waco over the last twenty years are the suggestions of increasing the number of police, working on

helping to restore familial institutions, and raising wages. Altogether, these different theories help highlight possible explanations for why crime increased so drastically during the sixties through the end of the eighties as well as provide possible explanations for the rapid decrease in the crime trends.

CHAPTER FOUR

Rate of Change in Crime Rates of Waco, 1960 – 2013

Waco versus the United States and Texas

As shown in Figure 2a, Waco has had higher violent crime rates than those of the United States and Texas until recently. Specifically, since 1960 Waco has consistently had higher rates of violent crimes in the last fifty years or so (see Table 1). However, in 2013 Waco's violent crime rate (404) decreased to the level of Texas (400), while being higher than the rate of the U.S. (368). Between 1960 and 1994, when the violent crime rate of Waco reached a peak, Waco's violent crime rates increased by more than threefold (347.60%), which was also the case with the U.S. (343.60%) and Texas (338.68%) as shown in Table 3a. So even though Waco showed a consistently higher violent crime rate than the U.S. and Texas during this period, the rate of increase in the violent crime rate was actually not much higher than the U.S and Texas. Additionally, as Table 3b shows, a reduction in the violent crime rates of Waco (1,212) between 1994 and 2013 was more than four times faster than that of the U.S. (346) and Texas (307). Reduction equals the difference between the crime rates of the two years being compared. So for example: Waco's violent crime rate was 1,615 in 1994 and 404 in 2013 (Table 1). Therefore the reduced amount from 1994 to 2013 for Waco would equal 1,212 ($1,615 - 404 = 1,212$). It was a result of this rapid reduction that Waco's violent crime rate in 2013 (404) was not very different from the U.S. (368) and Texas rate (400).

For property crime rates, Waco has also had a consistently higher crime rate than the U.S and Texas from 1960 through 2013. As Table 1 and Figure 2b shows, the property crime rate of Waco reached a peak in 1988, when the rate was 208.05% higher than 1960, whereas that of the U.S. and Texas were 192.76% and 258.19% higher, respectively (also see Table 3a). The rate of increase in Waco was about 15 percent higher than the U.S., but 50 percent lower than Texas. It is noteworthy that Waco has had a higher property crime rate than Texas throughout the 29-year period, but property crime rates did not increase in Waco as fast as it had in Texas. Furthermore, Waco has had the larger reduction in property crime rate between 1988 and 2013 ($7,699 = 11,949 - 4,250$) not only than Texas ($4,107 = 7,365 - 3,258$) but also the U.S. ($2,323 = 5,054 - 2,731$) since the peak year 1988 to 2013, when the gap is the smallest since 1978. If this trend continues, Waco will soon be at the same or even a lower level of property crime rate than the U.S. and Texas.

As for the index crime rate, since it is a combination of the violent and property crime rates, it has also stayed at a higher rate than both the United States and Texas, but drawn closer to the levels of Texas and the U.S. more recently (see Figure 2c). Between 1960 and 1988, Waco had 204.66% increase in index crime rate, while the U.S. and Texas had 201.75% and 261.60%, respectively (Table 3a). In the peak year for Waco (1988) the index crime rate was 12,918, whereas the U.S. was 5,695 and Texas 8,018. However, in 2013 Waco's index crime rate was 4,654, while the U.S. and Texas had 3,099 and Texas was 3,658, respectively (Table 1). As shown in Table 3b, Waco had index crime reduced by 8,264 between 1988 and 2013, which was much greater than the U.S. (2,596) and Texas (4,360). Because the index crime rate is so similar to the property

crime rate of any given geographical unit, in the following sections I will focus on only comparing the violent and property crime rates.

Waco versus Austin, Dallas, and Houston

During the late thirties through the end of World War II and the Korean War (1950 – 1953), Waco had lower violent crime rates than three major cities in Texas: Austin, Dallas, and Houston (see Figure 3a). Between 1930 and the early 1960s, violent crime rates in Waco tended to be similar to those in the three cities, being higher in some years and lower in other years. Of those years, 1953 was a peculiar year for Waco in comparison to the other cities, as Waco had a sudden spike in the violent crime rate, whereas all the other cities had a sudden drop in violent crime rate. Since then, violent crime rates in Waco have never stayed lower than those of the larger cities for a long period of time, as they did from 1930 to 1952 (Table 1). What could have caused such a large spike in crime? This year is very interesting, because up until this point, the property crime rates of Waco remained significantly lower than the other three cities (Figure 3b). However, in 1953, Waco caught up to the three and thereafter stayed relatively close to their levels of property crime.

One possible reason for the sudden spike in crime could be the F-5 tornado (rated in the top ten of the deadliest in U.S. history) that hit Waco on May 11th, 1953. According to a radio script titled “Waco Tornado Script for KWBU/NPR” by Hans Christianson, an Austin freelancer, “114 people were killed, 600 were injured . . . 2,000 vehicles and 1,000 homes and businesses were damaged along with 600 more completed destroyed. The final damage bill . . . around \$50 million” (2010, p. 1). One would expect lawlessness to rise in the wake of such devastation as thousands of lives were

upturned and people displaced from their homes. An increase in violent crimes and property crimes is not unexpected in the wake of such a vast disruption in the economic and social structure of Waco.

From the sixties through the nineties, there was not a significant variation in the property crime rates for Waco, Austin, and Houston (see Figure 3b), whereas Dallas pulled away from the group with a large spike in 1969 and continued to have much higher rates than the other cities until 1992. In 1996, Waco had a higher rate of property crime than the large cities for the first time since 1963, before quickly falling back down under the crime rate of Dallas for the last few years of the millennium. During the 2000s, Waco and Dallas have had the higher property crime rates until recently in 2010 when Austin and Houston surpassed them. As shown in Table 1 and Table 4a, from 1960 (3,879) through 1988 (11,949) Waco had a property crime rate of increase of 208.05%, which was less than Austin (250.64%), Dallas (380.93%), and Houston (238.98%). However, between 1989 and 2013, Waco experienced the second highest amount of reduction (7,350) of property crimes, with Dallas experiencing the most reduction (10,411). Austin and Houston saw similar reductions in property crimes of 5,264 and 4,590 respectively (Table 4b). The most recent data shows the property crime rate of Waco (4,250) was lower than Austin (4,850) and Houston (5,087) and similar to Dallas (4,165), which was the lowest of all (Table 2).

The violent crime rates of Austin, Dallas, Houston, and Waco from the sixties and the nineties were similar to what was just described for property crime rates. That is, Dallas pulled away with the highest in 1969 and remained so all the way through 1994. Austin kept a consistent pace with the lowest amount of violent crime starting in 1971,

leaving Waco and Houston to battle back and forth before Houston in 1979 stayed at a higher rate for thirteen years (see Figure 3a). The biggest increase in crime for all four cities was from 1983 through 1991, so I decided to compare the cities on a rate of increase. As shown in Table 4a, Waco (108.31%) has a comparable rate of increase for violent crimes with Dallas (123.49%), but has a much higher rate of increase than both Austin (55.05%) and Houston (73.75%) for these eight years. Moreover, between 1992 and 2013, Waco and Dallas had large reductions of violent crimes (856 and 1,408 respectively), whereas Austin (225) and Houston (502) had much smaller reductions (Table 4b). Beginning to decline in 1994 and since 1996, violent crime rates in Waco have remained lower than Dallas and Houston, but closer to Austin's rates.

Waco versus Bellmead, Hewitt, Robinson, Woodway, and Baylor Campus

The violent crime rates of Waco and Bellmead were not only much higher than the other adjacent cities but also opposite in trends as Waco rates decreased and Bellmead rates increased, I begin with comparing Waco and Bellmead. The violent crime rates of Waco were higher than those of Bellmead from 1985 through 2001, except for the year 1995 (see Figure 4a). Since 2002, however, violent crime rates in Bellmead have increased, remaining higher than those in Waco, which showed a declining pattern. The same was found for property crime rates of Waco and Bellmead: that is, the rates in Waco have consistently declined since 2002, remaining lower than the rates in Bellmead that continued to increase (Figure 4b). Between 1985 and 2013, Bellmead's violent crime had a rate of increase of 241.03% and property crime of 54.75% (Table 5a). Waco, on the other hand, had a percent reduction of 45.59% in its violent crime rate and 49.67% in its property crime rate during the same time period.

As expected, Baylor University campus had the lowest violent crime rate of all the small jurisdictions adjacent to Waco, but did not have the lowest property crime rate (see Figure 4c). Between 1985 and 1992, Hewitt and Robinson had an increase in their violent crime rates of 242.52% and 390.72% respectively, while Baylor had a reduction of 23 in its violent crimes (Table 5b). From 1998 to 2013, Woodway, Robinson, Hewitt, and Baylor violent crime rates were similar to each other as seen in Figure 4c. For property crime rates, Baylor campus had the highest rates in 1984, 1988, for a few years in the late nineties, 2002, and 2003 (Figure 4d). From 2004 to 2008, Robinson had the consistently higher property crime rates ranging anywhere from 1,629 to 2,733; whereas Hewitt ranged from 1,451 to 2,029, Woodway from 1,495 to 1,858, and Baylor from 1,418 to 1,996 (Table 3).

It is noteworthy that while Baylor campus has had the lowest violent crime rates, its property crime rates were actually consistent with those of the surrounding cities. One possible explanation for this occurrence is that Baylor campus has a similar population to those of the smaller cities and therefore could have a similar ratio of people committing the property crimes. Additionally, one could speculate that due to the constant population turnover that comes with being a college campus, the students are not going to notice one extra person they do not know. Therefore, someone with malicious intent could easily blend in with the college crowd and commit a property crime without anyone noticing. Furthermore, a college campus with a concentrated population of students who have a lot of valuables might have been a popular target for property crimes.

CHAPTER FIVE

Explaining Crime Trends: A Social Disorganization Approach

In their article “Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory,” Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves (1989) test a theory built on Shaw and McKay’s (1942, 1969) theory of social disorganization. Results from testing hypothesis led them to conclude that “communities characterized by sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organizational participation had disproportionately high rates of crime and delinquency” (p. 799). An interesting finding to note about Sampson and Groves’ study was that socioeconomic status and family disruption had a negative effect on teenage street-corner groups, whereas heterogeneity had positive effects. This means that a neighborhood’s economic status along with the disruption of families in the area contributed to the formation of teenage street-corner groups in a community, thus leading to juvenile delinquency, but that the heterogeneity of the neighborhood did not help contribute as might be expected. Therefore, when looking at the community-level to determine causes of crime or places of prevention, one must look at the heterogeneity demographics, along with socioeconomic status and family disruption rates.

Robert J. Bursik (1988) wrote an article called “Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and Prospects” that lays out five main criticisms of Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization model as well as recent attempts to solve those issues. Criticism number one of the social disorganization model when it

first was introduced was that it focused on a group, but the studies generally done at that time were focused more on the individual. Therefore, it was more difficult to base findings on aggregate data. Recently, however, studies have shown that combining the two methods of looking at the “relative effects of individual and community characteristics on the likelihood of illegal behavior” has become an important extension of the theory of social disorganization and thereby “broadened the scope of traditional theories of victimization” (p. 524).

Criticism number two was the assumption of stable ecological structures. However, as data continued to show, most cities did not have the same ecological structures as each other and therefore most attempts at comparison with another city with different social histories of development were difficult at best. For a reappearance of the social disorganization theory, the perspective had to change to include an “emphasis on the dynamics of urban change and their reflection in changing spatial distribution of crime and delinquency” (p. 525).

Criticisms number three and four had to do with the measurements of social disorganization as well as crime and delinquency. Few seemed to know exactly how social disorganization was supposed to be measured or exactly what the concept was and how it differed from disorganization in general. Eventually some researchers have attempted to define social disorganization “in terms of the capacity of a neighborhood to regulate itself through formal and informal processes of social control” (p. 527). At present, researchers have to study a few small communities (almost impossible with large communities) to feasibly obtain any direct indicators of social disorganization. On top of researchers struggling to measure social disorganization, accurate data collected on crime

and delinquency was also difficult to find. Areas with higher socioeconomic status could possibly have crimes going unreported due to low focus from law enforcement as they were primarily focused on lower socioeconomic areas. Perhaps there is only a perceived higher rate of delinquency in the poorer areas due to more people being apprehended, because police are not focused on the higher socioeconomic areas. However, this idea that police decision-making biases distorts the data does not mean that it is the primary reason behind the data pointing to higher crime rates in lower socioeconomic areas. It is something researchers have to consider.

Criticism number five has to do with the normative assumptions of social disorganization. The importance of this criticism is, first, that researchers cannot always assume that a general consensus of a neighborhood exists on how serious an offense is perceived. It is impossible to measure a community's goals and abilities to achieve that goal if no general agreement can be demonstrated. Second, this criticism points out that the model as it has been generally used in the past is too narrow in scope and needs to be expanded to include more than just the community as effecting crime in that community. Outside forces such as local government that control zoning and housing policies can also have a strong effect on the crime of a community.

Therefore, Bursik concludes with the notion that the neighborhood/community needs to be used as contextual evidence for the individual's actions. If the community has a strong familial structure and more control over the peer influence teenage "street-corner" groups, then there is a less likely chance of juvenile delinquency than in a community without a good structure. Even if a community is more affluent, it could still

have higher delinquency rates than a less affluent community if the less affluent community had more stability.

Robert J. Sampson (1995) also wrote a book chapter titled “The Community” on the importance of community, which ties in with the above authors. Sampson studies the factors that play into what communities have higher crime rates than others. It was interesting to note that a high mobility rate (or population turnover) of a community had twice as much crime than another community with a low mobility rate regardless of the socioeconomic status of the communities. Sampson also said that the racial composition of a neighborhood was not the main factor in whether or not that neighborhood experienced more crime. This is important because most people (including myself) would assume that a lower socioeconomic neighborhood with a high minority rate equals more crime. But those two factors according to Sampson are not the main reason behind the higher crime rates, because when the socioeconomic status is equalized between non-Hispanic whites and others Sampson discovered there was little difference in crime rates. However, the areas with more households led by females or family disruption saw more crime than the areas of family stability (regardless of race or socioeconomic status).

Finally, Sampson coauthored with William Julius Wilson (1995) to write a book chapter called “Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality” that focuses on how race and crime interacts. Sampson and Wilson found that, as stated above, the family structure had more of an effect “on juvenile violence than on adult violence” (p. 40). White families led by a female led to juvenile crime as much as black families in the same position. The combination of urban poverty and family disruption, however, was found to be disproportionate between the races. The percentage of white families living

in urban poverty (concentrated together) was extremely low compared to black families. Therefore, Sampson and Wilson concluded that the structural social disorganization and the cultural social isolation were the most important determinants of the relationship between crime and race and were a direct result of the concentration of poverty, family disruption, and residential instability.

After reading the above scholarly works, I decided to gather data on the heterogeneity, family disruption, socioeconomic status, and population turnover rates of Waco. Once data on the four variables are collected, I can then explore whether or not those characteristics tend to vary together with the changes in crime rates in Waco. The above research suggests that I find all four characteristics, particularly family disruption to coincide with the crime trends.

As reported in Chapter Two, I was unable to collect enough data on the population turnover statistics of Waco for comparison with the crime rates. However, I could find enough data on the other three characteristics of racial heterogeneity, family disruption, and socioeconomic status to compare with the crime trends of Waco. In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss each characteristic separately in relation to crime trends of Waco.

Section 1: Racial Heterogeneity and Crime Trends of Waco

To measure the racial heterogeneity of the City of Waco, I collected data on two indicators: % Black or African American and % Hispanic or Latino. I focused on these two groups since other racial/ethnic minorities such as Asians, Pacific Islanders, and American Indians or Alaska Natives in Waco are too small in number to provide reliable data for comparisons with Waco crime trends.

As shown in Figure 6, the % Black or African American residents in Waco gradually increased from 1960 through 1990 and then slightly decreased thereafter. This coincides most with the property crime trend, but it also aligns with the increase and decrease of violent crime over the six decades. The other indicator of racial heterogeneity, % Hispanic or Latino residents, on the other hand, did not match the overall property and violent crime trends of Waco. The percentage of Hispanic residents in Waco rapidly increased since 1970, surpassing that of African American residents just before the new millennium and continuing to rise at a sharp rate through 2010. Thus its direction after 1990 was the opposite of the property and violent crime trends.

These findings are interesting for two reasons. First, while a claim could be made that the observed similarities between the trends of racial heterogeneity and crime are coincidence, the observation is consistent with what social disorganization theory posits: that is, the crime trends varied together with the percent of African American residents in Waco. The positive association between % African American and crime rates observed at the city level, however, should not be interpreted as indicating such association at the individual level (i.e., Blacks committing more crimes than non-Blacks in Waco), which would be ecological fallacy. Second, on the other hand, the other measure of racial heterogeneity, % Hispanic, increased between 1960 and 1990, like both crime trends, but continued to do so afterwards, unlike the crime trends that began to slowly decline after 1990. Given the inconsistent findings between the two measures, too much weight cannot be given to racial heterogeneity being the sole cause of crime as there are other factors that must have contributed to the violent and property crime trends of Waco.

Section 2: Family Disruption and Crime Trends of Waco

In order to measure family disruption, I collected data not only on divorce rate but also % female-headed households in Waco given that divorce tends to result in female-headed households. In fact, social disorganization researchers commonly use both as a measure of family disruption. Unfortunately, though, I was unable to gather sufficient data for each measure for all six decades as the Census data recording system changed over the decades. However, I was able to cover each decade, using one of the two, and compare what I could find with Waco violent and property crime trends (see Figure 7).

As shown in Figure 7, the divorce rate sharply increased between 1960 and 1980 while the households led by females increased from 1980 to 1990 followed by a noticeable decrease in 2000 and a small increase in 2010. In comparison with Waco violent and property crime trends, an increase in the divorce rate between 1960 and 1980 corresponds to the increase in both violent and property crimes over the same period. The female-headed household statistics also closely align with the violent crime trends, with the only difference being in the last ten years as the female households increased and violent crime continued (albeit less sharply) to decrease. The female-headed household data also lined up somewhat with the property crime trends, but not as much for 2000 and 2010.

The results, while based on bivariate analysis of limited data, were in line with what was expected. That is, the crime trends of Waco generally were similar to the changes found in the indicators of family disruption in Waco. This result is consistent with the Sampson's (1995) argument that family disruption plays a large part in crime causation.

Section 3: Socioeconomic Status and Crime Trends of Waco

For the indicators of socioeconomic status of community that social disorganization theory suggests contribute to community crime rate, I looked at the % Unemployed, % persons below poverty level, and the median household income. I was actually able to find almost every decade needed for each indicator, except for persons below poverty level of 1960. As shown in Figure 8, the pattern of % Unemployed coincides the most with the violent and property crimes – with the exception of the year 2000 when % Unemployed was still increasing despite the crime trends had already begun decreasing, which it might indicate lagged effect of % Unemployed on crime. The indicator of % persons below the poverty level also tended to vary together with the crime trends of Waco, except for the most recent decade (2010) when the percentage increased while crime continued to decrease.

Similarly, the median household income could also be argued to have contributed to violent and property crimes in Waco since 1990 as it continued to rise in the last three decades when crime rates were declining. However, patterns of 1970 and 1980 do not fit this observation since median income, violent crime, and property crime all increased between 1960 and 1990.

Taken together, the results from comparing the Waco crime trends with changes in the social disorganization indicators tend to provide a partial support for the theory as proposed by Sampson and Wilson (1994) and Sampson (1995): that is, family disruption and poverty tend to have more of an impact on crime rates than racial heterogeneity. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate how indicators of family disruption and poverty in Waco might have contributed to Waco crime rates, although Figure 6 shows mixed findings about

racial heterogeneity. Perhaps the mixed finding might lend some support to Sampson's (1995) argument that racial/ethnic minority groups living together in a highly concentrated impoverished area with a high family disruption contribute to crime rates rather than racial/ethnic heterogeneity in and of itself as original social disorganization theory suggested.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

Throughout this research process, the aim has been to examine Waco's crime trends of the past eighty-four years (1930 – 2013) in comparison with the United States, Texas, and other cities in Texas. This research is important because the findings and observations made can shed a light on the reality of crimes in Waco. Examining violent and property crimes separately as well as combined, I found the crime rates of Waco to have been decreasing faster than the rates of other geographic units of comparison over the last twenty years. I also made an observation that Waco's crime rates are lower than those of Dallas and Houston in recent years. These are welcome discoveries because not only many people outside but also residents of Waco would learn that the crime rates of Waco are not as high as they thought as a result of this thesis believed to be the first study on long-term crime trends of Waco. Even when compared to the national and state rates, Waco's crime rates have been decreasing at a greater rate and as of 2013 the violent crime rate (404) is practically even with that of the State of Texas (400), though somewhat higher than the national rate (368). If the trend continues, Waco is on a path to having a lower crime rate than the national and state averages, as well as a lower crime rate than the main cities of Texas. However, it is something to wait and see in coming years.

Besides the long-term crime trends, I was interested in exploring what sociodemographic characteristics of Waco might have been associated with the crime

rates based on social disorganization theory. Chapter Five provided an overview of the racial, familial, and economic characteristics of Waco over the last five and half decades, although the analysis was limited due to the fact that each social disorganization indicator was examined separately rather than simultaneously. Having said that, it was interesting to see that changes in Waco crime rates were generally similar to those in the percentage of African American residents or those unemployed in Waco, which is consistent with what the social disorganization theory posits. However, family disruption, measured by % female-headed households, along with poverty, measured by % people living under poverty line, as suggested by Sampson (1995), tended to be the more likely sources of crime in Waco than racial heterogeneity.

Fifty years ago the citizens of Waco were experiencing a continuous rise in the crime rates. Therefore, those living in Waco, especially between 1965 and 1985, would have seen more crimes committed or would have lived through more turbulence and violence than anyone of the current generation. However, the current generation fondly dubbed the “Millennials,” with the help of the Internet and social media has access to more graphic news stories and replay videos of crimes as to build the misbelief that Waco is a very dangerous place to live. Then when a rare singularity happens such as the tragic event of the biker gang shooting at Twin Peaks that happened at the beginning of the summer of 2015, the belief that Waco has high levels of crime might have been further reinforced. Not only does an event like Twin Peaks get splashed over every local news station and social media outlet, it also receives national attention which then becomes one of the only things outsiders may ever know about Waco.

However, the findings of this thesis empirically demonstrate that not only was the above described event a singularity, but also that the widespread belief that Waco has high crime rates is a misconception. In fact, the Uniform Crime Report data of recent years show that Waco is actually much safer to live in than Dallas or Houston and is almost equal with that of Austin. Also the fact that crime in Waco has a faster reduction rate than any other larger city, the state, and the nation is incredible! If the recent trends continue, Waco may become one of the safest cities in Texas. While there is room for improvement, overall Waco is not as dangerous of a city, as is popular belief.

This brings us to the question of what kinds of changes in Waco might have brought about this relatively fast reduction in crime and what factors would help continue this course, further bringing down the crime rates. According to my research, family disruption seems one of the major contributors of crime in Waco, as social disorganization scholars would agree. Helping to foster strong family bonds and creating community networks to help support families would be an important aspect of keeping the current crime trend going. Other factors that may affect Waco crime rates for the better are the many volunteer and non-profit groups that give relief and support to those in need. Many Baylor students, for example, participate in a volunteer program called “Steppin’ Out” twice a year to help clean and repair Waco’s most impoverished areas. The impact of these types of services on the reduction of crime cannot be ignored. Overall, finding a way to strengthen family bonds, creating better community networks, and continuing services to help those in dire need are likely to all work together to continue Waco’s decrease in crime rates.

One of the more interesting discoveries of this thesis has been the facts about the neighboring cities of Waco. While Waco's crime rates have been steadily decreasing over the last twenty years, the City of Bellmead's crime rates have been increasing. This was surprising since Waco and Bellmead are adjoining. I speculate that Bellmead might have higher family disruption rates or more citizens below the poverty line than Waco, which is a topic for future research. Robinson has higher crime rates than Hewitt or Woodway, but all three of them had much lower crime rates than Waco or Bellmead.

While Waco has been known to be a high-crime city, which has turned out to not be the case, how about Baylor University campus? The most interesting finding about the campus is that Baylor actually has extremely low violent crime rates and much lower property crime rates than Waco. Future Baylor students and their parents should feel comforted in the fact that Baylor is a safe place to live and not only that, but Waco itself is much safer than they might have heard. Even though my research is limited in that I did not compare it with other university campuses, those looking to enroll as well as their parents will be pleased to know that violent crimes are very minimal (average of 5 violent acts in a year) and their main worry will only need to be "Can I find parking in time to get to class?" Altogether, Baylor campus in comparison with the surrounding towns has a lower rate of violent and property crimes than any other surrounding town in years recent.

Some limitations of this research that readers should keep in mind include, first, my analysis being limited to a bivariate analysis instead of a multivariate analysis. Second, I was limited in my ability to find sufficient data to conduct equal comparisons especially of Waco demographics. Finally, this research only made comparisons on a

relatively small scale (i.e. three large cities, four small cities) that might limit the analysis that could be made with a larger data pool.

In the future, it would be interesting and important for researchers to look into the areas of neighborhood-level crime rates in Waco and see not only how crime rates differ among Waco neighborhoods, but also whether observed neighborhood differences in crime rates can be attributed to their differences in indicators of social disorganization (i.e., family disruption, poverty rate, racial heterogeneity). It would be also interesting to see whether what I found in this study would be confirmed by a larger scale project that would allow for a multivariate analysis, taking all of the major sociodemographic indicators into account at the same time.

Despite the limitations acknowledged above, the most important finding of this research is that the City of Waco has seen larger reduction in crime rates since the nineties than any other group it has been compared with. Waco residents as well as the police department seem to be doing a good job at controlling and reducing crime, contrary to what popular belief might suggest. Strengthening the family unit and forming strong community networks will further help to reduce crime along with continuing efforts to alleviate poverty. Altogether, I hope and anticipate that in a near future Waco becomes one of the safest cities to live in in Texas.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Figures and Tables

Figure 1. 1930 - 2012 Waco Crime Rates




Figure 1a. Waco Original Violent Crime Rate Without Manslaughter by Negligence vs. New Rate With It Included




Figure 2a. Violent Crime Trends of Waco, the United States, and Texas




Figure 2b. Property Crime Trends of Waco, the United States, and Texas




Figure 2c. Index Crime Trends of Waco, the United States, and Texas




Figure 3a. Violent Crime Rates of Waco and Large Texan Cities




Figure 3b. Property Crime Rates of Waco and Large Texan Cities




Figure 4a. Waco and Bellmead Violent Crime Rates 1985 - 2013




Figure 4b. Waco and Bellmead Property Crime Rates 1985 - 2013




Figure 4c. Violent Crime Rates of Hewitt, Robinson, Woodway, and Baylor




Figure 4d. Property Crime Rates of Hewitt, Robinson, Woodway, and Baylor




Figure 5. Waco's Individual Violent Crime Rates 1960 - 2013




Figure 6. Waco Heterogeneity vs. Violent & Property Crime




Figure 7. Waco Family Disruption vs. Violent & Property Crime




Figure 8. Waco Economic Demographics vs. Violent & Property Crime




TABLE 1: Crime Rates of Waco, the United States, and Texas, 1960 – 2013

Year	Index Crime Rate			Violent Crime Rate			Property Crime Rate		
	Waco	National	Texas	Waco	National	Texas	Waco	National	Texas
1960	4,240	1,887	2,217	361	161	161	3,879	1,726	2,056
1961	4,027	1,906	2,128	322	158	158	3,705	1,748	1,970
1962	3,899	2,020	2,148	211	162	153	3,689	1,858	1,994
1963	3,662	2,180	2,243	216	168	170	3,447	2,012	2,074
1964	4,303	2,388	2,507	284	191	190	4,019	2,198	2,317
1965	4,906	2,449	2,584	294	200	199	4,611	2,249	2,385
1966	5,288	2,671	2,873	547	220	227	4,741	2,451	2,646
1967	5,040	2,990	3,130	453	253	246	4,588	2,737	2,884
1968	5,459	3,370	3,478	376	298	270	5,082	3,072	3,208
1969	5,735	3,680	3,967	427	329	328	5,307	3,351	3,639
1970	6,201	3,985	4,173	487	364	365	5,714	3,621	3,808
1971	6,593	4,165	4,100	660	396	376	5,933	3,769	3,724
1972	6,692	3,961	3,914	896	401	354	5,796	3,560	3,560
1973	6,905	4,154	4,126	938	417	385	5,967	3,737	3,740
1974	8,071	4,850	4,787	648	461	390	7,423	4,389	4,397
1975	8,468	5,298	5,407	636	488	391	7,832	4,811	5,017
1976	7,372	5,287	5,464	752	468	356	6,619	4,820	5,109
1977	7,871	5,078	5,397	1,013	476	408	6,858	4,602	4,989
1978	6,835	5,140	5,557	902	498	435	5,933	4,643	5,122
1979	8,786	5,565	5,925	692	549	508	8,093	5,017	5,417
1980	9,333	5,950	6,143	757	597	550	8,575	5,353	5,593
1981	8,251	5,850	6,050	706	593	532	7,546	5,257	5,518
1982	8,870	5,601	6,302	758	571	577	8,112	5,030	5,725

	Index Crime Rate			Violent Crime Rate			Property Crime Rate		
1983	7,979	5,179	5,907	643	538	512	7,335	4,641	5,395
1984	8,349	5,038	6,030	711	540	505	7,638	4,498	5,525
1985	9,187	5,225	6,569	742	558	550	8,445	4,666	6,019
1986	10,846	5,502	7,408	866	620	659	9,980	4,882	6,749
1987	11,543	5,575	7,722	908	612	631	10,634	4,963	7,091
1988	12,918	5,695	8,018	968	641	653	11,949	5,054	7,365
1989	12,723	5,774	7,927	1,122	667	659	11,600	5,107	7,268
1990	10,816	5,803	7,827	1,319	730	761	9,497	5,073	7,065
1991	11,963	5,898	7,819	1,340	758	840	10,623	5,140	6,979
1992	9,810	5,661	7,058	1,259	758	806	8,551	4,904	6,252
1993	10,613	5,487	6,439	1,571	747	762	9,042	4,740	5,677
1994	9,567	5,374	5,872	1,615	714	706	7,951	4,660	5,166
1995	9,328	5,275	5,684	1,398	684	664	7,931	4,590	5,020
1996	10,482	5,088	5,709	1,227	637	644	9,256	4,451	5,064
1997	9,284	4,927	5,481	1,110	611	603	8,174	4,316	4,878
1998	8,589	4,620	5,112	1,014	568	565	7,575	4,053	4,547
1999	8,913	4,267	5,032	945	523	560	7,968	3,744	4,471
2000	8,268	4,125	4,955	831	507	545	7,437	3,618	4,410
2001	8,908	4,163	5,142	776	505	572	8,132	3,658	4,570
2002	9,261	4,125	5,200	796	494	580	8,466	3,631	4,620
2003	8,151	4,067	5,153	688	476	553	7,463	3,591	4,600
2004	8,464	3,977	5,039	720	463	541	7,743	3,514	4,498
2005	8,114	3,901	4,847	746	469	528	7,369	3,432	4,319
2006	6,832	3,826	4,600	768	479	517	6,064	3,347	4,083
2007	7,483	3,748	4,633	930	472	510	6,554	3,276	4,122
2008	6,837	3,673	4,495	837	459	508	6,000	3,215	3,987

	Index Crime Rate			Violent Crime Rate			Property Crime Rate		
2009	6,389	3,473	4,506	706	432	491	5,684	3,041	4,015
2010	5,728	3,350	4,215	660	405	448	5,069	2,946	3,767
2011	5,641	3,292	3,892	601	387	409	5,040	2,905	3,483
2012	5,038	3,246	3,770	494	387	409	4,545	2,859	3,362
2013	4,654	3,099	3,658	404	368	400	4,250	2,731	3,258

Table 2: Crime Rates of Waco, Austin, Dallas, and Houston, 1960 – 2013

Year	Index Crime Rates				Violent Crime Rates				Property Crime Rates			
	Waco	Austin	Dallas	Houston	Waco	Austin	Dallas	Houston	Waco	Austin	Dallas	Houston
1960	4,240	3,113	3,297	2,971	361	175	247	268	3,879	2,939	3,049	2,703
1961	4,027	2,983	3,059	3,145	322	166	215	294	3,705	2,817	2,844	2,851
1962	3,899	3,437	3,439	3,135	211	170	218	336	3,689	3,266	3,221	2,798
1963	3,662	3,695	3,671	3,845	216	209	232	426	3,447	3,485	3,439	3,419
1964	4,303	4,505	4,261	4,460	284	320	273	459	4,019	4,185	3,987	4,000
1965	4,906	4,756	5,082	4,083	294	336	319	427	4,611	4,420	4,764	3,655
1966	5,288	5,653	5,485	5,169	547	361	434	603	4,741	5,293	5,051	4,566
1967	5,040	6,374	6,186	5,808	453	410	515	679	4,588	5,964	5,671	5,129
1968	5,459	6,838	7,232	6,840	376	496	596	825	5,082	6,342	6,636	6,015
1969	5,735	7,288	10,593	7,932	427	562	1,009	942	5,307	6,727	9,583	6,990
1970	6,201	6,063	8,809	6,332	487	494	966	799	5,714	5,569	7,843	5,533
1971	6,593	6,860	8,321	6,234	660	629	1,058	717	5,933	6,231	7,263	5,517
1972	6,692	6,242	7,647	6,266	896	537	932	654	5,796	5,705	6,715	5,612
1973	6,905	6,575	8,272	6,685	938	557	1,043	730	5,967	6,018	7,229	5,956
1974	8,071	7,609	9,740	7,389	648	432	906	787	7,423	7,176	8,834	6,602
1975	8,468	8,805	11,181	7,479	636	483	907	724	7,832	8,322	10,274	6,756
1976	7,372	9,570	10,810	8,621	752	477	858	653	6,619	9,093	9,952	7,969
1977	7,871	9,347	10,162	9,514	1,013	500	1,054	755	6,858	8,846	9,108	8,759
1978	6,835	9,817	10,252	7,310	902	561	1,171	601	5,933	9,255	9,082	6,709
1979	8,786	8,065	10,628	8,752	692	443	1,298	878	8,093	7,622	9,330	7,874
1980	9,333	8,755	11,778	8,886	757	502	1,409	975	8,575	8,253	10,369	7,912
1981	8,251	8,632	11,905		706	432	1,360		7,546	8,200	10,545	
1982	8,870	8,590	11,937	9,887	758	414	1,345	1,060	8,112	8,176	10,592	8,827
1983	7,979	7,823	10,793	8,772	643	403	1,149	921	7,335	7,420	9,644	7,852

	Index Crime Rates				Violent Crime Rates				Property Crime Rates			
1984	8,349	8,260	11,486	8,262	711	428	1,226	839	7,638	7,832	10,260	7,423
1985	9,187	9,606	12,982	8,928	742	581	1,440	943	8,445	9,024	11,542	7,985
1986	10,846	11,070	15,143	9,448	866	644	1,896	1,156	9,980	10,427	13,247	8,292
1987	11,543	9,443	16,283	9,392	908	493	1,989	1,090	10,634	8,950	14,294	8,302
1988	12,918	10,841	16,742	10,311	968	537	2,077	1,149	11,949	10,304	14,665	9,163
1989	12,723	10,669	16,707	10,816	1,122	556	2,131	1,140	11,600	10,114	14,576	9,676
1990	10,816	11,714	15,520	11,338	1,319	714	2,438	1,388	9,497	11,000	13,082	9,950
1991	11,963	11,295	15,066	10,824	1,340	624	2,568	1,600	10,623	10,671	12,497	9,224
1992	9,810	10,944	12,429	8,747	1,259	589	2,072	1,465	8,551	10,355	10,358	7,282
1993	10,613	10,252	10,627	8,187	1,571	600	1,743	1,454	9,042	9,652	8,884	6,734
1994	9,567	7,941	9,477	7,285	1,615	635	1,589	1,307	7,951	7,306	7,888	5,978
1995	9,328	8,132	9,464	7,588	1,398	773	1,532	1,283	7,931	7,359	7,932	6,305
1996	10,482	7,866	9,467	7,636	1,227	711	1,535	1,267	9,256	7,155	7,932	6,369
1997	9,284	7,870	9,336	7,264	1,110	646	1,384	1,174	8,174	7,224	7,952	6,089
1998	8,589	7,002	9,253	7,112	1,014	541	1,465	1,123	7,575	6,461	7,787	5,989
1999	8,913	6,904	9,616	7,271	945	498	1,414	1,187	7,968	6,406	8,201	6,084
2000	8,268	5,937	8,838	6,742	831	472	1,350	1,100	7,437	5,465	7,489	5,642
2001	8,908	6,469	9,132	7,107	776	474	1,462	1,172	8,132	5,995	7,670	5,934
2002	9,261	6,267	9,025	7,314	796	467	1,371	1,223	8,466	5,800	7,654	6,091
2003	8,151	6,657	9,328	7,055	688	462	1,371	1,175	7,463	6,195	7,957	5,879
2004	8,464	6,582	8,972	7,186	720	525	1,316	1,146	7,743	6,057	7,656	6,040
2005	8,114	6,502	8,484	7,059	746	490	1,254	1,173	7,369	6,013	7,230	5,887
2006	6,832	6,372	8,063	7,007	768	515	1,206	1,169	6,064	5,857	6,857	5,837
2007	7,483	6,881	7,845	6,817	930	540	1,069	1,132	6,554	6,341	6,776	5,684
2008	6,837	6,468	6,831	6,054	837	522	895	1,107	6,000	5,945	5,936	4,947
2009	6,389	6,769	6,323	6,444	706	523	792	1,126	5,684	6,245	5,531	5,319

	Index Crime Rates				Violent Crime Rates				Property Crime Rates			
2010	5,728	6,277	6,118	6,564	660	480	765	1,071	5,069	5,798	5,353	5,493
2011	5,641	5,665	5,739	6,028	601	430	681	975	5,040	5,235	5,058	5,054
2012	5,038	5,628	5,049	5,938	494	409	675	993	4,545	5,219	4,374	4,946
2013	4,654	5,213	4,829	6,049	404	363	664	963	4,250	4,850	4,165	5,087

Table 3: Crime Rates of Neighboring Cities of Waco, 1977 – 2013

Year	Violent Crime Rates					Property Crime Rates				
	Bellmead	Hewitt	Robinson	Woodway	Baylor	Bellmead	Hewitt	Robinson	Woodway	Baylor
1977					22					1,961
1978					32					1,805
1979					65					2,059
1980										3,978
1981										
1982					119					
1983					107					2,455
1984	448	181	108		57					3,085
1985	633	269	15		27	7,663	2,766	1,260		2,277
1986	446	136	107			10,582	3,745	1,288		2,031
1987	301	113	305		52	11,106	3,180	1,898		
1988	241	154	465		34	9,210	2,684	3,007		3,193
1989	288	122	295		25	8,014	2,298	3,484		2,358
1990	752	283	248		8	6,466	2,505	2,925		2,256
1991	727	621	528		34	8,986	2,671	2,451		2,048
1992	1,345	424	373		57	7,434	2,892	1,746		1,762
1993	1,399	149	325		16	9,147	2,604	2,017		1,962
1994	1,980	103	134		8	8,839	2,090	1,762		2,176
1995	1,013	120	145		33	9,595	2,473	1,613		1,536
1996	867	91	142		8	9,129	1,629	1,342		1,912
1997	589	102	99	99	32	10,772	1,866	1,334		1,880
1998	754	97	121	170	16	8,355	1,619	1,384	1,428	2,381
1999	781	153	140	100	7	7,652	1,760	1,449	1,735	2,253
2000	647	159	224	78	30	8,151	1,642	2,473	1,574	2,227

	Violent Crime Rates					Property Crime Rates				
2001	1,590	95	183	143	17	9,084	2,726	2,443	1,959	2,167
2002	1,558	115	180	135	21	7,523	2,392	1,977	2,028	2,389
2003	1,632	112	211	112	28	9,660	2,036	2,168	1,536	3,108
2004	1,399	85	226	112	43	10,222	2,029	1,629	1,529	1,547
2005	1,191	127	129	101	50	9,658	1,839	2,733	1,495	1,993
2006	1,368	207	140	253	71	7,399	1,528	2,468	1,858	1,996
2007	1,355	181	270	251	35	9,464	1,790	1,958	1,633	1,838
2008	1,467	101	141	238	7	10,424	1,451	2,365	1,789	1,418
2009	1,586	251	76	181	75	11,498	1,451	1,936	1,677	1,307
2010	1,692	152	84	58	-	10,312	908	1,903	1,893	1,088
2011	1,782	79	83	110	27	9,714	961	1,622	1,414	1,423
2012	1,528	100	169	93	65	11,281	1,045	1,762	1,455	832
2013						11,859	911	1,878	1,658	859

Table 3a - Waco, U.S. and Texas

Cities	Rate of Increase 1960 - 1994	Rate of Increase 1960 - 1988	Rate of Increase 1960 - 1988
	Violent	Property	Index
Waco	347.60%	208.05%	204.66%
U.S.	343.61%	192.76%	201.75%
Texas	338.68%	258.19%	261.60%

Table 3b - Waco, U.S. and Texas

Cities	1994 - 2013 Reduction	1988 - 2013 Reduction	1988 - 2013 Reduction
	Violent	Property	Index
Waco	1,212	7,699	8,264
U.S.	346	2,323	2,596
Texas	307	4,107	4,360

Table 4a - Waco, Austin, Dallas, and Houston

Cities	Rate of Increase 1983 - 1991	Rate of Increase 1960 - 1988
	Violent	Property
Waco	108.31%	208.05%
Austin	55.05%	250.64%
Dallas	123.49%	380.93%
Houston	73.75%	238.98%

Table 4b - Waco, Austin, Dallas, and Houston

Cities	1992 - 2013 Reduction	1989 - 2013 Reduction
	Violent	Property
Waco	856	7,350
Austin	225	5,264
Dallas	1,408	10,411
Houston	502	4,590

Table 5a - Waco and Bellmead

Cities	Rate of Increase 1985 - 2013	Rate of Increase 1985 - 2013
	Violent	Property
Waco	-45.59%	-49.67%
Bellmead	241.03%	54.75%
	1985 - 2013 Reduction	1985 - 2013 Reduction
Waco	338	4,195
Bellmead	(1,080)	(4,196)

Table 5b - Hewitt, Robinson, Baylor

Cities	Rate of Increase 1985 - 1992	1985 - 1992 Reduction
	Violent	Violent
Hewitt	242.52%	
Robinson	390.72%	
Baylor		23

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