ABSTRACT

Profiles and Policy: Evaluating How the Social Structure and Motivating Factors of
Modern Terrorist Organizations Impact US Foreign Policy

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This thesis asks who becomes an operative for modern terrorist networks and
why. In order to effectively formulate counterterrorism strategy, it is imperative to
consider motivating factors and end goals of each organization. While religious
motivation exists for terrorist networks, the extreme drive for political equality in
their region of operation is what creates the most significant impact. By surveying the
history, tactics, funding, and motivating factors of two major organizations, extreme
nationalism is determined to have greater motivation for these groups than religious
extremism. Special attention is given to female operatives in terrorist organizations by
presenting common themes of motivation and proposing that while these women operate
actively to gain political equality for their organization as a whole, they still struggle with
the same fight for gender equality within the organization. Research is concluded by
discussing how foreign policy has changed in a post-9/11 society and what still needs to
be done in order to address the growing role of women in terrorist networks.

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PROFILES AND POLICY: EVALUATING HOW THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND

MOTIVATING FACTORS OF MODERN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IMPACT

US FOREIGN POLICY

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To Mr. Keegan

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Literary Criticism of Current Research: Profiles, Strategy, and Sociological Perspectives

While acts of terrorism have been present in global relations for centuries, the concept of being attacked by a stateless enemy that does not wear uniforms or practice any sort of conventional military tactics is relatively new in the world of United States foreign policy. Within the last fifty years, foreign policy generated through the State Department, intelligence agencies, and the executive has transformed from a focus on traditional military development to anticipating, analyzing, and preventing the threat of terrorist attacks on US soil. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, colloquial phrases such as "War on Terror," "Holy War," and "Jihad" became commonplace in political and even public conversation. However, without first understanding the character profiles and end goals of the individuals who make up these terrorist networks, policymakers will fail in developing a methodology to combat terrorism and prevent future attacks. The military and political sectors miss the mark when they oversimplify terrorism, relegating it to no more than a holy war backed by some sort of religious motivation to fight for the tenets of Islam.

While religion may certainly play a role in the greater picture of historical acts of terrorism, modern attacks are grounded under the premise of extreme nationalism, not religious extremism. Furthermore, the emerging role of women in modern terrorist organizations is changing the game of how the United States responds to terrorist threats. While female operatives actively participate in the organization and are responsible for carrying out suicide attacks in order to gain political equality and recognition for the

group as a whole, they still face the same struggle for gender equality within the organization as women in civil society. Through a survey of the history, funding, tactics, social structure and most importantly, motivating factors of modern terrorist organizations, this thesis proposes that the extreme nationalism that drives terrorist organizations in their fight for political equality has shifted the focus of United States counterterrorism policy.

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, research and literature on terrorism became priority for policy development and military strategy. While information on Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda was readily available to the government and intelligence agencies, the mainstream public was widely unaware of the country's political history with bin Laden and the threat that Al Qaeda posed on the country. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the public wanted to know who bin Laden was, and how a single individual was able to change the game of foreign policy for an entire nation within a matter of minutes. Osama bin Laden was the perfect character example for the psychological and sociological characteristics of who becomes a terrorist and why.

In order to formulate policy against terrorism effectively, it is first critical to understand who terrorists are, what their end goals are, and the motivation behind the means of accomplishing those goals. The following provides a critical analysis of current literature and research regarding to the man behind the attacks that demonstrated just how vulnerable the United States could be in the face of a foreign enemy on domestic soil, how his strategy of surprise attack changed the focus of American foreign policy, and an overview of how the sociological perspective addresses acts of terrorism.

An Introduction to Al Qaeda

Terrorism has existed for centuries, but only recently have terrorist groups and their acts come to the forefront of public and media attention. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, introduced Americans to a new enemy, the Al Qaeda terrorist network led by Osama Bin Laden. For the vast majority of Americans, terrorism or some sort of global threat was only something for movies and history books. However, September 11 changed everything. Rohn Gunaratna's *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* provides a broad overview of the Al Qaeda network, including the history of the organization; its ideology, strategy, and structure; a survey of the global network of this terrorist group; and how the world anticipates new threats presented by it. Gunaratna also offers an in-depth look into Osama bin Laden's rise to power from his political involvement to becoming the leader of the most threatening terrorist network in the world. *Inside Al Qaeda* seeks to answer the primary questions regarding this new global enemy and draw a timeline that could help to anticipate or even stop Al Qaeda's next move.

Gunaratna begins his book with a thorough examination of the personal and political life of Osama bin Laden. In order to understand what made bin Laden so successful, it is important to consider where he came from and what shaped him into such an influential leader. Osama bin Laden was born in 1957 in Saudi Arabia to migrants from Yemen and Syria.[1] While his father urged all fifty-two of his children to avoid political and religious

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[1]Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: global network of terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2003) 21.

debate, after his father's death, Osama took a significant interest in politics. Gunaratna makes the jump to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He discusses the relationship that soon developed between bin Laden and Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam, one of the leading Islamists of his generation. In his explanation of the early founding of Al Qaeda, Gunaratna writes, "Azzam played a key role in formulating and articulating the jihad doctrine that mobilized Afghans and Arab volunteers to fight the Soviets."[2] Osama built training camps and guesthouses to improve Al Qaeda's social and military infrastructure. Gunaratna notes that "although Osama and Azzam agreed on the principal issues of supporting Muslims who were persecuted for their religious and political beliefs…they disagreed on tactics."[3] Their tension culminated in a dispute over using funds to train *mujahidin* fighters in Egypt, where Azzam wanted the funds to be used only in Afghanistan.

Little did Azzam know, but Osama was already plotting against him in order to reconfigure Al Qaeda in his own image, "as an unflinchingly hostile global terrorist force, established with the aim of destroying America and Israel and reestablishing the Caliphate by means of a worldwide jihad."[4] For the past thirty years, this is exactly what bin Laden strove to accomplish with Al Qaeda. Osama built up the military capability and financial resources of Al Qaeda in such a way as to allow him to plan and carryout attacks without flinching. Gunaratna describes bin Laden as the model for a "new generation of terrorists, many of whom come from educated families—a clear

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[2]Ibid, 24.

[3]Ibid, 29.

[4]Ibid, 30.

demonstration that Islamist terrorist ideologies appeal equally to all classes and strata of

society."[5] This is important in analyzing the success of Al Qaeda's deadly missions.

Theoretically, undermining the security system of a country such as the United Sates

should not be an easy task. The attacks on September 11, 2001, demonstrate the

organizational strength of Al Qaeda, all stemming from the influence of its leader.

Gunaratna devotes significant attention to discussing the organization, ideology, and

strategy of Al Qaeda. He notes that Al Qaeda's organizational structure has proved very

hard to detect and combat.[6] What may come as a surprise to the average reader with no

foreign policy background is that Al Qaeda was successful in its early stages because "it

inherited a fully fledged training and operational infrastructure that had been funded by

the US, European, Saudi Arabian, and other governments throughout the 1980s."[7] The

structure of Al Qaeda allows it to have indirect and direct control over its global force.

Multiple committees are involved in recruiting, training, transporting and launching

military operations, as well as getting the money to fund such operations.

One of Gunaratna's strongest sections in the book is his discussion of Al Qaeda's

finances. The average annual budget is just under $50 million including operational costs,

transportation, and training. Al Qaeda also funds various Islamist groups such as the

Taliban to buy loyalty, to the tune of $100 million.[8] One of the most chilling figures

presented in the book was the operation cost of the September 11th attacks. Al Qaeda's

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[5]Ibid, 35.

[6]Ibid, 72.

[7]Ibid, 74.

[8]Ibid, 82.

most expensive attack in September 2001 only cost the network $500,000. It is baffling that an attack that cost the United States so much politically, financially, and in human life, cost Al Qaeda so relatively little.

To understand the process of Al Qaeda's operations, it is critical to understand the ideology that provides the foundation for its actions. Gunaratna notes that some Islamists, including Al Qaeda, have misinterpreted jihad to mean "holy war." However, according to Gunaratna's research, "jihad is the exertion of one's utmost effort in order to attain a goal or to repel something detestable."[9] Translated, jihad refers to a struggle. There are inward and outward struggles, and such terrorist attacks have been justified by various Islamist groups as an answer to overcome the outward struggle. It is important to understand bin Laden's ideology because it provides the answer to why suicide missions are the main tactics used by Al Qaeda, and also demonstrates why bin Laden and his followers show no remorse for their actions. Gunaratna contends, "By constantly referring to Allah, in both his writings and speeches, Osama suggests that he is carrying out Allah's divine wish."[10]

Gunaratna continues his book to include case studies of Al Qaeda's global network of support and new threats that could be posed to America, Israel, and Western allies. While his book provides a broad overview of Al Qaeda, some of the material lacks depth. As Jonathan Schazner writes in his review of the work, "Gunaratna labors to draw distinctions between what he calls revolutionary, ideological, utopian, and apocalyptic

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[9]Ibid, 112.

[10]Ibid, 117.

Islamists. At best, these distinctions remain unclear."[11] Without becoming an

encyclopedia for the Al Qaeda network, *Inside Al Qaeda* provides an adequate survey of

Osama bin Laden and his followers to answer the basic questions of what this network

stands for and where it could be going in the future.

Looking into the Leadership: Osama bin Laden

To the average American, the attacks of September 11, 2001 came as the most

terrifying shock and surprise they had ever experienced on American soil. However,

Peter Bergen opens his book, *Holy War, Inc.* with the proposition that this attack should

not have been such an eye-opening surprise. In fact, multiple key members of the

executive branch had every warning that Osama bin Laden had intentions of attacking the

United States in such a way that would forever change the foreign policy of this country.

As game changing as the 9/11 attacks were, this does not make up the premise of

Bergen's book. *Holy War, Inc.* takes a full spectrum look at what makes the jihad against

the United States comparable to a corporate endeavor. He takes an in-depth look at the

history behind Osama bin Laden's empire, the inner-workings of Al Qaeda, and the

economic and political support that has allowed bin Laden and his followers to remain so

elusive for US officials, while successfully carrying out devastating attacks on its

enemies.

Bergen starts with a brief flashback to the morning of September 11, 2001, pointing to

a series of attacks that began ten years earlier with the bombing of a hotel in Yemen that

housed American soldiers. An Australian was the only casualty, and therefore little

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[11]Benjamin Ismail. "Review of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror :: Middle East Quarterly." Middle East Forum. http://www.meforum.org/1584/inside-al-qaeda-global-network-of-terror (accessed December 2, 2010).

attention was paid to the attack, but the assaults began to intensify each time. Bin Laden continued his attacks and in 1998, Al Qaeda bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa, killing more than 200 people. One of the final attacks prior to the 9/11 World Trade Center bombings was in October 2000, when the *U.S.S. Cole* was attacked in Yemen, leaving seventeen American sailors dead.

One of the strengths of Bergen's writing is that he introduces prior attacks that pointed the way to what would happen on 9/11. Before 9/11, the average American had no idea about Al Qaeda or what its followers were doing around the world. Bergen adequately informs the reader of what was going on "while America slept."[12] After the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda issued videotape with Osama bin Laden sitting front and center, basking in his post-attack victory. Bergen writes that the tape "is a graphic demonstration of how bin Laden and his followers have exploited twenty-first century communications and weapons technology in the service of the most extreme, retrograde reading of holy war."[13] That is one of the most important things to keep in mind about bin Laden and his supporters. While it may seem that the tactics and fighting style is barbaric and dated, Al Qaeda is one the most modern terrorist networks in modern society. It is this combination of the traditional and the modern that fuse together in what Bergen describes as Holy War, Inc.

The author goes on to describe the jihad in Afghanistan and how Osama bin Laden created a network to advance his struggle against America. One of the most significant things that Bergen uncovers that the bin Ladens originated, not in Saudi Arabia where

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[12]Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*, 1st Touchstone Ed ed. (New York: Free Press, 2002), 24.

[13]Ibid, 27.

Osama bin Laden was born, but in Yemen. This finding seems to solidify the idea that Al

Qaeda has the ability to branch out of Afghanistan effectively. Furthermore, Bergen

relates Al Qaeda's attacks on the embassy in Yemen to current speculation that Al

Qaeda's leadership hub could possibly be located back in Yemen. Bergen continues the

section with a discussion of Osama's childhood and teenage years, including the death of

his father. Bin Laden had been working for his father's companies and Bergen addresses

their early ties to the United States. Interestingly enough, the bin Laden family owns

property in New Jersey and in Texas. There is also a fellowship in Islamic architecture

that is named after the family. Bin Laden became interested in politics and foreign affairs

after the death of his father.

Bergen writes that Osama bin Laden was inspired by the ideas of Egyptian leader

Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb who wrote the key text of the jihadist

movement in Egypt. With this initial mention of the word "jihad," Bergen moves into an

explanation of what this term actually means. Understanding the true meaning of jihad is

critical in understanding the motives behind bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Especially since

9/11, the media, politicians, and the public have used "holy war" and "jihad"

interchangeably. This, however, is not the case.

While there are two different types of jihad, an inner struggle and an outward force

against the opposition to Islam, the latter forms the basis for Al Qaeda's actions. In

discussing the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the author notes, "Unprovoked, a

superpower invaded a largely peasant nation and inflicted on it a total, totalitarian war.

The population rose up under the banner of Islam to drive the infidels out."[14] By the end

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[14]Ibid, 49.

of 1989, bin Laden left Pakistan to return to Afghanistan. At the young age of 32, he had been the leader of one of the most deadly jihads at the current time, and was actively pursuing his next political operation.

In examining Bergen the CIA's involvement in the Afghan War, Bergen notes that several accounts have charged the CIA with training and arming the Afghan Arabs, and even bin Laden himself, in an effort to defeat the Soviets in the 1980s. However, in his research, the author contends that while the CIA may have made tactical errors during the war, these accounts are exaggerated and not supported by evidence. There are several connections between the CIA and Al Qaeda. For instance, the CIA helped an important recruiter for the Afghan Arabs who would eventually by convicted for his role in conspiring to blow up New York City landmarks such as the UN complex and the Holland Tunnel. Furthermore, the CIA was connected to an Egyptian-American, Ali Mohamed, who worked briefly for the CIA and then for Al Qaeda. Bergen writes, "While these links are certainly interesting, they are only that. They hardly amount to an operation by the Agency to train and fund the Afghan Arabs."[15]

Bergen further illuminates the funding behind the Afghan War and the support bin Laden received from Pakistan. He details the Al Qaeda operations from the Sudan before returning again to a discussion of Afghanistan where Al Qaeda declared war against the United States and its western supporters.

After examining the inner workings of Al Qaeda's structure and the support bin Laden enjoyed from his following, Bergen closes with the CIA investigation and US military

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[15]Ibid, 67.

retaliation of the embassy bombings in Sudan. As he notes, "A senior U.S. official defended the Sudan attack on the following grounds: bin Laden maintained personnel and companies in Sudan and had brokered discussions between Sudan and Iraq to improve military cooperation."[16] However, the attacks had a major unintended consequence; they turned bin Laden from a prominent leader in the Muslim world to a global symbol for jihad. This brings the book back to where it began in the prologue, the attacks on the World Trade Center. He concludes with questioning what to do about finding bin Laden, and where he might attack next. He reiterates the idea that even if and when bin Laden is captured, there will be other leaders to take his place and support from other groups in the Middle East, especially Pakistan and Yemen. Bergen's strength is that he is sufficiently thorough in his historical discussion of what made bin Laden so successful, but lacked a thorough follow-up on what was being done by the US and its allies to capture bin Laden and what could be done to defeat and break apart the structure of Al Qaeda.

Surprise and Strategy

In *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Robert Pape uses data from suicide terrorist attacks from 1980-2003 to discuss the motivation behind terrorism, and the impact that Islam has on the motives and operations of suicide terrorism. The author examines the strategic social and individual logic of suicide terrorism. In addition, Pape explores why terrorist groups target democracies and the justification that they find in the foundations of Islam. While discussing terrorist organizations around the world, he pays special attention to groups in the Middle East and provides an in-depth investigation into Al Qaeda. Pape concludes his work by examining terrorists as individuals to

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[16]Ibid, 123.

understand the group's dynamics and organization. He discusses the demographic and socioeconomic profile of suicide terrorists and discusses three individual case studies to illustrate his points.

Pape opens *Dying to Win* with a discussion of the strategic logic of suicide terrorism, which he argues is used by weak actors, or terrorist groups, to coerce Western states to abandon their foreign occupation. For the author, religion is rarely the root cause, but it often used as a tool by terrorist organizations in recruiting and implementing a broader strategic objective.[17] Pape falls short in this assertion, however, because in light of the 9/11 attacks, foreign occupation has done anything but decrease in the Middle East. In his review of the book, Bulworth writes that while "Pape argues that Al Qaeda's aim is to rid the Arab world of U.S. and western military forces, it is evident at least in the short run that the 9-11 attacks have resulted in greater U.S. and western military occupation in the case of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq."[18] If the main goal of terrorist organizations is to rid the Middle East of foreign occupation, then launching a suicide attack on US soil is not the way to do it. Al Qaeda had to know and expect that the United States would take action to retaliate against the attacks on its own soil.

Pape proposes that suicide terrorism is motivated by nationalism and operations are in response to unwanted foreign occupation. What may come as a surprise to many Westerners, Pape argues, is that Islam is not the root of suicide terrorism. Rather, terrorism is rooted in national and political influences. Therefore, the current western

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[17]Robert Anthony Pape, *Dying to win: the strategic logic of suicide terrorism*, (New York: Random House, 2005), 24.

[18]"Bulworth: Book Review: "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism"." Bulworth. http://jbulworth.blogspot.com/2005/07/book-review-dying-to-win-strategic.html (accessed December 2, 2010).

strategy of remaking Islamic societies will not solve the problem. Pape addresses this in his discussion of terrorist organizations being a weak actor in the politics of the Middle East and having to use unconventional tactics such as suicide operations to gain influence and recognition. The author maintains that nationalism is also the main reason why local communities resist foreign occupation.[19] The heightened sense of nationalism among Islamist terrorist groups has driven their motivation to rid the Middle East of foreign occupation. However, their plans seem to have backfired after the 9/11 attacks, as demonstrated by the military engagement by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In examining the individual logic of suicide terrorism, Pape classifies operations into two categories: egotistical and altruistic. He argues that egotistical operations are ones in which the terrorist completes the mission to escape some source of pain. Altruistic descriptions of suicide operations, he explains, are "based on the premise that killing occupiers eventually will lead to a decline in popular support for the occupation, eventual withdrawal and, for the occupied, liberation."[20] This is why, Pape argues, occupied communities call their suicide bombers "martyrs."

Dying to Win also makes predictions about the war on terror. The large number of US troops in the Middle East increased the risk of Al Qaeda suicide attacks against Americans, as indicated by September 11, 2001. Pape asserts that "although most Saudi Arabians do not want to be ruled by Al Qaeda, 95 percent of Arabians want U.S. troops

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[19]Pape, 57.

[20]Omar Attum, "Book Review: Dying to Win." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. http://washington-report.org/archives/Sept_Oct_2005/0509076.html (accessed December 3, 2010).

to leave their country."[21] The author contends that the longer the United States occupies Iraq and other regions in the Arab world, the more vulnerable the United States will be to another attack. Pape suggests that to avoid such attacks, the United States needs to formulate a new foreign policy that insures security, while still maintaining continued access to oil, without resorting to occupation and stationing troops in the Arab world. Where Pape falls short is his failure to make suggestions for what this new policy might be.

Pape's recommendations do present some inconsistencies. In a comprehensive review of Pape's work, Omar Attum addresses the possible holes in Pape's research. "He argues that suicide bombings against Israel decreased significantly after completion of the first section of its 'security fence,' and advocates its use and the use of such a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border."[22] He does not mention though, that the International Court of Justice has ruled that the wall around Israel is illegal because it is built on occupied territory. He also does not address how such an occupation can solve a problem that was, in fact, caused by occupation. Furthermore, he fails to remind his reader that while he advocates such a wall between the US and Mexico border, there never has been a terrorist attack on the United States from Mexico.

Despite minor inconsistencies, Pape's findings are new and revealing for the logistics and strategy behind suicide terrorism. His work serves as an insightful tool for supplementing research of this new enemy that the United States faces. It provides a look into the community as a whole, as well as the individual, and provides a different

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[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid, 1.

justification for suicide terrorism, other than the foundations of Islam. Terrorist group nationalism must be considered in conceiving a new foreign policy on confronting the terrorists and preventing future attacks.

Sociological Validation and Motivation

Through the Research Division of the Library of Congress, Rex Hudson compiled a study of the sociological and psychological foundations of terrorism. It is important to consider what makes the mentality of a terrorist so unique as to produce the actions of terrorism. It also is crucial to understand the social identity of terrorists to determine if there is motivation beyond religious calling that would prompt an individual not only to commit acts of terrorism, but to join a terrorist organization in the first place. The timing of Hudson's study is unique compared to popular literature on terrorism. This study was conducted in 1999, before the start of the current "War on Terror," and the case studies vary accordingly. However, it was published the year after the 9/11 attacks. Since the September 11 attacks, the Western world has allowed Al Qaeda to overshadow the presence of other terrorist organizations. This study presents generalized conclusions for terrorist identity across the globe, not just the Middle East.

Hudson begins the study by discussing a new generation of post-Cold War terrorists. He quickly makes the assertion that "terrorist behavior is normative, and that if they exceeded certain constraints and employed WMD they would completely alienate themselves from the public."[23] This assertion could lead researchers to find the determining factors of where terrorist groups would draw the line in terms of operation

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[23]Rex A. Hudson, *Who becomes a terrorist and why: the 1999 government report on profiling terrorists*, (Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 2002) 1.

tactics. While unconventional tactics of suicide bombings and improvised explosive

devises are, for the most part, completely acceptable tactics for terrorist organizations, the

use of WMD could be going too far to effectively achieve the political goals of terrorist

networks. If the end goal is to remove foreign troop presence within a particular region or

gain political equality within a state, then using a WMD in the region would be

counterproductive for terrorist groups.

Where Hudson is weak is his failure to discuss any reasoning or case studies where

terrorists have made a rigid definition of what are acceptable operations versus what

crosses the line. He also could have compared different organizations' operational tactics

and discussed whether or not certain groups have a line that they will not cross and why.

The PKK certainly would have a different line than Al Qaeda, but that could be because

of a severe difference in resources and finances rather than any ideological difference.

As he discusses the possible psychological classifications of terrorists that would use

weapons of mass destruction, Hudson examines paranoids, paranoid schizophrenics,

borderline mental defectives, schizophrenic types, passive-aggressive personality types,

and sociopath personalities.[24] He notes different studies that argue discrepancies within

this list, but his argument could be stronger with the addition of case examples for each

classification. For example, nuclear terrorism expert Jessica Stern disagrees with his

findings. She believes that "schizophrenics and sociopaths may want to commit acts of

mass destruction, but they are less likely than others to succeed."[25] While adding these

[24]Ibid, 2.

[25]Ibid 3.

contrasting studies strengthen Hudson's argument, it would be that much stronger if he would add specific case study examples.

The description of the new generation of post-Cold War terrorists aligns with other current literature on the subject. Hudson asserts that, "increasingly, terrorist groups are recruiting members with expertise in fields such as communications, computer programming, engineering, finance, and the sciences."[26] The new wave of terrorist recruiting demonstrates where recent terrorist tactics have stemmed from and where the future of terrorist operations could be going. In a world with increasing globalization, dependence on technology, and mass communication, it is crucial for terrorists to be able to adapt in order to be successful. It could even be said that terrorists need to stay ahead of the technological curve in order to insure that their operations are able to bypass security measures in their target regions.

Keeping in mind that this study was conducted two years before the Pentagon and World Trade Center attacks, Hudson made some eerie estimates of Al Qaeda's next possible attack. Hudson argued that in retaliation to the US cruise-missile attack against Al Qaeda training facilities in 1998, the network could attack some of the most crucial political buildings in the United States:

> Al Qaeda could detonate a Chechen-type building buster bomb at a federal building. Suicide bombers could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the White House.[27]

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[26]Ibid 4.

[27]Ibid, 7.

With all of the theories about conspiracy between Osama bin Laden and the US government leading up to the terrorist attacks, it is gripping to consider that Hudson's descriptions match so closely with the basic operations of what happened that morning.

Hudson introduces the sociology section of his study by defining terrorism, as well as describing terrorist group typologies and approaches to terrorism analysis. The author argues, "Terrorists attempt to create a high-profile impact on their targeted enemy with act of violence, despite the limited material resources that are usually at their disposal."[28] He cites Paul Wilkinson's study that concluded that causes of revolution and political violence in general are also the causes of terrorism. This applies to the multi-causal approach to analyzing terrorism. These could be ethnic conflicts, religious and ideological conflicts, poverty" and several others.[29] Other approaches discussed include the Organizational Approach, stating that terrorism is not committed by an individual, but by groups who reach collective decisions.[30] These different approaches allow political scientists and sociologists to classify terrorists and draw generalizations of their motivations to cause such acts.

Hudson concludes his study with case examples to demonstrate the sociological commonalities drawn on who a terrorist is. Socioeconomic standings, religion, age, gender, and location all play a role in making this determination. This is where Hudson's arguments are strongest because he offers case studies from across the globe to justify his argument. He explores female terrorists as well as terrorist networks from regions other

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[28]Ibid, 11.

[29]Ibid, 15.

[30]Ibid, 16.

than the Middle East, including South America and Africa. This study is important to gain a better understanding of the mentality behind the physical action. There has to be a reason or justification beyond religious practice that would drive an individual to become a terrorist. This is especially the case for women, have such a unique role in Islamic societies. However, women terrorists are certainly present in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The conclusions of this study are also critical because they can be applied across the global spectrum of international terrorism and are not simply region-specific.

Looking Ahead

In the arena of foreign policy and counterterrorism development, research intelligence is generated on a constant basis. New military development provides an almost instantaneous renewal of information, strategy, and long-term goals in preventing acts of terrorism and combating terrorist cells around the world. Even within the processing of this research, American Navy SEALS have captured and killed Osama bin Laden as well as other top Al Qaeda officials. President Barack Obama has announced the anticipated removal of combat forces from Afghanistan within the next year.

While terrorism is not a new threat, the tactics, operatives, and motivating factors continue to change. The structure of leadership and participation has remained consistent over time, but the addition of female operatives and the shift from religious motivation to a drive for political equality has forced a change in counterterrorism policy. There has been a definite transition from a sense of religious extremism that motivated early terrorist attacks to the extreme nationalism that supports the modern terrorist movement. Therefore, the colloquial phrases presented to the public by the media of "holy war" and "jihad" are misnomers for a struggle for political equality and identity.

However, what may be considered progress to the mainstream American public, only presents new obstacles and struggles for policymakers. It is only a matter of time before new members in Al Qaeda rise up to assume the charismatic role of their late leader. Removing troops from Afghanisntan could possibly open the door to new threats and vulnerabilities for both civilians in Afghanistan and US military in other parts of the region. Still, understanding the end goal of terrorism, as well as the strategies that this unique social structure uses to accomplish its goals, remains critical in developing proactive, effective foreign policy.

CHAPTER 2

A Global Perspective on Terrorism Through a Survey of the Kurdistan Workers Party
and Al Qaeda

Foreign policy analysts around the world largely underrated the presence of terrorist

networks and their ability to undermine the stability and infrastructure of governments

until the late 21st century. While certain groups have existed for decades, it has been to

the detriment of unsuspecting civilians and ill-prepared governments that the structure,

strategy, and motivation of terrorist networks have not been properly analyzed until after

attacks that devastated entire populations. In an increasingly globalized society, it is

important to consider the fact that foreign adversaries are no longer restricted to being

state actors. The rise of terrorist organizations has established a new wave of foreign

policy in regions around the globe, particularly the Middle East, which has been impacted

by both religious extremist groups and extreme nationalist organizations. With a strong

internal following and funding from other nations, these groups set out to accomplish

their religious or political goals by using unconventional tactics, making it difficult for

the international community to formulate a policy to effectively combat them or put an

end to their operations. No two terrorist organizations operate the same. They are built

around a different hierarchy of membership, fulfill different roles within that hierarchy,

and have end goals that are very specific to their reasons for violence or revolution.

Therefore, policy development for deterring terrorist acts or dissolving their cells has to

be unique to each organization. In this chapter we discuss the history, structure, strategy

and support of the Kurdistan Workers Party and Al Qaeda.

The Kurdistan Workers Party

In light of the current US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that were prompted by the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 2001, the mainstream perception of terrorism has been skewed to consider only religious extremism as a motivation for terrorism. However, the nationalist political movement in Turkey has presented a new wave of violent action to achieve political goals. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is an extreme nationalist organization led by Abdullah Ocalan as a movement to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.

With an active force of nearly five thousand members, and more than half located in northern Iraq, the PKK has presented a threatening voice to the infrastructure of both Turkey and the fledgling democracy of Iraq. The PKK receives funding and political support from several countries throughout the Middle East as well as Western Europe. This combination of external support and internal nationalist strength is what allows the PKK to remain such a strong force in the region.

History and Leadership

The US State Department designated the Kurdistan Workers Party or Kongra-Gel (KGK) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997.[31] While this was the date of official international recognition, the PKK has long since been operating in the Middle East, planning and executing attacks on those considered to be working against the

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[31]"Country Reports On Terrorism," U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm (accessed November 1, 2011).

nationalist and separatist mission of the organization. The Kurdistan Workers Party rose to power and influence as an extreme nationalist group. The PKK emerged out of the anarchy and civil turmoil of the 1970s when a number of violent, radical left-wing Turkish groups emerged in the political system.[32] Leftist Kurdish students began discussing the movement as early as 1973, and the PKK held is opening congressional meeting with Abdullah Ocalan in 1978.[33]

Abdullah Ocalan, a Maoist who studied political science at Ankara University, founded the PKK in 1978 as a Marxist-Lenninst organization. At the Fifth Congress of the PKK in 1995, Ocalan defined his ambitions that "the ultimate goal of the organizations is the creation of a Maoist State in areas of Turkey, Iran and Iraq."[34] Ocalan's main target were civilians who do not submit to his ambitions and security forces that stand in the way of goals, especially teachers, members of village self-defense groups, and elected officials.[35] For almost twenty years, Syria and Syrian-occupied Lebanon allowed their states as Ocalan's headquarters and facilities for his operations. However, after Turkey and Syria nearly went to war against each other in October 1998,

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[32]H. Barkey, "Turkey's Kurdish Question," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites.ccpdc/pubs/kur/kurfr.htm (accessed November 1, 2011).

[33]Ibid, 22.

[34]M. Radu, "Who Is Abdullah Ocalan?" PKK Terror, October 8, 2006, http://www.pkkterror.com/content/view (accessed November 14, 2011).

[35]Ibid.

"Demascus backed down, closed PKK camps and expelled Ocalan."[36] Ocalan went to Moscow and was then offered asylum by the Russian Duma.

In just a few days, Ocalan was invited to come to Greece, where he was welcomed by the broad expanse of support that he and his organization was receiving throughout the Middle East and now, even Europe. The United States and Turkey allied together to put pressure on the Russians to get rid of Ocalan. The Russians obliged, and after being expelled by the Russian government, Ocalan fled to Italy. Unfortunately for Ocalan, when he arrived in Rome, he was detained with a counterfeit passport and arrested on international warrants from Germany and Turkey. Ocalan was extradited to Turkey where he remains imprisoned at the maximum security Imrali Island prison.

Early operations of the PKK began as small, rural attacks. The organization's first series of attacks "targeted Kurdish landlords, including an assassination attempt on a member of parliament from the Justice party of Suleyman Daniel."[37] Through these early initiatives, the Kurdistan Workers Party made a name for itself as a fighter for the disenfranchised.[38] The PKK also became the most effective group in the southeast of the region and began to catch the security forces in the Middle East. These early police measures forced Ocalan and the executive council members to flee Turkey and establish operations in Syria, where the headquarters of operations remained until Ocalan's detainment in 1999. Military operations against the state were launched in 1984, and PKK authority figures added two more branches to the organization. The actual party is

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[36]Ibid.

[37]Barkey, 22.

[38]Ibid, 22.

the most prominent arm of the organization, but in 1985-1986, the National Liberation

Front of Kurdistan and the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan were formed to

provide intelligence, engage in propaganda activities in Turkey and abroad, and provide a

consolidated military structure.[39]

The PKK reached its height in the 1990s during the onset of the Iran-Iraq War and the

first Gulf War. These two conflicts gave the PKK the strategic depth it needed to confront

the Anakra government.[40] As troops began to thin in ranks through northern Iraq, the

PKK significantly increased its presence in the region. Furthermore, a "de facto Kurdish

autonomous zone emerged under the protection of the US, Britain, and France"[41] has

subsequently allowed the Kurdistan Workers Party to thrive.

During 2002-2003, the group transitioned, changed its name twice, and "brandished

its peaceful intentions while continuing to commit attacks and refuse disarmament."[42]

During 2004, there were numerous bombings in tourist attractions, as well as boarder

crossings into Turkey from safe-holds in northern Iraq. In 2006, the PKK claimed over

500 victims, and while a ceasefire was declared in October 2008, it only slowed the

intensity and pace of the attacks.[43] Over the following year, attacks on Turkish security

forces in the southeast continued to mount. In May 2007, the PKK claimed responsibility

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[39]Ibid, 22.

[40]Ibid, 23.

[41]Ibid, 23.

[42]"Kongra-Gel/Kurdistan Worker's Party," Global Security,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pkk.htm (accessed November 14,
2011).

[43]Ibid.

for two Improvised Explosive Device bombings within ten days in commercial Turkish centers. In an effort to add to their agenda of improvised violence, the PKK was also responsible for a series of bombings and rebel attacks in October of that year, demonstrating that even with the detainment of their top leader, the organization still presents a violent front in the region.

Nationalist Goals

From the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers Party, leaders and members of the organizations made it clear that the goal of the Party was not to reform religion, or expand the influence of Islam in the region. The Party is not at all any interpretation of a religious group. Rather, it is strictly a political movement. This is one of the main reasons that the PKK has gained so much external support. It has political motivation rather than religious goals, and outside groups are responsive to support the movement. The PKK has passionately proclaimed "its goal to be the creation of a unified, independent Kurdish state, and thus it has made no secret of its pan-Kurdish aspirations."[44] The organization supported a rigid military structure and Leninist "democratic centralism"[45] that has cut off any room for internal debate and prohibited transparency of organization and activity. Barkey argues, "No nationalist movement has achieved as much as the PKK has without recourse to political activism and preparation."[46] However, in order for the Party to operate based on the motivation of a heightened level of nationalism, there had to be

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[44]Barkey.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid.

some sort of division in the first place to inspire such a movement. This division is what scholars and analysts classify as the Kurdish Question. This what the nationalists see as a political separation between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples within the region.

In a collectivist approach to answering the Kurdish Question, the Party argues that there are two national communities in Turkey, the Turkish and the Kurdish. While this may seem like a simple answer, the PKK calls for an independent Kurdish state, and aims to "create a model of ethnic nationalism against nationalism of citizenship in Turkey."[47] According to Ozetekin, this model of ethnic nationalism is both collectivist and authoritarian, rejected the focus on the individual and therefore rejecting a focus on democracy. The PKK also argues that Turkey rejects the identity of the Kurdish people and that Turkey prohibits the Kurds from becoming involved in the political process. Ozetekin argues that despite these allegations, the Kurdish identity in Turkey is not being rejected.[48]

The constitutional structure in Turkey rejects the approach of collective identities and does not establish a differentiation between the "Kurdish people" in Turkey and the "Turkish people" in the country. This disconnect between the clash of identity recognition is exactly where the PKK finds the backing to its political movement. It also demonstrates the continuous struggle between the democratic individual approach that the Turkish government seeks to implement versus the collective authoritarian approach of the PKK. The Party leans much more on an ethnic identity than national identity, and

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[47]Y. Oztekin, "Terrorism in Turkey," Homeland Security Digital Library, April 17, 2000, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=11777&coll=limited (accessed December 15, 2011).

[48]Ibid.

therefore pushes to answer the Kurdish Question by creating an independent state for the

Kurdish people. Issues also manifest themselves when the PKK seeks to solve this

conflict with violent military attacks while the Turkish government would prefer to use

diplomatic communication. However, through the trend of earlier ceasefires and

declinations in attack frequency, it may be evident that the PKK opening up its

willingness for open discussion more so than what the international community is giving

the Party credit for.

With military resistance from Turkey and the United States, the PKK recognizes that a

military victory to gain an independent state will not be an easy task to accomplish.

According to Barkey, "while they recognize the impossibility of achieving a military

victory, they expect that the cost of the PKK-led struggle will force the Turkish

government to abandon the east and southeast, and, thereby, lead to the creation of an

independent state."[49] Still, if the PKK were to be successful in such a military campaign,

issues with state-recognition by regional and international organizations would certainly

become a problem. This could also have severe implications for a vulnerable economy

and a political system that could be increasingly susceptible to attack.

Tactics

The PKK uses a combination of classic insurgency violence and terror within the

political organization as its main idea for strategic operations. Attacks initially were

directed at potential rivals within the Kurdish camp, and then at other Kurds suspected of

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[49]Barkey, 26.

benefiting from interaction or cooperation with the state.[50] Guards in small rural villages

have especially fallen victim to the Party, and are often killed in mass numbers to

discourage further recruitment. The Kurdistan Workers Party also focuses on educational

institutions, as many members see the uneducated as their main audience for support. The

PKK sets special targets for schoolteachers and civil servants, and by burning schools and

other institutions, has greatly enraged the public.[51] Civilians are outraged that PKK

militants would destroy institutions that are so vital to the progress and wellbeing of their

community.

The PKK has set its primary focus to target the Turkish military presence in the

southeast of the region and has achieved significant results, "denying its enemy large

sections of the southeast. It even engaged the Turkish military in large skirmishes, but

suffered heavily for doing so."[52] The PKK is able to gain mainstream popularity with the

public through their longstanding unwillingness to back down from the Turkish military.

It is not a matter of having a stronger military force than the Turkish government, but that

they are more willing to keep fighting and not take surrender for an answer. The PKK

tried to create a political vacuum in the southeast by limiting the access of mainstream

Turkish institutions such as the press and political parties to the region.[53] The PKK also

encouraged civil disobedience campaigns, and targeted the economy through store

closings and worker strikes. In his research for the Wilson Center for International

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[50]Ibid, 28.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid, 29.

Scholars, Barkey finds that "by its own admission, the PKK was not very successful with its civil disobedience campaign."[54] The campaigns did not have clear political goals and were initiated too frequently. The government's security forces suppressed the civilian population, and as a result, the PKK has "clearly decided to refocus its energies on pursuing military operations an, in response to the increased effectiveness of the Turkish military, to expand its areas of operation as much as possible."[55]

Funding

The PKK receives funding from internal and external resources in order to carry out operations throughout the region. While political influence and military proficiency contribute to the success of an organization like the PKK, without monetary funding, logistical operations for the Party would cease to exist. For the PKK in particular, the source of its funding is controversial and contested throughout the international community. The organization claims that it receives most of its funds from contributions, both from Kurds within Turkey, and especially from those abroad.[56] However, government intelligence within Turkey argues that the majority of PKK funding comes from burglaries and robberies, extortion money, and a massive narcotics trade between Turkey and Europe. Barkey notes, "The PKK itself admits that it is able to gain funds by collecting customs taxes at the border from incoming trucks and activity conducted by

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[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Ibid, 30.

the main Iraqi Kurdish groups."[57] These funds are used to buy arms and support

operations in Europe. There are contributors that offer as much as twenty percent of their

salary in donation to the organization, while other funds are forcibly collected.

Drug trafficking between Turkey and the rest of Europe is of special importance for

the PKK and their funding needs. In 1992, the United States Department of State Bureau

of International Narcotics and Law issued a statement suggesting the PKK members

control much of the European drug cartel.[58] The report maintains that not only does the

PKK use taxes from narcotics traffickers and refiners to finance operations. Based on

report findings, the PKK may also be directly involved in transporting and marketing

narcotics in Europe as well. Y. Oztekin, a scholar in homelands security focused his

research on terrorism in Turkey. He found that "according to British security services, the

PKK is responsible for forty percent of the heroin sold in the European Union."[59] It is

estimated that the PKK makes millions of dollars each year from narcotics trafficking and

uses the profit to purchase firearms, munitions. And other equipment used by the

terrorists. A separate report issued under the UN International Drug Control Program

reported that "there were clear linkages between some narco-terrorist organizations for

example the Kurdistan Workers Party and other organized transnational criminal

groups."[60] The international community uses Turkey's geographic position along the

Balkan route to use in their accusation of PKK involvement in the narcotics trade. By

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[57]Ibid.

[58]Oztekin, 7.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid.

using this route, the PKK transports morphine base and heroin from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan into Turkey's eastern borders. Oztekin also discusses how drug trade for funding has become more prominent among terrorist organizations. "Since the late 1980s, the terrorist organizations have, instead of trafficking externally produced heroin, and opted for a more profitable way of producing heron from non-heroin opiates."[61]

The narco-terrorism issue surrounding the PKK is one of the most alarming for scholars and analysts because they fear that writing off the PKK as simply a narco-terrorist group is a misleading classification that will detract from the presence that this group makes politically. If not enough attention is placed on their political endeavors, then the recourse in the region could be detrimental to the civilians living there. This label would "conceal the more fundamental national, political, and social basis of the PKK movement, of which the narcotics trade is neither the raison d'etre nor a permanent feature."[62]

External Support

In order for the PKK to continue operations, it must rely on some form of support from other states. As previously mentioned, the PKK has received political support and financial contributions from countries in the Middle East as well as Western Europe. Barkey argues, "To the extent that the Kurdish Question is Turkey's most vulnerable point, for the countries threatened by Turkey, the PKK is a valuable tool with which to

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[61]Ibid.

[62]Barkey, 31.

punish Turkey."[63] Therefore, countries like Iran and Iraq have particular interest in funding the PKK. However, any external support from Iraq or Iran would be based on political motivation. With the knowledge that the PKK actively participates in the drug trade and deadly operations that are by no means justified for the advancement of Islam, this should have some implications for those Islamist nations that choose to support the organization. The PKK is a strictly nationalist movement that at one point even renounced Islam. When considering the political differences between these nations and Turkey, it could be interpreted that two rival Islamic groups in Iraq and Iran have banded together to support the PKK in its mission against the Turkish government. Because the PKK is so much more of a political movement than any sort of religious extremism, implications for Islam are much more indirect that directly impactful. Iraq and Iran are not the only countries supporting the PKK. In his research, Barkey contends, "The Syrian regime has been the foremost supporter of the PKK."[64] Until late 1998, the regime "provided the PKK with training facilities in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley in Lebanon" and provided a safe haven in Damascus for Ocalan and his executive council.[65]

The PKK also finds operation centers in the Western world. "The hub of the PKK's external activities in is Germany," where a majority of the Kurds reside as guest workers.[66] The guest workers provide the link between the West and the PKK and enabled the Kurds to organize and mobilize. Even though they are banned in Germany,

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[63]Ibid, 31.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid, 33.

the PKK still initiates large-scale demonstrations, sit-ins, and hunger strikes. According to the State Department, the PKK has 4,000 active sympathizers in Austria.[67] The PKK also has a known presence in Belgium and Cyprus. The Party uses Cyprus as a fundraising hub and a traveling route to other countries, possibly even for the narcotics trade. While other countries in Western Europe like France, Denmark, and Great Britain have condemned the PKK as a terrorist organization, it is still possible that the PKK has supporters in the region and could be using those locations to organize operations.

Recent Developments and Final Thoughts

The PKK launched a new wave of terrorist attacks against the Turkish government in 2009, but has not claimed credit for any of these attacks. Violence continued through 2010 as the PKK committed several attacks on Turkish security forces in the summer and fall, with no intentions of slowing their violence. In its most recent series of attacks, Turkish security forces have expressed growing frustration with the United States and Iraqi governments in their resistance to act against PKK rebels. Even more damaging is recent allegations "that the US helped Kurdish fighters."[68] If these allegations hold true, this could significantly strain US-Turkish relations and further damage the already weak reputation of the United States's stance on human rights and democracy in the eyes of the international community.

The Kurdistan Workers Party has been a violent force provoking the Turkish government with deadly attacks to advance its political agenda. As such a strong

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[67]US State Department, 1.

[68]"Wikileaks Report: Turkey Helped Al-Qaeda, Us Supported PKK?" Armenian Weekly, November 27, 2010, http://www.armenianweekly.com/2010/11/27/turkey-helped-al-qaida-us-supported-pkk-documents-show (accessed November 1, 2011).

nationalism movement, the PKK has garnered support within Turkey and abroad, in hopes that the Kurdish people can have their own independent national and finally be adequately represented within the international community. It has virtually impossible for the international community to confront such a vehement political movement, and with support from its own people as well as finance and political asylum abroad, the PKK is not a force that will soon be quieted without some sort of compromise or negotiation in their political aspirations.

Al Qaeda

Different forms of terrorism have existed for centuries. Groups of stateless individuals carrying out attacks with unconventional tactics in order to further some sort of a nationalist, religious, or cultural mission is not a new concept in the grand scale of world events. However, terrorist activity remained largely un-researched and un-analyzed until the attacks that shook the Western world to its core on September 11, 2001. On that fateful morning, four commercial airliners full of unsuspecting passengers and crew members were used as weapons in an attack on the United States at the World Trade Centers in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington DC, and a rural field in Pennsylvania. Two planes hit the World Trade Center Complex, a third plane crashed into the Pentagon, and it has been estimated that a fourth plane could have possibly been intended for the White House or for Capitol Hill. These attacks were planned and implemented by the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks became the most deadly attack on American soil in history, and changed the nature of American foreign policy, becoming the catalyst for two

American theaters of war in the Middle East. While there are certainly other terrorist groups not only recognized by the CIA but also by the international community as a threat to peace and security, it is critical that special attention be given to Al Qaeda because of the direct impact that the organization has had on the United States and continues to have on its foreign policy. This single organization managed to undermine the security of a country that stood as the world leader in military strength and security intelligence. Within a matter of hours, all of that seemed to fall apart in front of a public that was unaware of a threat of that magnitude and a government that was unprepared to answer such a threat.

History

Contrary to mainstream belief, Al Qaeda was not established originally as an organization to dismantle the West or halt the movement of democracy throughout the Middle East. In 1988, Osama bin Laden and other Arab fighters from the *mujahideen* movement that was supported by the United States collaborated to form Al Qaeda, which means "the base." According to news analysts from the BBC, "The organization grew out of the network of Arab volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight under the banner of Islam against Soviet Communism."[69] Bin Laden immediately began an anti-Soviet campaign and his group became known as the "Arab Afghans." During the attacks against the Soviets, Al Qaeda received American and Saudi funding. There are even some analysts that speculate that Bin Lade had security training from the CIA.[70]

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[69]BBC, "Al Qaeda's Origins and Links," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1670089.stm (accessed January 25, 2012).

[70]Ibid.

While the CIA denies these claims, scholars and analysts have pointed out that the United States provided funding and training to the *mujhaideen* fighters during the Soviet-Afghan War. In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 166, authorizing increased covert military aid to the *mujahideen*. The Act also established a new strategy for the Afghan war: to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action. This US assistance began with an increase in arms supplies and a stream of CIA and Pentagon specialists who traveled to Pakistan to help plan operations for the Afghan rebels.[71]

In 1991, Osama bin Laden moved through the Sudan to set up training camps. Sudan has become the oldest base for Al Qaeda business operations and preparations for attack. Bin Laden stayed in the Sudan for five years in order to grow his organization and establish a structure for carrying out missions. On February 26, 1993, Al Qaeda carried out its first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. A bomb planted in a car parked near the complex exploded, killing six and injuring more than 1000 people.[72] On October 4, 1993, eighteen US servicemen were killed in Somalia after members of a Somali militia shot down two Black Hawk helicopters. US analysts believe that Al Qaeda fighters helped to train those responsible for the attack. There were several more attacks throughout the 1990s, but most significant was the fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden in

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[71] Steve Coll, "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War," Washington Post, July 19, 1992. http://www.globalissues.org/article/258/anatomy-of-a-victory-cias-covert-afghan-war(accessed January 23, 2012).

[72]"Al Qaeda's Origins and Links." 1.

February 1998.[73] Written in the name of the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," this fatwa called for the killing of Americans, saying it is the "individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."[74] On October 12, 2000, two suicide attackers rammed a boat that was carrying explosives into the *USS Cole* near the port of Aden in Yemen. Seventeen US sailors were killed during the attack.

As mentioned earlier, the most infamous Al Qaeda attack committed was the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attacks, countless analytical documents have been written and published to address the question of why these attacks were committed, what could have been done to stop the terrorists, and most importantly, what policy can be formulated to protect the country against future attacks. These attacks were center stage for both American and international media outlets for months following and even ten years later, the sentiments of that morning still resounded with the American public, a public that had seen nothing of that magnitude in their lifetime. Nineteen members of Al Qaeda hijacked four planes from commercial airports and flew them into pre-selected targets. Nearly three thousand people died in the attacks, the worst ever on American soil.[75]

After the US began launching attacks in Afghanistan in an effort to shut down Al Qaeda, the organization moved operations back to the Middle East and throughout the

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[73]A fatwa is a juristic ruling concerning Islamic law issued by an Islamic scholar. In bin Laden's 1998 fatwa, he calls US presence in the Middle East a crime and a sin, and calls for a jihad against an enemy that is destroying Muslim countries.

[74]"Al Qaeda's Origins and Links." 1.

[75]Ibid.

early 2000s, carried out attacks in Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and

Iraq. On December 23, 2003, two groups that are linked to Al Qaeda attacked the British

Consulate in Istanbul, killing 27 and wounding more than 450. On March 11, 2004, ten

bombs exploded on four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain. Nearly 200 people were

killed and at least 1,800 were injured. Spanish officials found the attacks to be at the

hands of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which is said to support Al Qaeda's

war against the West.[76] In his book, *Terrorism- Understanding the Global Threat*, David

Whittaker writes about the attacks in Madrid and how these bombings brought Europe

back into the forefront as a target. The terrorist attacks on Madrid's railway stations are

labeled by Whittaker as Madrid's 9/11.[77] The author notes that "the collateral of

terrorism, that constant raw, numbing feeling of fear and anticipated surprise held most

Spaniards in suspense."[78]

London also fell victim to coordinated terrorism in July 2005. The bombs that went

off in the underground train stations, as well as on the transport bus in Tavistock Square,

crushed any sense of security in public London areas, and left the world wondering who

could have committed this and what would happen next. A fact causing much pain and

confusion was the impossibility of establishing who might be missing and who might

have escaped.[79] This was the same sentiment at the World Trade Center in September

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[76]Ibid.

[77]David J. Whittaker. *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat*. Rev. ed. Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson, 2007. Pg 30.

[78]Ibid, 34.

[79]Ibid, 35.

2001. Not only the fear and shock of what had occurred, but also the confusion and uncertainty of what could happen next forced the public into turmoil. Attacks throughout the Middle East continued to be carried out by the organization, and while nothing of the magnitude of 9/11 has occurred since, it has left analysts and civilians alarmed at the possibility of future attack.

Al Qaeda's Religious Motives and Nationalist Goals

Al Qaeda's goals have been intricately intertwined with both founding religious principles that have provided the umbrella for specific political motives. Current policy analysts fail to effectively classify Al Qaeda's motives when they simply leave it at a matter of religious "jihad" or a holy war against Christianity. Osama bin Laden's experiences as a coordinator for the Afghan and Arab resistance to the Soviet invasion during the 1980s provided the foundation for his belief that Muslims could take effective military action inspired by select Islamic principles. Bin Laden was taught by Islamist scholars and soon developed an ideological basis for his own belief in a puritanical Salafist Islamic reform in Muslim societies. He also believed in the necessity of armed resistance in the face of aggression—"a concept Al Qaeda has since associated with a communally-binding Islamic principle known as 'defensive jihad'."[80] By the early 1990s, bin Laden was very vocal about his desire to secure the withdrawal of US and other foreign troops from Saudi Arabia at all costs. In 1996, bin Laden issued a declaration of jihad against the United States, signaling his emergence as an international figure and

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[80]Christopher Blanchard, "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf (accessed January 25, 2012).

offered a full account of his main critiques of an enemy described as the "alliance of Jews, Christians, and their agents."[81]

After this declaration of jihad on the United States, bin Laden expanded the vision of the organization to include calls for political change and the reformation of Islamic societies. Christopher Blanchard conducted his research on the evolving ideology of Al Qaeda. He proposed that "Bin Laden argued that the Islamic world should see itself as one seamless community, and that Muslims were obliged to unite and defend themselves."[82] He sought a society that would be governed by Islamic law and follow Islamic principles of economics and social governance. He maintained that Afghanistan was a model Islamic state under the Taliban and this rhetoric continued to garner him support for both the Taliban and Al Qaeda.[83] Still, analysts argue that the construction of an Islamic state was a matter of nationalist motives that were disguised by religious principles to gain more support. In response to attacks in Yemen and on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, bin Laden argued that the attacks should be seen by Americans and the international community as retribution for US policy and compared them to alleged "massacres" of Palestinians.[84] These attacks were not classified as a Muslim response to Christian practices. Christianity was not even mentioned in bin Laden's responses. Therefore, special care needs to be taken in developing a comprehensive counter-terrorist policy that does not completely ignore religion, but focuses mainly on the political

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[81]Ibid.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Ibid.

motives of Al Qaeda's operations.

In the aftermath of 9/11, new departments and agencies were created within the US government to begin to research and analyze new information in regards to past attacks and future threats. During the first public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Brian Jenkins discussed the nature of the current threat and what the perceived motives of Al Qaeda were in carrying out these attacks. He noted first that Al Qaeda is more than just an organization. "It is a global network of relationships, a system for transforming the frustrations and discontents of Islam-natives, marginalized immigrants, the military sons of immigrants-into a violent expression of jihad."[85] This is significant and crucial for analysts and foreign policy makers not to marginalize Al Qaeda into a specific mold that can be combated with a singular policy of reaction or prevention. Al Qaeda is much more complex. For its members, Al Qaeda provides connectivity, training, and financial support for many different linked cells and groups that stretch all the way from North Africa to the southern Philippines. Throughout its history, Al Qaeda has indicated different political grievances that spur on its operations. "The presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, the oppression of the Palestinians, the suffering of Iraqi civilians under UN sanction, and an American-led war" are all used as examples to recruit members to its cause.[86]

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[85]Brian Jenkins, "First Public Hearing of the National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing1/witness_jenkins.htm (accessed January 25, 2012).

[86]Ibid.

Recent Developments and Looking Ahead

In the post-9/11 world, Al Qaeda shifted its focus of operation back to the Middle

East. Responding to US troop presence in Afghanistan and Iraq was the new goal of the

organization. Al Qaeda had a captive audience as the US began carrying out its own

attacks against the terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bin Laden vehemently requested

that all Muslims oppose the new government being established by coalition forces in Iraq.

Blanchard notes that "Abu Musab al Zarqawi referred to the current situation in Iraq as

an opportunity for the global jihadist movement to take advantage of insecurity in the

heart of the Arab world and to spread into neighboring areas."[87]

Al Qaeda operations continue to work toward their political goals through three

foundations. The first is the creation of an Islamic state governed solely by sharia law.

The second is foundation is that free elections and reforms will not be possible for

Muslims without freeing Muslim lands from ever aggressor and establishing Muslim

control over energy resources, including a nuclear arsenal. Finally, Muslims are to resist

and overthrow rulers who violate Islamic laws and principles.[88] Again, while these

foundations may be grounded under the umbrella of Islam, or use the Islamic faith as

principle guide for carrying out operations, it is not merely for faith reasons that Al

Qaeda continues to operate. There is a greater political gain to be made.

In terms of a current threat, today's Al Qaeda significantly differs from the Al Qaeda

of 9/11. The organization is more decentralized and operations depend more on local

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[87]Blanchard, 12.

[88]Ibid, 13-14.

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initiative.[89] This was especially the case after Osama bin Laden was captured and killed

by US Special Forces in 2011. Since 2001, any further attack or perceived threat has been

less severe than the 9/11 attacks. It is no secret or surprise that Al Qaeda is determined to

acquire weapons of mass destruction that could kill tens of thousands through biological

or chemical warfare.[90] However, if the United States is able to capitalize on the current

level of decentralization within the organization and develop counter-terrorist intelligence

and strategies, then the severity of threats can diminish. Furthermore, Al Qaeda is not the

only terrorist group that the US needs to be aware of.[91] The many linked organizations to

Al Qaeda could all pose substantial threat to safety and security and the US cannot solely

focus on Al Qaeda and turn a blind eye to the possibility of attack from another

organization.

With a survey perspective of the motives, strategies, and goals of terrorist networks as

organizations, foreign policy scholars and political scientists have turned to other fields

of research to learn more about the individual characteristics of the people who are

members of these organizations. Scholars look to sociology, psychology, and religious

studies to determine if there are any commonalities in the socioeconomic status of

individual terrorists. As researchers study who becomes a terrorist and why, they take

into account several factors that would be unique to individual societies, including

poverty, religion, and education. Recently, scholars have given special attention to the

status of women in society. The next chapter will focus on the emerging role of women

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[89]Jenkins, 2.

[90]Ibid.

[91]Examples include smaller groups linked to Al Qaeda, cyberterrorism threats, and domestic threats.

in terrorist organizations by providing research from historical and sociological perspectives to demonstrate that the future of these organizations depend on the functional role of their female members. Furthermore, future counterterrorism policy must take a more comprehensive approach to address the use of women in terrorist networks and the implications of using women as suicide bombers.

CHAPTER 3

The Role of Women in Terrorist Networks

Female involvement in terrorist networks has garnered significant attention recently from both scholars and the mainstream media. The threat of female suicide bombers is not new from a global perspective, and the role of women in terrorist organizations continues to grow at an alarming rate for counterterrorism policymakers and national security advisors. Research demonstrating the vital part that women play in Al Qaeda, the PKK, the Black Widows, as well as other groups in Latin America and Africa is being analyzed to determine what would drive women to become terrorists and what implications female terrorist activity has on their specific society and on the global stage. While there are several different factors that motivate women from different regions and religious sects to join terrorist organizations, there is a commonality that these women seek equality in their society, and then equality within the terrorist network in which they participate.

History

Female involvement in terrorist organizations is not a new threat. Secular groups began openly using women as agents of terrorism nearly thirty years ago, but research suggests that women have been used in terrorist groups at even earlier dates. Debra Zedalis, a graduate of the Army War College and researcher for the Strategic Studies Institute, has done extensive research on female suicide bombers. Her research includes a history of female terrorism; their motives for enlistment, and the implications women

have on terrorist networks and counterterrorism policy. Zedalis opens with a brief history of suicide bombing.

Long-term research indicates that suicide terrorism existed as early as the 11th century. The Assassins, a group of Muslim fighters, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the cause of Islam. Zedalis argues, "These perpetrators perceived their deaths as acts of martyrdom for the glory of God."[92] Historically, these religious acts of martyrdom were exclusive to terrorist groups with religious motivation. Secular terrorist groups began using female agents much later. Sana'a Youcef Mehaidli was sixteen when she conducted the first known female suicide attack in April 1985. Mehdaidli was a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and drove a truck of explosives into an Israeli defense convoy, killing two soldiers and injuring two more.[93] Secular groups such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party and the Kurdistan Workers Party continued to include women within the organization. In fact, "Seventy-six percent of attackers from the Kurdistan Workers Party have been women."[94] As women were successfully integrated into political separatist groups, religious groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban have formed female cells within the network. These cells are located in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the first Al Qaeda female suicide bomber attack occurred on December 25, 2010.

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[92]Debra Zedalis, "Female Suicide Bombers" (U.S. Army War College, 2004), 1-13, in Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/zedalis.pdf (accessed October 25, 2011).

[93]Ken Stofer, "The Unaddressed Threat of Female Suicide Bombers," *The War Report*, January 5, 2012, 1-3.

[94]Ibid, 1.

Throughout history, the prevalence of female suicide bombers has spread to Lebanon, Sri Lana, Chechnya, Israel, Turkey, and regions of Latin America. Women in Latin America have played important roles in various terrorist operations. "Women were among the fiercest fighters of the M-19 movement raid on Colombia's Palace of Justice in 1985."[95] Female leadership in terrorist organizations is unique to Latin America. Melida Anaya Montes was second in command of the People's Liberation Forces, and Dora Maria Tellez Arguello was second in command of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. In 1998, it was estimated that nearly one-third of the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) recruits were women. Some of the most notable terrorist organizations that have publicized their use of females include the Kurdistan Workers Party, Chechen rebels known as Black Widows, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and most recently, Hamas. Zedalis also provides statistical data collected on female suicide bombers. For instance, the LTTE "has committed the most attacks, close to 200, using women bombers in 30-40%."[96] Zedalis also provides data on specific case studies of female suicide bombing attacks. According to her data, Andaleeb Takafka was one the most successful female suicide bombers. In 2002, she detonated a bag full of explosives in Israel, killing 6 and injuring 104. While researchers like Zedalis have found relatively thorough information to trace the history of female suicide bombers, there are still questions to be answered. It is more difficult for scholars to obtain primary resources for research because of cultural or religious values that prohibit women from speaking out

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[95]Suzanne Graham, *African Politics: Beyond the Third Wave of Democratization* (Capetown: Joelien Pretorius, 2008), 198-219.

[96]Zedalis, 2.

about their membership in terrorist networks, let alone their role within the organization. Top officials for Al Qaeda deny that women are participants in the organization, even though research and media reports have found this to be true.

Common Characteristics

Zedalis defines who a suicide bomber is and why terrorist organizations have began using these attacks so frequently. The Institute for Counter-Terrorism defines suicide bombing as an "operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator. The terrorist is fully aware that if she/he does not kill her/himself, the planned attack will not be implemented."[97]

Zedalis moves into a discussion about who becomes a suicide bomber. Without primary source interviews, Zedalis notes the difficulty in finding consistent commonalities as well as her hesitation to make over-generalizing statements about who becomes a female terrorist as not to exclude exceptions to the evidence that she found. It is not a matter of lack of effort, rather the evidence that finding data or firsthand accounts from suicide bombers is virtually impossible, especially when to be considered a successful suicide bomber, the inevitable end of one's life would prohibit the ability to pass on information to scholars and researchers. There are some common factors that are assessed in determining who becomes a suicide bomber, including age, education, economic status, and socialization toward violence. The only factor that researchers can see any valid consistency in is that suicide bombers are primarily young people. This applies to female suicide bombers as well. Research shows that "the positive attitudes

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[97]Ibid, 2.

toward political violence—already well entrenched in persons under 17 years of age—

actually increases in the population up to the age of 24."[98] There is a fear among analysts

that organizations will pull in younger and younger women. "Once they break the

boundaries of what is accepted on a human level, there are no boundaries."[99] Other

characteristics of female suicide bombers seem to vary across the board. Some are

widows and others have never been married. Job status varies as well as socioeconomic

status. It is easier for analysts to compare characteristics between female suicide bombers

of two different groups rather than trying to find a consistent middle ground across all of

them. For instance "analysts can easily compare the Black Widows in Russia with the

Palestinian suicide bombers, since both appear to be serving struggle of national identity

with religious overtones."[100]

Motivation

There are several motivating factors for females who participate in terrorist

organizations. Some of these motivating factors are parallel to the reasons why their male

counterparts choose to participate in terrorist networks, but there are also some stark

differences. It is critical to keep in mind that gender-related aspects of violence have to be

interpreted within specific regions and societies, because gender relations are fluid and

change to the standards of each system and community.[101] When women were first

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[98]Ibid, 8.

[99]Ibid, 10.

[100]Ibid, 8.

[101]Graham, 202.

introduced to secular groups in the 1980s, it was a matter of strategy. Women were thought to have the ability to escape detection more easily than men and would therefore have more tactical value for the organization. Zedalis addresses the specific benefits that are provided by using female suicide bombers. There is a tactical advantage in terms of a "stealthier attack, element of surprise, and hesitancy to search women."[102] There is also an increased number of combatants and increased publicity that a group is using female bombers. The increased publicity will result in a larger number of recruits for the organization as a whole. What makes suicide bombers ideal for terrorist groups is that they "provide the low-cost, low-technology, low-risk weapon that maximizes target destruction and instills fear—women are even more effective with their increased accessibility and media shock value."[103] As time progresses and more women come to join terrorist organizations, there is a broader range of motivating factors that might drive a woman to join a terrorist network.

In her research, Suzanne Graham found that there are several generalized themes that exist for female involvement in terrorism. "It is understood that in many cases individuals becoming terrorists are impoverished, socially alienated, unemployed outcasts of a society."[104] However, for women, there are much more complex and gender specific factors that can drive someone to participate in terrorist activity. A common factor driving both males and females into terrorist networks is belief in a political cause. "A deep sociopolitical desire for change of leadership within a country, would, for example,

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[102]Zedalis, 7.

[103]Ibid, 8.

[104]Graham, 202.

involve every segment of society, including women."[105] In the 1960s and 1970s, Italian leftist groups attracted female groups with a message of social change and the promise of equality within the organization. Palestinian females were attracted by the radical ideas of the Infitada and later joined terrorist organizations. "Female terrorists in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) explained their shared hatred for the British troops…that motivated their joining the IRA."[106] Women are motivated to join groups like the IRA because of their promotion of equality within the group. Women's motivations for freedom exist in a multi-layered system. They want political freedom or independence for that specific group, but they also seek a sense of equality within the group itself.

Women are also motivated by the desire for social acceptance into a specific community and the desire to gain a higher rank in that social hierarchy. Women who act on behalf of terrorist organizations are able to position themselves "in roles within their organizations to improve their present status, but also in the hope of continuing this position in post-struggle structures."[107] These women are attracted by the possible social opportunities that they may receive after the political change that the group is fighting for. The problem with this assumption is that they fail to take into account the possibility that their male counterparts are only using them for tactical value and have no true intentions of ensuring social equality in their post-struggle system. These women are living, acting, and dying on the hope that they will be honored for their work and treated

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[105]Zedalis, 203.

[106]Ibid.

[107]Graham, 204.

equally. Furthermore, the motivating factor of social equality fails for suicide bombers who are successful because they will not be present to experience social change anyway.

One of the most central themes in motivation for female involvement in terrorist networks is the desire to restore feminine honor. In many communities, the female body is a symbol of honor that relates to a woman's perceived sexual purity.[108] For Middle Eastern and South Asian communities in particular, sexual purity is taken very seriously, and if a woman's honor is compromised through any violation of this purity, "the shame is not only placed on her but also extended to her family."[109] In an effort to restore this purity, women turn to suicide terrorism as a way to redeem themselves from shaming their family and to restore that honor. A woman's honor could also be compromised by a woman's inability to bear children, by a divorce, or by her having sex out of wedlock. This loss of honor could haunt a woman for the rest of her life.

There have been several reported examples of terrorist participation for honor restoration. In 1999, an 18-year old member of the LTTE presented flowers that were filled with explosives to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The terrorist agent was "close enough to touch his feet when the bomb went off."[110] A possible motivation for her to join the Tamil Tigers was her gang rape two years earlier that led to her becoming a social outcast in Sri Lanka. She opted to try and redeem herself by fighting for Tamil freedom.[111] In 2002, Wafa Idriss became the first female suicide terrorist of the Israeli-

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[108]Sofer, 2.

[109]Ibid.

[110]Ibid, 3.

[111] Graham, 202.

Palestinian conflict. Her husband divorced her because she was unable to have children. Idis was born in a refugee camp and was conditioned to violent militancy by living through the first Palestinian uprising against Israel. In January 2002, Idris went to the shopping district in downtown Jerusalem where she blew herself up, killing an Israeli man and wounding others.[112] She was a volunteer medic in the conflict but on that Sunday morning, "was out to kill as many Israeli civilians as she could, in one of the most devastating attacks by a Palestinian woman."[113] Both of these women were seeking to clear their name of the shame that had been brought on by violations of social norms. They were hoping to redeem themselves, not only in the eyes of the family, but also in the eyes of society. "Suicide bombers are considered martyrs and discretions in their past are forgiven and their family honor are restored when they give their life for an ideological cause."[114] It is their way of giving back to society or to their family as a sacrifice for the actions that brought shame to the family. This motivating factor is found most commonly in networks that are both politically and religiously motivated because the emphasis put on sexual purity is a societal norm and is not specific to one unique ideology.

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[112]James Bennet, "Arab Woman's Path to Unlikely 'martyrdom'," *New York Times*, January 31, 2002, under "World," http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/31/world/arab-woman-s-path-to-unlikely-martyrdom.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed March 20, 2012).

[113]Ibid.

[114]Marne Sutten, "The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism and the Need to Reform Counterterrorism Strategy" (diss., School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA506225 (accessed March 20, 2012).

Case Study: The Chechen Black Widows

There are also terrorist cells of females who make it their mission to carry out attacks in a response to grief or revenge for personal loss. According to Major Marne Sutten, a military expert in counterterrorism, grief is an important motive that attracts women into extremist organizations. The emotional, physical, and financial impact of losing a dominant male figure in their lives can drive women to be more easily radicalized by terrorist groups.[115] The Black Widows organization is comprised of women are seeking to avenge the deaths of their husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons who lost their lives in the Chechen wars against Russia. The Black Widows were officially formed in 2000 as a nationalist group in a resistance movement against the Russian government. Under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, the Black Widows began carrying out attacks in the Northern Caucasus region. The goal was to assist the Chechen militia in their rebellion against the Russian government, as well as avenge the death of their family members. In June 2000, Khava Barayeva became the first Black Widow suicide bomber when she blew herself up at a Russian military base in Chechnya.[116] They made global political headlines in 2002 "when images of Chechen women dressed in black chadors, their waists adorned with bombs, flooded Russian television screens during the three-day

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[115]Ibid, 22.

[116]START, "Terrorist Organization Profile: Black Widows," Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3971 (accessed March 21, 2012).

Moscow theater hostage crisis that left 129 people dead."[117] In 2004, Russian security

forces issued national alerts for a woman known as "Black Fatima," who was thought to

be one of the principal recruiters for the organization.

The Black Widows have been responsible for some of the most deadly terrorist attacks

in the post-9/11 world. In 2004, they were responsible for bombing two commercial

airliners that killed 89 people.[118] When Basayev was killed in 2006, Doku Umarov

assumed power. Attacks then began to spread throughout all of Russia. On March 29,

2010, two suicide bombers attacked the Moscow subway system, killing at least 40

people. Abdurakhmanova, one of the two suicide bombers fits the mold of motivating

factors for members of the Black Widows. Her husband was killed in a shoot-out with

police on New Year's Eve 2009. He was a leading Chechen militant in the region of

Dagestan.[119] The other suicide bomber was a schoolteacher that was married to a militant

Islamist. Umarov has told media sources that while the group plans to avoid civilian

targets, he does not believe there are any civilians in Russia. He claims, "A genocide of

our people is being carried out with their tacit consent."[120] For Umarov, until the people

of Russia call for the Russian government to make genuine efforts to give equality and

freedom back to the Chechen people, "civilians" are just as guilty as their government.

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[117]Miriam Elder, "Moscow Bombings Blamed On Chechnya's Black Widows," *Guardian*, March 29, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/29/black-widows-women-moscow-bombings (accessed March 21, 2012).

[118]Simon Shuster, "Russia's Black Widows: Terrorism or Revenge," *Time*, April 7, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1978178,00.html (accessed March 21, 2012).

[119]Ibid, 1.

[120]Elder, 1.

While some scholars and researchers hesitate to classify all Black Widow attacks as a means to seek justice for their husbands' deaths, most find common ground in the fact that extremists within the community can turn to the emotions of frustration and grief to the "ends of terrorism, usually after an order comes down from insurgents in the mountains to prepare a suicide bomber."[121] There is also question over whether or not membership in the Black Widows is completely voluntary, or if there are instances of forced recruitment. Yulia Yuzik, who has interviewed Black Widows for her research, argues that there are more complex combinations of motivating factors for terrorist activity, rather than a simple desire for justice. In Abdurakhmanova's case, Yuzik believes that she was at the crucial point of indoctrination when the insurgent order came down. "Once the Islamist community begins insisting you martyr yourself, the do not let up. They will pursue you forever, and you have nowhere else to go. That is the trap."[122] Yuzik makes a radical statement to generalize the motives of the entire Islamist community in terms of their unwavering pursuit. However, for women who are experiencing the social and psychological struggle of losing the dominant male figure in their life, it is plausible to suggest that these women are looking for someone or something to fill that void. In order to avoid persecution, the Black Widows turn to their Islamist community where they find self-respect, and identity, and a social group to interact with. Yuzik suggests that recruiters for the Black Widows work to find women

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[121]Shuster, 2.

[122]Ibid.

over the Internet that are in need of a father figure to strengthen the vulnerability that they felt from abuse or trauma.[123]

As the Chechen rebels continue to move throughout Russia, the risk of attack by the Black Widows increases as well. Whether their motives are purely for revenge or are combined with a radical indoctrination of Islamist ideology, the threat of attack does not change. The Black Widows provide evidence for one of the central motivating factors that drive women to join terrorist networks. The group also serves as an example for the struggle that women continue to face in terrorist networks, the inability to have an elevated role in any part of society, including the terrorist organization that they sacrifice their lives and families for.

Glass Ceilings and Gender Relations

Women in terrorist groups actively participate in the innermost workings of the organization. Women can fundraise, plan attacks, serve as medics for the group, and serve as operatives in suicide attacks. However, across the spectrum of terrorist organizations, women are rarely seen holding management or leadership positions. They may have abbreviated notions of authority within the smaller social circles of the network, but none of the major Islamic terrorist organizations allow women to hold leadership positions.[124]

In tracing the leadership of major terrorist organizations, while the majority of active participants in certain groups are women, the leadership roles of all of these groups are

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[123]Ibid, 2.

[124]Brian Palmer, "The Glass Ceiling For Female Terrorists," *Slate*, March 29, 2010, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2010/03/the_glass_ceiling_for _female_terrorists.html (accessed March 21, 2012).

held by men. Since its founding, the Black Widows has been an all-female group that has been led by male militant leaders. Every major attack, resistance campaign, and fundraising initiative has been planned and implemented by female operatives, but female members are denied the opportunity to exert authority over the group. Al Qaeda demonstrates similar parallels. Ayman al-Zawahiri, current leader of Al Qaeda, denied that there are women in Al Qaeda, but believes that the "domestic service of a jihadist's wife is heroic."[125] Female operatives of the Tamil Tigers and PKK face similar struggles for equality within the group. Women carry out 65% of PKK operations even though they only comprise 15% of membership. Still, these women will never see the authoritative power to coincide with their work for the organization. Male leaders of the PKK and Tamil Tigers told female suicide bombers that their work for the organization would lay the foundation for other women to advance within the group, but this has yet to happen.[126] The lack of female leadership and equality within the terrorist network is parallel to the lack of equality they face within the civil society or community. The desire for political equality is a motivating factor for the terrorist network as a whole. However, women do not only have to fight for equality for the group, but also for equality within the group.

The glass ceiling effect is driven by the differences in values of masculinity and femininity within the terrorist community. The divide between masculine and feminine identity and the values that society places them are strict within the Islamic community.

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[125]Ibid, 1.

[126]Ibid.

These identities of gender are further magnified during times of conflict.[127] During times of conflict, society expects men to be the strong warrior. Social norms dictate that they are the fighters and are trained to attack. Men are required to be the leader of the family and community, and this expectation permeates to the terrorist organization. Women are seen as the weaker link, with less skill and training, and they are not expected to be able to plan, let alone implement terrorist attacks as an effective operative. While males are thought to have a strong sense of political or religious motive for their participation in terrorist attacks, women are thought to have stronger personal reasons. This is one of the main reasons why female terrorists are so perplexing to scholars and foreign policy advisors. Females who participate in attacks as suicide operatives defeat the major assumptions that women are weak and incapable, as demonstrated by the Black Widows.

Family relations govern the actions of the Black Widows and violent attacks are the product of personal and family circumstances. Their terrorist attacks are tied to their relationship with their male family members. In many cases, these relationships have been destroyed because of violence between the Chechen rebels and the Russian government. Based on evidence presented earlier, the actions of the Black Widows are personally, not politically motivated. "Representing the actions of Chechen women terrorists in connection with family relations fuels the inter-subjective construction of masculine and feminine identities."[128] The labeling of the actors in the conflict, as well as the nature of the violence itself, helps to construct these identities. Within the Chechen

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[127]Lucy Hall, "Erasing Agency: Representations of Women Terrorists and the Intersection of Gender, Race, and Ethnicity," *Amsterdam Social Science* 4, no. 1 (2012): 9-28, http://www.socialscience.nl (accessed March 21, 2012).

[128]Ibid, 13.

conflict, women are labeled as victims. Therefore, their actions as Black Widows are analyzed with the connotation that they are only acting out of pain or grief. This label automatically stereotypes the women into the frame that they cannot possibly be operating out of logic or reasoning, rather they are acting on raw emotion. Men, however, are labeled as aggressive terrorists and political actors.[129]

This dichotomy of gender identity creates the hierarchy of inequality within the terrorist network. Identity traits that are unique to men in conflict include public, international, cultural, reasoning, and masculine, and these are all valued higher than female traits within the organization. Females are attributed with the opposite of this set to include private, domestic, nature, and emotional and feminine traits.[130]

These identity labels benefit women in regards to how they are perceived by the rest of the world. Until recently proven wrong, governments dif not expect women to be capable of implementing terrorist attacks as deadly as those being carried out by the Black Widows and the PKK. As discussed earlier, using women serves as an excellent tactical strategy for the group. In her research, Zedalis describes the strategic advantage of using females in terrorist organizations. There is a benefit for the Chechen rebels, Al Qaeda and the PKK in using women operatives. First, "it is a simple and low-cost operation."[131] It also increases the number of mass casualties and the likelihood of extensive damage. Perhaps most importantly for the leaders of these organizations is the

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[129]Ibid.

[130]Ibid.

[131]Zedalis, 7.

idea that "there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain)."[132]

In correlation to the benefits that women operatives provide for their organization as a whole, these women are faced with the individual struggle for equality within the group. Female terrorists are represented in such a way as to "associate men exclusively with violence, politically motivated actions and aggression, and women with peace, passive, and apolitical" sentiments.[133] Furthermore, males who carry out suicide attacks are seen as martyrs or political heroes. Women who do the same thing are labeled as victims. "The victimization of female suicide bombers serves only to reinforce gender stereotypes."[134] If the actions of female terrorists are only analyzed in accordance to their feminine ideals, then any sense of political motivation is erased and "their actions, albeit violent, destructive and political, are rendered as understandable only in connection to their relationships with men."[135] These gender stereotypes inhibit policymakers from creating effective means to counteract insurgency. Policymakers cannot plan to counteract actions out of emotion, pain, or grief. However, if the stereotypes of female weakness and vulnerability are stripped away and female operatives are seen on an equal playing field within the organization, comprehensive counterterrorism policies will be effective across the board, and not confined to groups that fit the mold of society's labeled identities.

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[132]Ibid.

[133]Hall, 14.

[134]Ibid, 14.

[135]Ibid, 14.

Depictions of Female Terrorists in the Media

Female terrorists are stereotyped by scholars and policymakers and are framed by labels within their own groups, but they are also stereotyped within the media. The media uses categories to stereotype female terrorists in their portrayal of terrorist activity to the public. Not only does this give the public a skewed view of what is truly happening in foreign policy, but it also gives the groups the opportunity to play into those stereotypes and then plan attacks that catch national security officials as wells as the public completely off guard. Miglena Sternadori conducted a study to determine the trends of stereotypes that mainstream media followed in their portrayal of female terrorists. In order to do this, she pulled 100 articles that mentioned female terrorists from major news sources around the world. She then analyzed these articles in correlation to the five historically used representations of female terrorists. These include notions that female terrorists are extreme feminists, they are only bound into terrorism via a relationship with a man, they are only acting in supporting roles within terrorist organizations, they are mentally inept, and they are unfeminine in some way.[136]

As a result of her study, she found that women terrorists were stereotyped by traditional feminine roles in the majority of the articles. Sternadori found that there were five stereotypical depictions of suicide bombers that emerged from the articles. Some operatives were stereotyped as the technically unskilled suicide bomber.[137] This label

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[136]Miglena Sternadori, "Sexy, Tough, or Inept? Depictions of Women Terrrorists in the News," *Red Orbit*, November 22, 2007. http://www.redorbit.com/news/health/1154128/sexy_tough_or_inept_depictions_of_women_terrorists_in_the/ (accessed March 21, 2012).

[137]Ibid, 2.

explains Al Qaeda's denial of female participation in the network. Others were depicted as the attacker seeking revenge, which coincides with the gendered motives of the Black Widows. The "failed mother" stereotype explains the motivation for women to carry out attacks in order to restore her honor.[138] The brainwashed victim stereotype provides reasoning for the statistic that such a small percentage of PKK operatives that are women are responsible for carrying out the majority of the suicide operations.[139] Finally, some of the more mainstream media resources depicted female terrorists as "the sexy babe with personal issues."[140]

She did note, however, that there were some exceptions to the rule. For instance, shorter news articles did not contain any linguistic elements of stereotyping. Because of their length, the articles were told from a neutral perspective.[141] Other articles included a series of atypical suggestions for why females participated in terrorist organizations such as the need for money or the practice of selling females into suicidal slavery.

In terms of terrorism and counterterrorism policy, the media is charged with relaying information to a generally uneducated public. News sources have to construct violent acts in a way that is understandable to an audience. However, these acts of deviance contradict social norms and the traditional views of gender roles.[142] This stark contradiction of traditional and societal values makes for outrageous headlines and an

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[138]Ibid.

[139]Ibid.

[140]Ibid.

[141]Ibid.

[142]Ibid.

unprecedented use of details to spark interest in the reader. However, when the media chooses to follow the stereotypes of female terrorists, they are not benefiting anyone in the long run. The story lacks truth and depth, and the public receives a skewed framework of information.

Future of Female Involvement

   As terrorist organizations see success from using female operatives in their missions, the number of female terrorists is expected to grow significantly. Females provide tactical value to their insurgent groups that cannot be gained by only using men. Their ability to go undetected through security checkpoints and their stereotyped weakness makes them effective agents for some of the most violent attacks that the world has seen. Female terrorists will continue to be motivated to join terrorist networks until the cost is more than the benefit. The hope that they can restore personal honor or bring justice to the death of their male family members is enough for these women to continue to operate. While they continue to struggle for equality within the organization, the opportunity to be a part of something that brings equality to the larger group motivates them to stay active.

   This growth has significant implications for US foreign policy and for counterterrorism policy on a global level. Current foreign policy seeks to address terrorism that has been stereotyped into a very rigid frame of religious extremism and fails to recognize the growing issue of extreme nationalism and various personal factors that motivate individuals to join terrorist networks. The next chapter will discuss the implications that gendered labeling and social stereotyping has on foreign policy. It will then offer thoughts for the future directions of constructing comprehensive counterterrorism measures that do not adhere to a single stereotype or characterization.

Special attention must be given to women who participate in terrorist organizations. These women are looking for the same political equality as their male counterparts, but they continue to face the social struggle of female identity within the group. With no opportunity for upward mobility within the terrorist organization, these women are being used as a tactical pawn in men's mission for equality. They are radicalized by the group into thinking that they will be restored to their original sense of personal honor and receive economic and political stability, but they are never able to overcome the gendered structure of the system. The media do nothing to help this situation either. By presenting female terrorists within stereotyped frames of motivation, female operatives are forced into a boxed identity, an identity that was chosen for them.

CHAPTER 4

The Evolution of United States Counterterrorism Policy in a Post-9/11 Society

The counterterrorism policy of the United States has evolved significantly over the

past thirty years. Before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, counterterrorism

policy was focused on deterrence abroad. The US had never seen an attack of that

magnitude on its own soil. Members of George W. Bush's administration were left in

shock and the public was left standing in fear. As the country began to pick up the pieces

of that horrific day, policymakers began asking questions. What did they miss? Did

someone know something and say anything? Where was the loophole in the current

system of foreign policy that gave way for a series of attacks that would take the lives of

more than 2,800 Americans and cost more than \$600 million to clean up?[143] National

security advisors and the State Department immediately began to analyze the current

system of policies and work to redevelop strategy and security to ensure that this would

not happen again.

Ten and a half years after the 9/11 attacks, US counterterrorism policy continues to

develop in response to threats in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. As

research analysts and political scientists learn more about the inner-workings of terrorist

networks, policymakers are able to develop effective plans to deter and quickly respond

to the threat of attack. When the government understands the true motivating factors of

terrorist organizations, counterterrorism strategy is solidified in a comprehensive policy

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[143]"9/11 by the Numbers," 9/11 Encyclopedia,
http://www.nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm (accessed March 23,
2012).

to address the extreme nationalism that drives terrorist networks rather than historic

religious extremism that has been mainstreamed by the modern media into incorrectly

defined by colloquial phrases like "jihad" and "holy war." This chapter discusses the

evolution of US counterterrorism policy from the years leading up to 9/11 until the

present, proposing that policy has shifted to respond to a political force of violence rather

than religious motivation. Furthermore, it will address new implications for foreign

policy that are initiated by the emerging role of women in terrorist organizations and

suggest that future counterterrorism measures should address gender issues in order to be

more effective.

Policy Prior to September 11, 2011

Before September 11, 2001, the US operated from a counterterrorism policy that

focused on deterrence, complete defeat, and rapid response to any threat against land or

citizens domestically or in international territory. On June 21, 1995, a Presidential

Directive to the Vice President was issued, and stated, "The United States regards all

such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will

apply all appropriate means to combat it."[144] President Bill Clinton called for the

preemption, apprehension, and prosecution of anyone who threatened to plan or

implement such attacks. The US also sought to "identify groups or states that sponsor or

support such terrorists, isolate them, and extract a heavy price for their actions."[145] This

memorandum documents two of the key differences between policy pre-9/11 and what

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[144]U.S. The White House, *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism*, by William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 39, pt. F95, serial 426 (Washington, DC, 1997), 1-11.

[145]Ibid, 2.

has been developed since then: the United States focused on reducing domestic

vulnerabilities and working with other governments rather than using a strategy of

unilateral, preemptive strike.

In order to reduce US vulnerabilities to terrorism, the Clinton administration proposed

a comprehensive approach from multiple members of his cabinet. As the chief law

enforcement officer, the Attorney General was to lead a committee to review the

vulnerability of government facilities in the United States and other locations that were

crucial to national infrastructure.[146] He would then report his findings and

recommendations to the president and appropriate members of the administration.

Clinton placed a significant level of responsibility on investigative agencies to

counteract terrorism. The Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, was charged with expanding

the program of counterterrorism. Freeh and the FBI were provided with $133.9 million to

fund the new counterterrorism policy.[147] Freeh was focused on strengthening the

international community in its efforts to deter acts of terrorism before they ever happened

and implement a more effective response to terrorist acts when they do occur. He

announced to the Senate four cornerstones of policy. Falling in line with the Presidential

Directive, the first was to reduce the vulnerabilities of the United States to terrorism. He

then called for deterring terrorist acts before they occur and in the event of such an

occurrence, to apprehend and punish the perpetrators of terrorist acts.[148] Freeh wanted

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[146]Ibid, 2.

[147]U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Counterterrorism*, by
Louis Freeh, 105th Cong., 1st sess., Statement Before the Senate Appropriations
Committee (Washington, DC, 1997), 1-6.

[148]Ibid, 2.

Congress to be confident in the fact that terrorism would be punished as a criminal act. Finally, Freeh proposed that it was critical to develop technology and intelligence capabilities to address the threat of nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare and weaponry.[149] By using a policy of classifying terrorists as criminals, the United States would be "one of the most visible and effective forces in identifying, locating, and apprehending terrorists here and overseas."[150] Freeh also addressed the nature of both domestic and international terrorist threats.

On an international level, Freeh broke the terrorist threat down into three major categories. He recognized state sponsors of international terrorism, formalized terrorist groups, and loosely affiliated international Islamic extremists as the major threats to national security.[151] Freeh listed Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea as state sponsors to terrorism. These countries had used terrorism as a tool of their own foreign policy by funding, organizing, and networking with extremist groups.[152] This list did not include Afghanistan, and while the government may not have been directly supporting Al Qaeda, the Taliban government was making little effort to suppress the development of the organization and practices of Osama bin Laden. Freeh also pointed out extremist groups to be aware of, but Al Qaeda was not on the list. He listed these organizations as being dangerous because they had their own infrastructures, hierarchy of

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[149]Ibid.

[150]Ibid, 3.

[151]Ibid, 4.

[152]Ibid.

personnel, financial systems, and training facilities.[153] As mentioned in Chapter 2, Al

Qaeda was established in 1988, and was operating with all of these institutions and

supports; yet Freeh fails to bring this group to the attention of the Senate. Freeh

concludes by naming some individual radical extremists and insurgent groups operating

in South and Central America, but again, nothing about Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden.

Freeh concludes his statement to the Senate by describing the responsibility to respond

to terrorism and deter the threat of weapons of mass destruction. He notes that the

president charged the Department of Justice with being the leading agency domestically

to prosecute and punish terrorists.[154] In the case of international incidents, the State

Department would be in charge of communicating with the president, developing

strategy, and working with the international community to respond to the threat of

terrorist activity. Freeh took the threat of weapons of mass destruction very seriously:

"The acquisition, proliferation, threatened, or actual use of weapons of mass destruction

by a terrorist group or individuals constitutes one of the gravest threats to the United

States."[155] Terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction were a much more serious

threat to the government than if a State in the international community had control over

nuclear weapons because terrorist groups have no one to answer to should they choose to

detonate a WMD. These radical groups have no regards for what the international

community has to say about the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, with little to no

training in the field of nuclear detonation, the risk of danger only increases.

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[153]Freeh, 4.

[154]Ibid, 5.

[155]Ibid, 6.

Presidential Directive 39 also specifies roles for other members of the cabinet. The Secretary of Defense was put in charge of reducing vulnerabilities of security within the military. The Secretary of Transportation was to focus on the infrastructure. Aircraft, maritime shipping, and ground transportation agencies were to coordinate security guidelines for railroads, interstates, mass transit, and pipeline facilities.[156] The Secretary of Transportation's role was one of the most vital, as his security strategy would have immediate and direct impact on the public. The Secretary of State and Attorney General were asked to "use all legal means available to exclude from the United States persons who pose a terrorist threat and deport or otherwise remove from the United States any such aliens."[157] Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury was to reduce economic vulnerability by preventing trafficking of firearms and explosives, and he was responsible for enforcing laws to control the movement of assets and the trade into the United States that was under the jurisdiction of the Treasury in the event of a terrorist attack.[158]

Through his Directive and work with the Senate Appropriations Committee, Clinton developed a comprehensive counterterrorism policy that addressed domestic vulnerability that could make it easier for a terrorist organization to attack the US. FBI Director Freeh consistently referred back to the president's policy to deter, defeat, and respond to terrorist threats or action both at home and abroad. He also joined with the President in his call for working collectively with the international community to develop policy and response to terrorist threats. The biggest issue was his failure to recognize Al Qaeda as a

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[156]Clinton, 2.

[157]Ibid.

[158]Ibid, 3.

growing threat. By not at least naming the organization as a possible threat to the US, the

policy was already put at a disadvantage. While Al Qaeda had not yet attacked in the US,

it was a major threat in the Middle East, and deserved more focus and attention as a

potential threat. One possible reason for this could be the focus of Clinton's

administration on domestic politics and the economy, rather than foreign threats. While

Clinton had named the threat of Al Qaeda, scholars and political analysts would agree

that Clinton gave special attention to the domestic stability of the United States and

worried less about terrorist threats abroad.

September 11, 2001 Calls for Change

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the 9/11 Commission was created to begin

answering the questions being asked by the international community, the president, the

public, and the families of the victims. The questions were simple: how could a nation

with the strongest military and economy in the world suffer an attack of this magnitude,

and what could be done in the future to prevent this from happening?

In response to the first question, Bruce Hoffman, the Director for the Center of Peace

and Security at Georgetown University, argues that the United States was wrong to

assume that an attack of 9/11 magnitude was beyond the capabilities of Al Qaeda.

Hoffman notes the significance that Al Qaeda's past successes should have had on US

policy toward the organization. The past successes of Al Qaeda demonstrated the

"operational and organizational capability to coordinate major, multiple attacks at one

time."[159] Hoffman also proposes that security officials were polarized in their focus of

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[159]Bruce Hoffman, "Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 25 (March 29, 2002): 303-16.

threat. They either spent too much focus on small car or truck bombs and other low-end threat measures, or, on "exotic high-threat" measures such as biological weapons and cyber attacks.[160] There was no middle ground for security officials, and Al Qaeda was able to capitalize on that vulnerability.

In response to the second question of future prevention, on July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its final report, calling for significant changes to be made by the Executive and Legislative branch to "more effectively protect our nation in an age of modern terrorism."[161] The Commission issued forty-one recommendations related to a new counterterrorism strategy. Before beginning its recommendations, the Commission noted the importance of building flexibility into the strategy, because terrorists can quickly modify their targets, tactics, and weapons.

Within the framework for new strategy, the Commission called upon the use of every national instrument, including "diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information dissemination, intelligence, and military—all are to be called upon combating international terrorism."[162] The Commission questioned the effectiveness of focusing so much on pre-emption and military force. They are both important factors of any counterterrorism policy, but the new strategy proposed that the war on terror would be won through long-term policy components. This was not going to be a conventional war because terrorists are not a conventional enemy. Additionally, the Bush

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[160]Hoffman, 306.

[161]House, *U.S. Anti-Terror Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Report*, by Raphael Perl, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 2005, CRS Report for Congress, 1-11.

[162]Ibid, 2.

administration "had placed even heavier emphasis on international law enforcement cooperation as a policy pillar."[163] While the cooperation of international law enforcement is necessary, this pillar was not adhered to consistently when the United States preemptively invaded Afghanistan without the full support of the international community. There are also implications for state sovereignty in regards to an international law enforcement agency being able to enter in a sovereign nation. As an international police force, INTERPOL has the ability to arrest terrorists for criminal activity, which would fall in line with Clinton's policy of criminalizing terrorism, but it would be up to the International Criminal Court to hear and prosecute the case.

The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is based on four pillars—defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending.[164] It is important to note this shift in priority from Clinton's counterterrorism policy. The first priority of this strategy was to defeat terrorism. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, this would be accomplished "Together with U.S. allies, defeating terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command; control, and communications; material support; and finances."[165] In order to implement this strategy of defeating, terrorists would be identified and located through intelligence resources. Terrorists and their organizations would be destroyed through capture and detention with the use of military power and international support to stop the funding of terrorist networks.[166] By denying terrorists state sponsorship, the Commission

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[163]Ibid.

[164]Ibid, 3.

[165]Ibid.

[166]Ibid.

hoped to force the collapse of the organization itself. Without funding, facilities, or other resources, terrorist networks would not be able to survive. The problem becomes the issue of state sovereignty. The international community can encourage states to practice policies of counterterrorism, and the UN can place sanctions on states that support terrorists, but they cannot legally force a State to stop funding a particular group.

The next pillar was to foster economic, social and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law in order to create a civil society that would not want or need to rely on a terrorist organization to receive basic needs.[167] This is the most important component of the entire strategy, but when it was modified to mean planting a western sense of democracy in a region that has never seen a government reminiscent of such a system, the component fails. The final pillar was based on defending U.S. citizens to include the protection of physical and technological infrastructures.[168]

The recommendations are followed by the Commission Report, calling first for a preemptive policy of attacking terrorists to fight the growth of Islamic terrorism. The report also cited the need to coordinate planning, intelligence, and sharing of information.[169] While this information may have been shared among agencies and departments within the administration, there were not sufficient measures to share this information with the international community, which led to unilateral action in

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[167]Ibid, 5.

[168]Ibid.

[169]Ibid, 6.

Afghanistan and Iraq. Bush also called on Congress to create the position of a National

Intelligence Director that would be separate from the position of CIA Director. This

appointee "would serve as the President's principal intelligence advisor, overseeing and

coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence community."[170] The

Commission was seriously concerned about the creation of this new position. They

worried that it would lead to an encroachment on civil liberty. There was also significant

concern over the costs of enhancing security. The drafters of the report stated, "Critical to

both these issues is the development of a methodology to measure the adequacy of

antiterrorism efforts, an issue not addressed in the 2003 National Strategy of in the 9/11

Commission report."[171] Without this methodology, Bush and his administration were left

to implement these policies as they saw fit, with or without funding and support.

Controversial Tactics of Counterterrorism

After the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, the US government began to use

new counterterrorism tactics (CT). Many of these resulted in controversy within the

administration as well as the public. Some of these tactics included "enhanced

interrogation, preventative detention, expanded use of secret surveillance without

warrants, ethnic/religious profiling, the collection and mining of domestic data, and the

prosecution of terror suspects in military tribunals."[172] Unconventional CT such as

enhanced interrogation included the use of water boarding and electric shock in an

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[170]Ibid 7.

[171]Ibid, 8.

[172]Nick Adams, "Counterterrorism Since 9/11," *Breakthrough Institute* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 4-43, http://www.thebreakthrough.org (accessed March 23, 2012).

attempt to purge information from suspected terrorists. The use of military tribunals and denial of the writ to *habeas corpus* for enemy combatants were policies that were challenged in the Supreme Court. Ignoring the debate on the morality or legality of these issues, the more important conclusions should have been made based on the effectiveness of these measures.

Nick Adams, Ted Nordaus, and Michael Shellenberger work for the Breakthrough Institute and conducted a research study to determine whether or not these tactics actually work to prevent terrorism. Based on their findings, these scholars came to the conclusion that unconventional CT methods have been counterproductive. These measures have been "increasing the ration of informational noise to terrorist signal, undermining the state's legitimacy among potential civilian informants, and legitimizing terrorists' preferred status as warriors."[173] Unconventional measures are not going to prevent terrorism. If anything, these tactics are only going to make the organizations angrier and provoke them to attack US military forces or plan another surprise attack on US soil.

The study found that the most effective counterterrorism measures were the ones that were least controversial. By draining the funding of these groups or denying them a safe haven in a particular state or region, counterterrorism policies begin to break down the organization at its center. Without resources and facilities, the organization will cease to function. Preventing terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is also critical to developing effective policy measures. If terrorists are unable to acquire these weapons, they are forced to operate with conventional materials, thus decreasing their threat of widespread violence. The report also finds that "establishing multiple layers of

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[173]Ibid, 4.

port and border security, undermining terrorists' recruiting messages, and bolstering perceptions of state legitimacy to encourage the cooperation of bystander communities" are also effective tools of counterterrorism policy.[174]

As a result of the study, there was no evidence that supported the claims for controversial counterterrorism tactics to be effective. Adams and his team went through more than 500 Accountability and Inspectors General reports and found no credible evidence that these tactics were prompting prisoners to divulge helpful information or aid in finding a larger number of terrorists in hiding.[175] Unconventional tactics do not produce useful information for law enforcement, and neither does the use of ethnic and religious profiling. In a post-9/11 society, there was a new culture of discrimination and prejudice. The public and the government alike discriminated against individuals of Middle Eastern descent or those who ascribed to the Muslim faith. This practice only alienated individuals who might have been useful and effective to provide information to the government and law enforcement officials.[176] The study concluded that because of the lack of progress made in capturing terrorists and the ineffectiveness of unconventional CT in gaining useful information, these tactics have become more and more unpopular with both the military and security agencies. Again, the question of morality and legality set aside, these tactics still prove to be a waste of time, resources, and intelligence with little to no return on useful information.

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[174]Ibid.

[175]Ibid, 5.

[176]Ibid.

Current Counterterrorism Strategy

When Barack Obama won the US presidential election in 2008, he stepped into office with two ongoing conflicts in the Middle East that were both costing valuable human lives, money and resources, and were operating without a timeline for an exit strategy. President Obama made it his mission to end the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in a timely manner and leave enough to ground troops to promote stability and help to rebuild infrastructure. In response to future threats of terrorism, the president stood firm in his belief that the United States will not tolerate a threat to security. In his press release for counterterrorism strategy, Obama maintained, "We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are."[177]

The ultimate objective for the Obama administration's counterterrorism strategy is to "disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat Al Qaeda—its leadership core in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our citizens."[178] The administration recognized that US policy must come from a posture of being at war, and that every power possible must be harnessed to defeat Al Qaeda. His strategy is to achieve the goals of protecting US territory by reducing vulnerabilities and increasing national defenses. He held consistent with preventing terrorists from acquiring biological or nuclear weapons. He hopes to eliminate Al Qaeda safe havens and counter

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[177]White House Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: National Strategy For Counterterrorism," The White House, http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism.html (accessed March 23, 2012).

[178]Ibid.

Al Qaeda ideology that attempts to justify violence. He plans to do this all while maintaining and protecting core American values of the rule of law, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.[179] President Obama believes that dealing heavy blows to the leadership and the structure of Al Qaeda and sending the network "on a path to defeat" can accomplish all of this.[180] He recognizes that Al Qaeda's image has been tarnished among the international community and as states begin to sever ties of support with Al Qaeda, the organization will have no choice but to crumble. Additionally, by building a culture of preparedness at home, the American public can be confident in their ability to prevent terrorist attacks and resiliently respond to them.

The Future of Policy and the Need for Gendered Strategy

While these methods that the president has detailed show primes, ignoring women leaves a gap in a comprehensive strategy. Scholars and analysts agree that as the role of women in terrorist organizations continue to grow and develop, the United States must create counterterrorism strategy to address the threat of female operatives terrorist organizations. Failure to create a counterterrorism policy that is comprehensive to identify that there is a unique threat for groups that use female operatives will result in a new vulnerability for US counterterrorism policy.

As policymakers look to create strategy for female terrorist involvement, they must refer back to the motivating factors that sparked the interest in terrorist participation in the first place. Beyond creating a policy that deters or defeats female terrorists, the United States should seek to create policy to elevate the status of women in society so that they

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[179]Ibid, 2.

[180]Ibid.

will not feel the need to ascribe to terrorist ideology in order to create a sense of belonging or security for themselves.

Seventy percent of the people living in poverty around the world are women and children.[181] Due to social structure and the historical elevation of a man's status over a woman, women are less likely to receive health care and education in poor countries. They are one of the most marginalized groups in society. Gender disparity leads women to look to a larger group to which they can become a part. The group is gains more appeal when women are guaranteed food, resources for their family, or the restoration of family honor. Groups like Al Qaeda, the PKK, and the Black Widows promise each of these to their participants. These groups invest in women because of their tactical value and strategic assets in carrying out suicide missions. If the United States flipped this policy around and began investing in women, many experts suggest that women would not feel the need to turn to more radical or unconventional groups. According to Miemie Byrd, a military expert in counterterrorism strategy, "When women are educated, there is a high probability that their children will be educated. In addition, educated women tend to meet their families' nutrition and health needs."[182] Increasing women's education inherently increases their productivity, it gives them a more equal standing in society, and it promotes their ability to contribute to their future and their children's future. From a sociological perspective, this is critical because creating stability within the society will allow women to have structure without turning to terrorist organizations to find it.

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[181]Miemie Byrd, "Why the Us Should Gender Its Counterterrorism Strategy," *Military Review*, July 2008. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_4_88/ai_n28048856/ (accessed March 23, 2012).

[182]Ibid, 3.

Creating this stability has to matter to the military because they are already fighting

against the misconception that women are weaker and incapable of implementing attacks

of such violence. However, the military can capitalize on the idea that women have no

upward mobility in terrorist organizations but would have the opportunity for upward

mobility if they were educated. Byrd argues, "Even if women do not participate directly

in terrorist activities, they often support their men's militancy by nurturing families

committed to violence extremism."[183]

Women are critical actors in the transmission of family values, beliefs, and culture.

The woman serves as the key person to pass down culture to future generations. Byrd

also addresses the need for a policy that approaches female terrorists from a communal

mindset. "To affect the collective mindset of a community, counterinsurgents and

counterterrorism measures should address this critical node of influence."[184] Military

planners and policymakers should keep this in mind in developing any effective strategy

of counterterrorism. If they are able to educate women of the regions that are havens for

terrorist organization, they are less likely to want to join that group.

Military experts agree with the sentiments of policy analysts. Major Sutten suggests

the implementation of programs that improve the social, political, and economic

environment of the region.[185] Educating women, stopping violence against women, and

encouraging gender equality are all critical to deterring female involvement in terrorist

organizations. Further, providing financial support for these women through

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[183]Ibid, 4.

[184]Ibid.

[185]Sutten, 44.

microfinance projects will assist in building their sense of personal stability. These women join terrorist organizations in search of political equality for the group as a whole, but are severely disappointed when they realize that there is no equality within the structure itself. By then, it is too late to do anything about it.

While critics may argue that these approaches for political and economic equality seem to take a Western approach to the problem, these programs work. Sutten's research on policy effectiveness finds, "For any solution to be effective, it must be appropriate to the social norms of the society within which it is being implemented."[186] Female terrorist operatives do not need democracy, but rather stability and a defined sense of identity.

In order to be effective, counterterrorism policy has to address the true motivating factors of the terrorist organization. Every suggestion presented in this research has focused on the political support and financial funding for these groups. It is also critical to recognize the need for stability in society and the universal need to educate women in order to discourage participation in terrorist organizations. For the majority of women, if they can feed their children and provide medical and other social care for them, they will find their sense of identity in being a mother, and they will not require a radical group to find a sense of belonging. In the final analysis, the United States must continue to cooperate with the international community in order to deter and defeat terrorism as a whole. Terrorism is a global threat, and it will take the entire globe to effectively and completely stop it.

Because of these motivating factors and use of female operatives, US counterterrorism policy continues to change. While there are internal political forces that created change in

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[186]Ibid, 45.

US counterterrorism policy at election time, the majority of these changes are the product of external forces. The attacks on September 11, 2001, were some of the largest external forces to ever produce such drastic changes in foreign policy. As the US continues to move forward in withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, it is critical to keep in mind the need for global cooperation and regional support from civilians on the ground. By using effective tactics to cut off funding and deny safe havens, terrorist organizations will begin to deteriorate at their cores. Furthermore, policy to address female involvement must be included in the comprehensive counterterrorism policy of the future in order to promote stability and begin to erase the motivating factors that would push women to join a terrorist network.

Terrorism has existed for centuries, but proper policy that uses global cooperation and cuts off support at the source will allow the international community to be successful in its movement to combat terrorism and immediately respond to threats in order to ensure a global level of safety and security.

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