Kvanvig, Jonathan L.Martin, Kraig W.2014-06-112014-06-112014-052014-06-11http://hdl.handle.net/2104/9084This dissertation is concerned with answering the following question: In virtue of what is one justified in closing inquiry? A closure of inquiry in an act whereby one intentionally stops some investigation and does so with the intention of not investigating in the future. I argue that on a maximization model of practical rationality, one is fully justified to close inquiry whenever one is morally obligated to close inquiry, or one is practically and morally justified in closing inquiry, or one is morally and evidentially justified in closing inquiry and one is justified in believing that closing inquiry is as good as any other means to the achievement of one’s ends (perhaps because one is justifiably worried that any defeaters one finds will be misleading defeaters). On a model of practical rationality in which an act is practically rational for one only if one is justified in believing that the act is as good as any other means toward the achievement of one’s ends, then one is fully justified in closing inquiry whenever one is morally obligated to close inquiry, or one is morally and practically justified in closing inquiry.en-USBaylor University theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.Epistemology.Closure of Inquiry.Practical Rationality.ThesisWorldwide access