Theses/Dissertations - Philosophy
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Browsing Theses/Dissertations - Philosophy by Author "Beckwith, Francis."
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Item Civic friendship and a value assumption in Rawls.(2016-03-16) Younger, Peter J., 1977-; Beckwith, Francis.In the late twentieth century, John Rawls reinvigorated the social contract theory in political philosophy. Previous contract theories could not explain how those bound by the social contract consent to be bound. Rawls argues that we consent to the contract hypothetically. If we would agree, under ideal conditions for resolving questions about the basic structure of society, to a particular social contract, then we actually consent (in the relevant sense) to the contract. With this understanding of consent in mind, Rawls argues in two stages. First, he argues to the original position – arguing that his original position thought experiment represents the ideal conditions for resolving questions about the basic structure of society. Subsequently, Rawls argues from the original position - parties in the original position would agree to two principles of justice which he names justice as fairness. If both arguments are sound, then all of us give our hypothetical consent to the terms of the social contract spelled out by justice as fairness. This dissertation argues that these arguments cannot both be sound. I approach Rawls’ work with a specific concern – in modern American society, discourse has become increasingly uncivil. This background condition gives rise to inquiry into civic friendship – how citizens might wish their anonymous fellow-citizens well and thus give rise to more amicable social conditions. Rawlsian liberalism helps adapt an Aristotelian conception of civic friendship to modern conditions of the pluralistic nation-state. Yet this conception of civic friendship has certain important limitations. Rawls designs the original position carefully – controversial assumptions may prevent people from acknowledging it as the ideal position, undermining the argument to the original position. But the argument from the original position requires the parties to select principles of justice from among a slate of options. This selection, like all acts, requires some ascription of value by the actor. In Rawls’ arguments, the parties assume that fulfilling the rational desires of persons is choiceworthy. This is inconsistent with the requirement that the original position avoid controversial assumptions. The argument to the original position and the argument from the original position cannot both be sound.Item Tolerance and “belief-sensitive pluralism.”(2023-08) Love, Chris W., 1988-; Beckwith, Francis.This dissertation explores timely subjects that pertain to the limits and nature of tolerance. Should governments enact hate speech laws? Ought we to prohibit speech and other actions on the basis of appeals to psychological and dignitary harm? Should we endorse recent efforts to revise or reject the traditional conception of tolerance, so as to justify the demand for “identity recognition”? The dissertation takes its launching point from a stand-alone chapter that explores yet another timely subject of debate: how to interpret the actions of those who oppose certain forms of LGBTQ policy. In the course of that chapter, I argue that we have a duty to try and understand the actions of others according to their own beliefs, and especially their own worldview beliefs, relevant to the subject at hand. Only then can we form a just view about the will behind those actions and, hence, avoid gross mischaracterizations of those agents. I call the duty in question “belief-sensitive pluralism.” It is a duty of interpretation or, more precisely, of contextualization. Not only does belief-sensitive pluralism promise to transform current debates over LGBTQ policy in wholesome ways, but it also bears importantly on the above questions about tolerance. In particular, the application of sensitive pluralism strengthens traditional worries about the ethics of hate speech laws, in ways that demand the attention of citizens and governments alike; it reveals serious complications with the categories of psychological and dignitary harm, which make those criteria unfit for a pluralistic society; and it shows that efforts to revise or reject the traditional conception of tolerance, in order to justify modern calls for identity recognition, make immoral demands of citizens. In these respects, belief-sensitive pluralism sheds much-needed light on areas of contemporary concern. Readers who worry that the widespread practice of belief-sensitive pluralism would transform political society in ways that cannot be squared with liberalism—or, at least, Rawlsian liberalism, with its careful avoidance of worldview considerations, given their propensity to divide citizens—will find a concluding chapter on that subject. It maintains that Rawlsian liberalism and belief-sensitive pluralism can be reconciled.Item Virtue ethics and character development at the United States Air Force Academy.(2022-03-07) Toms, Kathryn, 1980-; Beckwith, Francis.Our nation requires that service academies “develop officers of character.” “Character,” by its very nature, is deep; it is an embedded aspect of one’s personhood. As such, character will invariably draw upon one’s deeply-held beliefs. But our pluralistic, liberal nation is—and should be—anathema to mandate citizens’ deeply-held beliefs. So a service academy is faced with a seemingly intractable problem: it must not mandate the deeply-held beliefs that necessarily inform the very character development that is mandated. I argue that virtue ethics can provide a feasible solution. Virtue ethics is compatible with diverse justificatory frameworks. Thus, the state can undergird a character education program with virtue ethics, while servicemembers are still free to choose the justificatory framework for those virtues. This upholds both the servicemembers’ civil liberties and the nation’s mandate to develop officers of character.