• Login
    View Item 
    •   BEARdocs Home
    • Graduate School
    • Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   BEARdocs Home
    • Graduate School
    • Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Thomas Reid and the problem of secondary qualities.

    Thumbnail
    View/Open
    Dissertation (1.313Mb)
    Copyright and Availability Form (250.8Kb)
    Access rights
    Worldwide access
    Access changed 10/20/14
    Date
    2013-09-16
    Author
    Shrock, Christopher A.
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    Direct Realism is the view that human perception takes physical entities and their mind-independent properties as immediate objects. Although this thesis is supported by common sense, many argue that it can be dismissed on philosophical or quasi-scientific grounds. This essay attempts to defend Direct Realism against one such argument, which I call the “Problem of Secondary Qualities,” using the ideas of Scottish Common Sense philosopher Thomas Reid. The first chapter of this work offers a detailed introduction to the Problem of Secondary Qualities. The Problem of Secondary Qualities arises from the claim that science has shown that physical objects do not possess secondary qualities (color, smell, sound, taste, and heat). This is a problem for Direct Realism because secondary qualities are certainly possessed by at least some perceivable objects. As I present it, the Problem rests on three commitments: (1) that an analysis of secondary quality perceptions should extend to perception in general, (2) that we perceive secondary qualities, and (3) that physical objects do not possess secondary qualities without our perceptions of them. I conclude that Direct Realism requires an account of secondary qualities on which secondary qualities are perceiver-independent but identifiable with other causally relevant properties. In Chapter Two, I introduce Thomas Reid’s doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, in the context of his theory of perception, as a viable response to the Problem of Secondary Qualities. On Reid’s view, secondary qualities are both perceiver-independent and identical to scientific properties, and Reid offers many useful conceptual resources for responding to objections. Most important are Reid’s claims that (a) sensation or sense experience is casually related to, but not essential for, perception and that (b) our perceptions of secondary qualities give us very little knowledge concerning their natures. The final chapter shows how the Reidian theory holds up against four key objections to accounts of secondary qualities on which they may be identified with perceiver-independent, scientific properties. In most cases, the Reidian approach finds solutions without compromising our intuitions or received opinions.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/2104/8769
    Department
    Philosophy.
    Collections
    • Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    • Theses/Dissertations - Philosophy

    Copyright © Baylor® University All rights reserved. Legal Disclosures.
    Baylor University Waco, Texas 76798 1-800-BAYLOR-U
    Baylor University Libraries | One Bear Place #97148 | Waco, TX 76798-7148 | 254.710.2112 | Contact: libraryquestions@baylor.edu
    If you find any errors in content, please contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
    Contact Us | Send Feedback
    TDL
    Theme by 
    Atmire NV
     

     

    Browse

    All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    Login

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics

    Copyright © Baylor® University All rights reserved. Legal Disclosures.
    Baylor University Waco, Texas 76798 1-800-BAYLOR-U
    Baylor University Libraries | One Bear Place #97148 | Waco, TX 76798-7148 | 254.710.2112 | Contact: libraryquestions@baylor.edu
    If you find any errors in content, please contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu
    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
    Contact Us | Send Feedback
    TDL
    Theme by 
    Atmire NV