Belief and Credence: A Defense of the Vague Reduction

Fastenau, Conner

Belief and Credence: A Defense of the Vague Reduction

dc.contributor.advisor	Buras, Todd
dc.contributor.author	Fastenau, Conner
dc.contributor.department	University Scholar.	en_US
dc.contributor.other	Baylor University.	en_US
dc.contributor.schools	university scholar	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2020-05-29T13:35:22Z
dc.date.available	2020-05-29T13:35:22Z
dc.date.copyright	2020-05-04
dc.date.issued	2020-05-29
dc.description.abstract	An epistemological issue garnering increasingly more interest is the relation between the doxastic taxonomies of traditional and formal epistemology, and especially the relation between rational, outright belief and credence. Proposed solutions to this issue fall into one of three classes, viz. eliminativism, non-reductionism, and reductionism. In this thesis, I introduce and subsequently defend my own variation of the traditional reductionist view, which I call the Vague Reduction. To do so, I consider a score of eliminativist and non-reductionist objections to reductionism, and argue that they all fail; the upshot is that eliminativism is deemed untenable, non-reductionism unfounded, and traditional reductionist views implausible. In turn, I suggest that the Vague Reduction naturally recommends itself as an attractive and viable theory governing the relation between rational belief and credence.	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/2104/10946
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.rights	Baylor University projects are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact libraryquestions@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.	en_US
dc.rights.accessrights	Worldwide access	en_US
dc.title	Belief and Credence: A Defense of the Vague Reduction	en_US
dc.type	Thesis	en_US