The evidential support relation.

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dc.contributor.advisorKvanvig, Jonathan L.
dc.contributor.authorByerly, T. Ryan.
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophy.en_US
dc.contributor.schoolsBaylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-08T15:42:39Z
dc.date.available2012-08-08T15:42:39Z
dc.date.copyright2012-05
dc.date.issued2012-08-08
dc.description.abstractEvidentialist views in epistemology, like that of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, define epistemic justification at least partially in terms of evidential support. According to these views, a person is justified in believing a proposition p just when her evidence supports p. The subject of this dissertation is the evidential support relation at the heart of these views—viz., the relation which obtains between a person’s evidence e and a proposition p just when e supports p in the sense required by these views. I engage three initially tempting accounts of this relation in terms of meta-attitudes, explanatory relations, and probabilistic relations, finding all three accounts wanting. I then propose a fourth, causal account. My thesis is that evidentialists like Conee and Feldman should find this causal account of the evidential support relation more attractive than the other three kinds of account.en_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2104/8412
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisheren
dc.rightsBaylor University theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. Contact librarywebmaster@baylor.edu for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.accessrightsWorldwide access.en_US
dc.rights.accessrightsAccess changed 1/13/14.
dc.subjectEvidence.en_US
dc.subjectProbability.en_US
dc.subjectExplanationism.en_US
dc.subjectSeemings.en_US
dc.subjectEpistemic justification.en_US
dc.subjectEvidential support.en_US
dc.titleThe evidential support relation.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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