Theses/Dissertations - Church-State Studies
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Browsing Theses/Dissertations - Church-State Studies by Author "Beckwith, Francis."
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Item Appeal to conscience clauses in the face of divergent practices among Catholic hospitals.(2011-12-19) Hapenney, Sandra S.; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.Conscience clauses are laws enacted by federal and state governments to protect health care providers from participating in those medical practices they consider morally objectionable. This study examines the practices of Catholic hospitals and their adherence to the Ethical and Religious Directives (ERD) for Catholic Health Care Services issued by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. If divergence of practice exists among Catholic hospitals, such diversity may pose judicial and political problems for providing protection under the conscience clauses. Catholic hospitals in seven states—California, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Texas and Washington—were studied to determine if diversity of practice existed in the provision of direct female sterilizations. Inpatient discharge data was requested for three years (2007-2009) from the 1,734 hospitals, secular and Catholic, within the states. Of these hospitals, 239 Catholic hospitals were identified of which 176 provided obstetric services. The records of these 176 hospitals were searched for those containing the diagnostic code from the ICD-9-CM coding system for sterilization for contraceptive management. Eighty-five or 48% of these hospitals provided a total of 20,073 direct sterilizations in violation of the ERD. An analysis of Catholic hospital systems owning hospitals within the seven state study area illustrated that 69.0% of the hospitals were members of 26 various Catholic hospital systems. Ten systems operating in the seven states also have hospitals outside the study area. Within these 10 systems, 64.2% of the hospitals in the study area performed direct sterilizations. An analysis of the Catholic dioceses in the study area revealed that 72.1% of the dioceses had hospitals which provided direct sterilizations. Thus, diversity of practice resulting from varied interpretations and applications of the ERD exists among hospitals, and within hospital systems and dioceses. An analysis of the conscience clauses illustrates that Catholic hospitals are in jeopardy of defending themselves against judicial challenges and could strip themselves of the ability to mount a political front to aid in defending the conscience clauses.Item Christian covenant and liberal freedom : a new approach to the modern marriage crisis.(2012-08-08) Holton, Kevin T.; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.Today’s society is burdened by an overwhelming abundance of government regulations in what is commonly regarded as the private realm, and sizeable numbers of people of all political ideologies are scrambling to end those regulations they find offensive. Interestingly, those same would-be reformers who balk most loudly at some regulations are wholeheartedly committed to maintaining or adding to existing regulations when it suits their political agendas, indicating that people will willingly abandon their political principles when they conflict with their efforts to attain political power. To my knowledge, no one has given serious consideration to the elimination altogether of government regulation, especially in marriage law, as a means of advancing toward a more Christian standard of living. Herein, I demonstrate that the modern Christian obsession with maintaining legal exclusivity for heterosexual marriage is misguided while the secular liberal appeal for legalization of same-sex (or gender-neutral) marriage is equally ill-conceived. Instead, a libertarian approach to the formation of families is ideal for both the Christian and the secular liberal, for it allows the Church to tighten its hold on the definition of marriage and frees the individual to pursue whatever life choices she or she wishes to make. Prevention of the legal disestablishment of marriage ultimately feeds religious complacency, weakens the marriage bond, and distracts from the pursuit of holiness; it also enslaves the free individual to the capricious whims of the secular state.Item Competing schemas within the American liberal democracy : an interdisciplinary analysis of differing perceptions of church and state.(2013-09-16) Holzer, Shannon.; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.The current understanding of liberal democracy in many academic circles includes a set of restraints on the types of justification that are accepted for the creation of coercive legislation. There is much debate over which sources should be accepted to publically justify laws touching on education and morality. Many believe that religious beliefs are outside of public reason, and they are, thus, inadequate to justify the formation of coercive laws. The reason for this is that many people perceive religious reasoning as irrational, divisive, and dangerous. Because of this perception, religion has by and large been relegated to the private sphere. The perception of religious reasoning as irrational, divisive, and dangerous has also become firmly engrained in the legal community. Because of this, state and federal courts tend to treat legislation that is organically connected to religion as a violation of the Establishment Clause. This dissertation argues that this perception of religion is incomplete. Those who perceive religion as irrational, dangerous, and divisive somehow do not recognize its reasonable, peaceful, and unifying aspects. Furthermore, the problems popularly attributed to religious reason are not unique to religion. Secular reasoning can also be irrational, dangerous, and divisive. Ultimately, religious reasoning may indeed have a place in the formation of coercive legislation that is tolerable to its detractors. The incorporation of religious reasoning does not entail an all-out theocracy as many might fear. Given that the fundamental principles of liberal democracy are often grounded on religious premises, to require restraint of religious reasoning would be to remove the foundation of liberal principles on which this country stands. Furthermore, it would violate a key tenet of liberal democracy that all should be treated free and equal by placing a burden on the religious citizen that is not shared by the non-religious citizen.Item E pluribus unum : the limits of religious pluralism in American liberal democracy.(2011-05-12T15:22:30Z) Chen, Samuel S., 1987-; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies."Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Often inferred from the religion clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution are the absolute right of religious liberty and the subsequent necessity of a religiously pluralistic society. Religious pluralism has become a norm of American society and, in many cases, a norming value—seen as a founding principle of the United States and a keystone of liberal democracy. In the ongoing dialogue regarding religion and its role in democracy, however, religious pluralism's assumed position in society is one deserving of scrutiny. As religion itself is considered within the intricate balance of republican government, so must all aspects of religion—including religious pluralism and its trusted fortress: religious liberty. Such assessment illuminates and demonstrates the extent and limits of religious liberty and, subsequently, religious pluralism in liberal democracy.Item From Neo-orthodox theology to rationalistic deism : a study of the religious influences on the development of John Rawls's political philosophy.(2013-05-15) Kim, Keeho, 1967-; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that John Rawls’s early religious beliefs guided the development of his later political philosophy. By first analyzing A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin & Faith, I argue that the young Rawls’s embrace of Neo-orthodoxy shaped his later philosophical view of human dignity and that the central themes of his undergraduate thesis reappear in secular forms in his philosophical development, despite his abandonment of Neo-orthodox beliefs soon after World War II. I will trace the changes of Rawls’s view on his own religion through a comparison of his main works, from the young Rawls’s Neo-orthodox beliefs to the later Rawls’s rationalistic deism. In the mature Rawls’s political philosophy, I will show that the secular Rawls still holds the Good Samaritan’s ideals such as fraternity, mutual respect, love, and justice as the motivating forces behind the development of his two principles of justice and the duty of assistance. My conclusion is that even though Rawls gave up the basic beliefs of the Protestant Episcopal Church, he never abandoned the religious motivations that he held in his adolescence. Both the young Rawls’s theological work and the mature Rawls’s philosophical thought share the view that there are deep inequalities and other great evils in society and human history. As a solution, while the young Rawls appeals to the restoration of community through overcoming sin by faith, through A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), and The Law of Peoples (1999), the later Rawls pursues the establishment of the realistic utopia of a well-ordered society that will eliminate the great evils through the establishment of just social institutions. Moreover, I show that, contrary to his declared rejection of metaphysics in his theory of justice, Rawls engaged with metaphysical themes such as human nature, theodicy, moral motivation, and the problem of evil throughout his career, from his senior thesis to his later works. In the concluding chapter, I discuss the differences between the young and the later Rawls as he transitioned from Neo-orthodoxy to Rationalistic deism, nevertheless emphasizing that Christian values continued to motivate his work until the end. Key words: Neo-orthodox Theology, Moral Constructivism, Kantian Constructivism, Political Constructivism, International Morality, Just War, Urgent Human rights, Decency, John Rawls, Emil Brunner.Item Is “social justice” justice? : A Thomistic argument for “social persons” as the proper subjects of the virtue of social justice.(2008-10-15T14:21:42Z) Lee, John R. (Richard), 1981-; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.The term “social justice,” as it occurs in the Catholic social encyclical tradition, presents a core, definitional problem. According to Catholic social thought, social justice has social institutions as its subjects. However, in the Thomistic tradition, justice is understood to be a virtue, i.e., a human habit with human persons as subjects. Thus, with its non-personal subjects, social justice would seem not to be a virtue, and thus not to be a true form of justice. We offer a solution to this problem, based on the idea of social personhood. Drawing from the Thomistic understanding of “person” as a being “distinct in a rational nature”, it is argued that certain social institutions—those with a unity of order—are capable of meeting Aquinas’ analogical definition of personhood. Thus, social institutions with a unity of order—i.e., societies—are understood to be “social persons” and thus the proper subjects of virtue, including the virtue of justice. After a review of alternative conceptions, it is argued that “social justice” in the Catholic social encyclical tradition is best understood as general justice (justice directed toward the common good) extended to include not only human persons, but social persons as well. Advantages of this conception are highlighted. Metaphysically, an understanding of social justice as exercised by social persons fits nicely with an understanding of society as non-substantial, but subsistent being. This understanding of societal being supports certain intuitions we have about the nature of societal organization. In regards to social philosophy, an understanding of social justice as general justice exercised by social persons helps to account for the principle of subsidiarity and situate it properly within the domain of just acts. Consequently, the notion of social personhood helps to bring social institutions—considered per se, not as mere summations of individual persons—into the domain of justice.Item Nicholas Wolterstorff's Reformed epistemology and its challenge to Lockean and Rawlsian liberalism(2006-07-31T01:10:00Z) Coyle, Douglas L.; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.This dissertation charts the thought of Nicholas Wolterstorff as it regards his epistemology and political philosophy. It seeks to unfold his theory of democracy, which he calls the consocial position. It begins by introducing the reader to Wolterstorff by relating events and experiences of his life. This background information is important as it has played a vital role in shaping his thought. Next, it moves to explaining basic terms and ideas employed throughout. The basic issue, as Wolterstorff addresses it, is the question of whether citizens of a liberal democracy have a moral duty of religious-reason restraint in their public deliberations. Two basic strands of political theory are proposed as talking partners for Wolterstorff. The first is an Enlightenment public epistemology liberalism that argues for religious-reason restraint on the basis of a foundationalist epistemology. Wolterstorff develops this view through the work of John Locke. He criticizes this position and offers an alternative epistemology to that of foundationalism, which I call innocence epistemology. The second is a Post-Enlightenment public epistemology liberalism that argues for religious-reason restraint on the basis of a political doctrine. Wolterstorff develops this position through the work of John Rawls. He criticizes this position, and in its places offers his consocial position. His consocial position argues for a version of liberal democracy that does not require religious-reason restraint. The consocial position has three theses, none of which require a religious-reason restraint. The first thesis proposes three restraints on public deliberation, namely civility, respect for the law, and justice as the goal of deliberation. The second thesis proposes a particular understanding of the First Amendment as it regards government and religion. It calls for a position of impartiality, not neutrality. The third thesis proposes justice in shalom. This conception of justice has two primary components, namely a notion of rights, and a notion of prioritizing the evil of violating personhood.Item Religious liberty through the lens of textualism and a Living Constitution: the First Amendment Establishment Clause interpretations of Justices William Brennan, Jr. and Antonin Scalia.(2006-11-25T01:19:59Z) Nies, Gregory O.; Hankins, Barry, 1956-; Beckwith, Francis.; Waltman, Jerold L., 1945-; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.This paper examines how the jurisprudential visions of United States Supreme Court Justices William Brennan, Jr. and Antonin Scalia guide their interpretations of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The paper begins by examining Establishment Clause basics, the United States legal system and judicial philosophies, and Establishment Clause jurisprudential history. The elusive search for a standard Establishment Clause interpretation in modern jurisprudence is examined through an analysis of the linear historical view and the practitioner's categorical view. It is argued that the single most important factor in determining an overall jurisprudential philosophy is ones method of interpretation. Accordingly, the primary methods of constitutional interpretation, originalism, textualism and the Living Constitution method are examined. Justice Brennan's and Justice Scalia's jurisprudential visions are examined generally, and in the context of their Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The paper concludes that both justices have consistently applied their widely different but principled jurisprudential visions when interpreting the Establishment Clause.Item The separation of love and state : C. S. Lewis and Søren Kierkegaard as political allies.(2012-08-08) Pardo, Travis R.; Beckwith, Francis.; Church and State.; Baylor University. Institute of Church-State Studies.Does a limited government limit neighbor-love? Through their writings, C. S. Lewis and Søren Kierkegaard have inspired many individuals to “love thy neighbor,” yet these authors do not call for government to fulfill the command to love others. This is inconsistent, critics say, for neighbor-love ought to have political dimensions as well; in fact, love requires more government, not less. But Lewis and Kierkegaard favor a small and limited government. They are “generous liberal givers” on the individual level but “absolute conservative restrictors” on the collective political level. Why? These two men do not directly answer this charge of inconsistency, but this essay aims to extract three possible answers from their theology and political philosophy. All three answers agree that neighbor-love has social but not political implications: (1) the Argument from Corruption: sin hinders love; (2) the Argument from Force: a person cannot be forced to love by government since love requires consent; and (3) the Argument from the Holy Spirit: neighbor-love is divine love and the government does not have access to it; but the Church does have access by way of the Holy Spirit. If true, the Holy Spirit may be a missing variable in Church-State calculations for a model of Low State, High Church.