Department of Political Science
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Item The Catholic Church and the nonviolent resistance in Chile.(2006-07-25T15:07:03Z) Edmonds, Amy E.; Hinojosa, Victor Javier.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.When can nonviolent action be effective? That is the question that originally initiated this research project. While studying the different factors scholars believe to be important to a successful nonviolent action, I discovered that hardly any study examined whether religion impacted the success of nonviolent movements. This paper examines the influence of religion on nonviolent resistance by examining the case of Chile under Pinochet. Indeed, the presence of the Catholic Church as an institution independent of Pinochet’s military regime was so pervasive that if any example of a nonviolent action where religion played an important role could be found, it was Chile. The influence of religion is measured by examining the impact of the Chilean Catholic Church on twelve factors shown to greatly influence the outcome of nonviolent action.Item 1980 : Reagan, Carter, and the politics of religion in America.(2010-02-02T19:54:55Z) Hogue, Andrew P.; Medhurst, Martin J.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation examines the political uses of religion in the 1980 presidential election, doing so within the broader context of how and why those uses emerged, as well as how they functioned to usher in a new era, setting the parameters for future presidential candidates' uses of religion in presidential elections. I go about this by first examining several streams that converged in 1980, among them: the expansion of the American conservative movement upon its inclusion of religious conservatism as a major concern; the various historical factors that led to the engagement of religious conservatives in American politics; the surfacing of religious rhetoric in presidential politics during the 1976 election; and the disappointment experienced by religious conservatives during the Carter presidency. I then closely examine of the candidacies of Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, and John B. Anderson in 1980, showing the ways in which these candidates constructed lasting discourses of political religion and signaled the emergence of a new religious era in presidential politics. Finally, I observe the legacy of the 1980 presidential election, offering lessons from it to inform what appears to be the present dawn of a new religious era in American politics.Item Friendship, rights, and community : Aristotle and John Locke on the family and political life.(2010-06-23T12:27:49Z) Cain, Patrick N.; Nichols, Mary P.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation develops an account of Aristotle's view of the family in contrast to the now more familiar and influential understanding derived from Locke's theory of rights and government. For Locke, the individual as an autonomous unit enters into associations such as the family and civil society on a contractual basis, for limited purposes and with limited obligations. In response to the Lockean approach, this dissertation explores Aristotle's view of the family, the relations between men and women, and the political and philosophic implications of his position. It argues that, for Aristotle, friendship in the family is the source and foundation of political life. The proper practice of politics aims at friendship, and depends upon the development of a family structure conducive to that goal. For Aristotle, this development means transforming a family dominated by the manliness of the father into a family that makes room for the rule of the woman—a rule that allows for and fosters friendship. When properly structured, the family affirms an important role for women, an influence that is crucial to the formation of political life and its proper practice. Aristotle's view of the family offers a richer and more comprehensive framework for our thinking about the relations within the family between husbands and wives, and parents and children, as well as relations between the family and the broader political communities.Item The role of the Supreme Court in antitrust enforcement.(2010-06-23T12:29:19Z) Ramsey, David P., 1979-; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.For more than one hundred years, American antitrust laws have helped to define the legal framework supporting the continuously expanding and developing American economy. This legal framework has not remained unchanged; rather, the antitrust laws have been revised and re-interpreted at fairly regular intervals, leading to periodic changes in the scope and conduct of antitrust enforcement. Interest in and support for the antitrust enterprise may be seen to rise and fall in rough correlation with changes in the political and economic cycles. Prominent accounts of the development of American antitrust enforcement have tended to emphasize the importance of Congress, the President, the agencies, and, most recently, economic theorists, in helping to shape and re-define antitrust policy. My dissertation contributes to this literature by focusing on the institutional role played by the Supreme Court in balancing the contentions of the political branches, the enforcement agencies, and the advocates of various schools of economic thought, while also working internally to develop those rules of statutory construction and interpretation and those trial procedures best suited to the peculiar nature of antitrust proceedings. I examine several distinct approaches on the Court to antitrust enforcement—the common law, the rule of reason, monopolistic competition, workable competition, and per se regimentation—before turning to the development of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis, first examining its origins in the law and economics seminars of Aaron Director, then following its expansion through the scholarship of Director's students and colleagues, and finally tracing some of the most important instances of the Supreme Court's confrontation with Chicago School doctrine. Following a brief look to the future of antitrust law, I conclude with some reflections on both the enduring relevance of the rule of reason in the Court's antitrust jurisprudence and the Court's unique institutional strengths as a systemic regulator of the American economy.Item Authoritarianism and the Catholic Church in Latin America.(2010-06-23T12:31:34Z) Edmonds, Amy E.; Waltman, Jerold L., 1945-; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This research examines the relationship between the Catholic Church and the military regimes in Latin America in the latter half of the twentieth century. Although prevailing theories explain church behavior regarding authoritarianism in reference to Protestant competition, I argue that church opposition is best explained by institutional arrangements in two ways. First, whether the church opposes authoritarianism is contingent on the degree of institutional autonomy the church possesses. Secondly, the strength of the opposition depends upon the presence of structural carriers, which are institutions connecting the church to society. The cases of Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay are examined through a historical institutionalist lens to test these hypotheses. Findings from these historical case studies indicate that both institutional autonomy and structural carriers are necessary for opposition. Ultimately, this study sheds light on the question of why religious institutions operate in varying ways in similar political contexts. It is also a contribution to the "path dependent model," which posits that the history of institutional arrangements serves as a strong influence on contemporary institutional behavior.Item John Rawls and the Supreme Court : a study in continuity and change.(2011-05-12T15:29:15Z) Foss, Jerome C.; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.In his influential book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls indicates his approval of an independent judiciary and judicial review for stabilizing a just regime. His later works, particularly Political Liberalism, place increased emphasis upon the Court for bringing about and securing his realistic-utopian vision of a constitutional democracy. This is highlighted by his calling the Court the exemplar of public reason; it is to take the institutional lead in re-founding the U.S. Constitution upon an overlapping consensus on issues of public morality based upon a liberal theory of justice. Democratic theorists have argued that Rawls's version of constitutionalism is an undemocratic means of protecting democratic principles, to which Rawls responds that the initial role of assertion given to the Court can eventually be replaced by a more passive role once the overlapping consensus is adequately established. I argue that Rawls reverses the traditional understanding of change being a necessary component of continuity. He allows continuity for the sake of implementing change, a strategy that ultimately undermines the stable constitutional government he claims to be seeking.Item Balancing liberty of contract with police power : a Hobbesian approach.(2011-05-12T15:46:09Z) Pope, Thomas R., 1983-; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.Modern liberal society exists by negotiating a fine balance between the liberty of the citizen and the authority of the state. Yet, as the years put distance between our founding principles and their execution, we have become forgetful of the symbiosis that unites individual and common goods. Particularly in American jurisprudence, we see a growing antagonism between personal liberties and the state's ability to act in the interest of the whole (known as its "police power"). The first and paradigmatic contest between these principles can be traced to the Lochner v. New York and its later repudiation in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. Lochner and its ilk tend to overemphasize the interest of liberty at the expense of the public good. West Coast Hotel, on the other hand, so vehemently rejects the most radical components of Lochner that government regulation on behalf of the public good effectually supersedes even moderate liberty interests. Both approaches recur throughout the Court's history, and yet fail to achieve the necessary balance of liberty and the public good because they consider the matter as a dichotomy. My dissertation will explore our constitution's roots in social contract theory, looking particularly to the thought of Thomas Hobbes for a third option that is consistent with the language and tradition of the Constitution, and is also more effectually viable than existing alternatives. Within a framework of social contract, individual liberty finds its fullest expression within the political community, which in turn exists to promote individual flourishing. When one is favored at the expense of the other, both must suffer. I begin with a review of the existing jurisprudence on the matter, highlighting the role and influence of Lochner. I then proceed to identify elements of Hobbesian social contract in the Constitution, discussing how to interpret these provisions in light of their philosophic roots. This section includes a brief explanation of why Hobbes is preferred here to the more traditional Lockean reading. Finally, I conclude with an examination of more recent cases before the Court, applying the method I have set forth.Item Constitutional origins of the federal judiciary.(2011-12-19) Brogdon, Matthew S.; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation examines the constitutional underpinnings of twentieth-century developments in the structure and function of the federal judicial system. In the half-century between 1891 and 1939, the federal judiciary underwent its first complete reorganization since the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. The result was rapid growth in the independence, extent, and power of federal courts. Congress first furnished the federal judiciary with the institutional means to extend its jurisdiction by increasing the number of federal trial courts and establishing a full set of intermediate appellate courts in 1891 to handle the bulk of federal judicial business. In the ensuing decades, Congress gradually relinquished control over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, giving the Court nearly complete discretion over the composition of its own docket. Soon thereafter, Congress likewise turned over control of federal procedure to the Judicial Conference of the United States and in 1939 furnished the federal judiciary with its own administrative apparatus, the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, to aid in the formulation and administration of judicial policy. The resulting institution looked far different than the judiciary that had administered federal law in the early republic. Prevailing accounts of this development find the origins of the modern judiciary in its immediate political context and deny to the Constitution any role as a determinate of its forms, claiming that the Framers never envisioned the sort of judicial institution that now pervades the Union. Looking to the framing of Article III in the Federal Convention of 1787, debates in the First Congress on the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the exercise of judicial power in the early republic, I argue to the contrary that the modern judiciary is a fulfillment of, rather than a divergence from, the institutional design of the Constitution. This has important implications not only for the adjudication of interpretive controversies over the meaning and application of Article III, but also for broader debates about the complex interaction between constitutional forms and political practice. It suggests that the Constitution functions as a determinant as well as a product of American political development.Item The pursuit of happiness and the American regime.(2011-12-19) Amato, Elizabeth S.; Nichols, Mary P.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.The Declaration assumes that government has a duty to ensure that its citizens can pursue happiness, but it does not specify how or to what degree a government can or should exert influence over and take responsibility for happiness. The project for this dissertation is to consider American novelists as guides on the pursuit of happiness who with a critical eye can present the shortcomings of pursuing happiness in a liberal nation but also present alternatives and correctives compatible with liberalism. American novelists offer insights about the prospects for happiness in a liberal regime and the difficulties Americans face in attaining it. I examine works by four American novelists—Tom Wolfe, Walker Percy, Edith Wharton, and Nathaniel Hawthorne—in order to show how our novelists engage us in our understanding of and the pursuit of happiness. Through depicting characters pursuing happiness, our novelists show how our political and social order does or does not facilitate the pursuit of happiness and what individual decisions can contribute to or detract from happiness. In so doing, our novelists provide signposts and other markers to indicate what roads and pathways are or are not likely to contribute to happiness. The individual enjoys meaningful freedom to act on his own and in coordination with others for the sake of pursuing happiness. Our novelists point us toward each other as our greatest resource to help us and to guide us toward happiness.Item The other as friend : a platonic response to the political thought of Jacques Derrida.(2012-08-08) Dinan, Matthew D.; Nichols, Mary P.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation presents a critical examination of the political thought of Jacques Derrida, suggesting that some of its aims are better realized by Plato. I argue that Derrida's late political works respond to a concern expressed in his early essay, "Plato's Pharmacy," where he suggests that Plato suppressed the subversive insights of philosophy, merely "deciding" to preserve the possibility of hierarchical order in politics. Derrida's explicitly political works identify the same Platonic logic of "closure" in Western political thought's prioritization of the "self" or "commensurability" to the other or "incommensurability." Such closure runs the risk of a nihilistic denial of the ultimate incommensurability: future time. Derrida responds to this politico-philosophical crisis through his notion of "democracy to come," in which he argues that democracy is never fully present, because it alternates between its irreconcilable principles of equality and freedom, in turn. Democracy is thus the one regime receptive to the radically incommensurable future or "to come." While Derrida's efforts to disrupt the nihilistic denial of the future in his political thought are admirable, his account relies heavily on a problematic conception of the self, assumes receptivity to the other to be incompatible with meaningful political limitations, and oversimplifies the Western tradition of political thought in both of these regards. In response, I return to the origin of Derrida's political interventions: the dialogues of Plato. I first examine the Sophist, arguing that Plato preempts Derrida's suggestion that he suppresses philosophy in the name of political order by criticizing the Eleatic Stranger's diacritical ontology for its inability to censure sophistry without recourse to the very decisionism Derrida supposes Plato to recommend. Turning to the Phaedrus I argue that Plato demonstrates Socrates' superiority to the Stranger in the Athenian's recognition of the human context in which thought occurs. Furthermore, Socrates models a type of friendly openness to Phaedrus that mitigates the neutralization of the incommensurable other feared by Derrida, while at the same time providing a foundation for meaningful politico-philosophical limitations. Plato thus offers a model of politico-philosophical openness through which it is possible to better obtain the political goals of Derrida.Item Rhetoric, reason, and the problem of rule : Aristotle and J.S. Mill on speech and politics.(2012-08-08) Block, Stephen A.; Nichols, Mary P.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation examines the relation between reason, public speech, and rule in the thought of J.S. Mill and Aristotle. It argues that both Mill and Aristotle present alternatives to typical liberal theories of speech that distinguish private “moral” languages from non-moral public discourse based on artificially-constructed principles of “public reason.” Theories of “public reason” aim to disconnect reason from the human good in order to provide the individual with authority to pursue his own good freely while constructing rational political order. The result of such theories is a distortion of the purposes and meaning of human rationality. This dissertation argues that, in contrast to other modern liberal thinkers, Mill is inegalitarian in assuming a distinction between the wise “few” and the unwise “many.” His liberal theory takes its bearings from this outlook that affirms the possibility for the rational discovery of moral truth rather than the artificial rationality that characterizes other liberalisms. Mill’s argument for freedom of speech, which encourages public discourse about questions of morality, is a reflection of this distinction. Mill thus provides a richer and more satisfying account of human reason and its capacities that other liberals do. Mill denies that his inegalitarianism leads to a hierarchical and illiberal political order only because the life of the wisest does not entail the activity of ruling inasmuch as ruling is a burdensome task directed to the good of another rather than the ruler’s own good. In contrast to Mill, Aristotle affirms the intrinsic worth of political rule for the ruler and denies that political rule should be reduced to an instrument exercised in accordance with technical expertise. While ascribing such dignity to politics complicates any answer to the central questions that arise in political life – “who should rule?,” for example – it generates a perpetual need for speech and thought about the common good and justice that makes humans inseparably political and rational beings. Aristotle thus defends rhetoric as the language necessary to represent and communicate the ambiguous truths of politics and human action and as the highest manifestation of political rule.Item Political philosophy and the divine ground : Eric Voegelin on Plato.(2012-08-08) Romanello, Julianne M.; Corey, David D.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.Recent scholarship has shown an interest in how prominent twentieth-century thinkers have interpreted classic texts, especially those of Plato. Understanding how and why contemporary thinkers have turned to Plato promises to illuminate critical features of the contemporary thinker’s work, Plato’s work, and the modern situation in general. This study contributes to these efforts by examining how the political philosopher Eric Voegelin approached the Platonic texts. I argue that Voegelin’s approach to Plato is distinct from other twentieth-century interpretations inasmuch as Voegelin understood Platonic philosophy as a divinely-inspired quest for the ground of being. In order to substantiate my claim, I compare Voegelin’s approach to reading Plato to Leo Strauss’s approach, paying attention to each thinker’s antecedent intellectual commitments and specific techniques for analyzing texts. I then turn to each thinker’s conclusions about the significance of three particular dialogues: the Gorgias, the Republic, and the Laws. I show that Voegelin’s attention to the divine dimension of Plato’s thought brings clarity to a number of Plato’s most enigmatic passages, especially his various myths. Voegelin’s interpretation also invites us to reconsider the relationship between philosophy, politics, and history, for Voegelin’s Plato was involved in the dynamic process of restoring order within history through his loving insights into the eternal ground.Item The principled constitutionalism of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.(2012-11-29) Bartl, Anthony D.; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.Justice Kennedy is the nation's most influential jurist, but he is given little respect as a constitutional and legal thinker. Often called the "swing justice" for his pivotal position between the Supreme Court's "liberal" and "conservative" blocs, his frequent control of the Court's most controversial cases is often resented and criticized for an apparent lack of a consistent basis in constitutional principle or jurisprudential method. This dissertation joins the work of those who have previously sought to defend Kennedy from the charge that his jurisprudence lacks integrity. It differs from those previous works, however, by acknowledging a diversity to Kennedy's arguments that prevents his approach from being captured by a single ideological or methodological commitment. Whereas Kennedy's previous defenders have sought to uncover a particular method or an overarching idea that guides his jurisprudence, I argue the Kennedy finds different principles at work in the Constitution and sees his role as a judge to give full voice to these principles as demanded by the context of particular cases. To show how Kennedy's thought reflects upon these principles, I examine his opinions in certain critical and controversial areas of constitutional law--establishment and free exercise, speech and press, and due process liberty. Moving through Kennedy's opinions, a clear commitment emerges to liberty and equality as preeminent constitutional principles that often work together but sometimes find themselves in tension. In Kennedy's understanding, a proper resolution of cases where these principles conflict requires careful exploration of the meaning of these principles and the prudent use of judgment to find "correct balance in constitutional interpretation."Item Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and substantive due process : why the most powerful judge in American history isn't as crazy as everyone thinks he is.(2013-09-16) Capper, David Winston.; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation seeks to challenge the widely accepted characterization of Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy as a political moderate or ‘swing’ Justice. Looking at one of the most contentious areas of constitutional law–substantive due process–the dissertation considers the major substantive due process cases that the Court has heard during Kennedy’s tenure, and, by explaining how the apparent contradictions in his jurisprudence reveal that, rather than inconsistency, Kennedy has a consistent methodology for approaching substantive due process cases that is both respectful of precedent, as well as one which seeks to limit the Court’s power in this area of constitutional law. The dissertation will demonstrate that while Justice Kennedy is neither a true moderate like the late Justice Lewis Powell, nor a political ideologue, but a judicial and political conservative who seeks to rest the Court’s decision-making on a stable and methodical approach, rather than an inherently unstable political ideology.Item Rhetorical practice in Congress : a new way to understand institutional decline.(2013-09-16) Wysocki, Joseph F.; Nichols, David K.; Political Science.; Baylor University. Dept. of Political Science.This dissertation examines a previously unexamined factor that may contribute to the recent decline in Congress, the historical development of congressional rhetoric. Chapter one begins by examining the relationship between rhetoric and factors that lead to institutional health in Congress. Primarily, it argues that certain uses of rhetoric contribute to deliberation, regular order, and institutional identity, while others undermine these institutional goals. Rhetoric that undermines these goals has been used increasingly as congressional speeches have become more public in recent history. The chapter then proposes five specific standards to trace the development of rhetoric in two historical case studies. These standards are taken from scholarship on presidential rhetoric. They include: 1) the connection between speech and thought, 2) the constitutional tradition, 3) rhetorical self-restraint, 4) masculine and feminine rhetoric, and 5) crisis rhetoric. The first case study examines the two eras of congressional responses to the President’s Annual or State of the Union Address. Chapter two examines the institutional response prepared by both the House of Representatives and the Senate during the first twelve years of the United States existence. Chapter three turns to the televised opposition party responses offered by members of Congress that began in 1966. These two chapters show the more extreme examples of rhetoric according to the above standards. The second case study shows this transition more gradually. Chapters four through eight examine the floor debates of five important congressional reforms. These include: 1) the Pendleton Act, 2) the “revolt” against Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon, 3) the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, 4) the 1961 changes to the Rules Committee, and 5) the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act. These chapters illustrate the slow decline in rhetoric, according to the five standards developed. The conclusion in chapter nine ties the two case studies together with congressional decline and proposes an agenda for future research in the area of congressional rhetoric.Item Justice, prudence, and foreign relations in Aristotle’s political thought.(2015-07-23) Sims, Stephen Patrick, 1987-; Nichols, Mary P.; Clinton, W. David.This dissertation examines how the political thought of Aristotle addresses foreign relations and the nature of international politics. I argue that for Aristotle the practice of justice and prudence occurs only in relation to the common good of particular and separate political communities. Thus, the possibility of human happiness, understood to be the life of virtue, depends on the existence of separate and free political communities. Aristotle nevertheless understands natural justice and natural friendship as a sign of a fundamental human community, which helps explain his concern for just foreign relations. Thus, although human happiness depends on participation in a self-sufficient political community, it does not prescind from human relationships that cross the boundaries of political communities. I conclude by showing how Aristotle’s political thought combines strengths of contemporary theories, such as realism, liberalism, or cosmopolitanism, while at the same time avoiding their weaknesses.Item Good for self and good for others : Rousseau’s construction of international politics.(2016-04-05) King, Joshua D., 1987-; Corey, David D.; Clinton, W. David.My dissertation situates Rousseau’s international thought within the generally accepted categories of IR Scholarship. Was he a realist, a liberal, a constructivist, or something else? I argue that he does indeed exhibit tendencies of realism as well as modern constructivism but, ultimately, transcends both of these categories. Like realists, Rousseau is deeply aware that the struggle for power permeates social life. Awareness of and participation in this struggle conditions the behavior of individuals and states. Rousseau also shares with Constructivism the belief that state interests and political structures are the result of ongoing social and historic processes that continue to be constructed, interpreted, and revised. The ongoing construction of identities, interests, and institutions, means that change is possible, even in the international realm. Rousseau, however, is neither Realist nor Constructivist in the way he appeals to nature as the basis for his socio-political criticism. Rousseau’s arguments do not issue in a call for modern man to return to a state of nature, but they do affect the kind of “constructs” Rousseau is willing to entertain as legitimate. In order to improve political constructions, we must more nearly approximate psychological unity and strive to better correlate physical ability with psychological need. Social and political structures, including hierarchies of power, are necessary features of human life, but Rousseau also sees that such structures have a profoundly humanizing role to play in cultivating civic virtue, forming individual identity, and constraining amour propre. Rousseau articulates a responsibility to pursue international justice and suggests ways to do so through domestic politics, while acknowledging the intrinsic limitations bound up in humanity’s social existence.Item Political pluralism and the common law tradition.(2016-08-30) Warf, Nathan, 1987-; Corey, David D.The term “pluralism” has many meanings. In my project, I refer to the conception offered by a collection of British writers in the early nineteenth century. They understood pluralism as a response to the excesses of both individualism and state collectivism. They argued that individuals will always be found within a myriad of groups—families, churches, communities. Such groups are realities in their own right. They are not reducible to the individuals who make them up, nor are they legal fictions or mere concessions of the state. In fact, groups are constitutive of the state. The state owes its existence to groups, not the reverse. As a result, pluralists conceive the role of government to be the maintenance of a system of rules within which associations pursue their own ends. Though pluralism thus understood came to full bloom among the English pluralists of early twentieth-century Britain, its origins read back to Germany—from Johannes Althusius in the early seventeenth century and Otto von Gierke in the late nineteenth. Each of these thinkers conceived of society as being built from the bottom up by an assortment of groups. My argument is that this organic view of society goes hand in hand with a parallel organic view of law, which conceives law as a historically unfolding emanation from the people rather than as a simple command of the sovereign. In the second half of this dissertation, I turn to America. I argue that in early American history, a strong organic conception of law and society was present. Changes in our understanding of law have brought about corresponding changes in our understanding of society. The intermediary institutions praised by Tocqueville in the 1830s are much weakened as a result. We are left with the individual versus the state. Political pluralism offers a powerful alternative. I offer the jurisprudence of Justice John Marshall Harlan as a model for the practice of pluralism.Item Progressive constitutionalism : William Howard Taft as chief executive and chief justice.(2017-01-12) Burns, Kevin J., 1989-; Nichols, David K.This dissertation explores the relationship between William Howard Taft’s constitutionalism and progressivism, considering both his term as president and his tenure on the Supreme Court. While Taft has traditionally been painted as a “stand-pat” conservative who sought to stymie progressive reforms, he actually shows the flexibility of the Constitution and its ability to adapt to different times and circumstances. Taft was both a conservative on constitutional matters and a progressive with respect to policy. His jurisprudence has been praised as a model for originalists, yet he inherited a host of progressive policies from Theodore Roosevelt. Taft shows a perspective on American politics quite foreign to the modern eye, seeking to enact progressive reforms within the bounds of constitutional restraint. Taft’s political project provides a viewpoint too often missed by both conservatives and liberals today. Frequently, conservatives view the Constitution through the lens of original intent, and argue that the Constitution requires that public policy be in line with the thought of the Founders of 1789. Liberals, on the other hand, are prone to focus on the broadest language of the Constitution – “general welfare,” “liberty,” and “equality” – to the virtual exclusion of the rest of the document. The common error is that both liberals and conservatives too often attempt to argue that the Constitution mandates their preferred policy priorities. Taft, in contrast, shows that the Constitution is a fundamental law, which creates a structure by which government is empowered to enact a plethora of policies. The Constitution, in his terms, has the “elasticity” to adapt to changing circumstances and permit the government to respond to any of a variety of problems. Thus, he shows that the Constitution does not require either conservative or liberal policies, but is open to both.Item Who am I to judge? Rhetoric, passion, and rule of law in Aristotle's political thought.(2017-01-25) Basil, Christine J., 1989-; Nichols, Mary P.This dissertation is an attempt to articulate a response to what seems to be the greatest political crisis of our time: a politics divorced from reasoned speech (logos) and its most significant political function, judgment. Aristotle’s Rhetoric, I propose, provides not only a framework that allows us to see and articulate this contemporary dilemma, but also a necessary and illuminating alternative to the understanding of human reason that arose with the Enlightenment and is inextricably linked to this crisis. Modern political thought has largely attempted to limit the scope and importance of reasoned speech in political life. The result of this attempt has been has been the exile of reasoned judgment about political and moral matters from the public square; and the result of this in turn has been a crisis of confidence in reason itself and its capacity to help human beings navigate the complex situations and choices they must face in everyday life. All of this culminates in a crippling political and spiritual paralysis that contributes to political passions and actions set adrift, ungoverned by reason and apparently incapable of being gentled by its guidance. In the face of this, turning to Aristotle’s political thought provides a robust alternative understanding of reason and its role in political life. The Rhetoric, in short, is an elaboration of Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that it is precisely the faculty of reasoned speech that distinguishes human beings from other animals, and, further, that the cultivation of this faculty allows for the highest human possibilities, both as individuals and also in communities. Speech allows us to consider not only what is advantageous and harmful, but also what is just and unjust, and noble and base. The rare prospect of “complete community” is made possible only to the extent that human beings share speech about what is good, what is just, and what is noble (see Pol. 1252b27). Shared speeches about such matters, the likes of which Aristotle treats in the Rhetoric, are necessary as much to complete community as it is to man’s highest possibilities. The rediscovery of reasoned speech and its potential role in political life is the necessary and noble choice Aristotle lays before his modern audience in the Rhetoric.
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