Department of Philosophy
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Item Virtues, divine commands, and the debt of creation: towards a Kierkegaardian Christian ethic.(Southwestern Philosophical Society, 2006-01) Manis, R. Zachary (Robert Zachary).; Evans, C. Stephen.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Though Kierkegaard's ethic in "Works of Love" frequently has been a target of harsh — and often uncharitable — criticism, a number of recent treatments have sought to defend both its viability and its relevance to the contemporary discussion. Increasingly, the literature is replete with interpretations that situate it within the traditions of virtue ethics and/or divine command theory. I evaluate these readings, focusing primarily on the issue of moral obligation in Kierkegaard's writings. I argue that both the virtue and divine command interpretations are deficient, though Kierkegaard's ethic indeed shares significant points of contact with both traditions. I explicate and defend an alternative account of moral obligation that seems to me most to warrant the label, "Kierkegaardian," and attempt to expand the view, taking Kierkegaard's ethic as a foundation upon which to build a theoretically rigorous account of moral obligation. The resulting view, I argue, captures the best of both virtue ethics and divine command theory, while avoiding the most serious problems of each.Item Kongzi, Rawls, and the sense of justice in the Analects.(2006-07-31T01:16:48Z) Cline, Erin May.; Baird, Robert M., 1937-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.This dissertation is a comparative study of the philosophy of John Rawls and the Confucian Analects regarding the idea of a sense of justice. The first aim of this work is to correct a view that has been advanced by several scholars of Chinese and comparative philosophy, namely, that the absence of terms such as "justice" in classical Chinese indicates that classical Chinese texts are not concerned with questions of justice, and that classical Confucian philosophers were not interested in the ideas that are the focus of modern Western political philosophy. Against these claims, I argue that there are deep and important areas of agreement between the understanding of a sense of justice in the Analects and John Rawls's account of a sense of justice. I show that on both views, a sense of justice is cultivated first within the context of parent-child relationships and then within communities, finally emerging as a fully developed moral sense that informs the capacity to feel and act in certain ways toward other members of society. The second aim of this study is to show how comparative work can help us to understand more fully and accurately the features of two or more views. I argue that studying the idea of a sense of justice in the Analects alongside a Rawlsian sense of justice highlights some important dimensions of Rawls's work that have been neglected, including the role he assigns to the family and the community in his account of how citizens cultivate a sense of justice. I also argue that Rawls's discussions of moral psychology and the development of a sense of justice provide readers with a model for understanding the role that moral capacities can play in political philosophy. Rawls's account helps readers to see how an appreciation for justice can be expressed in a text like the Analects, even though there is not a fully developed theory of justice or a single term that consistently designates "justice."Item Kierkegaard’s practice of edification: indirect communication, the virtues, and Christianity.(2006-12-05T21:49:59Z) Tietjen, Mark A.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.The ultimate aim of Kierkegaard's authorship is to build up his reader's character. Kierkegaard's signed, religious works suggest this reading, but some interpreters say that the more indirect, pseudonymous character of many of Kierkegaard’s works undermines such an interpretation. I argue against recent deconstructive interpretations of Kierkegaard’s indirect communication that would refute the character-building reading. These interpretations are based upon undialectical conceptions of indirect communication and uncharitable views of Kierkegaard's stated intentions. To demonstrate Kierkegaard's character-building interests, I consider his clarification of the virtue of faith in several of his most important pseudonymous writings. Finally, I consider some possible implications of Kierkegaard's methods for contemporary moral philosophy.Item Transcending the garden : the role of the sign of the garden in Augustine's Confessions.(2008-10-02T18:22:26Z) Wolfe, John Edward, 1980-; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Augustine’s Confessions is a complete and unified document. Augustine utilizes sign to bridge apparent textual gaps and to establish an intimate relationship with his reader. Specifically, I assert that Augustine establishes a three tiered movement in the Confessions in which a sign is introduced, transcended, and reflected on. To confirm this movement, I trace the development of a specific sign, that of the garden, throughout the text. I begin with an examination of the introduction of the sign, which focuses on Books II and VIII. The garden events spanning these books serve to introduce the garden sign to the reader, as well as introduce a variety of possible signified objects. After successfully introducing the garden sign to the reader, Augustine begins to distance the text from certain signified objects. Augustine transcends preconceived notions of the garden sign to direct the reader toward a specific signified object, the divine. After encountering the divine, Augustine directs the reader back to the previous signified objects. This allows the reader to contemplate these possible signified objects in light of the true signified object. This results in a new understanding of the signified objects, and a deeper appreciation of the true signified. My final step in this project is to engage similar unity theory project.Item Where is Socrates going? : The philosophy of conversion in Plato's Euthydemus.(2008-10-02T18:25:36Z) Whittington, Richard T., 1977-; Schultz, Anne-Marie, 1966-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.This work examines the aim of Socratic philosophy in Plato's Euthydemus. To understand the conflict that occurs in the dialogue between Socrates and his sophistic rivals, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, one must evaluate Socrates' overarching goal and its divergence from sophistry. The author argues, however, that a sound analysis of this dialogue must go further and understand Socrates' quarrel with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as part of a larger quarrel between philosophy and the competitive values of Greek society. The two sophists in this dialogue hardly merit serious, sustained attention. They make no serious arguments and do not seem clever enough to conceal the speciousness of their method. They practice eristic controversy for only one purpose: to refute their interlocutor and move quickly to the next refutation before anyone has time to scrutinize the soundness of their frequently absurd arguments. Indeed, one might wonder why Plato spends his energy trying to discredit this absurdly clownish pair. The author argues that the brothers do not seem terribly threatening or important, but Plato's critique does not stop with them. Rather, he uses them as a caricature of Greek culture and its cult of victory and violence. In opposition to the culture's celebration of competitive values, he articulates a model of philosophical cooperation or (put differently) protreptic dialogue. Instead of aiming to win a dispute, he uses dialogue to convert his interlocutor to philosophy, a goal that diverges radically from sophistry. In this way, Socrates engages his interlocutor an intimate way, leading him patiently toward philosophy. At the same time, Socrates does not speak only to his interlocutor; he offers protreptic dialogue as a public model of discourse and an implicit critique of the city's obsession with competition and victory. Finally, the author contends that one cannot understand Socrates' philosophical goal (namely, exhorting his interlocutor to love wisdom) without understanding his sense of divine mission. In the Euthydemus Socrates begins with the divine sign, which sustains his sense of mission and purpose even when his protreptic dialogues terminate in aporia.Item Teleological moral realism : an explication and defense.(2008-10-14T14:49:54Z) Alexander, David Eric, 1978-; Beaty, Michael D.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Contemporary moral realists assume that goodness is a property susceptible to Kripkean/Putnamian developments in philosophy of language and metaphysics. However, close attention to the actual use of the term ‘good’ reveals that ‘good’ does not refer to a property but to a predicate-forming functor. Relying on an argument advanced by P. T. Geach, I argue that the semantics of ‘good’ is such that statements of the form “x is good” are semantically incomplete. In order to complete such statements some substantive has to be understood. I go on to argue that the semantics of ‘good’ has profound implications for metaethics. First, I show that goodness is not a property capable of figuring into necessary a posteriori identities. Thus, most contemporary defenses of moral realism fail. Second, I show that the semantics of ‘good’ reveals that ‘good’ must modify something that has a nature and function. I go on to argue that if it is true that ‘good’ must modify something that has a nature and function, then human goodness is both unique and uniform. Human goodness is unique because human nature is. Human goodness is uniform because human nature is. Third, I show that the correct metaphysics for functions is a normative account that supports the semantics of ‘good’ provided earlier. In the process of defending a normative account of functions I show that theories of functions that rely solely on evolutionary theory fail. Lastly, I consider and respond to some standard objections to moral realism. In particular, I examine the argument from motivation, the argument from queerness and the argument from the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. I show that the metaethical theory that emerged in the first three parts of the dissertation easily handles each of these arguments.Item Divine choice and natural law : the eudokian ethics of Francis Turretin.(2008-10-14T15:19:28Z) Bruce, James Elliot, 1974-; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Francis Turretin (1623–1687) places a threefold scheme of right (ius) within the framework of Thomistic natural law to explain the relationship between the divine will and the moral order. He centers his inquiry on a single question: can God ever dispense with a precept of the moral law? That is, can God temporarily suspend the obligation that a person has to a moral law so that an individual action is not immoral, even though it would be otherwise, if it were not for God’s command? For Turretin, the answer is unequivocally in the negative: God cannot dispense with any of the precepts of the moral law at any time, for any reason. Nevertheless, some laws do change, and Turretin uses divine, natural, and positive rights to explain why this change is possible. Divine right describes the authority and privilege, as well as the duties and obligations, that God has on account of his own nature. Natural right describes those privileges and obligations that God has due to the nature of the things he has chosen to create, and positive right deals with those additional privileges and obligations that arise from divine choice alone. Those laws, or parts of laws, that arise from divine and natural right cannot change. Those laws, or parts of laws, that arise from positive right can change, however. That God cannot change the moral law, or even dispense with it, does not undermine his freedom, because God is internally, and not externally, constrained. In his free choosing, from his eudokia (good pleasure), God is constrained by divine right, from his own nature; by natural right, from the nature of the things he has made; and, by positive right, from whatever additional laws he has chosen to establish. God’s free choice cannot contravene the natural law, yet the natural law is determined by God’s free choice, in so far as the natural law is constituted by the nature of the things God has chosen to create.Item Iris Murdoch's genealogy of the modern self : retrieving consciousness beyond the linguistic turn.(2008-10-15T14:00:23Z) Jordan, Jessy E.G.; Moore, Scott Hunter.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.In this dissertation I argue that Murdoch’s philosophical-ethical project is best understood as an anti-Enlightenment genealogical narrative. I maintain that her work consistently displays four fundamental features that typify genealogical accounts: 1) liberation (i.e., subversion) from a dominant philosophical picture; 2) restoration of a previous philosophical picture wrongly dismissed; 3) restoration of practices no longer intelligible on the dominant view; and 4) recovery of an alternative grammar at odds with the dominant philosophical discourse. The dominant philosophical picture Murdoch subverts is the eclipse of consciousness wrought by both the Anglo-analytic and Continental-existentialist traditions. Whether effaced by totalizing linguistic structures or identified with an empty choosing will, Murdoch argues that the forces present within her philosophical context are fundamentally hostile to an adequate conception of consciousness. Her genealogical project attempts to reassert the primacy of consciousness within this antagonistic climate by restoring a Platonic, erotic conception of consciousness. Additionally, Murdoch insists that consciousness is the fundamental form of moral being and that moral transformation, including the practices for that transformation, cannot be understood without a thick conception of consciousness. Murdoch’s account, therefore, refocuses our attention on important practices or techniques of moral purification rendered unintelligible on the dominant view. Finally, Murdoch recovers the Platonic metaphor of the Good, including the conceptual array in which the Good receives its meaning, in an attempt to develop an alternative grammar fit for the task of picturing the complexities and nuances of our ethical situation. I conclude by commenting on both the promising and problematic aspects of Murdoch’s legacy.Item Kierkegaard and modern moral philosophy : conceptual unintelligibility, moral obligations and divine commands.(2009-04-03T15:24:16Z) Cantrell, Michael A.; Evans, C. Stephen.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.We moderns have lost a grasp on some of our most commonly used moral concepts. Or rather, the moral concepts that we use everyday have, in our grasp, lost the intelligibility they once enjoyed. Contemporary moral judgments are linguistic survivals from practices that have been largely abolished in many spheres of modern society. And although we continue to use the same expressions, many of our moral utterances are now lacking in content, due to our having relinquished the conditions for their intelligibility. Elizabeth Anscombe argued for this thesis in her 1958 article, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” I demonstrate that there are good reasons to believe that Anscombe’s diagnosis of our modern moral predicament is correct before turning to point out that Anscombe was not the first to propose such a radical picture of our moral situation. Over a century before Anscombe, Søren Kierkegaard diagnosed the disorder of our modern moral language and thought and worked to identify, expose and correct modernity’s conceptual confusions. Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of the disorder of our modern moral language and thought has remarkable commonalities with Anscombe’s. Nevertheless, whereas Anscombe famously suggested that we would do well to abandon our use of the moral “ought” and of the notions of moral “right”, “wrong” and “obligation,” Kierkegaard prescribes a different solution. Instead of jettisoning our unintelligible moral concepts, Kierkegaard suggests, we should recover a divine law conception of ethics that would render our moral language and thought intelligible once again. I argue that such a recovery of a divine law conception of ethics is a viable option; specifically, I argue that a divine command theory of moral obligation—conceived as a special case of a social theory of obligation and developed with an eye toward the essential roles played by both institutional rules and the virtues—is theoretically defensible and deserves to be taken as a serious metaethical option by contemporary ethical theorists.Item Without measure : Marion’s apophatic-virtue phenomenology of iconic love.(2010-02-02T19:46:41Z) Antoninka, Amy.; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.I investigate Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love and its relation to ethics. I argue that his phenomenology of love provides a possibility for developing ethics. I rely on the saturated phenomenon of the icon and his phenomenology of love. I establish that the icon provides a rich sense of relation, a need to modify certain appraisals of justice, and provides a descriptive account of the virtue of receptivity. In chapter one, I give an exegesis of Marion's phenomenology of the icon. He argues that the icon moves toward charity, yet does not relate to ethics. Experience of the icon gives transformed vision that voids universal laws and frees the beholder to experience communion. In chapter two, I provide three examples of iconic experience that emphasize the importance of justice for the icon in contrast to Marion's formulation that justice is equivalent to revenge. I argue that Marion attacks justice because of its link to a deontological definition; yet, freed from deontology, Marion makes room for an apophatic way that moves toward a virtue ethic. In chapter three, I look at Marion's reasons for leaving ethics out of the icon. His critique of Kantian ethics, as well as his use and critique of the Levinas suggest that he opposes modern metaphysical ethics. In discussion of the receptivity to the call of the Other, he relies on the virtues. This reliance shows that Marion has room for a descriptive account of ethics, and that ignoring ethics undermines his overall project. I investigate Marion's claim that the icon opens up to charity by reading the apophatic doctrine of the icon in concert with the erotic reduction. I conclude that Marion’s phenomenology can be viewed as a counter-ethics a way to see phenomenology as a virtue practice, to unify reason and love in ethics, to remove the ego from the central concern of ethics, and to see the need for openness and vulnerability to the iconic other.Item The conversion and therapy of desire in Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues.(2010-06-23T12:17:30Z) Boone, Mark J.; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Foley, Michael P., 1970-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.The philosophical schools of late antiquity commonly diagnosed human unhappiness as rooted in some fundamental disorder in our desires, and offered various therapies or prescriptions for the healing of desire. Among these only the neo-Platonic treatment for desire requires redirecting desire towards an immaterial world. Although Augustine agrees with the neo-Platonists on the need to redirect our desires to an immaterial world, he does not adopt their therapy for desire. Instead he adopts a thoroughly Christian approach to the healing of desire. The conversion of desire results from the Trinitarian God's gracious actions taken to heal our desires. Augustine does not recommend fleeing from the influence of the body, as neo-Platonism encourages, but fleeing to Christ, immersing ourselves in the life of the Church, and practicing the theological virtues. In this dissertation I examine Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues. In Contra Academicos (Against the Academics), Augustine argues that we must vigorously desire wisdom in order to attain it; that we must have hope in the possibility of attaining wisdom; and that our desire for wisdom must be bound in faith to Christ. In De beata vita (On the Happy Life), Augustine argues that the Trinitarian God is the only perennially satisfying object of desire and shows that the pursuit of God is the activity of a prayerful community of believers who are practicing faith, hope, and charity. In De ordine (On Order), Augustine recommends that the reordering of our desires be pursued through a liberal arts education and through Christian morals. In Soliloquia (Soliloquies), Augustine says that we ought to love God and the soul. He also reminds us to submit to Christ's authority and practice faith, hope, and love. After discussing these things, I discuss in a concluding chapter the harmony of love for God and love for human beings, pointing to passages in the dialogues that suggest this harmony.Item Augustine's solution to the problem of theological fatalism.(2011-01-05T19:39:33Z) Hemati, Russell Danesh.; Beaty, Michael D.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.In Augustine's dialogue De Libero Arbitrio, his interlocutor Evodius presents an argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, a position we now call "theological fatalism." Since this position is irreconcilable with Augustine's theological commitments, he endeavors to reveal some flaw in Evodius' reasoning. The tradition of modern analytic philosophy has misinterpreted Augustine's arguments against theological fatalism, and as a result, his arguments are underappreciated and often ignored. Augustine is often characterized as accepting a deterministic understanding of free will (called compatibilism), even though the text of De Libero Arbitrio, De Civitate Dei, and several late anti-Pelagian do not support such a view. A more promising interpretation of Augustine's argument is that he endorses a version of free will whereby free actions have alternative possibilities only in reference to causation, but not in reference to foreknowledge. He argues that to exercise free will is to be the cause of what is willed. Thus, no loss of freedom is implied by advance knowledge of a volition, even if that volition has no alternatives relative to foreknowledge. This interpretation embodies a unique way to solve the problem of theological fatalism which has various benefits: it is more harmonious with Augustine's other works, it avoids various paradoxes of God's involvement in human affairs, and it can be combined fruitfully with other methods of solving the fatalism problem to make a comprehensive theory of foreknowledge, providence and free will. A particularly strong objection to Augustine's solution is that an agent cannot be truly free without the ability to do otherwise, regardless of the contents of God's foreknowledge. I argue that the important, intuition-bearing quality of alternative possibilities is the leeway within causality. Since Augustine's solution accepts alternative possibilities relative to causality (in fact giving more reasons to affirm this type of alternative possibilities), he does not compromise robust freedom of the will by rejecting leeway within foreknowledge.Item Taking responsibility for ourselves : a Kiekergaardian account of the freedom of the freedom-relevant conditions necessary for the cultivation of character.(2011-05-12T15:21:41Z) Carron, Paul E.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.What are the freedom-relevant conditions necessary for someone to be a morally responsible person? I examine several key authors beginning with Harry Frankfurt that have contributed to this debate in recent years, and then look back to the writings or Søren Kierkegaard to provide a solution to the debate. In this project I investigate the claims of semi-compatibilism and argue that while its proponents have identified a fundamental question concerning free will and moral responsibility—namely, that the agential properties necessary for moral responsibility ascriptions are found in scenarios where the agent acts on her own as opposed to her action resulting from freedom-undermining external causes such as manipulation, phobias, etc.—they have failed to show that the freedom-relevant agential properties identified in those actual-sequence scenarios are compatible with causal determinism. My argument is that only a voluntarist-libertarian theory can adequately account for the kinds of cases that the semi-compatibilist identify. I argue that there are three freedom-relevant conditions necessary for someone to be a morally responsible person: a hierarchical understanding of human desires [specifically and mental states generally], an incompatibilist (non-deterministic) understanding of human action, and a historical understanding of character development. The ability to reflect critically about one's own desires and emotions, and thus to have a kind of self-knowledge and understanding with regard to the springs of one's own actions, is required to make it possible for the agent to be the "source" of her own actions and character. The non-deterministic understanding of human action is needed for a similar reason: if determinism is true, then every action a person performs can be ultimately traced to and exhaustively explained in terms of factors outside the agent's control, thus making the agent's responsibility for his actions an illusion. And finally, human nature must be such that, over time, one's choices leave a dispositional residue of self-understanding and motivation in the person's self, out of which, in mature understanding and motivation, the person acts as a fully responsible agent.Item Knowledge revealed to the heart : an articulation and defense of Pascal's epistemology.(2011-09-14) Klapauszak, Janelle Liesl.; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.It is the focus of this dissertation to articulate Pascal’s position, which may be viewed as a middle ground between skepticism and dogmatism; a position that induces the reader to seek. The second and third chapters will be devoted to Pascal’s rejections of dogmatism and skepticism. By identifying his reasons for rejecting these two views, the middle position that Pascal attempts to hold will become clear. The fourth chapter will investigate the concept of divine illumination, first in Augustine, and then as it is passed down to Descartes and Pascal. The fifth chapter will be focused on articulating Pascal’s account of the heart, which allows for what I have termed dependent certainty. Chapter six will be devoted to placing this position within the landscape of contemporary epistemology, and specifically in arguing to what extent it ought to be interpreted as a kind of fideism and suggesting commonalities between Pascal’s eudaimonaic account and contemporary virtue epistemology.Item Explanation in metaphysics.(2011-09-14) Johnson, Daniel M., 1984-; Pruss, Alexander R.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.One of the primary tasks of the philosopher is to explain what it is for something to be the case – what it is for one event (substance, fact) to cause another, what it is for an action to be obligatory, what it is for an object to bear a property, what it is for a proposition to be true necessarily, what it is for a person to know something. This activity of explaining what something is or what it is for something to be the case, of identifying what I call ontological explanations, is of special importance to metaphysics, since the task of metaphysics generally is to get to the bottom of reality. The concept of ontological explanation is usually buried a layer deep in most discussions, however, and theses about it are either presupposed or clothed as claims about other things. In some cases, this leads to confusion and frustration, and in many other cases the discussion could benefit from a long look at ontological explanation even if that look isn't strictly necessary to remedy confusion. My goal is to give ontological explanation that long look, and then use the clarity gained to reinterpret, reorganize, and even make progress on some long-standing disputes in metaphysics. In the first two chapters I examine ontological explanation itself and connect it to a host of important metaphysical issues, including ontological commitment and truthmaker theory. In the third and fourth chapters, I apply the work done in the first two chapters to a pair of important metaphysical arguments that crucially employ infinite regresses of ontological explanations – Bradley's Regress and McTaggart's Paradox.Item Emotion, evaluative perception, and epistemic goods.(2011-09-14) Pelser, Adam C.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.In contrast to the widely held view that emotions are obstacles to ideal epistemic functioning, emotions, as evaluative perceptual states, can contribute in significant ways to our achievement of valuable epistemic goods including justified beliefs, understanding, and wisdom. That emotions are evaluative perceptual states – call this the perceptual thesis of emotion – is evidenced by the extent of the structural and functional parallels between emotions and sense perceptions. Emotions, like sense perceptions, can be both original and acquired and are distinct from the sensory inputs that give rise to them; they also resemble sense perceptions in being passive, intentional mental states with propositional content and they are sources of belief, while yet not themselves beliefs. Emotion also functions in parallel ways to sense perception with respect to the achievement of epistemic justification. Emotions, like their sense perceptual analogues, can and do function as justifying reasons or evidence for beliefs – call this the justificatory thesis of emotion. The justificatory thesis of emotion best explains plausible cases of justified beliefs formed on the basis of emotional experience, as well as the fact that we enjoy justification for evaluative beliefs bearing conceptual content indicative of emotional experience. Moreover, the justificatory thesis is not undermined by any of the strongest objections raised against it; namely, that emotions seem too unreliable to justify beliefs, that emotions themselves can be justified, and that we rarely cite emotions as our reasons for believing as we do. In another significant epistemic parallel between emotion and sense perception, emotional experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of value just as sense perceptual experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of the physical world. Emotion as evaluative perception is also essential to our achievement and actualization of wisdom. Wisdom is deep, appreciative ontological understanding of that which is good (i.e., the proper objects of wonder) and it essentially involves virtuous concerns and emotion-dispositions. Indeed, not only is our initial pursuit of wisdom often prompted by an emotional experience (e.g., wonder), wisdom is also partially constituted by and initially exemplified in virtuous emotional perceptions of value.Item Modeling divine deliberation.(2011-09-14) Tong, Jing, 1985-; Kvanvig, Jonathan L.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Under the assumption that God deliberates when he decides which world he will create, I set out to build a model for God’s deliberation. The first chapter will lay the ground and outline each chapter. From Chapter Two through Six, I will explore various models. These models differ from each other mainly because they represent the relations between God’s creative acts and the actualization of the worlds in different manners. Based on these chapters, I will conclude that the only models that are simple, consistent, and adequate at once are ones that rely on the causal connection between God’s creative acts and the worlds. Yet these causal models may well be implausible, if we hold onto the conventional notion that creatures have causal power. Our only option left, then, seems to be retreating into modal realism and abolishing the need for God’s deliberation. Before the concluding chapter, however, I will spend one chapter arguing that there is no best possible world and the world chosen by God does not have to be better than all other worlds.Item The meaning of illness : a phenomenological approach to the physician/patient relationship.(2011-12-19) Toombs, Sheila Kay, 1943-; Baird, Robert M., 1937-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.It is my purpose in this thesis to explore the "reality" of illness, using philosophical phenomenology as a guide. In particular, I am concerned to show that the experience of illness, rather than representing a shared "reality" between physician and patient, represents in effect two quite distinct "realities" (the meaning of one "reality" being significantly different from the meaning of the other). Philosophical phenomenology focuses on the nature of experience, and particularly upon the manner in which all experience is structured by the activity of consciousness. In so doing phenomenology emphasizes the unique nature of experiencing and particularly the correlation between the perceiver and that which is perceived. Meaning is seen to be a function of the activity of individual consciousness. In the first chapter consideration is given to some basic concepts which are fundamental for phenomenology and a distinction is made between "own world" and "common world." In the second chapter these concepts are shown to provide insights into the nature of the discrepancy between the physician's and the patient's understanding of illness. Consideration is given to the manner in which the separate worlds of the physician and patient are constituted. It is argued that it is through attentional focusing that the sense of illness is made explicit for the individual. An analysis is provided of the manner in which such attentional focusing is determined. In the third chapter consideration is given to the question of how it is possible to construct a shared world of meaning between patient and physician, given the unique nature of experiencing. An eidetic interpretation of illness is proposed and attention is directed towards some ways in which we do, in fact, come to some understanding of the Other. In the final chapter it is suggested that the notion of healing presupposes a shared world between physician and patient. A distinction is made between healing and curing disease. It is noted that the manner in which the "reality" of illness is defined directly influences the way in which the end of the patient/physician relationship is defined. It is argued that the end of the patient/ physician relationship is healing and that healing is a mutual act which is accomplished within the context of a shared world between physician and patient.Item Saints and moral philosophy.(2011-12-19) Riley, Sean A.; Beaty, Michael D.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.Starting with William James’s lectures on saintliness in The Varieties of Religious Experience, twentieth and twenty-first century moral philosophers have attempted to understand the relationship between moral philosophy and Christian saints. James sees the saints as exemplars of creative love, who draw their loving capacity from their relationship to the divine and whose pragmatic value derives from their melioration of the world. James believes that the saints are imitable and that the world would be better if everyone strived to be like them. I argue that though James’s attempt to see the saints as exemplars of demand-satisfaction consequentialism fails, his rich account of saintliness is pregnant with insights that later philosophers develop in service of their own non- consequentialist moral theories. With the exception of J. O. Urmson’s utilization of the saints to argue for supererogation in moral theory, philosophical discussion of saintliness dwindle until Susan Wolf astonishingly argues in her “Moral Saints” that saints (as construed by Utilitarian and Kantian moral theory) are ugly, boring, and unattractive. Robert Adams’s response to Wolf in “Saints” exposes the problem with reducing saintliness to moral exemplarity and neglecting the religious dimension. Adams argues that the saints are good insofar as they faithfully resemble God, display the virtues of the allies of God, and obey God’s callings and commands. Like James, Adams rightly connects the moral goodness of the saints to their relationship with the divine. I endorse Adams’s key insights but also indicate deficiencies in his account. Linda Zagzebski argues that the saints are morally good because they share God’s motives. Though her account of the virtues of the saints improves upon a lacuna in Adams’s account, I argue that it remains deficient in important ways. I then develop my own creative account of saintliness that draws on insights from the role-centered moral theory of J. L. A. Garcia and Sarah Harper and the moral philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and Alasdair MacIntyre. I argue that the saints can best be characterized as the friends of God and that doing so illuminates both the religious and moral aspects of saintliness.Item Toward a richer account of human rights in Christian moral theory : from Wolterstorff and Hauerwas to Wojtyla.(2012-08-08) Schwartz, Joel Aric.; Kruschwitz, Robert B.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.The role of human rights is disputed in Christian moral theory. When human rights are discussed, it is common to find that a problematic understanding of the human agent is assumed in those discussions, one that understands the agent motivated strictly by belief and accompanying desires. This connection is reflected in the work of Christian thinkers Nicholas Wolterstorff and Stanley Hauerwas. While they take opposing views of the value of human rights in Christian moral theory, both see a connection between this understanding of the human agent and human rights. An alternate understanding of the human agent focuses on developing perceptions and proper valuation of the good. Karol Wojtyla, who became Pope John Paul II, expresses an understanding of human dignity and perfectionism in his personalism that results in this alternate understanding of the human agent. When using this different understanding of the human agent, we can discover a richer account of human rights, an account that encourages us not only to do actions that typically reflect a respect for the dignity of human persons, but to actually cultivate appreciation for that dignity. Two oft-‐neglect characteristics of human rights are highlighted in the final chapter: a Wojtylian principle of correlatives and a commitment to completion of the human person, which are suggested by the perfectionism in Wojtyla’s personalism. Both of these characteristics of human rights reflect this alternate understanding of human agency, moving us toward both perceiving and valuing the human dignity in ourselves and one another in a meaningful way.
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