Department of Philosophy

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A politics for human flourishing.
(August 2022) Rusch, Benjamin D., 1991-; Haldane, John.
I argue that given the truth of an Aristotelian picture of human flourishing and the view that flourishing should be the aim of politics, a series of proposals should be adopted to promote more localized centers of social and economic life while still allowing for higher levels of political organization where it is beneficial. The unifying core of these proposals is that we can effectively adapt the liberal State’s way of regulating the relationship between individuals, which recognizes individual rights and responsibilities, and apply it instead to the relationship between local communities. Mine is not a liberal theory per se, but it learns from the liberal tradition and finds an Aristotelian justification for certain liberal institutions. I then show how this local-first model of governance may be used to promote human flourishing in the workplace, in education, and in other areas of life through responsible urban planning and use of technology.
A relational view of time.
(2016-07-06) Padgett, Daniel.; Pruss, Alexander R.
This dissertation is a defense of an Aristotelian, relational view of time. The Aristotelian holds that there are both fundamental and derivative entities. The relationalist maintains that time is not one of the fundamental entities but instead depends on, and is derived from, fundamental entities that change. In chapter one I discuss what, exactly, a view of time must take a stance on in order to be complete. This discussion results in a taxonomy for different views of time. With this taxonomy in mind, I give a selective survey to the history of the philosophy of time, paying particular attention to the views of Aristotle and Leibniz, of which my view is a successor. In chapter two I lay the groundwork of an Aristotelian ontology. In particular, I discuss how certain kinds of entities are grounded by fundamental entities. This plays a key role in motivating the claim that times are derivative entities. Chapter three is an exposition of common challenges and objections to relationalism. In this chapter we see how contemporary views of physics have factored into the debates in the philosophy of time. The answer to these challenges and objections comes in chapter four, in which I offer my view of time. While my view is a descendant of those of Aristotle and Leibniz, I make use of A.N. Prior's work on world states to state my view. After presenting my view, I answer the challenges and objections from chapter three and place my view within the taxonomy presented in chapter one. The final two chapters address views that are competitors to mine, considering first kindred versions of relationalism, and then arguing against substantialism, the view that time (or spacetime) is a fundamental entity. Substantivalism is the main rival to relationalism, and it comes in several forms. After arguing that not all versions of substantivalism are equal, I make my case against the most plausible form of substantivalism, which says that the only fundamental entity is spacetime.
A Thomistic principle of virtue individuation.
(2018-10-16) Beary, Alina A., 1978-; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-
In this dissertation, I aim to accomplish two goals. The first goal is to draw contemporary moral philosophers' attention to the need for a principal approach to virtue individuation. When we individuate virtues, we answer questions about the number of human virtues that exist and the ways in which they differ from one another. Most contemporary moral philosophers answer these questions in a haphazard way -- a practice that is in no small way responsible for the chaotic and cacophonous state of contemporary virtue ethics. I spend the second chapter developing a case for a principled approach to virtue individuation and laying out the desiderata for such a principle. I suggest that whatever criterion of individuation we adopt, it should be flexible yet parsimonious, so as to respect and preserve the diversity within the virtues. Moreover, our criterion must connect to our foundational beliefs about human nature and the nature of virtues in a non-trivial way. Having established the desiderata for a criterion of virtue individuation, I move to my second goal. This goal is to articulate Aquinas's approach to virtue individuation as a model for the way in which one might go about articulating one's own criterion. I argue that Aquinas individuates virtues based on their subject, their object, and their mode, and that this approach is an organic product of Aquinas's metaphysics of human nature. Accordingly, I dedicate the third chapter to sketching the relevant aspects of Aquinas's moral psychology and to situating Aquinas's account of habitus -- which is commonly translated into English as "habit" or "disposition" and of which virtue is a species -- within his moral psychology. The fourth chapter lays out Aquinas's account of virtues, paying special attention to the questions of virtue's subject, object, and mode. It also maps out the conceptual space -- the taxonomy of virtues -- that individual virtues may inhabit. With the conceptual apparatus thus established, in chapter five I explicated the Thomistic principle of virtue individuation. I demonstrate and test Aquinas's method by examining the virtues of generosity and magnificence, infused and acquired temperance, and, finally, a contemporary case of anger-regulating virtues.
Animals now and then.
(2018-01-12) Thornton, Allison Krile, 1988-; Pruss, Alexander R.
One aim of this dissertation is to remove ambiguities that have impeded a clear discussion and adequate evaluation of animalism. To that end I develop a taxonomy of different varieties of animalism and argue that there are substantive differences between them. In earlier debates about animalism, the previously elided distinctions that my taxonomy makes clear create unnecessary confusion and disagreement. My taxonomy resolves some of that confusion and provides the parties to the debate with a conceptual framework for importantly distinct accounts of personal identity. I also evaluate animalist arguments in light of the distinctions my taxonomy tracks. Specifically I identify which arguments support which varieties of animalism. The most popular varieties, I argue, are critically under-supported. All rely on a tacit presupposition that ‘animal’ is a natural kind term or a substance sortal, a supposition that animalists are under some pressure to reject. Thus, my evaluation prompts a refocusing of the standard defenses of animalism to prioritize defending the tacit presupposition. Finally, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from two objections: first, from the objection that if animalism is true, then human persons cannot survive death, or at least they cannot exist in an intermediate, disembodied state between their deaths and resurrections (if indeed they are to be resurrected). I do this by arguing that given hylomorphism, animals can become immaterial, and that this is less an affront to intuition and mereology than it might seem. Second, I defend a hylomorphic variety of animalism from the objection that if it is true, we are not the primary thinkers of our thoughts. The criticism is that if hylomorphism can solve certain puzzles (for example, the problem of temporary intrinsics), the resolving of which is one of the main points in hylomorphism’s favor, the view implies that our contingent mental properties primarily characterize something other than us. I argue that this criticism turns on a misunderstanding of how the hylomorphism at stake solves the relevant puzzles and that it can do so without major modification.
Appreciation : its nature and role in virtue ethical moral psychology and dialectical moral agency.
(2013-09-16) Carson, Nathan Paul.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
This dissertation is focused on appreciation and its role in virtue ethical psychology and moral agency. While appreciation is a central concept in aesthetics, I argue that it still needs to play a deeper and more precise role in virtue ethical discussions of moral understanding, experience, and agency. Overall, I contend that close examination of appreciation opens up a compelling dialectical picture of moral agency that is phenomenologically realistic, narratively unified, progressively unfolding and, ideally, marked by wholehearted engagement with morally significant features of reality. In chapter one I clarify the nature of appreciation, arguing (among other things) that appreciation does not always involve pleasure, sometimes displays minimal understanding, and is often an unfolding activity. Overall, I suggest that there are three broad, sometimes incompatible but often overlapping types of appreciation: (1) phenomenal-affective experience, (2) engaged evaluative understanding, and (3) the activity of evaluative attention. I argue that evaluative attention holds particular promise as a unitive principle for a dialectically unfolding conception of appreciative moral agency. In chapter two I import these distinctions into virtue ethics, and argue that through greater clarity and liberality about appreciation, we can identify one type that is fundamental to the moral life, clarify the types that express virtue, and better articulate the relationship between appreciation(s) and ethical wisdom. In chapter three I challenge Talbot Brewer’s Neo-Aristotelian view that virtuous activity appreciation involves full motivational harmony with the activity and supervening pleasure taken in it. A thorough critique of Brewer’s view, partly through cases of appreciative motivational conflict and emotional pain, opens us toward a more realistic and broadly applicable notion of unfolding appreciation as responsively plural, and closely allied with thoughtful evaluative attention. This conception of virtuous appreciating also suggests a new, concerned engagement understanding of wholehearted agency. Finally, in chapter four I examine Iris Murdoch’s notion of moral attention, and develop it as the appreciative activity of evaluative attention that unites developmental appreciative agency. Moving beyond Murdoch, I then articulate the basic elements of such dialectical appreciation as genuinely interactive, perennially unfinished, responsively plural, and a source of formal and personal unity.
Aretaic exemplars : a mixed-methods approach to character education.
(2020-02-26) Little, Sabrina B., 1986-; Evans, C. Stephen.
Virtue education is often framed in the philosophy literature as consisting of a number of discrete tactics, such as virtue-labeling, exemplar exposure, and nudging, with little regard for the level of maturity of the learner. This is a problem because age, life experiences, and growth in emotional and intellectual maturity impact how we respond to moral instruction. Furthermore, in the current virtue education literature, we lack a coherent narrative for how to advance a learner from natural character to moral virtue, developing the learner’s moral agency along the way. Ideally, virtue education tactics should build on one another over time. They should of course be age-appropriate, but they should also actively mature the learner, inviting her to rationally participate in her own habituation so that she becomes the sort of person who can choose well for herself. The goal of this project is to propose a developmental sequence for one particular avenue of moral education—learning about and being motivated to acquire virtues by way of aretaic exemplars. In part, this is a moral emotions project on admiration. I examine admiration’s elicitors and action-tendencies, as well as the ways in which our admiration can err, such as by mistaking qualities like charisma and popularity for moral excellences. A key focus of this project is addressing the practical question of how we might mature admiration over the course of moral development, to move a learner from admiration to virtue. Briefly, my solution draws on the classical tradition, which moves a learner through various stages—grammar (virtue concepts), logic (discursive reasoning about moral motivations and reasons for action), and rhetoric (post-deliberative action). I address how this structure, accompanied by a number of imitative practices, offers a productive pedagogical sequence for how to move a learner from admiration to moral virtue.
Aristotelianism and liberalism : toward a rapprochement.
(2022-01-21) Paddock, Caroline, 1984-; Haldane, John.
In this dissertation I offer an Aristotelian approach to remedying ambiguities and inconsistencies that have in recent years undermined and weakened liberal politics and theory. To this end, I offer five sketches of problems or puzzles internal to the liberal tradition, clarify key concepts that the liberal tradition inherited from Aristotle, and then argue for a way forward that should be amenable to both liberals and Aristotelians. I begin with two theoretical chapters having to do with the common good and its relationship to justice. The main issues are what the common good is (Chapter Two,) and which members of society should be considered as equals with regards to it (Chapter Three). After arguing that justice is constitutive of, not merely a means to, the common good, and that both Aristotelians and liberals should recognize that all human members of society are equal with regards to it, I move on to three more applied chapters. First, I argue that Aristotelians and liberals can and should agree on the truth of Mill’s harm principle, given the Aristotelian dictum that justice is always interpersonal. This rules out legal moralism and legal paternalism, which are traditionally thought to be key pieces of an Aristotelian theory of the government’s educative function. Nevertheless, I show that liberal government does have a legitimate educative function and should carry this out primarily through cardinal virtue education in publicly funded schools. Finally, I consider the contemporary firestorm of disagreement around religious freedom. I argue that when we conceive of religion broadly as a conception of what is of ultimate value, religious freedom becomes a facilitating condition for the availability of practical rationality, a basic aspect of the good life for both Aristotelians and liberals.
Augustine against the academic doctrine, way of life, and use of philosophical writing.
(2013-09-16) Spano, John; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Foley, Michael P., 1970-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
The recent literature on Augustine’s Contra Academicos stresses the philosophical, ethical, and literary elements of the text. However, these works neglect the polemical role of the dialogue as a response to Cicero’s Academic Skepticism. I offer a reading of the first of Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues, the Contra Academicos, that shows how his work can be read as a comprehensive rejection of the Academic philosophical life and doctrine as presented in Cicero’s dialogue, the Academica. To accomplish the goal, the work begins with an analysis of the doctrine in, way of life recommended by, and pedagogical function of Cicero’s Academica. The remaining chapters examine Augustine’s response to each of these elements of Cicero’s work. In Chapter Three I accentuate the philosophical importance of Augustine’s accusation that the Academics practiced a form of esotericism. This accusation, largely neglected, helps underscore Augustine’s rhetorical strategies to cultivate in his students an awareness of philosophical ironic discourse. Chapter Four focuses upon Augustine’s critique of the Academic way of life and the problems that arise from their insistence that all must seek wisdom yet be content with the inevitable impossibility of finding wisdom. Chapters Five and Six examine Augustine’s positive contributions to philosophical writing. Augustine rejects the Academic emphasis that wisdom must be sought by reason alone, suggesting that reason and authority are the twin means for that pursuit. The dual emphasis disallows Augustine from pedagogical uses of deception in the dialogue form, a subtle but important shift from other philosophical uses of this form of writing. By allowing reason and authority to guide one in the pursuit of wisdom, Augustine’s work also steers the reader away from the despair that Academic skepticism can so easily cultivate.
Augustine's solution to the problem of theological fatalism.
(2011-01-05T19:39:33Z) Hemati, Russell Danesh.; Beaty, Michael D.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
In Augustine's dialogue De Libero Arbitrio, his interlocutor Evodius presents an argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, a position we now call "theological fatalism." Since this position is irreconcilable with Augustine's theological commitments, he endeavors to reveal some flaw in Evodius' reasoning. The tradition of modern analytic philosophy has misinterpreted Augustine's arguments against theological fatalism, and as a result, his arguments are underappreciated and often ignored. Augustine is often characterized as accepting a deterministic understanding of free will (called compatibilism), even though the text of De Libero Arbitrio, De Civitate Dei, and several late anti-Pelagian do not support such a view. A more promising interpretation of Augustine's argument is that he endorses a version of free will whereby free actions have alternative possibilities only in reference to causation, but not in reference to foreknowledge. He argues that to exercise free will is to be the cause of what is willed. Thus, no loss of freedom is implied by advance knowledge of a volition, even if that volition has no alternatives relative to foreknowledge. This interpretation embodies a unique way to solve the problem of theological fatalism which has various benefits: it is more harmonious with Augustine's other works, it avoids various paradoxes of God's involvement in human affairs, and it can be combined fruitfully with other methods of solving the fatalism problem to make a comprehensive theory of foreknowledge, providence and free will. A particularly strong objection to Augustine's solution is that an agent cannot be truly free without the ability to do otherwise, regardless of the contents of God's foreknowledge. I argue that the important, intuition-bearing quality of alternative possibilities is the leeway within causality. Since Augustine's solution accepts alternative possibilities relative to causality (in fact giving more reasons to affirm this type of alternative possibilities), he does not compromise robust freedom of the will by rejecting leeway within foreknowledge.
Civic friendship and a value assumption in Rawls.
(2016-03-16) Younger, Peter J., 1977-; Beckwith, Francis.
In the late twentieth century, John Rawls reinvigorated the social contract theory in political philosophy. Previous contract theories could not explain how those bound by the social contract consent to be bound. Rawls argues that we consent to the contract hypothetically. If we would agree, under ideal conditions for resolving questions about the basic structure of society, to a particular social contract, then we actually consent (in the relevant sense) to the contract. With this understanding of consent in mind, Rawls argues in two stages. First, he argues to the original position – arguing that his original position thought experiment represents the ideal conditions for resolving questions about the basic structure of society. Subsequently, Rawls argues from the original position - parties in the original position would agree to two principles of justice which he names justice as fairness. If both arguments are sound, then all of us give our hypothetical consent to the terms of the social contract spelled out by justice as fairness. This dissertation argues that these arguments cannot both be sound. I approach Rawls’ work with a specific concern – in modern American society, discourse has become increasingly uncivil. This background condition gives rise to inquiry into civic friendship – how citizens might wish their anonymous fellow-citizens well and thus give rise to more amicable social conditions. Rawlsian liberalism helps adapt an Aristotelian conception of civic friendship to modern conditions of the pluralistic nation-state. Yet this conception of civic friendship has certain important limitations. Rawls designs the original position carefully – controversial assumptions may prevent people from acknowledging it as the ideal position, undermining the argument to the original position. But the argument from the original position requires the parties to select principles of justice from among a slate of options. This selection, like all acts, requires some ascription of value by the actor. In Rawls’ arguments, the parties assume that fulfilling the rational desires of persons is choiceworthy. This is inconsistent with the requirement that the original position avoid controversial assumptions. The argument to the original position and the argument from the original position cannot both be sound.
Common sense epistemology : a defense of seemings as evidence.
(2016-04-05) McAllister, Blake.; Kvanvig, Jonathan L.
Starting from an internalist, evidentialist, deontological conception of epistemic justification, this dissertation constitutes a defense of common sense epistemology. Common sense epistemology is a theory of ultimate evidence. At its center is a type of mental state called “seemings”—the kind we possess when something seems true or false. Common sense epistemology maintains, first, that all seemings are evidence for or against their content and, second, that all our ultimate evidence for or against a proposition consists in seemings. The first thesis entails phenomenal conservatism—an increasingly prominent and controversial epistemic principle. Together these theses imply that what stances we’re intellectually permitted to take will ultimately come down to what seems to be the case. Following a short introduction, the groundwork for the project is laid in Chapter Two. Common sense epistemology is presented in detail and situated within a larger epistemic framework. Starting assumptions are made explicit and briefly defended. The significance of the project is highlighted, including for those who reject the starting assumptions. I then begin my defense. The defense of common sense epistemology offered herein is holistic in that I strengthen the metaphysical and historical foundations of the theory in addition to arguing straightforwardly for its truth. In Chapter Three I show how common sense epistemology is a contemporary outworking of epistemic insights contained in the work of Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. In Chapter Four I give one of the most detailed accounts of seemings available and defend their existence. In Chapter Five I present my main argument for common sense epistemology. I begin with a Reidian argument for phenomenal conservatism. After concluding that all seemings are ultimate evidence, I consider what other kinds of mental states might serve in that role. All the likely alternatives are considered and rejected, leaving seemings as the lone candidate. In Chapter Six I respond to the problem of cognitive penetration—an influential objection that arises during my defense of phenomenal conservatism. Together these chapters compose one of the most thorough and sustained defenses of phenomenal conservatism and common sense epistemology in the literature.
The conversion and therapy of desire in Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues.
(2010-06-23T12:17:30Z) Boone, Mark J.; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Foley, Michael P., 1970-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
The philosophical schools of late antiquity commonly diagnosed human unhappiness as rooted in some fundamental disorder in our desires, and offered various therapies or prescriptions for the healing of desire. Among these only the neo-Platonic treatment for desire requires redirecting desire towards an immaterial world. Although Augustine agrees with the neo-Platonists on the need to redirect our desires to an immaterial world, he does not adopt their therapy for desire. Instead he adopts a thoroughly Christian approach to the healing of desire. The conversion of desire results from the Trinitarian God's gracious actions taken to heal our desires. Augustine does not recommend fleeing from the influence of the body, as neo-Platonism encourages, but fleeing to Christ, immersing ourselves in the life of the Church, and practicing the theological virtues. In this dissertation I examine Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues. In Contra Academicos (Against the Academics), Augustine argues that we must vigorously desire wisdom in order to attain it; that we must have hope in the possibility of attaining wisdom; and that our desire for wisdom must be bound in faith to Christ. In De beata vita (On the Happy Life), Augustine argues that the Trinitarian God is the only perennially satisfying object of desire and shows that the pursuit of God is the activity of a prayerful community of believers who are practicing faith, hope, and charity. In De ordine (On Order), Augustine recommends that the reordering of our desires be pursued through a liberal arts education and through Christian morals. In Soliloquia (Soliloquies), Augustine says that we ought to love God and the soul. He also reminds us to submit to Christ's authority and practice faith, hope, and love. After discussing these things, I discuss in a concluding chapter the harmony of love for God and love for human beings, pointing to passages in the dialogues that suggest this harmony.
Cultivating character : spiritual exercises, remedial virtues, and the formation of the heart.
(2016-02-05) West, Ryan D., 1981-; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-
According to philosophical situationists, empirical psychology suggests that most people are not virtuous, and that we should be skeptical about the possibility of cultivating virtue. I argue against the second claim by offering an empirically informed model of character formation. The model begins with ancient formational wisdom emphasizing emotion education, the practice of spiritual exercises, self-monitoring, and willpower, and is confirmed, nuanced, and supplemented by insights from recent empirical psychology. Many ancient philosophers, recent social psychologists, and philosophers of emotion agree that emotions are central to moral cognition. I defend a perceptual account of emotion, and show how this account suggests a practical upshot that empirical psychologists tend not to emphasize, but that the ancients would endorse: emotion education should be a primary focus of character formation. I dilate on this practical point using the remediation of inappropriate anger as a test case. Taking my remedial cues from the Stoic and Christian traditions, I argue that training the emotions through self-monitoring, willpower, and the use of “spiritual exercises”—practices of mind and body whereby one digests the doctrines of one’s philosophical school, so that those doctrines are not matters of mere notional understanding, but actually take up residence in one’s vision of the world—provides hope for meaningful movement in the direction of virtue. The rigorous practice of spiritual exercises involves difficult work. To have much success, the moral trainee will need at least the seeds of what I call “remedial virtues”: character excellences that enable an agent to do the demanding work of re-cultivating her character. The remedial virtues include self-vigilance (a kind of moral watchfulness) and the virtues of willpower (e.g., self-control, courage, perseverance, and patience). I develop empirically informed philosophical analyses of self-vigilance and the virtues of willpower, and offer empirical evidence to support the claim that they can be cultivated. Then I show how the remedial virtues can help us resist temptation, leverage temptation in the interest of further growth in character, and correct for the subtle situational forms of moral interference that situationists emphasize.
Divine choice and natural law : the eudokian ethics of Francis Turretin.
(2008-10-14T15:19:28Z) Bruce, James Elliot, 1974-; Hibbs, Thomas S.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
Francis Turretin (1623–1687) places a threefold scheme of right (ius) within the framework of Thomistic natural law to explain the relationship between the divine will and the moral order. He centers his inquiry on a single question: can God ever dispense with a precept of the moral law? That is, can God temporarily suspend the obligation that a person has to a moral law so that an individual action is not immoral, even though it would be otherwise, if it were not for God’s command? For Turretin, the answer is unequivocally in the negative: God cannot dispense with any of the precepts of the moral law at any time, for any reason. Nevertheless, some laws do change, and Turretin uses divine, natural, and positive rights to explain why this change is possible. Divine right describes the authority and privilege, as well as the duties and obligations, that God has on account of his own nature. Natural right describes those privileges and obligations that God has due to the nature of the things he has chosen to create, and positive right deals with those additional privileges and obligations that arise from divine choice alone. Those laws, or parts of laws, that arise from divine and natural right cannot change. Those laws, or parts of laws, that arise from positive right can change, however. That God cannot change the moral law, or even dispense with it, does not undermine his freedom, because God is internally, and not externally, constrained. In his free choosing, from his eudokia (good pleasure), God is constrained by divine right, from his own nature; by natural right, from the nature of the things he has made; and, by positive right, from whatever additional laws he has chosen to establish. God’s free choice cannot contravene the natural law, yet the natural law is determined by God’s free choice, in so far as the natural law is constituted by the nature of the things God has chosen to create.
Emotion, evaluative perception, and epistemic goods.
(2011-09-14) Pelser, Adam C.; Roberts, Robert Campbell, 1942-; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
In contrast to the widely held view that emotions are obstacles to ideal epistemic functioning, emotions, as evaluative perceptual states, can contribute in significant ways to our achievement of valuable epistemic goods including justified beliefs, understanding, and wisdom. That emotions are evaluative perceptual states – call this the perceptual thesis of emotion – is evidenced by the extent of the structural and functional parallels between emotions and sense perceptions. Emotions, like sense perceptions, can be both original and acquired and are distinct from the sensory inputs that give rise to them; they also resemble sense perceptions in being passive, intentional mental states with propositional content and they are sources of belief, while yet not themselves beliefs. Emotion also functions in parallel ways to sense perception with respect to the achievement of epistemic justification. Emotions, like their sense perceptual analogues, can and do function as justifying reasons or evidence for beliefs – call this the justificatory thesis of emotion. The justificatory thesis of emotion best explains plausible cases of justified beliefs formed on the basis of emotional experience, as well as the fact that we enjoy justification for evaluative beliefs bearing conceptual content indicative of emotional experience. Moreover, the justificatory thesis is not undermined by any of the strongest objections raised against it; namely, that emotions seem too unreliable to justify beliefs, that emotions themselves can be justified, and that we rarely cite emotions as our reasons for believing as we do. In another significant epistemic parallel between emotion and sense perception, emotional experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of value just as sense perceptual experience is necessary for the best and deepest human understanding of the physical world. Emotion as evaluative perception is also essential to our achievement and actualization of wisdom. Wisdom is deep, appreciative ontological understanding of that which is good (i.e., the proper objects of wonder) and it essentially involves virtuous concerns and emotion-dispositions. Indeed, not only is our initial pursuit of wisdom often prompted by an emotional experience (e.g., wonder), wisdom is also partially constituted by and initially exemplified in virtuous emotional perceptions of value.
Epistemic blame : its nature and its norms.
(2016-07-29) Bryant, James Clifton.; Dougherty, Trent
In this dissertation, I investigate our practices of blaming others for failing to believe as they ought to believe. I begin by articulating an account of blame in general, and extend that account to specifically epistemic blame. After considering the relationship between epistemic blame and moral blame, I argue that it is very difficult for us to know whether others are epistemically blameworthy. I conclude by arguing that we have good reasons to expect genuine epistemic blameworthiness to be quite rare, and that this fact justifies a charitable reluctance to blame others epistemically.
Et in pulverem reverteris : a defense of Thomistic hylemorphic anthropology.
(August 2022) Tomaszewski, Christopher M., 1988-; Pruss, Alexander R.
What is the relationship between the human soul and the human body and what does this relationship tell us about the prospects for the survival of the human person in the interim state between death and the General Resurrection? This dissertation is an attempt to shed light upon both of these questions using Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Since animalism about the human person is currently enjoying a great resurgence in popularity, I begin by offering the contemporary animalist reason to adopt Aristotelian animalism by showing that substantial forms can do crucially important work in warding off worries about compositional vagueness that would otherwise threaten the determinate composition and existence of material composites in general, including animals. I then show that human substantial forms are unique by offering an account of intentionality as partial identity between mind and object which rules out materialistic accounts of intentionality. Rounding out the first part of the dissertation, I argue that the substantial form (or soul) of the human person cannot reasonably be construed on Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology to be identical with that human person. Turning to the question of survival, I closely investigate the textual basis for believing that Aquinas rejected survivalism, the view that the human person survives in the interim state between death and the General Resurrection. This involves, among other questions, whether Aquinas’s mereology is compatible with such survival. I argue that Aquinas endorses a mereological principle that is ultimately incompatible with the commitments of Thomistic survivalism. Then, building on Aquinas’s work, I develop three original arguments for corruptionism (the view according to which the human person does not survive in the interim state), one of which is metaphysical and two of which are bioethical. Finally, I conclude with a summary exposition and brief defense of a dozen other promising and original arguments for corruptionism, drawn from premises concerning, among other things, the nature of supposita, of life, of individuation and the role played in it by matter, of accidents, of original sin, and of the General Resurrection itself.
The evidential support relation.
(2012-08-08) Byerly, T. Ryan.; Kvanvig, Jonathan L.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
Evidentialist views in epistemology, like that of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, define epistemic justification at least partially in terms of evidential support. According to these views, a person is justified in believing a proposition p just when her evidence supports p. The subject of this dissertation is the evidential support relation at the heart of these views—viz., the relation which obtains between a person’s evidence e and a proposition p just when e supports p in the sense required by these views. I engage three initially tempting accounts of this relation in terms of meta-attitudes, explanatory relations, and probabilistic relations, finding all three accounts wanting. I then propose a fourth, causal account. My thesis is that evidentialists like Conee and Feldman should find this causal account of the evidential support relation more attractive than the other three kinds of account.
Explanation in metaphysics.
(2011-09-14) Johnson, Daniel M., 1984-; Pruss, Alexander R.; Philosophy.; Baylor University. Dept. of Philosophy.
One of the primary tasks of the philosopher is to explain what it is for something to be the case – what it is for one event (substance, fact) to cause another, what it is for an action to be obligatory, what it is for an object to bear a property, what it is for a proposition to be true necessarily, what it is for a person to know something. This activity of explaining what something is or what it is for something to be the case, of identifying what I call ontological explanations, is of special importance to metaphysics, since the task of metaphysics generally is to get to the bottom of reality. The concept of ontological explanation is usually buried a layer deep in most discussions, however, and theses about it are either presupposed or clothed as claims about other things. In some cases, this leads to confusion and frustration, and in many other cases the discussion could benefit from a long look at ontological explanation even if that look isn't strictly necessary to remedy confusion. My goal is to give ontological explanation that long look, and then use the clarity gained to reinterpret, reorganize, and even make progress on some long-standing disputes in metaphysics. In the first two chapters I examine ontological explanation itself and connect it to a host of important metaphysical issues, including ontological commitment and truthmaker theory. In the third and fourth chapters, I apply the work done in the first two chapters to a pair of important metaphysical arguments that crucially employ infinite regresses of ontological explanations – Bradley's Regress and McTaggart's Paradox.
Fallow season : depression and its forebears.
(2020-06-22) McAllister, Derek Layne, 1987-; Evans, C. Stephen.
This dissertation is part history, part analysis. It surveys prima facie historical antecedents to our current clinical concept of depression—a chapter each on acedia, tristitia, noche oscura, melancholia, and Tungsindighed. The analytic portion compares and contrasts each historical condition with depression, examining symptoms, etiology, historical context, and more. As it turns out, many, if not all, of these historical conditions can present with or essentially have some kind of spiritual etiology—unlike depression, which is often seen as a pathological psychiatric condition. More than a mere historical recounting, however, this dissertation also engages critically with the contemporary literature on depression and offers strategies for incorporating the “old” forgotten wisdom with the “new” discipline of psychiatry. This dissertation thus brings together the history of philosophy, philosophy of religion, virtue ethics, and philosophy of psychology and psychiatry (especially mental health), featuring themes from Thomas Aquinas, Søren Kierkegaard, and the Desert Fathers, among others.

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